GT Crim Law Review

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo
CRIM LAW REVIEW RECITS/LECTURE [Glenn Tuazon] 2010, 1st sem Justice Callejo RPC BOOK ONE Notes Day 2 o Specific intent some forms of crime require that the overt act be accompanied by a specific intent. Ie homicide intent to kill, theft intent to gain, kidnapping intent to deprive one of his/her liberty. o Specific intent may be presumed such as theft (Rule 131) o Crimes against person intentional act of inflicting physical harm and the victim dies, intent to kill is presumed. o May there be reckless imprudence in attempted or frustrated homicide? No, because there is no intent to kill. Is there reckless imprudence resulting in homicide? Yes. Homicide referred therein simply describes that the person died as a result of the recklessness. o Acts of lasciviousness specific intent of lewd design. o There must be an overt physical act. o Sexual assualt may now be committed by the use of the tongue insertion in the private parts. o People v Oanis mistake of identity they killed a person who was sleeping without identifying who the person was. This was a deliberate act and as such the crime was homicide NOT reckless imprudence. The overt act was the act of shooting, therefore there was intent to kill. o May one be liable for an unintentional abortion resulting from reckless imprudence. o There can be no RI resulting in frustrated homicide. o Conspiracy and Negligence are incompatible. o Mala in se if the entire community condemns the crime as such then the crime must be inherently immoral. o In Fencing intent to gain is not required (Dumlao) o Use of an unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in homicide. If used in any other crime, it is not an aggravating circumstance. (RA 8294) o PD 115 Trust Receipts ( malum prohibitum) o Bouncing Checks (malum prohibitum) he must be aware that at the time he issued the check, there was a lack or insufficiency of funds. o One may be liable for both a estafa (mala in se) and BP 22 (malum prohibitum) o Illegal recruitment and estafa at the same time o Anti-carnapping act (SPL) and homicide or murder (RPC) o Felony by dolo or culpa cannot absorb a malum prohibitum crime o People vs Mangulabnan Robbery, about to leave the house, accidentally shot the gun upstairs. Thus Robbery with Homicide o o RAPE o (even if accidental) Article 8 does not apply to SPL but in the case of People vs CA, if two or more persons conspire to steal lumber(SPL), Article 8 shall apply. [Exception to article 8s applicability There can be no frustrated or attempted crime. Such requires that the crime is capable of consummation. In impossible crimes, consummation is impossible.
P v Brioso o The penis must be capable of erection. o Parts of the womans private organ o Pendula o Mons pubis attempted o Labia Majora penetration however slight CONSUMMATED RAPE o Labia Minora o NO SUCH THING AS FRUSTRATED RAPE o In sexual assault, the instrument need not enter the vagina completely. o There is no such thing as frustrated bribery, there is however attempted o There is no such thing as frustrated physical injuries, the crime is consummated upon infliction o Firing the gun, but missed attempted homicide or murder o Hit, the victim but non fatal attempted o Hit, fatal wound frustrated o Hit, victim dies consummated o Homicide requires the intent to kill if not intent than physical injuries lang. o Lazaro v People something about doctors o People v Umaging cerebral hemorrhage (accused took out the breathing tube attempted) Conspiracy o Conspiracy is not a product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of the conspirators. No conspiracy by negligence. o Article 8 does not apply to SPL, but there are SPL that says that conspiracy is in itself a crime. Ex: Dangerous Drugs Act o There must be intentional participation. o Simultaneous attack does not necessarily mean conspiracy o The conspirators must be animated by one design.
o Clarification between Borinaga and Sy Po belief is never a test

to determine whether the crime has passed the subjective or objective phase. It is the nature of the wound that determines whether it is attempted, frustrated or consummated. Thus, even if the accused believed that he inflicted the wound when in fact he didnt, such cannot be considered as frustrated perhaps

attempted crime. o Article 69 provides for the penalty of an incomplete self-defense o Pari delicto doctrine does not apply in criminal case. The State is not bound by any agreement between parties, it is their prerogative to prosecute criminals. o For 247 to apply, the killing or injury must be committed during the sexual act or immediately thereafter. o People v Bon read for Penalties Minority o If the minor acted with a conspirator, the presumption that the minor acted without discernment still applies. Aggravating Circumstances o Preliminary All felonies in RPC are public wrongs, as distinguished from private wrongs, the latter of which is just a breach of duty or contract of two private parties. Although the State has power to prosecute persons for private crimes, the law gives the victim the privilege of not instituting actions for private crimes: adultery, seduction, abduction, etc. There must be a complaint initiated by the offended party. Ratio: to protect the latter from shame and humiliation. (Juan de Penas v. P; 16 SCRA 871) Under RA 8353, the marriage of the offender and the offended party will extinguish criminal liability of the accused. Rape is no longer a private crime. (Art. 344 of RPC) it is now a crime against persons. There are no common law crimes in the Philippines, unlike England and the U.S. There are laws there which define crimes but do not provide penalties. BUT in the Philippines, we follow nullum crime nulla poena sine lege. (People v. Cuna 12 Phil. 241 doctrines derived from common law are not binding on the Philippines unless applicable to local conditions and not in conflict with local laws) Perez v. LPG Refillers Assoc. 492 SCRA 638 sources of criminal law are: RPC, SPL, municipal ordinances. What about administrative regulations. May these partake of nature of criminal law? YES. Requisites: 1) violation of admin regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute. 2) Penalty for violation must be provided by the statute itself. An administrative regulation implementing a penal statute has effect of penal law if it complies with the two requirements. Article 8 of NCC: judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. But decisions of the SC interpreting criminal statutes are not penal laws per se they are merely interpretative. If asked to enumerate at least two laws which show that the Phil. criminal law follows positivist theory, what laws are these? o ISL o Habitual delinquency law o People v. Ducusin 59 Phil. 109 The ISL was approved to uplift and improve human life. Not focused on the person as a criminal, but the law takes into account economic usefulness of offended and excessiveness of deprivation of liberty. o De Joya v. Jail warden 417 SCRA 636 The SC emphasized that the State is concerned not just with protective social order against criminal acts, but also redeeming the individual for social ends. Not just retribution, but reformation. Generality Art 14 of the NCC. Penal laws apply to all those who live or sojourn in the Philippines, subject to international law or treaty stipulations. Health Care Inc. v. Secretary of Health How does I law become, under the 1987 Consti? Either by transformation or incorporation. o Transformation requires that the I-law be transformed into domestic law; ex. local legislation o Incorporation international law is part of the law of the land. Immunities from criminal prosecution by certain individuals o VCDR adopted by U.N. and the Philippines. o Who are the diplomats covered? Classified into four: o A) ambassadors, ambassadors extraordinary; B) ministers and papal internuncios C) ministers-residents, D) charges-deaffaires, ad interim, ad hoc o Inviolable; not subject to local penal laws. Immune from arrest and prosecution for violation for local laws. o But may be temporarily restrained if they commit acts that threaten public order. State may simply request for recall of the diplomat but will not be prosecuted locally. Patemi v. U.S. (C.A. 1963, District of Columbia) o Minucher v. CA 397 SCRA 244 The petitioner is a citizen of Iran, but is also an honorary consul. He was caught in possession of drugs. HELD: A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violation of the penal laws of a country where he is assigned to. Not entitled to any immunity or diplomatic privileges under the VCDR. Nature of job of consuls, vice-consuls, or consuls-general are commercial in nature. Exception: when there is an agreement between the Phils. and the sending country. But the exemption is not based on the nature of his position. o Liang v. People 407 Phil. 414. The RP and ADB entered into an agreement under which officers and staff members enjoy immunity from legal processes and prosecution, with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, except when the bank

waives the immunity. ADB officer committed grave oral defamation not immune. This is not covered by immunity because he was not performing his duty. RA 7055 Members of the AFP and officers charged with such crimes. o Who are officers and members of the AFP? Art 1: members of AFP, those subject to military law, members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units o Civilian courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the AFP. o EXCEPTION: service-connected offenses (provided in RA 7055) courts-martial o Civilian court determines before arraignment when the crime is service-connected o Is it possible for a service oriented crime to be tried by civilian courts? YES. The President, before arraignment, in the interest of justice, may refer the crime to a civilian court as long as it is covered by the RPC or any other SPL. (Gonzales v. Abaya, 498 SCRA 445, Navales v. Abaya 441 SCRA 393) Members of PNP RA 6975 o Which entity of the government has jurisdiction? Civilian courts, because the PNP is civilian in character. Are there instances where even if certain persons commit crimes, nevertheless, they may not be prosecuted? o Yes, if they enjoy immunity by law. o Tanchangco v. Sandiganbayan (476 SCRA 202), one may also enjoy statutory immunity from criminal prosecution, where granted by law Transactional immunity o Omnibus Election Code one who reports to the COMELEC any incident of vote buying or vote selling, and he testifies for prosecution: he is entitled to immunity, even if he took part in such crime. Sec 261 of OEC. o P.D. 749 immunity granted to those furnishing information re: violation of bribery, indirect bribery, corruption of public officers Art. 2 of RPC Territory of the Philippines within Phil. archipelago, atmosphere, interior waters, maritime zone UNCLOS territorial sea up until 12 n.m. o Contiguous zone: Sec. 33 States may exercise control even within this area to prevent and punish infringement of customs, immigration, fiscal, sanitary laws within territory or territorial seas People v. Cheng English vessel in Phil. territory, not in transit. Accused was smoking opium on the ship. HELD: Convicted. Yes, followed the English rule, because he was smoking within Phil. territory. This had pernicious effect on Phil. territory (disturbs the peace). o Hypothetical question if he does not smoke the opium or sell it, does it still disturb the peace? Take note, the SC itself said that there is no clear definition as to what disturbs the peace. SUGGESTED ANSWER: Now, in the D.D.A., mere attempt to transport marijuana is a crime. Relate this to UNCLOS if a commercial vessel passes by the territorial sea. General rule: the ship cannot be boarded. But the UNCLOS said that the criminal law of a State may not be enforced on board the vessel to prosecute individuals, except if measures are necessary to suppress illegal traffic of narcotic drugs. o Note: if mere passing through the territorial sea can lead to boarding and prosecution, what more if the ship is docked? English the territorial State has jurisdiction, except when it merely concerns internal management of the vessel. French the flag of registration has offense, as long as it does not disturb the peace. P v. Togoto A person in the ship, in Vietnamese waters, got drunk and shot three people. He was not prosecuted in Vietnam. The SC held that the Phils. may exercise jurisdiction. Although following the English rule, which we adhere to, it must be Vietnam that exercises jurisdiction, since Vietnam did not exercise jurisdiction, there is nothing preventing the Philippines from deviating from English rule. Philippine Maritime Authority handles registration. Question o Now: in the D.D.A., mere attempt to transport marijuana is a crime. Question: can Phil. officials board the vessel to prosecute those on board? o Relate this to UNCLOS if a commercial vessel passes by the territorial sea. General rule: the ship cannot be boarded. But the UNCLOS said that the criminal law of a State may not be enforced on board the vessel to prosecute individuals, except if measures are necessary to suppress illegal traffic of narcotic drugs. o Note: if mere passing through the territorial sea can lead to boarding and prosecution, what more if docked? High seas free for all. o Is it possible that a crime was committed beyond the territorial sea, but yet, when the vessel enters Phil. territorial sea, can it be prosecuted? Yes, if it is a continuing crime. o Does the Philippines have ability to legislate on crimes applying to the high seas? Yes, for instance, P.D. 532 Piracy. o People v. Tulin 416 Phil. 352 Pirates wanted to unload the oil from a PNOC-owned vessel, boarded a ship within Phil. waters, went to Singapore, and unloaded the oil to another vessel in the high seas. HELD: Can prosecute for piracy even if committed in Singapore, because the crime began in our country. It continued to Singapore.

Exceptions 2 and 3 to Art. 2: o 2. Forge or counterfeit any coin, currency, obligation, security issued by government of PI; 3. Introducing into the PI the abovementioned o Rationale: protect economic security of the Philippines Last paragraph: o Crimes against the law of nations People v. Lollo they commit piracy outside the Philippines (high seas, Dutch East Indies, etc.) HELD: The Philippines can prosecute, because it is a crime against the law of nations. o Crimes against national security o Dillars v. US (182 Fed. Rep.2d 962) purpose of penal laws involving national security is to protect the domestic order and crimes against national and economic security of the Philippines. The law is designed to protect not only the national and economic security of the country, and should reach beyond the boundaries of the Philippines, wherever they may be found. Article 3 In a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of the act and omission punishable by law and mens rea (physical act + act of the mind) o Guevarra v. Judge 169 SCRA 476 a felony by dolo is a voluntary act. It is a free voluntary and intentional act; one acts with intelligence is he has the capacity to distinguish right from wrong, moral from not, licit from not o For felonies by dolo, one is not criminally liable if there is no criminal intent. o Manuel v. People 476 SCRA 471 There must be an evil act or omission and the criminal intent combined May one be criminally liable for crimes of omission? o YES. Elements: a) prosecution must prove that the accused acted voluntarily to not do a positive duty, b) criminal intent in refusing to obey the mandate of the law, c) there must be a positive duty provided by law o Examples: misprision of treason, prevaricacion (Art. 208 of RPC), fraud on treasury Mistake of fact o READ: People v. Achong. o If there is mistake of fact, then there is no criminal intent. One is not culpable for dolo. o The one invoking it must act with good faith. If he acts with negligence, he may be liable for felony by culpa. o Not a valid defense for felony by culpa. Not a valid defense for felony by SPL. In specific intent felonies, the prosecution must prove BRD the specific intent. But sometimes, specific intent may be presumed. o Ex. intent to kill must be proved. One can presume this, for instance, from the mere fact that the victim died from a deliberate act. o Ex. intent to gain in theft. One is found in possession of recently stolen property there is a presumption. o Criminal intent can be presumed from the commission of a delictual act. Motive not an essential element of crime. But there are instances where motive is a prerequisite to conviction of accused. o Political crimes rebellion, coup detat. If the crime committed, for instance murder, is in pursuance of political motive in rebellion or coup detat, it is absorbed by the crime. o Death by exceptional circumstances killed wife and paramour who were having sexual intercourse. Not criminally liable for homicide, if motive is to avenge dishonor. But if he killed the wife for some other motive, and not due to exceptional circumstances. Is reckless imprudence under Art. 365 of RPC a felony under Art. 3? (It is a quasi-offense.) o YES. Rafael Reyes Trucking v. People 329 SCRA 600 reckless imprudence is a felony under Art. 3 of the RPC. o Mistake in identity of the victim does this constitute reckless imprudence? People v. Oanis policemen were trying to arrest an escapee, and they saw a man sleeping. They thought the man was the escapee. HELD: The felony was dolo, not culpa, because the killing was deliberate. Mistake in identity is not culpa. o People v. Carmen may there be a crime of reckless imprudence through frustrated homicide? No. Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill. This is incompatible with recklessness, negligence, or imprudence. People v. Castillo 76 Phil. 72 There is no reckless imprudence resulting in frustrated homicide. o Can there be conspiracy resulting from negligence? There can be no conspiracy resulting from negligence, because conspiracy is the product of intention and not of negligence. (Art. 8 there is an agreement to commit a crime, and they decide to commit it.) o Can more than one person be liable for killing the same person, one by dolo and one by culpa? People v. Pugay 167 SCRA 439 3 people went to carnival. B was mentally retarded. A poured gasoline on B. C lighted a match and burned B. HELD: B who poured gasoline was liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. He should have anticipated that after pouring gasoline, someone with light a match

lack of foresight. C is liable for felony by dolo deliberate act. Malum in se/prohibitum Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 421 Phil. 290 o Plunder is malum in se, for three reasons: o (1) Although defined by SPL, it is malum in se because the crimes constitutive of plunder are mala in se. Under the law, mitigating and extenuating circumstances are applicable to plunder. o (2) The predicate crimes are punishable by RP to death. o (3) Plunder is inherently immoral and wrong. Sec. 27B of the Omnibus election code. A member of the BEI who tampers with election results. Is it malum prohibitum or malum in se? o Garcia v. CA 484 SCRA 617 the crime is malum in se, although the crime is defined by SPL. It is inherently immoral and wrong to tamper with election results. Possession of unlicensed firearm. Transient possession in RA 8294 is a crime. It is malum prohibitum. There must be intent to possess, not mere possession. Can the use of unlicensed firearm be an aggravating circumstances? Yes. RA 8294 provides that it is an aggravating circumstance. Violation of Trust Receipts law: malum prohibitum. Can one be liable for both a felony and a SPL for one delictual act? o Yes. Issued a check for a transaction. Liable for BP 22 AND liable for estafa. o Labor law: pretended to be a licensed recruiter. Liable for both illegal recruitment and estafa. Can one be liable for crime defined by SPL, commits another felony, and is liable for a special complex crime? o Yes. The anti-carnapping law (RA 6539). If the offender kills the driver or occupant to take the car, he is guilty of special complex crime of carnapping with murder. (People v. Mejia 275 SCRA 127) May a felony by dolo or culpa absorb a crime which is malum prohibitum? o Loney v. People 482 SCRA 194 NO. A felony by dolo or culpa cannot absorb a malum prohibitum crime. Tigoy v. People 492 SCRA 539 To be asked in exam o Violation of forestry code of the Philippines. Two persons went to the public forest and cut timber (this is a violation). They were charged for violation of the law (malum prohibitum). They were convicted, on basis of conspiracy. The court ruled that they were guilty to conspire to violate the forestry code. Agree with the SC decision? Can there be conspiracy to commit malum prohibitum? o NO. The SC is wrong. Art. 8 agree to commit a CRIME (felony). Thus, this does not apply to malum prohibitum. Article 4 felonies and impossible crimes Par.1 felonies Person is liable for natural and logical consequences of his criminal act o Natural = occurrence in ordinary course of things; o Logical there must be a reasonable connection between the act done and the consequence The act must be the proximate cause of the effect o Vda de Bataclan v. Medina The cause, which in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not occurred And that cause may cause another thing to occur, which produces the injury o Quinto v. Andres cause and effect relationship between act of accused and effect is not affected by the ff conditions: A) pre-existing condition of the victim (pathological) B) Negligence of doctor C) Refusal to get medical help Even if the resulting wrongful act was different from the offenders intention, he is liable for that resulting act o I saw a person I wanted to kill, but I hit the person behind him instead. Praeter intentionem I am now liable for a complex crime of attempted homicide with homicide. But also aberration ictus mistake in the blow o People v. Buyco 80 Phil. 58 Inserted vibrator in anal orifice of victim. It was rusty so the victim died. Complex crime of sexual assault with homicide under RA 8353 o People v. Magalone 406 SCRA 546 Accused threw a grenade at a person. It exploded and killed the target and inflicted SPI on the accused persons wife and the three children. Convicted for complex crime of murder and parricide. o P v. Ofello 105 SCRA 4 The accused robbed a store and to shut up the woman inside, he jammed a pan de sal in her mouth. She died by asphyxiation. Convicted of robbery with homicide. o Situation: the kidnap victim died from a heart attack due to fear. The accused is liable for kidnapping with homicide. o P v. Tulin Accused robbed victim of belongings, the victim ran away and jumped in the river. She drowned. Accused is liable since he created a sense of fear in the mind of the victim. o P v. Castromero Accused wanted to rape the victim, and he was armed with a knife. Victim jumped out the window. Liable

for rape with homicide, or if she did not die, rape with SPI. P v. Quianson Accused stabbed victim. Doctor put a drainage on the wound. The victim was in pain so he removed the drainage and he died. The accused is liable. o Even if the doctor is negligent, but the accused inflicted mortal wounds on the victim, the negligence of the doctor is NOT an active intervening force that exculpates the accused. But there are times the doctors acts are exculpatory. Hopton v. ? victim was brought to the hospital, but the doctor was so intoxicated, he gave the victim poison instead of medicine. The doctor was liable. o Quinto v. Andres not the proximate cause if: A) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the death of the victim, B) or if the resulting injury or damage is the intentional act of the victim. o Is it possible that two persons are liable for the death of the same person even if there is no conspiracy? Yes. Two persons went to a bar, did not know each other, sat on different tables. They saw an annoying person. One person stabbed him. The other, not knowing that the first one stabbed him too, stabbed him again. Both wounds were mortal. Both are liable for homicide. o P v. De los Santos If the crime committed by the accused is reckless imprudence, it is generally under Art. 365. If through such negligence, two people died. Can he be prosecuted for reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide? May reckless imprudence result into a complex crime under Art. 48 of the RPC? May be asked in the Bar YES, because reckless imprudence is a felony under Art. 3 and Art. 48 talks about felonies as component crimes. ROC: Rule 131, Sec 5(c) recall and reconcile o A person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary consequences of his acts, and expect those But intent is an internal act. How do you determine this? Through circumstances of the case. Par. (1) [all natural and logical consequences] does not apply to felonies by culpa, because par. 1 is specific: only to delitos. What will apply to culpable felonies? o Art. 365 of the RPC applies. Offender is liable for whatever damage or injury caused by him. Par. 2 impossible crimes Take note of both Intod and Jacinto cases Intod v. CA: Elements o 1) offender performed an act which would be an offense against
persons or property 2) offender performed the act with criminal intent 3) accomplishment of the act is inherently impossible or the means employed were inadequate or ineffectual Impossibility may be: o 1) factual or physical impossibility o o
The factual condition must be unknown to the offender NOTE: In the US, this is just an attempted felony. But for us, it is a consummated impossible crime. Ex. offender accepted goods which he believed to have been stolen, but which were not, in fact stolen Ex. offender offers a bribe to someone he believes is a public officer, but is in fact not Ex. offender believed his gun was loaded, pointed it as his wife, and pulled the trigger. But it was empty. Ex. Intod v. CA fired guns into empty bedroom, because the intended victim was out of town Ex. Jacinto v. P Sales agent, instead of giving check to employer, gave it to relative. The check bounced. HELD: impossible crime, because at the time the petitioner stole the check, there were no funds in the bank. But this about this: A) What about postdated checks? B) Does not the check (paper) itself have some value? o 2) legal impossibility Even when completed, would not amount to a crime Note: in the US, it is different. If there is legal impossibility, one is not criminally liable. Here, still punishable because he has the subjective tendency to intend commission of the crime. Ex. Stole a watch that turned out to be his. Ex. Offender saw a naked woman lying on the beach. He inserted his penis into his vagina. It turned out she was dead. Impossible crime = you cannot rape a dead person. (P v. Balmores) Justice Regalado: Under Art. 59 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for impossible crime is arresto mayor (correctional penalty). Supposing I saw a person on a bed, thought that he was my enemy, so I punched him. He sustained slight PI. But he turned out to be dead, so it was an impossible crime. o Under Art. 266(3) of the RPC the penalty is arresto menor for slight PI. o ODD! If that person were alive, the penalty would be less than if he were dead! Art. 5, par. 2

Article 5 does not apply to crimes defined by SPL, because of the use of the words degree of malice, etc. This brings to mind B.P. 22, in relation to A.C. 12-2000, as clarified by A.C. 13-2001: o S.C. noticed that people are using the courts as collection agencies and are clogging up dockets o So S.C. issued a circular dissuading people from filing B.P. 22, and for judges to just impose fines A.O. 08-2008, issued 25 Jan. 2008 o Libel imposable penalty is imprisonment or fine o According to the S.C., preference is fine over imprisonment o Brillante v. CA 174 SCRA 480 o P v. Veneracion 249 SCRA 244 remedy is executive clemency, if the penalty is too excessive. But dont refuse to impose. Art. 6 Felonies in book two of RPC are all consummated, except: o Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide Why do we punish attempted stages? o Attempts are punished because there is just as much need to reform a person who has unsuccessful attempted to commit a crime P v. Lizada 396 SCRA 94 Read this case. Lizada went to the room of a woman. He removed his pants and the womans underpants. He mounted her, but the brother of the woman arrived. Before he could do any more injury, he left. What crime did he commit? Attempted crime: - elements 1) Commenced execution directly, by overt acts o There must be an overt, external act o There is crime intended to be committed o There is direct connection to crime intended to be committed immediate and necessary connection o It can be the first of a series of acts that would produce the intended crime, as long as the intended crime is established or known P v. Lamaang o Differs from preparatory acts means or measures necessary to produce the desired end. Ex. surveillance 2) But offender did not complete all acts of execution to produce the felony o Still at the subjective phase of the commission of crime still has full control of acts, and has not completed the needed acts yet o Two phases: Subjective phase Objective phase Is he is still in the subjective phase and he desists from committing the crime, is he liable? NO. He is not liable. P v. Guevarra 155 SCRA 357 reason for desisting need not be legal or moral; could be remorse or fear as long as he desists voluntarily o But may he be liable for any other felony already committed apart from that desisted from? Yes. P v. Lozada 3) Not stopped by own spontaneous desistance 4) Due to cause or accident other than spontaneous desistance Frustrated felony All the acts of execution needed to produce the felony, but it was not produced by reason of causes independent of the perpetrators will Odd: not enough to wound the other person. The wound inflicted must be mortal. If it is not mortal, then it is a mere attempt. (Lazaro v. P) o EVEN if one has lost all control of the act, it still results in attempted crime! P v. Eduave, P v. Borinaga, P. v. Sy abandoned cases o In Spain, one may be liable for frustrated crime even if the wound was not mortal, as long as the offender believed that the wound could cause the death of the victim. P v. Callalo even if the accused believed that he inflicted a mortal wound, but he did not, it is merely attempted, not frustrated. The nature of the wound controls, not the belief of the person. Crimes where no frustrated stages exist: P v. Sampior no such thing as frustrated rape o As long as the penis enters the labia majora, it is already consummated o It is not the mere entry; the SC said that the entry must be in relation with the intent to have carnal knowledge of the woman o P v. Campuhan: But if it is just in the mons pubis just attempted. Bombardment of the drawbridge, even if the troops do not successfully enter the castle. If no intent, just acts of lasciviousness. o RA 8353 introduced the concept of sexual assault. Although there is no SC decision yet, it seems there is no frustrated sexual assault. P v. Salvilla 184 SCRA 671 the SC declared that one is liable for consummated robbery if one takes possession of the personal property of the other, however brief it may be. P v. Valenzuela no more frustrated theft, same rule: no need to have disposed of stolen property There is no attempted or frustrated crime of physical injuries. It is always consummated. o

There is no frustrated crime of adultery. It is consummated upon the sexual intercourse between the spouse and paramour. There is no attempted or frustrated stage in a felony by omission. There is no attempted or frustrated falsification of public document unless the falsification is so imperfect. Art. 9 How do you categorize reckless imprudence resulting into slight PI? o Riodica v CA 292 SCRA 87 The crime of reckless imprudence is a light felony, under the last paragraph of Art. 9 of the RPC. Punishable only by public censure. Art. 10 Ladonga v. P 451 SCRA 673 The SC applied Art. 8 (conspiracy) for violation of BP 22, a special penal law. When the penalty for a SPL follows the nomenclature of the RPC, the RPC applies suppletorily, ex. mitigating. P v. Simon R.A. 9165, amended by 9344; Dangerous Drugs Act provisions of RPC shall not apply to violations of DDA, except in the case of minor offenders o Reclusion perpetua, not L.I. o Penalty may be reduced by 1 or 2 degrees under Art. 63 Anti-hazing law One convicted under Sec. 4 is not entitled to mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed o The law also enumerates who will be deemed principals, etc. Anti-terrorism law conviction of a person under said law constitutes a bar to the prosecution of that person under the RPC or another SPL for the predicate crime R.A. 7610 Child abuse law, Sec. 10 Where the victim is under 12 years old, the penalty for murder, homicide, or intentional mutilation, or SPI, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua R.A. 9262 VAWC law if the offender commits act of physical violence and there is intent to kill o Crime is NOT violation of physical violence provision under VAWC but attempted, frustrated, or consummated parricide, homicide, or intentional mutilation Art. 8 May conspiracy under article 8 be considered as a preparatory act under Article 6? o People v. Lizada distinguished preparatory acts from attempts to commit a felony o Conspiracy under article 8 is not a felony, because there is no penalty provided by law. o Article 8 is thus a mode of incurring criminal liability. Enumerate at least two felonies punished pursuant to Article 8 as a felony per se? o Conspiracy to commit treason o Conspiracy to commit rebellion
For the above acts, the mere conspiracy is punishable. But the moment they actually commit treason or rebellion, conspiracy loses its juridical personality and it becomes a mere mode to commit a crime. (IMPT.) In the Philippines, conspiracy may be a substantive offense if the conspirators agree to commit a felony penalized under the RPC. If there is no such penalty in the RPC, it is simply a mode of incurring criminal liability. o Contrast: In the US, conspiracy is a substantive offense, and if the actual crime is committed, conspiracy still retains juridical personality as a felony. In effect, the accused commits two crimes; the conspiracy and the actual offense. 3 kinds of conspiracy: o A) wheel conspiracy there is one person (hub) and his underlings (stokes) Ex. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan READ for the Bar We have this. The others, not yet recognized. o B) chain conspiracy using legitimate enterprise to distribute narcotics Ex. drugs o C) enterprise conspiracy Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Art. 157 another kind of conspiracy and connivance o A convict or a person who escapes in connivance with another person. The conspiracy or connivance in connection with the crime committed here is an essential condition for the commission of said crime, in connection with Art. 223 of the RPC. The penalty is prision correccional in maximum pd instead of medium and maximum pd. P v. Pagalasan requirements for conspiracy: o 1) singularity of intent o 2) unity in the execution of the unlawful objective P v. Castillo there must be a criminal intent. Conspiracy is not a product of negligence, but intentionality. Art. 8 does not apply to crimes defined in SPL, unless the SPL provides that conspiracy to commit a crime under that law is a crime in itself. o Ex. RA 9165 (as amended) DDA: Sec. 26, conspiracy to commit any of those crimes enumerated in that section is a crime by itself. Ex. sale, importation, distribution and CONSPIRACY to do such. o Ex. RA 8484 (access device regulations) Sec. 11: Conspiracy to commit access devise fraud is a crime o Ex. RA 9372 (anti-terrorism law) conspiracy to commit terrorism is a crime punishable with 40 years of

imprisonment What if there is no provision in SPL? Can Art. 8 still be a mode to commit crime? o Andan v. P 484 SCRA 539 SC held that 2 or more persons who conspire to commit a crime of BP 22 are liable for such crime, applying Art. 8 of the RPC. o Tigoy v. CA 492 SCRA 539 Accused were guilty of forestry code. SC applied Art 8 of the RPC. Is Art 4, par. 1 applicable to Article 8 of the RPC? o Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates, which follow incidentally in the execution of the common design, as one of its probable and natural consequences even though not intended as part of the original design. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their act, by engaging in conspiracy. (IMPT) o So, extends to collateral acts incident to and growing out of the conspiracy. o Ex. Agreed to kidnap Julia at the point of a gun. She suffered a heart attack and died. Kidnapping with murder? HELD: Yes. Kidnapping with homicide. o Ex. Agreed to rob the victim only. But he resisted and one conspirator killed the victim. HELD: All the conspirators are guilty of robbery with homicide. (P v. Alvarez) P v. Berceles 388 SCRA 515 same principle applies to robbery with rape. o P v. De jesus 229 SCRA 384 If one of the robbers prevented the others from committing the extra act of homicide or rape, then he is only liable for robbery only, and not homicide and rape. It does not matter if he succeeds in preventing them of not. o P v. Mapalit 444 SCRA 793 One of the conspirators who committed robbery, after they all escaped, saw a car and carnapped it after. Only he was liable for carnapping. (I guess because they all dispersed na anyway) o P v. Bisda 406 SCRA 454 SC said the conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. o P v. Venicaryo 420 SCRA 280 Conspiracy continues until the object is attained. Conspiracy is a continuing event, unless in the meantime, they abandon the conspiracy or the conspirators are arrested. o P v. Punsalan 203 SCRA 264 They agreed to commit robbery. One conspirator stabbed the victim; he ran. Punsalan did not run, and he was caught. Defense: he was not guilty of the crime, because he desisted when he did not run. HELD: The mere failure or refusal to flee after the commission of the crime does not amount to a disavowal of the conspiracy. There must be an overt act to disassociate himself from the conspiracy. Art. 11 Is complete self-defense an absolutory cause? o Yes, because the accused is not deemed to have committed a crime. An absolutory cause means that the accused does not incur criminal liability. o You are exercising a right, because you have the right to protect your life or property or right. Is Article 12 an absolutory cause as well? o No. There is a crime, although the person is exempt from liability. o Basis here: the person is not acting with complete intelligence. There is no mens rea. People v. Genosa the woman was suffering from BWS, but why did the SC affirm the conviction? for exam o Because Genosa used self-defense theory. o She should have invoked the battered woman syndrome under RA 9262. People v. Jaurige compared to People v. De la Cruz: BOTH cases involved defense of honor. o Jaurige: mere touching of thigh, in church, in daylight. She killed him with fan knife. No self-defense appreciated. The means used were not reasonable. o De la Cruz: groped in dark alley. Killed with knife. Allowed to exercise self-defense. In todays law, rape is a crime against persons. Can De la Cruz invoke, hypothetically, self-defense instead of defense of honor? o Kira: Maybe if you invoke defense of honor, you dont have to prove the other requisites? But in self-defense, the three requisites apply? Are the RPC provisions applicable to crimes against women and children? o YES. o Art. 9 provisions of RPC are not applicable unless suppletory. RA 9262 Art 47 provides that the RPC provisions are suppletory. o The VAWC law uses RPC terms for penalties (prision mayor for SPI, prision correccional for LSPI, arresto mayor for slight PI) How is unlawful aggression defined? o Actual peril to ones life, or if merely a threat it must be real and imminent.

