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The Inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in Quranic Hermeneutics

muwo_1373 390..411

Mesut Okumus*
Hitit University orum, Turkey

Abstract
Al-Ghazzal criticized Muslim philosophers in general and Ibn S na in particular in a number of matters notwithstanding, he was deeply inuenced by philosophy and Ibn S nas views as to some issues. Of the contexts in which al-Ghazzal is under the clear inuence of Ibn S na are the interpretations of some Quran c chapters and verses which are related to the demonstration of the existence of God and the explanation of some divine attributes and names. In many of his works, al-Ghazzal reproduces Ibn S nas interpretation of the verses in harmony with the ontological proof. One can observe Ibn S nas inuence on al-Ghazzal in relation with the hierarchy of beings, too. However, the context in which Ibn S nas inuence is most obvious is the interpretation of the 35th verse of the Surah Nur. Ibn S nas interpretation of the terms occurring in this verse as symbols of the human faculties exercised a profound impact on the thought of al-Ghazzal , which manifests itself in his interpretation of the verse in Mishkat al-Anwar. Another of such contexts is the topic of human psychology and the interpretations of the verses related wherewith. Immensely inuenced by the psychological views of Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal adopted Ibn S nas notion of the simultaneous creation of soul and body, interpreting some Quranic verses in harmony with this notion. This article is intended to illustrate that al-Ghazzal , who is opposed to the blind imitation of any school of thought, did not make a wholesale denouncement of the views of philosophers; on the contrary, he made an extensive use of Ibn S nas ideas in conformity with his general attitude of beneting from all schools of thought. Key words: Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal , Quranic exegesis, hermeneutics, Islamic Philosophy

orn around twenty years after the decease of Ibn S na (d.428/1037), al-Ghazzal (d. 505/1111) points out in his al-Munqidh min al-Dalal that he had from his childhood onwards endured every kinds of hardships in his quest of truth, striving to examine all schools of thought without any discrimination.1 He set accounts

* Mesut Okumus holds a PhD in the Science of Quranic Exegesis and is presently teaching at Theology Faculty of Hitit University, in orum, Turkey. 1 Al-Ghazzal , al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, in Majmuatu Rasail al-Imam Ghazzal , (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1996), 537.
2011 Hartford Seminary. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148 USA. DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-1913.2011.01373.x

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with his contemporary currents of thought that he categorized into four groups as the Theologians, the Philosophers, the Esoterics, and the Sus. Putting each of them through the sieve of criticism, he wrote separate books of critical character on their views. During his ofce of teaching at the Nizamiyya Madrasa, he dedicated his three years to the examination of the views of the philosophers, two years for learning their views and one year for cogitating them. Afterwards, he rst composed Maqasid al-Falasifa in which he described their views and then Tahafut al-Falasifa in which he criticized them. In the latter one, he leveled serious criticisms at Muslim philosophers in general and at al-Farab and Ibn S na in particular, who are the greatest representatives of the Peripatetic philosophy in the Eastern lands of Islam. In the conclusion, he is held to have charged the Muslim philosophers, though without mentioning their names, of innovation in connection with seventeen issues and of indelity in relation with three issues.2 Al-Ghazzal s criticism of the philosophers has long been conceived of as a hostility towards and a war on philosophy. For instance, Salomon Munk (d. 1867), wrote that al-Ghazzal dealt a fatal blow to philosophy in the East.3 Then Ernest Renan (d. 1892), characterized al-Ghazzal as a foe of philosophy.4 But the recent studies have shown that this judgment is incorrect, and that though al-Ghazzal opposed some philosophical views, he did not denounce philosophy as a whole. For instance, Griffel states that though al-Ghazzal tried to refute some philosophical views, he had no hostility towards philosophy, neither did he refuse it as a whole; on the contrary, he adopted and championed the philosophical method.5 The scholars who have recently studied the works of Ibn S na in a serious way hold that al-Ghazzal was greatly inuenced by Ibn S na, building his own teachings on Ibn S nas ontology.6 The realm and extent of this inuence is yet to be studied notwith standing, it is now a fact that al-Ghazzal was deeply inuenced by the Muslim philosophers in general and by Ibn S na in particular, whom he criticized to the extent of declaring to be unbeliever. Even in his works in which he criticized philosophy, al-Ghazzal acknowledged that the writings of al-Farab and Ibn S na are the best in terms of explaining the Aristotelian philosophy, stressing that the works of the writers

Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, ed. by Sulayman Dunya, (Beirut: Dar al-Maarif, 1987), 307309; Filozoarn Tutarszlg, Turkish translation by Bekir Karlga, (Istanbul: agr Publishing, 1981), 212. 3 Salomon Munk, Melanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, (Paris: Librairie A. Franck, 18571859), 382. 4 Ernest Renan, Averroes et l Averroisme, (Paris: Librairie Auguste Durand, 1852), 133, 135. 5 Frank Griffel, The Relationship Between Averroes and al-Ghazali as it Presents Itself in Averroes Early writings, Especially in his Commentary on al-Ghazalis al-Mustasfa, in Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, edited by John Inglis, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002), 52. 6 Richard Frank, Creation and Cosmic System: Ghazali and Avicenna, Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Ak. Der Wisp. Heidelberger, 1992, 5262; Bekir Karlga, Ibn Sin, Trkiye Diyanet Vakf Islam Ansiklopedisi, (Istanbul: TDV, 1999), XX, 346.
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other than these two did nothing but distorted and further obscured the philosophical matters.7 This shows that he did justice to the two at least in this regard. A study of al-Ghazzal s works in which he addressed the views of the philosophers in both descriptive and critical terms show that he is a very careful and meticulous reader of Ibn S na. His Maqasid al-Falasifa is like an Arabic translation of Ibn S nas Persian Danishnama-i Ala with brief annotations. He also made an abundance of quotations from Ibn S nas al-Najat without giving credit to him.8 The same books chapter on the denitions is taken from Ibn S nas Risala f al-Hudud with minor changes of the places of the passages. Again the lengthy chapter on the discussion of praiseworthy traits of al-Ghazzal s M zan al-Amal is totally taken from Ibn S nas al-Akhlaq with minor changes of the places of the passages. The summarized version of the same chapter is included in Ihyau Ulum al-D n, too.9 All this proves that al-Ghazzal is immensely inuenced by Ibn S na, making a large use of Ibn S nas works in composing his own books. Richard Frank has illustrated that al-Ghazzal made use of the philosophical ideas of Ibn S na and established his ontology and other philosophical teachings on his philosophical system.10 The inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal is not limited to the philosophical matters. On the contrary, as Binyamin Abrahamov has demonstrated, this inuence extends to the non-philosophical issues and realm.11 Similarly, Jules Janssens has established that al-Ghazzal built his system of thought on the texts of Ibn S na and 12 made an extensive use of his ideas. In the same line with these ndings, this present study aims at illustrating that Ibn S nas inuence on al-Ghazzal holds true in connection with the understanding and interpretation of the many of the Quranic concepts and verses. We will also try to show that Ibn S nas interpretation of the Quranic concepts and verses inuenced, supplied a foundation for, and inspired al-Ghazzal by comparing their interpretations of the same verses and concepts in their various works and by citing examples of al-Ghazzal s employment of the explanations of Ibn S na. When doing so, we will depend only on the works that are certain to belong to al-Ghazzal , excluding the works whose authorship by al-Ghazzal is dubious. And we will make use of all their authentic works, regardless of their being philosophical or not. When comparing their interpretations, we will, as a
Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 7778; H. Ziya lken, Gazzl ve Felsefe, Ankara niversitesi Ilahiyat Fakltesi Dergisi, (AIFD), III-IV (1995), 105. 8 Cf. Ibn S na, Risala f al-Hudud in Tis u Rasail, (Cairo: Dar al-Arab, no date), 72102; Al-Ghazzal , Mi yar al- Ilm, (Egypt: Matbaatu Kurdistan al-Ilmiyya, 1329), 161175. 9 Karlga, Ibn Sina, DIA, XX, 346; For similar views, consult lken, Gazzl ve Felsefe, AIFD, 105; agrc, Gazzl, DIA, XIII, 496. 10 Richard Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, Revue des Etudes Islamiques, LV-LVII, (198789), 271285. 11 Binyamin Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Inuence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, Abr-Nahrain, Peter Press, Louvain, XXIX, (1991), 117. 12 Jules Janssens, Al-Ghazzali and His Use of Avicennian Texts in Problems in Arabic Philosophy, (Piliscsaba: Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 3749.
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rule, take into account the meaning, and not the word, as al-Ghazzal emphasized in his 13 works for he most of the times does not clarify the sources of which he made use and replaced the terminology of Ibn S na with a religious counterpart. By coining religious equivalents to the philosophical terms, he intended to earn a religious legitimacy for the appropriated terms and concepts.14

