EN BANC RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID[1] TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET

AND OTHER FEES. A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC

possible to those who are in need thereof the masses. Hence, every chapter of the IBP must establish and operate an adequate legal aid office. WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter has long been operational, providing free legal services to numerous indigent clients, through the chapters members who render volunteer services in the spirit of public service;

August 28, 2009 x---------------------------------------------------x

WHEREAS, the courts, quasi-judicial bodies, the various mediation centers and prosecutors offices are collecting fees, be they filing, docket, motion, mediation or other fees in cases, be they original proceedings or on appeal; WHEREAS, IBP Legal Aid clients are qualified under the same indigency and merit tests used by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), and would have qualified for PAO assistance, but for reasons other than indigency, are disqualified from availing of the services of the PAO, like the existence of a conflict of interests or conflicting defenses, and other similar causes; WHEREAS, PAO clients are automatically exempt from the payment of docket and other fees for cases, be they original proceedings or on appeal, by virtue of the provisions of Section 16D of R.A. 9406 (PAO Law), without the need for the filing of any petition or motion to declare them as pauper litigants; WHEREAS, there is no similar provision in any substantive law or procedural law giving IBP Legal Aid clients the same benefits or privileges enjoyed by PAO clients with respect to the payment of docket and other fees before the courts, quasijudicial bodies and prosecutors offices; WHEREAS, the collection of docket and other fees from the IBP Legal Aid clients poses an additional strain to their next to nonexistent finances; WHEREAS, the quarterly allowance given by the National Legal Aid Office to the IBP Misamis Oriental Chapter is insufficient to even cover the incidental expenses of volunteer legal aid lawyers, much less answer for the payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutors offices and mediation fees collected by the Philippine Mediation Center; NOW THEREFORE, on motion of the Board of Officers of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to move the IBP National Legal Aid Office to make the necessary requests or representations with the Supreme Court, the Philippine Mediation Center, the Department of Justice and

RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008.[2] The resolution requested the IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid[3] (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters. Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 provided: RESOLUTION NO. 24, SERIES OF 2008 RESOLUTION OF THE IBPMISAMIS ORIENTAL CHAPTER FOR THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID OFFICE TO REQUEST THE COURTS AND OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER AND PROSECUTORS OFFICES TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING AND LITIGATION OF ACTIONS, AS ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS OR ON APPEAL. WHEREAS, Section 1, Article I of the Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (otherwise known as []Guideline[s] on Legal Aid[]) provides: Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalances that may often lead to injustice, for which reason, it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should therefore unde[r]ly all legal aid offices. The same should be so administered as to give maximum possible assistance to indigent and deserving members of the community in all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may be necessary to forestall injustice. WHEREAS, Section 2 of the same provides: In order to attain the objectives of legal aid, legal aid office should be as close as

the National Prosecution Service and other quasi-judicial agencies to effect the grant of a like exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees to the IBP Legal Aid clients as that enjoyed by PAO clients, towards the end that IBP Legal Aid clients be automatically exempted from the filing of the abovementioned fees; RESOLVED FURTHER, that copies of this Resolution be furnished to Supreme Court Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno, IBP National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the IBP Board of Governors, Secretary of Justice Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, the National Supervisor of the Philippine Mediation Center, the National Labor Relations Commission, the Civil Service Commission and other quasi-judicial bodies and their local offices; RESOLVED FINALLY to move the IBP Board of Governors and National Officers to make the necessary representations with the National Legislature and its members to effect the filing of a bill before the House of Representatives and the Senate granting exemption to IBP Legal Aid clients from the payment of docket, filing and or other fees in cases before the courts, quasi-judicial agencies and prosecutors offices and the mediation centers. Done this 23 day of September 2008, Cagayan De Oro City. Unanimously approved upon motion severally seconded.[4]
rd

some expense which indigent clients could ill-afford, clients also lack knowledge on how to go about the tedious process of obtaining these documents; (c) Although the IBP is given an annual legal aid subsidy, the amount it receives from the government is barely enough to cover various operating expenses;[8] While each IBP local chapter is given a quarterly allocation (from the legal aid subsidy),[9] said allocation covers neither the incidental expenses defrayed by legal aid lawyers in handling legal aid cases nor the payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts, quasi-judicial bodies and the prosecutors office, as well as mediation fees and Considering the aforementioned factors, a directive may be issued by the Supreme Court granting IBPs indigent clients an exemption from the payment of docket and other fees similar to that given to PAO clients under Section 16-D of RA 9406. In this connection, the Supreme Court previously issued a circular exempting IBP clients from the payment of transcript of stenographic notes.[10]

(d)

(e)

The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 and required the IBP, through the NCLA, to comment thereon.[5] In a comment dated December 18, 2008,[6] the IBP, through the NCLA, made the following comments: (a) Under Section 16-D of RA[7] 9406, clients of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) are exempt from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to the institution of action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies. On the other hand, clients of legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters do not enjoy the same exemption. IBPs indigent clients are advised to litigate as pauper litigants under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court; They are further advised to submit documentary evidence to prove compliance with the requirements under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, i.e., certifications from the barangay and the Department of Social Welfare and Development. However, not only does the process involve