In P v. Sabio slapping. Was there danger to life and limb? Why is this unlawful aggression? o It is unlawful aggression against his honor. The face of a person is akin to his dignity, honor, etc. Is Art. 247 an absolutory cause? o Yes. Because the only imposed penalty is destierro. And that this is more of protection for the one who killed. o P v. Rabandaban: Caught wife in sexual congress. Honey, please leave the house. The wife took all the jewelry. She then wanted to kill him, so he took the knife and kill his wife. o So here, it was Art. 11 (SD), not 247 that applied. If two people agree to fight, is there SD? o No. because there is an agreement. There is no unlawful aggression. What is the exception? o When they agreed to fight, but one attacked ahead of time. What is the extent of defense of property rights? o See People v. Narvaez. o People v. Narvaez: SC said that the retaliation was disproportionate Dissent: follow this said that there must be an attack on the person in possession of property as well, and not just the property o May use such force as reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful physical invasion of his property. This does not seem to involve the taking of human life. o State v. Green 210 S.E. 145 State SC of So. Carolina the preservation of human life and limb is of more importance to society than the protection of property. People v. Gonzales the accused arrived and saw his wife in the act of sexual intercourse. The paramour ran and the wife dressed up. Gonzales went out. When he got back, he heard rustling leaves. He saw the paramour and the wife, who was putting on her panties. He stabbed his wife. HELD: You cannot invoke 247 because at that time, she was already putting on her panties, not in actual sexual intercourse. o Dissent: follow this you are unfairly punishing him, if we strictly apply the law. But what can you deduce from the fact that she was wearing her panties from a naked state. It is asking too much to actually catch them in the act of actual sexual congress. Self-defense is an act to save life; thus, it is an act, not a crime. Not anymore retreat to the wall; now stand your ground when in the right. Includes: o Defense of body and limb o Rights as person, including honor o Property and liberty Aside from the right to life and property is the right to honor. If the accused in arraignment pleads self-defense, is he making a judicial confession? o It is NOT a judicial confession, but just a judicial admission. He does not admit penal liability. He is merely admitted that he killed the victim. If the accused admitted killing the victim and pleads selfdefense, is the burden of proof shifted to accused? o No. The burden of proof never shifts; only the burden of evidence shifts. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non to complete selfdefense. o Complete SD: all three elements are present. o Incomplete: mitigating circumstance P v. Dela Cruz aggression includes actual physical assault, or if merely a threat, if the threat to life is real and imminent P v. Catbagon 423 SCRA 535 The unlawful aggression must be continuous because if at some point in time, it ceases, the offender can no longer invoke self defense. The aggression must continue up to the point where the aggressor is killed. Unlawful aggression is different from retaliation. P v Adlawan 375 SCRA 388 P v. Anibong 403 SCRA 92 SD proceeds from necessity and is limited by that necessity. The right begins where necessity exists, and ends when necessity ends. P v. 33 SCRA 226 if there is an agreement to fight, no SD because no unlawful aggression. o Exception: Justo v. CA agreed to fight but before they reached the place, one attacked. Reasonableness has no formula. It is case-by-case. When is provocation sufficient? o Oriente v. P 513 SCRA 348 provocation is sufficient if it is sufficient to incite the person to attack. Callejos usual question study o When can you invoke Art. 11? o When can you invoke Art. 247? o Can you invoke both at the same time? Suggestion: Husband also has right to invoke his honor and defend it, so Art. 11 can be invoked by the one discovering the sexual congress. He can also invoke 247, obviously. Prefer 11 over 247, because the latter results in destierro. It is not a penalty, but a limitation of his liberty. Can you invoke Art. 247 if there is mistake of fact? Ex. misled by movement of buttocks, pero wala pala sa loob.
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo o Apply by analogy P v. Achong
Only the offended spouse Art. 11 may include libel as unlawful aggression (P v. Hiung) may commit libel to fight against libel. Justice Callejo doesnt agree with this. Par. 4: Know these two cases o P v. Ty o P v. Retubado RA 8294 Art. 14(12) use of explosives is a qualified circumstance: What about RA 8294? Is it a qualifying circumstance? Defenses What was the reason why the SC did not uphold her claim of self-defense? (P. v. Genosa) o Because the threat to the womans life has already ceased. There was no more unlawful aggression. Did the SC appreciate any mitigating circumstances in Genosa? o 1) passion and obfuscation o 2) diminished will power Why wasnt BWS appreciated? o Because there was no RA 9262 then, during Genosa (2004). What does section 26 of RA 9262 say? o BWS as a justifying circumstance, notwithstanding absence of any requisites of self-defense. o Incur NEITHER criminal nor civil liability. What are the characteristics of the BWS? o (1) The woman believes the violence was her fault o (2) inability to place responsibility for the violence elsewhere o (3) fears for her and her childrens lives o (4) irrational belief that offender is omnipresent and omniscient Therefore, defense under Sec. 26 of RA 9262 is separate from, and independent from self-defense. In People v. Retubado, what is the defense? o State of necessity Art. 11(4). o But the defense does not apply because there can be no State of necessity when there is provocation by the party invoking the same. o Requisites: 1) The evil sought to be avoided actually exists 2) Injury feared is greater than that done to avoid it 3) there is no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it o Injury contemplated in Art 11(4) broad. Can include
liberty, property, etc. Is there such a thing as accidental self-defense? o No. o Self-defense has intent; accident has no intent. Minority Art. 13(2) and Art. 68 (privileged mitigating circumstance): were these amended by law? o Yes. Because RA 9344 changed the provisions on criminal responsibility of minors. o Age 15 and below = age of absolute irresponsibility o Age over 15 and under 18 only where there is discernment Under 9344, the minor is still exempt from specific offenses even if he or she acted with discernment? o Yes. Art. 58: Vagrancy Prostitution Mendicancy o These persons would undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program. When there is doubt if the person is a minor or not, what is the appropriate proceeding? o File for summary proceeding in Family Court. Lawful exercise of right or duty (Art 11(5)) Requisites: o 1) Must acted out of duty or office o 2) Injury caused is consequence of perform of that duty or right o [P v. Pule]
Calderon: The judgment and discretion of public officers in the performance of duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear legal provision, they must act in conformity with exercise of sound discretion. P v. Pule: Victim was a deranged man, who fell on the ground, helpless and mortally wounded by policemen. The policeman shot the person further on the forehead. SC HELD: there was no more need, since the person is already prostrate Cabanlig v. Sandiganbayan: Police can use force to prevent escape, to protect himself from bodily harm, etc. May a policeman invoke SD and performance of duty at the same time? o Yes. Cabalig v. Sandiganbayan, suppose the policeman during patrol sees one person about to shoot another and gave a warning, then the offender pointed the gun at the policeman, and the policeman shot the offender. The policeman was both defending himself and performing his
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duty, in preventing the offender from shooting the other person. Superior order o Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan 268 SCRA 332 Tabuena was with NAIA and Marcos ordered him to disburse money. Tabuena knew that the order was illegal. The SC acquitted him since Tabuena claimed that there was a mistake of fact he didnt know the order of Marcos was illegal. [Problematic: should have applied ignorantia legis neminem excusat] Exempting circumstances RA 9344 o 15 and under exempt o Over 15 to under 18 exempt unless acted with discernment o Took effect 20 May 2006, and applied retroactively to those minors convicted; ordered released and cases were dismissed to undergo diversion program Insanity v. Imbecility just read the books treatment on this Ortega v P (20 Aug 2008): Cases of children 15 and below shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to diversion program provided for by law. Presumption: minor acted without discernment. What if the minor was alleged as a co-conspirator? o Yes, the presumption of acting without discernment still applies. o P v. Estefano 267 SCRA 701 Evidence of conspiracy does not automatically mean the minor acted with discernment in the commission of the crime. May the presumption still apply even if the allegation was reckless imprudence under Art. 365? o Yes. Jarco Marketing case. What is the definition of discernment? o Guevarra v. Judge: When he is able to distinguish whether his act is moral or licit or not. o Jose v. P: The utterances of a minor and overt acts preceding crime, and nature of weapon is evidence of discernment. Pomoy v. P: Art. 12(4) What are requirements? o 1) performing lawful act with due care o 2) causes injury to another o 3) without intent or negligence What if there is negligence? o Art. 365 comes into play. o Jarco Marketing v. CA: Distinguished between accident and negligence, which are mutually exclusive. What is the difference between accident and negligence? o Accident without fault of the human being. Cannot be anticipated. o Negligence when there is some degree of fault in the person Mitigating circumstances RA 9344 did NOT repeal Art. 68. It merely amended it. o Minor over 15 and under 18, acting with discernment STILL entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance under Art. 68(2). NOTE: Under Art. 365, the court will not consider Art. 13 and 14 in imposing the penalty. Because this crime is NOT intentional. If the criminal is 80 years, is there a mitigating circumstance? o P v. Austria 27 June 2000 the accused was charged with rape. He was already 83 years old. His defense was erectile dysfunction. He was convicted, but the SC applied the old age as a mitigating circumstance. So far, this is the only case where this case was applied. Art 13(3) RA 8049 lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as committed CANNOT be invoked by accused in hazing incidents. Can lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed be invoked in malversation? o Perez v. P: 544 SCRA 532 YES. The petitioner was a municipal treasurer, and the audit team discovered he was short P72,000 of funds. After a few months, he returned the money he borrowed. SC: entitled to two mitigating circumstances voluntary surrender (by analogy Art. 13(10)) and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Oriente v. P: Used lead pipe to hit victim on the eyebrow, victim died. SC refused to apply the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. o Also applied the presumption that a person intends all the natural and logical consequences of his acts. P v. Pugay: (Gasoline burning case) SC also applied Art. 13(3), because the intent was less than the material act committed. What if two persons conspire to commit a felony, and one intended to commit the grave wrong as that committed, while the other did not? o P v. Espejo: The conspirator who did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed CANNOT invoke the mitigating circumstance. o BUT if both of them did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, then both CAN invoke the
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mitigating circumstance. Can both treachery and Art 13(3) be invoked together? o P v. Flores: Treachery refers to the manner or method used to kill the victim, while lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed refers to the state of mind of the person. They may coexist. Art 13(4) sufficient provocation Licayo v. P, and Oriente v. P: defined sufficient provocation o
o o
If there was only a gap of 30 mins, still ok. P v. Palabrica: 1 day lapse is not ok. P v. Ignas: only said hours still ok.
P v. Labeo: mere fact that the offended party merely shouted at the accused and asked the latter to leave is NOT proportionate to the latter killing the former. Gotis v. P 533 SCRA 441: Even if the act of the victim may not constitute unlawful aggression to enable the accused to invoke SD under Art. 11; however, the same act may still be invoked by the offender as sufficient provocation on the part of the victim. If provocation and passion/obfuscation are based on the same facts is the accused entitled to two separate mitigating circumstances or only one? o No. The accused is only entitled to only one mitigating circumstance, because both are based on the same facts. Telonia v. P: the accused was entitled to acting in immediate vindication of grave offense and sufficient provocation based on same facts. Was likewise only entitled to one mitigating circumstance still both arose from the same factual setting. P v. Arquiza: Provocation need not be in words, but can also be in action. In this case, without speaking a word, the victim entered the accused persons property and started gathering crops. SC HELD: this constituted sufficient provocation. Art 13(5) vindication of grave offense Grave offense in this provision is different from grave offense under Art. 9. Grave offense under this provision might not even be a felony at all. It usually is an assault to honor. W/N the assault is grave or not depends on factors such as: o Social standing of parties o Place and time and occasion when offense committed Grave offense even includes an insult o You are living at the expense of your wife! appreciated as grave offense Bacabac v. P: Offended party hit the accused with a bamboo stick, and the accused killed the offended party. SC HELD: Hitting with a bamboo stick is NOT a grave offense. P v. Ignas 412 SCRA 311: The world immediate here is not a correct translation of the word proxima in the Spanish Penal Code. There can be no immediate vindication of an offense when the accused had enough time to recover his serenity. How sufficient is sufficient time?
P v. Diokno: 63 Phil. 601 Diokno had a son who eloped the daughter. At that time, it was really deemed a dishonor. The father looked for his daughter for three days. The act of elopement was deemed continuous, and the effect was still there. o NOTE: but now, this is pretty ordinary already. So this case may be archaic already. Art 13(6) Passion and obfuscation P v. Ventura: Although passion and obfuscation may arise from jealousy, since there was a lapse of 1 week, accused was expected to recover his equanimity. Passion and obfuscation must not be based on an illegitimate relationship Must come from lawful sentiment, not lawlessness and revenge Bello: EXCEPTION o He lived with common law wife for 10 years. Bello supported her for 10 years. After, the common law wife wanted out, and wanted to live with another man. Bello killed her. Eh wala ka namang ibubuga talaga eh. SC HELD: Passion and obfuscation. Although the relationship was illegitimate, nevertheless, the victim was ungrateful and had the gall to bitch about it. Felonia v. P: Vindication and passion based on the same facts: only ONE mitigating circumstance may be appreciated. P v. Pansensoy: Treachery CANNOT co-exist with passion and obfuscation. When a person acts with passion or obfuscation, he loses his reason and self-control, which is inconsistent with treachery, because one who acts with treachery presupposes that he adopted a mode of attack of killing the victim. Art 13(7) voluntary surrender Navalos v. P: Before being charged of malversation, the accused returned the amount, he was deemed to have voluntarily surrendered analogous. o The return of the money must be spontaneous. Just read the book discussion. Art 13(10) P v. Genosa: SC applied par. 10. SC appreciated: mitigated mental capacity. Miscellaneous Mistake in identity nor error in personae: NEITHER exempting nor mitigating o P v. Hilario Abberatio ictus NEITHER exempting nor mitigating as well
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o P v. Genoya Aggravating circumstances Art. 266-B [RA 8353] law provides for special aggravating circumstances If the A.C. is inherent in the felony, it wont be considered as an AC. In the crime of falsification of document by public authority, then abuse of public position is deemed inherent. o Also for malversation and other crimes committed by public officers. o P v. Padilla For this to be aggravating, the public officer must use the influence or prestige of his office to commit the crime. Art 14(1) Does not apply if the public position is a constituent element of the crime. I.E. crimes committed by public officers. P v. Teves: Inherent in the crime of falsification by a public officer of a public document P v. Hipol: The malversed amount was so huge, that the Sol. Gen said that the crime was already economic sabotage and must be considered an aggravating circumstance. SC: There is no such aggravating circumstance as economic sabotage. No matter how huge the amount is, it is not aggravating. If the public officer could have committed the crime without the use of public position, it is not aggravating. P v. Tabeon 182 Phil. 131 If the accused who was issued a gun by the government by virtue of his position uses that gun to commit homicide, the use of that gun is an aggravating circumstance. He could not have used that gun unless he was a public officer. o But see P v. Villamor: Where Villamor used a gun officially issued to him by virtue of office use of that gun was not an abuse of public position. This is contrary to the Tabeon ruling. o Sir thinks its aggravating. But when you take the bar, the later decision is Villamor. Fortuna v. P 401 Phil. 545: Beautiful case Fortuna and copolicemen were in the police car. They saw a person and his sister walking on the street. They stopped and ordered the siblings to enter the car. Police guy: ganda ng relo mo ha! Ninakaw mo yan no! The police guy stole the watch and wallet of the girl. He also accused the girl of stealing the money. The policeman driving did not say anything. They let the brother and sister go. BOTH were liable for robbery. Did the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position apply even to the driver of the car? o Yes. He could have prevented the other policeman from robbing the siblings. But he did not. This was abuse of public position. Is this a generic or special aggravating circumstance?? o RA 7659 Sec 23 the use of ones public position in the commission of a crime is a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance. o This, thus, cannot be offset by generic mitigating circumstances. Art 14(2) with contempt of or in insult of public authority P v. Padro: requirements: o 1) crime committed o 2) person in authority engaged in exercise of public position o 3) offender knew person in authority o 4) victim is NOT a person in authority P v. De Mesa; [take note] A barangay captain is a person in authority under the LGC. The barangay captain was playing cards with some people. Accused shot b. captain. Does this provision apply? SC HELD: No. Two reasons: a) the person in authority must NOT be the victim per se; b) he was not performing his duty at that time. He was playing cards. P v. Siojo: If the crime was only committed in the presence of an agent of a person in authority, this provision does not apply. P v. Magbueno: If in the presence of a policeman, not aggravating because the policeman is only an agent of a person in authority. Supposing a crime is committed in the presence of a professor while the latter was performing his duty? o P. v. Tacan: This is not aggravated. A teacher or professor is only a person in authority under Art. 148 and 152 of the RPC. Is there an exception? o RA 9165 a teacher or professor is a person in authority for the purpose of enforcement of the DDA. o If you smoke marijuana in the presence of a professor, the professor is a person in authority. In the national penitentiary, sometimes the inmates feel bored and kill each other. Is this aggravating? o P v. Mendoza: Where the inmates killed another in the National Penitentiary, this was in contempt of public authority. Art. 14(3a) insult to age, rank, sex, etc. P v. Samudio 406 Phil 318: The accused was conversing with the barangay captain and the former killed the latter. May the A.C. of rank apply? HELD: No. Mere fact that victim was a person with a rank, such as barangay captain does not necessarily mean its aggravating, absent evidence that the killing was deliberately intended to disregard or insult or threaten to insult the rank of the victim.
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The A.C. of sex is not applicable: o if the accused acted with passion or obfuscation, o when there is an amorous relationship between the accused and the victim, o when there is a relationship of employer-employee, o when the sex of the victim is inherent in the crime, the validity of title over the property. What if the land is enclosed with a fence, and the person is outside the house but inside the fence? o Not dwelling. AC of dwelling is NOT applicable if the victim gave sufficient provocation. Elements (P v. Rios): o 1. Offended party gives provocation o 2. The provocation is sufficient o 3. The provocation is immediately before the crime To be considered as dwelling, it must be used exclusively for rest and comfort. o P v. Tano (May 5, 2000) the victim owns a building consisting of two floors: ground floor is video shop and 2nd floor is residence. The victim was killed in the video shop. HELD: No dwelling. The video shop is not exclusively for rest and comfort, even if in the same building. The law does not require that the offender must also be in the house. The offender can shoot from outside the house and kill a person inside it is still considered as dwelling, P v. Lasibar If the person is stepping on the first rung of stairs, then it is dwelling. But if he has yet to step, not pa. P v. Alcala If both offender and offended live in the same house, it is not aggravating. P v. Punzalan The house and the servants quarters are separate, but within the same compound. The houseboy went to the house of the amo and killed him there. HELD: Dwelling is NOT aggravating here because the servants quarters located in the same compound are considered as part of the dwelling of the offended party. o Sir doesnt agree with this. He thinks that the two houses are separate and distinct means it is a different dwelling. Does dwelling apply in robbery? Distinguish. o Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with homicide or robbery with intimidation of persons. o However, in robber with force upon things, dwelling is inherent. PD 1613: Dwelling is not aggravating in arson. P v. Malngan: A person dies inside a building burned on purpose. When is it homicide, when is it arson? o Intent is PRIMORDIAL. o If the intent is to burn the house, then the burning is arson even if a person dies. Homicide is absorbed. o If the intent is to kill the person and the burning was the means employed to commit the crime, it is homicide. o If the intent is to kill the person, and the house is burned to
P v. Reyes: Key: there must be deliberate intent to insult or show manifest disregard for the age, rank, sex. Not merely because the victim is a female or has a rank, this A.C. applies. P v. Nerio: 20-year-old man raped an 80-year-old woman. The victim was the teacher of the accused in grade 1. Key fact: victim was already retired! HELD: Fact that the offended party was already retired did not diminished the respect due her rank as former teacher in grade 1. Not aggravating in crimes against property. Ex: o Robbery o Robbery with homicide since here, the homicide was merely an incident to robbery P v. Lopez: The aggravating circumstances of age and sex cannot be absorbed by treachery. Treachery pertains to manner of commission. A.C. of age, rank, sex, refers to relationship. P v. Lora: The accused murdered a child 3 days old. The SC appreciated the A.C. of age of victim in convicting the accused of murder. ALSO, treachery, since the child cannot defend himself. P v. Malolot 548 SCRA 676: Accused hacked to death an 11 month old child. The TC convicted the accused of murder, qualified by treachery. HELD: A.C. of age of victim DOES NOT apply. This is absorbed by treachery. Sir does not agree with this case. o But Malolot should prevail, being the later case. Art 14(3b) dwelling P v. Sapinoso Victim was stay-in laundrywoman, but it was not her house (obviously). The killer was the houseboy, who also lived there. Laundrywoman had her own room. SC HELD: although the offender and offended lived in the same house, the crime is aggravated by dwelling, because the room was deemed a dwelling, notwithstanding being in the same house. P v. Santiago Accused and victim live in the same house but that house is composed of several small rooms. Each room although located in the same house is considered a dwelling separate and independent of the adjacent rooms. What is considered as dwelling? o Includes every dependency of the house and every integral part of the house. Includes staircase, enclosure under the house, and the terrace. What if the person is a squatter? o Still dwelling. The law does not make any distinction as to
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cover up the crime, then it is homicide and arson as SEPARATE CRIMES. There is no special complex crime of homicide with arson. Art 14(4) abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness P v. Ostia - elements o 1) reposed trust and confidence to offender o 2) abused this trust and confidence P v. Arojado: another requirement is that the confidence is IMMEDIATE AND PERSONAL such that it gives the accused some advantage and makes it easier to commit the crime. P v. Villanueva: the mother of the victim had a common law husband, whom the victim called papa. Papa raped the daughter. HELD: Abuse of confidence, even if the relationship between the mom and papa was illicit. Art. 14(5) committed in a place of worship P v. Jaurige for this to be an AC, there must be intent from the outset to commit the crime inside the place of worship. Here, the accused did not intent to commit the crime inside the church (she did not expect the man to touch her thigh). Art. 14(6) night time, uninhabited place, or by a band If all three are present, are these separate ACs or only one? General rule: only one. Exception: P v. Libraldo 390 Phil. 548 These ACs may be considered separate and distinct if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently of each other, revealing greater perversity. Night time Night time: o Subjective test when night time was sought purposely to commit the crime o Objective test when the nocturnity facilitated the commission of the crime N.B. The subjective and objective tests are alternative. They need not concur. Either tests application is sufficient. P v. Dela Cruz: It is not enough that the crime was committed in night time, there must be evidence that night time was sought for, or the nocturnity facilitated the commission of the offense Uninhabited place (despoblado) P v. Ostia: it is not the distance, but the possibility or impossibility of immediate aid to be obtained. o The more important consideration is if the commission of the crime makes it possible for the victim to receive aid. o Ex. The distance is not so great, but one has to climb up a hill to reach the house to render aid. There is despoblado. P v. Luneta: Prosecution must prove that the accused chose the remoteness of the place to aid the commission of the crime, or to conceal the commission of the crime. By a band P v. Oco 458 SCRA 120 More than three armed malefactors. o What is the test? Any weapon which, by reason of its intrinsic nature or purpose, is capable of inflicted serious or fatal injuries. o SC HELD: the four armed persons contemplated in the law must be principals by direct participation for band to be considered as a band in this AC. They must act together in the execution of the crime. P v. Estante Jr. There were four accused, it was alleged in the information that they composed a band. Two were acquitted. Majority of the SC HELD: band is still subsistent even if two were acquitted. o Justices Aquino and Abad-Santos both said 4-2 = 2. No band. Band is merely a generic AC in robbery with homicide or robbery with rape (Art. 294, 295) also in intentional mutilation or PI resulting in insanity, impotency, or blindness. This means that this can be offset by a generic MC. Contrast: o Art. 266-B if rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the offender is sentenced from RP to death (Under RA 8353). P v. Lamak if the crime of murder was committed by a band and aggravated by despoblado, there should only be one AC. Art. 14(8) with aid of armed men P v. Amion and P v. Oco and P v. Berayon SC said that for aid of armed men to be an AC, the requisites must concur: o 1) armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime directly or indirectly o 2) Accused availed himself of aid of such men or relied upon them when the crime was committed The armed men are accomplices who take part in a minor capacity directly or indirectly P v. Berayon: There should not be any conspiracy or the armed men must not be principals. Art 14(9, 10) recidivism, reiteracion Sir said: alam niyo nay un Art 14(11) price, reward, or promise Need not be money. P v. Paredes - The inducement MUST be the primary consideration by the principal by direct participation. P v. Fuerte If the offer is accepted, does the AC apply to both offeror and offeree?
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o YES. Both of them. Art 14(12) explosives, poison, fire, etc. Take note of COMADRE and MALNGAN (very important cases) Note than 8294 added a generic aggravating circumstance here, the use of unlicensed firearms or explosives. Art 14(13) evident premeditation P v. Anigum: Elements: o (1) Proof of time when the accused came up with the determination to commit the crime o (2) over act by accused showing he determined to commit the crime o (3) he clung to that determination o (4) lapse of time between the determination and decision to carry it out Essence of this AC: precedence of cool thought and reflection P v. Rolas: how much time must elapse? The law does not give a formula. Each case must be resolved on the extent of each factual circumstance. P v. Beltran: There was only a lapse of two hours from the decision to commit the crime and the actual commission of the crime. P v. Guillen was there evident premeditation when he wanted to kill President Roxas but he killed someone else? No. Because he did not intend to kill the other guy. o But if one decided to kill any Ilocano or anybody he encounters and he does, this AC applies. Evident premeditation is inherent in every specific intent felony. o Ex. kidnapping o Robbery o Estafa (intent to gain) o Piracy in Phil. waters P v. Huracha: If in addition to the crime of robbery, the accused intended to kill a person (robbery with homicide), evident premeditation is aggravating. o If he had no plan to kill a person, but he ends up killing a person in the house who put up resistance, there is no evident premeditation. P v. Perame and P v. Dela Cruz: if two or more persons conspire to commit a crime, and they decide to commit it, there may be evidence premeditation if the conspiracy allowed the conspirators to ponder upon and reflect on their decision to commit a felony. o NOTE: types of conspiracy 1) instant conspiracy: has no evident premeditation 2) non-instant conspiracy: time to reflect Art. 14(14) craft, fraud, or disguise Craft and fraud may be aggravating in robbery with homicide, where the accused induced the victim to take them where the cows they supposedly wanted to buy are found. But they ended up killing the victim. HELD: Aggravated by craft. Used intellectual trickery. Art 14(15) superior strength P v. Guevarra four accused were armed with a knife. One killed the victim, but there was conspiracy. Only one was armed. HELD: still superior strength, because the victim was unarmed. P v. Tilapia - Accused killed his wife. Did not consider abuse of superior strength in parricide. It is generally accepted that the husband is physically stronger than the wife. If an AC is absorbed by another, then it loses its juridical existence. o P v. Demo and P v. Suyum generally, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery. Abuse of superior strength then loses its juridical existence o Can superior strength in this case offset a mitigating circumstance? No because it already lost its juridical existence. Art 14(16) treachery May treachery be considered in carnapping with killing of a person? P v. Lovitania 388 SCRA 417 treachery is NOT aggravating in qualified carnapping. Carnapping is a crime against property, so treachery is NOT aggravating. Is this still true today? o NOT ANYMORE. Take note of P. v. ESCOTE (see discussion below), which appreciated treachery in robbery with homicide. Is treachery qualifying in special complex crime of kidnapping with murder? o YES. P v. Solangon If the victim of kidnapping is killed with treachery, it is a special complex crime of kidnapping with murder. o So treachery can apply, under the Escote rule.
P v. Garcia 554 SCRA 616 P v. Vallespin 391 SCRA 213: o For treachery to exist either as a generic aggravating or qualifying circumstance, two conditions: A) employment or means, manner, or method or execution that would ensure the safety of the offender from any defense or retaliation of the offended party B) deliberate act of the offender or conscious choice of the means, manner, or method of execution o Aspects of second element: Deliberate and conscious choice shown through a) prior conduct of the offender; b) relationship of the parties; c) nature of the killing
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo P v. Caratao 403 SCRA 482 mere suddenness of the attack does
not by itself suggest treachery, unless the offender used the suddenness of the attack as means or method to ensure success of strike o Chance attacks or crimes done in the spur of the moment, or those preceded by heated altercation, are NOT treacherous May treachery be considered if the wrongful act done be different from that intended by the offender? o P v. Castillo Treachery is present even if the victim killed is different the one intended to be killed o Treachery may be present in aberratio ictus or error in personae Treachery is inherent in murder by poisoning. If the offender poisoned the victim, treachery is inherent. Art 14(17) ignominy P v. Fuertes (Feb 28, 2000) circumstance pertaining to a moral order which adds disgrace or obloquy to the material injury caused to the offended party; tends to make the crime more humiliating P v. Valla the accused lighted a cigarette on the pubic area of the victim which caused blisters. With ignominy. P v. Umidang, P v. Bacule o When the accused focused his flashlight on the genitals of the offended party, and he examined it before he raped her in front of her father with ignominy o Raped victim before her betrothed o Or asking her to present her full nakedness before raping her o When victim was pregnant o Tied a banana fiber around his penis before raping his victim (Bacule) o P v. Sailan when the accused raped the victim using dogstyle and not missionary style. But now its now a separate crime of sexual assault. o NOTE: Art. 266-A of RPC: Decisions in Bacule and Sailan are now amended. sexual assault, P v. Cachola when the accused after killing the victim, sliced the left leg and took the flesh from the legs and shoulders of the victim, this is not adding ignominy to the commission of the crime because the victim was already dead. Art 15(20) with aid of minors under 15 years of age Remember RA 9344 a minor under 15 is absolutely exempt from liability So if he assists, then the minor is completely exempt from liability
