Literary Anthropology and the Case Against Science Author(s): S. P.

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LITERARY ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE CASE AGAINST SCIENCE

S.P. REYNA

University of New Hampshire

This article investigates questions:haveliterary two anthropologists offered telling critiques mode of knowing? is suggested It morepowerful, of science; and havetheyproposedanother, nor of thatneither hermeneutical literary anthropologists, philosophers, philosophers science offered have constructed arguments thatcompel the rejection science. 'Thick description', of as an alternative science,is shown to exhibit of to properties gossip.Thus the articleresponds to bothquestionsin the negative and, in conclusion,proposesthatthe literary anthropological approachamountsto a doctrineof Panglossiannihilism.

Literary anthropology arose in the late 1970s and 1980s. Most would agree thatmajorfigures thisprojecthave been thecontributors the influential in to text Writing culture: poetics politics ethnography the and of (Clifford& Marcus 1986), includingJames Clifford (1988), VincentCrapanzano (1992), George Marcus and Michael Fischer(1986), Paul Rabinow (1977), Renato Rosaldo (1989), and StevenTyler(1987). These gentlemen were in certainways enabled by Clifford Geertz,whose collectedessaysin The interpretation ofcultures (1973) and Local knowledge (1983) became something a Vulgate.A central of canon of theseessayswas thatbecause people's cultureis like 'an ensemble of texts' (Geertz 1973: 452), culturalanalysismust proceed as if it were the text'(1973: 448).1 'penetrating' 'literary Clifford claims thatliterary 'draw on recentdevelopments anthropologists in the fields of textualcriticism, culturalanalysis,semiotics,hermeneutic and (1986: 4). These diverse'developments' have philosophy, psychoanalysis' which makesliterary takena postmodern believethemturn, anthropologists in selves to be a vanguardof postmodernism anthropology. Because 'postmodern'has been definedas 'incredulity towardmetanarratives' (Lyotard 1984: xxiv), and because science is a vast epistemological of metanarrative the modernstory the storiesof how people know - it is thatmanyliterary for not surprising anthropologists repudiate science.Tyler, world' world is a post scientific example,announces that'the postmodern (1987: 211), one in which 'scientific thoughtis now an archaic mode of consciousnesssurviving a while yetin a degradedform'(1987: 200). This for

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is is the topicof thisarticle. How appropriate it to rejectscienceas degraded? Before proceeding,however,it mightbe useful to have some idea of the natureof science. Approach The view of science I shall presentis influencedby RichardMiller's postan Fact positivist and method (1987). I beginbyoffering opinion about art.Art, is imaginative representation experience. of among otherthings, a creative, experiScience is an art.Like otherartformsit is a mannerof representing is Two goals of the art of ence. The experienceit represents thatof reality. how and whyreality constituted it is, and to is as science are to understand is Prachow well it is known how and why reality constituted. understand to of goal involveexplanation, ticesthatcontribute theattainment the former to goal involvevalidation.At its most while those thatcontribute the latter and validationof explanations, concerning elementalscience is explanation, reality. is and there extremely Wherethereis debate, lively debate,is overthenature of explanationand validation.For example, some believe that Hempel's law model (hereafter D-N) is the onlyform deductive-nomothetic covering of explanation,even though Hempel himselfbelieved there to be other such as probabilistic (1966: 54-9).2 Certaincharacteristics forms, explanation of explanation and validationare discussedbelow. conof Explanationinvolvesthe formulation sentences,or propositions, tainingconceptsthatare relatedto each other.For example,one mightstate that'the more a personoccupies a prestige a proposition position,thegreater This propositionconsists of two that person's appearance of objectivity'. thatexhibita positive concepts,'prestigious persons'and 'aura of objectivity' thatare highin abstracrelationship betweeneach other.Sets of propositions It thatare tion and generality maybe said to be theories. is such propositions low thatare relatively in abstractermedlaws. Sets of propositions generally or tionand generality generalizations hypotheses. maybe said to be empirical The relatedconceptsin the sentencesof theories, empiricalgeneralizations is of A are and hypotheses representations how and why reality constituted. few laws can cover (i.e. represent) value of explanationis thata relatively enormousrealmsof reality. of different It is through practices validationthatthe accuracyof explanation is tested.3It should be understoodthat the validationthat occurs in which means thatthe typeof truth arrived is at science is a relative validation, an approximate truth(Miller 1987: 177).4 An explanation may be said to be if trueand validatedrelativeto otherexisting explanations it approximately and greaterrelative conformsto the norms of simplicity, correspondence, if A to exhibitssimplicity it has been demonstrated correspondence. theory thanitsrivals(Hempel 1966: 40-1). Parsimony refers be more parsimonious between the concepts,as to the number of conceptsand the relationships of and The well as to the complexity theserelationships conceptsin a theory.

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and the fewer conceptsand relationships the less theircomplexity, greater the the theory's parsimony. A theoryconformsto a norm of correspondenceif the predictionsor retrodictions formulated'on the basis of the theoryare in fact fulfilled' (Kaplan 1964: 313). The concepts and the relationships between the concepts in a theoryassertthatsomething will, or did, go on in reality. These assertionsare predictions retrodictions. or Observationsare experiencesof what does, or did, go on. They are the 'facts'.If what is observedto occur correspondsto what is theoretically supposed to occur,then the theory'fits the facts'.The theory not trueifit has been shown not to fitthe facts;it is is not falsified it has been shown on at leastone occasion not to fitthe facts. if obserHowever,the more facts theory in the absence of counterfactual a fits vations,the greater adherenceto the normof correspondence. its The notion of greaterrelativecorrespondence resemblesMiller's (1987) and Feyerabend's(1984) approaches to validation.For both, validation is of neverthatof a singletheory and alwaysthatof alternative explanations the This means thattheories always same realities. are judged againstothertheories. It is a question, therefore, a relativevalidation.A theorywhich of obfewer counterfactual accountsformore observations while encountering is truththanits rivals. thanits alternatives of greater servations approximate the Such relatively means thatit bettersatisfies norm greater verisimilitude of greater relative correspondence. in The view of sciencejust presentedis postpositive at least two senses. First,science is not concernedwith the productionof what is universally of true true,but with the construction what is approximately - explanations thatlastonly untilthe imagination creativity scientists and of construct truer each explanations. Second, the methodsof science are not uniform. Rather, scientific disciplinereliesupon thecreativity imagination itspractitioand of ners to be able to craft its own validation procedures to arrive at approximately trueexplanations. one rejectsscience,one rejectsthe artof If and the of of explaining, validating explanation, the experience reality. Prudentthinkers mightbe persuadedto rejectscience providedthattwo of questions had been answered.The firstof these is whethercriticisms scienceare compelling. The second is whether thereis another, more powerful mode of knowing than science, so that investigators might turn to a thatwould help them to addressreality more adequatelythan replacement has science.If thecriticisms sciencearevalid,thereis reasonto be dubious of about scientific and metanarratives, ifthereis a more powerful epistemology, thenit is appropriate abandon science. to Definitive answersto thesetwo questionsin all realmsof inquiry would be of a gargantuan task. I propose to consider the plausibility certainliterary attacksupon science. Further, certainof these anthropoloanthropologists' gists have suggested that the case against science has been made by and a relativist philosophicalhermeneutics philosophyof science. I shall an explore some of these critiques.Finally, analysiswill be made of 'thick

