CIVIL LAW FELIPE vs. LEUTERIO G.R. No.

L-4606, May 30, 1952

FACTS On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate oratorical competition was held in Naga City. Felipe was one of the Judges and was the chairman. Nosce was awarded the first price and Imperial the second price. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting refused to the verdict their and alleged that one of a the judges in committed a mathematical error on computing the scores. The Board amend award, Imperial filed complaint court. She asserts that she should have ranked 3rd place in the vote, which makes her score 9 or the First place. ISSUE Does the Judiciary have the power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest? HELD No. The Judiciary does not have the power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. No jurisdiction. Error is contemplated by law as a misapplication of a statute or provision. There could be error in the computation of final scores, but it is not error in context of law. The Court would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar contests. The decision of the board in such contests, although only implied, is final and unappealable. Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.

PHILIPPINE SOAP BOX DERBY, INC vs. YABUT G.R. No. 108115, October 27, 1995
FACTS John Elston Yabut was disqualified from joining the third race for violating the weight requirement for soap box derby after winning father, the first race. As a result disqualification, the private respondent Geminiano Yabut, Jr. (together with

Roadway Express, Inc.) filed a complaint for actual, moral and exemplary damages with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City alleging that the arbitrary disqualification of his son caused embarrassment and humiliation resulting to "mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation and sleepless nights. ISSUE Does disqualification and from the race that the resulted into embarrassment humiliation entitle private respondent

Germiniano Yabut, Jr. and his son to claims to moral damages? HELD No. Disqualification and from the does race not that resulted the into embarrassment damages. John Elston Yabut should have observed the rules of sportsmanship and sporting play. The maxim that "the judges decision is final" simplifies sports adjudication to a degree which the larger arena of life does not ordinarily mirror. Nonetheless, it is simplicity in procedure which we of the courts ought to altogether idealize or sometimes aim for. humiliation entitle private

respondent Germiniano Yabut, Jr. and his son to claims to moral

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

the

Court

of

Appeals

Amended

Decision dated December 9, 1992 is hereby REVERSED and the trial court's decision REINSTATED.

PE vs. PE G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962

FACTS Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador the present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.

ISSUE Are the plaintiffs-appellants correct in filing a case against the defendant-appellee for tarnishing their honor and name by having an affair with the daughter of the first?

HELD Yes. The plaintiffs-appellants are correct in filing a case

against the defendant-appellee for tarnishing their honor and name by having an affair with the daughter of the first. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he, who seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Defendant is sentenced to pay the plaintiffs for damages,

attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

HERMOSISIMA vs. CA
4

G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960

FACTS The complainant was 10 yrs older than the petitioner but they had a very intimate relationship that's why they are regarded as engaged then they had a child. However, the petitioner breaches his promise to marry the complainant and married a woman named Romanita Perez. This served as the cause of action of the complainant to file a complaint against the petitioner. Soledad Cagigas, the complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant; he married another woman. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, and for other damages.

ISSUE Whether or not the moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry HELD Yes. Moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry. Because of petitioner's seduction power, the complainant,

overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all,

Section 1, Article 2217 of the Civil Code provides: 5

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission. Article 2219 also states that: Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; It appeared that because of the defendant-appellants seductive prowess, control. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 for compensatory damages and P7,000.00 for moral damages. plaintiff-appellee overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-

TANJANCO vs. SANTOS G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966

FACTS Apolonio Tanjanco, (defendant) and Araceli Santos have a carnal relationship in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage (undying love, etc). Because of their sexual relationship, the plaintiff conceived a child and the defendant refused to marry Santos. Santos claimed that defendant caused her moral shock, mental and emotional anguish and social humiliation. (Art 21 of the new Civil Code) The Lower court dismissed the case due to failure to state the cause of action. The Court of Appeals favored Santos.

ISSUE Whether or not breach of a promise to marry can be consider

HELD No. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained intimate sexual intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made under Art. 21, and no

other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint. It was also established that their sexual relationship continued even after Tanjacos refusal to marry Santos.

AYTONA vs. CASTILLO G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962

FACTS December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner (DominadorAytona) as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. When Macapagal took his office as the next president he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the same time he appointed Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the ex-president. Macapagal averred that the ex-presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.

ISSUE Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.

HELD No it is not. Such appointment is not valid. In the case at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments spirit of the in one night, President provision Garcia exercised the double care; and therefore, such appointments fall beyond the intent and constitutional granting Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

GILLERA vs. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. L-20741, January 31, 1964

FACTS December 26, 1961 Socorro Gillera was appointed as interim member of the board of pharmaceutical examiners by Pres. Carlos P. Garcia for three years. Gillera accepted the appointment, took oath on Dec. 28, 1961, and assumed office until Dec. 31, 1961 where the exec sec informed her of her withdrawal in view of Pres. Admin. Order No. 2 On Dec. 29, 1962 Corazon C. Fernandez was appointed to the position which was already occupied by petitioner. Solicitor General for the respondent contested that because that was withdrawn and recalled pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2 of the President, but by virtue of the two presidential designations on January 11 and May 18, 1962, which July, terminated 1962 upon the was belief of the a release of the upon examination the verbal results on June 14, 1962; that her participation in the examinations and the on the effected of the permission that in former Executive could the

Secretary of the Board of Examiners. Amado del Rosario, absence successor, of petitioner under continue Fernandez (Gillera) discharging to was the office of Dr. virtue examiner which her

"hold-over" doctrine; that "the designation of respondent position Cruz of petitioner occupying by designation"

indicated that the latter's right to the same position had already ceased. ISSUES Is the ad interim appointment of the petitioner on Dec. 28, 1961 validly recalled or withdrawn? 9

RULING The court has decided that petitioners appointment is valid and she is entitled to the position as member of the board of pharmaceutical examiners. this Court not only did not categorically declare Administrative Order No. 2 valid and all appointments ineffective, made but by then outgoing indicated President that its Garcia, clearly

decision was more influenced by the doubtful character of the appointments themselves and not by the contention that the President had validly recalled them. As a matter of fact, in the decision in that Aytona case it was stated that, "the filling up of vacancies (by the outgoing President) in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration It is for of the need for basic was not the appointment and i.e., the the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted." the and foregoing that it consideration, one of those necessity of filling the position, that the appointee is qualified, "mass ad interim appointments" issued in a single night, that this Court upheld the validity of an appointment to the position of Auxiliary Justice of the Peace,
2

extended by President

Garcia and released on December 20, 1961, notwithstanding Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal. In the instant case, even the new President recognized the need for the immediate filling of the position of Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners, in view of the examinations that were given on January 2, 3, 4, and 7, 1962, that he (the President) saw it fit, "as a matter of emergency "designate" in order not to disrupt to public same service" position to to petitioner herself the

which she was previously appointed and had qualified. There 10

is also no allegation that petitioner is not qualified to the said office, or that her appointment was one of those attended by the "mad scramble in Malacaan" in the evening of December 29, 1961. On the contrary, it is not controverted by respondents that petitioner's appointment was extended on December 26, 1961 or even before the actual expiry of the term of Examiner Cruz, which was a few days before the examinations would take place, although said appointment was to take effect only on December 28, 1961, and in fact petitioner took her oath of office only on the latter date. Clearly, it cannot be said that in the instant case, petitioner's appointment was not the result of the President's deliberate action, considering her qualification and the exigency of the service.

ALBETZ INVESTMENTS, INC. vs. CA G.R. No. L-32570, February 28, 1977
FACTS The Calma spouses were the lessees of a lot in Prudencio Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The defendant Albetz Investments, Inc., it the lessor, upon needing of the the premises Calma in order to construct a new building, demanded delivery of the lot to and refusal Spouses, Albetz Investments, Inc. brought an action of unlawful detainer against Vicenta Calma. Judgment by default was rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering Vicenta Calma and all persons claiming under her to vacate the premises and to pay the corresponding Atty. was Macario granted rentals. The judgment director having become and lawyer issued of the final, Albetz writ S. Meneses, and the

Investments, Inc., filed a motion for execution. The motion Municipal Court of execution. To forestall the enforcement of the writ of 11

execution, certiorari performance Four days

private and

respondents

file and

several action

actions, for

to

wit; petition for certiorari and injunction, petition for prohibition, specific

after

the

dismissal

of

the last

action

or

eighteen months from the date of the issuance of the writ of execution and the consequent writ of demolition, the Sheriff, at the instance of defendant Albetz Investments, Inc., thru its lawyer, Atty. Meneses, demolished the house of' the spouses Calma without any issued by new the writ or order Court that house were for demolition having been Instance defendants of Manila. the and They the Municipal others the

.They commenced the instant action in the Court of First contend sheriff personal among and deputy demolished

indiscriminately

properties

carelessly placed, resulting in their being damaged, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs .The Court of Appeals affirmed en toto the decision of the Court of First Instance. ISSUE Whether or not the lower courts erred in awarding damages in favor of Calma Spouses RULING Negative. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Certainly, the demolition complained of in the case at bar was not carried out in a manner consistent with justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving the occupants of the house no time 12 at all to remove

their belongings

there

from.

No

damage

worth mentioning

would have been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments, Inc. if their men, led by the Sheriff, had been instructed to allow said occupants to remove their personal properties, considering that this would not have taken a considerable length of time

FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006 FACTS On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record was insufficient to prove infidelity. On April 20, 2001, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. On June 9, 2004, Court of Appeals resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the said court dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.

13

ISSUE : Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage will render the judgment in favor to the petitioner? RULING The petition is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The evidence on record did not convincingly establish that

respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable. The Court found Brixs alleged mixed personality disorder, the "Leaving-the-house" attitude whenever he and Amy quarreled, the violent tendencies the to but not a spend mere during more epileptic and lack with or attacks, of the sexual and than his his the of infidelity, preference family, are condition essential abandonment rooted of support, mates to

time

his band

on some

debilitating unwillingness A mere

psychological assume showing

refusal

obligations

marriage.

irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage

SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS

14

G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006

FACTS In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed employed that upon through him by machinations, Carmelita N. duress Cardenas and and intimidation the latters

father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and signed a marriage contract before the Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry. Consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime and claimed that she and Jaime were married civilly and in a church ceremony thereafter. She claimed that both marriages were registered with the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. Also, she contends that he is stopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having married to her for 25 years. The trial court declared the marriage void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license. It is based its ruling in the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar that no marriage license was issued in favour of the parties, thus the marriage license number appearing in the marriage was fictitious.

ISSUE Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar stating that no marriage license was issued are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.