But the same may be an aggravating circumstance Art 15(21) Cruelty Cruelty: unnecessary physical pain the commission of the crime P v. Sitchon test is whether the accused deliberately and despicably augmented the wrong committed by him by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increasing the suffering of the victim, slowly and gradually Number of wounds does not necessarily suggest cruelty; it is the deliberate act of committing the crime to cause unnecessary pain. o Ex. 20 wounds inflicted rapidly usually not cruelty o Ex. 20 wounds excruciatingly inflicted, where the person savored the act can be cruelty There can be no crime of robbery with multiple homicide, regardless of the number of victims. But supposing for this reason of robbery, two are killed, can we not consider the 2nd killing as an aggravating circumstance analogous to cruelty? o SC wrote two decisions, but reversed in the third. o P v. Abdul; The SC agreed and considered the second killing as an aggravating circumstance analogous to cruelty. o P v. Regala: The accused committed robbery, raped the victim twice on the occasion of robbery. The Sol-Gen urged the SC to treat the second rape as analogous to adding ignominy to the crime. The SC HELD: No, the second rape is not an AC because it is not included in Art. 14 of the RPC (simple reasoning different from Abdul). o P v. De Jesus: notwithstanding how many people he killed, there is no aggravating circumstance Special laws relating to aggravating circumstances R.A. 9165 Supposing the accused was under the influence of drugs and then he killed a person, may the killing by that person under the influence of drugs be considered an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime? o P v. Belgar Yes, the killing by the offender of the victim under the influence of dangerous substances must be considered an AC. o SC changed its mind in P v. Sitchon Drug addiction is not an AC because it is not included in Art. 14 of the RPC. o But R.A. 9165, sec. 25 notwithstanding provisions of law to the contrary, the positive finding for drugs shall be considered an aggravating circumstance. R.A. 8294 P v. Comadre Justice Tinga said that 8294 amended Art 14(12), because usage of illegally possessed firearms becomes an aggravating circumstance. Tinga: if the person is in lawful
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possession of the explosives, then he uses it, it is QUALIFYING to murder. Dissent of Callejo: Its absurd! If illegally possessed only aggravating. If legally possessed qualified to murder! Unjust. o Use of an unlicensed explosives is AGGRAVATING. Because it says any crime in the RPC. So that should include murder. It shouldnt be qualifying. If unlicensed firearm is used to commit murder or homicide, it is merely an aggravating circumstance. But what kind? Is it generic or special AC? [Important because generic AC can be offset by generic MC, and special cannot.] o It is a special AC, not merely generic. whether treachery can apply to robbery with homicide. Those who say no say that it cant apply because robbery with homicide, which is a crime against property. But here, J. Callejo decided to cite Spanish SC decisions, stating that treachery may aggravate the homicide part of that special complex crime. So treachery applies. Why not qualifying? o The crime of robbery with homicide is a unique crime in the sense that there can be no robbery with murder. Homicide is always used as a generic term, even if the second component is actually murder. o And even if the homicide was actually just out of negligence, it can still be robbery with homicide. RA 8353 P v. Sailan the accused raped the victim in the presence of her parents or husband, there is aggravating circumstance of adding ignominy. o Is this still applicable?? o Not anymore. In RA 8353, it is a SPECIAL QUALIFYING circumstance. (under the enumeration) R.A. 8353 is found in Art. 266-B of the RPC. The crime of simple rape becomes qualified becomes penalty of RP to death. In a sense, RA 8353 amended Art. 14 of the RPC. Did R.A. 8353 amend Art 14 of the RPC? o In Art 266-B, the use of a deadly weapon to commit rape is a special qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty from RP to RP/death. It is not an AC under Art. 14, but it is in 266-B and 266-C of the RPC. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES Relationship Is relationship still an AC in rape? o Yes. o Rape is now a crime against persons. But it does not lose its nature as a crime against chastity, because for rape to be committed, there must be lewd design. o P v. Navida Thus, relationship is still an AC in rape. o P v. Catubig relationship is aggravating in crimes against chastity, including rape. o RA 7610 child abuse. If the victim is raped by a relative, is this aggravating applying Art 15? P v. Montinola relationship is merely a generic AC RA 7610. If the victim is a victim of child abuse. P v. Orilla 422 SCRA 620 J. Carpio: Art. 15 does not say when relation is an MC, and when it is an AC. o In crimes where the imposable penalty is death, relationship shall not be deemed an AC, regardless of the crime.
P v. Ladjaalam But the law says homicide or murder. It MUST be consummated. If the crime is merely attempted or frustrated, the AC does not apply. Under 8294, if one uses an unlicensed firearm to commit a crime other than homicide or murder, then the use of the unlicensed arm is neither a separate crime nor an AC. BUT that person must be convicted for that other crime, before the usage of an unlicensed firearm can be considered as neither a separate crime or an AC. o P v. Sabanao If an unlicensed firearm is used to commit robbery with homicide, the use of such is not an AC. o But in another case, a division of the SC ruled that the ruse of an unlicensed firearm to commit robbery w/ homicide is an AC. But this is not controlling. The law is clear, only murder and homicide. Do the words homicide or murder include parricide and infanticide? Or should it be read strictly? o P v. Mendoza murder is used in its generic term. It therefore include parricide or infanticide, as the case may be. o But one can argue that since the law only mentions these two crimes, under pro rio, then it must be construed in favor of the victim. There is security guard of an agency. The agency has license to possess firearm, but the guard does not. The security guard used the gun to commit murder. Is it AC? o Catalina Security v. Decano Yes, it is an AC. Even if the employer was licensed but the guard had no license to possess that firearm, then 8294 applies. An accused committed double murder (complex crime). He used an unlicensed firearm. Is it special AC? o It should be. The law does not distinguish whether it is simple or complex. But there is no case yet. P v. Escote Jr. Take note that before this case, the SC has always been divided
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Relationship is always aggravating in crimes against persons such as homicide, murder. o P v. Ramirez the SC said that the relationship between step father and step son is akin to that to an ascendant and descendant and is subject to AC of relationship. o P v. Capareda relationship between step grand niece and step grandfather is not one of the relationships contemplated in Art. 15 of the RPC o P v. Calongi and P v. Fernandez when the accused and victim are first cousins, relationship is NOT aggravating. o P v. Bacabac Uncle and nephew/niece not covered. o P v. Atog 286 SCRA 157 Scope of relationship under Art. 15: Spouse, Ascendant, Descendant, Legitimate, Natural, adopted brother or sister Intoxication P v. Montigo MC only if not habitual, or not pursuant to planning a felony, and affected mental faculties ART. 16-20: principals, accomplices, accessories May a private corporation, partnership, or association or other juridical entity be criminally liable? o P v. Chow Guri and Ching v. Sec. of Justice (by Callejo) if the law provides for a penalty against the corporation. Or even if the crime is committed by a corporation, but prescribes a penalty on the officers or directors or employees. The state is not prevented from penalizing a corporation for violation of a penal law, even if the crime is committed by its agents. o New York Central v. US the agent or employee must be done through the scope of employment, or done to benefit the employer Trust Receipts Law P.D. 115 when violated by corporation, partnership, or association: penalty is imposed on responsible officers Labor Code ex. illegal recruitment (39-D) same penalty Principals Note that these provisions only apply when two or more people are acting criminally P v. Dasilo When may a person be criminally liable as principal by direct participation? o Participation in criminal execution o Carried out the plan and directly participated in the execution o [N.B. There must be conspiracy, under this usual definition ] o But can there be principals by direct participation without conspiracy? Yes (P v. Figueroa): the usual example of two people attacking a hambog guy in a bar with prior planning. The victim died due to two bullets, one from each gun. There is no conspiracy here, but both are liable as principals by direct participation. How about the mastermind? For him to be a principal, does he have to commit an overt act in the execution of the planned conspiracy? o Enough to be held as co-principal through conspiracy, as long as there is involvement in the planning and commission. What should the overt act consist for principals by direct participation? o Active participation o Or giving moral assistance to the other conspirators Mere presence Exercising moral ascendancy Can someone not be in the scene of the crime and still be a principal? o Yes. For example, there is conspiracy and one is on lookout duty for policemen. o For as long as the conspirators perform specific acts that were coordinated pursuant to the conspiracy. P v. Verayo 400 Phil. 202 the 3 accused conspired to kill the victim. They all stabbed. Is it a complex crime. HELD: Convicted only for one crime of homicide, because there is only one victim. The number of crimes committed is not dependent on the number of conspirators. Supposing rape was committed by 2 or more persons, what happens? o P v. Hofelina It is a qualifying circumstance in the commission of the crime. In a case, the husband raped the victim, while the wife of the accused was holding the arms of the victim. HELD: The husband was guilty of rape by direct participation, and the wife was principal by indispensable cooperation. o Since the crime was committed by two persons, there is a qualifying circumstance that requires imposition of RP/death. Is it possible that two persons are conspirators but are liable for different crimes? o Yes. Example, the private individual is liable for delivery of prisoners, while the escaped convict is liable for evasion of sentence. o Ex. Two persons killed one of the guys wife. One is liable for homicide, the other is liable for parricide.
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Robbery with homicide o General rule: when two or more persons conspire to commit robbery, they expect that it can be attended by violence. o Is it possible that one is liable only for robbery but not robbery with homicide? P v. Napalit f Yes, if one desisted before the homicide was committed. Ex. one prevented the other from stabbing the victim o What about robbery with rape? By using words of command Is price, reward or promise qualifying under 248? Yes. To whom imputed? People v. Alicastre (chief of police killed father of mayor Gordon) qualifying circumstance is imputed not only against PDP but also PDI. Use of words must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. PDP has no other recourse but to obey the command. Especially if PDI has moral ascendancy over the PDP. People v. Bolivar, 317 SCRA 577: defined criminal inducement as whenever act performed by PDP is determined by influence of PDI such that PDP has no other recourse except to follow the words of the PDI. PDI must have great moral dominance over the PDP. Possible that PDI is not at the situs of the crime, PDP is but PDI still liable for inducement? Yes, his inducement is enough. People v. Manigbas, 109 P 469. People v. Gamao, 23 Phil. 81 People v. Domangcas, 320 S 600; People v. Arrari (?) pdi by inducement must have such influence or overpowering moral ascendancy over pdp. Requisites of PDI o Inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and o Inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material execution Main distinction between principal by direct participation and principal by indispensable cooperation o PIC an act different from the overt act of the PDP (otherwise its PDP also) Must the PIC be at the situs of the crime? o People v. Cayago, 244 P 308: 3 accused raped common victim. While one raping, the other 2 holding hands and feet. They took turns in doing so. In case of doubt, liability of PIC is merely as an accomplice Possible that one is PIC yet commits a crime different from the PDP? o Yes. Malversation through falsification of public documents committed by public officer in conspiracy with a private individual. Private individual may be liable for malversation. People v. Sendaydiego. Possible that PDP is by dolo but PIC commits culpa? o Yes. Samson v. CA, 103 P 277: bank ee and two of his friends. Friends made ee to believe that . estafa through falsification of commercial document by culpa. o 105 P 2094 Art 18 Accomplices People v. 429 P 701. Requirements for liability as accomplice People v. Rafael, 397 P 109. At what point must accomplice acquire knowledge of commission of crime by PDP? SC: accomplices come to
P v. Verseles all the accused will be liable for the rape committed by one of them, unless one proves that he endeavored to prevent the person from doing so. o Note: P v. Punsalan Must perform an OVERT act to prevent the commission of the other crime. Mere silence or running away is not enough disavowal. Art. 48 in relation to RA 9346, RA 9344, in relation to Art. 68 As a general rule, principal by direct participation must be at the place of the commission of the crime. He performs acts of execution, cannot possibly do so if he is not at the situs. But this does not mean if he is not at the situs, he is not PDP. People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430: If a part of a crime has been committed in one place and the other at another, each person who commits at one part no matter how wide the distance between conspirators People v. Corpuz, 412 Phil. 479: Illegal recruitment. Accused employee of a corp engaged in illegal recruitment. GR, corporations not criminally liable because no criminal intent; EXC, provision of law provides that officers, employees liable. SC: even a mere employee of a corp engaged in recruitment may be considered as PDP in the crime of illegal recruitment and if the employer is a private individual, the employer and the employee are PDP if it is shown that the employee consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The existence of corp entity does not shield the ee who si the corporate agent who knowingly causes the corp to commit the crime. Ee as agent of corp naturally aids and abets crim by corporation and will be prosecuted as principal if with knowledge of business of corp participates in the commission thereof however slight his contribution may be. If he knows illegal and participates in furtherance, liable as PDP. o The law of agency as applied in civil cases has no application in criminal cases. Distinguish PDP from PDI Two ways of becoming PDI o By directly forcing another to commit a crime By using irresistible force By causing uncontrollable fear o By directly inducing another to commit a crime By giving price, or offering reward or promise
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know of criminal resolution of pdp after the pdp has reached a decision to commit a crime. Accomplice does not decide commission of crime. Accomplice just agrees after criminal resolution is accomplished, he does not conspire. But if accomplice commits an act of execution, already PDP. Prior or simultaneous acts not indispensable for commission of crime, not overt acts for commission People v. Geralde, 401 P 174: conspirator and accomplice has one thing in common, they know and agree with criminal resolution but the business is by pdp. Accomplices merely instruments of conspirators, not members of conspiracy. People v. Continente, 398 P 367 People v. Vera, 312 S 662: 4, PD 532 (highway robbery, brigandage) any person who directly or indirectly abets commission of piracy or robbery in the highway or brigandage is not merely an accessory, but an accomplice to the principal in the crime May one be a PDP on the basis solely of presumption? o Yes. One caught in possession of recently stolen property is presumed to be author of theft or robbery. May one be charged and convicted as accomplice or accessory even before principal charged or convicted or should pdp first be convicted before accomplice and accessory be charged or convicted? What are their corresponding liabilities? o People v. Rafael, 397 P 109: Following Vino v. People, 178 S 626 as long as commission of the crime it can be proven beyond reasonable doubt, determination of criminal responsibility of accessory may be determined independently of and separately from liability of pdp o PCGG v. Ombudsman Desierto, 397 S 971: if the case against PDP is dismissed, the case against acc must also be dismissed because the liability of the acc is subordinate to that of the pdp. Indeed an acc is like a shadow that follows the pdp and not the other way around. o But dismissal of case against acc does not necessarily result in dismissal of case against pdp. Art 19 Accessories People v. Favros, 429 P 701: for one to be an accessory, he must have knowledge of the commission of felony, he participates after the commission of the felony by any of the acts enumerated in art 19. His participation must not be that of a principal or accomplice. Accessory knows of commission of crime by pdp during or after the commission of the crime but does not participate in the commission of such. His participation comes after commission of the crime in any of the 3 instances in art 19. One who receives part of the ransom/loot from kidnapper/RWH is an accessory to crime of kidnapping/RWH. Corpus delicti Mere silence of one in commission of crime is not acting as accessory not a crime to be silent. US v. Caballero. People v. Antonio, 390 P 989: accused policeman witnessed the killing of victim by co-accused. Policeman failed to arrest culprit and even told co-accused not to tell other policemen. Is Antonio an accessory? Yes, under third par of art 19, it was duty of policeman to arrest culprit and not to conceal commission of crime by silence or misleading authorities that accused was really culprit. By his acts, policeman abused his public position. PD 1612 Anti-Fencing Law. Tan v. People, 313 S 229; CJ Davide in Pamintuan v. People 234 S 63. One who acquires stolen property is criminally liable as accessory under art 19 or as principal for fencing under pd 1612. Prosecution has option of prosecuting as accessory for robbery under art 19 or principal for fencing. Pamintuan v. People, 234 S 63: But for one to be principal for fencing, crime of robbery or theft must be committed, accused does not participate in commission of robbery or theft, acquires proceeds of robbery or theft, has actual knowledge or should have known subject is from robbery or theft and intent to acquire. Art 20 Accessories exempt from liability People v. Mariano, 400 P 883: A killed B, told sister C to hide body of B. A and C buried B. TC ruled that C (sister of principal) is an accessory under Art 19 but was exempt from liability under Art 20. SC said indeed sister who helped is exempt from criminal liability under Art 20. Basis of exemption is ties of blood of principal and accessory and preservation of cleanliness of ones name which compels one to conceal crimes committed by ones relatives. o J. Callejo does not agree with statement of preservation of cleanliness of ones name Pacheco, noted commentator on Spanish Penal Code. What if policeman furnishes means for his brother to escape with abuse of public position? Is policeman exempt? Pacheco is of the opinion that policeman is exempt because ties of blood constitute a more powerful incentive than call of duty. Moreover, law does not distinguish between private individuals and public officers. J. Callejo agrees. Art 21 Offended party and accused agreed to fight; one lost. He filed for a complaint for physical injuries. Does the pari delicto doctrine apply? o No. It does not apply to criminal cases. In fact, two people can agree to duel, and if one dies, the offender may be charged under the RPC. Estoppel does not apply to criminal cases. The offended party is the State. Private individual who sustained the damage is merely he witness to the crime.
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo P v. Judge Dacuycuy: There can be no imprisonment at the
discretion of the court. There must be limits imposed by law. Brilliante v. CA: The SC issued admin orders giving preference to fine over imprisonment for BP 22 and libel. There was no abolishment of the penalty of imprisonment. Art 22 There can be retroaction of the reduction of death to RP. RA 9344, o Sec. 59: DP cannot be imposed on a minor o Sec. 54: cases of children 15 and below automatically dismissed and referred to appropriate diversion programs Those undergoing service of sentence: must undergo rehab in youth rehab center o Sec 67 if minor is no longer entitled to suspension of sentence, and court resolves to impose the sentence, he can still apply for Probation o Sec 68 child serving sentence at time of passage of RA 9344 and below 18 at the time of commission of crime, and acted with discernment: benefited by retroactive effect of law Art 23 RA 8353 amended Art. 23 and Art. 344 o Rape and sexual assault are now crimes against persons o Criminal action can only be commenced by information filed by public prosecutor, and not the private offended party o Else, private crimes can only be instituted by private offended party. Not due to jurisdiction but to protect private offended party. If a crime is public, private individual cannot pardon the crime or compromise it, unless provided by law. In a criminal action, it is the State that is the offended party; the private individual is just a witness. Criminal liability may only be extinguished by law or the grounds in Art. 89. o A public officer is charged with RA 3019. He returns the money. Will his liability be extinguished? No. It will not exonerate him from criminal liability, but will extinguish his civil liability. P v. Sandiganbayan o Exception: RA 8353 marriage of offender and rape victim Shall extinguish criminal action If already convicted, penalty imposed will be extinguished o A husband, however, can commit rape or sexual assault against his wife. Art 24 Par. 2 mentions commitment of minor in a facility, according to Art. 80 already repealed by PD 1603 and amended by RA 9344 RA 6975, par. 4:
If police officer or employee is charged for a crime in a valid information, he may be suspended during pendency of the case o Lacson v. Roque: Suspension of mayor is not a penalty in this case. This is only to facilitate justice. RA 3019: o Public officer or employee is charged may be suspended 90 days o This is not deemed a penalty o
Par. 4 refers to administrative sanctions in administrative cases against public officers and employees (imposed by superiors) Tudtud v. Caayong Arts 25-27 RA 9346 DP can no longer be imposed, but it did not abolish DP, because the Constitution still allows it to be imposed Ikaw v. Judge: dual personality of temporary DQ or suspension o As principal penalty Temporary DQ: 6 years and 1 day-12 years Suspension: 6 months and 1 day-6 years o As accessory penalty: Follow principal penalty P v. Bon: RP is an indivisible penalty o There is no minimum, medium, maximum period P v. Villanueva o It is not affected by mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Indivisible penalties: o RP o Perpetual absolute or special DQ o Public censure Effect of indivisible penalties: o Impose penalty in its entirety Even if there is a special aggravating or two mitigating it will not be affected o BUT if there is privileged mitigating, it may be reduced by 1 or 2 degrees P v. Diqui: after imprisonment of 30 years, eligible for pardon o Not mandatory; dependent on President
It was never the intention of Congress to convert RP into a divisible penalty. P v. Gawkard penalty of 30 years of RP was erroneous, so it was converted to just RP. o If it were the intent of Congress to make it divisible, it also should have amended Art 76 of the RPC but it did not (this is the table of divisible penalties). Art 63 provides for indivisible penalties, and RP is there. o P v. Lucas: Only reason for the 30 year imposition is for the three-fold rule under Art. 70, where the maximum duration of the convicts sentence cannot be more than 3-fold of the length
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of time of the most severe sentence Do not interchange RP with LI. Latter cannot be reduced by one or two degrees. EXCEPTION: o P.D. 818 Syndicated Estafa: Maximum of crime is 30 years, which in connection with the accessory penalties shall be 30 years of RP o People v. Canales imposed 40 years of RP, with accessory penalties of death, and cannot be pardoned until after 40 years have passed. How did the court reach this decision? Because under Art. 309 of the RPC, theft is punishable by maximum of RT. But for Art. 310, qualified theft, penalty is two degrees higher. This is death. But the rule under Art. 74 is that if the next higher penalty is death, it becomes RP, with accessory penalties of death. This is also the reason why he cannot be pardoned before 40 years have lapsed, instead of 30. Art. 26 penalty of fine o Read in conjunction with Art. 38 (order of payment of pecuniary liabilities: 1. Reparation, 2. Indemnification, 3. Fine, 3. Cost of proceedings) o Ricaforte v. Jurado: fine is not given to the complainant; it is given to the State. o Can accused use its cash bail bond to pay his fine, if convicted? Yes. The law does not prohibit him from using his cash bail bond to pay his fine. It is only meant to ensure his attendance during the process. o Conflict of provisions leading to confusing rulings, if the fine is exactly 200 pesos: Considered a light felony P v. Canson But for prescription, it is considered a correctional penalty 10 years Art. 28 How do you compute the penalty if the accused is not in jail? o Compute from the time accused is at disposal of the authorities or the court for promulgation of sentence. What if he is in prison? o From the day the judgment of conviction becomes final. If he appeals, it is not yet final. Art 29 preventive imprisonment Destierro does not involve imprisonment, although only partial. Sec. 53, RA 9344 any form of physical restraint imposed on a child in conflict with the law including his community service or commitment to a rehabilitation center shall be considered as preventive imprisonment. If the minor juvenile is imprisoned pending trial he shall be credited with the service of the sentence with the full time in which the child was preventively imprisoned o Provided the child agrees with the rules and regulations of the penal institution o If not, still entitled to 4/5ths of the time If the convict is sentenced to life imprisonment, he is still entitled to the benefits of this provision. Under Art. 104 of the RPC, the offender is civilly liable to the offended party for restitution, damage, reparation, and indemnification for consequential damages. The liability of the accused under Art. 104 civil liabilities or pecuniary liabilities. How about the penalty of fine under Art. 38 of the RPC in relation to Art. 39? o It is also a pecuniary liability of the accused, but it is a pecuniary PENALTY (not pecuniary liability), because it is a penalty under Art. 25 of the RPC. Art. 39 Subsidiary imprisonment can only be imposed if the accused is penalized with a fine (either alone or in conjunction with imprisonment), and because of insolvency, he cannot pay the fine. The convict cannot be ordered to serve subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay pecuniary LIABILITY; but he can serve for pecuniary PENALTY. If he is not insolvent, but he does not want to pay the fine, can he choose to go to jail instead? o No. The accused the has no choice but to pay the fine. Fortun Ironworks Co v. Schwarzkott o Although in P v. Subido, the SC said the convict has to choose whether to pay the fine or choose subsidiary imprisonment. J. Callejo does not agree with this. He agrees with Ironworks. If the accused was convicted of a crime defined by SPL, Art. 39 will still apply, taking into account Art. 10 of the RPC. o Ex: Violation of BP 22, an SPL, o Ty v. P the governing law is Art. 39, not Act 1732. Ignore 1732. Supposing he was convicted for possession of unlicensed firearm and sentenced to prison term but he was insolvent. Subsidiary imprisonment? o Yes. Again, Art. 39 is consistent with Art. 10, not Act 1732.
Subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty. There must be a statement in the dispositive portion that if he is insolvent, he must serve subsidiary imprisonment. Absent this specific order in the dispositive portion, he
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cannot be compelled to serve this. (Ramos v. Judge) If the penalty is higher than prision correccional, there can be no subsidiary imprisonment. Toledo v. Superintendent, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, supposing the accused is charged with 2 or more offenses and there was 1 decision convicted him of all the charges. How do we determine the 6-year limit? o Where this situation exists, the 6 year period limit shall be based on the total duration of the penalties imposed by the court based, after the joint trial, on the 3-fold rule under Art. 70 of the RPC. If the totality of the penalties exceed 6 years, no subsidiary imprisonment shall not be imposed, even if the penalty for each of the crimes is less than 6 years. Art. 45 forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime Who has the power to order forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools used in the crime? o Only the TC which rendered conviction of the accused may order this. o People v. Singson but before the court may do so, the tools or instruments must be presented to the court as evidence. Otherwise, the court has no jurisdiction to order the forfeiture or destruction of such. o People v. Gacutan In case of bribery, the money used may be forfeited in favor of the state. The tool or instrument MUST belong to the accused himself. If it belongs to some other person and he has no involvement in the crime, there can be no such declaration People v. Elona Does this provision apply to SPLs? o Yes. The court may order destruction nonetheless if the items are contraband. (DDA) RA 9165, Sec. 20 those subject of the crime, including proceeds derived from drug trafficking, and even money and assets acquired in violation of RA 9165 deemed and ordered forfeited in favor of the government, unless belonging to third persons without involvement of the crime. o Exception to third person rule: if the items are beyond lawful commerce still forfeited Under Sec. 20 of the same law, the proceeds of the sale or disposition of the property forfeited must be used to pay the expenses incurred in the proceedings including cost of the proceedings Art. 48 complex crimes P v. Bon Death penalty may no longer be imposed, even in relation to Art. 48 of the RPC. Material Plurality when a single act constitutes two or more gave or less grave offenses, or when an offense is a necessary means to commit the other o There is only one penalty, although there are multiple crimes o The more serious crimes penalty is imposed in maximum period Delito compuesto (first mode) o Either dolo or culpa P v. De los Santos person was convicted for reckless imprudence resulting into homicide and destruction of property o The felonies resulting from the single act must be felonies in the RPC o If punishable under the RPC and an SPL, Art. 48 will NOT apply. The offender may be charged and convicted for both crimes, separately without double jeopardy. Ex. Estafa and illegal recruitment Ex. Estafa and BP 22 Supposing one wants to kill another with treachery, but there was abberatio ictus, or error in personae, then the crime committed by the accused is a COMPLEX CRIME. o Attempted homicide + homicide P v. Patrolla the accused stabbed the victim with a bolo, the bolo hit both the person and the person behind him. o Complex crime of murder and SPI. P v. Andaya the accused forcibly insert his penis into the vagina of the woman and she sustained Less SPI in her vagina. Art. 48 Rape complexed with Less SPI o Problem here: SC applied the second paragraph. J Callejo does not agree. It must be paragraph 1. The law is clear: a single act. But the SC sometimes applied the single impulse test or the single criminal intent test. Gamboa v. P, cited in P. v. Judge Pineda : there must be singularity of the criminal act, not singularity of the criminal impulse. Because singularity of criminal purpose is NOT written in Art. 48. The SC applied single impulse test for the first time o P v. Tulos he stole on the same occasion 13 cows. SC held: one crime of theft even if there were 13 cows, applying single impulse test. o P v. de Leon took two roosters on one occasion. SC HELD: one crime of theft because it was in response to one criminal impulse. In crimes against chastity, the SC adopted another test: single criminal intent. o P. v. Obrique raped niece at 10 am, then 11 am at same grassy area. One crime of rape, even though committed in intervals of one hour, he was motivated by one criminal intent.
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo o P v. Intong accused inserted private organ and raped the
victim, but he was not content; he also inserted his finger at the same place and same occasion. SC said: the accused is guilty of one count of rape and 2 counts of sexual assault, same place, same occasion. P v. Aaron (CJ Corona) the accused inserted his penis into the vagina of the victim and made several push and pull movements but without removing his organ, until he reached orgasm. How many crimes of rape? Prosecutor said as many crimes of rape equal to the number of push and pull. HELD: only one, because he reached orgasm only once then he removed it. Lesson: do not remove it. P v. Sollano The accused raped his niece once a day, insert his finger once a day, for 16 successive days in different locations. HELD: as many crimes of rape and sexual assault equal to how many times he inserted his organ and finger. Reasoning: there could not be a single criminal intent because each time he committed the crime, was on different days the accused was animate by separate criminal intents on each occasion. P v. Calimlim: Raped victim for first time is the pig pen, about 8m from the house. Then brought her to the room and raped her again. Then brought victim room of cousin, and raped again. Brought her to kitchen, where he raped her again. HELD: There were separate criminal intents because he raped the victim in different places although the rapes were done successively. Test: place test
NOTE: P v. Escoton: Convicted person for 5 counts of rape even if it was in the same place, and at the same night. Be forewarned that this might be the new rule now (2010 decision). What test will be applied for kidnapping? Single impulse, or single intent? o P v. Laranaga even if the persons were kidnapped on the same occasion and place, there were as many crimes of kidnapping as there were persons. Kidnapping with homicide, K with murder, K with rape: these are all special complex crimes, and not complex crimes under Art. 48 of the RPC. Even if the homicide or rape is a mere afterthought, this would be the crime. o P v. Rimurin (?) if the victim of kidnapping got raped, how many crimes of special complex crime of kidnapping and rape? There are as many times of crimes of kidnapping and rape as the number of persons kidnapped and raped. o Test: number of persons o P v. Bacungay Same rule for kidnapping for ransom, Even if it
is the same situs, the number of crimes of kidnapping will depend on the number of persons kidnapped. o P v. Reyes 7 persons kidnapped. Two of them killed. [The SC said there was only 1 crime of kidnapping with homicide.] This is strange case (J Callejo does not agree) Will you apply the single criminal intent or resolution test in mala prohibita? o No. Lim v. P: Person issued 3 bouncing checks on the same occasion. There are as many violations of BP 22 as there were many checks. The criminal intent or resolution test does not apply because it is mala prohibita. What about falsification of documents? Apply the single criminal intent or resolution test? o P v. Penas: Accused convicted of only one complex crime of estafa through falsification of three postal money orders which she cased in on the same day. Since it was the SAME occasion the acts are considered as only one act of estafa through falsification of commercial document. o BUT P v. Gonzales: There are as many crimes as how many vouchers were falsified. o P v. Villanueva: Accused falsified three money orders separately. Each constitutes separate crimes. Animated by separate impulses, in falsifying each voucher. o P v. Segovia: Accused, an employee of the SC, falsified the roll of attorneys. Included 3 names. HELD: As many crimes of falsification as there are many persons. o Lastrilla v. Granda: Uncles and aunties died and left three parcels of land. Executed three separate deeds of sale, on different occasions, making it appear that the vendors were the uncles and aunties, when they were still alive. Separate crimes. [Might be asked in the Bar] Antedating, forging the signature, and ? am I guilty for three counts of falsification for falsifying one document on three modes? Only ONE crime of falsification of public document even if there were multiple modes. o Gamboa v. CA: There was no single impulse, intent, or resolution test mentioned in Art. 48. It mentions a single act. (This was an estafa case, citing P v. Pineda) o Compare to Ilagan v. CA: As far as the lot buyers were concerned, there were as many crimes of estafa as the number of times the petitioner fraudulently collected from the victims. As far as the corporation is concerned, it depends on obligation to account. If he is obliged to account everyday and he fails to do so, there are as many crimes of estafa as the number of days he failed to account. If he is obliged to account every
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo o