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description', suggestedby some literary anthropologists be an alternative to to science in sociocultural realms. When Lyotarddefinesthe postmodernas 'incredulity towardmetanarraThis articlesuggeststhatthe tives',he announces a postmodern scepticism. views of literary anthropologists extendwell beyondscepticism a doctrine to thatmightbe termedPanglossiannihilism. Literary anthropology science and Literary anthropologists, thoughemphatic thattheydisapprove science,do of not devote large portionsof theirtextsto arguingthis view. Clifford, for example, in The predicament culture of (1988), offersno explicitarguments of against science.Similarly, readers Crapanzano's Hermes' ddemma Hamlet's and revenge (1992), sub-titledOn theepistemologyinterpretation, of a heading that promisesconsideration questionsof knowing, of discoverthatscience plays no extended role in his arguments.5 review of the literature, A however, suggeststhat there have been three general positions assumed by literary when theyrejectscience. The first these is illustrated of anthropologists by Clifford Geertz. Geertzwas recently interviewed RichardHandler about his life'swork. by At one point the two men discussed what Geertz refers as the 'science to thing'(Handler 1991: 607). Geertz confides,'I neverreallyboughtit, but I entertained idea - even triedto do it once in a while ... but gave it up' the (Handler 1991: 608). In anotherpartof thissame discussion,Geertz says 'I came out of a nonscientific 'and I neverdid buy background', againdivulging thisstuff'(Handler 1991: 607). Geertz gave up science because he did not 'buy' it. No otherreasonsare for the science. The slang expresoffered throughout interview repudiating sion 'to buy' somethingmeans to 'believe' it. Geertz did not believe the 'science thing' and so he rejectedit. This is the firstof the anti-science Science is simplydismissed positionsadvanced by literary anthropologists. withoutgrounds. It mightbe objectedthatthisdismissalof scienceoccurredin an interview which Geertzwas speaking during onlyinformally. Consider,then,the assertion made on the openingpage of Local knowledge therewas a 'growing that recognition'that science 'was not producingthe triumphsof prediction, that control,and testability had so long been promisedin its name' (1983: 3).6 In this case it appearsthatthereis reason to dismiss science. After all, thatsciencewas 'not producing'.Now social therewas 'growing recognition' science may,or may not, have been workingpriorto 1983. However,Local and compellingevidence - in fact,it asmarshallsno systematic knowledge - bearingupon the absence of prediction, controland sembles no evidence for testability a singlestudy. Possibly,when Geertz said that there was 'growing recognition'that he sciencewas 'not producing', was alludingto a body of scholarswho had Yet are made such discoveries. these thinkers not named. Their evidence is

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not presented.So there is no way of assessingwhether,in fact,they had unequivocallydemonstrated Geertz's point. Readers of Local knowledge are led to believethatthere was reasonto rejectscience.However,the reasonfor makingsuch a rejectionis simplyasserted, againwithoutgrounds.7 There is a second anti-science positionthatis illustrated consideration by of and of certainarguments Renato Rosaldo. Rosaldo does appear in Culture a for truth criticize majoraspectof science,itsclaimsto objectivity, he says to that'thisbook arguesthata sea changein culturalstudieshas eroded oncedominantconceptionsof truthand objectivity' (1989: 21). My analysisof of his of Rosaldo's treatment objectivity beginsby presenting understanding the a major actorin debatesover objectivity. Next, it offers substanceof his it over which deviews concerningobjectivity. Finally, presentsthe terrain bates have actuallyswirled in the last four hundred years when scholars consideredquestionsof objectivity introducedthe question Max Weber,at the turnof the twentieth century, to of thepossibility objectivity thesocial sciences.As Mannheimobserved, of which are requisiteto Weberwas quite clear thatthereare 'social conditions the genesis' of values, and thatthese values influenceanalysis(Mannheim 1936: 81). This committed Weberto the beliefthat,'There is no absolutely of "objective"scientific analysis culture... or... of "social phenomena"indeof special and "one-sided"viewpoints'(1968: 85). pendent in Rosaldo is aware that 'Discussions of objectivity the human sciences ritually invokeMax Weberas theirfounding ancestor'(1989: 169). He furtherasserts, 'The Weberiantradition legitimated has researchprograms that in the to clarify world ratherthan attempt, the name of value-free inquiry, changeit' (1989: 172). This statement impliesthat Weber- as founder this of of tradition believed in the possibility value-freeinquiry, which we have just seen was not the case. So, readersshould recognizethatRosaldo does not appreciate complexity Weber'sapproachto objectivity.8 the of Thus they of mightbe on theirtoes concerning own treatment the topic. his Since objectivity neverformally is definedin Culture truth, meaning and its must be inferred fromits usage in the text.At one point Rosaldo asserts, 'Such termsas objectivity, and refer neutrality impartiality to subject positions once endowed with greatinstitutional authority' (1989: 21, emphasisin the and original).The notion of a 'subject position' goes undefinedin Culture to or but truth, it seems to refer a social position,such as thatof a professor a student.Impartiality neutrality used in ways thatsuggestthemto be and are If similarin meaningto objectivity. thisis indeed thecase, thenperhapswhat Rosaldo is implying thatsocial positionswere endowed with objectivity. is For example,thereis theopinion,now in some disrepute, thatprofessors are objective. Later in the textRosaldo announces that 'I have argued thatduringthe classicperiod ... normsof distancednormalizing description gaineda monopoly on objectivity' (1989: 48). His 'classic' period was thatof twentiethThe 'norms' he refersto centuryanthropology prior to postmodernism.

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that style, which he terms'distancednormalizing', were those of a writing the 'prescribed, among otherthings, use of the presenttenseto depictsocial conferred life ... and the assumptionof a certaindistancethatpurportedly resemblesthe first, objectivity' (1989: 48-9). This second usage of objectivity in thatit assertsthata stylemaybe endowed with objectivity. in What Rosaldo seems to be suggesting thesetwo usages is thatobjectivity that can be or of refersto thoughtsand sentiments impartiality neutrality provokedin people by certainsocial positionsor styles.People who accept Thus when the impartiality a person believe in thatperson's credibility. of he Rosaldo analysesobjectivity, is concernedwith the conditionsthatconfer credibility. said ago, FrancisBacon, in Novumorganum, that'the Almostfourcenturies which impart theirown prophuman mind resemblesthoseunevenmirrors and disfigure them' (cited in Durant objects ... and distort ertiesto different were due to 'idols'. The archaic Bacon believed, 1926: 143). Such distortions, term'idols' mightbe glossed as 'biases', and Bacon argued thatthese arose fromdifferent causes. One of the idols was produced by the market-place. Here biases derived'fromthe commerceand associationsof men with one another.For men converseby means of language;but words are imposed of accordingto the understanding the crowd' (cited in Durant 1926: 145). If of the crowd' is understoodto be a precursor the phrase'the understanding of the notionof cultural values,thenBacon's view thatthereare idols of the is thatvalues impose bias. market-place a realization is definedin science as the property a proposition of Objectivity normally reflects phenomenathatexistindependently ... or a methodthat'accurately of our beliefsabout them' (Boyd etal. 1991: 779). Bacon posed the question of whetherobjective knowledge of the world was possible, even though observation. is thought biased,and decided thatit could be achievedthrough with him,and theirdisputations at CambridgePlatonists the timedisagreed mightbe said to have begun moderndebatesover objectivity. contestedthroughout is Whetherobjectivity possible has been vigorously thisdebate to the introduced the twentieth century. Weber,as noted earlier, social sciences. Cunninghamconsidered,and arguedagainst,the pre-1970s groundsa anti-objectivist positions(1973). Hesse (1980) arguedon different and similarposition.Brown,in Observation objectivity (1987), made a case for of even thoughhe acceptedcertainanti-objectivist the possibility objectivity, that objective Greenwood has sought to demonstrate premisses.Recently, are and classification explanation possibleeven thoughactionsand practices and with are sociallyconstituted appearsunfamiliar (1990a: 196). Culture truth these pro- and anti-objectivist positions,for theyare not discussed in the text.9 The followingconclusion may be drawn, given the preceding.When has his Rosaldo informs readersthathe will argue thatobjectivity 'eroded', underhis audience could assume that he is using the normal,scientific and that he is concernedwith an epistemological standingof objectivity;

