Hierarchy in Mathematics, Learning, Ability and Society 1.

Hierarchy in Mathematics A theme of previous chapters is the assumption that mathematics has a unique fixed hierarchical structure. Analogues of this thesis include the assumptions that mathematics learning is best organizedthis way, that mathematical ability is structured this way, and that society has a more or less fixed hierarchical structure, which education needs to reflect. These are assumptions of profound social and educational significance, warranting a chapter to themselves. A. Does Mathematics have a unique hierarchical structure? This question can be analyzed in two parts, concerning the existence and the uniqueness of a hierarchical structure for mathematics. Thus we have two subsidiary question; does an overall hierarchical structure of mathematical knowledge exist? And if so, is this unique and fixed hierarchical structure? A hierarchical can be defined for any body of mathematical knowledge with an overall structure. Whether it is an axiomatic structure, based on axioms and rules of inference, or a definitional structure, based on primitive terms and further defined terms, than a hierarchy is definable, as follows. The primitive expressions of the hierarchy (axioms or primitive terms) comprise its lowest level (0). Any other expression E in the structure can be reached in some minimum number an of rule applications (rules of inference or definition) from an expression of level 0 . this number n defines the level of expression E in the hierarchy. So every expression is assigned to a unique level in the hierarchy. Thus any body of mathematical knowledge can be given a canonical hierarchical form provided that it constitutes a single mathematical system or structure, linked by inferential or definitional relationships. Of these, inferential relationships are the most appropriate to consider, for they reflect the justificatory links between mathematical propositions and formulas, providing the structure of deductive axiomatic theories. Using the distinction between the levels of formal, informal and social discourse of mathematics, we see that for an appropriate formal mathematical theory, a hierarchy can be defined. For a realm of informal mathematical inquiry, this may not be possible. For an axiomatic basis may not be fully specified, and the logical relationships between informal mathematical propositions may not be conclusively established. Thus in the following we will focus only on formal mathematical theories, of those informal mathematical theories which are ready for formalization. For otherwise the conditions for establishing a hierarchy may not be met. We are now ready to consoder the two questions. First of all; does an overall hierarchical structure of mathematical knowledge exist? We have seen that for formal mathematical theories, with a fixed set of acioms, these is a hierarchical structure. The choise of the axioms set, together with the specification of the rules of inference and the background formal language, determines a hierarchical mathematical theory. However, mathematics is made up of many different theories, many of which have many different axiomatic formulations. Axiomatics set theory, for example, has a number of quite distinct axiomatizations such as Zelmelo-Fraenkel Set Theory and Godel Bernays-von Neumann Set Theory (Kneebone,

1963). Beyond this, many mathematicians further vary the axiomatic set theory there are studying by appending further axioms (Jech, 1971; Maddy, 1984). Consequently, there is no overall structure to formal mathematics, since it is made up of a myriad of different theories and theory formulations, each with its own structure and hierarchy. Futhermore, virtually every one of these axiomatic theories is incomplete, according to Godels (1931) theorem. Thus there are truths of the theory which do not have a place in the deductive hierarchy. As we saw in earlier chapters, the attempts by some of the great mathematicians of this century to establish mathematical knowledge in a single foundational system whether logicist, formalist or intuitionist, all failed. Thus the results of meta-mathematics force us to recognize that mathematics is made up of a multiplicity of distinct theories, that these cannot be reduced to a single system, and that no one of these is adequate to capture all the truths even in its limited domain of application. It follows that the question as to the existence of an overall mathematical hierarchy must be answered in the negative. This is irrevocable. However, in fairness, we should also consider a weaker question. Does a large and comprehensive informal structure of mathematics exist, even if it fails to satisfy the stringent criteria required to give an unambiguous structure to mathematics? Such a structure can be found in the Elements of Bourbaki (Kneebone, 1963). Bourbaki provides a systematic account of mathematics, beginning with set theory, and developing one after the other the major theories of pure, structural mathematics. Although the Bourbaki structure cannot be said to be complete (in the informal sense), for it leaves out the computational and recursive aspects of mathematics, it represents an informal codification of a substantial portion of mathematics. Does this provide an affirmative answer to the much weakened question? If we concede that it does, then the following caveats must be borne in mind: 1. A significant portion of mathematical knowledge is omitted, 2. The system is not formally well enough defined to allow a fixed hierarchy of mathematical knowledge to result, 3. The whole system depends on the assumption of classical set theory as the foundation of mathematics, 4. The whole system is culture-bound, reflecting mid-twentieth century structuralism. Thus only in a very weak form can we assert that there is an overall structure to a significant part of mathematics. The second question is as follows. Given the assumption that there is an overall structure to mathematical knowledge is it a unique and fixed structure on which a hierarchy can be based? This question again has two parts. The first is concerned with the uniqueness of the structure of mathematics. The second concern the definability of the precise hierarchy in terms of this structure. We have already seen that thissecond part is untinable. Even if the structure provided by Bourbaki is conceded to be unique, it is informal and therefor does not suffice for the precise definition of hierarchy. Thus in any strict sense, we can already assert that there is no unique hierarchy to mathematics. But let us turn to the uniqueness of the structure of mathematics. This uniqeneness would seem to depend on agreement as to the foundations of mathematics. Bourbaki assumes set theoretical foundations. Ignoring the differences between different set theories, can set theory be said to provide a unique, universally agreed foundation to mathematics? This question must be answered in the negative. We have already seen that the foundationist claims that

