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Daniel Kennedy

Free Will and Determinism

V83147

Space-time, Causation and Consciousness: The Unintelligibility of Free Will in Our Universe

Introduction One cannot doubt the mystery our universe holds. Its ambiguity leads to fervent debate over free will, agency and the like, and since one cannot observe the universe from a position outside of it, it seems one must forever recognise this dualism. Not so, I contend. The universe, as it exists, must conform, at the very least, to predictable probabilities. If not, the universe would appear chaotic. Thankfully, the universe does appear to have some structured, ordered composition one finds it intelligible. This intelligibility, one might assume, should point towards some underlying governance. However, one can never truly escape ones own consciousness, meaning the manner in which one experiences may affect the experience itself. This famous postulation, developed in its most eloquent form during the Enlightenment period, appears to challenge commonly accepted beliefs about scientific inquiry, especially when it necessitates the existence of a priori principles, yet it remains difficult to disprove the hypothesis, all knowledge has a subjective quality. Can we ever have, therefore, true knowledge of the universe? Would it ever reveal its secrets to an extent that resolves the free will argument? According to Kant, our notions of cause and effect belong to the subjective mind, which can do nought but infer such structures into the world.1 In this world of phenomena, events follow a deterministic causal chain, so no event in the past, present or future can be altered in any real sense (if one also accepts space and time as conditions of experience). In the past century, however, what we take to mean causation has undergone dramatic revision in light of the discovery of quanta. Far from enlightening the field, quantum mechanics (QM) have complicated the causal issue, though QM, once fully understood, will almost certainly enable a more thoroughgoing interpretation of the universe. On the other hand, advances in the social sciences, genetics, biochemistry and neurophysiology, have further reduced human behaviour to activities we can predict, and for which we can account. It looks as though free will must occupy a room that gets

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 60 (B35, 36; A21)

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increasingly smaller with the advance of science. Even the indeterminism of QM appears irreconcilable with the libertarian ideal of free will.2 Advocates of this libertarian free will thus often rely on consciousness, specifically human consciousness, as indicative of its reality. Herein, they say, one can find the essential characteristic of human experience, the capacity for self-determination; or, analogously, the conscious observer makes use of trans-empirical power centres,3 which allow for freely-chosen acts. I would argue that this view of free will falsifies, devalues, and negates reality,4 and undermines the kind of free will we inherit from it. Humanity, I maintain, exists as an expression of the universes attempt to know itself humanity existing within the universe so one must construe notions of multiple worlds as false. This includes the supposed worlds of phenomena and noumena. Hence, if we want to make sense of our experiences, we should interpret them in a realist fashion, and disregard any theory unable to state the conditions under which it may be falsified.5 The following attempts to justify the relegation of free will to no more than a useful myth, one that holds no verifiable authenticity in our reality, whilst still recognising the subtleties within the ongoing debate.

Part One Conditions of Human Experience

Humes causation As an empiricist, Hume believed that the relations we see between events, specifically causal relations, are sensational, and that causation represents repetitive similarities between external sensations, which when reflected upon give rise to feelings of connection. Our impression of connection between events belongs to the world of internal sensation, but it would not come about but for the external sensations that represent the world of which we have experience. The synthesis of these impressions uniquely defines humanitys concept of causality. However, one can see that in Humes eye, our experience never actually represents causation to us.6

2 3

Pink, Thomas, Free Will: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 17 Kane, Robert, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 33 4 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Twilight of the Idols & The Antichrist (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 15 5 McGrath, Alister E., Science and Religion: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 78 6 Pink, Free Will: A Very Short Introduction, p. 121

