People v. Villanueva FACTS: The Chief of Police of Alaminos Laguna charged Villanueva with the crime of malicious mischief.

The complaninant in the same case was presented by Atty.Fule, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor after securing the permission of the secretary of justice that every time he would appear in the trial of the case, he would be considered in official leave of absence and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The counsel for the defense of the accused presented a motion to inhibit Fiscal Fule from acting as private prosecutor in this case invoking section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that no judge or other official or employee of the Superior Courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. ISSUE: Whether Fule can engage as in private practice as private prosecutor in the case? HELD: The Court held that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: "Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services." For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law. Hilado vs. David Facts: On April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilados now deceased husband. The counsels for the plaintiff were Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo. The original counsels for the defendant were Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita. On January 28, 1946, Atty. Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case. On May 29, Atty. Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Atty. Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, she had turned over the papers to Atty. Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case was and is pending, to disqualify Atty. Francisco. Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That Atty. Franciscos law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilados purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Atty. Franciscos professional services. Issue: Whether or not there an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued Held: The relation of attorney and client between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his

professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. An attorney is employedthat is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselorwhen he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court. Prohibition of attorneys from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other is implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which provides that an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court imposing upon an attorney the duty to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client. The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client. An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his clients disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. The defense that Atty. Agrava, a member of Atty. Franciscos law firm, wrote the letter and that Atty. Francisco did not take the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of interdiction. If the letter was written under the circumstances explained by Atty. Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estops him in the same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. DOMINGO v. HON. ANTONIO MASAQUEL FACTS: Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in a civil case against Pedro Bravo for the recovery of 3 parcels of land. After trial, respondent judge rendered a decision declaring plaintiffs the owners of the parcels of land. The plaintiffs filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment. Atty. Mariano Sicat was a former assistant or associate of the respondent Judge. Thereafter, motions filed by the defendant through Atty. Sicat were granted, including a motion for a new trial. Before the opening of the courts session, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for the petitioner, saw respondent judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of the petitioner that he inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon the ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Sicat was his former associate. The respondent Judge, however, rejected the request because according to him the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for disqualification of the judge provided for in the Rules of Court. The Judge called Domingo Austria and inquired from the latter if it was true. The petitioner answered in affirmative, so as to the question of the judge as to whether the petitioner lost his faith in the sense of fairness and justice of the presiding judge. The judge declared said plaintiff in contempt. HELD: A judge cannot prevent any personeven a litigant or counsel in a case before him to entertain an opinion about him as a judge. A citizen of this republic is entitled to expect that our courts of justice are presided by judges who are free from bias or prejudiceand it should not be made to count against the citizen if he so expresses himself truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as safeguard, not for the judges as persons, but for the functions that they exercise. The judge being a former associate of the new counsel is not a ground for disqualification, but it may constitute a just and valid reason for the judge to voluntarily inhibit himself form hearing the case. DELOS REYES V. AZNAR FACTS: The respondent is the chairman of the Southwestern University in Cebu who allegedly had carnal knowledge of the complainant who was then a second year medical student. It has been established by the complainant that she was brought by the respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for 3 days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail her in her Pathology subjects. A complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the ground of grow immorality. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality HELD: A member of the bar should satisfy the court that hes fit to be a lawyer whenever his integrity is challenged. The respondent is disbarred for his highly immoral conduct of using his moral ascendancy to satisfy his carnal desires besides being a married man. In Re: Clemente A. Soriano FACTS: On Oct. 10, 1969, entered his appearance in the case entitled IP vs. Menical Tiburcio, et al. as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et. al. Said case, however, has long been decided and terminated.