mathematics rests on a uniqe foundation fail. At least two alternatives to the set theoretic foundations of mathematics exist. First of all, it has been claimed that Category Theory can provide an alternative foundation of mathematics, in place of set theory (Lawvere, 1966). This claim has not been fully justified, but it nevertheless contitutes a challenge to the uniqeness of set theoretic foundation. Indeed, there is a branch of category theory (Topos theory) to which both intuitionistic and classical logic can be reduced (Bell, 1981). Since axiomatic set theory is expressible in first order classical logic, it can be reduced to category theory. Secondly, intuitionist logic provides foundations for mathematics. Although not all classical mathematics is expressible in terms of this basis, much of the intuitionist programme has been realized for analysis, by Bishop (1967) and others. Furthermore, intuitionostic logic accommodates combinatorial mathematics, unlike the set-theoretic foundations of classical mathematics. Thus on the basis of these two arguments, the claim that there is a unique structure to mathematics is refuted. In fact, the history of mathematics teaches us the opposite lesson. Throughout its development mathematics change through the fundamental restructuring of mathematical concepts, theories and knowledge (Lakatos, 1976). Thus although structures play a central role in organizing mathematical knowledge, they are multiple structures which form, dissolve and reform over the passage of time. There are no grounds for assuming that this process will ever cease, or for assuming that alternative theories and reformulations will ever be axhausted. Such a view is central to social constructivism, and to other philosophies of mathematics which acknowledge its historical basis. Thus not only is it untrue that at any one time mathematics can be described by a single unique hierarchical structure, but also over time whatever structures are present change and develop. In refuting the claim that mathematics has a unique hierarchical structure, attention has been restricted to the logical, that is deductive structure of mathematical theories. As we have seen hierarchies can be defined in other ways, most notably, as hierarchies of terms and definitions. Whilst these are not nearly as significant in mathematics as deductive structure, the same argument can be transposed to this realm. For the deductive structure of any theory carries with it a hierarchy of definitions, and almost as many definitional structures as deductive ones exist. Thus there is no unique hierarchy of definitions either. No further, global hierarchies certainly do exist, such as the Turing degrees (of unsolvability) in recurtion theory (Bell and Machover, 1977). But these in no way structure even a significant fraction of mathematical knowledge. Thus it can be asserted unequivocally that mathematics does not have an overall hierarchical structure, and certainly not a unique one, even when the claim is interpreted generously and loosely.

Is mathematics a set of discrete knowledge components? There is a further assumption concerning the nature and structure of mathematical knowledge which deserves examination because of its educational import. This is the assumption that mathematics can be analyzed into discrete knowledge components, the unstructured sum (or rather set) of which faithfully represents the discipline. This assumption requires that mathematical propositions are independent bearers of meaning and significance. Distinguishing between the formal, informal and social discourses of mathematics, it is evident that this claim is best made for formal mathematics. For the other two domains

presuppose meaning contexts, as will be argued below. Since structure is one of the characteristics of mathematical knowledge, this claim may also rest on the unwarranted assumption that there is a unique structure to mathematics. This may be needed so that when the discrete molecules of knowledge are recombined, a fixed and predetermined whole (the body of mathematical knowledge) results. We have disposed of this second assumption above. However, the presupposition that mathematical prepositions are independent bearers of meaning and significance also fails. First of all, formal mathematical expressions derive their significance from the axiomatic theory or formal system in which they occur. Without this context they lose some of their significance, and the structure imposed by theory collapses. Secondly, the expressions of formal mathematics explicity derive their semantic meaning from the interpretation or class of intended interpretations associated with the given formal theory and language. Such semantic has been a standard part of formal logic since Tarski (1936). This notion has been extended to the treatment of formal scientific theories by Sneed (1971), who adds the class of intended interpretations to the structure of the theory. Thus the separation of the expressions of mathematics into isolated and discrete part denies them much of their significance and all of their semantic meaning. Such expressions consequently have little claim to be regarded as the molecular components of mathematical knowledge. Even more than the above, the expressions of informal mathematics discourse have implicir meanings associated with the overall background theory and context. For the rules and meanings which govern such expressions do not have precise formal stipulations, but depend even more on implicit rules of use (wittgenstein, 1953). Models of the semantics of both formal and informal languages iscreasingly draw on the context of utterances (barwise and Perry, 1982). Whether expressed in formal or informal language, the expressions of mathematics cannot be regarded as free-standing, independent bearers of meaning. Thus mathematics cannot be represented simply as a set of molecular propositions, for these do not represent the structural relationships between propositions, as well as losing their contextdependent meanings. B. Educational Implications The fact that the discipline of mathematics does not have a unique hierarchical structure and cannot be represented as a collection of molecular propositions, has significant educational implications. However, first the relationship between the discipline of mathematics, and the content of the mathematics curriculum needs to be considered.