At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its effort to help improve the administration of justice, particularly, the access to justice by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 in fact echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations during the Forum on Increasing Access to Justice spearheaded by the Court last year. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the administration of justice.[11] We now move on to determine the merits of the request.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MAKING AN IDEAL A REALITY

Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. As such, it is guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law: Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.[12] (emphasis supplied)

(b)

The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the most important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of our society.[13] Among others, it has exercised its power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights[14] to open the doors of justice to the underprivileged and to allow them to step inside the courts to be heard of their plaints. In particular, indigent litigants are permitted under Section 21, Rule 3[15] and Section 19, Rule 141[16] of the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma pauperis. The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to improve the administration of justice and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively,[17] assists the Court in providing the poor access to justice. In particular, it renders free legal aid under the supervision of the NCLA.

SEC. 22. Other factors. The effect of the Legal Aid Service or of the failure to render the same upon the Rule of Law, the proper administration of justice, the public interest involved in given cases and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be considered. SEC. 23. Private practice. Care shall be taken that the Legal aid is not availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law, or taken advantage of by anyone for personal ends. SEC. 24. Denial. Legal aid may be denied to an applicant already receiving adequate assistance from any source other than the Integrated Bar. The means and merit tests appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility for coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure that any exemption from the payment of legal fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to justice by the poor. This will guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this end, the following shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the said clients: A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) ARTICLE I Purpose Section 1. Purpose. This Rule is issued for the purpose of enforcing the right of free access to courts by the poor guaranteed under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution. It is intended to increase the access to justice by the poor by exempting from the payment of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original proceeding or on appeal, qualified indigent clients of the NCLA and of the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters nationwide. ARTICLE II

A NEW RULE, A NEW TOOL FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE Under the IBPs Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the IBP (Guidelines on Legal Aid), the combined means and merit tests shall be used to determine the eligibility of an applicant for legal aid: ARTICLE VIII TESTS SEC. 19. Combined tests. The Chapter Legal Aid Committee or the [NCLA], as the case may be, shall pass upon the request for legal aid by the combined application of the means test and merit test, and the consideration of other factors adverted to in the following sections. SEC. 20. Means test. The means test aims at determining whether the applicant has no visible means of support or his income is otherwise insufficient to provide the financial resources necessary to engage competent private counsel owing to the demands for subsistence of his family, considering the number of his dependents and the conditions prevailing in the locality. The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the Developmental Legal Aid Program such as Overseas Filipino Workers, fishermen, farmers, women and children and other disadvantaged groups. SEC. 21. Merit test. The merit test seeks to ascertain whether or not the applicants cause of action or his defense is valid and chances of establishing the same appear reasonable.

Definition of Terms Section 1. Definition of important terms. For purposes of this Rule and as used herein, the following terms shall be understood to be how they are defined under this Section: (a) Developmental legal aid means the rendition of legal services in public interest causes involving overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children and other disadvantaged groups and marginalized sectors; Disinterested person refers to the punong barangay having jurisdiction over the place where an applicant for legal aid or client of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office resides; Falsity refers to any material misrepresentation of fact or any fraudulent, deceitful, false, wrong or misleading statement in the application or affidavits submitted to support it or the affidavit of a disinterested person required to be submitted annually under this Rule which may substantially affect the determination of the qualifications of the applicant or the client under the means and merit tests; Legal fees refers to the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as a necessary incident of instituting an action in court either as an original proceeding or on appeal. In particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs fees, stenographers fees (that is fees for transcript of stenographic notes) and commissioners fees; Means test refers to the set of criteria

used to determine whether applicant is one who has money or property sufficient available for food, shelter basic necessities for himself his family; (f)

the no and and and

Merit test refers to the ascertainment of whether the applicants cause of action or his defense is valid and whether the chances of establishing the same appear reasonable and Representative refers to the person authorized to file an application for legal aid in behalf of the applicant when the said applicant is prevented by a compelling reason from personally filing his application. As a rule, it refers to the immediate family members of the applicant. However, it may include any of the applicants relatives or any person or concerned citizen of sufficient discretion who has first-hand knowledge of the personal circumstances of the applicant as well as of the facts of the applicants case. ARTICLE III Coverage

(g) (b)

(c)

(d)

Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from payment of legal fees. Persons who shall enjoy the benefit of exemption from the payment of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court, as an original proceeding or on appeal, granted under this Rule shall be limited only to clients of the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices. The said clients shall refer to those indigents qualified to receive free legal aid service from the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices. Their qualifications shall be determined based on the tests provided in this Rule. Section 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. The following shall be disqualified from the coverage of this Rule. Nor may they be accepted as clients by the NCLA

(e)

and the chapter legal aid offices. (a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered by developmental legal aid or public interest causes involving juridical entities which are non-stock, non-profit organizations, non-governmental organizations and peoples organizations whose individual members will pass the means test provided in this Rule; Persons who do not pass the means and merit tests; Parties already represented by a counsel de parte; Owners or lessors of residential lands or buildings with respect to the filing of collection or unlawful detainer suits against their tenants and Persons who have been clients of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office previously in a case where the NCLA or chapter legal aid office withdrew its representation because of a falsity in the application or in any of the affidavits supporting the said application.

