Professor Hubin Philosophy 431

Objections to Utilitarianism
I. Disutility of Utilitarianism: Some objections to utilitarianism seek to undermine utilitarianism on its own grounds. That is, they seek to show that utilitarianism refutes itself. A. Disutility of Calculating: It is sometimes charged that utilitarianism has bad consequences because if we were to take time to calculate before acting, we would frequently not be acting in a timely manner. (The image is that of a person calculating utility while an innocent child [if this is not an oxymoron] drowns.) 1. Reply: Utilitarianism recommends that course of action that produces the best consequences. If calculating produces worse consequences than some alternative, the utilitarian theory tells us not to calculate.

B.

Problem of Utilitarian Dispositions: It is sometimes said that the disposition to maximize overall utility will not maximize overall utility. There are two different ways that this could happen. (If one believes that utilitarian dispositions will lead one to calculate utility in situations in which one should not, then the above objection about calculating can be seen as an instance of this problem. In particular, it is a version of the indirect consequence version of this objection.) 1. Indirect Consequences: Sometimes it is charged that utilitarian dispositions (dispositions to maximize overall utility) indirectly lead to bad consequences. a) ExampleNuclear Deterrence: If I an the leader of a super power and am disposed always to do what produces the most overall utility, my threat to engage in retaliation for a massive nuclear strike will not be credible. An opponent will know that once they strike me, in a single bold stroke, with all they have, it will no longer produce overall utility for me to retaliate. (It will just kill lots more people, many of them innocent, without deterring any further attack on the opponents part.) Therefore, since I am disposed always to maximize utility, I will not retaliate. Reply: If it does not maximize utility to have a disposition always to maximize utility, you should do what you can to dispose yourself in ways that have better consequences. The utilitarian says that, to the degree that dispositions are under your control, you should bring it about that you have the dispositions it would maximize utility for you to have. The disposition to maximize utility may not do this. If not, the utilitarian tells you to do what you can to have different dispositions.

b)

2.

Direct Consequences: Sometimes it is said that there are direct consequences of utilitarian dispositions that are objectionable. a) b) ExampleEstrangement: See handout titled Cautionary Stories for the Utilitarian for an example. Reply: The utilitarian replies to this in the same way that she does to the previous example.

Copyright 2004 by Donald C. Hubin

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Objection to the Strategy of These Objections: These objections all seek to show that there are utilitarian reasons for not acting like a utilitarian, or for not thinking like a utilitarian, or some such thing. Such an approach is ill-conceived. 1. Truth vs. Utility: We must distinguish between the truth of a theory and the utility of accepting it. The utilitarian is one who holds that utilitarianism is true, not that it maximizes utility to accept it, teach it, etc. The disutility of utilitarian dispositions (if they really are disutilitarian) would not say anything about the truth of utilitarianism. Self-Subversion of the Objection: Even if the empirical claims of the objectors are correct (that utilitarian dispositions are disutilitarian), this will constitute a moral reason for rejecting utilitarianism only if utilitarianism is true. (How could the fact that accepting a theory has bad consequences be a good reason to reject a theory unless it is true that we ought to produce good consequences?)

2.

II. Applicability: Even if we wanted to put utilitarianism into effect, we could not, for there is no practical measure of utility (whether that is understood as pleasure, happiness or the object of a desire). A. Incommensurability: Pluralistic utilitarians have the additional problem of potential incommensurability of utility. (See handout titled Cautionary Stories for the Utilitarian for a discussion of this issue. B. Interpersonal Comparison of Utility: Many theories, most notably the desire satisfaction theory, have serious problems with interpersonal comparisons of utility. Desire satisfaction theories have this problem because strength of desire is usually measured by noting what an agent does when in a trade-off situation. If she prefers apple pie to cherry pie when she knows that she can have either, she has a stronger desire for apple pie. But this gives us no mechanism for determining strength of desires in different persons.

III. Counter-Intuitive Consequences A. Problems with Population Size: This is the problem of total vs. average utility discussed on the handout titled Cautionary Stories for the Utilitarian. 1. Duty to Procreate: If our duty is to maximize total utility, it appears that we might have a duty to procreate that is quite different from any plausible duty of this sort. We might have a duty to produce a child who is less happy than anyone now alive and whose birth will make everyone else less happy, just because the addition of his small happiness will just more than compensate for the reduction in their happiness. a) b) Reply #1: Maximize average utility rather than total utility. (1) ResponseDuty to Exterminate: The case of Xavier, the Happy Hermit. Reply #2: Apply utilitarian reasoning only to fixed populations (1) Response: Utilitarianism is not a fully adequate theory of morality because many of our moral problems concern issues that intrinsically involve population changes. (Should we adopt policies that encourage or discourage population growth?) B. Special Obligations: It is often argued that the utilitarian takes the only intrinsically significant moral relation to be the benefactor/beneficiary relation. But this leads to insufficient concern for the special relation in which we stand to others. It leads to giving no intrinsic weight to promises and contracts, nor to special obligations one might have as a result of an office one holds, etc.
Copyright 2004 by Donald C. Hubin

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Justice 1. 2. Retributive Justice: a) a) Example: Preventing a Race Riot by Punishing an Innocent Person Distribution of Wealth (Commodities, Body Parts, etc.): Since the utilitarian is concerned to maximize total (or average) utility, there is no guarantee that money, commodities or any other objects of value will be distributed equitably. (1) Utilitarian Reply: There are good utilitarian reasons for favoring more equal distributions of wealth over less equal ones other things being equal. The primary reason is that wealth is subject to diminishing marginal utility. Thus, a thousand dollars in my pocket will probably create more happiness, pleasure, and produce more desire satisfaction than it will in Ted Kennedys pocket. (Of course, in the latter case, there would be the additional problem of whether he could find his pants.) While there are other utilitarian arguments favoring some inequalities in the distribution of wealth, it is reasonable to think that utilitarianism will not be indifferent to the demands of equality of wealth. b) Distribution of Utility: The utilitarian can, though, give no reason for favoring a more equitable distribution of utility over a less equitable one. For the maximization of utility is all that matters to the utilitarian. Thus, if one alternative maximizes utility (pleasure, happiness, or what-have-you), but gives it all to one person, that is better than any alternative that fails to maximize utility but distributes what it does produce more equitably. Distributive Justice:

D. Excessive Demands: Any consequentialist theory, utilitarianism included, seems to demand too much of us. Practically everything we do will be immoral. For it is almost always true that we could be doing something else that would produce more utility. Is it permissible to give only 1/3 of your income to the needy? Not if it would produce more total utility to give 1/2 or 2/3 of it. Many argue that morality does not demand that on each and every occasion we be doing all we can to produce total utility. Morality leaves us some leewaysome moral slack.

Copyright 2004 by Donald C. Hubin