In his explanation to the Court requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him, Soriano alleged that he took the case in the honest belief that said case was still pending, as was represented by Marcelino Tiburcio, when the latter engaged his services, and the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio Dalangpan. ISSUE: Was Atty. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of the court? HELD: The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgement besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted appearance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And, if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. Atty. Sorianos entry of appearance in the present case as chief counsel of record for the respondents in effect sought to pre-empt the former counsel of the premier control over the case. Furthermore, what Atty. Soriano should have done in keeping with the reasonable vigilance expected of members of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records section of the Court. The Court found Atty. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. The inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made to the Court. De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan FRANCISCO, J.: The petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for his alleged failure to account for P200,000.00 received for certain official training programs of the Department of Agriculture as established by 1) lone prosecution witness Josephine Angeles testimony that no such training programs were held at the designated places, and 2) petitioners failure to present a single receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00 because of his former lawyers insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite having been denied by the Sandiganbayan. To avert his guilt, petitioner filed the instant Omnibus Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion For Reconsideration In The Light Of The Present Developments And To Consider Evidence Presented Herein And To Set Aside Conviction. This was filed on petitioners behalf by a new counsel. In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved from what he considers as the serious and costly mistake of his former lawyers in demurring to the prosecution evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of which deprived him of presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary evidence (i.e. photocopies of the list of expenses and receipts) that would have completely belied the accusation against him. Petitioner appeals to the Courts sense of justice and equity that these documents be summoned and appreciated by the Court itself or by the Sandiganbayan to give him the final chance to prove his innocence. ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his former lawyers? RULING: Petitioners present dilemma is about losing his liberty because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy which thus forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly decision of his previous lawyers. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting his evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated. The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it. In the case at bar, the rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due - to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. WHEREFORE, petitioners Omnibus Motion is GRANTED and the Courts Decision and Resolution are hereby RECONSIDERED. Accordingly, let this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence.

In Re Attorney Marciail Edillon Facts: On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) board of governors unanimously adopted a resolution recommending to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice. The case of the respondents arguments is that the provisions regarding the payment of the membership dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property granted to him by the constitution. Issue: Whether or not the respondent be disbarred for not paying IBP membership dues. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent be disbarred and his name be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys of the court. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not a violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meeting of the IBP or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues for the elevation of the quality of professional legal services. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. Legal Ethics Principle: The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities. The practice of law is being clothe with public interest. The holder of this privilege must submit to the degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has earned. JON DE YSASI III VS, NLRC FACTS: Petitioner was employed by his father as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Negros Occ. sometime in 1980. His employment was on the fixed salary with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses. He was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attends to other tasks that may be assigned to him by private respondent. He lived in the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there. After his marriage, he moved to Bacolod city with his wife and commuted to his work. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized and his recuperation lasted several mos. During his illness, the father took care of all his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. In April 1984, private respondent ceased to give his salary w/out notice. Petitioners demand for an explanation was to no avail. Hence, this case for illegal dismissal against his father with NLRC. NLRC dismissed case holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that his termination was for a valid cause. He motioned for a reconsideration. Based on evidences presented, petitioner has not abandoned his work he was illegally dismissed by his father. Petitioners absence was justified by his illness and strained family relations. He has some medical certificates to show his frail health. He also wrote a letter informing private respondent of his intention to resume working and he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. All these are indications that private respondent did not abandon his employment. HELD: The court held that both parties are at fault in this case. They should have 1st settled their differences. They had allowed their personal problems to aggravate the situation by filing labor case. The court ordered private respondent to pay his son back wages and in lieu of sons reinstatement to work to give separation pay. The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties disappoints the court. Counsels are reminded that their ethical duties as lawyers to represent clients with zeal go beyond merely presenting their clients causes in court. It is their responsibility to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts preferably out of court and especially in consideration of direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. The function of lawyers is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. They should be mediators for concord and conciliator for compromise rather than a virtuoso in technicality in the conduct of litigation. In Re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen 31 SCRA 562 (February 18, 1970)