month, he is guilty for every month he fails to account. Nice. P v. Serrano: There were as many crimes of estafa through forgery as there acts. bank did not bother to check, since we are friends. The employees failure to ascertain identity of payee, there is falsification/endorsement by culpa, becoming the means to commit estafa. o HELD: Estafa, through falsification by culpa. Why, can a public document be done through culpa? o Yes. Because for official or mercantile documents, there is no need to prove that there is intent to cause damage. o The intent to cause damage is only required for private document. Therefore, there is no falsification through culpa for private documents. What about forcible abduction with rape: related with Art. 342 and rape/sexual assault (Art. 366-A)? o Absorption of felonies. o If the intention was to rape, and the victim was brought to a place in light of rape. HELD: Rape only abduction is absorbed by rape. P v. Almanzor o But there may be a complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. When is it not absorbed? P v. Mojerada: Victim abducted and brought to grassy area near her house, where she was raped. Abduction was absorbed since it was near her house. P v. Godinez: Brought to place 600m from her house, where she was raped. Abduction was STILL absorbed by rape. P v. Abarquez: Abducted to place 100m from her house (13 year old girl) forcible abduction with rape. What is determinative? SPECIFIC INTENTION OF OFFENDER AND NOT THE DISTANCE What if there was abduction, and then there were three rapes done after? o P v. Garcia, P v. Caraang: The moment the first rape was committed, then forcible abduction with rape was consummated. So the second and third rapes were SEPARATE crimes. HELD: One complex crime, two separate simple crimes. (This is en banc.) o But there are some commentators that say that the subsequent rapes must be absorbed since abduction is a continuing crime. If the accused abducted two women at the same time, and then raped both? o Guilty of TWO counts of forcible abduction with rape. Exceptions to the second clause 1. Indispensable 2. Essential element or mode of committing another felony 3. Merged with another crime 4. Felony is committed to conceal another crime o
Libel: o Even if two or more persons were subject to libel, if there was only one publication, there is only one crime of libel. Crimes against persons: o P v. Lawat Constabulary officers killed around 50 Maranaws with guns. Convicted of complex crime of multiple murder under Art. 48(1), applying single impulse test. [Note: court just resorted to this because they couldnt tell who killed who] o P v. Pingcalin Several killings inside Bilibid prison. HELD: Multiple murder and multiple attempted/frustrated murder. Against, applied single criminal impulse test. (J. Aquino) Dissent by Makasiar: Read Art. 48 single act. It doesnt say single criminal impulse. On an MR: J. Aquino reneged, considering Makasiar. If it is prisoners, apply Art. 48. If NOT prisoners, then separate crimes. [This is really strange.] o P v. Pineda: DO NOT APPLY SINGLE IMPULSE TEST. Just read Art. 48! A single act! (The SC got mad na here) o P v. Salidad: Several accused with automatic, high powered guns and killed several people. If you pull the trigger, several bullets shoot out. Complex crime of multiple murder and multiple attempted murder. Although several independent acts were done, it was not possible to determine who among them killed how many victims. The accused showed a single criminal impulse based on my gosh, di natin napatay lahat). Also used conspiracy as basis. o But see P v. Dalmacio Armalite guns fired successively, and explosives, killed several and seriously wounded others. The accused were guilty for as many crimes as how many people were injured. Malversation: o P v. Barbas: There may be a complex crime of malversation through falsification of official documents a crime being done to commit another crime. Delito compuesto (Art. 48(2)) Necessary means to facilitate or ensure the commission of another felony. If one felony is indispensable to the commission of another, then Art. 48 DOES NOT apply; there is only one crime. o Bottom line: Must be necessary but NOT indispensable Is it possible that one is delictual and the other is culpable felony? o Samson v. CA. Yes. o Cashed check on behalf of an impostor. The employee of the
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo Take note: Batulanon v. P [Note for the Bar]: Company officer falsified
two private documents to make it appear that there were two extra employees, even if she really just kept the wages for herself. Apply Art. 48(2) for estafa through falsification of private document? o No. There can be no complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document, because the latter must have 1. Intent to cause damage, and 2. Damage caused. For estafa, the same elements must apply. The moment the falsification was made with intent to cause damage, the same element CAN NO LONGER BE USED to establish estafa. The crime instead is falsification of private document. If the estafa can be committed without the falsification, the proper charge is estafa. Art. 48 DOES NOT apply. If it is falsification of public or mercantile document, can there be complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document? o Yes. [See discussion above on element of falsification of public documents.] Recits Does article 48 apply to culpable felonies ex. Reckless imprudence resulting into homicide? o P v. De los Santos Yes. Because a complex crime involves felonies. Culpa is a felony. Are aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable to Art. 365? o No, Art. 365, because it involves negligence, Another principle in De los Santos can Art. 48 apply if the constituent acts are less grave felony and light felony? o No, light offenses are not included (see excerpt). If under Art. 48, the maximum of the graver penalty is imposed, is it a special aggravating circumstance? o No. What if the accused is entitled to a generic mitigating circumstance, will it offset? o No, unless it is a privileged mitigating circumstance. De los Santos: Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as acts or omissions punishable by law committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa). In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, of the complex crime of homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence, and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted of the complex crime of multiple homicide with damage to property through reckless imprudence for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers. The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed. In P v. Comadre, SC said that Art. 48 is for the benefit of the offender, under the pro reo principle. What does J. Tinga mean by that? o Because even if there are two crimes committed, the law only punishes the offender for one, although it is in the maximum. Because in the eyes of the law, the two crimes stem from one criminal intent this is less perverse in the eyes of the law compared to punishing him for two crimes. Does this apply to the second part of Art. 48? o Yes, because the first act was only a means done to commit the second crime. There is still one criminal resolution. How did the SC reason this out in P v. Hernandez? o Absorption in political crimes. o Read the dissent of J. Montemayor. He said that pro reo should not apply to the second paragraph because he committed two crimes, unlike in the first paragraph. o The majority rejected this by pointing out that both means were included in the same provision. If the treatment for the second paragraph must be different, then it should have been placed in a different provision. How do you define grave and less grave offense? o Defined according to the penalty. o Grave: afflictive or capital o Less grave: corrective Does 48 apply if one crime is under RPC and one is SPL? o No. It mentioned felonies. o So punish them separately. Ex. violated estafa and BP 22. If one is under RPC and ordinance? o No. Punished under both the RPC and the ordinance violated. Can there be a complex crime of arson and homicide? o No. Its either only simple arson or simple homicide. NEVER complex. o Look at intent. Lecture
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Will Art. 48 apply if the resulting crimes from the single act constitute two different felonies? o Yes. Ex. I threw a grenade at the house of my wife and paramour, and both died. Guilty for complex crime under Art. 48(1) murder and parricide. P v. Magalona P v. Macasling: Art. 48 will apply even if there is mere abberatio ictus. Ex. I fired my gun at A, but killed B instead. Art. 48 will apply: attempted homicide with consummated murder. Can one person be liable for homicide and SPI? o P v. Patrolla: Yes. titles were falsified. delito continuado: even if there were two transactions, there was a single criminal resolution leading to a single crime of estafa through falsification of public document. Adultery is not a delito continuado. Each sexual act is an offense. P v. Zapata: adultery is consummated and exhausted at the time of carnal union. Can you apply Art. 48 to plunder? o J. Regalado: Plunder is unique. Cant apply Art. 48. Although there maybe some predicate crimes, only ONE CRIME is committed. What is the penalty for a complex crime? o Penalty for the more serious crime, applied in its maximum period. Art. 49 N.B.: this provision only applies for error in personae Not to aberratio ictus or praeter intentionem o Because here, Art. 48 applies Skipped 50-60 But take note that the regular provisions on calculation of penalty do not apply for the privileged mitigating circumstance in Art. 68 Art. 59 for impossible penalty There is some commentary that the penalty for impossible crime does not apply for light penalties (or else, the penalty for the impossible crime would be greater than the crime itself) Art. 67 Has become inoperative. Apply Art. 365 instead Art. 61 and 71 Amended by RA 9346. Death penalty should not be taken into account for graduation of penalties. ONLY reclusion perpetua is indivisible now. Art. 62 Special aggravating circumstances: o Abuse of public position o Crime committed by organized/syndicated group In this case, conspiracy is assumed What does this mean? o It cannot be offset by generic mitigating circumstances Art. 63 Made inoperative by RA 9346 Then, there are two indivisible penalties (death and RP). But now, only RP is indivisible. o Cannot be affected by mitigating circumstances o EXCEPT privileged mitigating circumstances Art. 64
People v. Paicana, Jr.: the accused stabbed his wife to death, and she was 6 months pregnant at the time. Is he liable for complex crime? o Yes. Parricide with unintentional abortion, Take note of difference between Ampito and Batulanon cases [for the bar] Recits Can robbery with force upon things be complexed with robbery with violence against persons? o Yes. The former can be a means to commit the latter. Is coup detat a political crime? o Yes. o Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order. Any common crime committed in furtherance of a political crime is absorbed. o The common crimes are absorbed because they are necessary to achieve the political purpose. o What about illegal possession of firearms? Yes. Absorbed. Ponce Enrile v. Salazar case. Lecture Article 48 does not apply to special complex crimes o Ex. robbery with homicide, robbery with rape, robbery with intentional mutilation o Ex. kidnapping with murder, kidnapping with rape, kidnapping with homicide People v. Ordono the accused each raped the victim, and one of them killed the victim. Both are guilty of rape with homicide (one each), even if only one killed the victim. Delito continuado Applied by the SC to the crime of theft: People v. Tomblos, P v. De Leon. There is only one crime of theft even if the accused stole 13 cows belonging to two different owners. Single larceny rule was applied if a person steals several objects in the same occasion, in the same place, although belonging to different people Mallari v. P Mallari wanted to borrow money P3K, but the lender wanted to give P1,500 only. Mortgaged two lots to secure debt. Went to the aunt to borrow instead, and mortgaged the same two lots. The
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Check paragraph 5. If there are two or more generic mitigating and no aggravating, the court may impose a penalty one degree lower. o Ex. if there are four mitigating circumstances, once you use two to lower the penalty by one degree, the two are useless na. These have no effect. Basan v. P What if the accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, has two generic MC, and no AC. Can it be lowered by one degree? o P v. Tacbojo (June 1993) No. No matter how many MCs there are, RP cannot be reduced by degrees Penalty of fine Art. 66 and 75 Study this well What are the scenarios: o Either the law imposes a penalty of fine o OR penalty of fine AND imprisonment o OR penalty of fine or imprisonment A woman who is suffering from BWS is exempt from criminal liability If a minor is charged with a heinous crime punishable by death or RPdeath, is he entitled to suspension of conviction? o Yes. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec non distinguire debemos. o P v. Garcia But if the minor commits a SPL, which does not follow nomenclature of RPC, the minor is not entitled to privileged MC. o Ex. Life imprisonment in Illegal Recruitment Is the recommendation of the social worker binding on the court? o No. The court must ascertain the basis of the finding of the social worker o P v. Candelario If minor has already reached the age of 21, proceed with enforcement of judgment of conviction. Art. 69 P v. Bon If the penalty is death, reduced to RP with no parole. Art. 70 Reclusion perpetua shall be considered as 30 years only for the purpose of service of sentence. What are the penalties that can be served simultaneously with penalty of imprisonment? o 1. Perpetual absolute DQ o 2. Perpetual special DQ o 3. Temporary absolute DQ o 4. Temporary special DQ o 5. Suspension o 6. Public censure o 7. Fine o 8. Bond to keep the peace o 9. Civil interdiction Can destierro be imposed as the same time as imprisonment? o No. o
If the law provides for a penalty of fine of not less than 50K to 100K the court has discretion to impose a fine within these bounds Will you apply the ISL by analogy? o No. It does not apply here. If the law specifies penalty of fine OR penalty of imprisonment (Ex. BP 22), can the court impose a similar alternative penalty? o NO. The court must make a definite choice. Increase or reduction in the degree of the fine: o Increase or reduce (as the case may be), the maximum by 1/4th of the maximum amount o Do not change the minimum
P v. Judge: Fine cannot be used as substitute penalty to imprisonment. Penalty of fine is independent from penalty of imprisonment. Lazaro v. P: Accused drew and issued a check to pay for an obligation, but it bounced. Changed for BP 22. During trial, accused paid the value of the check. So there was no more damage to the complainant, but the case was already pending. May the accused be convicted for a fine still? o Yes. Penalty of fine does not go to the offended party but the State. Art. 68 In conjunction with RA 9344: DP cannot be imposed to a minor AM 02-1-18 note this o 1 Dec 2009: If the minor committed a crime and the time the law took effect, he was already 21, can he enjoy the benefit of suspension of sentence o Padua v. P RA 9344, Sec. 2 o Minor 15 or younger: exempt (no discretion to commit a crime) RA 9262
Imprisonment must be served by the convict successively, following the order of their severity, as provided for by Art. 71 o 2nd sentence does not commence until after the first expires. Do not include subsidiary imprisonment penalty in the computation of 40 years. Art. 76 No penalty executed except by virtue of final judgment If the person is acquitted, cannot anymore be subjected to public censure (P v. Abellera) Judge sentenced accused to 25 years RP; can he be compelled to serve sentence? o No. There is no such sentence as 25 years of RP; just RP. o Remedy: writ of habeas corpus.
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Art. 79 If the convict becomes insane or an imbecile: suspend service of sentence and sent to hospital for necessary treatment But the civil liability should still be enforced in spite of insanity or imbecility of the person Art. 87 Destierro: Memorize Not permitted to enter places designated in the sentence, nor within radius specified which shall be from 25-250 KM from the place specified. Art. 89 P v. Bayotas: civil liability of accused extinguished by death includes duty to restitute the proceeds of the crime But civil liability predicated on a source other than the delict survives. Can be executed against the estate. Absolute pardon and amnesty Pardon: does not look back; looks to the future and is not retrospective o If he is pardoned and commits a crime of the same title, he is still a recidivist Amnesty: everything is extinguished Pardon is a private act of the President and must be proved by the accused, unlike amnesty, where the court can take judicial notice because it is a public act with the concurrence of Congress Effects on right to suffrage and right to hold public office: o Absolute pardon granted by President to civil rights, but for these two specific rights, it must be specifically granted by the pardon P v. Patriarca Art. 344 US v. Guarin the offended party may grant the offenders, in the crime of concubinage and adultery o Offended party may pardon before institution of criminal complaint o If there is conviction by final judgment, the President may grant PARDON EVEN IF it is a private crime Service of sentence: amnesty o Kapunan Jr. v. CA: Ramos issued a proclamation granting amnesty to Honasan,, Capunan, etc. Does the proclamation include members of the AFP (any person who may have been involved in rebellion)? Yes. But the amnesty does not include any crime not covered by the proclamation itself. The latter must specify the crimes to which amnesty is extended. Marriage o P v. De Guzman (3 March 2010) Under 8353, the marriage between offender and offended party in rape or sexual assault will extinguish criminal liability and the penalty already imposed o So even if the marriage happened during service of sentence, even the penalty already imposed is extinguished Supposing there are 3 accused: principal by direct participation, principal by indispensable cooperation, and an accomplice if there is marriage between principal by direct participation, does this extinguish liability for the other accused? Yes, they are benefited. This was the intent of the Senate when they removed the original proviso stating that the co-principal, accomplice, and accessory do not benefit (through Sen. Enriles statement). Suppose an accused made perjurious statements in petition for naturalization. He is found out. He decided to withdraw the petition for naturalization. Does this extinguish liability? o Chua v. P No. This extinguishes merely the application but not the liability for a crime already committed Tan v. Phil Comm intl Bank: For BP 22, when a check was issued, there were no funds. But when presented, there were funds no liability. o If there were still no funds when presented, there is amnesty period for 5 days to pay. If paid no liability. Prescription of crimes If the penalty imposed on the convict is a compound one, what is the basis for prescription? o The highest penalty. Destierro is correctional: prescribes in 10 years What should be considered to determine whether the crime has prescribed or not? o Romualdez v. PCGG: Consider the FF 1. Period of the offense charged 2. Period when it begins to run 3. Period when it is interrupted o Act 3326 the law defining how to compute prescription for crimes under SPL But there are SPLs that themselves provide for manner of computing prescription Ex. OEC 5 years What is the rule under Act 3326? o Prescriptive period: from when it is known to the offended party or to the State or agents o If not known when committed, when discovered by the offended party or the State or its agents What do you mean by offended party? o Private party or government or agents When is the period interrupted? o Counted when complaint filed for preliminary investigation with public prosecutor or the OMB. How about continuing crime? When does period being to run? o
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o Prescription period runs after the occurrence of the LAST act. Supposing a document is executed ex. REM and it is falsified. When does the period run? o For documents required to be filed with the Reg. of Deeds, period begins to run upon filing with the ROD (P v. Pacificador) But what is the rule for marriage? o Jarillo v. P: Prescriptive period should begin to run from when State or agents or offended party acquired actual knowledge of the second marriage. Unlike property registration, registration of marriage is not constructive knowledge of marriage. Prescription of penalties Luna v. Warden, Del Castillo v. Torrecampo the prescriptive period for penalties begins to crime when the accused commits the crime of evasion of service of sentence Partial extinction, conditional pardon o Evasion service of sentence o Violates their pardon o Habitual delinquents o Kidnapping for ransom o Dangerous Drugs Law o Release from prison would cause a threat to public safety or society o Demensia or insanity Recitations Art. 12(1) in relation to RA 9344 Minor exempt from criminal liability. Is the minor civilly liable? o The minor is also exempt from civil liability. o Parents/guardians are civilly liable o Relate with Art. 221 in Family Code Supposing the minor acted with discernment, but the minor is criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Is he civilly liable? o Apply 2180 negligence, culpable felony o Art. 221 otherwise o [NOT SURE] Does a complex crime under Art. 48 automatically mean there is only one civil liability? o No. There is as many civil as crimes pa rin, because Art.48 is strictly a pre reo provision in criminal law and does not extend to civil liabilities. Is the adopted civilly liable for the damage caused by the adopted minor? o Yes. What are the requirements for the employer to be civilly liable for damage caused by their employees? o The employee has to be insolvent. Is a teacher liable for students acts? o Only when engaged in industry. Mere consulting doctors in a hospital negligently left gauze in the stomach of a person they operated on. Is the hospital liable? o Respondeat superior because there was control exerted by the hospital o Are these consultants deemed employees? Yes. Because employer-employee relationship is not determined by the nomenclature of the relationship. Professional Services v. Natividad o For medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their attending physicians, including medical consultants. Ratio: performance of these doctors are evaluated by a peer review board based on feedback from patients, mortality statistics. The private hospitals can hire/fire/exercise control over the consultants. The hospital is owned by a private corporation. Is the private corporation civilly liable for the negligence of the consultantdoctors? o If a private hospital is owned by a private corporation, such corporation may be held liable on the basis of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility. As the owner of the hospital, the private corporation is duty-bound to see to it that the hospital meets the needs of the patients, including close supervision over medical staff, including consultants. When can the employer be exempted from subsidiary liability, or have it lessened? o Phil. Rabbit v. P: If there is collusion between employee and private complainant, ex. the claim is inflated, in order for the employer to have more liability. In order for employer to be liable, there must be proof that the employee is insolvent. Proven through returns of the sheriff. o Can the employer challenge the sheriffs returns? Yes. o At what stage of the proceedings can the employer do this? Upon the submission of the sheriffs return. If the employee is convicted based on reasonable doubt, is there civil liability for the employer? o Yes. The only time there is no civil liability, is when the court holds that the accused did not commit the acts on which the charge was based on. Regardless as to who the actual owner of the motor vehicle might be, the registered owner is the operator of the same with respect to the
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public or third persons. The owner on record is the employer of the driver; the actual operator and owner are mere agents of the registered owner of the vehicle. (First Malayan Leasing v. CA) BA Finance v. CA: The registered owner is subsidarily liable (not the lessee), but the registered owner can recover from the lessee. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW For benefit of convict, and to increase economic contribution. Purpose: to individualize the administration of Phil. penal law. o Looks at convict as private individual, and secondly as member of society as a whole. De Joya v. Jail Warden: The State is concerned not only in protecting social organization against criminal acts of destructive individuals, but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. Sec. 1: o Court must determine the maximum of the indeterminate penalty, and then the minimum o Minimum: court has unlimited discretion within the range of the minimum of the penalty one degree lower than the penalty imposed by law Cannot avail of ISL: o 1. Convicted and punished with death, life imprisonment, RP For the purpose of ISL, life imprisonment and RP are synonymous. Serrano v. CA 2. Treason, misprision of treason, proposal to commit treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage; piracy, 3. Habitual delinquents 4. Escaped confinement or evaded sentence 5. Violated conditional pardon 6. Maximum term of not more than one year [7. Those already sentenced by FJ upon passage of Act] When the person serves the minimum of the ISL, he may apply for parole. He will be allowed to leave the penal institution under certain conditions. (Ex. do not commit crime, etc.) This lasts for a certain period of time. If he complies with the conditions of the parole, the Board of Pardons and Parole will give out final release and discharge. Probation NUMBER ONE RULE: if you file appeal, you lose probation. If you file for probation, you cannot appeal. RA 9344 penalty is suspended. Minor is given a chance to comply with conditions. If he reaches 21, he goes to jail, but with Probation: if the minor is incorrigible, then he will serve the penalty of imprisonment. But he is still entitled to probation. RA 9344 is an amendment of the Probation Law. Because normally if you appeal, you lose probation. But under 9344, allowed. Pablo Francisco v. CA (April 6 1995). Usual rule: if the penalty exceeds 6 years, you lose benefit of probation. He was sentenced for 3 crimes, tried jointly, each having less then 6 year penalty. But if you add them all together, they exceed 6 years. HELD: By a vote of 8-7, the SC said he is entitled to probation. The penalty for EACH crime is considered, not all the crimes. P v. Evangelista: Convicted of frustrated homicide (prision mayor). Appealed to CA: affirmed, but with modifications. He filed petition for probation. He claimed he did not appeal from CA decision. HELD: No probation, because appeal that matters is appeal from the trial court, not the CA. RA 9372: those who commit terrorism not entitled to probation. If the court denied petition for probation, but there was GADALEJ remedy is Rule 65 (Certiorari)\ Soriano v. CA: In the probation that was granted, a condition was that he has to submit a program of payment for the civil liability. He did not pay. The probation was revoked for failure to comply. Went to the CA: unconstitutional because he is being imprisoned for nonpayment of debt HELD: Wrong contention! Imprisoned for not complying for condition of probation, not for nonpayment. CIVIL LIABILITIES Whether punishable by law or not. (Because it can be based on Ks, or quasi-delicts). There may be victimless crimes or crimes with victims. The moment the criminal action is instituted, the civil action is instituted along with it. Crimes defined by SPL can there be civil penalties? o Yes. P v. Pajaro. But there must be evidence that a party, including the government sustained substantial injury so that
o o o o o o
Bates v. P: If the court imposes a penalty of fine (if alternative between imprisonment and fine), the ISL does not apply because it applies only to penalty of imprisonment with divisible penalty. There are laws which expressly provide that the convict is not entitled to the benefits of the ISL and parole. Ex. terrorism law. Offenders who commit crimes while on parole are DQed from ISL. Consider the criminal as member of society, relationship with dependents, family, society at large. Is he civic minded? Read Guinhawa v. People when a straight penalty is imposed, and when not o Answer: when BOTH minimum and maximum durations of imprisonment are less than 1 year. For instance, in this case, the maximum was four months and one day. The court imposed a straight penalty of 60 days. Parole
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the accused may be civilly liable. If a crime is absorbed by another crime, can there be civil liability in the absorbed crime, juridically speaking? o Yes. P v. Hernandez. Ex. political crimes like rebellion, sedition, etc. there can be murder or rape. Nevertheless there is civil liability for these acts. o P v. Malngan. Yes, there is criminal liability for homicide, even if absorbed by arson. Rodriguez v. Pomferada: I issued a post-dated check in payment of a current obligation. It bounced. How many crimes? Two: BP 22 and estafa. Q: Will the person have to pay twice for the value of the check, considering there is only one check? HELD: Although there are two crimes, there is only one check, thus there should only be one payment of the check. Damages: o Art. 2202: for crimes and q-delicts liable for all natural and probable consequences of the act or omission o Art 2204: liability may be increased or decreased depending on aggravating or mitigating circumstances o 2197 actual or compensatory, moral, exemplary, temperate, nominal, etc. o 104: reparation, restitution, indemnification for consequential damages o 2200: not only value lost, but also lost profits Moral damages o Macalinaw v. Ong: includes physical suffering, besmirched reputation, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, etc. o Under what circumstances may MD be recoverd? Crimes leading to physical injuries Includes death Quasi-delicts Seduction abduction rape or other lascivious acts Adultery concubinage Illegal arbitrary detention, arrest, search Libel slander defamation Exemplary damages o Art. 2229: exemplary or corrective damages imposed by way of example or correction. Intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrong doings and vindication o When a crime has one or more ACs, exemplary damages may be imposed o In criminal law, an AC not alleged in the information cannot be considered. Does the same rule apply for ACs, which can be the basis of exemplary damages under the NCC? P v. Demape: word aggravating in NCC should be applied in its generic sense since it does not distinguish. Includes specific aggravating, qualifying circumstances, etc. These are distinct and separate from penalty of fine in the RPC. Even if not alleged in the complaint or information, if proven = can lead to exemplary damages. The rule is under the NCC and not the RPC, after all. o Even if treachery is a qualifying circumstance under AR 248, it can be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing exemplary damages o P v. Gonzales: May exemplary damages be awarded in arson? HELD: Yes. It is an anti-social act. o Relationship may be a basis for granting exemplary damages even if it is an inherent element of the crime (ex. parricide) Temperate damages o Art 2224: it must be reasonable o The heirs of a deceased in homicide, murder, parricide: entitled to actual damages, as proved by requisite documentary evidence. If the actual damages are not proved, the court may prove temperate damages. Attorneys fees o Art 2228: must be reasonable Interest o Art. 2211: right now, 6% Even with RA 9346, the classification of crimes as heinous and quasiheinous still remains (heinous: death; quasi-heinous: RP) o If the crime is heinous: 75,000 indemnity 50,000 moral damages o Quasi-heinous 50,000 indemnity 50,000 moral damages Civil indemnity in rape and sexual assault P v. Jalandoni: simple rape indemnity 50,000; moral damages 50,000 o No need to prove besmirched reputation, mental anguish etc. It goes without saying already. REGARDLESS of sexual preference, religious orientation, etc.. P v. Santiago P v. Palma: Sexual assault (finger) o 30,000 indemnity o 30,000 moral damages Raped three times: o There must be a separate award for each crime. o It cannot be one award for 150,000. There must be three separate awards for 50,000 each.
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo General rule: for rape support child born out of rape. (Art. 345 in
every case) o May the offender be compelled to give support to the child born out of rape, although the woman is married?
US v. Hernandez: No, not if the woman is already married. Dissent by Justice Regalado: compel offender, provided that the paternity of the child to the offender is established. (Basis: Art. 345 of RPC does not distinguish) o But the offender cannot be obliged to acknowledge offspring in adultery and concubinage, when the offended party is married and paternity cannot be determined. P v. Hapin: use of woman to rape a woman is aggravating even special: o 25,000 damages Acts of lasciviousness: o 5,000 moral o 2,000 exemplary for each count Qualified rape: o 75,000 indemnity o 50,000 moral damages Rape with homicide: o 100,000 indemnity o 50,000 moral damages For moral damages on parricide, homicide, rape, etc. No need to allege emotional suffering on information. o But some cases say that in homicide or murder, there must be proof that the heirs suffered emotional pain, suffering, etc. Ex. if they are separated, then they dont feel anything. Consummated homicide: o 50,000 indemnity o 50,000 moral damages Frustrated homicide: o 30,000 moral damages Attempted homicide: o 30,000 moral damages o Moral v. P: 10,000 lang In reckless imprudence resulting to homicide: o Indemnity o Moral damages
Magbanua v. Tabusares THIS PROVIDES FORMULA ON HOW TO COMPUTE Thus, the formula for the computation of unearned income is: Net life gross living Earning = expectancy x annual less expenses
Capacity income Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula: 2/3 x [80 age of deceased] Robbery with homicide: o 50,000 indemnity o 50,000 moral damages Forcible abduction with rape (for each count): o 75,000 indemnity o 50,000 moral damages Kidnapping with rape: o 100,000 for kidnapping o 25,000 for moral damages o 50,000 for slight illegal detention Victim kidnapped was 8 years old: o 50,000 indemnity o 200,000 moral damages o 100,000 exemplary damages because demand for ransom was deemed an AC Qualified carnapping: o 75,000 indemnity o 50,000 moral Art 105, 106 - restitution and reparation Restitution Order to return ransom: because the father gave ransom to offender. Basis: Art. 105 and 108 of the RPC. What if a third person acquired a property that was subject of crime? o Can still recover the item from that person o But the buyer in GF is entitled to reimbursement from thief or criminal If the stolen property cannot be returned anymore, what is the remedy? o Value of the thing taken. o When do you determine value? At time of commission of crime or upon order of return? Rationale is to bring back the situation to before the crime was committed. Value of the property in the commission of the crime must be the basis. What other liabilities aside from restitution and reparation? o Under NCC, for one to be able to recover actual damages, he must be able to prove by documentary evidence the actual damages sustained by him o If he cannot prove actual value of actual damages, what must one prove to be entitled to temperate damages? Claimant need not prove actual amount, as long as there is proof that there is loss. Court may grant temperate damages, as long as
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reasonable. P v. Billaber: In a charge for illegal recruitment, the money paid by the applicant (placement fee, etc.), o 12% interest on the return of the amount paid from time of filing of the case until the amount has been paid. Palana v. P: The petition was convicted for BP 22. Ordered to pay to offended party the amount of check with interest (6%) from filing of information until the finality of the decision + 12% per annum from finality of decision until the amount was paid.
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RPC BOOK TWO I: CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY TREASON (114) Recits Is treason delito continuado? o Delito continuado contemplates a series of acts committed over time, but only instigated by a single criminal resolution. o Guinto v. De Luz; P v. Victoria: either a single or act, or a series of acts impelled by one criminal intent. How many ways can treason be done? o 1. Levying war against the Philippines o 2. Adhering to the enemy, by giving aid or comfort aliens, they owe temporary allegiance to the Philippines. While they are here, they are under the protection of the Philippines. Treason is a war crime. Explain. o It cannot be committed during time of peace. It may be incubated during time of peace, but once war commences, treason may blossom into a crime (only then). Is there a complex crime of treason with rape, murder, etc.? o No. It is a political crime, and thus absorbs these other component acts. Remember P v. Hernandez, where there was a heated SC discussion on the nature of political crimes. These are essential elements of the crime of treason; without these, treason could not be committed. What do you mean by levying war? Is the mere assemblage of armed men with capacity to overthrow the government enough? Or is there a need to strike? o Levying of war means an armed body of men, committing acts of violence for purpose of overthrowing the government. Mere conspiracy to overthrow is not enough. There must be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of executing treasonous design by force. They must be in such a position that they may overthrow the government. It is not even necessary that they be armed by high powered arms, but it is enough that they constitute enough men to overthrow the government. What is the second mode? o 1. Adhering to enemy o 2. For giving aid and comfort o N.B. BOTH elements must concur. Without one, there is no treason by the second mode. He must translate this to overt acts. There is difference in quantum of evidence to prove adherence and to prove the overt act. Explain. o Adherence may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. o The overt act, however, must comply with the two-witness rule, because treason is such a heavy crime, in order to prove it, there is a higher bar. The offenders committed five overt acts. Must the prosecution prove all five with two witnesses? o No. They can prove even just one. o But note that the witnesses must be credible. Lecture Corpus Juris Secundum: Treason differs from other crimes, because all persons are regarded as principals. Those aiding or abetting, or even those not present in the scene but playing just a small part are considered principals. This is the only provision in the RPC that is based on the constitution of the US (Art 3, Sec 3), and not borrowed from Spain. This includes the need to either have:
DAquino v US: o Was a dual citizen (US/Japanese), who worked in a radio show that discouraged American troops and lowered their morale. o What is punished as an element of treason is unlicensed adherence, not licensed adherence. Kawakita v US: o Was a dual citizen (US/Japanese) too. o Sided with Japan in the war. But registering as a Japanese citizen and gaining employment in Japan does not automatically revoke the dual-US citizenship. o Dual citizenship is not a defense. There must have been a prior renunciation of the American citizenship, and this was not done. Laurel v. Misa: o Philippine government was still the de jure government, notwithstanding Japanese occupation during the war. Their loyalty must still remain with the Philippines. There are those who hid the principals in treason or helped them by giving arms. Can there be accomplices or accessories in treason? Or are they all principals? o As long as you performed an overt act, there is a an act of treason already. There can be no accomplice or accessory in the crime of treason. Are Articles 13 and 14 applicable to treason? o No. The penalty does not depend on 13 or 14, but on the nature of the crime committed. The SC will not apply 13 and 14, and will just assess the crime, according to its barbarity. Is treason a specific intent crime? o Yes. The specific intent is to deliver the country to the enemy. o If you dont intend to deliver the country to an enemy, then it is mere rebellion Aliens may also be guilty of treason. Under what circumstances? o If they are residents of the Philippines, because as resident
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o o Testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act Or confession in open court
Laurel v. Misa: even if the alien is a mere temporary resident of the Philippines, he can be liable for treason, based on his temporary allegiance to the Philippines. Haut v. US; requirement of overt act of giving aid or comfort is to make sure that the crime of treason has moved from the realm of thought to the realm of action. o Does the mere act of Haut of letting his son stay in his house constitute the overt act of giving aid and comfort? Yes. (The son here was aligned with Germany.) US v. Kramer: Purpose of two-witness rule to prevent the possible fabrication of evidence to prosecute a person. Quantity of witnesses is not enough; the witnesses must be credible. Each witness must testify to the same overt act. P v. Deguyo: if the acts are separable, there must be at least two witnesses for each separable act. o No need to have to prove the entire composite act; enough to have witnesses prove each component. If there is confession in open court, then no need for two witnesses. P v. Perez: Getting women to satisfy sexual urges of enemy soldiers not giving aid and comfort to the enemy. o J Callejo disagrees. He thinks this is giving aid and comfort to the enemy. P v. Lozano: Sexual and social relations with Japanese soldiers do not materially improve their war effort. o Again, J Callejo disagrees.
Dillars v US: Aid and comfort may be made by speech. Article 12 defenses APPLY. (Uncontrollable fear, etc.) Treason absorbs common crimes. (Discussion above) The ISL does not apply to treason. There is a specific provision. P v. Nunez: But a minor who committed treason is still entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Use of unlicensed firearms not aggravating. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TREASON (115) Conspiracy or proposal to commit treason is a crime in itself. But if they actually commit treason, these crimes lose their juridical personality and become mere modes. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason MAY be committed during time of peace. MISPRISION OF TREASON (116) Felony by omission. Elements o 1. Aware of plan to commit treason;
o 2. Fails to report it to governor/mayor or fiscal Gravamen of crime; WILLFUL or MALICIOUS concealment. It is a crime by dolo. How much time? Depends on circumstances. ONLY committed by Filipinos, not a foreigner. Thus, dual citizens, who are foreigners too, may NOT be liable for misprision of treason. Likewise, the two-witness rule does not apply Misprision of treason is different from being an accessory-after-the-fact. The latter hides the principal. Misprision hides the conspiracy. o (Note though: there are no accessories in treason. This statement is based on a UK case) Punished two degrees lower than treason, since the person who committed misprision is punished as an accessory to treason. But he is still a principal of misprision of treason. ESPIONAGE (117) J. Callejo: Just study this. Offenses: o 1. Without authority, entering warship, fort, etc. to obtain information, etc. of confidential nature Relating to national defense o 2. Possessing by reason of public office the information, etc. and disclosing them to foreign representative First mode: as long as there is intent; no need to actually obtain Can be committed even in time of peace PIRACY (122-3) Lecture Two modes of committing piracy: o 1. Attacking or seizing a vessel on high seas or Philippine waters o 2. Seizing the vessel in the vessel whole/part of its cargo, equipment, or personal belongings or complement or passengers While in the high seas/Phil. waters The offenders must not be members of the complement or passengers MUTINY is also punished only committed by crew or passengers o unlawful resistance to superior officer o or raising commotions and disturbances on board Qualifying circumstances: o 1. Seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon it o 2. Pirates abandoned victims without means to save themselves o 3. Attended by murder, homicide, PI, or rape
P v. Tulin: RA 7659 merely expanded Arts 122 and 123, but under PD 532, there can be a separate crime of Piracy in Phil. waters or high seas from piracy in Phil. waters or high seas in Arts 122 and 123. How to distinguish: P v. Puno o PD 532 one must prove that the perpetrators were purposely
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organized not just for one act of robbery, but several indiscriminate commissions thereof. There must be evidence of similar attempts or takings before. o P v. Sandoval Reiterated the several indiscriminate commissions doctrine above. If there is only one, either 122, 123 or 293, 294 (robbery). Piracy on the high seas: o P v. Lollo: Crime against the law of nations. o Piracy on high seas has two aspects: 1. Violation of common right of nations 2. Criminal liability of the pirates may be imposed by municipal law of the country, where found Arts 122, 123: o Makes mention of complement of vessel. Who are these? Under Art 648 of the Code on Commerce: All persons on board, from the captain to the cabin boy o Par. 3 of 123 physical injuries, murder, rape qualify the crime. Physical injuries include frustrated or attempted homicide. It must be used in its generic term. o For these common crimes to be an element of piracy, they must accompany the crime of piracy. There is no complex crime of piracy with rape, or murder, or PI. There is only one crime of piracy. It is a single, indivisible offense. Do not apply Art 48. o EVEN IF a lot of people died or were raped, there is still one crime of piracy. o But if these crimes were committed after the piracy has been committed, they become separate crimes. o RA 8294 even if they used unlicensed arms or explosives, there is no violation of this statute. Taking of the implements or cargo of the vessel or the passengers, for them to be liable under Art 122 or 123 they must not be part of the crew or complement. o If they are passengers or crew members, the act is ROBBERY under the RPC Arts 293, 294. Philippine waters is defined differently in PD 532, from that in the Constitution: o High seas: all parts of the sea not included in the EEZ o EEZ: not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from shoreline RA 9372 terrorism law o Piracy in Phil. waters or high seas are predicate crimes of terrorism. If these are committed for purpose of sowing terror in the population, then terrorism is committed, with these as predicate crimes. PD 532 defines a vessel: o To transfer passengers or cargo o Includes boats for fishing
P v. Catantan: There is crime under PD 532 even if offender did not seize the vessel, but merely boarded it and inflicted PI on the occupant or owner. RA 6235 aircraft hijacking is a predicate crime for terrorism under RA 9372 too. II: CRIMES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL LAW ARBITRARY DETENTION (124) Astorga v. P: Elements of arbitrary detention o 1. Offender is public officer or employee o 2. Detains person o 3. Without legal grounds What is gravamen of the crime? o Detention without legal grounds by public officer or employee, of another person. How do you distinguish this from kidnapping? o Arbitrary detention: public officer or employee vested with authority to arrest or detain another person, but detains another without any lawful cause. o Kidnapping: offender is a private person and the purpose is to deprive the victim of his or her liberty. Who are liable for arbitrary detention: o Public officers or employees authorized to detain another person. o Ex. PNP, NBI, even judges acting in official capacity
Milo v. Salangga: Sec 338 of LGC who are persons in authority, or agents of persons in authority authorized to detain: o Punong barangay o Members of sangguniang barangay o Members of lupong tagapamayapa o N.B. They are persons of authority but limited to their jurisdiction, in their respective barangays. If they arrest beyond their barangay, they are NOT persons in authority under this provision. Art. 152 o Barangay captain o Barangay councilman o Barrio policeman What about Forestry Code? o District foresters are authorized to enforce Forestry Code and may arrest violators. o Forest officers or employees of bureau of forest management they do not even need a warrant of arrest to arrest. Sec. 44 of RA 9165 Dangerous Drugs Law o School heads, supervisors, teachers: they are persons of authority, for the purpose of enforcing the Dangerous Drugs Law within school premises or outside school premises in an
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official school activity May a private person be liable for arbitrary detention? o Yes. US v. Ponte: if the private individual connives with the person in authority. How about the CAFGU. Are they persons in authority? o Yes. P v. Flores: They are authorized to carry firearms, to complement the operations of the regular force of PNP; they are composed of civilian volunteers. Under EO 264, they MAY arrest. So they can be liable for arbitrary detention. What do you mean by detention? o P v. Oliva: Psychological restraint, and not just physical restraint is enough for this provision, in whatever form, for whatever length of time. (Ex. keeping a child in the room, while sinisindak mo siya with a big gun.) o Astorga v. P: Fear has been known to make people immobile. This includes threats to kill, and similar threats. This is equivalent to using actual physical force to detain. Take note of circumstances where people can be arrested without a warrant (in flagrante delicto, etc.) o Usual cause of Arbitrary Detention charge is arresting a person without warrant. o Ex. a person evading his sentence may be arrested on the run without a warrant, because he is committing an offense in flagrante delicto. David v. Arroyo: Mere fact that the accused was wearing a t-shirt saying oust Gloria now is not a reason in itself to be arrested for inciting to sedition. P v. Lozada: Hot pursuit based on actual facts, with the use of the senses of the policemen, with reasonable basis to believe that the person arrested is the author of the crime, etc. RA 9372 terrorism o May a person be arrested for act of terrorism, and for how long must the arrested person be detained? Three days. Arbitrary detention may be committed by dolo or culpa. o Ex. Re-arresting a person who was released by means of order of the court. May there be a complex crime of arbitrary detention with PI? o Yes. This happens when there is excessive force in the arrest. The period provided in Art 124 are NOT essential elements of the crime. These just provide a guide for calculating the sentence. Need not ACTUALLY be convicted as having committed a crime enough that the nature of his deed, and how the officer at the moment characterized the act. DELAY IN DELIVERY OF PRISONERS TO JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES (125) [STILL ARBITRARY DETENTION] Elements: o 1. Offender is public officer or employee o 2. Detained a person legally o 3. Fails to deliver person to proper judicial authorities within proper time period RA 9372 what are the duties of those conducting custodial investigation? o More expansive than duties in RA 7438. [Check] o Before detaining a person after warrantless arrest, he MUST first deliver the person to the nearest office OR RESIDENCE of a judge, so judge can: Ascertain identity of officer and arrested person Determine circumstances behind arrest Check for torture, or other abuses o Then, the judge delivers within 3 days to nearest court with jurisdiction his report Does the law apply to crimes defined by SPL? o Depends, if the penalties used follow the nomenclature of the RPC. How do you determine the imposable penalty? o 12 hours light o 18 hours correctional o 36 hours afflictive o BASIS: what crime as it appears to the arresting officer, and NOT what the crime actually turned out to be. What is delivery to judicial authorities? o Means constructive delivery, which is time the appropriate complaint or information is filed, with the court for appropriate judicial proceedings. o NOTE: Not a PI. o Soria v. Desierto: delivery of arrestee to judicial authorities constructively: MTC, RTC, Family Court, Sandiganbayan Not to the CA, not to the SC. They are not trial courts. o If there was no warrant of arrest or commitment order, but the information or complaint was filed is there delivery? Yes. Take note of rules on inquest, under Criminal Pro. Art. 125 talks about those LAWFULLY arrested, but there was no immediate delivery to the courts. o The inquest must be terminated within period stated in Art. 125. Or else, kawawa yung policeman. Alvior v. Auguis: [Context: before, the MTC may still conduct PI, but now they cannot under the amended ROC.] The person was lawfully arrested then delivered to MTC, but the judge was not there. The