RULING 15

The petition is DENIED. Marriage License is an essential requisite for the validity of a marriage. A marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception. The certification must state that the document does not exist. Thus the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the rules of Court.

Presumption of regularity, rebutted. Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. According to Section 3(m),[20] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable official presumptions. acts may be The presumption by of regularity evidence of of rebutted affirmative

irregularity or failure to perform a duty .The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications. Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as [th]e [Court[ believed true in case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said 16

logbook, [th]e [Court] cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

The States policy is towards the strengthening of the family. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans towards the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favour. It is not to be lightly replied; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

17

FAMANILA vs. CA G.R. No. 150429, August 29, 2006

FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC which dismissed petitioners complaint for payment of disability and other benefits. Petitioner vessel Roberto Famanila and was hired its was by the respondent NFD

International Manning Agents, Inc. as a Messman for Hansa Riga, a registered owned Limited. by He principal, respondent by the barbership Management repatriated

principal because of his permanently disability. With this, he signed a Receipt and Release dated February 28, 1991 and settled his claim by accepting the amount of US$13,200 from respondents. Petitioner filed a complaint praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the was insurance affirmed proceeds, by the moral NLRC damage the and CA. attorneys fees. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint due to prescription, which and Petitioner contends that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because of his disability. He argued that such disability as well as financial constraints vitiated his consent, making the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable. ISSUE Whether the Receipt and Release is valid and enforceable. RULING The petition is DENIED. The Receipt and Release signed by petitioner is valid, absent of vitiated consent. Disability is not a factor that may vitiate consent. A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable agreement. Under 18

the

Civil

Code,

the

vices

of

consent or

are If

mistake, consent

violence, is given

intimidation,

undue

influence

fraud.

through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is voidable. A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a proper action in court Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioners self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record that his consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. Dire necessity is not a ground for annulling the Receipt and Release. it is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of in keeping with what has been expressly stipulated but also good faith, usage and law. Further, dire to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has not been shown that petitioner was forced to sign it.

19

SPS BATAL vs. SPS LUZ G.R. No. 163601, September 27, 2006
FACTS Spouses Luz and Kenichiro contracted the services of FrankBatal to survey the lot they purchased. Based on such survey, they constructed concrete fence on said land. A case was filed against them for alleged encroachment of a designated right of way. They found out that Frank was not the licensed geodetic engineer but his wife, Erlinda. Frank admitted his mistake and offered to share in the expenses for file the a demolition complaint. and reconstruction spouses of the portion that of the fence, but he failed to deliver, prompting respondent spouses to Petitioner contend Erlinda supervised her husbands work, and claimed that the fence was already erected on the house and lot of respondent spouses before they were contracted to do a resurvey and laying out of concrete monuments. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent spouses, and held that encroachment of the perimeter fence on the right of way was cause by the negligence of petitioner-spouses. The Ca affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that petitioner-spouses cannot claim that the error of the construction of the fence was due to the unilateral act if respondent spouses in building the fence without their consent as they gave their word that the boundaries laid on through the concrete monuments are correct.

ISSUE Whether petitioners exercised the required diligence in laying out the boundaries on respondents property as a basis for the erection of a perimeter fence.

20

RULING The petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Culpa culpa

aquiliana aquiliana,

vis-a-vis which is

culpa the

contractual. or

Culpa, act

or or

negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as wrongful negligent omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, already or as culpa contractual, increases which the is the fault from or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which existed, and which liability such existing obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately following Articles; while culpa contractual is governed Article 1170 to 1174 of the same code.

Petitioners committed breach of contract. in the present case, it is clear in that the the petitioners, failed of to the in carrying the the for out their contractual diligence obligations, exercise markings requisite concrete

placement

perimeter fence that was later constructed. The placement of the markings had been done solely by petitioner Frank Batal who is not a geodetic engineer. It was later discovered that it was not he but his wife, petitioner Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed geodetic engineer and who is, therefore, the one qualified to do the work. Petitioner Frank Batals installation of the concrete cyclone monuments had been done without the adequate supervision of his wife, Erlinda. As a result, the placement of the monuments did not accurately reflect the dimensions of the lot. The respondents, upon assurance given by petitioner Frank Batal that they could proceed with the construction of the perimeter fence 21

by relying on the purported accuracy of the placement of the monuments, erected their fence which turned out to encroach in an adjacent easement. Because of the encroachment, the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus, suffered damages. Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for damages suffered by the respondents in accordance with Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code

PNB vs. CA G.R. No. 107508, April 25, 1996

FACTS Ministry of Education Culture issued a check payable to Abante Marketing and drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB). Abante Marketing, deposited the questioned check in its savings account with Capitol City Development Bank (CAPITOL). In turn, Capitol deposited the same in its account with the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) which, in turn, sent the check to PNB for clearing. PNB cleared the check as good and thereafter, PBCom credited Capitol's account for the amount stated in the check. However, PNB returned the check to PBCom and debited PBCom's account for the amount covered by the check, the reason being that there was a "material alteration" of the check number. PBCom, as collecting agent of Capitol, then proceeded to debit the latter's account for the same amount, and subsequently, sent the check back to petitioner. PNB, however, returned the check to PBCom. On the other hand, Capitol could not in turn, debit Abante Marketing's account since the latter had already withdrawn the amount of the check. Capitol sought clarification from PBCom and demanded the re-crediting of the amount. PBCom followed suit by requesting an explanation and re-crediting from PNB. Since the demands of Capitol were not heeded, it filed a civil suit against PBCom which in turn, filed a third-party complaint against PNB 22

for

reimbursement/indemnity

with

respect

to

the

claims

of

Capitol. PNB, on its part, filed a fourth-party complaint against Abante Marketing. The Trial Court rendered its decision, ordering PBCom to recredit or reimburse; PNB to reimburse and indemnify PBCom for whatever reimburse amount and PBCom pays PNB to for Capitol; whatever Abante amount Marketing PNB pays to to indemnify

PBCom. The court dismissed the counterclaims of PBCom and PNB. The appellate court modified the appealed judgment by ordering PNB to honor the check. After the check shall have been honored by PNB, the court ordered PBCom to re-credit Capitol's account with that ISSUE: Is the alteration of the serial number a material alteration. HELD NO. Sec. 225. What constitutes a material alteration. Any alteration which changes: (a) The date; (b) The sum payable, either for principal or interest; (c) The time or place of payment; (d) The number or the relations of the parties; (e) The medium or currency in which payment is to be made; (f) Or which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is specified, or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect, is a material alteration. it the amount. the PNB filed of the the petition for is a review on certiorari averring that under Section 125 of the NIL, any change alters effect instrument material alteration.

23

Petitioner alleges that under Section 125(f), any change that alters the effect of the instrument is a material alteration. The court does not agree.

An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of a party. In other words, a material alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of NIL. In his book entitled Pandect of Commercial Law and

Jurisprudence, Justice Jose C. Vitug opines that an innocent alteration (generally, changes on items other than those required to be stated under Sec. 1, N.I.L.) and spoliation (alterations done by a stranger) will not avoid the instrument, but the holder may enforce it only according to its original tenor.

24

MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS GR No. 138509, July 31, 2000

FACTS On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage annulled, marriage 1996), and with with a Ma. Dulce nor Javier. With he Imelda with said marriage a (on not Jan. yet 25, nullified herein third terminated, contracted Marbella Julia second

petitioner marriage

certain

Hernandez,

thereafter. Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon City. of his first marriage license. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The RTC granted the motion, while petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE Whether or not of the subsequent of a filing previous of a civil action for a declaration nullity marriage constitutes

prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to It is therefore not a Respondent cannot be permitted to use his

the determination of the criminal charge. prejudicial question.

malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

25

prejudicial

question

is

one

which

arises

in

case

the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime the but guilt so intimately innocence connected of the with it that Its it two determines or accused.

essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action, and;

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first

having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question

Parties

to

a its

marriage

should only

not

be

permitted courts

to

judge

for such

themselves

nullity,

competent

having

authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of 26

the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy

POLITICAL LAW AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
27

FACTS This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc. Prior to Presidents signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation is completed. ISSUES 1 Whether or not petitioners have legal standing Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress,

exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process

RULING The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal 28

dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of 29

lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

NORTH COTABATO vs. GRP PANEL G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008
FACTS The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought aboutby the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed inKuala Lumpur, Malaysia.This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus andProhibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TemporaryRestraining Order. The agreement mentions "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which itgrants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of theBangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. Theagreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region inMuslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions onpublic consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional HELD: 30

GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation andthe right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it areunconstitutional because it is contrary .RULING Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justifiable controversy for resolution by this Court. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by 31

other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.

LEGAL ETHICS

CERVANTES vs. PANGILINAN A.M. No. MTJ-08-1709, July 31, 2009

FACTS 32

Respondent Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan issued on December 5, 2001 a warrant of arrest in a criminal case for Slander against the therein 18, accused-herein posted 2001, bail complainant at pleaded Lanie On not Cervantes arraignment She who on later subsequently December fixed P2,000.

complainant

guilty.

filed on January 22, 2002 a Motion to Admit Counter-Affidavit. Judge Pangilinan advised complainant that he could not accept her belatedly filed Motion because she had already been arraigned. Cervantes charged Judge Pangilinan with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Ignorance of the Law Executive Judge Perfecto Pe of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City through a Resolution, was tasked to investigate the complaint made by Cervantes. Judge Pe made the following investigation: Judge Heriberto Pangilinan failed to diligently observe the Rules on Summary Procedure in criminal cases. The case of simple slander is punishable by arresto menor with a fine of not more than P200.00 which is covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure. Warrant of Arrest should not have been issued against Lanie . He could have ordered Lanie Cervantes to file her Counter-Affidavit within ten (10) days as provided by [t]he Rules before arraignment

ISSUE Is Judge Heriberto Pangilinan liable with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Gross Ignorance of the Law? RULING Yes, the Court finds Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge manifested a lack of 33

mastery of the provision of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure. Judge Pangilinan fixing issued the a Warrant of the of Arrest in against the Lanie of Cervantes, bond accused amount

Php2,000.00. The requirement for the accused to p[o]st bail is part of the regular procedure[,] not the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. While ordinarily, judges may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment absent any bad faith or malice, they nonetheless have obligation to keep abreast of all basic laws and principles (Belga vs. Buban, 331 SCRA 531). The claim of good faith and absence of malice in glaring instances of incompetence and ineptitude does not abate a judges consequent liability. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Creer vs. Fabillar, 337 SCRA 632 (2000); Pacris vs. Pagalilauan, 337 SCRA 638

ASTURIAS vs. SERRANO, et al. A.C. No. 6538, November 25, 2005
FACTS Dr. Asturias filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Fedman Development Corporation (FDC) and Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City where it was docketed as Civil Case 34

No. 16640. RTC decided in favor of the complainant on April 6, 1992 to be affirmed by the Court of Appeals with Modification that the complaint is hereby DISMISSED on July 31, 1998. FSCC did not make an appeal regarding the decision and thus it became final and executory. Then complainant filed a motion of execution on August 10, 1999 However on July 1, 2003, the counsel of FSCC filed a petition to annul the RTC judgment invoking Rule 47 of Rules of Court, stating that they just discovered the decision in March 2003. This is backed by a verification subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public which was made by the respondents, who were members of the Board of Directors and unit owners of FSCC. This was contested by the complainant because according to her, the decision of the RTC was notified at the very latest on August 11, 1999, basing it on the Sheriffs report that the copies of the decision were furnished to the Administrative Secretary of FSCC. ISSUE It is being contested whether the respondents indeed received the RTC decision last March 2003 or not. Upon which it will then be determined whether the respondents are guilty of perjury because of the sworn statement that they executed. RULE The burden to prove that the respondents indeed received the decision on August 1999 lies with the complainant. Dr. Asturias has not shown any evidence with regard to the case. Also, in order to consider a scenario to be perjurious, there must be a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. In this case, as it has been mentioned in the previous paragraph, 35

the complainant hasnt produced or shown any evidenced that would prove that the respondents have willfully and deliberately sworn a falsehood in the verification made in the presence of a notary public. Therefore the petition for review is DENIED.