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reflect can phenomenaindematter, thatof whetherpropositions accurately pendentlyof beliefs about them. This, we have seen, is not the case. He in Rosaldo's topic is social psychological natureand not epistemological. and feelings thatmake something is interested the generation thoughts in of appearcredible,i.e. objective. for Rosaldo has nothingto say about objectivity, the simple reasonthathe positionexhibited is not talking about it.This, then,is a second anti-science one by literary anthropologists, in which it appearsthatthereis a case against science,thoughtheyreallyhave nothingto say because theyare addressing some othertopic. of a Certain pronouncements Tylerand Rabinow and Sullivan illustrate asserts that third anti-science stanceadoptedby literary anthropologists. Tyler of think it as a 'game' (1987: 201) thathas now 'failed' science'spractitioners but which continuesto be played in a 'degraded' state (1987: 200). Let us It to explorethisclaim of degradation. is important realizethatthe textfrom which this assertionis taken containsno analysisthat unambiguouslyand details (1) what is 'degraded'in science; (2) how much it is 'deexplicitly graded'; and (3) what the evidence is for the two previous assertions.In Engel effect, Tyler saysthatscienceis degradedbecause it is. The philosopher of 'is remindsus thatthe fallacy Begging-the-Question to assume the point in dispute' (1981: 106). PresidentCoolidge committedthis fallacyin announcing that 'When large numbers of people are out of work, follows'.Tylerdoes the same when he assertsthatscience is unemployment degraded, because it is. peculiarity Tyler'sposition.He of There is, however, farmore disturbing a emotionallymalign pushes his readersto accept his views by attributing qualitiesto opposingviews. Tylerdoes not want you to accept science,because it is a 'game' which has 'failed' and is 'degraded'. Such a form of argumentation mightbe called thatof deceptiveemotiveemphasis;because it uses words to conveyfeelings about arguments thatone acceptsa conso clusion on emotivegrounds,regardless itsempirical logicalstatus.One of or rejectsdegradedthings like corpsesand science- because theysmell bad. later in the same essay Tylerpursues this same formof argumentation when he characterizes 'scientific rhetoric' 'inappropriate', as 'empty','ridiculous', 'simple-minded', 'absurdity'(1987: 207). This is an argumentby an deceptiveemotiveemphasisthatrelieson what mightbe considereda form of echolalia.This latteris a literary device thatinvolvesrepetition words, of in In or syllables words,to achievean echo effect. thisinstance, repeating by in the shortspace of a singleparagraph pejoratives such as 'ridiculous'and thatscience is 'simple-minded', Tylersets echoingin readers'mindsfeelings not good. However,arguments or thatproceed by begging-the-question by are fallacious(Kaplan 1964).10 deceptiveemotiveemphasis There is an additional of handling science.For examproblemwithTyler's investigation provides ple, in the essayjustconsideredhe saysthata scientific a representation the world,while an ethnography which he contrasts of

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with and greatlyprefersto science - provides an 'evocation of the same on reality'(1987: 200). A few pages further he explainsto readerswhy he announcingthat 'The whole point of evocation to representation, prefers frommimeethnography is than"representing" thatit frees rather "evoking" which entails"objects", rhetoric mode of scientific sis and thatinappropriate ", "ex"verifications", "facts "descriptions", "inductions","generalizations", and like concepts' (1987: 207). Regardlessof the fact "truth", periments", to thatTyleragain begs the question and does not demonstrate readerswhy for what is important the purposeat hand is 'objects',etc.,are inappropriate, reveals. just presented of his understanding science thatthe quotation scienceseeksverification truth. and RudolfCarnap, whether Consider first of interpreter science in the and arguably most influential a logicalpositivist is said in the 1930s, 'If verification half of the twentieth the first century, thena univerof establishment truth understoodas completeand definitive a e.g. sal sentence, a so-calledlaw ..., can neverbe verified, factthathas often (1953: 480). Carnap saysthatby the 1950s it had 'often'been been remarked' truths. There is no did practices not seek to verify made clear thatscientific with the work of Carnap, evidence thatTylerhad, or has, any familiarity Popper (1935), Lewis (1934), or Nagel (1934) which developedthisposition. rhetoric The claim thatthe adequacyof science depends upon a particular might also be questioned. Rhetoricis 'the deliberateexploitationof eloin quence for the persuasiveeffect public speakingor in writing'(Baldick he 1990: 188). In the quotationfromTylercitedearlier, statesthatthereis a "inducrhetoricwhich entails "objects", "facts","descriptions", 'scientific thatresultin the thatactivities ... tions","generalizations"' The contention are and generalizations 'delibinductions of establishment facts, descriptions, 'of eloquence' is nonsensical.The propositionsof an erate' exploitations rhetorical fanfare. However,the withconsiderable inductionmaybe offered canons of induceffect thesestatements of dependsupon whether persuasive applied and not upon their tive or deductivelogic have been appropriately ornamentation. Tylerhas confusedthe communicationof scienrhetorical of tific practices with the practice. Such a representation science is a of misrepresentation it. Tyler Finally,the declarationthat science is mimesis deserves scrutiny. (1987: 26) and in another definesmimesis in one place as 'representations' goes un(1987: 164). Representation place as 'thinkingas representation' defined.However,it is possibleto provideexamplesof common denotataof of the term.A statueof a woman is a representation her,as are poems to her, theoriesof her gender. However, statues, paintingsof her and scientific one poems and theoriesare different fromeach other. paintings, has In short,the conceptof mimesisas representation enormoussubstantivescope, broaderthanthatof science. But Tylersimplyassertsthatscience to relevant science and is a formof mimesis.He adds no otherinformation economics as a partof culture,without This is like defining science alone.

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explaining what it is thatis economics. So Tyler'sreaderslack the informaof tion needed to distinguish theory a woman froma pictureof one. the Tyler'scase againstscience is made by beggingthe question,by arguments thatconvinceby deceptiveemotiveemphasis,and, as has just been shown, or of an by offering understanding science thatis eitherincorrect inexact. Thus Tyler'sarguments directednot at science but at a strawfigure. are of now turnsto Rabinow and Sullivanand theirtreatment objecAttention social a to look tivescience. In the introduction theirInterpretive science: second (1987), they appear to confront science directly. They announce that 'the Nineteenthcentury'sconceptionof logical,cumulativeprogressthrougha undermined'(1987: 4). A purelyobjectivescience ... has been progressively point mightbe made about the subject of Rabinow and Sullivan's deconin struction.The sub-sectionof the introduction which their critique of idea of science is containedis entitled'The deconstruction the positivist of 'idea' of science, science'. Thus what theyare concernedwith is a particular specificallya 'positivist'one. Some equate positivismwith science but, Rather,it is a though the concept is a broad one, this usage is incorrect. particular body of doctrineabout science. Rabinow and Sullivan tell their readersthatwhat theyare exercisedabout is the conceptionby the 'logical of positivists' the 'Comtean ideal' (1987: 10), but theirargumentsare discience. rectedagainsta particular attempt explainand understand to There is a venerablelineageof philosophiesof scienceascendingin generafromthe to tions fromcontemporary postpostivists the logical positivists; to logical positivists Comte and earlierKant; fromKant to Locke and other windingfromBacon back empiricists; fromLocke to Bacon; and eventually to Aristotle the ancientworld. The growthin this lineage has resulted in from later evaluationsof earlierscientific paradigms.Bacon, for example, of encouragedthe forging modernconceptionsof science by railingagainst medieval philosophies of science that relied too much upon Aristotelian deduction. what However, and this is critical, science is science,and not necessarily philosophersmay thinkit to be. This means thatwhile the existenceof of problemswitha particular philosophy science- forexample,logicalpositivism- may implythatthereare difficulties understanding science, these of problems imply nothingnecessarily about the properties science itself This means thatactually of Rabinow and Sullivanoffer criticism science no perse. With this understood,let us explorewhetherRabinow and Sullivan raise cogent questions concerningscience itself when theymake theircase againstthe 'Comtean ideal'. Rabinow and Sullivan debate the 'Comtean ideal' in the fourteenparaidea of science' graphsthat compose the 'Deconstructionof the positivist and begins section."1Their argument can be expressedin six propositions, with fourpropositions about logicalpositivism: 1. Logical positivism had an ideal of a 'unifiedscience' thatincludedthe naturaland human sciences (1987: 10);

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2. 3.