Interpretation of the Verses Associated with the Notion of the Necessary Being
Inspired by al-Farab , Ibn S na builds his ontology on the categorization of beings into a threefold grouping as the necessary, the contingent, and the impossible.15 But one should clarify that this is a conceptual division, not actual, for an impossible thing can never come into existence or be thought to exist. What cannot be thought to exist cannot thus be predicated of existence.16 So the actual things are divided into the necessary and the contingent in the ontology of Ibn S na. Ibn S na denes the necessary as the being whose existence is necessary and whose non-existence entails a contradiction in the mind. Furthermore, the necessary being is the real being and the ontological principle of the contingent beings. As for the contingent being, it is that whose existence and non-existence is equal, like the two empty pans of a scale. So, in order to exist or not to exist, it needs a preponderator that would prefer one of the two options.17 For him, to assume the existence or non-existence of the contingent beings creates no contradiction in the mind.18 Termed as Wajib al-Wujud in the Arabic philosophical terminology, the Necessary Being forms the foundation and beginning of Ibn S nas philosophy for It is the source and principle of all other beings.19 He holds that Its essence is the same as Its existence, and vice-versa. Since Its existence is necessary in Itself, It can never be thought to exist not. When explaining the divine name Real (al-Haqq), Ibn S na explains this point as the following: From the name Real, the being itself and everlasting being is understood . . . The Necessary Being is that which is everlastingly Real in Itself. While the contingent being is real by other than itself, it is false in itself. So, save the Necessary Being, who is one, everything is false/perish in itself.20
Al-Ghazzal , al-Mustas fa, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1993), 46, 53; al-Arba n, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1988), 151; Iljam al-Awam in Majmuatu Rasail al-Imam Ghazzal , (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1996), 321. 14 Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 275276. 15 Mehmet Bayrakdar, Islm Felsefesine Giris, (Ankara: TDV Publishing, 1999), 196. 16 Hseyin Atay, Ibn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, (Ankara: Gelisim Matbaas, 1983), 130131. For the philosophical consequences of the character of this distinction, see Tahir Ulu, Shreverd nin Ibn Sn Felsefesine Ynelttigi Elestiriler, (Konya: Ideal, 2009), 181 and on. 17 Atay, Ibn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 128, 134. 18 Bayrakdar, Islm Felsefesine Giris, 196. 19 bn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 159160. Atay, I 20 Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, (Tehran: no date), 48.
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In comparing the Necessary Being and the contingent beings, Ibn S na makes the following remarks: A group of people asserted that the sensible things are existent and necessary in themselves. But if you remember and consider our remarks on the conditions of the Necessary Being, you recognize that they are not necessary, reciting the verse of God, But when it set, he said: I love not things that perish21, for an entity which lies in the realm of contingency is subject to a certain kind of perishing.22 Ibn S na thus puts in the contingent category all the beings apart from the Necessary Being, i.e., the beings whose quiddity and existence are not the same, viewing them as perishable when compared to the Necessary Being. The verse that he mentions as proof is one of the verses that tell of the Prophet Abrahams debate with his people. These verses relate that when reasoning about the existence of God, Abraham rst saw a star at night and said, This is my Lord. But because they set soon, he moved towards God by saying I love not things that perish.23 In his al-Maqsad, al-Ghazzal adapted Ibn S nas explanations on the Necessary Being, the contingent as well as the name Real of the Necessary Being to a way consistent with the Asharite doctrine.24 He explains the name Real of God as follows: The name Real is opposite of the false. Things appear with their opposites. Everything is either absolute false or absolute real or real in one respect and false in the other. That which is impossible in itself is false in the absolute sense. That which is necessary in itself is real in the absolute sense. That which is contingent in itself while it is necessary by the other is real in one respect and false in the other. With respect to itself, the contingent has no existence and is false, receiving its existence from the other. The contingent is real in the respect that it receives existence from the Necessary Being while it is false with respect to itself. Therefore, Everything will perish save His Face.25 This is so pre-eternally and post-eternally, and not conditionally. For nothing in itself save the Real deserves to exist pre-eternally and post-eternally. So all other things are real in relation to that from which they receive reality as they are false with respect to themselves. From this is known that the Absolute Real is that which exists really by Itself and from which everything that is real has received its reality.26 In his al-Maqsad al-Athna, a middle-length work, that he composed as a commen tary on the Ninety Nine beautiful names of God, one can observe the inuence of the explanations of the earlier authors. There one can nd his conformity to the Asharite tradition, the passages quoted from al-Takhb r by al-Qushayr on one hand and the