LABOR LAW ASIA PACIFIC CHARTERING (PHILS.) INC. vs. FAROLAN G.R. No.151370,
FACTS The termination of a managerial employee on the ground of loss of confidence should have a basis and the determination of the same cannot be left entirely to the employer. 36

December 4, 2002

Petitioner Asia Pacific Chartering (Phils.) Inc. (Asia) is tasked with the selling of passenger and cargo spacesfor Scandinavian Airlines Catalino System. Bondoc Petitioner Asia, through its Vice Maria President Linda R. (Bondoc),offered Respondent

Farolan (Farolan) the sales manager position to which Farolan accepted.Upon Vice President Bondocs request, Farolan submitted a detailed report attributing the drop of salesrevenue to market forces beyond her control. Consequently, Asia directed Roberto Zozobrado (Zozobrado)to implement solutions. Zozobrado informally took over Farolans marketing and sales responsibilities butshe continued to receive her salary. Asia claims that the increase in sales revenue was due to Zozobradosmanagement. Asia then sent a letter of termination forcing to Farolan tofile on a the ground of for loss of confidence Farolan complaint illegal

dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that the dismissal was illegal for lack of justcause, however, such decision was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) stating that the termination of employment due to loss of confidence is within management prerogative. On appeal,the Court of Appeals upheld the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this petition. ISSUE Whether or not Respondent Farolans dismissal was illegal HELD A statement is of thus the in requisites order, to for wit: a valid the dismissal of an be employee (a) employeemust

afforded due process, i.e., he must be given opportunity to be heard and to defend himself; and (b)dismissal must be for a valid cause. The manner Farolan to be by which Respondent of and 37 fairness to Farolan and was due being evidence dismissed process in her afforded violated Respondent thebasic precepts was heard

dismissed,

without present

theopportunity

defense. particular dismissal personnel,

She as

was or of

never by

given

written respect as

notice the to

stating the for and for her file valid

acts loss

omission trust

constituting confidence

grounds rank ground

required

law. With and

dismissal requiresproof of involvement in the alleged events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions andaccusations by the employer has for will not be the sufficient. trust of But his as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of abasis for believing that such valid employee ground breached an employer be would on suffice for his dismissal.Loss of trust and confidence to be a employees dismissal must based a willful breach and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly andpurposely, without justifiable excuse.It is not disputed that Farolans job description, and the terms and conditions of her employment, with theexception of her salary and allowances, were never reduced to writing. Even assuming, however, that Farolan was a managerial employee, the stated ground (in the letter of termination) for her dismissal, loss of confidence, should have a basis and determination thereof cannot be left entirely to the employer.

BACOLOD-TALISAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al. vs. DELA CRUZ G.R. 179563, April 30, 2009
FACTS The twin notice requirement provided by law should be observed in order for a dismissal to be valid. Romeo dela Cruz (respondent) is an employee of Bacolod-Talisay Realty Development Corporation(Bacolod-Talisay) as an overseer. He was suspended for 30 days for payroll paddling, selling canepoints without the knowledge and consent of management and 38

misappropriating the proceeds thereof, and renting out tractor for use in another farm. After 30 days, he received a letter informing him that he was dismissedfrom his work.Respondent dela Cruz and Bacolod-Talisay had a confrontation before the barangay council but they did notreach any settlement. A case for illegal dismissal was filed by dela Cruz, and it was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter as well as the NLRC. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRCfinding that the Bacolor-Dalisay did not comply with the guidelines for the dismissal of an employee. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner, Bacolod-Talisay observed due process in dismissing Romeo dela Cruz HELD The Court of Appeals correctly held though that Bacolod-Talisay did not comply with the proper procedurein dismissing respondent. In other words, Bacolod-Talisay failed to afford dela Cruz due process by failing tocomply with the twin notice requirement in dismissing him, viz: 1) 2) a first notice to apprise him of his fault, and; a second notice to him that his employment is being terminated. The letter dated June 3,1997 sent to dela Cruz was a letter of suspension. It did not comply with the requiredfirst notice, give himreasonable the the purpose to of which his is to side.In was not apprise the employee of the cause for termination and to opportunity in explain the fine, while the dismissal of dela Cruz was for a just cause, procedure effecting same observed.

39

TAXATION

DBP vs. CA G.R. No. 86625, December 22, 1989

FACTS The Development Bank of the Philippines imported IBM computer equipment from the United States, and in connection therewith paid to the Bureau of Customs duties, compensating taxes and import processing fees in the aggregate sum of P 5,562,926.00. It 40

thereafter

asked

for

refund

of

the

amount

paid,

invoking

Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 1087 (eff., Jan. 20,1986). The Customs Commissioner refused to grant the refund, maintaining that the customs duties, taxes and fees had been correctly imposed and collected. The DBP appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on July 31, 1987 adjudicated the controversy in its favor, ordering the Commissioner of Customs "to refund to ... (it [the DBP]) the amount of P 5,562,926.00 it paid to the Bureau of Customs ... (which) shall be applied and credited to the payment of the subscribed capital stock of the Government in the Bank." The Commissioner in turn came up to the Supreme Court on an appeal by certiorari, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 79635. By Resolution of the Court en banc dated September 15, 1987, however, the appeal was referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) for the reason that "(s)uch cases emanating from the Court of Tax Appeals now fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129." In the CA the case Ninth Division rendered judgment under date of October 3, 1988, annulling and setting aside that of the CTA. The CA ruled that Section 7 (2) of Republic Act No. 1125-pursuant to which the CTA had therefore been exercising exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, inter alia- had been superseded by said P.D. No. 242, it being "a settled rule of statutory construction that where there is irreconcilable repugnancy between two statutes anent the same subject matter-as there is between P.D. No. 242 and Sec. 7 (2) of R.A. No. 1125 in regard to the manner of settlement of disputes involving customs duties, etc. between government offices, agencies and corporations-the one of late enactment, being the 41

latest expression of the legislative will, should prevail over the other which is of earlier enactment."

ISSUE Whether or not the CA has exclusive jurisdiction to review cases decided by the CTA. DECISION The Court reaffirms its earlier resolution that it is the CA which is now vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the CTA and other quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. In view of the comprehensive provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 granting or to the of IAC(now Regional the Trial CA) "(e)xclusive and appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders awards Courts quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." The fact that, as the DBP argues, the CTA is not among the agencies reorganized by said Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, is of no moment. What is essential, and indisputable, is that the law did not, as the DBP imagines, deal only with "Changes in the rules on procedures;" and that not only was the Court of Appeals reorganized, but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened by Section 9 of the Batas. Its appellate jurisdiction was also extended to cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts, but also "all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders within or the awards appellate of ... quasi-judicial of the Supreme agencies, Court in instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling jurisdiction 42

accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948," it being noteworthy in this connection that the text of the law is broad and comprehensive, and the explicitly stated exceptions Appeals. appellate further excludes have Indeed, no reference of the last whatever to Court of to the the Court over 9 of of Tax and the intention expand original

jurisdiction by its orders

Appeals of the Labor

quasiwhich and the

judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, is stressed from the paragraph only the under Section Code provisions, issued "decisions

interlocutory

Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals." Since final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are now within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and since appeals by certiorari may properly be taken only to this Court, it follows that the mode of appeal from the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of Appeals should be by notice of appeal cum petition for review, consistently with mode of appeal from other quasi-judicial bodies and agencies prescribed by Republic Act No. 5434 (eff., September 9,1968), and that formerly provided for by Republic Act No. 1125, supra. It is on this basis that the interim or transitional rules adopted in this Court's en banc Resolution of January 11, 1983 on the subject prescribe that appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129."

PETRON CORP.

vs. TOBIAS, et al. April 16, 2008

G.R. No. 158881,

43

FACTS Petron maintains a depot or bulk plant at the Navotas Fishport Complex in Navotas. Through that depot, it has engaged in the selling of diesel fuels to vessels used in commercial fishing in and around Manila Bay. from the office of wherein from the On 1 March 2002, Petron received a letter Navotas was Mayor, assessed respondent taxes Toby Tiangco, to the "relative due

corporation to

figures covering sale of diesel declared by your Navotas Terminal 1997 2001." The stated total amount was P6, 259,087.62, a figure derived from the gross sales of the depot during the years in question. The computation sheets that were attached to the letter made reference to Ordinance 92-03, or the New Navotas Revenue Code (Navotas Revenue Code), though such enactment was not cited in the letter itself. Petron duly filed with Navotas a letter-protest to the notice of assessment pursuant to Section 195 of the Code. It argued that it was exempt from local business taxes in view of Art. 232(h) of the Implementing Rules (IRR) of the Code, as well as a ruling of the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance dated 31 July 1995, the latter stating that sales of petroleum fuels are not subject to local taxation. The letterprotest was denied by the Navotas Municipal Treasurer, respondent Manuel T. Enriquez, in a letter dated 8 May 2002. This was followed by a letter from the Mayor dated 15 May 2002, captioned "Final Demand to Pay," requiring that Petron pay the assessed amount within five (5) days from receipt thereof, with a threat of closure of Petrons operations within Navotas should there be no payment. Petron, through counsel, replied to the Mayor by another letter posing objections to the threat of closure. The Mayor did not respond to this last letter.