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The principle of causation dictates that causes must necessitate their effects. Hume argued that even if one specifies all the causes of an event, one would still not have specified something that makes it logically necessary for the event to occur.7 Therefore, one must also include the laws of nature as causal influences, which create the necessary conditions for the event to occur. However, for Hume, the laws of nature are just universal regularities or constant conjunctions, not necessary truths.8 Nevertheless,
Tis evident all reasonings concerning concerning matters of fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and we can never infer the existence of one object from another, unless they be connected together, either mediately or immediately. In order therefore to understand these reasonings, we must be perfectly acquainted with the idea of a cause; and in order to that, must look about us to find something that is the cause of another.
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Kants Transcendental Aesthetic The implications of Kants transcendental method are truly far-reaching. Kant postulates that knowledge of the world is influenced by the observer. We perceive objects by experiencing their phenomena, but objects can exist independently of their being observed. Their nature, however, is determined by the very fact that we are able to perceive them. Experience itself, for Kant, is a kind of knowledge that needs interpreting, and how we interpret this knowledge is determined by rules, which must exist a priori. The world as we experience it is thus constructed by our own intuition of it, meaning we can never know a thing in itself; we can know only phenomenal representations. The noumenal world is inaccessible because it exists outside of space and time, which are conditions of experience. Nevertheless, the phenomenal world is no less real than the noumenal world our experiences elicit. Kant thus posits a hidden world, unknowable to the conscious observer. Though the reasoning and philosophical investigations lying behind this position are methodical, the eventual conclusion is indolent. One must, therefore, recognise Kants intention as always to provide the metaphysical basis for a freedom of the human person, which he equates to the soul (or noumenon), from which one can infer moral quality; he cannot accept free will as an epiphenomenon. However, supposing there were such things as noumena, their free nature, existing as they would outside of

7 8

Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 222 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 223 9 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 649

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space and time, is meaningless unless translated into the phenomenal world, for phenomenal representations also share a causal nature, and cause and effect demarcate much of our practical reasoning and morality.10 I find Kants attempt to reconcile cosmological free will and practical free will perplexing.11 In my opinion, he distinguishes the noumenal self so sharply from that of phenomena that one might as well not talk about it at all, since to do so would only conform to our phenomenal conceptions. Kantian free will is utterly mysterious. Kant also relies on another unverifiable belief the mind. There are many dualist interpretations of immaterial mind versus material body, of which Kants is just one. We feel that consciousness is abstract in nature, but that it can have an effect on the concrete world around us. This dualism often appears obvious, but it is not defensible. If we find the world intelligible through the inference of space, time and causality, dont these occur in reality since our intellect is the product of physical events? Though the physical universe constitutes immense capacity for creativity, surely we dont suppose that it can create outside of itself an ethereal realm? In any case, how can the brain intuit anything that is a priori without being caused to do so? The libertarian who defines the mind as the moderator of choice glorifies it and affirms its transcendent (not transcendental) nature, free from the laws of physics. Scientifically, this is reprehensible. Logically, it is vacuous, for there is a failure to acknowledge the possibility that the mind could fall foul of the same deterministic or indeterministic problems body faces in the free will discussion.12 Popper admits the assumption of undetermined states of consciousness within a deterministic universe would be highly unsatisfactory, and indeed gratuitous,13 for they would be unknowable to our physically determined behaviour. Indeed, consciousness would fail as a cause of action. For this reason, he advocates an indeterministic universe, moving beyond Kants dualistic universe to one of interaction between three, based on quantum indeterminacy. The free will discussion now becomes convoluted, and we require analysis of the universe as it exists.
10 11

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 463 (B561; A533) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 463 (B561; A533) 12 A more plausible extra factor in the act of choosing freely may be the relationship between the agent and the act itself. The agent-causation theory suggests that free actions exist through an agents relation to the world they affect, not merely a set of received circumstances. Agents are not events or occurrences, so they can be deemed causal, and thus begin a causal chain. It is then our experience of agent-causation that leads to our understanding of event-causation, the way in which we view effects as having causes, which is precisely why an agent is able to act freely, and why their choice is undetermined an event cannot cause that by which it is caused. There are objections to the agent-causation theory. Again, what is to distinguish the apparent choice made by an agent from chance? The libertarian states that agent-causation, by its very nature, cannot be random, as it is the conscious control over an event itself, not a spontaneous occurrence. Agent-causation is, therefore, indeterminable and deliberate. (Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, p. 48) 13 Popper, Karl, The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism (London: Routledge, 1982), p. 25