The Sura al-Anam, 6/76. Ibn S na, al-Isharat wa al-Tanb hat, (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, no date), III, 103. 23 Fakhr al-D n al-Raz nds no problem with Ibn S nas interpretation of the verse I like not things that set. See, Fakhr al-D n al-Raz , Mafat h al-Ghayb, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1990), XIII, 45. 24 Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 277. 25 The Sura al-Qasas, 28/88. 26 Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqsad al-Asna Sharhu Asmaillah al-Husna, (Egypt: Matbaa-yi Taqaddum, 1322), 9192. For similar explanations, see Mishkat al-Anwar, 275276.
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explanations quoted as passages from al-Shifa and Risala al-Arshiyya by Ibn S na.27 Al-Ghazzal thus rests largely on the explanations of Ibn S na when elucidating several beautiful names of God. Al-Ghazzal falls back on Ibn S na in connection with the arguments set forth in relation to the existence of God. For instance, Ibn S na remarks that he exclusively relies on the concept of existence in his exposition of the existence of the Necessary Being as well as Its freedom from attributes, totally ignoring the beings as proof with relation to the demonstration of Its existence.28 He tries to set forth the existence of God in a philosophical way on the analysis of the notion of existence itself.29 He holds that when being itself is considered, being as being rst indicates It, and only after Him those which follow It in terms of existence. Ibn S na holds this way of demonstration to be more reliable and superior. Stating that the Quran also designates this point, he mentions the following verses as proof: We shall show them Our proofs on the horizons and within themselves until it will be manifest unto them that He is the Real.30 I am saying that this verse is a ruling given for a certain group of people. Does not your Lord sufce, since He is Witness over all things?31 I am saying that this verse is a ruling given not for those who seek proof for Him, but for the veracious people (sidd qun) who take Him as the very proof for His existence.32 Thus, Ibn S na depends merely on the clarity of the concept of existence, demonstrating the existence of God on the basis of the notion of existence itself, and seeking no proof from the physical world. This is called the ontological proof in philosophical terminology.33 Ibn S na is held to be the founder of this proof but he did not develop it further.34 It is also claimed that Ibn S na is the rst in the Muslim world to employ the method of moving from the cause to the effect, namely, from the Necessary Being to the universe.35 In his various works, al-Ghazzal entirely adopts this ontological proof of Ibn S na as well as his interpretation of the verses he cited in connection with this proof. Posterior to al-Ghazzal , this notion was taken and worked out mostly by the Sus who embraced the doctrine of the oneness of being (wahdat al-wujud). In this process, the part of intermediacy between the philosophers and the Sus was also played by al-Ghazzal . Al-Ghazzal dresses Ibn S nas ontological proof and interpretation of the involved verses in a Su clothing, couching them in the following way:

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Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 277. Ibn S na, al-Isharat, III, 5455. 29 Bayrakdar, Islm Felsefesine Giris, 197. 30 The Sura Fussilat, 41/53. 31 The Sura Fussilat, 41/53. 32 Ibn S na, al-Isharat, III, 55. 33 Atay, Ibn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 161, 164; Bayrakdar, Islm Felsefesine Giris, 196197; T. J. de Boer, Islmda Felsefe Tarihi, Turkish translation by Yasar Kutluay, (Ankara: 1960), 97. 34 Hilmi Ziyalken, Islm Felsefesi, (Istanbul: Cem Publishing, 1993), 110. 35 Atay, Ibn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 168, 200201.
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The Sus mostly recollect the name Real of God due to their regarding themselves with respect to their own ontological status as perishable. For they view the actual entities with respect to their own ontological status as non-existent. But since the Theologians are occupied with the least useful actions in terms of demonstration, they mostly utter the divine name al-Bar , meaning creator in their respective languages. Most of the creatures rst see everything other than Him and take them as proof for His existence. So, they are the addressee of the verse, Have they not considered the dominion of the heavens and the earth, and what things Allah has created?36 But since the veracious people see nothing other than Him, they take Him as proof for the other things. So these are the addressee of the verse, Does not your Lord sufce, since He is Witness over all things?37 In his explanations, al-Ghazzal employs the terms theologians (mutakallimun) and the veracious (sidd qun), calling those who take the creatures as proof for the existence of God the theologians while referring to those who view God as proof for the existence of the creatures as the veracious, just as did Ibn S na. He makes similar explanations in his Mishkat and Ihya, too. Know that the people of insight see nothing but see God at the same time. Some of them went further and said, I saw nothing but saw God before seeing it. For some of the people of God see the things through Him, while some others see the things and Him together. To the rst group is pointed by the following words of God: Does not your Lord sufce, since He is Witness over all things?38, while to the second is pointed by the verse, We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and within themselves until it will be manifest unto them that He is the Real.39 The rst is the people of witnessing while the second is the people of demonstration through the proofs of God. The rst is the rank of the veracious whereas the second is that of the scholars who are rmly-rooted in knowledge. Next comes the rank of the veiled and unaware people.40 As is seen, in the Ihya, only the verses cited in connection with the people of demonstration changes whereas in the Mishkat, the second part of the verse is employed. The term veracious (sidd qun) is kept as the same in both works of Ibn S na and al-Ghazzal , while the people of demonstration are mentioned by al-Ghazzal rst
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The Sura al-Araf, 7/185. Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqsad al-Asna, 9293; Mishkat al-Anwar, 279, 292. 38 The Sura Fussilat, 41/53. 39 The Sura Fussilat, 41/53. 40 Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 279; Ihyau Ulum al-d n, (Egypt: Daru Nahr al-N l, no date), IV, 238. The term shah d occurring in the verse is interpreted in the exegetical sources as Gods seeing everything including the human acts, rather than in the sense of proof. Consult al-Tabar , Jami al-Bayan, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1988), XXV, 5; Al-Zamakhshar , al-Kashshaf, (Beyrut: Darul Kitabil Arabi, 1987), IV, 201; Raghib al-Isfahan , al-Mufradat, (Istanbul: Daru Kahraman, 1986), 394. As different from his explanations above in connection with the divine name al-Shah d, al-Ghazzal in al-Maqsad explains this term as Gods knowing and awareness. He adds that God is called al-Shah d in relation to His knowing the outward affairs while He is called al-Khab r with respect to His knowing the inner and unseen issues. See al-Ghazzal , al-Maqsad al-Asna, 91.