44

Thus,

on

20

May

2002,

Petron

filed

with

the

Malabon

RTC

Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment for Deficiency Taxes with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The quested TRO was not issued by the Malabon RTC upon manifestation of respondents that they would not proceed with the closure of Petrons Navotas bulk plant until after the RTC shall have decided the case on the merits. However, while the case was pending decision, respondents refused to issue a business permit to Petron, thus prompting Petron to file a Supplemental Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against respondents. On 5 May 2003, the Malabon RTC rendered its Decision dismissing Petrons complaint and ordering the payment of the assessed amount. Eleven days later, Petron received a Closure Order from the Mayor, directing Petron to cease and desist from operating the bulk plant. Petron sought a TRO from the Malabon RTC, but this was denied. Petron also filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial, but this was likewise denied. On 4 August 2003, this Court issued a TRO, enjoining the

respondents from closing Petrons Navotas bulk plant or otherwise interfering in its operations. ISSUE
1. Is the challenged tax on sale of the diesel fuels an excise

tax

on

an

article

enumerated

under

the

NIRC,

thusly

prohibited under Section 133(h) of the Code?

2. Is the challenged tax prohibited by Section 133(h) under

the proviso, "taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products"? RULING

1. It is evident that Am Jur aside, the current definition of

an excise tax is that of 45 a tax levied on a specific

article, rather than one "upon the performance, carrying on, or the exercise of an activity." This current definition was already in place when the Code was enacted in 1991, and we can only presume that it was what the Congress had intended as it specified that local government units could not impose "excise taxes on articles enumerated under the [NIRC]." This prohibition must pertain to the same kind of excise taxes as imposed by the NIRC, and not those previously defined "excise taxes" which were not integrated or denominated as such in our present tax law. It is quite apparent, therefore, that our current body of taxation fact, law does any not explicitly adoption of accommodate the the traditional definition of excise tax offered by Petron. In absent statutory traditional definition, it may be said that starting in 1986 excise taxes in this jurisdiction refer exclusively to specific or ad valorem taxes imposed under the NIRC. At the very least, it is this concept of excise tax which we can reasonably assume that Congress had in mind and actually adopted when it crafted the Code. The palpable absurdity that ensues should the alternative interpretation prevail all but strengthens this position. The Court thus can assert with clear comfort that excise taxes, as imposed under the NIRC, do not pertain to "the performance, carrying on, or exercise of an activity," at least not to the extent of equating excise with business taxes. 2. The Court can concede that a tax on a business is distinct from a tax on the article itself, or for that matter, that a business tax is distinct from an excise tax. However, such distinction is immaterial insofar as the latter part of Section 133(h) is concerned, for the phrase "taxes, fees 46

or charges on petroleum products" does not qualify the kind of taxes, fees or charges that could withstand the absolute prohibition imposed by the provision. It would have been a different matter had Congress, in crafting Section 133(h), barred "excise taxes" or "direct taxes," or any category of taxes only, for then it would be understood that only such specified taxes on petroleum products could not be imposed under the prohibition. The absence of such a qualification leads to the by conclusion Section that all Where sorts the of law taxes does on are not petroleum prohibited products, including 133(h). business taxes,

distinguish, we should not distinguish. The language of Section 133(h) but makes all plain "taxes, that fees the and

prohibition with respect to petroleum products extends not only to excise taxes thereon, charges." The earlier reference in paragraph (h) to excise taxes comprehends a wider range of subjects of taxation: all articles already covered by excise taxation under the NIRC, such as alcohol products, tobacco products, mineral products, jewelry, In automobiles, goods made the of and such non-essential metals, to goods as and and precious reference perfumes, fees

yachts and other vessels intended for pleasure or sports. contrast, of later "taxes, charges" pertains only to one class of articles of the many subjects excise taxes, specifically, "petroleum products". While local government units are authorized to burden all such other class of goods with "taxes, fees and charges," excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect to petroleum products.

47

COMMERCIAL LAW EVANGELISTA & CO vs. SANTOS G.R. No. 31684,

FACTS On October 9, 1954 a co-partnership was formed under the name of "Evangelista & Co." On June 7, 1955the Articles of Co-partnership was amended as to include Leonardo herein Atienza of respondent, Abad Santos each. an Estrella and The Abad Santos, as industrial partner, with herein petitioners Domingo C. Evangelista, capacity, Abad Jr., a Conchita amended P.Navarro, the original capitalist partners, remaining in that with contribution of her P17,500 Articles provided, inter alia, that "the contribution of Estrella Santos consists industry being industrial partner", and that the profits and losses "shall be divided and distributed among the partners ... in the proportion of 70% for the first three partners, Domingo C. Evangelista, Jr., Conchita P. Navarro and Leonardo Atienza Abad Santos to be divided among them equally; and 30% for the fourth partner Estrella Abad Santos." On December 17, 1963 herein respondent filed suit against the three other partners in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging her; and that that and the partnership, which her her She was also the made a partyhad the the the the defendant, had been paying dividends to the partners except to notwithstanding to to to pay to or give demands and any let defendants examine regarding the her that of refused continued books the be affairs refuse her her in to

June 28, 1973

partnership partnership declared by defendants

information share therefore

dividends

partnership.

prayed

ordered

render accounting

partnership business and to pay her corresponding share in the partnership profits after such accounting, plus attorney's fees and costs. 48

ISSUE Whether or not Abad Santos is an industrial partner and is entitled to the shares of the partnership? HELD Yes. It is not disputed that the provision against the industrial partner engaging in business for himself seeks to prevent any conflict of interest between the industrial partner and the partnership and to insure faithful compliance by said partner with this prestation. That appellee has faithfully complied with her prestation with respect to appellants is clearly shown by the fact that it was only after filing of the complaint in this case and the answer under thereto the appellants art just exercised mentioned to their by the right of in of an exclusion codal Answer, to the alleging filing reached

their Supplemental defendants' answer

subsequent complaint,

defendants

agreement whereby the herein plaintiff been excluded from, and deprived of, her alleged share, interests or participation, as an alleged industrial partner, in the defendant partnership and/or in its net profits or income, on the ground plaintiff has never contributed her industry to the partnership, instead she has been and still is a judge of the City Court (formerly Municipal Court) of the City of Manila, devoting her time to performance of her duties as such judge and enjoying the privilege and emoluments appertaining school even in to the said office, the aside from teaching of an the in law Manila, she without joined express consent as herein

defendants'. Having always knows as an appellee as a City judge before appellant company industrial partner, why did it take appellants many years before excluding her from said company as aforequoted allegations? And how can they reconcile has such exclusive been such with a their main theory "The that real appellee never partner because

agreement was to grant the appellee a share of 30% of the net 49

profits which the appellant partnership may realize from June 7, 1955, until the mortgage of P30, 000.00 obtained from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporal shall have been fully paid.

GARCIA vs. LLAMAS G.R. No. 154127, December 8, 2003

FACTS A complaint for sum of money was filed by respondent Dionisio Llamas against Petitioner Romeo Garcia and Eduardo de Jesus alleging that the two borrowed Php 400,000.00 from him. They bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the loan on or before January 23, 1997 with a 15% interest per month. The loan remained unpaid despite repeated demands by respondent. Petitioner resisted the complaint alleging that he signed the promissory note merely as an accommodation party for de Jesus and the latter had already paid the loan by means of a check and that the issuance of the check and acceptance thereof novated or superseded the note. The trial court rendered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the respondent and directed petitioner to pay jointly and severally respondent the amounts of Php 400,000.00 representing the principal amount plus interest at 15% per month from January 23, 1997 until the same shall have been fully paid, less the amount of Php 120,000.00 representing interests already paid. The Court of Appeals ruled that no novation, express or implied, had taken place when respondent accepted the check from de Jesus. According to the CA, the check was issued precisely to pay for the loan that was covered by the promissory note jointly and severally undertaken by petitioner and de Jesus. Respondents 50

acceptance of the check did not serve to make de Jesus the sole debtor been because first, to the obligation the incurred by him upon and its petitioner was joint and several; and second, the check which had intended extinguish obligation bounced presentment. ISSUES (1) Whether or not there was novation of the obligation.

(2) Whether or not the defense that petitioner was only an accommodation party had any basis. HELD For novation to take place, the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a previous valid obligation; (2) the parties concerned must agree to a new contract; (3) the old contract must be extinguished; and (4) there must be a valid new contract. The parties did not unequivocally declare that the old obligation had been extinguished by the issuance and the acceptance of the check or that the check would take the place of the note. There is no incompatibility between the promissory note and the check. Neither could the payment of interests, which in petitioners view also constitutes novation, change the terms and conditions of the obligation. Such payment was already provided for in the promissory note and, like the check, was totally in accord with the terms thereof. Also unmeritorious is petitioners argument that the obligation was novated by the substitution of debtors. In order to change the person of the debtor, the old must be expressly released from the obligation, and the third person or new debtor must assume the formers place in the relation. Wellsettled person is of the the rule that be novation clear and is never It presumed. is thus Consequently, that which arises from a purported change in the debtor must express. incumbent on petitioner to show clearly and unequivocally that 51

novation has indeed taken place. Note also that for novation to be valid and legal, the law requires that the creditor expressly consent to the substitution of a new debtor. In a solidary obligation, the creditor is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors. It is up to the former to determine against whom to enforce collection. Having made himself jointly and severally liable with de Jesus, petitioner is therefore liable for the entire obligation. (2) By its terms, the note was made payable to a specific person rather than bearer to or ordera requisite for negotiability. Hence, petitioner cannot avail himself of the NILs provisions on the liabilities and defenses of an accommodation party. Besides, a non-negotiable note is merely a simple contract in writing and evidence of such intangible rights as may have been created by the assent of the parties. The promissory note is thus covered by the general provisions of the Civil Code, not by the NIL. Even granting that the NIL was applicable, still petitioner would be liable for the note. An accommodation party is liable for the instrument to a holder for value even if, at the time of its taking, the latter knew the former to be only an accommodation party. The relation between an accommodation party and the party accommodated is, in effect, one of principal and surety. It is a settled rule that a surety is bound equally and absolutely with the principal and is deemed an original promissory debtor from the beginning. The liability is immediate and direct.