Facts: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title before the SC, in protest against what he therein asserts a great injustice committed against his client by the SC. In the same breath, he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by the present members of the SC is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb. The SC notes that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. There was, therefore, no need for the SC to exercise its supervisory power. As a law practitioner, Atty. Almacen knew or have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of the hearing (which admittedly he did not). Issue Whether or not Almacen is guilty of misconduct as officer of the court. Held Criticism of the courts, has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the lawyer. As a citizen and as officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise this right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect the courts. It is such as misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. That the misconduct of Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction against disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing such, there is no reason why INDEFINITE SUSPENSION, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of that compass of that authority. Accordingly, the SC orders Atty. Almacen be suspended from the practice of law until further orders In re: Victorio D. Lanuevo Facts: This is a consolidation of different disbarment proceedings instituted in connection with the Bar Examinations held in 1971. Lanuevo, then the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, through machinations and misrepresentations convinced the different Bar examiners to re-evaluate the paper numbered 954 belonging to Ramon Galang. He said that if the paper of Galang were to be re-evaluated and given a little more consideration, he would have passed. Galang furthermore did not disclose his pending case of physical injuries in his application for the bar examinations. Issues: Should they be disbarred considering the foregoing? Held: Lanuevo . Yes, he is not clothed with authority to determine whether an applicant's paper merits re-evaluation. Whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance is immaterial. His only function is to tally the grade of each applicant. He took undue advntage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by ht ecourt. He is therefore guilty of serious misconduct. Galang. Yes, he is guilty of frudulently concealing and witholding from court his pending criminal case fo rphysical injuries. By falsely representing this, he committed perjury. This is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law. Thi is in additon to his dubious admission to the bar. The Bar Examiners. Their action do not warrant any disciplinary action on their part. They acted in good faith believing the the Bar Confidant is with authority to request the same. They did not know the name of the examinee and did not receive anything. Nevertheless, they are reminded that the position they hold is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest and thus required to exercise the greatest or utmost care and vigilance and in the performance of their duties. LEGAL ETHICS: Grounds for nullification of admission of successful bar candidates misrepresentations relative to educational attainment lack of good moral character Fraudulently printing of bar examinations IN RE RUSIANA 56 SCRA 240 (March 29, 1974) FACTS:

On May 29, 2959, the SC, finding that respondent Atty Carlos C. Rusiana, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955, committed the acts of misconduct as a notary public and has exhibited such a frame of mind and observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of a member of the legal profession, ordered his disbarment. Respondent has intermittently filed with the SC petitions for re-admission, supported by resolutions from members of the Bench and Bar, labor unions, newspaper editors and reporters, members of professional and civic organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting to respondents good conduct and moral character since his disbarment and petitioning for his reinstatement to the legal profession. These earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rusiana of Cebu City be reinstated to the Roll of Attorneys. RULING: On July 20, 1972, Sc issued resolution. Considering (a) that respondent movant had been disbarred as pf May 29, 1959; (b) that since then the said respondent may be considered as having undergone adequate punishment; (c) tha t he has observed exemplary conduct since then, according to the credible certifications attesting to his repentance for the offense committed by him 13 years ago, and may be reasonably expected to observed scrupulously the Canons of Legal Ethics in the future; (d) but that in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is hereby required to enroll in and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school, and that upon his filing with the Clerk of Court of sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review classes attesting to his having regularly attended and passed their subjects, under the same conditions as ordinary students said movant Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the lawyers oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of this Supreme Court. The sole object of this Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust. Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in the Courts above-quoted resolution, as evidenced by the sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review classes attended by him attesting to his having attended regularly and passed their subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students. WHEREFORE, respondent Carlos Rusiana is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyers oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to this Court the requisite fees. ABAIGAR VS. PAZ FACTS: Plaintiff Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David Paz. Plaintiff employed respondent David Pazs services during her divorce case. After the termination of the divorce case, respondent lawyer professed his love for plaintiff to which they had an agreement to live together as husband and wife. Plaintiff consented to the proposal, despite her knowledge that Atty. Paz was civilly married, for she was made to believe that there was no legal impediment to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not complainants contention is with merit? HELD: It was improbable that respondent accepted proposal just like that, it appearing that she is highly intelligent and has a high educational background. It is likewise hard to believe that at her age, she is still ignorant of the law of the legal impediment of marrying because divorce is not acceptable here. It can be concluded that she voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit relations by legal union. When a lawyers integrity is challenged, it is not enough that he denies that charges but rather he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence. The burden of proof rests on the complainant. The evidence adduced by complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against respondent. Complainant filed the disbarment case not in the redress of wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the consequences of their actions. The case was dismissed, the consent of the complainant to the illicit affair was establishe. COSMOS v. LO-BU