Logical positivism inclinedhuman scientists 'formal to models' (1987: 11); The 'cultural world could not meet thisnorm' (1987: 11);

of 4. The structuralisms Piagetand Levi-Strauss were representatives of thislogicalpositivist 'project'(1987: 11). Then a fifth proposition added specifying problemwiththesestructuralis a isms. This problemis expressedin a quotationwhich Rabinow and Sullivan takefromRicoeur: 5. Structuralism 'seals its formalizedlanguage offfromdiscourse,and therefore fromthe human world' (Ricoeur, in Rabinow & Sullivan 1987: 12). Finally, fromthe fifth proposition, Rabinow and Sullivandraw a sixthconwhich is thatstructuralism is: clusion, 6. A highpriceindeed forthe science of man' (1987: 12-13). The crux of theirposition appears to be thatstructuralism does not seem able to accountforcertaintypesof phenomena,those involving cultural the world.Whether thisis correct debatable.However,even ifitwere true,the is conclusionof theirargument does not seem to followfromtheirpremisses. In effect, they contend that because a particular brand of science cannot of accountforcertain the types phenomena,it followsthatlogicalpositivism, Comtean ideal, and science are 'undermined'.However,thereis nothingin theirfirst fivepremissesthatwarrants such a conclusion. whetheror not a particular science is successfulis irrelevant to Further, are To whetheror not philosophiesof science or science itself correct. insist that does not accountfor upon thisis like asserting because Ptolemaictheory motion, logical positivism, positivismand science are no longer planetary credible. Such a position is based on a fractured logic. The inappropriate the logics,the question begging, deceptiveemotiveemphasesand the fuzzy strawfigure argumentsof Tyler,Rabinow, and Sullivan constitutea third, This is one in which - as anti-science positionof theliterary anthropologists. opposed to the two previouspositions- thereare actual assaultson science. However,theyare specious. have not made a cogent case against Bluntlyput, literary anthropologists to science. However, theirworks include references certainhermeneutic and philosophersof science, such as philosophers,such as Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn, who have commentedupon science and have perhapspurof sued a more vigorousprosecution the case againstscience. So it is to the thatattention now turns. hermeneutic philosophers and Hermeneuticists science
'no one would dream of puttingin doubt the immanentcriteriaof what we call scientific knowledge' (Gadamer 1987:111-12).

have adopted vis-a'-vis Among the different positions that hermeneuticists science, threestand out, none of which is too menacing.In fact,the first

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is position,farfromattacking science,insiststhatinterpretation a variantof science. This view,of course, is thatof Wilhelm Dilthey, who believed that interpretation performed the human sciences and, as is communiwas by thatthe 'The human sciences form cated by the titleof one of his chapters, an independent whole alongsidethe natural sciences' (1989: 56). This stanceis also thatofJurgen characterized a Habermas. His project, as 'struggle the soul of science' (Wellmer1974: 53), formulated theory for a of in 'cognitiveinterests' Knowledge humaninterests and (1972). These interests, of accordingto Held, 'give rise to the conditionsfor the possibility three sciences: the empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, the critical' the and (1980: 255-6). Habermas does dislikepositivism. However, it should be reis no memberedthatpositivism not science,and thereis certainly insistence in Habermas that science is 'degraded'. Nor is there any demand that it is should deferto hermeneutics, the latter but one of people's scientific for interests. is The doctrinethatinterpretation a formof science has been arguedalso in the literary world by Hirsch. In Validity interpretation in (1967), Hirsch set himselfthe task of demonstrating that 'the much advertisedcleavage bein tween thinking the sciences and the humanitiesdoes not exist' (1967: 264). This was because 'The hypothetico-deductive process is fundamental to both of them' (1967: 264). Hirsch accepted the 'hypothetico-deductive' method; and he believed thathe had used it, in the words of Madison, to establish'the basis of a science of interpretation' (1988: 3). A second positionthathermeneuticists have advancedconcerningscience is the oppositeof the first, thatscienceis a formof interpretation. i.e. Such a thesisis entertained Gadamer in Truth method and by (1975), or at least this seems to have been his intentwhen he said that 'Understandingmust be conceivedas a partof theprocessof comingintobeing of meaning, which in the significance all statements those of artand those of everything of else that has been transmitted is formedand made complete' (1975: 146). I interpret phrase'everything the else' to includescience.Thus, science,along with 'everything else', is partof a dynamicof 'coming' into understanding. Gadamerhopes, then,to subsume sciencewithininterpretation. However, Gadamer intendedby doing this 'not so according to one commentator, much to attackscience as to defendhistory, and otherformsof humane art knowledge'(Weinsheimer 1985: 26). This explainswhy he is carefulto informhis readersthatscienceoffers 'certainty' a (1975: 446), and that'no one would dream of puttingin doubt the immanentcriteriaof what we call scientific knowledge' (1987: 112). 'WhatGadamer appears to mean by the 'immanentcriteria' science are the canons of scientific of methodologies.12 thatGadamer devoted littleeffort However,Weinsheimer (1985) reports to worksof science or thoseof philosophers science,so that either of digesting his ability to is these'immanent criteria' limited. Gadamer actually understand does suggest'that... the use of scientific methodsdoes not suffice guarto antee truth'(1975: 446). Though he is quick to add immediately that'This

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does not mean a diminutionof their scientific quality' (1975: 446). Of view to course,as alreadynoted in our discussionof Tyler, was a similar this thatheld by the logical positivists, suggesting at least with regardto the of questionof the possibility truth thatGadamer'spositionresembledthat of the foremost advocatesof science. in continental Attention now turnsto theAmericanpragmatist the largely In hermeneutical community, RichardRorty. a major evaluationof Rorty's work,TaylorsuggestedthatRortyhas argued 'a new thesisof the unityof science', to wit that'all sciences are equally hermeneutic'(1980: 46). Rorty, at least in 1980, accepted thisconstruction his position (1980: 39). This of thatscience is acceptancemeantthathe, too, acceptedGadamer'scontention a formof interpretation. Rortyhas said some contentiousthingsabout 'a demise of foundational in and epistemology' Philosophy themirror nature of (1979: 311), and because was readby manyto mean 'science',itwas believedthatRorty 'epistemology' had arguedin favourof a 'demise' of science.This was not the case. Rorty's opponentswere, as he himselfstates,realistphilosophers who advocateda 'representationalist problematic' (1991: 12). Further, close readingof Philosophy and themirror nature of suggests,as Roy Bhaskar observes,that Rorty actuallyaccepted a Hempelian version of logical positivism(1990: 199). methodolBhaskarshows in additionthatRortybelievedthatthisscientific of ogy was 'in order and correct'and to be 'compatiblewith the possibility Geisteswissenschaften' 197).13 In short,Rorty believes that 'there is (1990: to nothing wrongwithscience,thereis onlysomething wrongwithattempts of divinizeit,theattempt characteristic realistic philosophy'(Rorty1991: 34). have concernThere is a third pointofview thathermeneuticists entertained and It betweeninterpretation explanation. acknowledges ing the relationship thatthereare two different modes of knowing, rejectstheview thatthere but is any 'epistemologicaldichotomy' between the two (Strasser 1985: 31). it proRather, insiststhattheyare interrelated. Perhapsthe most influential is Paul Ricoeur, who communicated it to an ponent of this view audience in the early1970s in his essay 'The model of the English-speaking between explanationand text' (1971).14 Ricoeur expressesthe relationship as thatthe 'statusof hermeneutics interpretation one of a 'dialectic',insisting is thatdefinedby the verydialecticbetweenthesetwo attitudes' (1981: 36), and hermeneutic i.e. those of scientific explanation understanding. Ricoeur's positionas one thatcould not Rabinow and Sullivan represent has frompositivist be 'farther orthodoxy'(1987: 9). Ricoeur certainly little in interest positivism;however,Rabinow and Sullivan seem unaware that of with an appreciation science. Ricoeur, such a positionis not incompatible in as his and forexample,characterized efforts Hermeneutics thehunansciences beto attempting 'take anotherstep in the directionof this reconciliation Ricoeur saysthat and interpretation' tweenexplanation (1981: 161). Further, one of the 'epistemologicalconcerns of hermeneutics'is to be 'scientific' (1981: 44).