CRIMINAL LAW

52

FRANCISCO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 177720, February 18, 2009

FACTS In an Amended Information dated 9 November 2000, which was filed on 13 November 2000 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, petitioner Eliseo Francisco, Jr. (Francisco) was charged with Estafa in an Amended Information, as defined in Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Francisco was an employee of Bankard Inc., it is a credit card company engaged in issuing credit cards and in acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from the purchase of goods and services by credit card holders using Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by other banks and credit card companies. Sometime in August 1999, Solidbank, one of the companies which issues credit cards, relayed to Bankard that there were four questionable Bankard.Inc transactions (private reflected in one to account have a in which complainant) decided thorough

investigations on fraudulent crediting. ISSUE Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed reversible error in affirming the assailed order and decision of the regional trial court of pasig city, branch 267, despite the absence of an element in the crime charged for which petitioner was indicted

RULING

53

The element of estafa referred to by petitioner Francisco is the third one under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code in the following list provided by this Court in several cases: (1) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess agency, power, business influence, or qualifications, transactions, property, or credit, other imaginary employs

similar deceits; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. (Emphasis supplied.) The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. It does not require that the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party. Thus, in this case wherein a person pretended to possess credit in order to defraud third persons (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa), but the offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof, such person is liable for estafa under Article 315(a), even though the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended party. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him.

54

KAPUNAN vs. CA G.R. Nos. 148213-17, FACTS Eduardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi who were the members of the AFP were allegedly charged with the 1986 killing of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver, Leonor Alay-ay. On the night of November 12, 1986, the victims were seized and to a "safe house" in Cubao, then to a secluded area in Antipolo where they were shot dead. The reports made by the Investigating Panel disclose that respondent Kapunan, Jr. had created the CounterIntelligence and special project team which headed the surveillance of Olalia and that Legaspi was present in the safe house when they brought Olalia and Alay-ay. Being members of the AFP who claimed that the act was done for a furtherance of a political claim, No. thus 347, Public they are entitled to an to amnesty Rebels, in (Proclamation Crimes entitled Order, "Granting Other Amnesty March 13, 2009

Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Against Crimes Committed Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission) criminal liabilities. The Panel and the Department of Justice denied their petition. ISSUE The main issues raised are whether or not the grant of amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 or 348 extinguished their criminal liability. RULING The Panel refused to consider petitioners defense of amnesty on the ground that documents pertaining to the amnesty failed to show that the Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied 55 for and their criminal uplifting their

liabilities were not uplifted. It was held that the killings were not committed in furtherance of a political belief because at that time, there was no rebellion yet launched against the Cory Aquino government. of The petition was denied for and reconsideration the Court of to the Department Justice Appeals

affirmed the same.

PEOPLE vs. DOMINGO, et al. G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009
FACTS On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San (father) alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant the van. Reyes and a certain and Juanito also Pataray boarded with (Pataray) the two van. male approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside Appellant Reyes Pataray and Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo Flores,

companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape. After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of appellants Robert, and their cohorts, and Chua Jona Ong Ping Sim (mother), Raymond (children) Abagatnan

(Abagatnan) (housemaid) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their male companions. Appellant Flores, with the other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the vehicle. Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male

companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million 56

pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night. On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and their cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could not be reached. Thus, appellants escorted instructed in Abagatnan to look to the for Yao San in the Upon poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion Abagatnan proceeding poultry farm. arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao Reyes San and about the ransom their demanded. male Thereafter, left appellants Arnaldo and companion

Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safe-house. In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house, and after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts.

57

On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao San acceded to appellants demand. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim. On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the payoff at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellants call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left. On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City. Both died of asphyxia by strangulation. On 26 July Quezon 1999, City. appellant Thereupon, Arnaldo appellant surrendered Arnaldo, to with the the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts. Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes

58

were

identified

in

police

line-up

by

Yao

San,

Robert

and

Abagatnan as their kidnappers. On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan, Batangas. of Atty. Afterwards, Rous, appellant a Flores, with the assistance executed written extra-judicial

confession detailing his participation in the incident. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Flores was subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers. ISSUES

1.) Whether Reyes, Arnaldo and Flores conspired in kidnapping

the Yao family and; 2.) Whether or not the appellants committed special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. RULING Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective among the accused. When the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete the crime, with a view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists. As can be gleaned of from and the credible and their testimonies appellant at Yao and San, sworn and and

statements

Abagatnan,

Robert poked

Yao, guns

Reyes

Pataray approached

thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then took the drivers seat and drove the van, while each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo 59

and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts in the kidnapping acts of of the family. and Clearly, their the foregoing individual appellants cohorts

demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose of extorting ransom. Under Article (1) 267 the of the Revised is a of Penal private Code, the crime (2) of he is or

kidnapping is committed with the concurrence of the following elements: of his offender the individual; or the kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter liberty; (3) act is detention (a) kidnapping kidnapping illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances present: detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. All of the foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are private individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking control of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family 60

was taken against their will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females.

GARCIA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 171951, August 28, 2009

FACTS The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him. Two days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chys sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to come out of his house He also and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him. portion of Chys head. mauling.

reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back Chy found an opportunity to escape, he He was He was ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the He also complained of difficulty in breathing. found later unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. that Chy died of myocardial infarction. Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy. of homicide. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the

pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed

striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victims heart is healthy. What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted ISSUE 61

If Garcia is liable for the death of Manuel Chy despite the fact that the cause of death is myocardial infarction, a non-violent related cause of death RULING The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Article Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, said law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with 13(3) circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner. The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death of the victim, if the latters heart is in good condition. Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty

should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period. penalty maximum. of ten Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the years of prision mayor, as minimum, to trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate (10) fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as

CALIMUTAN vs. PEOPLE

62

G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006

FACTS Victim Cantre and Saano, together with two other companions had a drinking spree in a videoke bar at ten oclock in the morning of February 4, 1996.Thereafter, they decided to part ways and went to their respective houses. On their way home, Cantre and Sanano met the petitioner and Michael Bulalacao. Cantre suddenly punched Bulalacao because he is suspecting the latter as the one responsible for throwing stones at his house on previous night. After being hit, bulalacao ran away. Petitioner picked-up a stone which is as big as mans fist, ran toward Cantre, and threw it to the latter, hitting him at the left side of his back. When Cantre turned his attention to the petitioner, Sanano tried to pacify the two. Both Cantre and petitioner calmed down and went to their houses. When Cantre arrived at his house, he complained of the pain in the left side of his back which was hit by the stone. At that night, he again complained of backache and also of stomachache. Hes condition immediately became worse, and at around three oclock in the following morning, Cantre died. Right after his death, Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday ,the Municipal Health Officer and made a findings that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. Unsatisfied, the Cantre family requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim by the NBI. Dr. Mendez conducted an exhumation and autopsy and reported that the cause of the death was traumatic injury of the abdomen. The victim suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to pacify the victim but the latter refused and pulled out eight-inch Balisong. When he saw the victim was about to stab Bulalacao, he picked up a 63

stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim. He contended that the throwing of the stone was in defense of his companion. The RTC rendered a decision, which was later affirmed by the CA, holding that petitioner was criminally liable for homicide and that the act of throwing a stone from behind was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony which caused the death of the victim and held that the accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. Hence, these case.

ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner has the intent to kill the victim and thus liable for homicide? DECISION While the Supreme Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the CA and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen which is the result by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, it nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the CA as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for. Article according to 3 of the the Revised by Penal which Code they classifies are felonies in means committed,

particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender. In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice).The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of 64

the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed culpable by the Court of Appeals. beyond Instead, this Court of in finds the petitioner Calimutan guilty reasonable doubt

felony

of reckless

imprudence

resulting

homicide

under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutans intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.

65

PEOPLE vs. DE LOS SANTOS G.R. No. 131588,

FACTS On the cloudy morning of October 5, 1995, in Maitum Highway, Barangay Puerto, CDO, Glenn delos Santos in his driven motor vehicle, Isuzu Elf, ran over members of the Philippine National Police (PN) who were jogging in the same direction as the truck was proceeding. Instead of applying his brake, the accused continued to travel. Because of the incident, 12 PNP joggers were killed on the spot, 11 were seriously wounded and 10 sustained minor injuries. Two hours later, the accused surrendered. In the lower court, the accused was found guilty. In his appeal, he testified that he had drunk three (3) bottles of beer earlier before the incident. He also added that because he had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction, he was not able to see the joggers. He only realized he hit something until he noticed the thuds and he couldnt distinguish what he hit because it was dark. ISSUE Whether or not the accused intentionally caused the death and injury of the PNP joggers? RULING No, the accused only exhibit an inexcusable lack of precaution. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from lack or which of failing material to damage on the such results part act, by of reason the taking of inexcusable performing precaution person into

March 27, 2001

perform

consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of

66

intelligence;

(4)

his

physical

condition;

and

(3)

other

circumstances regarding persons, time and place. As to its verdict, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, the accused should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. As to penalty, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to render penalty exercise assistance by one to the victim, therefore, fifth constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the degree. Moreover, the paragraph to the thereof rules provides that in the imposition of the penalty, the court shall its sound discretion without regard prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies through imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty. In this case, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that the accused, escaped from the scene of the 67

incident, leaving behind the victims. Because the accused, failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, the penalty would be prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. the Applying separate Article offenses 48, of the maximum of said penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. resulting For in reckless the imprudence may be slight physical injuries, accused

sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period. As far as the award of damages is concerned, the trial courts award of death indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each group of heirs of the trainees killed. Likewise, for lack of factual basis, the awards of P30,000 to each of those who suffered serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who suffered minor physical injuries.

68

G.R. No. 14258, August 2, 1919 US vs. BAGUIO

FACTS The defendant, Eugenio Baguio of Paete an Laguna said to known have as organized, directed and managed association

Turnuhan and denominated Samahan Abuluyan ng Salapi between November 1913 till May 1914. The said association was conducting a prohibited given game a of chance called Loteria book) (Lottery). and a Each member of the said association was subscribed by one or more shares, Libreta (memorandum number representing each share. In return, the member will pay P1 peso every Sunday and entitled to win a premium of P500 pesos by drawing lots conducted on the same day every week. The accused used to receive two (2) centavos for every peso of the amount of the premium as a recompense for his work as director and manager of the society or Turnuhan. ISSUE Whether or not Eugenio Baguio committed acts in violation of Gambling Law. HELD The accused, Eugenio Baguio was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for he committed acts in violation of Act No 1757 or known as Gambling Law. "Gambling," as defined by Section 1 of Act No. 1757, consists: (a) in the playing of any game for money or any representative of value or valuable consideration or thing, the result of which game depends wholly or chiefly upon chance or hazard; or (b) in the use of any mechanical invention or contrivance to determine by chance the loser or winner of money or of any representative 69

of value or of any valuable consideration or thing. Section 7 of said act prohibits absolutely "the playing at and the conducting of any game of monte, jueteng, or any form of lottery or policy or any banking or percentage game, or the use of any mechanical invention or contrivance to determine by chance the winner or loser of money or of any representative of value or of any valuable consideration or thing." Section 7 further provides that "any person taking any part therein or owning or operating any such mechanical invention or contrivance shall be punished as provided in Section 3 of said Act." The lower court held that the defendant was guilty of conducting a lottery in violation of the law and was duly arrested, charged and sentenced to pay a fine of P100 pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law, and to pay the costs.