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Part Two The Universe (As We Know It)

Space-time and the Relativity of Einstein The revelation of the relativity of space and time has led to many Kantian, or neo-Kantian, followers exhibiting it as a suggestion of the veracity of idealism, and the inaccuracy of realism.14 For them, the demonstration of the subjective quality of the spatio-temporal conditions of experience vindicates the belief in the insertion of such frameworks by the observer. For sure, the lack of an absolute space or time necessitates a system of reference that then gives an arbitrary or contrived view of the universe.15 However, such convictions miss the point entirely. Special Relativity asserts the laws of physics remain the same for all observers. (No mass can reach the speed of light, for to do so would require an infinite amount of energy.) Hence, special relativity actually affirms the universality of experience the laws of nature remain the same for all inertial frames of reference.16 This also includes non-observers. Moreover, space and time, space-time, must now be understood to constitute the universe itself, not merely as referring to axes on a grid. Furthermore, the general theory of relativity refutes any a priori concept of space-time, since without mass, space-time has no separate existence.17
Space and time not only affect but also are affected by everything that happens in the universe. Just as one cannot talk about events in the universe without the notions of space and time, so in general relativity it became meaningless to talk about space and time outside the limits of the universe.
18

Einstein tells us space-time does not claim existence on its own, but only as a structural quality of the field *generated by massive bodies+.19 According to the special and general theories of relativity, then, the observer intuits space-time as a necessary property of substance, but space-time does not exist purely through the act of observation. Gravity can actually warp space-time, affecting our spatio-temporal experience more than the experience itself ever could.

14 15

Ryckman, Thomas, The Reign of Relativity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 28 Ryckman, The Reign of Relativity, p. 16 16 Stannard, Russell, Relativity: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 4 17 Einstein, Albert., Relativity and the Problem of Space, http://www.relativitybook.com/resources/Einstein_space.html (1952), 3.9 18 Hawking, Stephen, A Brief History of Time (London: Bantam, 1988), p. 38 19 Einstein, Relativity and the Problem of Space, http://www.relativitybook.com/resources/Einstein_space.html 3.11

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Though one can confine statements of truth in physics to things that are experienceable physical things,20 this should not lead to the conclusion that physical truths exist outside of our cognition, for the opposite may also follow. Certainly, hypotheses provide ground from which to work, but they remain theoretical until proven otherwise, and human achievement does not rest on negative intuition. If space-time relativity does not demonstrate a noumenal world, what can we say about human free will? If anything, relativity confines ones experience of the universe, limiting causality to only that which lies within an events light cone. Relativity on its own, however, paints an incomplete picture of the cosmos.

Causation and Quantum Physics Causation is one of the most challenging philosophical concepts, and it goes to the heart of the free will debate. Fundamentally, we ascribe one of two natures to the universe. Either, it is deterministic and predictable according to laws, or it is indeterministic and events happen at random there is no cause.21 We tend to see both kinds in the world, but our common scientific understanding prefers events to be determined. However, QM gives us a view of the universe entirely foreign to our everyday understanding. We typically interpret motion as Newtonian, predictable and consistent, attributing notions of cause and effect to that which we experience. At the much smaller level of elementary particles and quanta, however, we find a much less certain picture. Here, probability reigns, and classical physics appears impotent. Laudisa pertinently summarises the problem we inherit:
either the notion of causation is interpreted in such general terms so as to lose sight of the original underlying intuition so that we seem to do nothing but giving a different name to the puzzle under scrutiny or we are led to ascribe to the special-relativistic spacetime structure a purely phenomenological status in order to make room for a preferred spacetime foliation, with respect to which causal relations can be univocally defined.
22

However, there is no discontinuity between the macroscopic and microscopic events we observe. This is because the multiplication many times over of quantum events, which concur with probability and statistical laws, leads to the predictability of larger, more massive objects. Hence,
20 21