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and sciences suggeststhatRicoeur had A readingof Hermeneutics thehuman not done extensivereading in the sciences; that he had done almost no readingin the postpositivist philosophyof sciencewhich had been developcould be that ing rapidly since the 1960s; and, finally, he hoped hermeneutics elevatedto the 'status'of a science (1981: 44). Thus, even thoughRicoeur in about science,he was interested 'reconwas not especially knowledgeable and in makinghermeneutics ciliation'betweenthe two modes of knowing, 'scientific'. The following remarks seem pertinent thejust consideredphilosophers to of interpretation. First,when theyconsider science, it is generallynot so with hermeneutical much to invalidate as to place it in some relationship it analyses.Second, theydo not appeardeeplygroundedin eitherscienceor the of observations, philosophy science.Third,perhapsbecause of thepreceding of all are respectful science. Rabinow and Sullivan have said that 'the philosophersof interpretation have been important figuresin the undermining'of the 'Comtean ideal' and (1987: 10). The 'Comtean ideal' was, ofcourse,positivistic, to thedegree thatpositivism assertedthatthe onlyvalid formof knowledgewas scientific, thatthisis incorrect.15 However, the hermeneuticists have soughtto suggest of withan acceptance science.After as Gadamer all, such a view is compatible of in said, 'no one would dreamof putting doubt the immanentcriteria ... scientific knowledge'. The relativists science and
'science can stand on its own two feet' (Feyerabend 1984: viii).

The most cogentevaluationof science has been thatof a group of philosoand Kuhn - called phersof science - includingDuhem, Quine, Feyerabend of 'relativists' (Hesse 1980).16An understanding thiscritiquerequiresfamiliin withpositivism, withcertain of arity specifics whatwas rejected positivism to This by the relativists, and, finally, with a recentalternative relativism. alternative position- advancedin diverseformsby Glymour(1980), Miller (1987), Harre (1986), Suppe (1989), Dretske (1969), Salmon (1989) and Ziman (1978) - mightbe called scientific realism(Boyd etal. 1991: 780).17 Before proceeding,however,two points should be clear. The relativists have been opposed to a particularscientific paradigm,logical positivism. 'a However, theyfurther presumethatif it were corrected, science' would bloom that'is one of the most wonderfulinventions the human mind' of (Feyerabend1984: 4). Positivism,as formulated Comte, was the doctrinethat the central by methodologicalnotions,especiallythose of explanationand confirmation, could be applied 'accordingto rules thatare the same for all sciences and in historical periods'(Miller 1987: 1). The dominantschool of positivism the halfof the twentieth Centralto logical first century was logicalpositivism.18 was the tenetthatobservation providea neutral, objective, can i.e. positivism Kuhn and Feyerabend 'rejectedthisview' (Suppe means of evaluating theory.

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were complex and involved 1989: 301). Their arguments againstobjectivity by judgements about whethertheorycan be confirmed factsand whether by thanothers. one theory can be shown to be better supported observation Below I explicateaspectsof the relativist anti-objectivism, then present and certainrealistcounter-arguments theirposition. to objectivity based upon is Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend's (1984) case against of theirinterpretation what is known as the Quine-Duhem thesis (Quine 1953; Duhem 1906). This thesis emphasized the supposedly 'weak' links was betweentheoryand observation. Such frailty assertedto resultbecause theoriesonly make contactwith observation through network connecta of ing,auxiliary theoriesor hypotheses. links The full implicationsof the weak theory/observation will become theory. A apparentfollowingexplicationof the natureof logical positivist involvesboth enormously propositions and oththeory generaland abstract ers thatare less generaland abstract. propositions, oftentermed The former and generalconcepts, laws or explanatory theories, composed of abstract are called theoretical which exhibitrelationships betweeneach other, and terms, in so doing ultimately should be between specifywhat the relationships are called exploratory eventsin the world. The latter propositions variously or auxiliary rules (Suppe theoriesor hypotheses, well as correspondence as are propositions called observa1977: 77).19 Certainconceptsin theselatter tional terms. Theoretical terms are so abstract as to have no direct observational referents. to observablerefObservational termsrefer directly erents.Correspondencerulesand connecting auxiliary or hypotheses specify which observationaltermswill qualifyas being 'about' which theoretical comes about because exploraterms.The logical partof 'logical' positivism or theoriesor hypotheses deduced froman explanatory are tory, auxiliary, terms are said to based in good measure upon which theoretical theory, terms. represent which observational thatsuch a theoryfollowsa deCarl Hempel, as earliernoted,suggested formof explanation(1966). This explanationincludes ductive-nomological what is to be explained, explanandum as well as the (E), proposition(s)stating containsan the thosethatdo the explaining, explanans (Ln). The explanandum There are two typesof propositionsin the auxiliary theoryor hypothesis. those consistingof explanatory theories,called by Hempel laws explanans: conrules or operational definitions, (Ln), and those called correspondence necting laws with events that may be observed in reality (Cn). In is the deductive-nomological explanation explanandum deduced fromthe exruleswhich compose it.When planans, fromthelaws and correspondence i.e. this occurs, the laws in the explanans may be said to 'cover' what is being in is explainedin the explanandum, the sense thatthe latter logicallyentailed by the former. of Durkheim's theory suicide may be expressedin D-N form.The explanans consists of one covering law and three correspondencerules. The coveringlaw is:

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Li: Deviance is inversely relatedto solidarity. The correspondence rulesare: Cl: Suicide is a formof deviance. C2: Catholicshave highersolidarity have lower solidarity. C3: Protestants in is: The auxiliary hypothesis theexplanandum E: Catholicscommitsuicide less oftenthando Protestants. in If the propositions the preceding correct, are thenthe following syllogism of illustrates D-N explanation suicide: a Li Cl. C2. C3 E therefore, links One is now in a positionto graspwhyobservationaVtheory mightbe thoughtto be weak in such explanation.Duhem and Quine claimed that via such theoriesonly made connexionswith observations the 'network'of and correspondence rules (Duhem 1906: 187; auxiliary theories, hypotheses i.e. Quine 1953: 43). This meanttheybelievedthatan explanatory theory, a fromfalsification the alteration or coveringlaw,can alwaysbe protected by or of rulesemployedin the substitution auxiliary hypotheses correspondence or derivation the falsified of prediction; as Quine put it bluntly, Any statementcan be held true ..., ifwe make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system'(1953: 43). If thisis the case, thenfactscannotconfirm theorules and auxiliary ries,because the correspondence hypotheses can always be alteredto fitthe observations, the facts. i.e. For example,it mightbe the case in postmodernUnited StatesthatProtestantsno longercommit suicide more frequently than Catholics,but that throwthemselves bridgesfarmore oftenthando hermeneutioff positivists cists. Such factswould appear to disprove Durkheim's theoryof suicide. However, Duhem and Quine mightsay thatAll thatneeds to be done to sustain the originalcoveringlaw is to change the auxiliaryhypothesisto "Hermeneuticists commitsuicideless thanpositivists", the lasttwo corand respondence rules to "Hermeneuticists have higher solidarity" and have lower solidarity". When thisis done, Durkheim'slaw again "positivists coversthe facts'. Kuhn and Feyerabendaccepted the Quine-Duhem thesis and suggested thatit had implications objectivity. them the Quine-Duhem thesis for For or meantthatall observations were 'theory-laden' 'theory-informed'. Obserin vationis 'theory-laden' the sense thatwhat a scientist 'sees' is dependent directsthe scientist observe.Durkheimians to upon what an existing theory see devianceeverywhere. So Marxistssee exploitation. a Durkheimianview of civil disturbancesmightbe heavilyladen with observationsof deviant while a Marxist'sview of the same reality rioters, mightbe equally heavily