70

PEOPLE vs. OANIS

74 Phil 257

G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943

FACTS Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas Galanta sleeping with his or back towards the fired door. at Oanis him and simultaneously successively which

resulted to the victims death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man. ISSUE 1. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties. 2. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty. HELD 1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. Ignorance facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas. 2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) 71 the offender acted in the

perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.

URBANO vs. IAC G.R. NO. 72964, January 7, 1988

FACTS Urbano had a dispute with Javier due to latters opening of irrigation system which flooded farmers palay storage. Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo but they had amicable settlement later on. 22 days after incident, Javier died due to tetanus. ISSUE Whether or not Urbano is criminally liable? HELD No. Civil liabilities only. Death wasnt directly due to the hacking. Proximate cause is that cause, w/c, in natural & continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury & w/o w/c the result wouldnt have occurred. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, & logical consequence of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt (because this is a criminal conviction). Infection of wound was efficient intervening cause between wounding & hacking w/c was distinct & foreign to the crime. The petitioner at the very least is guilty of slight physical injury. But because Urbano & Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators 72 to effect a compromise

agreement, the criminal liability is wiped out by virtue of PD 1508, 2(3) w/c allows settlement of minor offenses.

US vs. AH CHONG G.R. No. L-5272,

FACTS The defendant Ah Chong lived in a quarters together with Pascual Gualberto. The defendant killed the latter under the impression that the first was being attacked in their own room by robbers or ladrons. The defendant claimed that Pascual forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings. ISSUE Is the defendant guilty of homicide due to negligence? HELD No. The defendant acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense. He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge. Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal. The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be REVERSED, and the defendant ACQUITTED of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. 73

March 19, 1910

74

PEOPLE vs. BELTRAN G.R. No. 168051, September 27, 2006

FACTS On the night of October 25, 1999, Honorato Beltran suddenly attacked Norman Habla while the latter was resting along the road. Beltran repeatedly and lethally hacked Habla with a bolo until the victim died. The following events happened before the actual attack, Beltran and Habla quarrelled on October 22, 1999 where Beltran claimed that the victim mauled him. Beltran also claimed that the victim shouted invectives to him and his mother and challenged him to a fight moments before the attack. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals have found Beltran guilty for the murder of Habla and ordered Beltran to pay damages to the family of Habla. ISSUE(S) Can Beltran be free of criminal liability by using the justifying circumstance of Self Defense? Article 11, Revised Penal Code. Can Beltrans criminal liability be mitigated because the victim provoked and threatened the defendant and the two have a previous disagreement? Art 13, Par. 4, Revised Penal Code. HELD The first two are elements missing; for Self Defense the under of Justifying unlawful Circumstance First, presence

aggression. The mere act of insulting and provoking the defendant to a fight are not considered as unlawful aggression since there is no immediate threat to Beltrans life and limbs. Second, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or avoid it. Given that Habla have indeed insulted and challenge Beltran to a fight, the manner on how Beltran retaliated shows excessive use of force or means. There were multiple and lethal blows 75

inflicted to the victim and most of them landed in the neck and area. Beltran also continued to attack the victim even the latter fell to the ground and was defenseless. The attack is not proportionate to the insults of the victim. The facts show that the elements are missing to claim self defense as justifying circumstance. The second issue focuses on the possible points that will

mitigate Beltrans criminal liability; however this cannot be applied to this case. The victim may have earlier provoked the accused but moments before the victim was attacked he was just resting and no provocation occurred. The defendant cannot also use their previous in order disagreement to mitigate between his the victim and the defendant criminal liability. Their

dispute was settled in the Office of the Barangay. The defendant cannot claim his acts were immediate vindication against Beltran since three days have already lapsed since their quarrel and Beltrans participation in the settlement is a testament that he has no longer grudge or anger against Habla. To make matters worse, the manner on how Beltran attacked the victim was treacherous in nature that aggravates his liability under the Principles of Aggravating Circumstance (Art 14, RPC). Beltran stalked the victim before launching the surprise attack. Beltran carefully planned his execution in order to ensure the success of his attack and eliminates the victims chance to defend himself and retaliate. The following issues were used by the Supreme Court to uphold with modifications the decision of the lower courts that the accused is guilty and ordered to pay damages to the family of the victim.

PAERA, vs. PEOPLE

76

G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011

FACTS Santiago Paera(petitioner) the punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Darong Occidental acted with resentment, refusal to to borne follow his out his of the water and Darongs namely Vicente Darong, Diosetea Darong and Indalecio (complainant) scheme, repeated causing distribution him lose perspective

angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm. ISSUE The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats. HELD The rule of the court is affirmative, the petition is denied and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39 is affirm. Due Process Mischief in Raising New Issues on Appeal The court would applied this rule if were it not for the fact the petitioners liberty is at stake. Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats Petitioners theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threat because he only had a single mental resulotion, a single impulse and single intent to threaten the Darongs. The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the concepts of continued and complex crime preclude the adoption of petitioners theory. The threats were consummated as soon Darongs family heard petitioner utter his threatening remarks and spoken the threat at different points in times to the three individual. Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten 77

another with the infliction upon the person of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime" This felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened." The Prosecution Proved the Commission of Grave Threats Against Vicente The court affirm the ruling because no law requires of private complainant as condition for finding guilt for grave threats especially if, as here, there were other victims or witnesses who attested to its commission against non testifying complainant. No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioners Commission of Grave Threats The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC, which negates criminal liability of -anyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive. In, this case the petitioner failed to obtain the three requisites. In the fulfilment of duty of exercise of office the petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with bladed weapon, threatening harm on their person for violating his order.

78

PEOPLE vs. ULEP G.R 132547,

FACTS SP01 Ernesto Ulep, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death plus civil liabilities (According to court a quo, the killing of Buenaventura Wapili was attended by treachery thus qualifying the offense to murder). Death penalty, having imposed by the trial court made the case for automatic review by the Supreme duty. Wapili, having a high fever, was acting strangely in his home. His brother- in -law, Leydan, was trying to calm him down. Later on, he went out from his room naked and chased his brother-inlaw. Leydan, with the help of 2 neighbors tried to tie him with rope but were unsuccessful. Wapili completely gone crazy kept running without to particular the direction. but Leydan as Wapili went to a the policewoman report incident passed Court. Accused-Appellant justifying prays for of acquittal, due of to a self-defense and circumstance fulfillment

September 20, 2000

policewoman's house, he banged latters vehicle, so she called for assistance. SP01 Ulep and 2 other police officers went to the scene where they saw Wapili armed with a bolo and a rattan stool (but according to Wapilis relatives and other witnesses, he had no bolo, only rattan stool). Ulep fired a warning shot but Wapili charged towards them so Ulep shots him on various parts of his body. Wapili fell to the ground. Ulep came closer then pumped another bullet to his head, literally blowing his brains out. Wapili sustained 5 gunshots wounds, the cause of death is multiple gunshot wounds but the wound in the head caused the victims instantaneous death. Ulep voluntary surrendered himself to the police headquarters after the incident. ISSUE 79

Whether or not Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili considering his claim of self defense and fulfillment of duty? RULING WON. The trial courts erred in charging Ulep murder and sentenced to death penalty? The evidence at hand does not favor Uleps claim of self-defense. The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. In the present case, the records show that the victim was lying in a prone position on the ground, possibly unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to his life. Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of RPC may be successfully invoked; the accused must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that 1. he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case. The Court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right. Under Art. 69 of RPC, "a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability

80

in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. This Court disagrees with the conclusion of the court a quo that the killing of Wapili by accused-appellant was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The victim could not have been taken by surprise as he was given more than sufficient warning by accused-appellant before he was shot. The killing of Wapili was not sought on purpose. Accused-appellant went to the scene in pursuance of his official duty as a police officer after having been summoned for assistance. The Court credited Ulep with the mitigating circumstance SPO1 of voluntary surrender. Appealed Judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE, instead of Murder, and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum. He was also asked for indemnification as a civil liability.

PEOPLE vs. GEROLAGA, et al.

81

G.R. 89075, October 15, 1996

FACTS In the morning Roberto of of March Aroroy, 21, 1987 at of the and Poblacion Remedios of a of the Sy or Municipality accused Province Efren and in Masbate, Philippines, Ruado price the

Gerolaga, treachery chest,

Ativo

conspiring and helping one another , with intent to kill, evident premeditation, hitting death. ISSUE Whether or not other accused Remedios Ruado Sy and Efren Ativo who were unquestionably absent from the crime scene, equally as guilty as Roberto Gerolaga who while admitting the killing of the victim proffer self defense as a justifying circumstances? on the consideration and other reward, assault and stab Antonio Sy with a double bladed dagger, abdomen parts of body, thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous

HELD In Regional Trial of Court the it Decision, having convicted the all the of accused for murder through conspiracy or by and for not having acquitted reasonable all accused having herein, or upon ground to doubt, failed refused consider

exclusively, only the purely admissible factual and more credible circumstantial evidence obtaining in this case, and to observe with liberality, or consistent justice, with the the law, proper dispensation and of the criminal bar. On the defense of Gerolaga theory, to appreciate self defense, the following requisites must be clearly proven. 82 penal jurisprudence

fundamental precepts, as are applicable to, or in the case at

1.Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel and 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. However, even the first and the third requisites were to be appreciated in favor of Gerolaga. The second requisites have not been met. There was no reasonable necessity to inflict upon Antonio Sy numerous wounds, five of them fatal. Moreover, the justifying circumstances of self defense may not survive in the face of Gerolagas flight from the crime scene, his concealment of the weapon and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. On Appeal, accused Gerolagas criminal liability is individual and separate. He shall be liable only for homicide, not murder as no qualifying circumstance have been proven beyond reasonable doubts because no mitigating or aggravating circum,stances attended the killing. The prosecution attempted to establish conspiracy by showing that the reward was financed by appellant Remy Ruado- Sy and that Efren Ativo delivered the amount to the killer. However, the unrebutted testimony of Ruado-Sy that with the approval of her husband, she set aside the P3,000.00 as reward for the indemnification and apprehension of Commander Helen Lipanto and the fact Activo merely obeyed the order of his employers to deliver the amount to whoever could identify and apprehend said NPA commander, no criminal intent to kill Anotnio Sy could be attributed General to them. As there the is no other evidence in to prove the conspiracy except the affidavit of confession, even the Solicitor admitted that Lower Court erred finding existence of conspiracy.