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arresting officer did not release the detainee. He just delivered to the clerk of court. HELD: Liable for failure to deliver, because the clerk cannot conduct PI anyway and the judge was not there. o Note: If the case is cognizable by the OMB or Sandiganbayan there is agreement between OMB and DOJ, where the DOJ can conduct PI but they have to submit findings to the OMB. Art. 12, par. 7 applies as defense. There can be defense of insuperable cause for delay in delivery. RA 9372: Art. 125 has been amended. [Take note] o The period for lawful detention prior to reporting is maximum THREE DAYS Delay in delivery of a prisoner arrested lawfully by a private person amounts to ILLEGAL DETENTION, not arbitrary detention. Art. 125 only applies to warrantless arrests. Failure of officer to comply with Art. 125 does not affect the legality of the confinement. DELAY IN RELEASE (126) [STILL ARBITRARY DETENTION] Another crime by omission (Art. 126). Officer delays release of arrested person (either convict or detention prisoner) beyond period provided. Proceedings mentioned in the article: petition for habeas corpus Offenders: o Heads of jail or penal establishment o Custodial guards Who may order release of prisoner? o Either the courts or the prosecutor, or the director of Bureau of Prisons Same penalty as 124, because failure to release is tantamount to arbitrary detention. EXPULSION (127) Can only be done by public officers or employees. o If NOT authorized, then the crime is trespass to dwelling. To be liable: must use force, violence, or other measures to compel another to change his residence against his will Relate to RA 9165, Sec. 31: o In addition to the penalty provided for in the DDA, any alien who violates the provision must be deported immediately without further proceedings, except if the penalty is death (although no more DP under RA 9346) Under Probation Law: may the person be compelled to change his residence? o Yes. Sec. 10. The court may require the probationer to reside in a place designated by court, and may not change residence without prior notice. Marcos v. Manglapus: Heirs of the late President Marcos are barred from returning to the Philippines. With respect to aliens, with respect to the Deportation Board, the President has the power to deport aliens. If the Philippines has an extradition treaty with another country, may compel a person in the Philippines to be deported and extradited to that other country. RA 9372 one charged with terrorism may be granted bail, but placed under house arrest under usual place of residence until further order of court. VIOLATION OF DOMICILE (128) May be violated through 3 modes: o 1. Entered dwelling o 2. Searched without consent o 3. Entered and refused to leave
If all three modes are committed, there is still just ONE CRIME committed. US v. Dorr May only be committed by public officers or employees with authority to arrest, or to seize property of another. Is it possible that the consent of the owner of the house is denied impliedly, and not expressly? o Yes. It may be implied or express, in spite of the laws language (without the previous consent of such owner) o US v. Panes: if entry is made through a way not intended for ingress, there is entry against will of owner denial is implied Owner: does this include lessee of the house? o Yes. o Arevalo v. Hilatan: Residence under this provision is the place where the person is habitually present; and from where he departs and intends to return. Art. 128 does not apply to public officer or employee who entered dwelling of another in hot pursuit. SEARCH WARRANT MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED, OR ABUSE IN SERVICE OF WARRANT LAWFULLY OBTAINED (129) Acts punishable: o 1. Procuring search warrant without just cause o 2. Exceeding authority or using unnecessary severity in executing legal search warrant Remember: 129 is an EXCEPTION to Art. 48. When a public officer obtains maliciously a search warrant by submitting a perjurious affidavit or deposition o There are TWO crimes committed: 1. Perjury, 2. Procurement of malicious search warrant o Basis of this statement is the phrase in addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense P v. Dela Pea: If the officer applied for search warrant without probable cause, and uses the warrant to extort money. Is the police officer liable
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for malicious procurement? o Yes. Because he was not acting in GF. There was malice. o If the policeman applied for a warrant in GF, but it was denied, there is no crime committed. If officer knew deposition was false, but still submitted it to obtain warrant, there are two crimes: o 1. Procurement of malicious search warrant o 2. Art. 184 offering false testimony in evidence The one who made the deposition knew it was false, but still came up with deposition: liable for perjury There is also a crime when a search warrant was lawfully obtained, BUT in the enforcement, the officer EXCEEDED his authority. o United Laboratories: the search warrant described property to be seized, but the items seized were not in the warrant. o EXCEPTION: plain view ex. seeing drugs out in the open may be seized. But if not in plain view, he exceeded his authority. P v. Hua: Office may break open the door, if he is refused entry upon knocking and identifying himself as an officer. o Knock and announce rule in warrants, BEFORE breaking a door. o Breakage: includes lifting latch, unlocking chair or hatch, turning knob, etc. Art. 129 does not apply to searches made by employees of Bureau of Customs, because authority is based on Art. 2203 of Tariff and Customs Code, in enforcement of customs law. o Papa v. Mango: BOC officials do not possess authority to do searches in domicile PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS (131) Only committed by public officers. If done by a private person, it is disturbance of public order. Offenses: o 1. Prohibiting/interrupting/dissolving peaceful meeting without legal ground o 2. Hindering persons from joining lawful association or preventing them from attending o 3. Prohibiting or hindering persons from petitioning to authorities for correction of abuses or grievances Must be done by a stranger to the meeting. If done by a member of the meeting, it is unjust vexation If the meeting is not peaceful, it can be broken up CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP (1323) Interruption of religious worship Offending religious feelings III: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER Recits Rebellion is a crime against public order. What about terrorism? o It is a crime against national security and the law of nations. o There can be a crime of international terrorism; it a crime much like international piracy, where anyone may capture the suspected terrorist anywhere. Can there be terrorism complexed with rebellion? o No. Rebellion is simply a predicate crime of terrorism. What is the main difference between terrorism and rebellion? o For terrorism, there must be widespread panic and fear; and there must be an unlawful demand against the government. NOTE: terrorism is a specific intent crime, as with rebellion so there is a difference in the o In contrast, rebellion is merely a crime against public order. Objectives: 1) remove allegiance to government of the Phil. Territory or any part; 2) or deprive Chief Executive or legislative of powers/prerogatives What about coup detat? It is a crime against public order too. o Again, it is a specific intent crime so the difference lies in the purpose o It is to diminish inherent powers of the State (taxation, eminent domain, police power) Is there a frustrated crime of coup detat? o No. The moment there is intent + swift attack, the crime is consummated, even if the purpose is not achieved. o There can be attempted coup detat, but not frustrated. Suppose they commit rape. Is rape absorbed by coup detat? o It cannot be absorbed, because it does not help forward the power of diminishing power (unlike in rebellion, where rape would help sow public disorder.) But what about rebellion? o Rape is absorbed in rebellion. What about murder in coup detat? o It can be absorbed, because it helps further the intent. Why is rebellion a predicate crime of terrorism? o Because committing rebellion can sow widespread fear. o In the same way, murder is a predicate crime, because multiple murders or maybe murdering one key person like the President could cause widespread panic or fear. Is rebellion a continuing crime? o Yes. Is conspiracy to commit rebellion a continuing crime? o Mike: No. One two or more people come to an agreement to commit a crime, and decide to commit it, the crime is consummated. o But it is, according to Omil v. Ramos. Oh well. Lecture
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REBELLION (134) Art. 134 of RPC: distinguish rebellion from insurrection o Rebellion overthrow government and supersede o Insurrection minor change as to certain maters in government or to prevent exercise of government authority as to certain matters P v. Hernandez rebellion is a vast movement of people; involving multitudes Rebellion o Any part of the country; or whole country o Can be private or public individuals
Omil v. Ramos SC declared that rebellion is by nature, a continuing offense, which differentiates it from other offenses. It may be committed by a single or a series of acts for achieving any or all of the purposes stated in the RPC provision. Insurrection and rebellion are both political crimes. Terrorism is different because the purpose is to achieve the illegal demand on the government. It may be political, it may not it may be purely monetary. For rebellion to exist there must be intent + overt acts. May there be frustrated rebellion? o No. When the intent + overt acts are present, the crime is consummated. There is no need to achieve the goal. o Likewise, no frustrated coup detat. o No need for actual clash
US v. Vergara mere membership in CPP is not rebellion. But being a member of the NPA, the military arm of the CPP, constitutes rebellion. Common crimes are absorbed by the political crime. o But even if the common crime is absorbed by the political crime, there may be civil liability for these predicate crimes. The liability under the NCC is apart from liabilities in the RPC. No more crime of subversion. COUP DETAT (134-A) Also a political crime Intent is to diminish State power (eminent domain, taxation, police power) Modes: violence, intimidation, threat, strategy, stealth + swift attack Does not absorb all common crimes (ex. Rape is not absorbed) Omil v. Ramos: conspiracy to commit rebellion or coup detat is a continuing crime o Believe it or not, according to J. Callejo Use of explosives is absorbed by coup detat (RA 8294) DISLOYALTY (137) Acceptance of public position or continuing to discharge functions disloyalty
Motive of public officer is immaterial; whether it is gratuitous or not But if he commits overt acts of rebellion (for example, he continues discharging his office and he commits murder or malversation to help the rebels), then the crime becomes rebellion, not disloyalty One may be liable for crime of omission under this provision: failing to resist the rebellion within ones powers o May invoke Art. 12 fear, force, etc. INCITING TO REBELLION OR INSURRECTION (138) Writings or speech must be done with intent to induce the readers or listeners to commit rebellion or insurrection If the listeners are not incited, they are not guilty of any crime. But the person speaking is guilty for inciting. But if the listeners are incited to commit rebellion, all of them, including the inciter, are ALL principals for the crime of rebellion o Inciter PDI o Listeners PDP SEDITION (139) Key term: publicly and tumultuously Motives: o 1. Prevent promulgation or execution of and law, or holding of popular election o 2. Prevent National, provincial, or municipal government or officer from exercising functions or preventing execution of AO o 3. Inflict act of hate/revenge upon person or property of public officer or employee o 4. Commit act of hate/revenge against private persons or social class, for political or social end o 5. Despoil any person, municipality, or province, or National Government of all its property or part thereof, for political or social end Sedition is the raising of commotion or disturbance in the state; revolt against legitimate authority, public corporation, social classes, etc. Ultimate objective: violation of the public peace P v. Camlon: Sedition is a crime against public order and the tranquility of the general public What laws are included in par. 1? o Laws in general, even political in nature, as well as civil and criminal laws; ordinances of municipal or provincial boards Who are the officers included in par. 2? o Includes judges and justices, and constitutional officers; municipal council, provincial government or board o BUT NOT barangay officials or council
BUT they are included in par. 3 In both rebellion and sedition, there is a public uprising. o Rebellion to achieve political purpose, they take up arms 43
Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo o Sedition as long as tumultuous; they do not take up arms,
because they do not intend to overthrow the government Lig v. P what is tumultuously? o Full of public commotion, or uproar. o Essence: intent + tumultuous uprising
P v. Mendoza: when is there public uprising? o Tumultuous public uprising more than three persons who are armed participating therein What are crimes of hate/revenge in the law? o Crimes against persons (murder, etc.) o Crimes against property (arson) o Victim may be private or public officials, whether of national or local government What about crimes of murder, homicide, PI, arson, committed by those committing sedition are these absorbed? o NO!!! They are not absorbed. o Neither are these complexed. DO NOT apply Art. 48 o The re are separate and independent crimes o Ex. P v. Cabrera- guilty of sedition, and murder as separate crimes There can be a complex crime of Sedition and Art. 143/144 (prevention of meeting of board/Congress) Again, the crime is consummated upon concurrence of intent + overt acts. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SEDITION (141) No crime of proposal to commit sedition; just conspiracy INCITING TO SEDITION (142) Phil. Journalists v. Lee Freedom of speech does not protect inciting to sedition Punishable acts: o 1. Inciting others to commit acts of sedition o 2. Uttering seditious words or speeches tending to disturb public peace o 3. Writing, publishing, circulating scurrilous libels and government or authorities tending to disturb public peace For #2 and 3, no need to have any of the enumerated purposes Concealing such evil practices is NOT an act of an accessory in this case, but an act of a principal. ACTS PREVENTING MEETING OF CONGRESS AND SIMILAR BODIES (143) Meeting of barangay council is not included here o Liable for grave coercion under Art. 286 May be committed by public officers or employees DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS (144) Offender must NOT be a member of the body disturbed; he must be a stranger to the deliberative body
If they commit crimes of violence like homicide to disturb the meeting, there CAN be a complex crime under Art. 48 Barangay council meeting not covered by this provision VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY (145) Amended by 1987 constitution. Parliamentary immunity only applies up to prision correctional. If a congressman is in possession of low-caliber gun, he is protected (since this is up to 6 years only) But if the gun is high caliber, he is not immune (this is prision mayor) They are also immune from searches under this provision. But it is not in the Constitution. In the deliberations for the Constitution Commission, searches do not prevent their functions. So the Constitution does not protect searches. ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES (146) Who are the leaders or organizers of illegal assemblies? o May be determined by their speeches, publications, pamphlets, banners, leaflets indicating roles and responsibilities If there is one with an unlicensed firearm, and he attended an illegal assembly, is he liable for RA 8294? o No, because he is committing another crime. So he cannot be guilty of violating RA 8294. Two forms: o 1. Meeting conducted for the purpose of committing any crime punishable under RPC AND there were armed persons o 2. Meeting where audience is incited to commit treason, rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or direct assault Whether armed or not Under the first form, a meeting with presence of an armed person to achieve a crime in the RPC is proscribed. If they ACTUALLY commit the crime, what happens to illegal assembly? o It loses its juridical existence. It becomes a mere preparatory act. Second form is a point of disagreement. o Second form: the audience or assembly is incited to commit rebellion, treason, insurrection, sedition, or assault upon person of authority or his agents o All authors agree that inciting to commit such crime is an element of the second form o But there is disagreement as to the liability of the inciter: Some say the crime is inciting to rebellion or sedition BUT the problem is, it is an element of Art. 146, so how can one commit inciting to rebellion or sedition? J. Callejos opinion: If the inciter is NOT a member of the assembly (an outsider) he is liable for inciting.
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If the inciter is a member the government has two options: o 1. Charge with illegal assembly o OR 2. Inciting to rebellion or sedition For second form, motive is not important For first form, when one is not performing his duty, then motive comes into play If a public officer goes into a locality to solemnize a marriage, then he is going back to his office. He is assaulted. Is it direct assault? o Yes. When he is going back to his public office after solemnizing the marriage, the going back is part of his official duty. If a mayor is attacked for past performance of duty, is it direct assault? o Yes. Attacked barangay kagawad, but hit the barangay chief tanod who was just sitting around. Is it direct assault? o P v. Recto: No. He is not performing his duty at the time he was killed. The person MUST be aware that the person is a PIA or an agent thereof. P v. Reyin o P v. Alviar: Changed the rule a bit: Person must KNOW or OUGHT TO HAVE KNOWN that the person assaulted is a PIA or an agent P v. Villasenor: An officer in civilian clothes was committing surveillance in public market. Was there direct assault? o No. Because the accused did not know that the accused was a police officer who was on 24 hour duty. o And the accused killed the victim on a personal grudge. so what does ought to have known mean then? o J. Callejo does not agree with Reyes who says that there is presumption that people know who PIAs are. o But for very popular officials like Mancao, people ought to know Agent includes: o Police, municipal treasurer (since he is only a deputy ex-officio of the provincial treasurer), postmaster, rural policemean, sheriff, agents of BIR, Malacanang confidential agent Husto v. CA o Husto is an academic supervisor. The victim is an academic supervisor too; the latter wanted to transfer a favorite teacher to Poblacion. Husto disagreed. They agreed to fight. They were just about to go out, Husto could not wait; he grabbed an ashtray and smashed it against the others head. o Defense of Husto: there is no Direct Assault because they agreed to fight o SC It was direct assault because they did not fight outside P v. Fook o Fook, a Chinese person, went to the Philippines. He got body
o o
ILLEGAL ASSOCIATIONS (147) Two types of illegal associations: o 1. Totally or partially organized to commit any of the crimes in the RPC o 2. Totally or partially organized for some purpose contrary to public morals What is public morality? o Estrada v. Escritor: those which are detrimental or dangerous to conditions helpful for the advancement of society o NOT religious morality, but secular morality RA 9208 Law against trafficking or women or children o Also punishes association organized to propagate or promote immoral doctrines, obscene publications or shows, sex tourism, sexual exploitation, pornography Anti-terrorism law RA 9372 o Sec. 17 Public officers may petition that an association may be declared as one composed of those conspiring to commit terrorism DIRECT ASSAULTS (148) Intended to protect those exercising official functions and to guarantee dignity and authority It is a FORMAL CRIME. It is not a material crime. o There can be no frustrated direct assault. o It is consummation when a person of authority is attacked with force or met with serious intimidation or resistance Forms: o 1. Without public uprising, use force/intimidation to attain any of the purposes in rebellion or sedition o 2. Attack, use force, seriously intimidate, or resist a PIA or any of his agents While in the performance of duties First form rarely occurs (without public uprising, employ force, intimidation, resistance to achieve purpose of rebellion or sedition) Second form is more common (seriously intimidate or resist any PIA or agent in performance of official duty) o Who may be liable in second form? Private individual, person in authority, or agent of person in authority o Crime may be committed when PIA or agent is performing duty o Seriously qualifies only intimidate and resist but not attack or the use force, which only requires a laying of hands Is motive important? Sarsipuedes v. P
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searched immigration. He passed. He went back cause he forgot something. He got body searched again. He got pissed. o Fook resisted. He was charged for direct assault. o SC No direct assault. The PIA or his agent who exceeds his power is NOT in the exercise of the functions of his office. Here, they body searched Fook TWICE, which is beyond the scope of duty. o Resistance is legitimate against exceeding authority of PIA or agent. How much resistance can be done depends on the extent of excess of authority. What is lay a hand? o P v. Monzon, P v. Garcia: To inflict upon PIA or agent a physical attack; holding; shoving; etc. with intent to cause evil or injury o US v. Gamban when a person lays a hand over PIA, the crime is direct assault. It is not necessary to ascertain what force the law requires, since the law itself defines the force by providing the term laying a hand. When is force or intimidation sufficient? o Depending on circumstances of the particular event. In the following cases, there was direct assault: o Accused punched a police officer several times o Accused struck police officer with pen knife and wounded him o Accused tried to stab the police officer but he missed still DA o Accused struck judge with dagger, after the judge convicted him of theft Qualified when: o 1. Committed with a weapon o 2. Offender is public officer or employee o 3. Offender lays hands upon PIA If committed with a weapon: o QUALIFIED direct assault (special aggravating circumstance; cannot be offset by generic MC) o Not enough to merely carry a weapon. He must use the weapon to assault the victim. o Mere aiming of a gun to a PIA qualified direct assault because there is intimidation, with use of weapon RA75, sec. 7 (Assault of diplomat) Special crime o A crime is committed by any person who assaults, strikes, or wounds a public minister or ambassador, contrary to law of nations There can be a complex crime of direct assault with another felony. But if direct assault is committed and ONLY slight PI results, there is just the crime of direct assault. A mayor is on the way home or on the way to the office. The accused robbed the mayor and killed him. What is crime? Robbery with homicide. The direct assault is absorbed by Robbery with homicide, which absorbs crimes committed pursuant to such. P v. Ladjalaam Fired SMG against police officers serving warrant Direct assault with multiple attempted homicide How do you reconcile this provision with Art 265, which provides a distinct penalty if the victim is a PIA? o Art. 265 If there are less serious PI, the crime is less serious PI. The PIA must not be performing his duties when the less serious PI are inflicted, or it is not by reason of past performance of duty. o Art 48 Direct assault with less serious PI if the PIA is in performance of his duty or is attacked for past performance of duty. Can there be complex crime of DA with serious disturbance under Art. 153? o Villanueva v. Ortiz: Yes. If election inspectors or watchers are holding a meeting to canvass, and they were assaulted, causing serious disturbance: there is a complex crime of direct assault with serious disturbance INDIRECT ASSAULTS (149) Elements: o 1. There is direct assault against an agent of a person in authority (under Art. 148) o 2. A person came to the aid of the agent o 3. The offender uses force or intimidation against such person coming to the aid of the agent There is disagreement again as to this provision. o Guevara and Reyes: WRONG about this o Said there is indirect assault if there is a person going to the aid of PIA or agent, and that person is himself assaulted. o J Callejo agrees with Regalado: Guevara and Reyes did not take into account RA 1978: Agent One who goes the aid of a PIA becomes an agent of a PIA. If he himself is attacked, then he becomes an agent of a PIA becomes direct assault There is only indirect assault if the private person comes to the aid of the agent of the PIA. Lawyers and teachers can be PIAs o Result with RA 9165 (DDAs) teachers and professors are PIAs when performing their duties For one not to be liable for resistance, the resistance must be coextensive with the excess of authority, and just sufficient to repel the excess or abuse DISOBEDIENCE TO SUMMONS (150)
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Acts punished: o 1. Refusal to obey summons of Congress, or any commission authorized to summon witnesses o 2. Refusing to be sworn in o 3. Refusing to answer legal inquiry or produce documents o 4. Restraining another from attending as a witness therein o 5. Inducing disobedience to summons or refusal to be sworn in (#1 or 2) Relate to Senate v. Ermita: EO 464 case. o The President of the Philippines and members of SC are exempt from powers of inquiry o If President does not agree with attendance of members of Executive, they cannot be compelled to answer queries of Senate Relate to Sec. 35 of RA 9372 o Any information secured in violation of anti-terrorism law is inadmissible in evidence in any judicial, QJ, legislative, or admin functions TUMULTS (153) Relate to Art. 131. For policemen to be guilty under 131, the person must be a stranger to the meeting. David v. Arroyo the policemen should not have acted precipitately in arresting. They must take into account right to assembly peaceably. o What are the limits to right of assembly? What is the test? Clear and present danger of substantive evil, with imminent danger posed against the public interest KMP v. Ermita o There is need for permit in a rally (BP 880) When can permit be denied? Again, Clear and Present Danger test of substantive evil, with imminent danger posed against public interest o But for freedom parks, there is no need for a permit o Calibrated preemptive response maximum tolerance Recits Distinguish 131 (Prohibition, interruption, or dissolution of peaceful meetings) from 153? o 131 Disturbance is caused by a public officer not part of the peaceful assembly So if he is part of the assembly, it can be under 153 153 (first mode) Serious disturbance in a public place, office or establishment Can be committed by a public officer part of the assembly Cannot be committed by culpa (since there is intent to seriously disturb) o 153 (second mode) Interrupt or disturb public performances, functions, gatherings Can be committed by one not part of the gathering Can be committed by private OR public officers Excludes peaceable assembly under Art. 131 (so just normal gatherings) What is the nature of the crimes? o 131 crime against the fundamental law of the State o 153 crime against public order So this really is just for normal gatherings, and not one subject to fundamental rights Distinguish 153 from 155 (Alarms and scandals)? o In both cases, there are both disturbances o 153 causing of public disturbance, and the offender had the intention to cause such serious disturbance Cannot be created by culpa o 155 not serious How do you determine if the disturbance is serious or not? o Look at the place, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the causing of disturbance, and effect to people at that time The locus of the crime is determinative of its nature. What do you mean by this? o The place where it is committed. Public place those which are open to all, as distinguished from domiciles. What kind of disturbance must be caused in 153? o Serious. Otherwise, it will be alarms or scandals under 155. Under second mode, what are the elements? o 1. There is public performance or function o 2. There is disturbance caused Suppose someone disturbs court proceedings, is it covered by the second mode? o Can be charged with Art. 153, because these are open to the public. o So this covers proceedings, such as those by the COMELEC. Under the second mode of 153, this does not include religious assembly under 132. There is a presumption under law of tumultuous disturbance. What is this? o Caused by more than 3 armed men. If there is actually a tumultuous disturbance, does the
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presumption need to apply? o No need for the presumption. In the causation of a serious public disturbance, there is SPI or damage to property. Do you apply Art. 48? o Yes; there are two grave or less grave felonies committed in a single act. (Disturbed COMELEC proceeding.) o Villanueva v. Ortiz there was serious disturbance complexed with direct assault. If there are two modes done, is there a complex crime? o No, there is just one crime, notwithstanding multiple modes. This provision will apply even in a judicial proceeding. Can you cite to me a decision which supports this stand? o P v. Adugan the function of proceeding under the second mode includes judicial proceedings. o P v. ?, junior Public rally of INC, and there was serious disturbance. Is this covered by 132 or 153? No. This is not a religious ceremony, but a rally (Art. 131) Distinguish inciting to rebellion/sedition from Art. 153 (tending to incite rebellion/sedition)? o Intent controls. For inciting, there has to be intent in the first place. For 153, theres just tendency to incite. Does the burying with pomp provision still apply? o No, in light of RA 9346, there is nobody executed. Acts punished as tumults/other disturbances of public order: o 1. Serious disturbance in public place o 2. Interrupting or disturbing gatherings (not included in 131 or 132) o 3. Making outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition o 4. Displaying placards or emblems which provoke disturbance of public place o [5. Burying with pomp not applicable] ALARMS AND SCANDALS (155) Acts punished: o 1. Discharging firearm, rocket, firecracker, or explosive within any town or public place o 2. Charivari or disorderly meetings o 3. Disturbing public peace while wandering at night or engaged in nocturnal amusements o 4. Causing disturbance or scandal while intoxicated while 153 is n/a Is Alarms and Scandals a specific intent crime? o No. It is the result, not the intent that controls. o Calculated to cause alarm or danger is an erroneous translation. o If there is discharge of firearm but there is no alarm caused, then there is no crime under Art. 155. If the firearm is unlicensed, can one be convicted under RA 8294? o No. If there is another crime committed (155 here), one cannot be liable for RA 8294. DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAIL (156) What is punished: o Any person removes from jail or penal establishment and person confined therein o OR helps him escape by violence, intimidation, or bribery o OR through other means Lower penalty o OR taking guards by surprise outside the establishment Lowest penalty Delivery of prisoners o Applies to BOTH detention prisoners and convicted Is the delivery of prisoners a principal or accomplice? o Principal under Art 156 If the person is a convict, is there a crime when he escapes? o Yes. Evasion of sentence. If the person is a detention prisoner, is there a crime? o No. He is presumed innocent. Is there a crime of frustrated delivery from jail? o No. May they be an attempt? o Yes. When is the crime consummated? o The moment he steps out of the building where the cell is, however brief it may be. If a mental retardate is transferred to a hospital, from jail, and he is delivered, is there a crime of delivery from jail? o Yes. The hospital is an extension of prison. If a person is in his house, can there be delivery? o Yes. Because if under arresto menor, there can be house arrest. Who may be liable for delivery? o 1. Those helping a co-prisoner o 2. Employees of penal establishment, if without custody of the prisoner If he has custody, the crime is infidelity in the custody of prisoners o 3. Private person Is it possible that a person with custody of a prisoner is liable for delivery of prisoners and not infidelity? o Yes, if he was off-duty. If a person delivered a prisoner, and the prisoner had a change
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of heart and decided to return, is the principal for delivery still liable? o Yes. If the prisoner who escapes is a detention prisoner, and he is convicted later on for the crime for which he was detained, is he entitled to ISL? o ??? Is there a provision in the Anti-terrorism law that punishes a custodian who lets his prisoner escape? o Sec. 44. o Can this be committed by culpa? Yes. It can be committed by negligence, as long as it is inexcusable negligence. If the detention prisoner is charged with parricide, and the person delivered him, can not the person be charged as accessory under Art. 19? o Yes. The law provides that a person who helps escape a person who committed parricide, murder, treason, escape, he can be an accessory under Art. 19 to parricide, murder, etc. o So what applies now, Art. 19 or 156? Either, the prosecutor has a choice. The prosecutor can choose ONE but not both. N.B. the Art. 19 punishment is heavier than 156 (since 156 is only prision correccional) Under Art. 8 (conspiracy), it can be a crime in itself or a mode. Is it possible that conspiracy or connivance be an aggravating circumstance? What is the effect if a co-prisoner who connives? o For delivery of prisoners from jail, there is connivance. It aggravates the punishment. So note this is a THIRD character of conspiracy not just mode, not just crime, but also aggravating circumstance. o What about bribery? Bribery in this case can be deemed a means to commit the crime of delivery. o If the public officer accepts a bribe to release the prisoner, what are the crimes? One giving money corruption One accepting money 1. Bribery 2. Delivery of prisoners But if the bribery was towards another prisoner, what is the effect? It would be a deemed a means to commit the crime. If a person commits a bribe to a public officer, one crime is being done as a means to commit another does Art. 48 apply? No. Because under Art. 210, if a crime is committed and then the officer is bribed, another crime is committed we will discuss this soon. Bottom line: do not apply 48. The law is nebulous by stating other means, correct? o Example, craft, disguise o What is the effect? Arresto mayor (lower penalty) If the other means used by the principal of delivery of prisoners is a FELONY, what happens? o Art. 48 applies. Example, if there was direct assault, attempted homicide, physical injuries, etc. o The means provided specifically in Art. 156 (bribery), or fraud (or other means that do not constitute crimes by themselves), etc. do not attract Art. 48. EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE (157-9) How is evasion of service committed? o Committed by one convicted by final judgment, and one escapes from prison. When is prescription of penalties suspended? o When one escapes from jail If a person escapes from jail, and he is arrested without warrant, would the policeman be charged with arbitrary arrest? o No, because warrantless arrest is allowed for those who escaped. Is evasion a continuing crime? o Yes, as long as he is escaping, he is committing a crime. o Rule 113, Sec. 5 allows policeman to arrest a person who escaped from jail as long as he is out, since he is continuing to commit a crime. Can one be guilty of evasion of sentence, although not confined in a prison? o Yes. o Ex. If arresto menor, can spend sentence in house. o If one is sentenced to destierro, how can one commit evasion of sentence? Entering into the prohibited place. o Ex. Hospital, which is an extension of the penal institution.
Tanega v. o 1. o 2. o 3.
Masacayan- elements of evasion Convict by FJ Serving of sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty Escaping during sentence
Del Castillo v. Torrecampo escape is the unlawful departure from the limits of his custody. One not arrested for service of FJ cannot be held to have evaded service of sentence. Is a person serving sentence for an SPL be liable for evasion
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(meaning, even if it is not a felony under the RPC)? o Yes. As long as serving sentence, whether RPC or SPL. Under what circumstances may a prisoner be not liable for evasion of service of sentence? o 1. Detention prisoner o 2. Deportee who violated deportation order o 3. Youthful offender under 9344 Because rehab center is not a penal institution US v. Hoe supposing one is convicted for violating of DDL, and is ordered to suffer imprisonment, and then deported after serving sentence, but then he escapes, he is liable for evasion of service. If after serving sentence, but before deportation, he escapes it is NOT evasion of service, but just a violation of deportation order. If one uses violation or intimidation, it is absorbed. But if one commits a crime to evade, then Art. 48 can apply. A convict was granted conditional pardon. The usual condition is not committing another crime during conditional pardon. Is the violation of the conditional pardon a felony? o Yes, it is a felony. o P v. Jose stating it is not a felony, has been overruled by Torres v. Gonzales What is the period for the condition? o Remaining period of the sentence if the penalty remitted is greater than 6 years o If less than 6 years, prision correccional in minimum period Is it necessary for the prosecution for violation of conditions of pardon upon violation? o No. The C.E. can order the immediate arrest of the person through Board of Pardon and Parole. Is a violator of the conditions of pardon entitled to ISL? o No. It is provided in the ISL. Circumstances qualifying offense: o 1. Unlawful entry (by scaling) o 2. Breaking doors, windows, etc. o 3. Using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence, intimidation o 4. Through connivance with other convicts or employees of penal institution If the convict evaded on circumstances of a catastrophe: o And caught again, increase penalty by 1/5 o If he returns within 48 hours, decrease penalty by 1/5 only by a person convicted by FJ for a crime, and he commits another crime. o Does the second crime have to be a felony? Yes. It cannot be an SPL. The law uses nomenclature of penalties in RPC. (Maximum period of the second crime.) o Does the first crime have to be a felony? No. It can be an SPL. o If the second crime has an aggravating circumstance, what is the effect to the penalty? Since it is in the maximum, then the aggravating circumstance will result into the maximum of the maximum. o He commits another penalty. Is he a quasi-recidivist again? Justice Regalado: He is a quasi-recidivist again and again. If he is not a quasi-recidivist for the second time, he can commit another crime with impunity. o What if he is a recidivist AND a quasi-recidivist? Since recidivism is an A.C. too it leads to the maximum of the maximum. But the law makes mention of Art. 62, par. 5. What is this? o One is a habitual offender. Can you make quasi-recidivism an aggravating circumstance, given that both have the same element of committing a crime again? o Anj: Yes. Purpose of law is to punish repeated criminality. One who escapes from jail, is he automatically a quasirecividist? o Justice Regalado: No. Because the very act of evasion of sentence is an element of the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism. Under Art. 62, par. 1 if the aggravating circumstance in itself constitutes a crime punishable by law, it is not taken into account. o Anj disagrees. o J Callejo: This still bothers me. No clear answer. Can one be a quasi-recidivist or recidivist at the same time? o Yes. Only difference: recividism can be offset by generic mitigating, quasi-recidivism cannot. While serving sentence, a convict commits a complex crime. What is the effect? o Maximum of the maximum of the more serious crime. What is the best evidence to prove prior conviction? o Court judgment. What is the difference between reiteraction and quasirecidivism?
For violation of conditional pardon through commission of the crime, there can only be conviction under Art. 159 after conviction. QUASI-RECIDIVISM (160) Is quasi-recidivism (160) a crime? o No, it is a special aggravating circumstance. It is committed
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Reiteracion: needs final service of two or more lesser crimes, or one graver or equal crime IV: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST FORGING THE GREAT SEAL OR THE SIGNATURE OR STAMP OF THE PRESIDENT (161) Can forgery of signature or great seal be committed by culpa? o No. There must be knowledge and intent to use the signature or great seal. o Presumption: possession of a document bearing the forged signature or seal deemed to be the one who committed the forgery. USE OF FORGED GREAT SEAL, PRESIDENTS SIGNATURE OR STAMP (162) Can only be committed with criminal intent, because the law uses the word knowingly. Offender here is not the forger. MAKING, IMPORTING, AND UTTERING FALSE COINS (163) How many means to commit this crime? o Three: make, import, utter o Note: if foreign currency, amount is immaterial. o o 5. Or destroying currency notes or coins Must be of legal tender o ONLY provision in this part that requires legal tender [though this conflicts with J. Callejos statement in 163 that the coins must be of legal tender too] Coins of foreign currency are not included SELLING OF FALSE OR MUTILATED COIN (165) Possession includes constructive or physical possession of counterfeit or mutilated coins There must be knowledge Two acts punished: o 1. Possession of false/mutilated coin with intent to utter o 2. Actual utterance of the coin If the one possessing is also the counterfeiter, this crime is absorbed under 163 FORGING TREASURY OR BANK NOTES OR DOCUMENTS PAYABLE TO BEARER; OR IMPORTING OR UTTERING SUCH FALSE OR FORGED NOTES/DOCUMENTS (166) Take note of modes to commit forgery of bank notes or treasury notes, etc. o Sec. 9 of NIL when payable to bearer or order 1. Payable to bearer 2. Payable to person named or bearer 3. Payable to fictitious or non-existent person + knowledge of person making it so payable 4. Name of payee is not the name of any person 5. Last indorsement in blank Three acts: o 1. Forging or falsification of treasury/bank notes/documents payable to bearer o 2. Importing false or forged bank notes o 3. Uttering these in connivance with forgers or importers To utter is to offer the forged document, knowing it to be false, whether accepted or not, with representation that it is genuine, with intent to defraud o P v. Balmores a PCSO ticket is a government obligation. If the accused bore a PCSO ticket and wrote in ink the number purported to win attempted estafa, because he was not able to encash it before being caught Blank forms of postal money orders are not official forms. o UNLESS filled up
P v. Rion: If it was legal tender at that time, but it is not legal tender anymore, there can still be violation of Art. 163. (Ex. Using a 1-centavo coin, which is not out of circulation can still be punished) May be frustrated. If the imitation is so imperfect, although all acts were committed. o Attempted, if failed to perform all acts of execution, except for spontaneous desistance To import: to bring into port these coins. There is consummation when the boat enters port or the plane enters airspace. EVEN IF they are not unloaded or brought to customs. Importation may be frustrated, if before they cross territorial waters of Philippines, they are caught. How many crimes are committed if the offender makes 1,000 counterfeit 10 centavo coins, and a few US coins? o Two: a) coins of one currency, b) and another, by the US o So the test is number of currencies involved N.B. this crime can be prosecuted abroad, under Art. 2 The coins subject matter of the crime must be legal tender in the Philippines, and are still in circulation. o Mutilation of coins of other countries: not punished under this provision. Damage is not an essential element of utterance MUTILATION OF COINS (164) Amended by PD 247, which punishes: o 1. Willful defacement o 2. Mutilation o 3. Tearing o 4. Burning
P v. Samson treasury warrant is a government obligation and is therefore covered by Art. 169 of RPC COUNTERFEITING, IMPORTING, UTTERING INSTRUMENTS PAYABLE TO ORDER (167) Again, utterance here must be in connivance with forgers or importers. Otherwise, see 168.
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ILLEGAL
POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR BANK NOTES AND OTHER CREDIT INSTRUMENTS
(168) Tecson v. CA elements of crime under Art. 168 o 1. Treasury/bank note/ security payable to bearer or order is forged or falsified by another person o 2. Offenders knows it was falsified o 3. Used OR possessed with intent to use
Possession must be with intent to use. P v. Liboro One may be liable under this provision of fake dollar bills, but it must be coupled with either actual use or intent to use the fake dollar bills Possession alone, without use or intent to use, is NOT a crime under 168 RA 8484 (Access devise law) o Sec. 17 any prosecution under this law shall be without prejudice for liabilities for violations of RPC o So one can be charged under both RPC and 8484 RA 8239 forgery of passports o If it is also punishable under RPC, and the RPC crime has higher penalty, IMPOSE higher penalty. o But only ONE CRIME is committed. HOW FORGERY IS COMMITTED (169) How is forgery committed under 169? o The ways of committing forgery: o 1. Giving a treasury or bank note or instrument payable to order or bearer the appearance of a true and genuine document o 2. Erasing, substituting, or counterfeiting, or altering figures, letters/words, or designs in said instrument What do you mean by utter? o To offer a forged document or instrument, knowing that instrument to be false, with representation of genuineness o There must be intent to defraud How about a false bank note? Is it included in 169 or 166 of RPC? o P v. Alacris SC ruled that false bank notes are included in the phrase and other representatives of value of whatever domination in 166 However, blank forms of postal money orders are not official, public documents, or treasury/bank notes. They are not certificates of obligations until filled up. Possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines with any figures, letters, or words altered or erased with full knowledge of such alteration is punishable under 168, in relation to 166. Art. 167 o For one to be guilty of uttering an instrument payable to order, there must be connivance with others o Connivance is an ESSENTIAL element of the crime FALSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS (170) Resolution, ordinance, or bill referred to must be a genuine one
The alteration must be to the substance of that bill, resolution, or ordinance There must be a deliberate intent (malice) May a private person be liable under Art 170? o Yes. The law does not distinguish. FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE, NOTARY, ECCLESIASTIC MINISTER (171) If the person committing the crime is a public officer with custody of such document, he may be liable under Art 171 committing the crime with abuse of public position (Opinion of Sen. Padilla J Callejo concurs) If falsification of the document is done through simulation or other means other than alteration, it may be falsification under Art. 171 of the code. The RPC does not define a document. But P v. Andaya defines a document covered by Art. 171. How is it defined? o It is a deed or instrument or other authorized paper by which something is proved, established, or set forth. What documents are covered by 171 and 172? o Legislative, official, commercial, private?
In Batulanon v. P, was it a public, official, commercial, or private? o What was falsified here was a cash voucher. o But it was not a commercial document, although connected to business transactions. o Commercial document used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions o It was a private document executed by private person without intervention of public notary or person legally authorized When is there falsification with taking advantage of public position? o 1. Has official custody of the document o 2. When he intervenes in preparation of the document In Siquian v. P, was there taking advantage of public position? o Yes. Mayor, was in public position and he used this position to make it seem that a non-existent position appeared to exist. o Barometer: if he uses influence, prestige, or ascendancy of his office to commit the crime. If a public officer or employee falsifies a document, and it is not part of his duties, he did not abuse his public position. May falsification of public or commercial document be committed by culpa? o Yes. Samson case he endorsed checks without knowing the identity of the persons who were recipients of the checks. o He did NOT alter the document, he merely endorsed without due diligence. How about a private document? Can it be falsified by culpa? o No. There has to be intent to damage or damage caused. It cannot be committed by culpa.
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo o But not for commercial, public, or official document no need