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as the theologians and then as the scholars rmly-rooted in knowledge. It follows that both Ibn S na and al-Ghazzal combined the Su epistemology and general epistemol ogy and both claimed for the Su epistemology a relative supremacy over other epistemologies, and last but not least, Ibn S na is al-Ghazzal s source of inspiration in 41 this line of thought. Ibn S na thinks that the Necessary Being knows all things in an absolute and universal manner. He knows all things through their causes. Since the things undergo a continuous change, the knowledge attained from them will also change. But His knowledge of things is not dependent on the things. On the contrary, He knows everything by Itself. Sharing this view of Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal also maintains that the objects of knowledge are posterior to the knowledge of God, and not vice-versa.42 Gods knowledge of the forms of the things is the cause of their coming into existence in reality. This view of Ibn S na is completely adopted by al-Ghazzal .43 Ibn S na thinks that both things and their causes stem from Him. He is wise in this sense. His wisdom is at the same time His knowledge. The Necessary Being is that from whom everything receives its existence. He gives everything its concomitants. This meaning occurs in several contexts in the Quran: Our Lord is He Who gave unto everything its nature, then guided it aright,44 He measured, then guided,45 It is He who created me, and guides me.46 The philosophers refer to His act of creation as the rst perfection and to His continuation of the creation as the second perfection. The Necessary Being is therefore the Absolute Wise.47 Although Ibn S nas notion of the Necessary Being is in conict with the Islamic notion of God and his views on the divine attributes are not consistent with the established interpretation of the Ahl al-Sunna, he tried to express the perfection of the Necessary Being in the best way possible to him in the nal analysis. In doing so, he however suffers the failure of explaining Him as in perfect terms as is He. Having difculty in nding right words to describe the Necessary Being, the philosopher says in al-Shifa as the following: We have no other names to express these meanings. If one nds the statements we have used ugly, he can replace them with the better one.48 Another similarity between Ibn S na and al-Ghazzal appears in the interpretation of the beautiful names of God. The former explains the divine attributes First and Last in harmony with his philosophical system. He holds that by the First is meant that His Essence is unitary, and not compounded, and that He has no cause, and that beings originate from Him. By the Last is meant that the rise of beings and the spiritual voyagers
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Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Inuence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, 3. Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 9. 43 Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqsad al-Asna, 52, 5859. 44 The Sura Ta-ha, 20/50. 45 The Sura al-Ala, 87/3. 46 The Sura al-Shuara, 26/78. 47 Ibn S na, Danishnama-i Ala , Ilahiyyat, (Tehran: Danishgah-i Tehran, 1331 (Solar Hijri), 100. 48 Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, 369.
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are back towards Him.49 Al-Ghazzal interprets these two divine names in the same terms. In his book on the most beautiful divine names, he makes the following remarks in association with the two names above: He is the First with respect to beings for the whole emanated from Him one by one in order. He is the Last with respect to the spiritual voyagers for they keep rising through one spiritual stage after another until they reach His presence, which is the end of their voyage. He is the Last in terms of being witnessed and the First in terms of being.50 Ibn S na thinks that all beings emanated from the Necessary Being. Since He is one in all respects, only one can emanate from Him. The rst thing to emanate from Him cannot be corporeal body, for all the corporeal bodies have two essential or relative causes, i.e., matter and form. So these two cannot emanate from Him. Thus, the rst thing to emanate from Him is an incorporeal being, i.e. the First Intellect. This is expressed in Law by the Prophet as The rst thing God created is the intellect51 and The rst thing God created is the Pen.52 While the verse You will nd no substitution in Gods course of action53 points to the continuity of creation, the verse You will nd no change in Gods course of action, either54 signies the continuity of the divine command. Considering the fact that God acts through the angels, al-Ghazzal interprets the word His hand occurring in the saying of the Prophet, God squeezed the clay of Adam by His hand for forty mornings as an angel. Then he quotes the two sayings of the Prophet cited above by Ibn S na, namely, The rst thing God created is the intellect and The rst thing God created is the Pen, claiming that the intellect God created rst is not an accident, as opposed to the claim of the theologians. So he interprets the intellect as an angel, who is called the Pen, too.55 The inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in these interpretations is obvious. The only difference is that while Ibn S na refers to the rst created thing as intellect, al-Ghazzal describes it as an angel. Al-Ghazzal takes up Ibn S nas statements in this context with some changing, as the case with the context of the interpretation of the divine name Real. Even if some of his explanations are in consistence with the early Asharite doctrine, one can notice the trace of the Neo-Platonist theory of emanation in his interpretation of the divine names First and Last.56 Al-Ghazzal inserts God in the chain of beings and
Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 13. Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqsad al-Asna, 98; Ihya, IV, 233. Huwa al-awwalu bil-idafati ila al-mawjudati, idh sadara minhu al-kullu ala tart bih wahidan bada wahidin. Wa huwa al-akhiru bil-idafati ila sayri al-sair n ilayhi. Ihya, IV, 233. 51 Ibn Taymiyya claims that the scholars of had th agreed that this saying is fabricated. See Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd ala al-Mantiqiyy n, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Lubnani, 1993), 198. Consult also Ajlun , Kashf al-Khafa, (Beirut: Muassasat al-Risala, 1985), I, 309. 52 Abu Dawud, al-Sunan, Sunna, 16; Tirmidh , al-Sunan, Qadar, 17; Tafs r-i Sura 68; Ahmad bin Hanbal, al-Musnad, V, 217. 53 The Sura Fatir, 35/43. 54 The Sura al-Ahzab, 33/62. 55 Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 15. 56 Al-Ghazzal , Faysal al-Tafriqa, 242.
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presents Him as the source towards which the Su Gnostics aspire to return and rise. So, though his explanation of the creation of beings and their return seems to be in harmony with the Asharite and Sunnite Su doctrine, his notion of the chain of being occurring in some of his works disagrees with the established Sunni conception of the universe.57 In connection with the interpretation of the verse And eight will uphold the Throne of your Lord that day,58 Ibn S na asserts that many Scriptures inform that God is over the Throne (al-Arsh), but the Mushabbiha, namely, the Muslim anthropomorphists, believe that God is set on the Throne, suggesting a touch between Him and the Throne. Saying that the corporeal beings end with the ninth sphere, the all-encompassing sphere, Ibn S na argues that the meaning of the verse is that God is over the Throne without a touch, just as Aristotle explained at the end of his Simaul-Kiyan (Physics), and that the spheres are referred to as angels in religion. So he interprets the verse along the lines of the emanationist cosmology. Though al-Ghazzal does not adopt the doctrine of emanation, he however tends to interpret Gods being set over the Throne as Gods governing all the universe from the heavens down to the earth through the Throne, and brings into existence no form in the universe till He creates it rst in the Throne.59 He compares Gods governing of the universe to the painters and calligraphers rst forming the gures and writings in their minds and to the men controlling their bodies through their minds. He states that God governs the universe through His Throne and Protected Tablet (al-Lawh al-Mahfuz).60 To recognize that al-Ghazzal is inuenced by Ibn S na in the contexts above, it sufces to take a cursory look at classic exegetical works which they do not interpret the names First and Last like al-Ghazzal . For example, Ibn Jar r al-Tabar (d. 310/923) explains the name First occurring in the verse He is the First and the Last, and the Outward and the Inward; and He is Knower of all things61 as He is innite and prior to everything and explains the name Last as He is innitely posterior to everything. He cites as proof for this explanation the verse Everything will perish save His Face62 and explicates that For when He was, nothing else was and He will be after all things have perished. Similarly, the way al-Tabar interprets the names Outward (al-Zahir ) and Inward (al-Batin) differs from that of Ibn S na and al-Ghazzal . For him, the Outward means His witnessing everything, His ruling over everything, and that nothing is superior to Him, while the Inward means that He is immanent to everything and that nothing is