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This means thattheory of ladenwithobservations oppressedrevolutionaries. makingobjectivity impossible. biases observation, then If the precedingis correct,Kuhn and Feyerabendargued further, observatheories obligedto makedifferent are scientists attached different to Two consequences followfromthisclaim. tionsin supportof theirtheories. to can be confirmed only relative the observations The first thata theory is by has thatapplyto it. The second is thatifeach theory itsown observations theories. which it is evaluated,thenthereis no basis for judging contending contentions appear Theories are, in effect, incommensurable. Such relativist science. to devastate in realists respondedand, However,largely the 1970s and 1980s,scientific refuted as the titleof one of theirworks suggests, soughtto have Relativism (Siegel 1987). Suppe arguesthattheirworkhas been so thoroughthattoday are the relativists but 'influential relics of the history the philosophyof of of science' (1989: 300). The followingbears upon the plausibility Suppe's claim.20 claims are correct, the First,it must be realizedthateven if the relativist for praxis- what scientists actuallydo - are not that implications scientific put it,that as great.The Quine-Duhem thesisseemed to imply, Feyerabend 'theoriescannot be refutedby fact' (1984: 113).21 However, even if this theoriesin assertionis accepted,it does not mean thatone stops evaluating of whether what is observed(the facts)conform what has been said to terms will be observed(the theory). Quine and Duhem both realizedthattheoretical knowledgewas more dependable if supportedby observation, and that the the more it was supportedby fact, more reliableit was. This means that is while such theoretical by knowledgeunsupported observation unreliable, knowledgesupportedby greatbodies of factis far more reliable; and, of the to (Ziman 1978). This impliesthat course,one prefers latter the former the canon of logical even if the Quine-Duhem doctrineis judged correct, the positivism, norm of correspondence i.e. thattheorymust fitthe facts (Kaplan 1964: 313) - stillguides research. it even though competingtheoriesmay be incommensurable, Similarly, that Kuhn or Feyerabend, one stopsusing to does not mean,according either in evidenceto evaluatethem.Feyerabend, fact, actuallysuggestsprocedures fromolder ones. new theorieson the basis of observations forformulating thatbear upon an existing He says thatscientists mightmake observations theory, dividing these observationsinto those which support and those which do not supportthe old theory. Then, on the basis of these facts,a for to searchfora new theory beginswith the capacity account theoretically and facts both the confirming falsifying of the old theory(Feyerabend1984: procedures: 158-9). Three pointsshould be clearifone followsFeyerabend's in critical the evaluationof old and new theories,(2) (1) factsare absolutely and theoriesare commensurablein termsof the numbers of confirming because new theories and (3) therecan be theoretical progress falsifying facts, facts. possess fewerfalseand more supporting

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RecentlyGreenwood, workingwith a notion of a 'developingspiral' of theoriesformulated Enc (1976), has suggested'that thereis something by between fundamentally wrong'withthe relativist 'conceptionof the relation explanatory theoriesand the exploratory theoriesand otherauxiliary hypothesesupon which manyobservations depend' (1990b: 569-70). He has tried and are to show how alternative theoriesare, indeed, testedby observation thuscommensurable. In sum, both relativist and scientific realistparadigmsregardscience as a better. powerfulmode of knowingwhich theyare concernedto understand Further, is farfromclear thatrelativist it doctrines can be sustained.Rather, theirpositionsare claimed to be 'relics'. However,everyone, includingthe relativists, insists thattheories should be supported evidence.In fact, by both and relativists, Feyerabend, his critics, like like Greenwood,suggestmethods on forevaluating alternative theories the basis of observation. is Nowhere in the major textsof literary anthropology therean extended or of the logical positivists, the relativists, the scientificrealists. analysis of doctrinesthat define these There is neitheridentification the different nor is thereconsideration theircogency Literary of approaches, anthropoloof gistshave no idea what the philosophers science have actuallysaid about science.This means that when Tyler saysthatscienceis 'degraded'he does so in ignoranceof Feyerabend's claim that'science can stand on its own two feet'.It is time now to turn to the second part of the analysisof the case alternative science. to againstscience,and to considera literary anthropology Thickdescription
strivefor "thickdescription"'(Ohnuki-Tierney1990: 2). 'anthropologists

The object of studyin literary anthropology 'the web of language,symbol is and institutions constitutes that signification' (Rabinow & Sullivan 1979: 4). thisweb is a centraltaskof analysis, and has been so since Understanding Geertz declared in The interpretation ofcultures: 'Believingwith Max Weber, thatman is an animal suspendedin webs of significance I takecultureto ... be those webs' (1973: 5). This declaration posed the question of how one studiesculture, and itwas in responseto thisthatGeertzfirst formulated his views concerning thickdescription. This he did in the introductory essayto Theinterpretation ofcultures when he proposedthat'theanalysis culture of' was 'interpretive' (1973: 5), thatanthroand that'ethnography pologistsanalyzeculturethrough ethnography, finally is thickdescription' (1973: 9-10). These statements equate thickdescription with interpretation, which poses three questions. What preciselyis thick and is description, it in anyway problematic, to what extentis itWeberian? of Geertz says it is a 'sortingout of structures signification' (1973: 9), a to which to him 'is like trying read (in the sense of "construct readingof") a manuscript' with a (1973: 10). In so faras otherliterary anthropologists, of notable exception,have not questioned this definition thickdescription, and as it has informed studiesof manybothin anthropology beyond, the and

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it may be taken as a fundamental methodologicalpracticeof both literary and in anthropologists those interested culturalanalysis. The notableexception to this enthusiasmforthickdescription Crapanzano,who claims,at is leastwhen it is practised Geertz's classic essay 'Deep play', thatit 'offers in no understanding the nativefromthe native'spointof view' (1992: 67). I of concurwith thisassessment. There appear to be two problemswith thickdescription. The first to has do withitsvagueness.Geertzsaid thatinterpretation liketrying read (in 'is to the sense of "construct reading a of") a manuscript' (1973: 10). Consider,for example, the term 'reading'. Geertz never divulges what he means by a reading. One common understanding it is as theattribution meaningto of of conceptsin languageX by assigning themmeaningsfromotherconcepts to in languageX. By this definition, it number 1, the statement call 'love is a of feeling caringabout somebody'is a reading. However,Geertzis talking about readingmeaningsin othercultures.This would imply, Rabinow suggestsit does, thatinterpretation, so faras it as in involvesreading,is a 'process of translation' (1977: 151). If thisis the case, and Geertz is talkingabout readingas translation, then what is meant by readingis the mappingof the meaningof conceptsin languageX onto those in languageY By this definition, call it number 2, the statement 'love is l'amour' is a reading.Definitions1 and 2 are plausible,non-identical underof standings reading.Other definitions entertainable, Geertzdoes not are yet indicatewhetherhe wants readersto do number one or number two, or somethingelse. Thus the natureof reading,or perhaps translation, left is unread,or perhapsuntranslated. thatin a readingone must 'construct' meanthe Geertz is clear,however, examination the notion of ingsof natives.Unfortunately, again thereis little of 'construction' Geertz,thoughit appearsforhim to involvea 'sorting by of out of thestructures signification' thenatives(1973: 9).22 There are two of of The first thatthe notion is concernswith such a definition construction. is enormously There are manytypesof of structure signification of complex. of thereare manytypesof structures signification, meanings.So presumably his and it mighthave been usefulifGeertzhad enlightened readersas tojust of he what sortsof structures signification was talkingabout. Second, the One's imaginationruns riot phrase 'sortingout' is not very informative. out' signification. Definitions different contemplating techniquesof 'sorting thatleave crucialproperties of unspecified what theyare about maybe said as of to be ambiguous. A definition construction undisclosed sortingsof to qualifyas ambiguous. If thick would appear unspecifiedsignifications whose meaningis involvesnotionsof readingand construction description thenthoseperforming practice this leftunclear, maynot knowwhattheyare as a doing when theyare constructing reading.This would imply, Geertz of 'is thatthickdescription (or should be) guessing makesa matter principle, at meanings'(1973: 20).