for intent to damage If a public officer or employee falsifies a document, but in so doing did not abuse his public position, he is guilty NOT under 171, but under 172 (falsification of private individuals) If a notary public falsifies a document outside his territorial jurisdiction, did he abuse his public position? o NO. He is not a notary public outside his jurisdiction. Do 171 or 172 apply to electronic documents? o Yes, by specific provision of Sec. 6(h). o In fact, a document may be notarized electronically and considered a public document. If it is falsified, 171 comes into play. A document incapable of producing legal effects cannot be foundation of a right and thus CANNOT be subject of falsification. Public document o When an authorized person not a party thereto intervenes in a document o Reports made by officials in their official duty Official document o Public officer takes part by virtue of official position, or any document which has become part of the public records Is a passport an official document? o Yes. RA 8239. What is a commercial document? o Used by merchants or business to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions Is a cash disbursement receipt a commercial document? o No. Batulanon it is a private document. Merely a receipt issued. Is a sales invoice a commercial document? o Yes. Monteverde. A document notarized by a notary public without a commission is it a public document still? o No. It is a private document. How about a private document that is falsified before being submitted to the government, as required? o The falsification of a private document before submission may nevertheless be falsification of public or official document because it is destined to be such. o Read Monteverde v. P for the bar. When one takes a civil service examination, are the exams official documents? o The booklets or papers submitted to the CSC are official documents. P v. Leonidas
How about pleadings of parties and papers submitted to the court in the course of official judicial proceedings? o Vermejo v. Bayus the pleadings of parties and papers filed by them which are involved in actions and submitted to the custody of the court are public documents How about a personal data sheet submitted to the CSC for appointment to public position? o It is a public document. Because such document is required by law. CVC v. Acevedo o The mere fact of preparation occurred before submission does not affect its status because the document is destined to be part of public record. You apply for a drivers license and prepare an application. You falsify your age in the application, prior to submission. Is that falsification of public document? o Yes. Daba v. P: the blank form becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished and submitted to LTO. The roll of attorneys is also a public document. Very interesting case: Layug v. Sandiganbayan vis--vis Flores v. Layosa. o Layug: an ordinary government employee has a time record measured through Bundy clock. Layug is a teacher in Davao national high school. He said in his record that he went to class and taught from 8:30-11:30, 1:30-4:30. But some of the time, he spent in the library. He was charged for falsification, because he said in his time record that he taught in certain times, but he was just in the library. No question, the time record is a public document. He was charged for falsification of a public document ELEVEN times. But he did not get his salary for the time he was not teaching. QUESTION: Is he guilty for falsification of public document even if there is no damage to the government? HELD: Layug was acquitted. In the prosecution of cases involving falsification of time records, there must be proof of damage to the government (e.g. salary paid for services not rendered). BUT this is weird, because usually, damage is not an element of falsification of public document. o Flores: The falsification of a daily time record automatically results in financial losses to the government because it enables the employee to be paid salary and earn leave credits for services never rendered. Contrast: In Flores, damage is not an element, because potentially, the government can be damaged. Beragio v. CA: J Callejo agrees with this o A COMELEC registrar, who was also a lawyer, was allowed by
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COMELEC to appear for poor litigants. He submitted a DTR saying that he was in the office, but he was actually in court attending to poor litigants. He was charged with falsification. o HELD: Even if he was not in the office at that time, the COMELEC allowed him to appear for poor litigants. He was performing a duty authorized by the COMELEC. There was no falsification. XXX v. CA o Spouse is a janitor, but before the janitor died, he received his check. Before the check became due, the janitor died. The widow already received it. She cashed it, thinking it was leave credits value. The check was worth X amount, though the janitor had leave credits exceeding the amount of the check. She was charged with falsification. o HELD: Acquitted. She was acting in good faith. There was no damage to government; in fact, the government owed the janitor pa. P v. Coral o Got a warrant of arrest, falsified signature of the judge, and had his wife arrested. He claimed he was not guilty of falsification because it was a spurious document in the first place. o HELD: Convicted. There can be falsification even if it is a spurious document. Cannot use own acts of falsification as a defense against prosecution. Heck v. Santos and Buzon v. Baltazar o The notarization of a lawyer by a private document without requisite commission [meaning, it does not become a public document] is still liable for falsification of public document. o So to simplify: 1. The document remains private 2. But the crime is F of public document Can there be an attempt or frustration of falsification? o Consummated the moment the genuine public or official document is altered, or the moment the false document is executed Even if the document is not put to illegal use THUS there can be no attempted or frustrated falsification of public or official document UNLESS the falsification is imperfect. P v. Dizon o The crime of falsification can be committed by omission. Here the asst. book keeper did not include in the ledger things or properties purchased by him as such. He committed estafa through falsification by omission by not indicating in the ledger his purchase of goods. May someone be convicted based solely on presumptions? Yes. One found in possession of falsified document is presumed to be the author. Caubang v. P o In the absence of a saifactory explanation, one in possession of such is presumed to be the author thereof. Alarcon v. CA Counterfeiting or imitating handwriting, signature, rubric (171 1) In the provision, the word imitating is an inaccurate translation of the Spanish penal code. It does not mean imitating but feigning. Feigning means the forgery of a signature that does not in fact exist. P v. Rampas for one to be guilty for falsification under this provision, it is not necessary that the imitation of writing, handwriting, or signature be perfect. It is only necessary that the two writings bear some resemblance to each other US v. Femur (?) there can be no falsification of public document unless there is an attempt to imitate the genuine signature of another P v Isla one is guilty of falsification even if he did not imitate the signature of the person in the document, as long as there is a DIFFERENCE between the genuine signature of another and the falsification. Causing to appear that persons participated, etc (171 2) P v. Bernardino elements: o 1. Offender is public officer or employee or NP o 2. Takes advantage of official position o 3. Falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons participated in any act or proceeding when in fact, they did not. Lastrilla v P o He had an uncle and auntie. By 2000, his auntie and uncle died. He executed three documents (deed of sale, deed of conveyance) all in the same occasion. In each document, the dead spouses sold to the vendee parcels of land. Then, Lastrilla signed the signature of his dead uncle and auntie, and antedated the deed. o Is this falsification? Yes, under this paragraph. The uncle and auntie are both dead. So this provision applies even if those who were made to appear to participate are already dead. But there is only one crime, even if there were several modes. Abubakar v. P accused was a COMELEC registrar. He made it appear in the list of voters that certain voters were listed, when they were not, and that they voted, when they did not. o Guilty under this same provision o + Liable under Omnibus Election Code Can this crime be committed to conceal another crime?
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo o Yes. P v. Villanueva. Villanueva was an accountable officer; he
misappropriated funds of government. To conceal malversation, he falsified receipts to show that people received some amounts, when they did not. o Guilty of two crimes: Malversation Falsification under this paragraph P v. Leonidas o He was paid by examinee in CSC to take the exam on his behalf and pose as him. Is he guilty of falsification? o Yes. He made it appear that another person participated in the exam, when he did not. Mallari v. P favorite case o Delito continuado he falsified two documents over two parcels of land as security for loans from two people. He made it appear that the owners of the land mortgaged the property to the two people from whence he got the loan. o There is only ONE crime delito continuado. [He explained it better in the Art. 48 discussion] Persons in fact participated in proceedings, but accused make it seem that they said/did some things they did not do (171 3) P v. Stella Romualdez she changed the answers of a Bar examinee, when in fact he did not. Then she corrected the answers. o The examinee was guilty as an accomplice, by knowing that Romualdez committed the crime. Making untruthful statements in narration of facts (171 4) Siquin v People what are the requirements: o 1. Offender is a public officer or employee o 2. Untruthful statements in narration of facts o 3. The facts must be absolutely false If there is color of truth in it, he is not liable under this paragraph Go Kiok to o Petitioner was Chinese, but he declared himself as Filipino. The clerk wrote down Filipino in the residence certificate. o Clerk is NOT guilty he had no criminal intent and relied on the Petitioner. o Petitioner is guilty under this paragraph as Principal by Direct Inducement. If there is colorable truth to the statement, one is not criminally liable. If there is a color of truth to it, there can be no criminal intent. Jamora v. Sandiganbayan there is no F of public document if acts of accused are consistent with GF, even if it may be false. Color of truth indicates GF. A government altered for it to speak the truth there is no falsification
(e.g. there is error in cedula, then altered to speak the truth. There is alteration, but no falsification) What is legal obligation? o The legal obligation may spring not only from a law or a regulation/rule promulgated by authorities (e.g. CSC, COMELEC) o E.g. Guilty of F under this provision, if she falsified a personal data sheet, which is a document required to be submitted to the CSC under rules. (Lamancas v. Inta) Mere fact that she was not hired is inconsequential. The duty to make truthful statements, what is it based on? o Law o Or an ordinance, as long as it requires such making of truthful statement o Or one issued by a government agency (see Siquian) o P v. Manalo may also be based on R&R of constitutional body like a CSC, which requires prospective employees to submit employees data sheet o Basis in Go Kiok To case: CA 465
Concerned Employee v. Generoso A government employee who falsely stated in ITR that he has 2 dependents, when just has one, so that he can pay less taxes: the government employee is guilty of falsification of official document. There must be deliberate intent to make a false narration of facts Altering true dates (171 5) May this crime be committed by culpa? o No. Intent is essential to the crime. Dates referred to here are those that have legal efficacy; ex. Date when obligation is due, date when persons were married. Making alteration or intercalation to genuine document which changes its meaning (171 6) Garcia v CA Elements: o A) a person changes a document or intercalates an entry or statement therein o B) The alteration or intercalation was made in a genuine document o C) Alteration or intercalation made in document to speak of something that is false Crime may be committed by a private individual o If committed on a private document falls under Art. 172 There must be independent proof of damage cause or intent to cause the same to another person o If committed on a commercial, public, or official under Art. 171 Alterations or intercalations on the face of a document are, in the absence of evidence relating to them, are presumed to have been made prior to the execution of a document. One making the alteration must
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explain the same. What alterations consist of: o Erasure o Interlineations o Additions o Substitution of any material matter in a document or instrument If the alteration or intercalation was made to make the document speak the truth, it is not a crime. And the intercalation or intercalation must change the substance of the document. There must be criminal intent. It cannot be committed by culpa. Good faith is a proper defense. Garcia v. CA facts: o Garcia had agreement with Quejada, to purchase from the latter a parcel of land. Garcia made down payment of P5K. Quejada made two copies: gave one to Garcia, and kept one with her. When the sale was aborted and Garcia wanted the payment returned, it was made to appear that the amount actually paid was P55K instead of P5K. Garcia charged with falsification for changing the amount from 5 to 55K. o SC HELD: Garcia guilty of falsification for intercalating in a genuine document a bigger amount. Issuing copies (171 7) Two modes of committing this crime o 1) there is no genuine original of the copy of the document issued in an authenticated form o 2) there is a genuine document Done with dolo or with deliberate intent Alteration of the copy of the genuine document changes character of genuine document Public officer or notaries-public. Sec. 19, Rule 132 of Rules of Evidence enumerates these documents. Intercalating instrument or note (171 8) Intercalated document must be false and change the sense of the document or official book. Number of crimes of falsification committed: Flores v. Layosa one may be liable for estafa through falsification of a public or official document Lastrilla v. CA there are as many crimes of falsification as the number of documents falsified If there is only one document falsified, but under multiple modes, there is only one crime of falsification P v. Pomferada someone falsified the roll of attorneys, by inserting three persons there; he committed three counts of falsification, even if made on the same roll of attorneys Art. 172 Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents by private individuals Two modes under paragraph 1: o Private individual falsifying a public, commercial, or official document no need for damage or intent to damage o Private individual falsifying a private document there is need for damage caused or intent to cause damage If a public officer falsifies a document, without abuse of official position, he can be liable under Art. 172 Dizon v. P o Damage includes material damage and damage to the credit or honor of a private person o So it is not confined to mere material damage The offender did not gain any profit from the falsification of private document. But intent is an internal act. How does one establish this intent? o There must evidence independent of the falsification to establish intent. o P v. Paraiso may consist in an attempt to encash or use the document, or verbal or physical acts indicating intention behind falsification Batulanon v. P o Read the facts o As to the three private individuals, he committed falsification of a private document. The same essential element of damage or intent to cause damage cannot be used to establish estafa, since this has been used in falsification o But the mother saying she received the money for an on behalf of my son, when she actually did herself, she did not commit falsification but the crime of estafa, since there was nothing falsified Under paragraph 2, how is the crime committed? o 1. Person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding o 2. or using a falsified document, to cause damage or with intent to cause damage A private individual who falsified a document, and also used the document under a judicial proceeding, is he liable under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2? o Under the 2nd paragraph, the person using the document is other than the author of falsification. If the falsifier himself uses the document in a judicial proceeding, he is liable for falsification (par. 1) and not for use If a government employee falsifies his personal data sheet by making it appear that he passed the CSC exam, when in fact he did not, and he used the personal data sheet to apply for a position with the government (therefore, not in a judicial proceeding); how many crimes of falsification did he commit?
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Two crimes: Falsification of the personal data sheet Use of such document in a proceeding other than a judicial proceeding Is a falsified document was used in a judicial proceeding, is there need to establish damage caused or intent to cause damage? o No. If it was used in some other purpose or proceeding, is there need to establish damage caused or intent to cause damage? o Yes. Art. 174, 175 just rely on commentaries of Reyes Art. 176 INTRODUCTION OF PHILIPPINES ANY INSTRUMENTS INTENDED TO BE USED IN COUNTERFEITING In a situation where the instruments imported could not be used for the intended purpose, is it an impossible crime or a crime under Art. 176? o Still 176. As long as there was intent to use and there was importation. o P v. Santiago For one to be liable under 176, no need to import a complete set. It is necessary that the implements brought into the country cannot be used by themselves, but can be used alongside other instruments, there is violation of the law o Spanish SC if impossible to use these for the crimes of counterfeiting mentioned, it is not a crime if it is impossible to use Art. 177 Usurpation of authority or official functions 2 modes of committing the crimes: o 1. Usurpation of authority o 2. Usurpation of official functions When a public officer or employees has already retired or resigned but continues to do his duties, is he liable for usurpation of functions? o Yes. Usurpation of authority prosecution must prove: o 1. Accused is aware he is not a public officer o 2. He falsely represents himself to be such o 3. Such person has performed pertaining to an act of person in authority or agent of PIA Felony here is committed by dolo. GF is a defense. Can be committed by a private individual P v. Baltazar a notary public who notarizes a document when his commission has expired violated this provision A private person may be guilty of usurpation of public authority complexed with seduction o (seduced a minor) Usurpation of authority complexed with falsification o when one pretended to be a BIR agent, and showed falsified BIR ID Take note of Art. 299-A(4) o o o Robbery may be committed through pretense of exercise of public authority o It is NOT a complex crime. Usurpation is an essential element under this mode. Art. 267. If a person kidnaps another to deprive another of her liberty, by pretending to be a public officer. Is he liable for complex crime of Art. 177 and 267? o No. Usurpation of authority is a mode of committing crime of kidnapping. Person pretending to be authorized to issue passports: o Liable under RA 8239. (Phil. Passport Law) Art. 178 PUBLIC USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME I. Fictitious name purposes: o 1. To conceal a crime o 2. To escape judgment o 3. To cause damage II. Person who conceals his true name or other personal circumstances Elements under first par.: o 1. Publicly uses fictitious name o 2. With any of the mentioned purposes Here, motive is essential element If a person uses a fictitious name publicly, but without these purposes, what crime is committed? o Same crime, but under Par. II. What is meant by publicly? o Includes use in an official or public document What is meant by damage? o Not equivalent in falsification of private document. Damage here is not to a particular person but to public interest. Public interest is something in which the public, community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which some legal rights are affected. If one uses a fictitious name to defraud another, what crime is committed? o Estafa. Art. 315-2(A) Under Art. 299(A)-4, robbery may be committed through use of fictitious name to gain entry into the house of another. o Again, the use of fictitious name here is mode to commit robbery. If one uses a fictitious name in a narration of facts in a public or official document, what crime is committed? o Falsification of public, commercial, or official document, because penalty for use of fictitious name is already integrated in the former. What is meant by evasion of judgment? o Includes criminal or civil. Law does not distinguish. o
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One is a convict serving sentence, and another person in jail substitutes for the former, to allow him to escape. The other prisoner took his place and claimed to be the escapee by stating his name. What crime did the first person commit? o Evasion of sentence, complexed with use of fictitious name (? confirm with Abu If the security guard noticed that the first person was gone, but did not ask the name of the replacement. What crime? o Different opinions o Justice Albert: replacement is guilty of use of fictitious name under this provision o Justice Reyes: replacement guilty with delivery of prisoners from jail AND of use of fictitious name to conceal the escape of the prisoner Person who escaped: evasion plus use of fictitious name to evade service o Justice Regalado: replacement is guilty of delivery of prisoners from jail. Use of fictitious name by the replacement is absorbed by crime of delivery. Escapee is guilty of evasion of service of sentence, but not use of fictitious name. o J. CALLEJO if the replacement did not use a fictitious name to help the convict escape, he is ONLY guilty for delivery of prisoners (since he did not say a fake name). There was NO overt act of using publicly a fictitious name. If the person uses a fictitious name, art. 48 will apply Replacement: delivery of prisoners complexed with use of fictitious name; Escapee: evasion of service of sentence complexed with use of fictitious name There are as many crimes as the number of fictitious names used If a person uses a fictitious name to obstruct justice o Violated PD 1829 (knowingly uses a fictitious name to delay apprehension of suspects) Art. 179 see authors comment Art. 180, 181, 182 FALSE TESTIMONIES False testimony against a defendant (Art. 180) o Justice Albert: this only applies if the charge against defendant is under the RPC, because the penalty for false testimony is dependent on the RPC graduation of penalties o J. CALLEJO the basis must be whether the SPL uses nomenclature of RPC There must be criminal intent only committed through dolo. GF is a defense The testimony must be complete o Must have been subjected to direct and cross examination o Unless other party waved right to cross-examination false is internal act. How can you establish this? o State of mind may be determine by things he states or does, proof of motive to lie, and objective falsity itself (if the statement is egregiously false), or proof from other facts. False statement must be related to the subject of inquiry, which legitimately affects the defendant. Not necessary that the witnesss testimony directly affects the decision. It just needs to affect a material fact. There must be judgment of conviction or acquittal, because penalty depends on the penalty imposed on the convict. Does this provision include testimony on qualifying and aggravating circumstances? o Yes. It does not matter whether the accused is convicted or acquitted. It the intention of the accused that suffices. Will not apply if accused in main case is convicted and is convicted for a penalty less than correctional, or a fine. o The liar may not be prosecuted under 180, but can be prosecuted under perjury. Witness? o Includes injured party or any witness o And even one of the accused, as long as he testified for the prosecution If the accused gave false testimony in favor of himself, is he liable under 181 (favorable false testimony)? o No. o Unless, P v. Soliman Hindi ko pinatay yan. Siya po ang pumatay! This was a lie. He is liable under Art. 181. Measuring stick: not just disclaiming guilt, but pinning it upon another. It is a formal crime. The crime is committed as soon as the false testimony is given. o Thus, retraction does not extinguish the crime already committed. o UNLESS it was spontaneously done in the same testimony there is GF Relate to RA 6981 witness protection program: o Person in WPP who testifies falsely loses immunity and can be liable for perjury o But NOT art. 180-182 of the RPC RA 9372, sec. 47 o Any person knowingly furnishing false testimony in any proceeding involving terrorism is liable not under 180-182 but for the crime committed Art. 182 false testimony in a civil case o Here, the offender may be a party litigant, or a witness for a party
Villanueva v. SOJ witness must be aware that his testimony is false. Unless he is aware, he may invoke GF. Knowledge that his testimony is
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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo o Ark Travel Express v. Judge might be given in the bar Elements of 182:
o o o o o
1) False testimony given in civil case 2) relating to issues raised 3) Must be false 4) witness knows it is false 5) Must be malicious and given with intent to affect the issues in the case The retraction of a witness under 182 does not extinguish criminal liability. civil case o Includes ordinary action o Includes supplementary proceedings (Execution of judgment, prohibition) How about false testimony in special proceedings? o Does not apply to special proceedings. Neither does it apply to naturalization proceedings. Covers testimony in a petition to annul judgment Unlike Art. 180, penalty does not depend upon outcome of the case. Art. 183 PERJURY Definition, see Art. 183 Villanueva v. SOJ o Applies for: o 1. Light penalties o 2. Other proceedings (ex. Special proceedings) o 3. Etc. etc. Elements: o Perjury is a felony by dolo. It cannot be done by culpa. o There must be malice. Mere assertion of false, objective fact not enough. o There must be criminal intent. Must be on a material matter How about petitions? o Petition for habeas corpus is a public document. If the allegations are false, crime is F of a public document. o Padua v. Paz a complaint for damages filed with MTC which contains false allegations perjury o Asturias v. Serrano petitioner filed petition to annul judgment and made false assertions crime is perjury too o J. CALLEJO In light of these, a petition filed in court where false statements are made, the crime is perjury. It is not necessary that the proceeding where the false statements were made must terminate first. Subornation _-> PDP, PDI The party who is liable is the party who OFFERS the document n
evidence o Must know that the document is false Malicious procurement of search warrant and use perjured document what crimes are committed? o Malicious procurement of search warrant o Perjury o NOT complexed. Art. 185, 186 MONOPOLIES, ETC Assignment: Up to Art. 236 Recitation on Avon v. Luna; Rivera v. Solidbank Art. 200 GRAVE SCANDAL Must be in a public place. Must be in public view US v. Samaniego unless there is an element of publicity, there can be no grave scandal. Here, the accused and her paramour were doing adultery in a private place (kitchen of womans house) Art. 201 IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS, ETC. US v. Cutingger What is the test of obscenity? Whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men. Whether the tendency of the matter is the deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to those immoral influences. o P v. Apparachi f Mere nudity in art or sculpture is not obscene since this can be a work of art. If the nude representations are sold for commercial purposes and not the sake of art, it may fall under this provision. How about actual exhibition of sexual intercourse in public? It is a crime under this provision. There is no art here. P v. Tinpongco it must be distributed widespread or to many people, because if it is isolated, then it does not disturb the law RA 9995 law punishing video and photo voyeurism (amended Art. 201) o 1. Taking a video or photo of sexual act without consent of person o 2. Capture image of body parts (breast, buttocks, private parts, etc.) without consent of the person NOTE: For above, there must be reasonable expectation of privacy If a couple goes to a motel, is there an expectation of privacy? Yes. That is why they went to the motel. o 3. To sell, copy, or cause distribution of the video or photos even when there is consent by the persons involved o 4. To broadcast in print, radio, or video these sexual acts (even in VCD or DVD) What covers the female breast? Any portion. Private area? covered or naked What is Reasonable expectation of privacy? The
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person concerned believes that she can disrobe in privacy without being concerned that she would be captured in photo or video o This photo or video is inadmissible for evidence. o Exception: police can apply to court for an order to take a photo or video of a couple for investigation and apprehension of those committing this crime. Relate to RA 7610 - Child abuse law o Those who coerce or induce a child (person under 18, or over 18 but suffering from mental or physical defect) hired to perform in indecent shows or obscene publications o Here, the child is EXEMPT because the child is a victim. o Who are liable? Ascendant, guardian, any person entrusted with care of child Person who induces or coerces the child Art. 202 VAGRANTS AND PROSTITUTES Amended by RA 9344, Sec. 58 o Persons below 18 are exempt from criminal liability from prosecution for vagrancy or prostitution o Or mendicancy under PD 1563 RA 7610 o Pimps are liable, and those other persons that procure child prostitutes or encourage them, and those who engage in sexual intercourse with children, and those deriving profit or advantage (e.g. owners of establishment) Further amended by RA 9208 anti-trafficking of persons act of 2003 o Covers sex-tourism, qualified trafficking of persons, etc. o If the trafficked person is a child (under 18 or over 18 but has mental or physical defect), the crime is qualified o Also qualified if offender is in military or law enforcement agencies o If the offended person dies, becomes insane, gets AIDS/HIV, is mutilated, it is also qualified o What are the civil liabilities? Offender liable to trafficked person from personal properties If insolvent, take value from those proceeds and instruments derived from trafficking, that are confiscated o THERE CAN BE INDEPENDENT ACTION for civil liabilities under this law o Also, exempt from filing fees Art. 203 WHO ARE PUBLIC OFFICERS? P v. Maniego definition in 203 is extensive and comprehensive. Embraces all public servants, from highest to lowest. Removes distinction between officers and employees. Definition includes those occupying positions in government, highest to lowest, permanent or temporary. Includes those with positions in GOCCs, including GSIS, Postal Service. Agbayani v. Sayo Includes subsidiaries of GOCCs, whether created under Corporation Code or original charters. P v. Sandiganbayan Whether stock or non-stock, vested with functions relating to public needs (governmental or proprietary), owned by government either wholly or partially Crimes committed by judgment Art. 204 KNOWINGLY RENDERING AN UNJUST DECISION Applies to the judges of the first and second levels (MTC, RTC) But not justices of appellate courts, SC, or Sandiganbayan (those who render collective judgment after due deliberation) Judge must commit breach of positive statutory duty or performance of discretionary act with improper or corrupt motive Valdez v. Judge A judgment is unjust contrary to law, not supported by evidence, made with conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice o Must be intent + overt act It is not enough that the judgment is contrary to law or that the judgment is not supported by evidence there MUST be intent on the part of the judge to do the injustice. A judge renders a decision that is not based on evidence on record, and he is aware of it. He still renders the decision. Is he ipso facto criminally liable? o No. The judgment of the court must become final and executory before he can be charged of a violation of Art. 204. What proceedings are contemplated? De Vela v. Pelayo o There must be a decision of an appellate court, in prohibition/certiorari/appeal impugning the validity of the decision o OR there is an administrative charge against the judge for promulgating the unjust order This crime is malum in se. It cannot be committed by culpa. CONTRAST TO ART. 205 MANIFESTLY UNJUST JUDGMENT THROUGH INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE There is inexcusable negligence if the mistake of the judge and cannot be explained; there is a manifest injustice that cannot be explained by a reasonable explanation. When is a judgment unjust? o When it is contrary to evidence on record or the law.
Unlike Art. 204, a judge may be liable by culpa. Attachment of liability? o Not only erroneous, but motivated by dishonestly, hatred, or some other evil motive What can the judge invoke as a defense against ignorance of the law?
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o 1. Good faith o 2. Absence of malice o 3. Improper consideration Art. 206 UNJUST INTERLOCUTORY ORDER Elements of this crime? o 1. Judge performs any of these acts: Renders manifestly unjust IO or decree through inexcusable negligence or ignorance o 2. Either by dolo or culpa An IO does not finally dispose of the case Art. 207 MALICIOUS DELAY IN ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE Felony by dolo. Must be committed with corrupt motives or malice, by a judge in delaying the administration of justice. Mere delay is not enough. There must be intent to deliberately delay. Magdango v. Judge Art. 208 PREVARICACION Very important Public officer who in dereliction of his duties, maliciously refrains from instituting prosecution for violation of laws, or tolerates commission of these acts Who are the officers liable here? o Those charged in institution or filing of criminal complaints against violators of the law Ex. Agents of the NBI, PDEA, prosecutors, OMB, special prosecutor, etc. o Those charged with enforcement of internal revenue laws are NOT included This is malum in se. Although the crime may be committed by tolerance, however, the law expressly requires that the public officer/employee MALICIOUSLY refrains from instituting or prosecuting violations of the law. US v. Mendoza Before a public officer or employee may be charged and convicted of prevaricacion, the offender whom the public officer refused to charge/prosecute must FIRST be prosecuted and convicted for that crime whose prosecution was omitted by the public officer o This is a condition sine qua non to prevaricacion Refers to both RPC and SPL crimes What about public officers and employees not tasked with instituting criminal actions or prosecuting them? o They are liable under PD 1829 obstruction of justice o May also be held as accessories under Art. 19 of RPC Liable for other crime? o Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices law, in addition to liability under Art. 208. Prevaricacion is a constituent element of qualified bribery (Art. 211-A). Art. 209 BETRAYAL OF TRUST BY ATTORNEY OR SOLICITOR Can only be committed by attorney-at-law (no more procurador judicial anymore) First form of violation: o Client must suffer prejudice due to malicious breach of lawyer of professional duty, or inexcusable negligence, or ignorance o What is prejudice? Material or moral damage o Where else is the lawyer liable under? Sec. 4B of RA 3019 Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Law if the lawyer knowingly induces or causes public official to commit any of the offenses under Sec. 3 of the RA 3019 o Practicing lawyer may also be liable for bribery under this provision, if he connives with a public officer. SAN YUNG SECOND FORM? Third form: no liability for lawyer if the client accedes to the lawyer representing another Bribery (very important) Art. 210 DIRECT BRIBERY Three forms: 1. Public Officer: o agrees to perform a criminal act, o in connection with official duties, o in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or present o received by him or mediation of another o whether the crime is committed by him or another 2. Acceptance of gift, etc. for a non-criminal act, whether the act is done or not 3. Acceptance of gift, etc. in consideration for refraining from doing something which is his duty to do Crime of bribery is committed by the public officer. Giver of the gift commits corruption of public officer. What are the elements of the first mode? Garcia v. SB o 1. Accused is a P.O. o 2. Receives directly or through mediation of another some gift, etc. o 3. Gift, etc. was given in consideration of commission of commission by the P.O. of some crime in connection with performance of his duties Second mode? o 1. Act in consideration for which the gift, etc. was given does not constitute a crime o 2. The act or crime relates to P.O.s exercise of functions