57

Mahmud Qasim points out that no one at that time including al-Ghazzal could remain immune to the inuence of philosophy and the emanationist cosmology in particular. See Mahmud Qasim, al-Aql wa al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , in Mihrijan al- Ghazzal f Dimashq, (Cairo: 1961), 201. 58 The Sura al-Haqqa, 69/17. 59 Ibn S na, Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, ed. by Michael Marmura, (Beirut: Dar al_Nahr, 1968), 5354. 60 Al-Ghazzal , Iljam al- Awam, p. 308; Kimya, 4041. 61 The Sura al-Had d, 57/3. 62 The Sura al-Qasas, 28/88.
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closer to anything than is He. The verse We are nearer to him than his jugular vein63 points to this meaning, too.64

Interpretation of the Verses Associated with the Levels of Being

In his philosophical system, Ibn S na ranks the beings in the superlunary and sublunary world in accordance with a hierarchical order. He situates the Necessary Being, the rst and most perfect being, on top, while he puts the matter, the least perfect one, in the bottom, ranking the rest according to their perfection in the descendant hierarchy. He set a hierarchy for the sublunary beings that begins from the matter, the least perfect being, ascending towards the more perfect ones, and ending with the Acquired Intellect (al-aql al-mustafad). So consider how being descends gradually from the Most Perfect Being to the less perfect ones, ending with the matter, and how being similarly ascends gradually from the least perfect back to the more perfect ones, i.e., to the rational soul and the Acquired Intellect!65 In his various works, al-Ghazzal adopts this ontological hierarchy of Ibn S na as the same. While this adoption appears only implicitly in some of his works, it is explicit in the Mishkat: God brought the generated and created things into existence in accordance with a certain order. God is so rst that nothing is before Him. The generated and contingent things all generated from Him. Then, this hierarchical order of creation goes downwards to the less perfect, ending with the matter, the least perfect of things. Beginning from the matter, the least perfect of things, this hierarchy goes upwards back to the more perfect till it ends with the human being. Thanks to the purication of his lower soul, man assumes the character described as Return unto your Lord, content in His good pleasure!6667 On the top of both philosophers gradation of the sublunary beings, namely, those which are subject to generation and corruption, is situated the Prophet, in other words, the holy prophetic soul. The three faculties that Ibn S na thinks to be essential to the prophets, i.e., the rational power, the imaginative power, and the effective power (al-quwwa al-aqliyya, al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila, al-quwwa al-muaththira) occur in the works of al-Ghazzal , too.68 The conception of the universe is another context in which al-Ghazzal was inuenced by Ibn S na to the extent that he diverged from the Asharite tradition. For Ibn S na, the present universe is the best of the possible universes. He also thinks that God
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The Sura Qaf, 50/16. Al-Tabar , Jami al-Bayan, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1988), XXVII, 215. 65 Ibn S na, al-Isharat, III, 241242; For similar remarks, see al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, 435436; al-Najat, 334336; al-Mabda wa al-Maad, 9192. 66 The Sura al-Fajr, 89/28. 67 Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 277. 68 Ibn S na, Risala f al-Fi l wa al-Inal, 35; al-Ghazzal , Kimya, 29.