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has A second, relatedproblemwiththickdescription to do with thevalidof ityof its attributions meaning.Again it is Crapanzano who has a helpful insight.He realizes thatwhat Geertz does in 'Deep play' is to offer'the point of of native'sconstructed constructed understanding the constructed view' (1992: 67). This suggeststhatthickdescriptioninvolves readingsof readings. These include: what nativesthinktheymean. thinkthe nativesmean. what nativeinformants mean. what ethnographers thinkthe informants thinkaudienceswant to know about whatethnographers what nativesmean. Geertz acknowledgesthatthickdescriptioninvolves such multiple transinterpretations, writings themselves are that'anthropological lations,stating second and thirdorderones to boot' (1973: 15). The crucial epistemologicalquestion is, does thick descriptionprovide with ways of makingmultiplereadingsvalid? Crapanzano, for his analysts of part,believes that Geertz 'offersno understanding the native fromthe of native'spointof view' because his (Geertz's) 'constructions constructions of appear to be littlemore than projectionsor blurrings his point of view evidence' (1992: in withthatof the native'offered the absenceof 'specifiable the charge, Geertz's apparent 67). This is a serious charge. Anticipating or graspan interpretation you do not,see the point answerto it is You either or you do not' (1973: 24). Such a responsemay be construedin two ways. to thatit takesintuition make reliableinterpretations, Eitherhe is asserting or he is sayingthatyou 'see the pointor you do not',but I am not going to explain how this is done. Either construalarrivesat the same conclusion. at mannerhow to arrive valid interpreGeertzdoes not detailin a systematic tations.Therefore,as Abner Cohen states,his attributions meaningare of unverifiable' (1974: 5).23 'conjectural, frequently strivesto Max Weber,unlike Geertz, believed that 'every interpretation achieve utmostverifiability' roughly (1968: 36). Webermeantbyverifiability what is meant by validity. Thus for him therewere more and less valid and inappropriate in interpretations the sense that therewere appropriate of attributions meaningto action. Further, Weber suggestedcertainprocedures involving'verification interpretation its results' (1968: 37) to of by evaluatethe adequacyof meanings. Essentially, theseinvolvedthe comparing of of observedaction,the results, with the attributions the meaningof the If withtheirinterpretaaction,the interpretations. the resultsare consistent has tion,thena verification occurred. Though one may not agreewith the adequacy of Weber's techniquesfor to the validity, point remainsthathe believedit worthwhile estabachieving readersthathe lish such procedures.This means thatwhen Geertz informs is a Weberian, is only partially he correct.Geertz tells his readersthatthey 'will not findvery much in the way of "the theoryand methodologyof in (1983). Gone fromGeertz is a Weberian interpretation"' Local knowledge Reading 1: Reading2: Reading3: Reading4:

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Below, Tyler's,Rabinow & Sullivan's and Clifford's concern with validity. of the views are exploredconcerning possibility valid interpretations. Tylersuggeststhat 'evocation' (1986: 123) occurs when somebody like and perhapsin evocationcan be founda way his Geertzconstructs readings, Normallytropesare used to evoke someof makingaccurateinterpretations. conceit'my love is like a red,red thing.Consider,forexample,the fetching rose'. Here what is beingevokedis 'love', and thisis done by metaphorically sayingthatit is like a 'rose'. but not in termsof theirown attributes, in termsof Tropesdescribethings In otherthings'attributes. the examplegivenabove, love is not describedin termsof what it is, but in termsof what it is not - a plant.Tylerseems to in realizethis,because he saysthatwhat is constructed such exercisesis 'an reality' of fantasy a fantasy (1986: 125), which is 'reality emergentfantasy' at (1986: 139). This means thatthickdescription, leastwhen it is based upon of an evocation,appearsto be a techniqueforthe construction meaningin Such a which the denotataof termsare explicitly those of the native.24 not valid interpretations. procedurewould appearto hinderdiscovering Tylerappearsto accept such a judgementwhen he says that'The point is of not "what counts as reliablerepresentation experiencesand culture" ... of The pointis the irrelevance theseissues' (1989: 566). This is because he is in interested 'poetry' (1987: 202), and poetryin the formof 'postmodern of of is evolved textconsisting fragments disethnography a cooperatively an course intendedto evoke in themindsof both readerand writer emergent of and fantasy a possibleworld of common sense reality, thus to provokean effect' that (1987: 202). 'Reliable aesthetic integration will have a therapeutic for is interpretation' irrelevant Tylerbecause he wants to use thickdescriptherapy. tion to indulgein 'fantasy' is Rabinow and Sullivan, for theirpart,say that 'ambiguity an inherent (1979: 13). This is a strongassertion.All' interaspectof all interpretation' open to several exhibits because 'The textis plurivocal, uncertainty pretation (1987: 13). However,theytell readers, readingsand severalreconstructions' are Human action and interpretation subjectto manybut 'it is not infinite. Any closure of the process through many constructions. not indefinitely externalmeans is violence and oftenoccurs' (1987: 13). Some may be rethese are not lieved to find that,though there are 'many' interpretations, are thatsome interpretations more valid This raisesthe possibility 'infinite'. which poses thequestionof bywhatproceduresdoes one arrive thanothers, at them? methneveroffer However,Rabinow and Sullivan,like Geertz and Tyler, between more and less valid interpretations. Rather, ods for distinguishing 'is theywarn that 'external'stoppingof interpretation violence'. What the Nor is it made clearwhy word 'external' mightmean here is neverspecified. the stoppingof interpretation mightbe 'violent'.Clearly,simplyceasing to the interpret meaningof an action is not violentin the normalsense of the violence. If they about some metaphorical term.So, perhapstheyare talking

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are, theirtextdoes not informreaderswhat this mightbe. What, however, seems to be implicitin the precedingquotationwarningagainst'closure of is the process' of interpretation thatto ward offviolence one must keep on interpreting, a religiousperson chantingover and over again magical like verse. of Clifford'sapproach to the question of the possibility achievingvalid interpretation influenced his enthusiasm a passagefromNietzsche is by for to where he asks, What then is truth?', which he responds,A mobile army -in of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms short,a sum of human and relations, which have been enhanced,transposed, embellishedpoetically and canonical' (Nietzsche, and rhetorically, which after long use seem firm, is cited in Clifford 1988: 93). Such truth not about accuraterepresentations or images of beings but about those that just 'seem firm'.This doctrineof truth was untenableand, as has been noted,Nietzsche himselflaterrepudiated it (Clark 1990; Westphal1984). If acceptedrepresentations truth, be thenClifford believes'It is more than ever crucial for different people to formcomplex,concreteimages of one to another'(1988: 23). Further, believesit is the callingof ethnographers he These should be the resultof formulate theseimagesin theirethnographies. and in'a constructive negotiation'(1988: 41) between the ethnographer formants the Other in which the resulting of textwill be a 'dialogue and never explainswhat polyphony'(1988: 41) of interpretive images. Clifford he means by 'negotiation'.However, ethnographic representations not are supposed to provide accuratetranslation meaning.This is because 'no of of scientific methodor ethicalstancecan guarantee truth such the sovereign for images' (1988: 23); an assertion thatseems based more on his admiration a doctrinedisavowedby Nietzsche,than upon any close analysisof science thathe has performed. In sum, the responseto the question 'how does one validlyinterpret' has been as follows.Geertzsaysyou eitherget it or you do not. Tyler arguesthat 'reliable' interpretation irrelevant is when your goal is to write therapeutic Rabinow and Sullivan suggestthat it is being 'violent' to look for poetry. valid methodsof interpretation. is in Clifford interested negotiating polya phony that 'seems firm' and whose truth he cannot 'guarantee'. After investigating same literature we havejust considered,Spencer conthe that cludes that literaryanthropologyhas abandoned 'any consideration of problemsof validation'(1989: 159; emphasisin the original).25 This rejection of validationby these literary is of anthropologists not characteristic all of students meaning. Scholarsas diverseas Eco (1990), Goodenough (1965), Habermas (1972), Mannheim (1936) Ricoeur (1971: 544-51), and Schutz (1967) have followed Weberin struggling developprocedures arriving valid interpretations. to for at Interpretationsarrived at in the absence of validation procedures do not includeattempts discoverif theyare in conformity to with the normsof or correspondence of relative correspondence. This meansthatsuch interpre-

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tationsare not proposedon the basis of evidence.They are 'fantasy realities' of what the anthropologist says the informants the nativessay.Plainly say finalproductseems spoken,theyare gossip. So the literary anthropologist's to be her or his impressions Others' gossip.Gellner,perhapsexasperated, of called one of such discourses'metatwaddle' (1992: 41). Conclusion Nihilism is 'the doctrinethat nothing,or nothingof a specificand very generalclass exists,or is knowable' (Runes 1942: 210). Literary anthropoloof gists'demands forthe repudiation science,and forits replacement with a thickdescription innocentof validation, means thattheyhold a doctrine that As theirsis a defacto allows themto know nextto nothing. a result, nihilism. of However,it is a specialvariety nihilism. in Doctor Panglosswas the character Voltaire's Candidewho specializedin talkingintellectually pretentious nonsense. Neither the literary anthropologists,hermeneutical philosophers, nor the relativist philosophersof science have providedcompellingcritiquesof science. This means, as Rortysaid, that'thereis nothingwrong with science'. Further, Geertz proposes to replace science with gossip. Science is not degraded,and gossip is not a for substitute it. This means thatliterary anthropologists know little, because theyhave not shown thatlittleis knowable,but because theyhave chosen,withoutreason, not to know. Having made such a choice, and hence knowing little,but to theirs would appearto be believing themselves be an intellectual vanguard, a Panglossiannihilism.A dangerwith nihilismis thatit stops practicesthat lead to the acquisition of knowledgeof how to proceed in all realms. A Panglossiannihilismis one thatencouragespeople to proceed not on the basis of knowledgebut on thatof bombast.It is agentswith the power to make the most noise who tendto prevailin such a situation.