Maamba v. Judge For the public officer to be liable for direct bribery under the 2nd form, although the act of the P.O. does not constitute a crime, the act must be unjust
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If the act is ENTIRELY outside his official functions, not liable for direct bribery. If a public officer represents to an individual that he can issue a permit, but he cannot issue it in actuality, he is not liable for direct bribery. He is liable for estafa. When is bribery consummated under form 1? o If the gravamen of the crime is the offer or promise and the acceptance, the crime is consummated upon acceptance of the offer/promise. NOTE: If the act was done prior to acceptance, the act consummates the crime already [I spaced out and thought I heard this. CONFIRM first] o It does not matter whether the offered thing is actually given to the officer as long as there is offer and acceptance, there is consummation Pelegrino v. P The offered money was left on the table. The public officer gets the envelope and says ano to? HELD: Mere physical receipt without any other act or sign showing acceptance cannot lead the court to conclude that bribery has been committed. There must be physical act indicating acceptance. What constitutes gift or present? Can it be services? o Yes. The gift or present may be in the form of services to be rendered by the bribe giver. A promise to do an act that would have pecuniary gain to the PO is a present. o It is enough if a reward or personal advantage would accrue to the PO from the performance of an act by the bribe giver, and he values it highly Can there be attempted or frustrated bribery? o De Los Angeles v. P lawyer promised and actually delivered to NBI money to spare his client from investigation for smuggling of aliens. NBI agent accepted the money, but the agent gave it to his superior to use as evidence against the smuggler. What crime was committed? Attempted bribery. o US v. Te Tong Appellant offered money to Chief of Police for the latter to release certain merchandise seized from appellant in gambling. The police accepted it, but to use it as evidence against appellant. What crime? Attempted bribery as well. o P v. Ng Pek Appellant convicted of attempted bribery when he offered money to the police to dissuade them from arresting him and charging him for violation of ordinance. Policemen refused to accept the money. What crime? Attempted bribery. o But NOTE: the one guilty of bribery is the public officer, but why is it that in these three cases, there was attempted bribery? It
must have been attempted CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICER. Under Mode 1, the officer must receive the gift or present OR accept the promise to give the gift or present. But the act to be committed must be a crime. The present or gift may be solicited by the public officer or employee. If does not distinguish whether offered by the bribe giver or solicited by the officer o Whether the act was done, it does not matter. o In fact, if the criminal act was actually done by the PO, he is guilty of two crimes: direct bribery + that crime. Article 48 does not apply. o May he be charged simultaneously for these two crimes? Yes. Merencillo case Supposing he received the bribe to commit a criminal act, but the officer did not commit the criminal act? o He is liable for bribery under the first mode. It does not matter if he actually commits the crime or not. There are as many crimes of direct bribery as the number of times a bribe is offered and received/accepted. o Ex. LTO inspector every time he checked and he was offered money and he accepts/receives it to do a criminal act Mode 2: Mariposque case a robbery was committed, and Mariposque told the victim: I will recover your property, but you have to give me PHP 5,800. Private complainant agreed. Mariposque recovered it. He did not deliver it. There was an entrapment. o SC HELD: The recovery of the property was not a crime. Nevertheless, failure to deliver the goods to the private complainant was unjust. o J CALLEJO: There was an obligation to return the property. It was his duty to do so! His refusal to do so is not a crime, but it is unjust. May a private individual be liable for bribery? o Asejas III v. P Asejas was a practicing lawyer. His Japanese client came to the Philippines. He told his client there is a complaint against you. Immigration agents told client: Give P25K so we wont investigate you. Lawyer connived with the public officers and encouraged his client to give money. He did. o HELD: Private person (lawyer) was liable for bribery for acting in conspiracy with the public officers. o J CALLEJO: The Japanese client gave money because he was afraid to be charged for any irregularity in the VISA/ violation of DDA. Shouldnt they have been charged for robbery/extortion??? Bribery must be given voluntarily. That is the difference between bribery (voluntary giving) and robbery/extortion (involuntarily, through threat) I am gay! -Glenn
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Judge was an accomplice when he allowed his chambers to be used for the bribery transaction between the police and the suspected criminal for illegal possession Judge was PDP when he acted as the broker in bribery Art. 211 INDIRECT BRIBERY Given gifts by reason of his office Distinguish from direct bribery: o Indirect no such agreement to perform or not perform an act. PO is not required to do anything in particular. Enough that he received the gift/present by reason of his office Art. 211-A QUALIFIED BRIBERY Relate with Art. 208 For PO entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed crime punishable by RP and in consideration of offer, promise, gift, etc. Must it be RPC or can it be SPL? o In general, must be RPC because the term used is reclusion perpetua. o Include SPLs that use the nomenclature of the RPC penalties. What are the described public properties or funds here? o 1. Public funds owned by national government or any of its agencies, including LGUs, GOCCs, under the custody of the accountable officers o 2. Funds or property under custodia legis which are attached, seized, or deposited with private individuals or public authorities under the law or by orders of the courts or executive officers even if such funds belong to public individuals o 3. Funds and properties of public corporations or special instrumentalities such as the PCSO as well as the PNRC are public funds/properties Mariano Ocampo v. P amounts loaned to private individuals by GOCCs are private loans and are therefore not public property or funds What is the purpose of Art. 217? o The SC ruled that the law is designed to protect the government and penalize erring public officers conspiring with private individuals resulting to loss of public funds and property due to corruption or neglect of duty How committed? o Misappropriation of public funds o OR the taking of such property o OR by consenting another to take such property, whether wholly or partially o OR permitting another due to negligence or abandonment of duty, to take such public funds or property Elements? o 1. Offender is a public officer o 2. He has custody or control of funds by reason of duties of office o 3. Those funds/property are public funds for which he is accountable o 4. He appropriates, takes, misappropriates, consents, or through abandonment/negligence, permits another to take the same What is to appropriate? o To use public funds or property for himself or convert the same for his personal advantage o Includes any attempt to dispose of public funds or property without any legal right What is taking? o Concept of taking in malversation is the same concept as taking in theft or robbery o Once a public officer has possession of public property, however brief as may be, and disposes of the same, he is liable for Malversation Who is an accountable officer?
US v. Mendoza The officer must first be convicted for prevaricacion, prior to conviction for qualified bribery. Art. 212 CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS The act of offering or giving to the public officer gifts, presents, etc. [Note: the public officer is liable for bribery] It must be by reason of his public office Can there be attempted corruption of public officers under Art. 212? o In some cases, the CA said there can be an attempt of this crime. P v. Elago CA said there can be frustrated corruption of public officers. This has not been affirmed by the SC, and J CALLEJO doubts it would ever be affirmed. Art. 213 FRAUDS AGAINST PUBLIC TREASURY, ETC. Par. 1 crime by dolo o Consummated by mere entering into agreement by public officer/employee with interested party or speculator no need for damage to be proven Par. 2 mere demand of sums different or mere failure to issue receipts o Par. 2 is mala prohibita o Not required for State to suffer damage o If accountable officer demands amount in excess of what is due to the government, the amount due to the government is still public property but the excess is private property May private individuals be liable under Art 213? o Yes. US v. Ponte if there is conspiracy with public officer Art. 217 MALVERSATION (very impt) By dolo or culpa
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By reason of office, is accountable for public funds or property Every officer of government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds or property and who shall be accountable therefore and for safekeeping thereof in conformity with law o What about donations made by private individuals to government, are they public funds/property? Yes, whether domestic or foreign source, when duly accepted by government (because these are remitted to the national treasury and for which a general fund is provided for). Even the proceeds are public funds or property. o 1987 revised administrative code except as provided otherwise, all money or property officially received by a public officer in any capacity or in any occasion must be accounted for as government funds or property o LGC any officer of the local government whose duty permits or requires possession/custody of public funds are accountable officers o To determine who is accountable the nature of the duties CONTROLS and not the nomenclature of the office o Frias v. P Frias is a municipal mayos; he went to Manila on official business. He got a cash advance. Under the LGC, if you are given a cash advance, you have to account for this when you return from your destination. If he fails to account for it, although he was not benefited. HELD: The municipal mayor is an accountable officer, because under the Government Auditing Code, he was obliged to account for the cash advance. Fact of lack of benefit does not exempt him from liability. There are two officers: one accountable, one not. They use public funds to drink beer. HELD: Accountable officer liable for malversation. Nonaccountable cannot; he is liable for theft. Can a sheriff be liable for malversation? o Yes, because those taken under official duties are in custodia legis o Ex. Received money from execution sale and misappropriates it o What are the fiduciary funds of the courts? Ex. Bail bonds Ex. Funds from extrajudicial foreclosure, even if destined for a private person, since it is momentarily entrusted to the one conducting public auction o Money and property is under custodia legis if taking through official judicial processes RA 9165, DDL any public officer or employee who is accountable for seized/surrendered dangerous drugs is liable under the law: life imprisonment to death Is the decision of the SC is Diego v. SB still true today? o o The crime should be 9165, since it is SPL. Art. 217 cannot anymore apply for drugs under custodia legis that is misappropriated. o J CALLEJOs opinion: charge under 9165 alone, not 217, and not concurrent If a private individual profits from the fruits of malversation, since he cooperates as an accessory? o He can be liable for malversation as an accessory. There must be concrete evidence that: o 1. He received public funds/property o 2. There is a shortage of such Government Auditing Code you cannot give vale to a co-government employee. To tolerate such a practice is to sanction every public officer to turn public funds into a lending business. So giving vale is NOT ALLOWED. [Situation here: public officer using public funds to give advances to fellow employees.] Demand is NOT an element of the crime. If one misappropriates different types of property: guns, money, etc.? o If he did everything in one occasion, just one crime o If multiples times, as many crimes of malversation as the number of times he misappropriated San Jose v. Karunungan Clerk of court has custody of 100K consigned with court. The sheriff stole it when the clerk went out for lunch. Is the sheriff guilty of malversation? o No. He is not the accountable officer. If the clerk is negligent, he is liable for malversation through negligence. The sheriff is liable for theft. Restitution does not exempt him from criminal liability, o At best it is a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. If person is charged with dolo, can he be found to have committed it by culpa? o Yes. Tabuena v. SB Abuse of confidence and taking advantage of public position are INHERENT in crime of malversation. Art. 218 FAILURE TO ACCOUNT Campomanes v. P elements o 1. Public officer o 2. Accountable officer o 3. Required by law or regulation to render accounts to government or provincial auditor o 4. Fails to make account within 2 months Art. 220 TECHNICAL MALVERSATION Elements? o 1. Public officer o o
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2. Has public fund or property under administration 3. Has been appropriated by law or ordinance 4. Applies such fund or property for public use OTHER THAN that for which it has been appropriated for So he did not get it for himself Gravamen of crime: use or application of funds/property for some other purpose than that provided for by law or ordinance Is this included in malversation in 217? o No, this is separate and independent from malversation in Art. 217 If appropriated by the provincial board, but he uses it for a purpose other than that provided for by the board? o J CALLEJO: thinks this is included, because ordinance can include appropriations even by boards Art. 231 OPENLY REFUSE TO EXECUTE JUDGMENT OF SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. What is openly refusing? o Promptly and unreservedly refusing to execute judgment clear and manifest refusal o There must be criminal intent to defy superior authority Disobedience to void or invalid decision is not a crime Art. 235 MALTREATMENT OF PRISONERS See RA 9745 law on torture Who are the public officers? o Those with custody of or in charge of the prisoner o Custody must be actual and not just by fiction of law Who is the victim? o The prisoner, the detention prisoner, or convict who was subjected to maltreatment If he inflicts physical injuries without intent to kill or he kills the prisoner, he may be guilty for maltreatment of prisoners and either PI or homicide/murder Art. 236 238 ANTICIPATION, PROLONGATION, ABANDONMENT OF DUTIES Judge who continues to exercise functions of an abolished position, in GF, is a de facto officer Abandonment must be total and under such circumstances indicating absolute relinquishment [THE FOLLOWING NOTES ARE CARE OF JENNIFER REYES. THANK YOU!] o o o Art 239-241 USURPATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
legal qualifications. good faith is a defense Nominating v Recommending Merely recommending is not a crime under this provision. To be liable must nominate someone not qualified Art. 245 ABUSES
AGAINST CHASTITY
If crime against chastity or person is committed then art. 245 is absorbed. Public Authority is an aggravating Circumstance Art. 248 MURDER relate to R.A. 9745 Penalty provided for in the Crime against torture and RPC may be applied suppletorily Amnesty Law is not applicable Applies to officers who can arrest and investigate violators of the law If there is Rape and torture is committed is there a special complex crime? Justice says no decision yet in SC. Check Section 14 of the law R.A. 7080 Only have to show a series or pattern of acts that proves plunder Anti-Graft and Corruption Court must first determine the validity of the information before there can be suspension of the public officer. Crimes Against Persons Art. 246 PARRICIDE Father, mother, child or spouse of the accused legitimacy is not an issue but if between ascendant and descendant other than the parent or child should be legitimate If child is less than 3 days old the crime is parricide May it be committed by Culpa? Can it be complexed with unintentional abortion? Yes. Appellant stabbed his wife to death the wife was pregnant at the time (P v Paykana April 16, 2008) Robbery with homicide homicide used in its generic terms it includes parricide and infanticide Muslim Code of the Philippines
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS/ LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
Usurpation of one department of the powers of another does not cover usurpation within the same department. Different provision covers such usurpation
APPOINTMENTS
Art. 244 UNLAWFUL
Must be aware that the person nominated or appointee does not have the
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can marry more than once as long as can provide equal companionship????? Can be committed by Culpa (P v Paykana) They were quarreling the husband drove with recklessness If did not die - frustrated or attempted No intent to kill - physical injuries, serious or less serious Art. 247 UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES Defines a Felony but there is an absolutory cause Example of an exempting circumstance A crime is committed but not criminal liability No Civil liability because of the absolutory cause P v Kurikur P v Uyanid 406 p 651 - no civil liability imposed on the offender. Sir does not completely agree H Stabbed the paramour. The paramour tried to strike back. W tried to save P. H stabbed W to death. SC said art 247 to both attacks. Callejo: Art. 247 must not be applied because the reason H killed W is because W was protecting P. P v Rabandaban 85 P 636 Told his W to leave. W went inside the bedroom to take her jewelries. H said W should just leave and not take the jewelry. W tried to stab H, H stabbed W. NOT Art. 247 because he was protecting himself. Killing must be the direct by-product of the outraged suffered by the offending party In order to apply Art. 247 when the killing was done after the sexual intercourse. Sexual Intercourse must be consensual Even if not consensual can still apply Art. 247 if husband acted due to MISTAKE OF FACT Must the court take into consideration circumstance? Yes. mitigating and aggravating Can only be invoked by the Offended Spouse Relative may invoke Art. 11, but the act must be reasonable. R.A. 8353 punishes sexual assault Assume husband saw wife completely naked, paramour clothed but the finger was inserted. -- not sexual intercourse Special Law did not amend Art 247 Can the husband use Art. 11? Callejo: can be applied Art. 248 MURDER Torture and Cruelty are different Cruelty refers only to Physical Outrage to subject to gross insult to scuff - to show contempt by _____ acts and language Killed the Victim and threw the body in the river = scuffing P v Pugay - Guilty of homicide by culpa and one by dolo but one victim R.A. 9745 Physical and mental torture P v Commadre Art. 249 HOMICIDE P v Lazaro No frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence Homicide means there is intent Euthanasia Sec. 10 RA 7610 victim of violence is a child the penalty is reclusion perpetua of under 12 VAWC If there is intent to kill but the victim does not die apply RPC Section 6 of the Code Art. 251 DEATH
IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
The reason behind destierro is twisted logic possible only from a twisted mind. He thinks no logic with the provisions - says one justice Does not apply Sexual Assault
Does not define a crime only provides penalty Elements: 1 Several persons - more than 2 in each group 2. Do not compose groups organized for the purpose of attacking another 3.Persons attack one another is a tumultous manner 4.cannot determine who killed the disease 5.person who inflicted physical injuries to the disease can be identified Neither Art 251 or 252 apply if the Person who committed can be
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ascertained They will also not apply if there is only one victim Not apply if the one group so organized attacked another group and the other group only defended themselves all of the members of the attacking group are liable for all injuries on the basis of Art. 8 RPC conspiracy Art. 253 ASSISTANCE
TO SUICIDE
Art. 257 UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION May be committed by Culpa P v lopez accused stabbed wife 9 mos pregnant - parricide with unintentional abortion There can be a complex crime of Unintentional Abortion and Parricide May there be Frustrated abortion YES. According to Justice Regalado. Home Work Art 262- 282 anti graft Art. 262.Mutilation There must be intent to mutilate Serious physical injuries if there is no direct intent to mutilate if intention is to kill then frustrated homicide or parricide Relate to Sec. 6 RA 9262 The offender shall be punished under the RPC and not under this special law Art. 263 Par.1 Impotence - loss of the power to procreate and not only copulation If castration was done solely to deprive the victim the power of generation then the law violated is Art. 262 Deformity means disfigurement Blindness must be complete P v. Guttierez Med Cert issued by the doctor states that the healing period is one month the crime is less serious physical injuries. When we speak of month it is understood to mean 30 days Relate RA 7610 prision mayor in its minimum period Art. 264 Important Injurious substances must be introduced or injected into the body of the victim. There must be NO intent to kill if there is intent to kill it can be murder, homicide, parricide etc. If the substance is poisonous Murder
Person trying to commit suicide does not commit a crime, even if fails to kill himself. If S jumps to kill himself, lands on another and kills that other person S can be liable for the death of the other person Others belive not liable Art. 254 DISCHARGE
OF FIREARMS
Elements 1. Offender discharges a firearm against or towards another 2. no intention to kill or injure but only to scare If with intent to kill then Murder or homicide at any of its stages If fires in the air can be Art 153 or Alarm No distinction between an unlicensed or licensed firearm if another crime is committed not guilty under RA 8294 This article can be complexed with serious and less serious Physical Injuries Art. 255 INFANTICIDE Elements: 1. Child born alive and 2. be viable - capable of independent existence Fetus with intra uterine line of 6 months not viable Child expelled prematurely the crime is abortion not Infanticide Treachery is inherent in infanticide P v Corales 121 S 426 Raped pregnant daughter daughter delivered her child. The father took the child after delivery and burried the child alive SC: rape and infanticide and abuse of superior strength in infanticide. Callejo: abuse of strength inherent in infanticide Arts. 256/7 ABORTION so long as the fetus dies due to violence or drug administered even if fetus is in full term. Can be intentional or unintentional;
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CanNOT be committed by CULPA Intentionally introduced the substance If offender not aware that the substance is injurious = serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence There was intent to kill but the qty was not enough to kill NOT an impossible crime Serious or less serious physical injuries Art. 265 - Art. 266 Slapped the victim. Victim did not sustain any physical injury or medical attendance crime is slight physical injuries If purpose is to humiliate the crime is slander by deed If there is intent to kill Parricide, murder homicide Rivera v People and Lazaro v P Injury may not be serious at the onset but later on becomes serious the crime committed can change depending on the ultimate injury caused. Frustrated -> Consummated Physical Injuries => Homicide or murder Art 266-A and Art 266-B Crime against person the charge may be filed now by the public prosecutor consent of the offended party is no longer needed Husbands may now be liable of sexual assault of their lawful wives has the right to use the power of persuasion but he cannot use force, violence, or intimidation. Sexual relations must always be consensual Ex. H and W have been legally separated - more reason for the wife to refuse Ex. H has AIDS Lewd design is inherent in both crimes. Inherent is the desire of the offender to get sexual gratification by the insertion of his organ or any instrument Sex is now classified 1. rape 2. sexual assault Sodomy criminal act can be committed against a man or a woman May a woman be guilty of rape or sexual assault may be guilty as accomplice or principal by indispensable cooperation Sexual assault may be committed by a man or a woman Inserts finger and organ one count of sexual assault and one count of rape NO FRUSTRATED RAPE OR SEXUAL ASSAULT only attempted or consummated stage Enough that a part of the object or organ pass through the genital, anal orifice, mouth "Instrument" can be a part of the human body. Ex. finger, tongue other things Under 12 Statutory rape no need for violence or intimidation Par. 1 Force, threat, intimidation Force can be actual or constructive what is pivotal is the offender was able to achieve his purpose. Fear includes fear of death, bodily harm Intimidation viewed in the eyes of the victim must be of such as to cause fear on the part of the victim Father raped his daughter, he claims the daughter did not resist moral ascendancy and parental authority over the daughter substitutes for violence same rule if uncle, common law husband of mother Girl Over 12 but mental age of 12 not statutory rape because beyond 12 years old but the crime is still rape Deprived of Reason intellectually weak to the extent that she is not capable of giving consent to sexual intercourse Act is done w/o her consent Mental retardate Mental abnormality Deprive of reason need not be complete borderline mental deficiency is enough The woman was sleeping. The accused went on top of her they had sex. Woman says rape because she was half asleep SC convicted the man. Callejo does not agree. Cannot imagine the situation. when a woman is asleep (natural and regular suspension of unconsciousness) Drug was injected into her body then raped ability to resist was taken away by the administration of drugs even if the woman was awake at the time of intercourse.
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Rape may now be committed by machinations and grave abuse of authority. Ex. if the offender succeeds by pretending to be the twin brother that is fraudulent machinations Gave abuse of authority employer or superior - employee teacher - student Doctor patient Qualifying circumstances only one circumstance is needed to qualify. Do not use the others as a generic aggravating 1. Use of a weapon - weapon means any instrument made or designed for the infliction of injury or is likely to produce death of physical harm. Meer possession is not enough. It must be used to intimidate the woman. Whether licenced firearm. SUPPOSING NO LICENSE CAN IT BE A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE. NOT AGGRAVATING OR QUALIFYING OR SEPARATE because rape was committed (p v almanzor) 2. RA 83 53 are in addition to the aggravating circumstances to art 14 of rpc 3. Permanent Physical mutilation 4. Know that the victim is pregnant at the time of the commission there can be rape with unintentional abortion Special Complex Crime Homicide committed on occasion of rape or sexual assault Homicide is used in its generic term No such thing as Murder with rape or sexual assault "On the occasion" logical connection between homicide and rape no appreciable amount of time intimate relation between the two crimes Abduction with rape if original intention is rape then the crime is rape To prove age can still be stipulated in the pre trial guardian refers to legal or judicial Victim is below 7 qualifying death Offender with AIDS/HIV/STD to be qualifying offender must be aware Pardon relate with 345 RPC affects not only the crime but also the penalty RA 7610 Sec 5 the child victim is under 12 accused prosecuted under RPC statutory rape Art. 267 KIDNAPPING
AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION
Elements 1. actual deprivation of liberty - intent 2. offender is a private individual 3. purposeful action of depriving liberty 4. lack of consent At the beginning agreed to go with offender but later refused later prevented with the use of force from leaving the place or detained against his will can still be liable of kidnapping P v Astorga Newer case said lock up means also deprivation of liberty and not merely being kept in an enclosure. Leaving a child in a place where he did not know his way home = kidnapping Amount of time of the deprivation is not material. R. A. 9745 do not include torture anymore that is different already 2 or more persons were killed by the occasion of kidnapping 2 kidnapping with homicide or murder P v, Muip kidnappers kidnapped the victim. Took his pajero car, demanded ransom but failed to get any. They killed the victim. Offender was charged with two separate cars of kidnapping with homicide and car-napping SC kidnapping for ransom and car-napping. What happened to the homicide? - homicide is a qualifying circumstance. Because you proved ransom so penalty is death. Do not use homicide as qualifying but as aggravating. Callejo: does not agree. Should be kidnapping with homicide for ransom. Same penalty death. There is a case that agrees with Callejo which should be followed because decided by the SC en banc. If main purpose is to kill and not to deprive of liberty then the crime is murder not kidnapping and vice versa. same rule if main purpose is to rape Ransom does not have to be necessarily pecuniary Grave Coercion person forces another to leave his home, without any deprivation of liberty (ex. Inducing a minor to come with him) Distinguish between kidnapping and Highway Robbery Section 2e - differentiate with ART 267 rpc. Highway Robbery - to be crime under this law the kidnapping must be directed not only to specific victim but to any prospective victim indiscriminately P v mendoza 254 s 61 Serious illegal detention - can be committed without being taken but in
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kidnapping there must be taking Can there be a complex crime of kidnapping with Usurpation of authority? No. This is one of the modes of committing the crime of kidnapping Serious Illegal Detention v Kidnapping kidnapping there is taking There must be a specific Intent to deprive the victim of their liberty Victim does not consent of being deprived of Liberty Is there such a crime as Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention? If all the elements of kidnapping are present then only kidnapping Special Complex Crime even if the murder or rape was an after thought Kidnapping with murder If the death occurs on the occasion of the kidnapping It does not matter if the crime or murder, homicide or rape is merely an afterthought. (P v Laranaga) as long as there is an intimate connection between the felonies Cross Fire between the kidnapper and the police. The bullets of the Police killed the victim of the kidnapping. (P v Job) What crimes are committed? Special complex Crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide as the case may be because the law does not distinguish between who kills as long as is killed as a consequence of the kidnapping. It is not required that the victim was killed by the kidnapper Kidnapping and the woman was raped and when she is about to escape the kidnapper shot the victim. What crime was committed? Special Complex Crime Kidnapping with rape and homicide Penalty is Death now Reclusion Perpetua but the killing (civil indemnity and moral damages) may be the basis of a separate civil liability. So is the rape - civil indemnity and moral damages If the victim is a minor, female or public officer irrespective of the duration the crime is kidnapping or serious illegal detention. P v Laranaga penalty of death if subjected to torture. In light of RA 9745 - torture and dehumanizing acts are different. If kidnapped and there was slight physical injuries inflicted on the victim because of the resistance? What is the crime? Is the stabbing was an unnecessary means for the kidnapping then The frustrated or attempted murder is separate for kidnapping Murder, Homicide or Rape must be CONSUMATED to be a constituent element of kidnapping Kidnapped a pregnant person raped there was an abortion. What is the crime? Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping with rape and unintentional abortion this is a case ask diane Kidnapping for the purpose of ransom and the victim was killed ransom qualifying for the imposition of death peanlty special complex or kidnapping with ransom with murder Intention was to rape the victim but the victim was detained before she was raped? SC: If the original intent was to rape and the victim was only incidentally detained. Not the purpose to deprive the victim of her liberty. The Crime is RAPE and NOT Kidnapping with Rape (P v Nuguid) Possible one guilty of murder and kidnapping with murder? when he killed the son of employer and after killing the son he kidnapped and detained another son and then killed that son there are two crimes. Murder and Special Complex Crime of kidnapping with murder. Because the first murder was done prior to the kidnapping Main Object is to Kill same ruling with rape (P v Ong) Grace Coercion v Kidnapping P v Astorga Dec 22 1997 child was walking. The accused took the hand of the girl and brought her to the street. Made it appear that the father sent her to bring her to the street. The girl did not want to go but she was forced by the accused. Not kidnapping because there was no specific intent to deprive her of her liberty. That is why only grave coercion because forced to do something against her will Ransom anything required by the offender as consideration for the release not necessarily pecuniary can be in the form of services If there is Torture and Terrorism what law prevails? Torture law prevails Cruelty - Physical Torture R.A. 9745 - broader than just Physical has Psychological, mental Art. 268 SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION Elements 1. Private individual 2. kidnaps or detains another or any manner deprives liberty 3. act is illegal 4. w/o attendance of the circumstances in previous article 5.
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day = 24 hours from deprivation of liberty until cessation even if victim escapes or is rescued within 3 days - NOT an exempting circumstance Neither is the Voluntary release but can lower the penalty Person who proved the place is an accomplice Art. 269 UNLAWFUL ARREST Purpose is to Deliver to Proper Authorities Art. 124 - no lawful ground and fails to deliver to proper authority May be committed by private individual or public officers other than law enforcement agents but with intention to deliver Who are proper authorities those authorized to arrest another with a lawful cause or file charges against those arrested Art. 270 KIDNAPPING
AND
