Though Clausewitzs insight, War is a continuation of policy is well known, his arguments regarding the influence of the people

in relation to war is discussed less often.1 Wars are fought at the forward line of troops (FLOT) as well as in the rear, with the logistical trains which encompass all the decisions and efforts up to the point of war. Solid ties between these two must exist in order to achieve success on the battlefield. Clausewitz describes this orchestrated balance as the paradoxical trinity of the Army, people, and government.2 The first component is the military force or Army. Commanders take charge, supporting a specific end to the promulgated policy. Next are the people, described as emotional, irrational and patriotic. Lastly is the government whose politics can affect the operational environment.3 These three tendencies are comparable to three different codes of conduct, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.4 During the Civil War in 1861, this paper will reflect that the people held the most influence within the three paradoxical magnets because they were critical enablers that provided the backbone to the war. Operations undoubtedly depend on resources and supplies arriving at the front lines. These lines of communication (LOCs) originate early in the military decision-making process (MDMP), but are overlooked by offensive planners once the first round is fired. The LOCs are both critical capabilities as well as critical vulnerabilities for both sides. As the Confederates found out, once the LOCs are compromised by the enemy, the Soldiers will inevitably be depleted of critical resources. Prior to the use of railways during the Civil War, animals and Soldiers carried everything used to wage war. This included the food, ammunition, bandages, etc., which drastically slowed movement time. 5 The pace of war changed when Frederick List, foresaw the benefit of the speed and accessibility that railways offered.6 The Union capitalized on Lists wisdom and simultaneously adhered to Clausewitzs second rule of strategy, by concentrating their powers where the enemys critical vulnerabilities lie, thereby making other areas of the enemies operation vulnerable.7 The Union utilized the railroad to transport Soldiers and supplies quickly to help support its strategy of exterior lines and land invasion of Confederate states. The Union continued to further exploit the railroad for all of its capabilities. Its strategy of exterior lines not only required additional soldiers, but also successful logistic operations to continuously transport the supplies to the Soldiers. Through the rail systems, the Union rapidly replaced Soldiers and supplies, a feat that would have been nearly impossible only a couple of years earlier. By controlling nearly 30,000 miles of the railroad, while sabotaging Confederate
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 610 2 Ibid, 89. 3 Ibid, 89 4 Ibid, 89.

6 David Hollis, The Impact of Railroads On Warfare During the American Civil War, TOCWOC,http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2010/02/16/the-impact-of-railroads-on-warfare-during-theamerican-civil-war/(accessed May 6, 2012). 7 Principles of War, http://www.clausewitz.com, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Principles/#III (accessed May 6, 2012).

track, the Union was able to use this critical resource to their advantage.8 Because the North knew the capabilities of this asset, they had their Soldiers dismantle the Confederate track. However, due to the Confederates economy, they were unable to replace the track and therefore lost the capability of their rail system.9 Railroads were not only used as a supply system, but also as a tactical weapon, a logistics component, and a communication tool. Much like todays intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), commanders would often use the locomotives to reconnoiter an enemys position because armies would stay near the tracks for resupplies. Once information on the enemys position was obtained, the locomotives expeditiously traveled back to headquarters in order to disseminate the enemys status for follow on missions. Another rule in Clausewitzs strategy was to follow up on successes with the utmost energy. Adhering to this rule, the North collaborated intensely with the private sector to support their war efforts.10 The government recruited and actually commissioned railroad executives and placed them in key positions directly under the Secretary of War.11 Integrating the U.S. Military Rail Roads (USMRR) at the tactical level made a significant difference. Specifically it was Herman Haupt, whose easy to follow principles for tactical rail generalship, received the blessing from the secretary of war. Haupts principles fundamentally changed the Gettysburg campaign of 1863.12 Haupt and the USMRR increased the Norths capability at Gettysburg by enabling continuous rail support regardless of where the Soldiers were located.13 As discussed above, the people were the key trinity that affected the Civil War. Through the influence of people, the Union was able to leverage their wisdom and at both the strategic and tactical level of the war. The people built, maintained, and provided the strategy to effectively utilize the railway throughout the Civil War. By making the strategic decision to focus on the railways as a critical capability, the North was able to use the people to leverage the railroad to replenish supplies and provide rapid access to troops. The Unions Secretary of War was able to exploit the railways and the people within in the industry to further its war efforts. This proved to be the single most important strategy throughout the war because of its enduring effects that influenced many battles of the Civil War.

8 David Hollis, The Impact of Railroads On Warfare During the American Civil War, TOCWOC,http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2010/02/16/the-impact-of-railroads-on-warfare-during-theamerican-civil-war/(accessed May 6, 2012). 9 David Hollis, The Impact of Railroads On Warfare During the American Civil War, TOCWOC,http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2010/02/16/the-impact-of-railroads-on-warfare-during-theamerican-civil-war/(accessed May 6, 2012). 10 Principles of War, http://www.clausewitz.com, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Principles/#III (accessed May 6, 2012).

12 Ibid, 262 13 Ibid, 263