NCLA and the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters. The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee, as the case may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid by the combined application of the means and merit tests and the consideration of other relevant factors provided for in the following sections. Section 2. Means test; exception. (a) This test shall be based on the following criteria: (i) the applicant and that of his immediate family must have a gross monthly income that does not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee in the place where the applicant resides and (ii) he does not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos. In this connection, the applicant shall execute an affidavit of indigency (printed at the back of the application form) stating that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the applicants affidavit. The latest income tax return and/or current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the applicants affidavit. (b) The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the developmental legal aid program such as overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children and other disadvantaged groups. Section 3. Merit test. A case shall be considered meritorious if an assessment of the law and evidence at hand discloses that the legal service will be in aid of justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking into consideration the interests of the party and those of society. A case fails this test if, after consideration of the law and evidence presented by the applicant, it appears that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. Section 4. Other relevant factors that may be considered. The effect of legal aid or of the failure to render the same upon the rule of law, the proper administration of justice, the public interest involved in a given case and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be considered. ARTICLE V

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. The NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices shall not handle the following: (a) Cases where conflicting interests will be represented by the NCLA and the chapter legal aid offices and Prosecution of criminal cases in court. ARTICLE IV Tests of Indigency Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of the

(b)

Acceptance and Handling of Cases Section 1. Procedure in accepting cases. The following procedure shall be observed in the acceptance of cases for purposes of this Rule: (a) Filing of application An application shall be made personally by the applicant, unless there is a compelling reason which prevents him from doing so, in which case his representative may apply for him. It shall adhere substantially to the form made for that purpose. It shall be prepared and signed by the applicant or, in proper cases, his duly authorized representative in at least three copies. Applications for legal aid shall be filed with the NCLA or with the chapter legal aid committee. The NCLA shall, as much as possible, concentrate on cases of paramount importance or national impact. Requests received by the IBP National Office shall be referred by the NCLA to the proper chapter legal aid committee of the locality where the cases have to be filed or are pending. The chapter president and the chairman of the chapters legal aid committee shall be advised of such referral. (b) Interview The applicant shall be interviewed by a member of the chapter legal aid committee or any chapter member authorized by the chapter legal aid committee to determine the applicants qualifications based on the means and merit tests and other relevant factors. He shall also be required to submit copies of his latest income tax returns and/or current tax declaration, if available, and execute an affidavit of indigency printed at the back of the application form with the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the applicants affidavit. After the interview, the applicant shall be informed that he can follow up the action on his application after five (5) working days. (c) Action on the application The chapter legal aid committee shall pass upon every request for legal

aid and submit its recommendation to the chapter board of officers within three (3) working days after the interview of the applicant. The basis of the recommendation shall be stated. The chapter board of officers shall review and act on the recommendation of the chapter legal aid committee within two (2) working days from receipt thereof; Provided, however, that in urgent matters requiring prompt or immediate action, the chapters executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions may provisionally act on the application, subject to review by the chapter legal aid committee and, thereafter, by the chapter board of officers. The action of the chapter board of officers on the application shall be final. (d) Cases which may be provisionally accepted. In the following cases, the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office, through the chapters executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions may accept cases provisionally pending verification of the applicants indigency and an evaluation of the merit of his case. Where a warrant for the arrest of the applicant has been issued; Where a pleading has to be filed immediately to avoid adverse effects to the applicant; Where an appeal has to be urgently perfected or a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus filed has to be filed immediately; and (iv) (e) Other similar urgent cases.

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Assignment of control number Upon approval of the chapter board of officers of a persons application and the applicant is found to be qualified for legal assistance, the case shall be assigned a control number. The numbering shall be consecutive starting from January to December of every year. The control number shall also indicate the region and the chapter handling the case. Example:

Region[18]

Chapter GM

Year Manila 03 099

Month 2009

Number -

(a)

(f)

Issuance of a certification After an application is approved and a control number duly assigned, the chapter board of officers shall issue a certification that the person (that is, the successful applicant) is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office. The certification shall bear the control number of the case and shall state the name of the client and the nature of the judicial action subject of the legal aid of the NCLA or the legal aid office of a local IBP chapter. The certification shall be issued to the successful applicant free of charge. Section 2. Assignment of cases. After a case is given a control number, the chapter board of officers shall refer it back to the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter legal aid committee shall assign the case to any chapter member who is willing to handle the case. In case no chapter member has signified an intention to handle the case voluntarily, the chapter legal aid committee shall refer the matter to the chapter board of officers together with the names of at least three members who, in the chapter legal aid committees discretion, may competently render legal aid on the matter. The chapter board of officers shall appoint one chapter member from among the list of names submitted by the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter member chosen may not refuse the appointment except on the ground of conflict of interest or other equally compelling grounds as provided in the Code of Professional Responsibility,[19] in which case the chapter board of officers shall appoint his replacement from among the remaining names in the list previously submitted by the chapter legal aid committee. The chapter legal aid committee and the chapter board of officers shall take the necessary measures to ensure that cases are well-distributed to chapter members. Section 3. Policies and guidelines in the acceptance and handling of cases. The following policies and guidelines shall be observed in the acceptance and handling of cases:

First come, first served Where both the complainant/plaintiff/petitioner and defendant/ respondent apply for legal aid and both are qualified, the first to seek assistance shall be given preference. Avoidance of conflict of interest Where acceptance of a case will give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the chapter legal aid office, the applicant shall be duly informed and advised to seek the services of a private counsel or another legal aid organization. Where handling of the case will give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the chapter member assigned to the case, the client shall be duly informed and advised about it. The handling lawyer shall also inform the chapter legal aid committee so that another chapter member may be assigned to handle the case. For purposes of choosing the substitute handling lawyer, the rule in the immediately preceding section shall be observed.

(b)

(c)

Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary No member of the chapter or member of the staff of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office shall directly or indirectly demand or request from an applicant or client any compensation, gift or present for legal aid services being applied for or rendered. Same standard of conduct and equal treatment A chapter member who is tasked to handle a case accepted by the NCLA or by the chapter legal aid office shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients. He shall treat the client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and the said clients case in a manner that is equal and similar to his treatment of a paying client and his case. Falsity in the application or in the affidavits Any falsity in the application or in the affidavit of indigency or in the affidavit of a disinterested person shall be sufficient cause for the NCLA or chapter legal aid office to withdraw or terminate the legal aid. For this purpose, the chapter board of officers shall authorize the handling

(d)

(e)

lawyer to file the proper manifestation of withdrawal of appearance of the chapter legal aid office in the case with a motion for the dismissal of the complaint or action of the erring client. The court, after hearing, shall approve the withdrawal of appearance and grant the motion, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. Violation of this policy shall disqualify the erring client from availing of the benefits of this Rule in the future. (f) Statement in the initiatory pleading To avail of the benefits of the Rule, the initiatory pleading shall state as an essential preliminary allegation that (i) the party initiating the action is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and therefore entitled to exemption from the payment of legal fees under this Rule and (ii) a certified true copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article is attached or annexed to the pleading. Failure to make the statement shall be a ground for the dismissal of the action without prejudice to its refiling. The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office, files an appeal. (g) Attachment of certification in initiatory pleading A certified true copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this Article shall be attached as an annex to the initiatory pleading. Failure to attach a certified true copy of the said certification shall be a ground for the dismissal of the action without prejudice to its refiling. The same rule shall apply in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office, files an appeal. (h) Signing of pleadings All complaints, petitions, answers, replies, memoranda and other important pleadings or motions to be filed in courts shall be signed by the handling lawyer

and co-signed by the chairperson or a member of the chapter legal aid committee, or in urgent cases, by the executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions. Ordinary motions such as motions for extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing and manifestations may be signed by the handling lawyer alone. (i) Motions for extension of time or for postponement The filing of motions for extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing shall be avoided as much as possible as they cause delay to the case and prolong the proceedings. Transfer of cases Transfer of cases from one handling lawyer to another shall be affected only upon approval of the chapter legal aid committee.

(j)

Section 4. Decision to appeal. (a) All appeals must be made on the request of the client himself. For this purpose, the client shall be made to fill up a request to appeal. (b) Only meritorious cases shall be appealed. If the handling lawyer, in consultation with the chapter legal aid committee, finds that there is no merit to the appeal, the client should be immediately informed thereof in writing and the record of the case turned over to him, under proper receipt. If the client insists on appealing the case, the lawyer handling the case should perfect the appeal before turning over the records of the case to him. Section 5. Protection of private practice. Utmost care shall be taken to ensure that legal aid is neither availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law nor taken advantage of by anyone for purely personal ends.

ARTICLE VI Withdrawal of Legal Aid and Termination of Exemption Section 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee may, in justifiable instances as provided in the next Section, direct the handling lawyer to withdraw representation of a clients cause upon approval