NOTES This article is dedicated to LJ. Reyna, whose views made it possible. N. Glick Schiller were presentedat Versions of the argument and R.E. Downs have been exactingsupporters. the New York Academy of Sciences, Brandeis Universityand the University of New and who correctedshortcomings, Hampshire. I am indebted to those who read earlydrafts especiallyV. Dusek, K Westphaland E. Wolf. 1 Literary was also influencedby V. Turner (1982). There are other ananthropology be in besides those identified the essay who mightappropriately termed literthropologists ary,such as Fernandez (1991) and Tedlock (1983). However, the authorsof The interpretation anliterary said trulyto represent culture those who are frequently are and ofcultures Writing it anthropologists will be to these authors. When I referto literary thropology. 2 Thorton, forexample,equates D-N explanation with science when he says 'The scienor tific, nomotheticdeductivemethod,achieves explanationthroughappeal to formulaethat are regardedas "established"througheither empiricalor logical means' (1992: 19). Miller explanationis causal (1987: 60). has argued thatultimately

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3 The terms 'confirmation' (Miller 1987) or 'verification' (Reichenbach 1953) are often used in place of validation.Kaplan (1964) uses the last termand I preferit. This is because, connote that a propositionhas been at least in English, the firsttwo terms more strongly confirmedor verifiedonce and for all, which is never the case. The notion of validation includes the sense thata theorymay have been validated,though not necessarily universally or absolutely. 4 Miller has propounded explicitly doctrineof approximate a truth. 5 Science is not mentionedin the index of eitherThe predicamentculture of (Clifford1988) or Hermes' dilemma Hamlet's and revenge (Crapanzano 1992). 6 It is not clear to what science Geertz was referring when he said it was 'not producing'. Certainly he was disposed to believe in the failure of scientificanthropologya la Harris or Goodenough. This dispositionwas shared by many Radcliffe-Brown, Levi-Strauss, of of his American colleagues in the 1970s, and may account for the popularity his views. instancesof science is not evidence that science itselfis a However, the failureof particular truth failure.It is, in fact,evidence of the reversewhen explanationsof greaterapproximate come to replace those of lesser accomplishments. 7 Geertz's oeuvre extensive.Nowhere in it does he constructhis own compelling criis tique of science. 8 Explorationof Weber's views concerningvalues in science can be found in Anderson (1992). literature that is favourabletowardsobjec9 Rosaldo does not reference anthropological for tivity, example Beattie (1984), jarvie (1986). 10 Other literaryanthropologists have used argument by deceptive emotive emphasis. Rabinow, forexample,in a commentupon an essay criticalof literary anthropology, implied that those opposed to literary anthropologymight be 'moral Majoritivists',and that the essay's argumentwas suspect because its author cited a source with connexions to 'the Brazilian military'(1988:430). Geertz has said that 'many' behavioural scientistshave 'engaged' in 'collectiveautism' (1973: 57). 11Actually,their argumentoccurs in the firsteight paragraphsof the 'Deconstruction' section. The remainingsix paragraphs the section describe how interpretation of mightdeal with discourse,action and understanding and are, thus, irrelevant the argument. to 12 Gadamer does have concerns about the extent to which empirical-analytic science is relevant(Nuyen 1990). 13 Bhaskar's interpretation Rortyis based upon his readingof passages on pages 347, of and 356, and 359 of Philosophy themirror tature. of 14 Strasser(1985: 31) suggeststhat Apel (1976), von Wright(1971) and de Boer (1983) take positions similar to that of Ricoeur, as do the later Dilthey (1989: 31) and Rickman (1980: 311). 15 The assertion that positivism has been undermined has been contested, i.e. by J. Turner (1992), who expressespro-positivist sentiments. 16 Relativists are also called post-empiricists (Hesse 1980) and neo-empiricists (Greenwood seems to catch the type of empiricismthey propose 1990b). However, the term 'relativist' because of their belief that knowledge and its justification'are accessible only relativeto some set of backgroundprinciples which do not themselvesadmit of any neutralevaluation' (Siegel 1987: 537). 17 Scientific realismis the view that the subject matterof scientific researchand theories of exists independently our knowledge of it, and the goal of science is the descriptionand explanationof both the observableand unobservableaspects of this independently existing world (Boyd et al. 1991: 780). 18 Logical positivists, prior to the second world war, were membersof the Vienna Circle. were eitherin the U.S., where Nagel and Hempel Following the war, most logicalpositivists or of or were major spokespersons, in England,under the influence Ayer,Brathwaite Popper. Popper, and his followers,one of whom was Feyerabend,emphasized that theorieswere ratherthan confirmation. best testedby falsification

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as Correspondence rules are referred variouslyin the literature operationaldefinito tions,epistemiccorrelations, co-ordinating definitions and rules of interpretation. 20 Criticismof Kuhn and Feyerabendcomes fromHesse (1980: 167-87), Shaphere (1966) and Suppe (1977: 617-49; 1989: 313-54). 21 Carnap had noted in the 1930s: 'Even if each single instanceof the law were supposed to be verifiable, numberof instancesto which the law refers e.g. the space-timepoints the - is infinite which are always fiand therefore can never be exhaustedby our observations nite in number' (1953:48). This meant thatlogical positivists not believe thatlaws could did (1959), and be verifiedwith facts.Popper, however,insistedthattheoriescould be falsified it is this thatFeyerabendsays is also impossible. 22 Constructionappears to have begun as a logical positivistnotion (see Carnap 1953). Lutz (1988: 5) and Gergen and Davis (1985: 266) respectively offerculturaland social approachesto construction. 23 Spencer says thatGeertz, on page 30 of The interpretation expends 'considerable ofcultures energyon the problem of the validationof differing interpretations' (1989: 159). My reading of thatpage is thatit offers proceduresforarriving valid attributions meaning. no at of 24 I am not assertingthat metaphors are irrelevant to culture and society. Fernandez makes it clear thatthis is not the case (1991). 25 Other studiesof literary have arrivedat critical conclusions (see Carrithers anthropology 1990; Friedman 1987; Polier & Roseberry1989; Roth 1989; Sangren 1988; Spiro 1992; Ulin 1991). There has also been supportforthiskind of anthropology (Pool 1991).

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L'anthropologie litteraire: r6quisitoire contre la science

Resume litteraires e't ont Deux questions sontexamin6es:Peut-ondireque les anthropologues de Et un une a memed'offrir vraiecritique l'entreprise scientifique? ont-ils proposer pu ni mode de connaissance plus puissant? suggere On que ni l'anthropologie litteraire, la les philosophie hermeneutique, la philosophie sciences, ni des n'ontsu assembler argude scientifique. Apresavoir ments necessaires pouraboutir rejet au critique la demarche que de en offerte commealternative montre les proprietes la 'description profondeur', a l'analyse scientifique, identiques cellesdu commerage, repondpar la negative sont on a en n'est aux deuxquestions litteraire anthropologie posees,et on conclut que I'approche riende plus qu'un nihilisme dignedu docteur Pangloss. Horton SocialScience Durham, Anthropology Program, Center, University ofNew Hampshire, New Hampshire 03824-3586,U.S.A