(Canon 19.03 A Lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling a case) FACTS: Cosmos Foundry Shop (CFS) was burned and the owner Ong Ting established a new company named New Country Foundry Shop (NCFS). To avoid liability from the case against the CFS Workers Union, Ong Ting executed an absolute deed of sale to Lo-Bu, which in turn applied for the original registration of the firm name and gave his name as manager. Despite the sale, Ong Ting filed a verified urgent motion to reopen the case. The absence of good faith on the part of Lo-Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear thus there was no actual turn over of the company to Lo-Bu, in fact, the family of Ong Ting continued to run the business after his death. The petitioner CFS Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor on January 16, 1973, therefore prompting the Deputy Sheriff to serve the writ, levying in personal properties of NCFS for the purpose of public auction sale. Lo-Bu filed a petition to recall the writ of execution but was denied by the court. Atty. Bustamante, Lo-Bus counsel denied such allegations. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent, he did maintained. On January 26, 1973, in order to vindicate his right over the levied properties, in an expeditious or less expensive manner, herein appellant voluntarily submitted himself, as a forced intervenor, to the jurisdiction of the respondent CIR, by filing an urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said court to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the NCFS to him without the latter being made a party to the case, as well as the jurisdiction of said court to enforce the decision rendered against respondent in Case No. 3021-ULP, by means of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at NCFS. RULING: Such conduct on the part of the counsel is far from commendable. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously admitted. That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. He was of course expected to defend his clients cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that he has obligation as an officer of the court no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand boy at the back and call of his client, eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious his good standing in the bar. PEOPLE vs TUANDA FACTS: On 17 December 1983, Atty, Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued 3 checks. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. Consequently, after charges were filed against her with the Trial Court, Atty. Tuanda was convicted of violating B.P. Blg. 22. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. She then filed this Motion to Lift Order of Suspension considering that she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez. ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension imposed upon Atty. Tuanda should be lifted. HELD: The Court affirmed the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda holding that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." It added that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

"Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.-A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." The crimes in which respondent were convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. ZENAIDA REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a deed of sale of four (4) parcels of land. In the case at bar, hearings were scheduled for the presentation of petitioner's evidence on six different dates but were all postponed because of the absence of the petitioner and her counsel. While petitioner's absences were explained, those of her counsel were not who simply disappeared without a trace, despite warning to counsel that her failure to present evidence for her client would be considered a waiver of the latter's right to present her evidence. Because of this, the Court deemed that she has waived her right to present evidence and was found guilty by the Court. Hence, she filed this motion praying that she be given the chance to prove her innocence by being allowed to present her evidence. ISSUE: The issue in this case is whether the trial court properly held petitioner to have waived the right to present evidence because of her failure to proceed despite several postponements granted to her. Petitioner's motion is based on her contention that because of her counsel's unexplained absences at the trial she was prevented from presenting evidence in her defense and therefore denied the due process of law. HELD: The High Court said that under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of her lawyer. To deny petitioner the opportunity to present her evidence on the merest chance that she might be innocent would be to disregard the wisdom that it is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person. In sum, it is better to allow petitioner another chance to present her evidence than to let her conviction stand based solely on the evidence of the prosecution. Motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court, SET ASIDE and this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for a new trial for the purpose of allowing petitioner to present evidence in her defense with directive to the court thereafter to decide the case with all deliberate speed In the matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines On June 15, 1989, The Supreme Court issued a resolution to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By- Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of the IBP officers. The candidates for presidents during the 1989 elections were: Atty. Violeta Drilon, Atty. Paculdo, and Atty. Nisce IBP By- laws ( Sec. 4 and Sec. 14 thereof) provide that the IBP shall be non- political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national,or regional, or chapter. At the formal investigation, the following violations were established: Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice- president, the officers of the House of Delegates and the Board of Governors Use of PNB plane in the campaign more specifically with Atty. Violeta Drilon