Ryckman, The Reign of Relativity, p. 125 Hodgson, David, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 100 22 Laudisa, Frederico, Non-locality and theories of causation, Non-locality and Modality (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2002), p. 233

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we can safely proceed on the assumption that the middle-sized objects that we deal with in our everyday lives do exist, independently of being observed, in definite positions and with definite motion and do behave in accordance with the laws of classical physics.
23

We should not forget, though, that the practical way in which we read causation is not the entire picture, and QM proves to be more problematic. In fact, QM can be deterministic along the interpretation of the wave function, but it appears in this case we must also relinquish locality.24 There is patently appeal here for the believer in free will the existence of indeterminable events, or at least determinable events without any meaningful reference (good news for Kantians). The collapse of the wave function can be interpreted in several ways. Either, the observation event itself collapses the superposition, or there are hidden variables unknown to the observer, or there are actually myriad worlds which reflect all the possible outcomes within the superposition. The many-worlds theory is fantastic, but useless. Not only would many-worlds be unverifiable, but to accept their existence we would have to posit worlds in which the most improbable events regularly occur, leading to a meaningless conception of probability. One would then also have to radically revise ones understanding of causation. Observer participation is even less desirable, for according to this theory, an agents conscious mental activity could act holistically in exercising a causal influence not fully explicable from a physical viewpoint.25 How does one not find the presupposition of a conscious subject conceited? It is simply unsatisfactory to let the act of observation determine ones interpretation of QM, which is so fundamental to the way in which the universe operates, and I agree that it is reasonable... to believe that the wholly implausible idea that matter is to some extent dependent on mind will be rooted out of QM.26 Instead, one should look to the hidden variables theory, which attributes non-locality to an epistemic shortfall, acknowledging humanitys knack for forming incomplete ideas concerning the world, whilst simultaneously trying to eliminate that incompleteness. The effect of this theory, if proven by discovery of the hidden variable[s], would be to make QM (and therefore everything) deterministic. We might then ask whether we should still assent to notions of free will. Alternatively, one could view the superposition as an objectively existing informational structure, carrying the maximum information that can be had about the world.27 The appeal of this ontic approach, attributed to von Neumann, is that it does not require conscious measurement of the environment for the collapse to occur, but does explain why it does occur when we observe it. Again, however,
23 24

Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 91 Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 100 25 Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 100 26 Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 100 27 Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 103

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the restriction of information seems unsatisfactory. With regards to relativity, non-locality is not taken to permit the transmission of a detectable signal faster than the speed of light, so one need not suppose the causation of any event lying outside the light cone of the originally observed event, i.e. local causation is preserved.28 Nevertheless, non-locality and Bell-type inequalities are cause for concern for those who favour traditional concepts of cause and effect. QM, therefore, leads to the development of probabilistic causation:
for an event (or set of events) C to be a cause of an event E, Cs occurring must raise the probability of Es occurring and this probability is conditional on an appropriately chosen set of background factors so that the increase in probability picks out a genuine case of causation rather than a spurious case of accidental correlation.
29

While this may give a more complete description of what we mean by causation at the quantum level, it is inadequate and too mundane for what the libertarian needs to justify a free will based on the workings of QM. Somehow, though, proponents of free will still maintain that the free will they espouse can be found in the sphere of QM. The many-minds theory attempts to explain how QM might provide different routes, or choices, of mental states, but does not explain quite how the event is chosen.30 Others point to consciousness and mental events as determined by QM, not classical physics, as means of agency:
any strong sense of free will requires that mental events, such as those involved in decisions and voluntary actions, have efficacy in the physical world. Mental events appear to be associated with patterns of physical events spread over substantial regions of the brain; so that if the mental events, as such, are to have an impact on the world, this would seem to suggest some non-locality in causal histories.
31

Hodgson goes on to say, however, that Dennett believes any noticeable effect of quantum-level indeterminacies in our brains would make it extremely unlikey, given the complexity of our brains, that we could ever know whether any particular act was or was not one for which the person was

28 29

Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 100 Bishop, Robert C., Chaos, Indeterminism and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 117 30 Bacciagaluppi, Guido, Remarks on Space-time and locality in Everetts interpretation, Non-locality and modality, pp. 108-109 31 Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 86

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responsible.32 It appears, then, that the onus is on the libertarian to prove that QM is not only effective in probabilistically causing mental states, but also that these mental states are not arbitrary.