of the IBP Board of Governors (in the case of the NCLA) or of the chapter board of officers (in the case of the chapter legal aid committee) and through a proper motion filed in Court. Section 2. Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid. Withdrawal may be warranted in the following situations: (a) In a case that has been provisionally accepted, where it is subsequently ascertained that the client is not qualified for legal aid; Where the clients income or resources improve and he no longer qualifies for continued assistance based on the means test. For this purpose, on or before January 15 every year, the client shall submit an affidavit of a disinterested person stating that the client and his immediate family do not earn a gross income mentioned in Section 2, Article V, nor own any real property with the fair market value mentioned in the same Section; When it is shown or found that the client committed a falsity in the application or in the affidavits submitted to support the application; When the client subsequently engages a de parte counsel or is provided with a de oficio counsel; When, despite proper advice from the handling lawyer, the client cannot be refrained from doing things which the lawyer himself ought not do under the ethics of the legal profession, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, witnesses and litigants, or the client insists on having control of the trial, theory of the case, or strategy in procedure which would tend to result in incalculable harm to the interests of the client; When, despite notice from the handling lawyer, the client does not cooperate or coordinate with the handling lawyer to the prejudice of the proper and effective rendition of legal aid such as when the client fails to provide documents necessary to support his case or unreasonably fails to attend hearings when

his presence thereat is required; and (g) When it becomes apparent that the representation of the clients cause will result in a representation of conflicting interests, as where the adverse party had previously engaged the services of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid office and the subject matter of the litigation is directly related to the services previously rendered to the adverse party.

(b)

Section 3. Effect of withdrawal. The court, after hearing, shall allow the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office to withdraw if it is satisfied that the ground for such withdrawal exists. Except when the withdrawal is based on paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the immediately preceding Section, the court shall also order the dismissal of the case. Such dismissal is without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred if the withdrawal is based on paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding Section. ARTICLE VII Miscellaneous Provisions Section 1. Lien on favorable judgment. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the client was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. In case, attorneys fees have been awarded to the client, the same shall belong to the NCLA or to the chapter legal aid office that rendered the legal aid, as the case may be. It shall form part of a special fund which shall be exclusively used to support the legal aid program of the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office. In this connection, the chapter board of officers shall report the receipt of attorneys fees pursuant to this Section to the NCLA within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. The NCLA shall, in turn, include the data on attorneys fees received by IBP chapters pursuant to this Section in its liquidation report for the annual subsidy for legal aid. Section 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare forms. The NCLA shall prepare the standard forms to be used in connection with this Rule. In particular, the NCLA shall prepare the

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

following standard forms: the application form, the affidavit of indigency, the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person, the affidavit of a disinterested person required to be submitted annually under Section 2(b), Article VI, the certification issued by the NCLA or the chapter board of officers under Section 1(f), Article V and the request to appeal. The said forms, except the certification, shall be in Filipino. Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the forms from the NCLA, the chapter legal aid offices shall make translations of the said forms in the dominant dialect used in their respective localities. Section 3. Effect of Rule on right to bring suits in forma pauperis. Nothing in this Rule shall be considered to preclude those persons not covered either by this Rule or by the exemption from the payment of legal fees granted to clients of the Public Attorneys Office under Section 16D of RA 9406 to litigate in forma pauperis under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Section 4. Compliance with Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. Legal aid service rendered by a lawyer under this Rule either as a handling lawyer or as an interviewer of applicants under Section 1(b), Article IV hereof shall be credited for purposes of compliance with the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. The chairperson of the chapter legal aid office shall issue the certificate similar to that issued by the Clerk of Court in Section 5(b) of the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. ARTICLE VIII Effectivity Section 1. Effectivity. This Rule shall become effective after fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

A FINAL WORD Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all. The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock. WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters is GRANTED. The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is hereby APPROVED. In this connection, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said rule in a newspaper of general circulation within five days from the promulgation of this resolution. The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to inform all courts in the Philippines of the import of this resolution. SO ORDERED.

The above rule, in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service and the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, shall form a solid base of rules upon which the right of access to courts by the poor shall be implemented. With these rules, we equip the poor with the tools to effectively, efficiently and easily enforce their rights in the judicial system.

EN BANC Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people? The two Executive Judges, that we have approached, fear accusations of favoritism or other kind of attack if they approve something which is not clearly and specifically stated in the law or approved by your HONOR. Can your Honor help us once more? x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION BERSAMIN, J.: In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote: The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst. Indorsement to pay a nominal fee of Php 5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection action of 10 million pesos, thus giving us access to the Justice System previously denied by an up-front excessive court fee. The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this privilege to indigent persons. While judges are appointed to interpret the law, this type of law seems to be extremely detailed with requirements that do not leave much room for interpretations. In addition, this law deals mainly with individual indigent and it does not include Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons. As seen in our Article of Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, to broken families who returned to a normal life. In other words, we have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot reach to, or have rejected or abandoned them. To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.[1] In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court,[2] and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court,[3] which respectively state thus: Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. We shall be privileged if you find time to visit our orphanage the Home of Love and the Spiritual Retreat Center in Antipolo City. Grateful for your understanding, God bless you and your undertakings.

RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.

A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC

Promulgated: August 19, 2009

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a) Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees. The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigants affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested

by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members,[4] is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.[5] As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer. There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 176339, January 10, 2011]

DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM AND LELY KUNG LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. SECURITY BANK CORP., TITOLAIDO E. PAYONGAYONG, EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY CORP. AND GIL SILOS, RESPONDENTS.