Example during midnight or sleeping Even if Occupant is only a lessee the crime is still trespass Art. 282 GRAVE THREATS Threat under death those made with deliberate purpose to create in the mind of the victim that the threat will be carried out Intimidation is conditional if w/o condition the threat must be serious and deliberate May be caused by an Intermediary Threaten to kill the victim if not have sex and victim is forced to have sex the crime is rape. The threat forms part of the violence or intimidation. The Grave Threats not separate but forms part of the rape Usurpation of Real Rights with the Use of force Grave Threat v Robbery Extortion GT - depends upon the moral pressure of some future injury RE - material possession or securing on the spot with the use of grave threats. Grave threat is absorbed. (P v Osorio 21 P 237) Count: Number of People Threatened person has no right to do so Art. 286 GRAVE COERCION Distinguish between grave coercion and SID/K? o Grave coercion there is no intent to deprive another of his liberty o SID while there is also intimidation, there is deprivation of liberty If used to prevent people from seeking grievance or peacefully assembling, violation is under Art. 131 (disturbance or prevention of peaceful meeting.) Threatened the owner of a property, intending to take his property from him. (Ended up killing him.) o Art. 312 Usurpation of real rights over real property o May be liable for grave threats or homicide, as the case may be. But may be absorbed by the violence provision in Art. 312 Forcible abduction will result, not grave coercion, if there is lewd design. Distinguish between grave coercion and robbery. o See above. (Jajas notes) Art. 287 UNJUST VEXATION/LIGHT COERCIONS Maderazo v. P Crime of other light coercion and unjust vexation includes human conduct while not leading to physical harm or without use of force or intimidation. o TEST: Annoyance, irritation, disturbance to victim Crime of dolo Unjust vexation or acts of lasciviousness may be deemed preparatory acts for the crime of rape
FAILURE
TO RETURN A
MINOR
Elements: 1. offender entrusted with custody of the minor 2. deliberately fails to restore to his parents or guardian or those entitled to the custody of the minor "Deliberate" Refusal must be intention, malicious and premeditated malice or ill motive (p v Bernardo, Or P v Ty) Not Repeal art 267 Par .4 The gravamen of the crime of to deprive the minor of his liberty P v Pastrana accused was asked by the father to brign the child to the hoospital for treatment. The accused took custody of the minor and refused to return unless parents gives financial assistance. Liable under Art. 270 Parents may be liable under this provision custody of the minor is given to other people other than the parents Art. 280 QUALIFIED TRESPASS
TO DWELLING
If the purpose is for him to commit the crime then not trespass to dwelling. Dwelling becomes an aggravating circumstance If not intention when entered but once inside commits a crime 2 offenses Refusal may be actual or constructive Presumption of lack of consent depending on the circumstance.
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Ex. Vexed the woman first, then kissed her all over first. This all depends on the accused persons intent Art. 292 REVELATION OF SECRETS Includes trade secrets (Air Phil. v. Pennswell) Not patented but known only to a few individuals Art. 293 ROBBERY Valenzuela v. P no more frustrated robbery, just attempted or consummated Elements: o 1. Personal property of another o 2. Unlawful taking o 3. Intent to gain o 4. Violation or intimidation against persons OR force upon things P v. Tan: o Taking in theft and robbery taking of anothers property, depriving the latter of possession of property, through force, violation, or intimidation, or force upon things, with intent to gain o ESSENCE: taking of personal property out of possession of another without privity or consent and without animus revertendi (intent to return) Must concur: o 1. Taking (physical act) o 2. AND intent to gain (mental act) o o Not necessary that the offender ACTUALLY gains, because intent to gain is enough. Gain o Not limited to just pecuniary benefit, but also utility, satisfaction, enjoyment, and pleasure o Ex. Gasoline boy took a parked car and went on a joy ride. He claimed that he did not intend to take it. But here, there was gain because there was enjoyment, utility, satisfaction, and pleasure. o Even mere use of property taken is already gain under the law. o Gain rebutted by evidence that he took property because he claims to be the owner of the property. The person is exempt from theft or robbery, even if it turned out not to be his. If the claim is made in BF, then it is theft or robbery. At best, it is just coercion. Property o Includes any property NOT included in the enumeration of real properties o And capable of appropriation o N.B. Includes electricity, phone services, and the like o Can contraband property (ex. Drugs) be subject to theft/robbery? Yes. US v. Albao When is it robbery or theft? o The crime is robbery, not theft, if there are acts of violence, or intimidation before asportation, to enable the person to take the property. o If violence or intimidation was done after possession was taken, he is only liable for theft, grave coercion, or physical injuries as the case may be. Exception: Robbery with homicide, and robbery with rape Intimidation o Unlawful coercion, duress, putting owner/possessor in fear o Attempt to take property of another with threats of bodily harm o No requirement of material violence it is NOT indispensable for there to be intimidation Is it possible that one is guilty BRD of theft/robbery even if thing stolen is not offered in evidence? o Yes. P v. De Jesus. Because the person may have destroyed the property, thrown it away, etc. o As long as the corpus delicti is proved, the unlawful taking of personal property, there can be proof BRD. Is snatching theft or robbery? o Depends. If the victim is not subject to violation or intimidation,
Taking need not be permanent. (Salvilla even brief possession consummates the crime) What do you mean by personal property? Does it include services? o Yes. Laurel v. Judge. Placed overseas call to Japan, connected through Philippines (ex. PLDT). The accused set up a corporation and put implements on the underground cables to divert the call, so they wouldnt pass through the PLDT, and instead pass through the corporation. o What is taken here are services provided by PLDT. The deprivation is for services to collect cost of calls. o Any act to transfer possession, which can be done through the hands of the offender, or through any mechanical device such as access devise cards, which controls destination of the property stolen, or meter tampering, fraudulent obtaining of gas, or diversion of overseas calls Wire-tapping of electricity: must tap between area of entrance of wire up the meter of the consumer. Intent to gain can be established through overt acts of offender before or after the taking of personal property. Intent to gain presumed from taking another persons property without consent. Intent to gain cannot be presumed only if there is evidence to the contrary.
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it is just theft. If the owner is wounded through violence or there is intimidation, it is robbery. One in possession of recently stolen property is presumed to be the author of the crime of theft/robbery. (Mabunga v. P) How recent is recent case-to-case. o Possession may be actual or constructive. The property may be in the actual physical control of the offender or in the possession of another, but under the control of the offender. Ex. I stole something but pinatago ko sa kaibigan ko o Accused must not be able to explain his possess satisfactorily. When is the presumption conclusive? o If the accused fails to explain any innocent origin of his possession, and the possession is fairly recent, and it is exclusive. Art. 294 ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE / ROBBERY WITH RAPE / ROBBERY WITH ARSON / ROBBERY WITH
INTENTIONAL MUTILATION
RA 7659 There is now a special complex crime of robbery with intentional mutilation There is also robbery with arson Art. 48 will not apply for crimes here in Art. 294 Can there be robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence? o No. The other crime must be consummated. May Art. 48 apply if the constituent elements are not consummated? o Yes. If one crime is done to commit another, or a single act resulting into two or more grave or less grave offenses, and one constituent crime is not consummated. o Otherwise, if both consummated, then its a special complex crime. Homicide is used in its generic term. There is no robbery with infanticide, parricide, murder, etc. There is no robbery with multiple homicide. DO NOT use the 2nd or 3rd killing as aggravating. Its just robbery or homicide. What do you mean by reason of the crime of robbery? o The homicide/other constituent crime was not committed in the course of robbery, or shortly thereafter, but there is a LEGAL connection, intimate relation in the commission of robbery Ex. Killing the victim to prevent the person from reporting to the authorities Ex. Killed noisy neighbor who shouted magnanakaw! o It doesnt matter if it happens before, during, or after o P v. Mangulabnan Person was robbing a house. Heard rumbling noises in the attic. Shot a gun at the ceiling, and even
without intent to kill, he accidentally killed a hiding person. HELD: Robbery with homicide. (Not robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence even if it is by mere accident, it is robbery with homicide) o What if the person killed is one of the robbers himself? Doesnt matter. Its still robbery with homicide. Even if the guy who shot a robber is also a fellow robber. Is there robbery with homicide AND rape? o No. As long as there is homicide, it is ALWAYS just robbery with homicide. o But the rape still has corresponding civil liabilities. o If a house is burnt to kill another, it is robbery is homicide, not robbery with arson or robbery with homicide and arson Irrespective of number of people killed or rape, it is just robbery with homicide or robbery with rape. If the original intent is to kill or to rape, but as an afterthought, he stole from the person he killed or raped, then there are TWO CRIMES. o Separate crimes of homicide and robbery o Separate crimes of rape and robbery Can there be robbery with homicide, if aside from intent to gain, there is another motive (ex. He wanted to kill the guy)? o Yes. As long as there is intent to rob, even if there are other motives, it is robbery with homicide. (P v. Tidula) o BUT: P v. Tidong (J. CALLEJO does not agree) X is employee of Juan, who fired him. X seeks to recover unpaid wages; Juan refused. X said kung di mo ako bayaran, sasaksakin ko anak niyo. X got the money, then killed the child. HELD: Robbery with homicide, because there was intent to rob. J CALLEJO does not agree because the wages are his in the first place. P v. De Jesus A group of robbers were robbing in Makati. One of the robbers was shot. There was a chase all the way to Laguna, where a shoot out happened. Another robber got shot by the police. HELD: Robbery with homicide. EVEN IF the shoot out happened in some other place, it was intimately connected to the robbery. Also, it does not matter that it was a robber that got killed. If a homicide is committed by one robber, ALL of them are liable for robbery with homicide. (One merges his will into the common intent.) o Pagalasan any crime committed by the conspirator incidental to execution of common design in included in the crime. o EXCEPT: when one of the robbers overtly attempts to prevent the homicide. He is just liable for robbery, even if he is unsuccessful. o Even a look-out is a PDP, because the conspirators are given specific tasks to further the crime. P v. Escober
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There is no special complex crime of theft with homicide. Robbery with homicide does it absorb physical injuries? o Yes. May there be a crime of robbery with force upon things with robbery with rape or robbery with homicide? o No. Robbery with force upon things cannot be complexed with robbery with rape (or homicide) Robbery with rape: must be accompanied by rape. o AS LONG AS THE ORIGINAL intent is to rob o Even if the rape was committed even before asportation o The intention to rob must precede the rape, even if the actual robbery comes after. o Thus, if the accused raped the victim and just he took the jewelry as a memento, there are two crimes of robbery and rape. Even if there are multiple rapes, it is just robbery with rape. o P v. Bercelles Even if each of the accused raped the victim, there is only one crime of robbery with rape. o P v. Suyo (a very special case) accused robbed the victim, raped her twice, then he inserted his finger in the vagina of the woman. HELD: Robbery with rape. The second rape and insertion of the finger are absorbed. Even the insertion of a finger was absorbed! o P v. Angeles Three robbers took victim of robbery in a taxi, went to Quiapo. One robber made the other two go down, then he took the woman to a motel. HELD: All of them were guilty of robbery. The other one is also liable for rape, separately. If the place of the rape is far from the situs of the robbery, there are TWO crimes, but not robbery with rape. [Read this case to confirm if it is a special complex crime or if it is separate crimes.] Robbery with arson arson must be contemporaneous to robbery Art. 295 & 296 ROBBERY WITH PHYSICAL INJURIES, COMMITTED IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE, AND BY
A BAND
Band here is in the nature of a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic MC. o BUT for robbery with homicide/rape/intentional mutilation/arson ONLY just a generic aggravating circumstance Art. 296 provides that if any of the firearms used is unlicensed, the penalty is the maximum period. Was this amended by RA 8294? o Yes. Art. 296 has been amended by RA 8294. Here, the unlicensed firearm will NOT increase the penalty to its maximum period anymore. Art. 296 Firearm here can be licensed or unlicensed. o Arms can includes bolos and clubs. If one is a member of a band, may he be not liable for crime of
robbery, if he tries to prevent it? o Yes. Even if he is a member of a band, if he prevents the robbery or tries to, he is not liable. PD 532 highway robbery or brigandage o P v. Puno there must be evidence of indiscriminate commission of the crime of robbery for PD 532 to apply ATTEMPTED AND FRUSTRATED ROBBERY (297) Has this provision been nullified by P v. Valenzuela? o Yes. It is rendered nugatory as far as FRUSTRATED robbery is concerned. Homicide in 297 is used in its generic term. The homicide must be consummated. If the crime of homicide was committed with treachery. Can treachery be used as a generic aggravating circumstance? o Yes. In other situations, if there is treachery, it becomes murder. But there is no such thing as robbery with murder. So it is robbery with homicide, with the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery. (P v. Escote) o P v. Dagundung Offender entered the property but he did not find any property there. It is NOT frustrated robbery but attempted robbery. EXECUTION OF DEEDS BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION (298) Here, an offender uses force or violence to execute a document. What kind of document is referred to in 298? o Public documents only. It does not include private documents. If it is a void document, will that be robbery under 298? Robbery presuppose damage caused to the victim, but since the document is void, this means he does not lose anything. Can it still be robbery? o No, it is grave coercion. The offender compels by violence or intimidation the victim to execute a document but he died due to heart attack. What is the crime, 298 or 294? o 298, but even so, the penalty is still governed by 294 par. 1, as provided in the last sentence. ROBBERY IN AN INHABITED HOUSE, PUBLIC EDIFICE, OR DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS WORSHIP (299) There is a provision here about use of fictitious name to rob. How does this differ from Art. 178, where there is also use of fictitious name? o Here, to enter the house, with intent to rob. In 178, to conceal crime, etc. Do you apply Art. 48? o No, because use of fake name is an element of the crime. Same as with simulation of public authority. ROBBERY OF AN UNINHABITED PLACE (302) What is an uninhabited place?
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o Synonymous to an uninhabited house If committed by a band, what is the effect to the robbery to an uninhabited palce? o Maximum penalty. (?) BRIGANDAGE (306-7) Were article 306 and 307 of the RPC amended by PD 532 (Anti piracy and anti highway robbery law)? No, it did not. The crime in PD 532 is a separate crime from Arts. 306 and 307. Art. 306 o there must be three or more armed robbers here o mere conspiracy to form a band of brigands is already a crime o particular robbery against particular victim PD 532 o even just one person can commit the crime o the act must be committed by the person o There must be indiscriminate highway robbery, and must be organized to do so; THEFT May a crime be theft even if there is violence used to take away personal property of a victim? o Generally, no. There must be no violence or intimidation or force upon things. o Exception: When the violence committed was not for the purpose of taking the theft. Ex. When a person was killed first, then as an afterthought, the criminal took the property. (P v. Dela Cruz the property goes to the heirs, so there was still taking without consent even if the original owner is dead). There are two crimes here: homicide and theft How many modes to commit theft? o 1. Take another persons property without his consent o 2. Offender finds lost property and he does not return it to the owner or the authorities Local authorities Can this be committed by culpa? No. There must be DELIBERATE refusal to return or deliver to authorities. o 3. A person who malicious damaged property of another, shall remove or make use of fruits or object of the damage caused by him o 4. Enter enclosed property where trespass is prohibited, then hunt or fish, or gather crops May stolen property be the subject of theft? (Nanakaw na nga, ninakaw pa ulit) Yes. The law does not distinguish. P v. De Leon what is punished is the alarm caused to the community and the violation of personal rights How do you establish intent to gain? o Acts preceding, contemporaneous, or subsequent to taking. Can there be intent to gain if the purpose is to conceal a crime? o Yes. Benefit is not always material, it can be any kind of benefit to amount to gain. Is there presumption of theft? o Yes, when a personal is found in possession of recently stolen property and he cannot explain how he came into possession of such. Then it will become conclusive. o How recent is recent? Case by case. If a person is given property for a particular purpose, and that person took or misappropriate the property, would it be estafa or theft? o Theft; when only physical possession is given but juridical possession is kept by the transferor. o What is given here is just DE FACTO possession, not juridical. A bank teller, after receiving deposit, instead of giving it to the bank, she takes it. What is committed? o Theft, not estafa. o The bank teller is a mere employee of the bank. As an employee of the bank, she only get de facto possession of the deposit. So it is theft. (Galang v. People) Laurel v. Judge there can be theft of services. Under Code of Commerce, services are personal property. Can gas or electricity be stolen? o Yes, using jumpers. So even intangible property can be subject to taking. RA 7832 also punishes theft of electrical property. So which is applicable, 308 or RA 7832? o Either under Art. 308 or RA 7832. Can commercial documents, PNs, etc. be subject to theft? o Yes, these have value. In a case, the sheriff stole evidence stored in the vault of the court (ex. Gun, money, whatever), when the clerk of court mistakenly left the vault open. What crime was committed? o Sheriff: theft o Clerk or court: Malversation by culpa, since he has custody of documents I own a car. I delivered it to the repair shop. I left it, and the owner of the shop sold my car. What crime was committed, theft, estafa, or carnapping? o Theft. To determine between theft and estafa, ask: was the o
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possession de facto or juridical? Here, it was merely de facto/material possession. o But doesnt the repair shop acquire a lien over the property, under Sec Trans, where he can sell it if he is not paid? It does not apply here, because he hasnt even tried repairing the car. o The SC had a decision saying this is estafa (Laura Santos case). But J. Callejo does not agree with this. o When this case was decided, there was no carnapping law yet. Should it apply now? [No ?] I think yes. What do you mean by lost in Par. 1 of Art. 308? o The property must have an owner and is not yet res nullius. If property is stolen and the thiefs identity cannot be deciphered, can you consider the property lost? o Yes. Can loss stem from ones own faults? o Yes. I saw property and did not know who owns it. I gave it to the police and he stole the property. What is the crime of the cop? o P v. Avila said this is theft. o But isnt he an accountable officer under Art. 217? except that he was a commission salesman that the employer reposed confidence on him What does mail matter include? o Any matter that is deposited with the Phil. Postal Corporation which are delivered through postal service. Includes mail matters, parcels, money orders, printed materials, etc. o Regardless if it is a postal corporation or a private corporation. What matters is that it is MAIL MATTER
It can be argued that it is in custodia legis and he is an accountable officer, and it can be MALVERSATION. I like this (J. Callejo) QUALIFIED THEFT (310) What are the grounds to qualify? o 1. Grave abuse of confidence o 2. By a domestic servant o 3. Stealing large cattle o 4. Theft of mail matter o 5. Coconuts o 6. Fish from fishpond/fishery Was this amended by PD 533, the anti cattle rustling law and RA 6539, the anti-carnapping law? o No; these are SPL, according to the SC Grave abuse of confidence? o It must be a special relation of intimacy. o Ex. Branch manager stole the jewelry under his custody. If there is conspiracy, but one is trusted and the other is not, what is the crime? o Two crimes: qualified theft for the former, simple theft for the latter (P v Saranilla) How about a commission salesman of a corporation? o P v. Maglaya: Just simple theft, because there is no evidence
CARNAPPING Taking with intent to gain a motor vehicle o Without latters consent o Or force upon things o Or violence/intimidation upon persons How does it differ from theft/robbery? o It addresses theft of motor vehicles belonging to another o It deals EXCLUSIVELY with motor vehicles o Without this law, the taking of motor vehicle is theft/robbery as the case may be. There are two kinds penalties provided, following RPC nomenclature and not o RP to death if there is homicide, rape, etc. o 14 years and 8 months to not more than 17 years and 4 months if committed without violence, intimidation, or force upon things o 17 years and 4 months to not more than 30 years if with violence, intimidation, or force upon things [penalty for qualified carnapping] May there be qualified carnapping? o If there is no person killed or raped, and there is only PI or attempted/frustrated homicide or murder or rape the crime is QUALIFIED carnapping o There is special complex crime of carnapping with homicide or rape or murder. It is a single and indivisible offense. Here, the owner, driver, or occupant of the car is killed or raped. If committed on the occasion of the carnapping, even if the principal crime here is an SPL crime If the person killed is anyone other than the owner, driver, or occupant of the car, then it is a separate crime. (Ex. Bystander) For this to committed, the homicide, murder, or rape must be CONSUMMATED. If the homicide or murder is merely attempted or frustrated, then the crime is qualified carnapping. o DO NOT apply Art. 48 of the RPC. Someone committed qualified carnapping (14 y 7 17 y 4 penalty) and then sold the car to another person. Is he an
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accessory under Art 19 of the RPC? o NO. The nomenclature does not follow the RPC. o But he can be a principal for FENCING. What is a motor vehicle? o Propelled by any power apart from muscular power So a motorcycle is included. A bicycle is not. A tricycle is included. A pedicab is not. o Using public highways, but exempted bulldozers, etc. which are not considered motor vehicles The latter are just subject to theft/robbery P v. Calabroso o If initial intent is to kill the driver, but stole the car as an afterthought, there are two crimes committed. Homicide and carnapping. If the initial possession is lawful (since they rented the car), by killing the driver of the car and then taking it for their own, it still became carnapping with homicide. Even if the car was taken from the driver and not the owner, it is still taking because there is no consent by the owner. P v. Bustinera hired as a taxi driver to drive the car for a fixed period of time. He did not return it. The taxi was found abandoned in a place. HELD: Although there was initially lawful possession, it transformed to illegal possession when he abandoned it in a secluded place: carnapping. o Crime is consummated even if the carnappers abandoned the car after. The offenders stole a truck and the personal effects contained therein. What is the crime? o Two crimes: Carnapping as to the truck Theft as to the personal effects o The SC was wrong here, because it said qualified theft. CATTLE RUSTLING (PD 533) May there be cattle rustling even if cattle is not taken? o Even if large cattle is not taken, there can be cattle rustling if it is killed and its meat is taken. There may be a special complex crime of cattle rustling with homicide if a person is killed on the occasion of cattle rustling. FORESTRY CODE How can the Forestry Code by violated? o Merida v. People o Mustang Lumber v. CA o Tigoy v. CA Violation of Forestry Code is malum prohibitum. Theft of coconuts: If the coconuts are taken when they are still on the tree, or deposited on the ground the crime is qualified theft. o If any other place, simple theft. USURPATION OF REALRIGHTS OVER PROPERTY (312) It is a single and indivisible offense. It is possible that a single and indivisible offense is committed, but there are as many penalties as how many acts of violence are committed. SWINDLING/ESTAFA (315) ESTAFA WITH UNFAITHFULNESS OR ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE (1) 1. Altering substance of anything with value that offender should deliver based on an obligation o The law applies even if the property the offender is bound to deliver is opium or something illegal/obscene But he is also liable under Dangerous Drugs Act, or immorality provision in RPC, etc. 2. Misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, etc. o 1. Goods were assigned o 2. Misappropriation or conversion; or a denial by him of such receipt is also a violation o 3. To the prejudice of another o 4. Demand by offended party to return the money or property o What is any other obligation to make delivery or to return? It refers to contracts of bailment, lease of personal property, deposit, commodatum because under any of these provisions, there is JURIDICAL POSSESSION by the depositary In estafa, both MATERIAL and JURIDICAL possession is transferred to the offender o What is the difference between material and juridical possession? Possession which gives to the transferee a right over the thing/property which he may set-up against the transferor Theft or robbery; there is NO transaction between offender and offended party The transaction involved must not transfer ownership to the offender o There must be a FIDUCIARY relationship between offender and offended party. There must be an agreement to return the same thing or money It doesnt matter if the obligation is guaranteed by a bond or not Without this relationship, there is no estafa The duty to return the same thing or money is based on o
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o o MUTUAL AGREEMENT by the parties or BY LAW When does fraud come into play? When there is conversion or misappropriation. (Very nice case) In bank loan transactions, usually, the borrower is required to produced show money to establish that she can repay the loan. But in a case, she borrowed the show money from someone else. She used it for her own benefit. HELD: Guilty of estafa. It was received in trust for a particular purpose, and there is obligation to return. By misappropriating it, she is guilty of estafa. Salazar v. P: Even a temporary disturbance constitutes misappropriation. No need to be permanent. What does prejudicial to another mean? It need not be the owner of the property himself. It can be another person, as long as there is damage caused. Manahan: An owner of a truck pledged it to another as security for a loan contract. But then, he leased it to another and it was stolen from the lessees possession. HELD: There was no estafa, because there was no intent to misappropriate or convert. J. CALLEJO: Disagreed. The petitioner could not have acted in GF, because he had already pledged it to another as security for a loan. When the Can there be estafa when there is no gain on the part of the offender? Case: a person was assigned jewelry to sell, with commission. He was not prohibited from appointing a sub-agent, so he got one. The sub-agent stole the jewelry. HELD: The agent was acquitted because he did not convert or misappropriate the jewelry. Lim v. CA petitioner was assigned jewelry to sell by commission again. He asked a friend to sell jewelries to act like a sub-agent. The sub-agent stole the jewelry. HELD: The agent was acquitted because he did not profit or gain. But is it possible that the agent is liable? He is liable if he CONSPIRED with the sub-agent. The agent cannot be liable for mere negligence in entrusting the jewelry to another because there is no such thing as estafa through negligence BUT: if there is prohibition to entrust the jewelry to a sub-agent, but the agent still does, then the agent can be liable. May there be estafa in a loan transaction? No. Because owner of the money loaned is transferred to the borrower, even if the borrower can pay back. o What about money market placement? Sesbreno v. CA No estafa because it partakes the nature of a loan. What about bank deposits? Can there be estafa if the money deposited is used by the bank? None. Deposits are treated as loans to the bank, and is covered by the nature of loans. A teller of a bank receives deposits and misappropriates these. What is the crime? Theft, not estafa, because the bank teller is merely an employee of the bank and only gets material possession of the money. In a sale of property and earnest money is given and the money is used by the seller. Is there estafa? No. Down-payment or earnest money forms part of the purchase price. The seller can use this money, even if the sale eventually does not push through. An employee who fails to account for cash advances for travels? No estafa. Because this is in the nature of a loan, and the employee obtains juridical possession of such. Libuit v. CA the private respondent delivered his car to a motor shop for repairs. The owner of the shop misappropriated it. HELD: there is obligation to return after repair. There was juridical possession, and thus, estafa. Ilagan v. CA Ilagan was a sales agent selling residential lots on behalf of a corporation. He was authorized to sell the lots, but NOT the monthly amortizations from the lot buyers. However, he received these and worse, he failed to remit these. HELD: Accused is guilty of two sets of estafa: As regards the lot buyers, he committed estafa through fraud or misrepresentation because he claimed that he could receive monthly amortizations. As regards the employer, estafa with abuse of confidence, because he did not remit. How many counts of estafa? Depends on how many offended parties/victims. But if committed on different dates or occasions there are as many counts of estafa as the number of transactions. PD 155 Trust receipt transaction A trust receipt transaction imposes upon trustee to give the price sold if sold, or if the goods are not sold, return them to the entrustor. Is a violation of PD 155 estafa under Art. 315 par. 1(b) Violation of this constitutes estafa.
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It is malum prohibitum. The only thing to be established: prejudice caused to another. Mere failure to deliver already constitutes the criminal offense. When a person participates in the commission of a crime, he CANNOT escape liability due solely to the fact that he was acting as an agent of another party. The NCC provisions on agency do not apply to criminal cases. 3. Taking undue advantage of signature of offended party in blank ESTAFA THROUGH FRAUD (2) Distinguish between estafa through fraud from estafa through abuse of confidence? o Abuse of confidence conversation or misappropriation o Fraud or false pretenses fraudulent acts simultaneous or preceding In illegal recruitment, can one be liable under both the Labor Code or Estafa under this provision? o Both the Labor Code AND estafa. There is no double jeopardy because the Labor Code is an SPL. Essential elements: o 1. False pretense, fraudulent act or means o 2. Such must be made or exhibited prior to or simultaneously o 3. Offended party must have relied on such and was thus induced to part with his money or property o 4. Thus causing damage 1. Using fictitious name, falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, etc. 2. Altering quality, fineness, weight of anything pertaining to his art or business 3. Pretending to have bribed any government employee 4. Post-dating a check, or issuing a check knowing that he does not have enough to fund the check, and without informing the payee 5. Obtaining food or accommodation at a hotel, restaurant, etc. without paying therefor, with intent to defraud o Or obtaining credit through false pretense or fraud o Or surreptitiously abandoning or removing luggage from establishment without paying Fraud: o Anything calculated to deceive o Ex. Falsely representing that property used as security had mangoes, when it was really barren (Vasquez v. P) o Ex. I will sell you my property. But it really wasnt his. (Arecheta v. P) Caveat emptor doctrine does not apply. You cannot invoke the fact that the victim was himself negligent. It doesnt apply to criminal cases. Post dating a check: o o Can a person other than a drawer be liable? Yes. Indorser or a co-conspirator. Elements: 1. Post-dating or issuance of check contracted at the time the check was issued 2. Lack or insufficiency of funds to cover it 3. Knowledge of the drawer of this lack 4. Damage capable of pecuniary estimation to the payee The fraud must be committed PRIOR or UPON the issuance of the check. The check MUST NOT BE for paying a pre-existing obligation, because there is no more deceit in this case. The drawer obtains no gain here, because the consideration has already been delivered to him. The date of the obligation, being the very date of the check, is a MATERIAL INGREDIENT of the crime. Must the check be negotiable? Negotiability of a check is NOT the gravamen of the crime, but the fraud or deceit in knowingly issuing a worthless check. Post-dating of a check, as long as when it is due, there are funds, even when there are no funds at the time it was issued. If the check is issued as a guaranty to secure a loan, there is no estafa. Issuing a check in exchange for cash: Estafa, because you received something in exchange How do you prove knowledge that there were no funds? Direct evidence Notice of dishonor from drawee bank duly received by the drawer of the check and failure to deposit money to cover the amount Depositing required amount within 3 days of notice of dishonor you escape liability What is the effect of failure to deposit within 3 days? Failure to deposit the amount will give rise to presumption of deceit.
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o Clarification between Borinaga and Sy Po belief is never a test

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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo o

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

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Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

Criminal law review | Glenn Tuazon | Justice Callejo

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EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS/ LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS

Art. 244 UNLAWFUL

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