Consciousness and Neuroscience Historically, consciousness is no less tricky to define than causation. It does seem undeniably fundamental in the free will debate, but one must test its irreducibility. It seems as though the conscious experience is just accepted as how it appears to us. One often hears of levels of consciousness without an explanation of the physical processes these might entail. In discussions of free will, one of the most significant findings of Neuroscience is often ignored. The so-called Readiness Potential is far more conclusive than the metaphysical declarations of traditional epistemologies. Studies find that the voluntary acts of the participants are preceded by an electrical change in the brain, i.e. neurons firing in an area of the brain not directly associated with the motor act, but not associated with conscious awareness also.33 This change occurs 550 msec. before the act, which is also 350-400 msec. before participants become aware of the intention to act, i.e. before they are conscious of their own volition. This would seem to suggest that our free will is actually determined, for how can we act with intention if we are unaware of the intent? The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously.34 This is not the entire story, however. Participants do have the power to veto the act before it is carried out, and by this capacity, one might say they control performance of the act.35 Taking this into account, one could say that free will is not initiative but regulative; actions are caused, but one retains the ability to accept or reject the final outcome. Traditional concepts of moral responsibility etc can be kept meaningful as long as they are revised to express this new understanding of volition. Still, it is unknown whether the regulative act of free will is determined or not, and more investigation is needed. Nevertheless, one can point to a very real incidence of apparent conscious decision-making in the results, even though it may only be epiphenomenal. I object to any notion of mind expressed as one half of the dualist world, for it is unintelligible to suggest such a mind could be causally effective within the natural world. However, we might be viewd as autonomous agents if we identify decisions and actions with or through an

32 33

Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 101 Libet, Benjamin, Do We Have Free Will? The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 551 34 Libet, Do We Have Free Will? The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 551 35 Libet, Do We Have Free Will? The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 551

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emotional response that has the effect of identifying them as our own, i.e. we relate them to ourselves personally. Agency and causation can thus be viewed as subjective:
We can describe the process of emotional identification as a cognitively nontransparent, but economical and efficient test for whether actions are consistent with ones own past. It thus fulfils the function of a self-compatibility test. I suggest that we call this kind of agency authenticity.
36

This more sophisticated view of the relationship between act and actor conforms to compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility.

Conclusion The scope of this investigation has determined it more of a treatise than was originally intended, but no doubt there was no choice in the matter. I have tried to show that libertarian free will is a desperate vision,37 but I concede that my understanding of the relevant scientific disciplines is rudimentary, and can be challenged. However, my basic argument is clear how can we experience freedom without also experiencing constraint? Freedom should be understood as relative, not absolute, and one can influence the freedom one has by enabling oneself with the capacity to do more, so that when opportunity arises, one is not constrained by inability. This is a compatibilist position shared by the likes of Daniel Dennett in his authoritative work, Elbow Room. Advocates of a deeper freedom need to show why this view of freedom is not enough. Associated to this, libertarian free will often eludes scientific investigation because of the alternative world from which it is said to project, which is another reason to reject it in favour of a will more intuitively correct and practical. Dennett describes the brain as both a semantic engine, and a syntactic engine.38 By this, he means the brain manipulates meaning (semantic), but that it does so imperfectly because it is a physical mechanism, which must, therefore create its own meaning from structural or formal properties (syntactic). This is an appealing linguistic metaphor, and closely approximates, in my view, how we experience the world. He goes on to say that free will, the belief that one can choose one action over another based on considerations, is an illusion generated as an offshoot of the evolution of self-conscious beings. The brain could never be a true semantic engine because it is subject to physical processes like everything else, but it can transcend these to form abstractions.
36 37