While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use the property in their business. But the Bank posted at the place private security guards from Philippine Industrial Security Agency (PISA). The Lims also claimed that on several occasions in 2000, the guards, on instructions of the Bank representatives Titolaido Payongayong and Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to the place and barred the Lims as well as DMI's employees from entering the property. One of the guards even pointed his gun at one employee and shots were fired. Because of this, DMI was unable to close several projects and contracts with prospective clients. Further, the Lims alleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and personal items left at the property.

DECISION ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims embodied in the plaintiff's supplemental complaint filed without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.

From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans from respondent Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled P92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank to secure the same, including a building and the lot on which it stands (the property), located at M. [1] de Leon St., Santolan, Pasig City.

The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against the Bank and its co-defendants [2] Payongayong, Sison, PISA, and Gil Silos. Answering the complaint, the Bank pointed out that the lease contract allowed it to sell the property at any time provided only that it gave DMI the right of first refusal. DMI had seven days from notice to exercise its option. On September 10, 1999 the Bank gave notice to DMI that it intended to sell the property to a third party. DMI asked for an extension of its option to buy and the Bank granted it. But the parties could not agree on a purchase price. The Bank required DMI to vacate and turnover the property but it failed to do so. As a result, the Bank's buyer backed-out of the sale. Despite what happened, the Bank and DMI continued negotiations for the purchase of the leased premises but they came to no agreement.

In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence. DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the lease. The contract also provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.

The Bank denied, on the other hand, that its guards harassed DMI and the Lims. To protect its property, the Bank began posting guards at the building even before it leased the same to DMI. Indeed, this arrangement benefited both parties. The Bank alleged that in October of 2000, when the parties could not come to an agreement regarding the purchase of the property, DMI vacated the same and peacefully turned over possession to the Bank.

On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31, 1999. Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the terms of its purchase. DMI offered to pay the Bank P8 million for the property but the latter rejected the offer, suggesting P15 million instead. DMI made a second offer of P10 million but the Bank declined the same.

The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it claimed that it never prevented DMI or its employees from entering or leaving the building. For this reason, the RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI and the Lims to enter the building and get the things they left there. The latter claimed, however, that on entering the building, they were unable to find the movable properties they left there. In a supplemental complaint, DMI and the Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in additional actual damages to them of over P27 million.

The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001. On that date, however, counsel for the Bank moved to reset the proceeding. The court denied the motion and allowed DMI and the Lims to present their evidence ex parte. The court

eventually reconsidered its order but only after the plaintiffs had already presented their evidence and were about to rest their case. The RTC declined to recall the plaintiffs' witnesses for cross- examination but allowed the Bank to present its [3] evidence. This prompted the Bank to seek relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) [4] and eventually from this Court but to no avail.

3. Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the machineries, equipment, and other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the property.

The Court's Rulings During its turn at the trial, the Bank got to present only defendant Payongayong, a bank officer. For repeatedly canceling the hearings and incurring delays, the RTC declared the Bank to have forfeited its right to present additional evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

One. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs' failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action.

On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in favor of DMI and the Lims. It ordered the Bank to pay the plaintiffs P27,974,564.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees. But the court absolved defendants Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.

But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs' action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs' non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the [6] case.

The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things the RTC's authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs' failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the CA, the latter found for the Bank, reversed the RTC decision, and dismissed [5] the complaint as well as the counterclaims. DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, hence this petition.

The Issues Presented

Two. As to the claim that Bank's representatives and retained guards harassed and intimidated DMI's employees and the Lims, the RTC found ample proof of such wrongdoings and accordingly awarded damages to the plaintiffs. But the CA disagreed, discounting the testimony of the police officers regarding their investigations of the incidents since such officers were not present when they happened. The CA may be correct in a way but the plaintiffs presented eyewitnesses who testified out of personal knowledge. The police officers testified merely to point out that there had been trouble at the place and their investigations yielded their findings.

The issues presented in this case are:

The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners' witnesses for having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court. But the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the Bank's fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of diligence.

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiff's supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it; Domingo Lim and some employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank guards' unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower. Their testimonies were never refuted. Police Inspector Priscillo dela Paz testified that he responded to several complaints regarding shooting incidents at the leased premises and on one occasion, he found Domingo Lim was locked in the building. When he asked why Lim had been locked in, a Bank representative told him that they had instructions to prevent anyone from taking any property out of the premises. It was only after Dela [7] Paz talked to the Bank representative that they let Lim out.

2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment committed against DMI and its representatives; and

Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules. Payongayong, the Bank's sole witness, denied charges of harassment against the Bank's representatives and the guards. But his denial came merely from reports relayed to him. They were not based on personal knowledge. Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the movable properties in question had remained in the premises and that the bank was responsible for their loss. The only evidence offered to prove the loss was Domingo Lim's testimony and some undated and unsigned inventories. These were self-serving and uncorroborated.

While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees. The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards.

Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix [8] the amount of the award. None of these circumstances obtain in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and REINSTATES with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 68184. The Court DIRECTS respondent Security Bank Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim damages in the following amounts: P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 for attorney's fees. The Court DELETES the award of actual damages of P27,974,564.00.

SO ORDERED. Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing [9] fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

To aggravate plaintiffs' omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed.

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case. The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the

THIRD DIVISION

The Facts:

[G.R. No. 152272, March 05, 2012]

JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY AND NELSON A. LOYOLA, PETITIONERS, VS. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL AND MICHAEL ALUNAN, RESPONDENTS.

On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring [5] subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency and their respective officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).

[G. R. NO. 152397]

FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL AND MICHAEL ALUNAN, PETITIONERS, VS. JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY AND NELSON A. LOYOLA, RESPONDENTS.

The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard; and that its permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered use of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.

DECISION Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road.

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the July 31, 2001 [1] [2] Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA[3] G.R. SP No. 60543, which annulled and set aside the March 3, 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Bian, Laguna (RTC), granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and upheld the June 16, 2000 [4] Omnibus Order denying the motion to dismiss.

On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued ordering Fil-Estate, et al, for a period of twenty (20) days, to stop preventing, coercing, intimidating or harassing the [6] commuters and motorists from using the La Paz Road.

Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance of a WPI.

On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class [8] suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their comment on the motion to dismiss [9] to which respondents filed a reply.

[7]

On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order JCHA, et al. to post a bond.

[10]

granting the WPI and required

al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and present right over La Paz Road. The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the merits.

On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration arguing, among others, that JCHA, et al. failed to satisfy the requirements for the issuance of [12] a WPI. On March 23, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their opposition to the motion. In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court, raising the following issues: The RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order, denying both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.

[11]

Hence, these petitions for review.

(A)

Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul (1) the Order dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor [13] legal easement constituted over it.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.

(B)

On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The Order dated March 3, 1999 granting the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the portion of the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000 denying the motion to dismiss is upheld.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE [15] SUPREME COURT.

In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al. anchor their petition on the following issues: SO ORDERED.
[14]

I. The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et

The Court of Appeals declaration that respondents Complaint states a cause of action is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.

II.

The Court of Appeals pronouncement that respondents complaint was properly filed as a class suit is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.

III.

In their Memorandum, Fil-Estate, et al. explain that La Paz Road is included in the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-120008, T90321 and T-90607, all registered in the name of La Paz. The purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to provide a passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the south, one of which was the Juana Complex I. When Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage, canal, and lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality of Bian. The streets within the subdivisions were then converted to public roads and were opened for use of the general public. The La Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was excluded from the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC, a consortium formed to develop several real properties in Bian, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of stock, La Paz contributed some of its real properties to the Municipality of Bian, including the properties constituting La Paz Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project.

[17]

The Court of Appeals conclusion that full blown trial on the merits is required to determine the nature of the La Paz Road is contrary to existing laws and [16] jurisprudence.

JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. They, however, disagree with the CAs pronouncement that a full-blown trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the hearing on the application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a public road and that commuters and motorists of their neighboring villages had used this road as their means of access to the San Agustin Church, Colegio De San Agustin and to SLEX in going to Metro Manila and to Southern Tagalog particularly during the rush hours when traffic at Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights Entry/Exit was at its worst.

Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI was proper since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have a clear right over La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of way or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road constituted an injury to such right. According to them, La Paz Road is a torrens registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it. They claim that La Paz Road is a private property registered under the name of La Paz and the beneficial ownership thereof was transferred to FEEC when La Paz joined the consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.

Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not sufficiently contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the pleading.

JCHA, et al. argue that La Paz Road has attained the status and character of a public road or burdened by an apparent easement of public right of way. They point out that La Paz Road is the widest road in the neighborhood used by motorists in going to Halang Road and in entering the SLEX-Halang toll gate and that there is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity. For residents of San Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang is along Rosario Avenue joining La Paz Road.

They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a class suit for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the commuters and motorists they are representing have a well-defined community of interest over La Paz Road. They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or cause of action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than the others.

Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI because the public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently proven and, as residents of San Pedro and Bian, Laguna, their right to use La Paz Road is undeniable.

The Courts Ruling

The issues for the Courts resolution are: (1) whether or not the complaint states a

cause of action; (2) whether the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.

With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:

(1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
[18]

Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.

The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its [19] averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs [20] cause of action. To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not [21] considered.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative [24] of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA: The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid [22] verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may [23] be asserted by the defendant.

In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.

Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lays down the rules for the issuance thereof. Thus:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts

complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits but merely an order for the grant of a provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is separate and distinct [29] from the trial on the merits of the main case. The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending [30] the decision of the case on the merits. There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the trial which may not be obtained or presented during the [31] hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. Moreover, the quantum of [32] evidence required for one is different from that for the other. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31, 2001 Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.

A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and [25] adjudicated. The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount [26] necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to [27] be clear and positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their [28] complaint.