83

Appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy and Efren Ativo are hereby ACQUITTED and are ordered released immediately, unless they are detained for some other legal cause. Appellants Roberto Gerolaga is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of crime of homicide for which he is hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prison mayor medium as minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos P50,000.00). SABANG vs. PEOPLE 518 SCRA 35 G.R. 168818, March 9, 2007 FACTS On the eve of the fiesta, there is a drinking spree outside a store with Nicanor Butad, a civilian Cruz I will and agent(victim), Andresa you Nilo Sabang(petitioner) and Butad uttered and the spouses words, Villamor. to Randy.

Suddenly, Randy Sabang(son of the petitioner) surprisedly came shoot Petitioner reacted saying, Just try to shoot my child because Ill never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat. After which, according to the witnesses, petitioner grabbed the gun which was tucked on the holster at the waist of Butad and then heard a gun shot. Thereafter, Butad lying on the floor sustaining four gun shot that caused his death. ISSUE Whether or not petitioners insistence on the justifying circumstance of defense of relative deserves merit?

HELD During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded innocence, but during the presentation of the evidence for the defense, he claimed to 84

have acted in defense of a relative which is a justifying circumstance. The Court said that, in order to claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence of the three requisites: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; 2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and 3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation been given by the relative attacked. The Court finds that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Butad since there was no imminent threat on his sons life. Petitioner even said a words dismissing what Butad uttered, that indicates petitioner did not consider Butads words a theart at all. Further, the four gun shot wounds sustained by Butad negates the claim that killing was justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. The Court ruled that, petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the CA and RTC were affirmed with modification on the award of moral damages.

PEOPLE VS. PRUNA G.R. 138471 October 10, 2002

85

FACTS On January 3, 1995 while a certain Lizette Arabelle Gonzales was defecating in the grassy area near their neighbors backyard, a certain Manuel Pruna (a.k.a. Boy) called her attention while sniffing rugby among his friends. Upon responding to Boys call, he then placed her on his lap and tried to touch her sensitive parts and later on proceeded to bring her along the grassy area and raped her. Boy was later on arrested. Prosecution Witnesses and their Statements: Jacqueline Gonzales, the victims mother, narrated to the court that she was fetching water from the well when the incident happened. Noticing that her daughter is not yet home she decided to look for her and she saw her crying and then Lizette narrated what happened. Lizette also stated that she knew the accused and said accused was the one who inserted his penis into her vagina as she was laid down on the grassy area. She also told the court that she knew that it was a sin to tell a lie. Dr. Teresita Quiroz and Teresita Magtanob examined the victim and corroborated the findings of medico-legal examination, respectively. Examination shows that there are sperm cells present within the girls vagina signifying sexual intercourse. Defense Witness and their Statements: Carlito Bondoc testified that Boy was at home during the time the incident occurred because he & Carlito were having coffee. Lower court ruled guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape and is sentenced to death penalty, thus it is automatically subject to an immediate review. ISSUES 1. Is Lizette a credible witness despite of her age? 86

2. Is

Lizettes

minority

properly

established

and

if

the

imposition of death penalty is proper. RULING 1. Yes, it is presumed that a witness is competent and the burden to prove incompetence lies on the party contesting the competency of the witness. In this case, despite that the incident happened when she was three years old and that the case was filed when she was five years old, the court presumed that the child is a competent witness because test of competency relies on intelligence, not age. The fact that the child was able to perceive the correct impressions during the incident and narrate it to the courts, knowing the consequences of lying proves this. 2. Court set out guidelines for the appreciation of age as evidence, stating that the best evidences of age are: the birth certificate, similar authentic certificates, testimony of the mother and the testimony of the person concerned (provided it is express and clear). In this case there was no document presented that can attest to the fact of age of the victim. Though the defense tried to contest the credibility of Lizette because of her tender age, it does not mean that the prosecution is relieved from the burden of proving Lizettes age and also not a proof that indeed Lizette is below 7 years old, which if true would qualify accused to death penalty. Because there is no concrete evidence proving the age of the victim, the court cannot assume an age for Lizette, thats why accused is not guilty penalty of is qualified not rape, and the imposition is of death of proper. However, accused guilty

statutory rape because of the mothers testimony, and that Pruna is convicted of statutory rape of a girl below 12 years old and is sentenced 87 to the penalty of reclusion

Perpetua. Furthermore, the civil liability for indemnity is not enough, moral damages should also be awarded.

PEOPLE VS. CONCEPCION, G.R. 136844,

FACTS

386 SCRA 74

August 1, 2002

The accused Concepcion is a police officer charged with murder for the killing of Lorenzo Galang. According to the testimonies of both parties, Lorenzo Galang was brought to the barangay hall because he was so drunk and unruly at the town plaza and was continually disturbing the peace. The accused then came to the barangay hall to question Galang. But herein lies the differences in the testimonies of the witnesses. The prosecution witness (two of them) testified that while interrogating Galang, Concepcion fired two shots past the ear of the victim without injuring him. Later on, he hit the victim in the abdomen and fired a shot which wounded Galang in the thigh and then, Concepcion fired three more shots which hit the victim in the chest and killed him. According to the accused, he was merely pacifying Galang when the victim became so unruly that the accused fired two warning shots. Galang was not scared; instead, he tried to grab the gun from the accused. Two shots were accidentally fired which hit Galang, The accused claims that he should be thus, causing his death.

exempted because he was performing his lawful duty as a police officer and that the shooting was purely accidental. The Court found Concepcion guilty. ISSUE Whether or not appellant is exempted from criminal liability under Article 12 (4) of the Revised Penal Code. Whether or not treachery and abuse of public position are qualifying circumstances. 88

RULING No. The rule in criminal cases is that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused. When the accused admits to the commission of offense charged but raises an exempting now has circumstance the burden of as a defense, that the he burden is of proof to is shifted to him. By invoking mere accident as a defense, appellant proving entitled that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4)of the Code. Any person while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. Unfortunately, the testimony of the accused was full of

inconsistencies which failed to discharge the burden. For one, Concepcion claims that when the victim tried to grab his gun, said rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel. Concepcion claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by grabbing the barrel of the gun. The court finds this inconceivable. Furthermore, it was not believable that a person so drunk would try to take away a rifle from a police officer who also had a handgun tucked by his waist. Lastly, the prosecution witness categorically testified that he saw Concepcion shoot the victim with the M-16 rifle. Also, appellants gun discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the victims body which the court do not think as purely accidental. Treachery is attended in the commission of the crime. in this case, treachery was is only in an the aggravating information, Though treachery stated it However, was not

circumstance.

alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to murder. Since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder, under Revised 89

Rules on Criminal Procedure, treachery has to be considered as generic aggravating circumstance. Consequently, the crime committed by appellant is homicide and not murder. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, not having been alleged in the information, could not be appreciated to increase appellants liability. The appellant is guilty of homicide. The penalty for homicide under ART 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating aggravating circumstance circumstance of of voluntary treachery, surrender the penalty and should one be

imposed in its medium period.

90

PEOPLE vs. ANOD G.R. 186420 August 25, 2009

FACTS On May 16, 1997, before midnight, Samuel Anod (appellant) and his co-accused Lionel Lumbayan stabbed and hacked to death Erlando Costan in his house situated in Barangay Borbonan, 5 Bislig, Surigao del Sur (Borbonan). His body was found by Miguel Platil. The following to day, May 17, 1997, appellant Barangay brought that he and Lumbayan of surrendered 18, 1997, Andromeda and and Perater, Lumbayan admitted Chairperson to the

Borbonan, before whom they admitted the killing of Costan. On May appellant narrated were to her police station. The Barangay Chairperson testified before the RTC that appellant killed However, who, back. ISSUE 1. Whether the and court gravely erred in not considering fear. the appelant's claim on the exempting circumstances of irresistible force uncontrollable 2. Whether the court gravely erred in appreciating treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances. RULING 1. No. The appellant failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error for not appreciating the exempting circumstances of irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. The evidence on record showed that the appellant had the chance to 91 at for the his time defense of The the the and Lumbayan Costan. appellant claimed poking Costan that a he only at the

cooperated with Lumbayan out of fear of being stabbed by Lumbayan incident, was knife at appellant's breast. appellant stabbed once

escape

Lumbayan's

threat

or

engage

Lumbayan

in

combat,

as

appellant was also holding a knife at the time. Thus, appellant's allegation of fear or duress is untenable. The court held that in order for the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. However, for such a defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear, and or of of intimidation such nature must as be to present, induce is a imminent and impending, A threat well-grounded not enough.

apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. future injury

2. No. Indubitably, the killing of the victim was attended by treachery. Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against execution ensure its persons, thereof employing which means, risk methods and him to or forms in from the to any tend, directly specifically, arising

execution,

without

defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make. In this case, the appellant tied Costan while the latter was lying down before he and the Lumbayan execution stabbed of the the crime latter to death; to thus, them. ensuring without risk

SIERRA y CANEDA vs. PEOPLE

92

GR No. 182941 July 3, 2009

FACTS In August 2000, thirteen year old AAA was playing with her friend BBB in the 2nd floor of her familys house in Palatiw Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner warned them not to tell anybody of what they did. AAA told the incident to her teacher (Elena Gallano) and to the parent of her classmate (Dolores Mangantula) who both accompanied AAA to the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged rape. ISSUES (1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A 9344 on the petitioners exemption from criminal liability; (2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the defense to present the petitioners birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A No. 9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the prosecution by express provisions of R.A No. 9344. HELD (1) After the examination of the CA decision and the records of the case, to deviate from the lower courts findings of guilt. The records show that the prosecution established all the elements of of AAA the and crime the 93 charged other through the credible evidence; testimony corroborating

sexual

intercourse

indeed

take

place

as

the

information

charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of R.A No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal, not on the civil liability. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which minor shall be proceeded against in accordance provisions of article 80 of this Code. (2) The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 R.A 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in conflict with the law may be determined. Pursuant to Section 64 R.A No 9344 Criminal Case No120292-H for rape filed against petitioner Robert social Sierra welfare y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. who Petitioner proceed is in REFERRED to the appropriate local and development officer shall accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.9344. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA P 50,000 as moral damages, and P 30,000 as exemplary damages. case, such with the

94

DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., vs. CHING, et al. G.R. No. 161803, February 04, 2008
FACTS On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City,going to Surigao City. They were delivering vehicles tire commercial a parked night mover not while prime a Joana mover The Paula with a passenger trailer, Cresilito substantial bus owned was by cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two was private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. as the trailer suffered a blowout the mover the before. askew driver a Limbaga, portion parked prime prime was occupying with

of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. The equipped triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning device as substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring his headlights break and the approaching to the passenger left to bus. He the pumped slowly, swerved avoid

oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor as a injuries. result of The the Nissan van, On however, became inoperable incident.