Walter, Henrik, Neurophilosophy of Free Will, The Oxford Handbook to Free Will, p. 575 Dennett, Daniel C., Elbow Room: the Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984), p. 28 38 Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 28

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As regards relativity and QM, I feel I have made the case for realism and determinism. Strawson agrees that people are not actually morally deserving of praise or blame if Einsteins theory of relativity is anything close to correct.39 The causation of QM also means that the agentself is ultimately as it is as a matter of luck.40 Furthermore, one cannot be the cause of oneself causa sui and it is by acting erroroneously that we come to the idea of being able to act freely. Nevertheless, QM remains enigmatic, and different causal theories may have a differing degree of adequacy when applied to the domain of microphysics.41 Another (im)possibility for free will has been omitted from this essay the existence of a Creator. The Divine Foreknowledge dilemma is philosophically important to discussions of free will, but since we cannot observe such a Being, it would be pointless to justify a belief for or against here. Admittedly, the fact that we have no experience of a timeless realm is not in itself any reason to think there is no such realm,42 but ideas of an eternal, omniscient divinity unnecessarily complicate the issue for these purposes. The free will debate will no doubt continue long into the future. Advocates on both sides often claim that their view should take precedence until one is disproven, and they appeal to our sensibility when making such assertions. However, the libertarian attack of determinism is hollow. I believe The lack of a strong form of free will does not imply that all moral order collapses or that we need abandon every concept of responsibility.43 In fact, deterministic behaviour, once fully understood, should lead to an enabling view of the universe and humanitys place within it. The amalgamation of QM and relativity provides a hugely complex worldview, but it is not beyond the wit of humankind to rationalise physical laws into workable tools. Libertarianism is a hard position to defend. I personally find it untenable, but human free will is becoming increasingly nuanced.
It is possible to argue that the full reality of free will and constraints upon it can only be fully explicated in terms of an emergent realm of human social and rational influences and counterinfluences that depends upon the physical world for its existence but is not reducible to physical processes.
44

39 40

Strawson, Galen, The Bounds of Freedom, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 441 Strawson, The Bounds of Freedom, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 457 41 Laudisa, Frederico, Non-locality and theories of causation, Non-locality and Modality, p. 224 42 Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook to Free Will, p. 51 43 Walter, Neurophilosophy of Free Will, The Oxford Handbook to Free Will, p. 574 44 Bishop, Chaos, Indeterminism and Free Will, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 122

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Ryckman, Thomas, The Reign of Relativity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) Scruton, Roger, Kane: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) Sosa, Ernest and Tooley, Michael, Causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) Stannard, Russell, Relativity: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) Zeki, Semir, A Vision of the Brain (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1993)

Einstein, Albert., Relativity and the Problem of Space, http://www.relativitybook.com/resources/Einstein_space.html (1952) Einstein, Albert, Physics and Reality, Daedalus, Vol. 132, No. 4 (2003), pp. 22-25 Evans, D. A. and Landsberg, P. T., Free Will in a Mechanistic Universe? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1970), pp. 343-358 Grieder, Alfons, Relativity, Causality and the Substratum, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1977), pp. 35-48 Kaiser, C. H., The Consequences for Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 37, No. 13 (1940), pp. 337-348 Leslie, John, Our Place in the Cosmos, Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 291 (2000), pp. 5-24 Margenau, Henry, Quantum Mechanics, Free Will, and Determinsim, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 21 (1967), pp. 714-725 Moyal, J. E., Causality, Determinism and Probability, Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 91 (1949), pp. 310-317 Putnam, Hilary, Time and Physical Geometry, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 8 (1967), pp. 240-247 Price, Huw, A Neglected Route to Realism about Quantum Mechanics, Mind, Vol. 103, No. 411 (1994), pp. 303-336 Shanks, Niall, Quantum Mechanics and Determinism, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 170 (1993), pp. 20-37 Trenholme, Russell, Causation and Necessity, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 14 (1975), pp. 444-465)

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