 Formation of ticket and single slates Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any member Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the court hereby ORDERS that the IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled. Daroy vs. Legaspi Facts : Complainant hire Atty. Legaspi, respondent, to represent them in the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the gonzaga spouses. The heirs in a joint petition which the respondent signed as a counsel for the complainants that the administrator is authorized to sell the lands and the net proceeds would be distributed among the six group of heirs. The land was sold and daroy came to know of the sale only when the respondent wrote a note dated Oct. 1969, the respondent already received the money from the sheriff. Several demands were made but repeatedly failed to pay. Hence this disbarment proceeding. Issue: wheteher or not atty. Legaspi should be barred? Held: a lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all god fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly money of his client that has come to his possession. We find atty, legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional misconduct and should be disbarred. Principle: the relationship between a lawyer and his client is fiduciary in its nature and of very delicate and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. PERIQUET vs. NLRC FACTS: Periquet was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development Corp. of the Philippines (CDCP), for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming that she had been framed, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within ten days without loss of seniority rights and other privilege and with full back wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to the date of her actual reinstatement. On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by the NLRC. Nine years later, Periquet filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision. The motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter, which required payment to Periquet of the sum of P205,204.42. In its decision, NLRC held that the motion for execution was time-barred because it was filed beyond the 5-year period prescribed by the Rules of court and the Labor Code. Periquet contends that the decision of the NLRC is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. ISSUE: Whether or not the claim of the Petitioner is tenable? HELD: The claim of Periquet is untenable because the records show that it was she wo caused the delay of the execution of the judgment in her favor. The original decision called for her reinstatement following the affirmation by the NLRC, but there is no evidence that she demanded for reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from CDCP the sum of P14,000 representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of the agreement. Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated and so she would be granted back pay from the date of her dismissal until the date of her reinstatement.

Attorneys are duty-bound to advise clients not to make untenable claims that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of the Court, the SolGen and the respondents. Petition denied. LEGAL ETHICS PRINCIPLE Lawyers are not mere hired employees who must questioningly do the bidding of the client however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. COUNSEL MUST COUNSEL. CANON 15: A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. 15.05: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give candid and honest opinion the merits and probable results of the clients case neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case. TELAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS 202 SCRA 534 FACTS: Pedro and spouse Angelina, petitioners, received a Notice to Vacate from DBP the lot they were renting from Luciano Sia. Pedros cousin, Vicente and his spouse Virginia Telan, respondents herein, had executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot share by Pedro and Angelina. Later on, spouses Telan filed a suit at the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela to evict Pedro Telans family from the lot. They were also able to acquire a new Transfer Certificate of Title over said lot. Pedro and Angelina hired the services of Atty. Paguiran to defend them in the suit but he was indisposed to do so.. In the course of their eatery business, Angelina became acquainted with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a lawyer. Having no counsel to handle their case, they asked Atty. Palma to represent them and the latter consented. In the meantime, Pedro broke his hip and was in and out of the hospital for treatment. Meanwhile, the case was dismissed for failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period. The petitioners were not aware of this and they only came to know about the dismissal of the case when somebody from informed Pedro. He verified the facts but Atty. Palma could no longer be found so he engaged the services of a new lawyer and found out that Atty. Palma was a fake. ISSUE: Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process. HELD: The Court ruled that the petitioners had not been accorded due process of law because they lost they right to appeal when they were deprived of the right to counsel. The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, especially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss. The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company. A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation even by the attorneys mistake or negligence in procedural technique. But how can there be negligence by the counsel when the lawyer turned out to be fake? Wherefore, petitioners are granted due course to the appeal.