October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against prime mover owner and driver with theft in Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint.

95

ISSUE Whether or not Prime Mover is liable for the damages suffered by the Nissan Van HELD YES, Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a good father of family in managing and running its business. The evidence on record shows that it failed to provide its and prime mover and of trailer the with the required and the early warning devices with reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance condition prime mover trailer. The circumstances show that the trailer were provided with worn out tires and with only one(1) piece of spare tire. We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it. We find that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was utterly negligent in allowing novice driver, like Limbaga, to operate vehicle, such as a truck loaded with bulldozer, which required highly specialized driving skills. The employer clearly failed to properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover. Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway. Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring of that the the the prime reveal mover that was in proper the rear condition. on the ** Facts case when Ortiz, its

driver of the truck, failed to give the Joana Paula bus the space road it needed, latter vehicle scraped right side on the protruded bulldozer blade and the impact threw the bus directly on the path of the oncoming truck. This made plaintiffs-appellants/appellees conclude that the JoanaPaula bus 96

occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver of the truck, to swerve to its left and ram the front of the parked trailer.** To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: the (a) fault damage or suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff.**The two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these two (2) tires were attached to one of the two (2) I-beams or axles attached to the rear of the trailer which axle is very near but behind the other axle and with the location , it would have the other beam suffer the flat tires as it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D-8bulldozer

97

PEOPLE vs. BABANGOL, et al. G.R. No. 181422,

FACTS Four men were arrested through a buy-bust operation held on May 18, 1999 of the Service Support of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group. Though, the accused denied the charge claiming that the police only arrested, beaten and that they would be charged in connection to drugs unless they paid up. However, the RTC found all four guilty of the crime charged and sentenced each of them to the penalties of reclusion perpetua and fine of Php500,000.00. The accused appeal but CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Two of the accused Babangol and Naranjo appeal to SC. ISSUE Babangol and Naranjo question the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence proving that there was really a buy-bust operation, the custody and quantity of the substance shabu that has been confiscated by the police and the conspiracy acted by Naranjo (driver of the van used by the accused. RULING First, appellants claim that there was a switching of evidence, failure of the police to apply fluorescent powder to the boodle money and the prosecutor should have presented the informant to prove that there was really a buy-bust operation that took place however, the prosecution said those claims were not necessary to prove the offense charged. Second, the custody and test of the substance confiscated shabu was merely affirmed by the Forensic Chemist that it was truly forwarded on the laboratory and the sample he took for of testing entire 98 was logically presumed to be the representative its contents. Lastly, that

September 15, 2010

prosecution failed to proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Naranjo was acted in conspiracy with the other accused since he had not done an overt act in pursuit of the crime. That only Babangol only carried the bag of Shabu to the pretend buyer. Wherefore the SC modified the CAs decision on November 14, 2006. The court ACQUITS accused-appellant Cesar R. Naranjo of the charge for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and ORDERS his immediate release from detention. The Court also orders the release of the KIA Besta Van with plate number UUA 480, which the police confiscated as a result of this case, to its registered owner, Cecillia L. Naranjo. Finally, the Court Affirms in toto the judgment of conviction against accused-appellant Arnel Babangol.

JACINTO vs. G.R. No. 162540,

FACTS

PEOPLE July 13, 2009

Entrapment by the NBI with marked money on Aug 21, 1997. The trial of the three accused went its course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC decided that: The Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog The De Valencia appealed y Rivera to the and CA Jacqueline and, on Capitle guilty 2003, of a qualified theft. three December 16, Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus: the decision of the trial court is modified, in that: (a) Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium. 99

(c) Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. A Partial Motion for Reconsideration was filed only for

petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied. ISSUE 1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information; 2. and 3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING The petition is granted. The decisions are modified. Petitioner is found guilty of an impossible crime and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs. Whether or not worthless check can be object of theft;

PEOPLE vs. SOBUSA G.R. No. 181083, January 21, 2010

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FACTS On May 23, 2000, AAA a 10 year old girl filed a rape case against her step father Herminigildo Sobusa. She said that days before the Holy week of the same year, she was raped by Sobusa in her room. The following day she even told her papa that there are bloodstains in her pillow and panty that was overheard by her Tita Bebing who is the sister of Sobusa and told her to just keep quiet. However, in May 2000 she told her two friends about the incident who told her to tell it to her Aunt DDD. They reported it to the barangay captain and the latter reported it to the municipall hall and a warrant of arrest was issued for Sobusa. AAA underwent medico legal with the findings of incomplete old healed hymenal laceration at 10 & 12 o clock position with fungal infection. The doctor said that this could have been inflicted on the victim a month or more and could be caused by trauma which in this case was through a forcible insertion of a stiff or hard penis into the vagina of the victim. Sobusa however claims that he did not rape AAA and voluntarily surrendered to the police. He said that he could not have raped AAA because he treats her as his own and that he works during night time as a security guard. He claims that the case was only instigated by the relatives of AAA's mother because they don't like him and accuses him of being a drunkard and a gambler. He was convicted for rape beyond reasonable doubt by the lower court with a penalty of death and to pay damages that was later on affirmed with modification by the appelate court giving him a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE

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Sobusa insists that the court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt in him for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. RULING The higher court affirmed the ruling on the following basis: (1) AAAs credible testimony concerning the rape incident; (2) AAAs positive identification of accused-appellant as the one who raped her; (3) physical evidence consistent with AAAs assertion that she was raped; and (4) the absence of ill motive on AAAs part in filing the charge.

PEOPLE vs. TORPIO G.R. No. 138984, June 4, 2004

FACTS In the evening of October 11, 1997 Anthony went to the house of Dennis and invited the latter for a drinking spree. Afterwards both left the house of named Porboy Perez the three proceeded on the shoreline in a cottage; Anthony tried to let Dennis drink gin and as the latter refused. Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 inch fan knife but did not hit him Dennis got up and ran towards their home. Upon reaching home, he got a knife alarmed by the action of Dennis his mother shouted. Manuel his father tried to scold his son and tried to confiscate from him the knife but failed to do so, resulting Manuel incurring a wound in his hand. Dennis went back to the cottage upon seeing Anthony , the latter ran towards the creek but Dennis blocked him and stabbed him, when he was hit Anthony ran but got entangled with a fishing net and fell on his 102

back

Dennis

them

mounted

on

him

and

continued

stabbing

him

resulting to latters death. After the stabbing Dennis left and went to Camp Downes and slept there the next morning Dennis voluntary surrendered himself to Boy Estrera a well known police officer. ISSUE Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of grave offense is appreciated? RULING The Supreme Court held that the mitigating Circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was properly appreciated. Dennis was humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by Anthony although the unlawful aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony. It was none the less a grave offense for which Dennis the may be given the benefit of of a mitigating sufficient circumstance. However, mitigating circumstance provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e. attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE vs. BI-AY JR.

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G.R No. 192187, Dec. 13, 2010

FACTS On December 26, 1996, at around 7:00 in the evening, victim Rodrigo Claro, together with his son Baby Boy Claro, were in the house of the victims father, Francisco Claro. While Rodrigo and Francisco were talking with each other, accused Jorge Bi-ay, Alex Lingasa, and appellant Eliseo Bi-ay, Jr. alias Gideon arrived. Jorge Bi-ay, the eldest in the group, approached Francisco and asked for coffee. Francisco readily gave coffee and the accused Jorge requested the victim Rodrigo to serve coffee to his two companions who were waiting outside, accused Alex and appellant Eliseo, which Rodrigo acceded. Rodrigo then went out of the house carrying the two (2) cups of coffee, he noticed that his 10 year-old son, Baby Boy Claro, was following him and told his son to stay behind. When he was about to proceed, to the appellant ground. Eliseo Accused who Alex was ahead of him, and suddenly stabbed hacked him on the nape which caused him to lose his balance and fall followed suit Rodrigo at the back by thrusting a bladed instrument. Accused Jorge also went towards Rodrigo and stabbed him. Witnessing the vicious assault on his father, Baby Boy Claro ran and shouted to his grandfather for help who then went out from his house with a bolo. Within ten (10) meters away, Francisco saw appellant delivering hacking blows on his son who was then lying on the ground face up, while accused Jorge and Alex immediately withdrew and fled as Francisco nearly approached them. Thereafter, appellant also ran away after all of them took turns in hacking the victim which caused his untimely death. On March 27, guilty 2003, the RTC rendered a decision of murder finding as the

accused

beyond

reasonable 104

doubt

charged

qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Rodrigo Claro. ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of murder with treachery as aggravating circumstance? RULING On July 16, 2009, the CA rendered a decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision, WHEREFORE, premises considered the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Negros Occidental, finding accused-appellant Eliseo-Biay, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is hereby directed to pay the heirs of Rodrigo Claro the amounts of P50, 000.00 as moral damages, P25, 000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25, 000.00 as temperate damages in addition to the P50, 000.00 as civil indemnity awarded by the trial court. Considering the circumstances he admitted that he delivered the first blow on the unwary victim, he initiated the deadly assault by hacking the hapless victim on the nape, causing the latter to immediately lose his balance and fall to the ground, the Court cannot hold the accused liable as a mere accomplice because his active and direct involvement in the brutal killing of the victim was too obvious. WHEREFORE, the July 16, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

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Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and Spouses Lito and Maria Cristina Santos vs. Court of Appeals, Heirs of Pacifico C. Mabasa G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
Facts The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to respondents herein. As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondents property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses of the petitioners the second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed. When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by Petitioners Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such 106

a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Petitioner, Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because of some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Trial court rendered a decision ordering the Petitioners Custodios and Santoses to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access ingress and egress, to the public street and Mabasa to pay the Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. The CA rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification only insofar as the. grant of damages to Mabasa The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied. Issues: Whether the grant of right of way to herein private respondent Mabasa is proper. Whether the award of damages is in order. Held: No. Herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. 107

No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. (damnum absque injuria). In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it (damnum et injuria.) In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

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At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitude. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.

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