The relationship between mathematics and the curriculum Two alternative relationships are possible. (1) The mathematics curriculum must be a representative selection drom the discipline of mathematics, albeit chosen and formulated so that it is accessible to learners.. (2) The mathematics curriculum is an independent entity, which need not represent the discipline of mathematics. Most curriculum theorists reject this second possibility, arguing the general case that the curriculum should reflect both the knowledge and processes of inquiry of the subject disciplines (Stenhouse, 1975; Schwab, 1975; Hirst and Peters, 1970). A form of Case 2 is devastatingly satirized by Benjamin (1971).

Studies of curriculum change have documented how developments in mathematics give rise via the pressures exerted by mathematicians to changes in the scholl mathematics curriculum reflecting these developments (Cooper, 1985; Howson et al., 1981). More generally, in mathematics education it is accepted that the content of the curriculum should reflect the nature of the discipline of mathematics. Such acceptance is either implicit, or explicit, as in Thwaites (1979), Confrey (1981) and Robitaille and Dirks: The construction of a mathematics curriculum . . . [results from] a number of factors which operate on the body of mathematics to select and restructure the content deerned to be most appropriate for the scholl curriculum. (Robitaille and Dirks, 1982, page 3) An international seminar on the future of mathematics education explicitly considered the possibility that real mathematics would not form the basis of the mathematics curriculum for everyone (the majority would study omly useful mathematics). However, this was contradicted by the three other options concidered, including the most widely accepted view that a differentiated but representative curriculum is needed (Howson and Wilson, 1986). Of the five ideologies distinguished in this book, all but the industrial trainers strongly endorse case 1. As a concequence of this brief survey, it can be said that the principle that the mathematics curriculum should be a representative selection from the discipline of mathematics represents the consensus of experts. If the mathematics curriculum is therefore to reflect the discipline of mathematics faithfully, it must not represent mathematics as having a unique, fixed hierarchical structure. There are multiple structures within any one theory, and no one structure or hierarchy can ever said to be ultimate. Thus the mathematics curriculum should allow for different ways of struucturing mathematical knowledge. Im addition, the mathematics curriculum should not offer a collection of separate propositions as constitutive of mathematics. For the components of mathematics are variously structured of inter-related, and this should be reflected in the mathematics curriculum. These educational implications allow us to criticize the National Curriculum in mathematics on epistemological grounds. For the mathematics curriculum is represented as a unique hierarchy of fourteen topics (attainment targets) at ten levels (Departement of education and Science, 1989). Furthermore, at each level, the topic is represented by a number of propositions or processes, and mastery of the discipline of mathematics is understood to result from the mastery of these disparate components. Thus the National Curriculum misrepresents mathematics, contrary in terms of the nature of mathematics, as well as portraying mathematical knowledge as a set of discrete facts and skills. A possible defence is that the mathematics curriculum might fail to represent the discipline of mathematics in order to fulfil a psychological purpose, such as to represent a psychological hierarchy of mathematics.

2. Hierarchy in Learning Mathematics A. The view that mathematics learning is hierarchical It is often claimed that the learning of mathematics is hierarchical, meaning that there are items of knowledge and skill which are neccesary prerequisites to the learning of subsequent items of mathematical knowledge. Such views are embodied in Piagets theory of intellectual development. Piaget postulates a sequence of four stages (sensori-motor, pre-operational, concrete operational, formal operational) which form a hierarchy of development. The learner must master operations at one stage before she is ready to think and operate at the next level. However the rigid hierarchical aspect of Piagets theory has been criticized (Brown and Desforges, 1979). Indeed Piaget coined the term decalage to describe hierarchytransgressing competencies. Another psychologist who proposes that learning is hierarchical is Gagne. He argues that a topic can only be learned when its hierarchy of prerequisites have been learned. [A] topic (i.e.,an item of knowledge) at a particular level in the hierarchy may be supported by one more topics at the next lower level . . . Any individual will not be able to learn a particular topic if he has failed to achieve any of subordinate topics that support it. (Gagne, 1977, page 166-7) Gagne claims that in empirical testing, is none of his topic hierarchies has there ever been more than 3 per cent of contrary instances. Thus two influential psychologists representative of the developmental and neo-behaviourist traditions assert that learning is hierarchical. Furthermore, both these psychologists have made special studies of mathematics. Within mathematics education, there has been empirical research purporting to uncover learning hierarchies in mathematics. An influential British project, Concepsts in Secondary Mathematics and Science, proposed a number of hierarchies of understanding in some of the major areas of scholl mathematics (Hart, 1981). This study offers up to eight hierarchical levels in each of the topics studied. The cited theories and empirical work are small selection of the research concerned with identifying hierarchies in the learning of mathematics. Such research, possibly coupled with absolutist-foundationist views of the nature of mathematics, have led to the widely held belief that the learning of mathematics follows a hierarchical sequence. For example, this view is articulated in the Cockcroft Report. Mathematics is a difficult subject both to teach and to learn. One of the reasons why this is so is that mth