19-20 April 1979 [?

]
The memo by Vadim V. Zagladin, deputy head of the
International Department of the CPSU Central Committee
ON THE BASIC CONTENTS OF TALKS WITH THE US
SENATORS
During the official negotiations with the delegation of US
senators led by J. Biden and the unofficial talks with the delegation's
head and some members, our collocutors expressed a number of
considerations of certain interest.
1. J. Biden, the head of the delegation, said that the mutual
understanding that the SALT-2 treaty should be ratified is, basically,
achieved in the Senate Commission for Foreign Affairs. However,
four reservations should be formulated. The contents of those
reservations have already been reported to us by our embassy in
Washington.
While commenting on the contents of those reservations, Biden
said they should not worry the Soviet Union because they do not
concern the substance of the treaty. The only reservation which, in
his opinion, may cause our 'displeasure' says that the SALT-2
should not prevent the US from providing the defence capabilities of
their allies. In practice, the collocutor said, this is a way to confirm
the US' preparedness to keep supplying European NATO members
with modern US weapons, with the exception, naturally, of those
types which are covered by the treaty itself.
The Senate Commission for Foreign Affairs is going to conclude
the consideration of the treaty by the end of September. However,
the Senate itself is starting to work on this problem later, possibly on
the eve of the Christmas.
2. As for the problem of supplying Western Europe with new
types of weapons, including the Pershing missiles etc.;, Biden said
that no final decisions had been taken on this issue yet. Those

decisions will be taken in December. And a lot there, he

emphasised, will depend on the position of the Soviet Union.
During unofficial talks, Biden noted rather cynically that he
personally and other members of the US Senate do not very much
care about the Europeans' concerns. The main area of the US
citizens' interest is the security of the US itself. Nevertheless, the
feelings of our allies also 'concern us', he said. 'We cannot stop
supporting our allies, because if we did that, we would have
weakened America's own security'. Therefore, Biden continued, the
Americans will probably have to solve the question of the supplies of
the new types of armaments to Western Europe positively in
principle. In any case, the majority in the Senate supports that, he
said.
Then Biden meaningfully emphasised (and he was actively
supported by Senator Prior here) that if the SALT-2 treaty is ratified
before December, and if the Soviet Union makes some
demonstrative steps in favour of further disarmament progress
before the NATO meeting, the European countries probably may
refrain from deploying new types of American weapons in Europe,
or at least, postpone the decisions taken on this issue.
To our question on what exactly steps are meant here, Prior
answered that, for example, the Soviet government might state it is
not going to increase the number of SS-20 missiles any further.
3. Something that caught our attention was that this time, in
both official and unofficial talks, the senators would raise more
questions about the prospects, about the SALT-3, than the SALT-2.
Unofficially, Biden said that 'the question of the future is more
significant to the more serious senators - although not to all - than
the question of the present treaty. The thing is (he explained) that
many in the Senate consider the present treaty as a kind of an
intermediate step, a booster for the further reduction of the arms
race. Many in the US are very serious about this, believing it is
possible to negotiate the reduction of the level of military
confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, at the same time,
many people are uncertain whether the USSR will agree to further
serious steps of that kind.'

Most questions concerned two subjects. Firstly, whether the

USSR would agree to a significant reduction of the number of
nuclear missiles at the next stage (the senators were particularly
interested in heavy missiles in this connection). Secondly, whether
the USSR would agree to the explansion of control and the
introduction of 'more effective methods' (for example, the 'black
boxes', which were discussed during the negotiations on the
prohibition of underground nuclear tests).
It emerged during that talks that, in spite of all huge work we are
doing about this, many statements of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev were
unknown to the majority of the senators for example, his
statement that the Soviet Union was not going to make the first
nuclear strike against anyone. The relevant texts were given to
them, along with some other documents of the CPSU and the Soviet
government.
4. It should also be noted that, this time, the delegation did not
officially raise the issue of human rights during the negotiations.
Biden said the did not want 'to spoil the atmosphere with problems
which are bound to cause distrust in our relations.' However, during
the breaks between the sessions the senators passed to us several
letters concerning these or those 'refuseniks'.
Unofficially, Biden and Lugar said that, in the end of the day,
they were not so much concerned with having a problem of this or
that citizen solved as with showing to the American public that they
do care for 'human rights'. They must prove to their voters that they
are 'effective in fulfilling their wishes'. In other words, the collocutors
directly admitted that what is happening is a kind of a show, that
they absolutely do not care for the fate of most so-called dissidents.
In the same conversation, Biden asked us to ensure that
senators' appeals on those issues are not left unanswered even if
we just reply that the letter is received but we cannot do anything.
According to Biden, letters of this kind if they are not addressed to
the highest representatives of the Soviet state sometimes remain
unanswered.

19-20 1979 .

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