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein. As correctly ruled by the CA:

Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private respondents failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and unmistakable right over the La Paz Road which was sought to be protected by the injunctive writ. They merely anchor their purported right over the La Paz Road on the bare allegation that they have been using the same as public road right-of-way for more than ten years. A mere allegation does not meet the standard of proof that would warrant the issuance of the injunctive writ. Failure to establish the existence of a clear right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction.

Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can fully prove their respective positions on the issues.

CORONA, J.:

THIRD DIVISION IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Present: G.R. No. 154598

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion[2] read:

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON Petitioner,

PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* CORONA and CARPIO MORALES, JJ.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.

- versus -

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations officer in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.

ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, Respondent. Promulgated: Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

August 16, 2004 Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification[3] that respondent was no longer residing there.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court or any court for that matter to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from the legislature.

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.

xxx

xxx

xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal

In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,[4] Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.[5]

The petition is granted. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word exclusive apparently cannot be construed any other way.

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.

We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the heirs of miners killed in a workrelated accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children. The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioners submission that the word exclusive in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on

any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children[8] under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:

Idolatrous reverence for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life.

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.[9]

xxx

xxx

xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.-A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

SO ORDERED.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved. One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:[10]

That the serving officer will have to search for the child all over the country does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008] VENANCIO FIGUEROA Y CERVANTES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT.
[1]

NACHURA, J.:

When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, [2] 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.

On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch [4] [5] 18. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as [6] charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for [7] the first time, the trial court's jurisdiction.

[3]

incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged? c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case? d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect? e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime [9] charged? Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the [10] action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic [11] Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 had already [12] been amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The said provision thus reads: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.--Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court's decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction but modified the penalty [8] imposed and the damages awarded.

xxxx

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution: a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner's appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel? b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to [13] 6 years, jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.

While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC--the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.

Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)

To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.

Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans, the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations: It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus: x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be [20] unfavorable: x x x Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches .
[21] [19]

As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred [14] by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it. [15] We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa that: It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction [16] can not be waived by the parties. x x x Later, in People v. Casiano,
[17]

the Court explained:

4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position--that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but [22] revolting. For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. [23] Ramirez, we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated-- obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)--to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse--as well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert [24] it. In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the court's jurisdiction, and who later obtained

an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the [25] rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., the Court ruled: While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held: Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barre petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours) Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled: In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial court's jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court's jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief - the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.

at any stage, a litigant's participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court's jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA [26] 36 [1995]). (italics ours) Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. [27] Pastorin, where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped [28] from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.

Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,

[29]

the Court clarified that:

Petitioner argues that the CA's affirmation of the trial court's dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.

The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a court's jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception

rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel . Indeed, the general rule remains: a court's lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the [30] answer. Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said: Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has [32] abandoned it or declined to assert it. And in the more recent Regalado v. Go, the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus: Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
[33] [31]

been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court's jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court's directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to [34] comply. The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court's absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the [35] adverse party does not suffer any harm.

raised in the petition. Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, [36] change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment [37] creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235- M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely--only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be [38] strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most [39] effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment [40] rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even [41] attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. As we have [42] stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action.x x x

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and [43] collateral attacks . With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues

THIRD DIVISION

DECISION

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners,

G. R . N o . 1 8 1 3 0 3

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, - versus CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN, R e s p o n d e n ts . PERALTA, JJ.

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders[1] dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria Danao Accorda, Evelyn Danao, Fermina Danao, and Leonora Danao, against respondents Benigno Tappa, Jerry Reyna, Saturnino Cambri, Francisco Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil Case No. 6868.

Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages[2] against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T127937[3] situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate.[4] During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.[5]

Promulgated:

Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members,[6] continued to occupy the subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.[7]

September 17, 2009 x---------------------------- ---------------------x Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.

According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title.[8] Petitioners additionally sought in their Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latters baseless claim over the subject property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.[9] Petitioners likewise prayed for an award against respondents for exemplary damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith and resorted to unlawful means to establish their claim over the subject property. Finally, petitioners asked to recover from respondents P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, because the latters refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to engage the services of a lawyer.[10]

exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.[15]

Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez.[16] And even if the two causes of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.[17]

Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691,[11] amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in its 4 May 2007 Order that:

The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion. It clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real property with assessed value less than P20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the same without prejudice.[12]

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court[13] states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.[14]

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises

The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title

to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.[18] The dispositive part of the 31 October 2007 Order of the RTC reads:

Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court rules in the negative.

This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute the assessed value of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action.

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.[21]

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.[19]

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of:

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:

Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO.[20] As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC. Petitioners statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only challenging the fact that their Complaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on the facts and arguments set forth in the instant Petition, however, the Court determines that the fundamental issue for its resolution is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

exercise: An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)

xxxx (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.[22]

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action for quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.[23]

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.[24] Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.[25]

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.[26]

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall

In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed

after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real property as owner.[27]

Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[29] No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. As for the RTC dismissing petitioners Complaint motu proprio, the following pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana[28] proves instructive:

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)