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laid down each natural law for an objective. There is no aw, dysfunction and random in the universe.69 Ibn S nas approach to the perfect nature of the universe stems from his conception that good prevails the universe and evil has no essential existence or more precisely, it is the lack of perfection. The notion of theodicy, i.e., the justice of God, is closely related to Ibn S nas theory of emanation and the doctrine of provision (inaya).70 The philosopher explains this doctrine as the following: It must be known that provision (inaya) means that the First knows by Itself how beings should be in the good order and He is the cause of what is good and perfect as far as possible and is content with the way they are, just as described. So the First conceives the best possible order in the best way and thus that which He conceives as order and good in the best possible way overows from Him in the best manner to His knowledge. This is the meaning of provision.71 The same approach can also be seen in al-Isharat: The provision means that the knowledge of the First encompasses everything and how everything should be in accordance with the best order. This is necessary to Him and implied by the compass of His knowledge. Everything occurs in the best way according to His present knowledge without the will and intention of the First Real.72 In conclusion, Ibn S na holds that the First knows the best possible order in the best possible way and that which He knows as such emanates from Him in the best possible manner.73 For him, the beings thus have come into existence in the best possible way. Similarly, nothing possible of His perfection has remained unfullled. For, if it were possible for the beings to be better than they are, they would absolutely be that way.74 Its rudiments going back to al-Farab and Ibn S na, this doctrine was later reduced into a shorter rhymed formulation: Laysa al-imkan abdau min-ma kan (Nothing can 75 be more wondrous than it presently is). Ibn S nas conception of emanation and provision was not welcome by the doctors of religion for it leads to determinism in the universe and rules out the will of God in particular.76 Al-Ghazzal quotes this notion of 77 the philosophers as the same in his Maqasid. But in the post-Maqasid writings, he adopts Ibn S nas notion that the present universe is the best possible universe, as opposed to the established Asharite notion of God as possessing will and acting as He wills ( faalun l -ma yur d).78 While he quotes this view of Ibn S na only in descriptive terms, he explicitly adopts it in his other works. In his Kimya-yi Saadat and al-Arba n,
Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya in Majmu u Rasail, (Deccan: Dar al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1353), 10; Risala f Ajram al-Ulwiyya in Tisu Rasail, (Cairo: Dar al-Arab, no date), 43. 70 Mehmet Aydn, Din Felsefesi, (Ankara: Seluk Publishing, 1992), 121. 71 Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, 415. 72 Ibn Sin, al-Isharat, III, 298299. 73 Ibn S na, al-Isharat, IV, 298299; al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 10. 74 Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 16. 75 Aydn, Din Felsefesi, 121122. 76 Atay, Ibn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 204. 77 Al-Ghazzal , Maqasid al-Falasifa, 296. 78 According to the Asharite doctrine, God acts just as He wills. Consult al-Ashar , Kitab al-Ibana, (Deccan: Dairat al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1948), 5152.
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he points out that the universe is like a person whose all parts are in harmony with, and complimentary to, each other. The parts of the universe are in such good and strong a manner designed that if the design changes, the whole system collapses. This are all the manifestation of Gods name Designer (al-Musawwir ).79 It is Him who created everything in the universe. He created His creatures in such a way that nothing can be thought to be better and ner than its present state. If all the reasons of the rational beings come together and think hard to nd a better manner for this kingdom or seek a way better than its present way of governance or want to add or remove something from it, they fail. It is wrong to think that there can be better than this. One who fails to understand the mystery of His wisdom and action is like a blind person who enters into a room where everything is as should be but cannot see. When he bumps or hits something down, he says, Why is this on the way? In fact, it is not on the way, but he cannot see the way. God created everything with justice, wisdom, and in the best way possible. If it were possible that there be better than that which He created and He did not create it, He would be either incapacitated or stingy, neither of which can be said of God. So all things that He created like hardships, sickness, poverty, ignorance, and misery are in conformity with justice. It is impossible that He do injustice because injustice is to dispose over the domain of another person.80 As obvious in these examples, al-Ghazzal appropriated Ibn S nas views and interpretations in connection with the ontological hierarchy and cosmological order, incorporating them into his own system.

Interpretations of Some Quranic Terms

We nd that al-Ghazzal is under the inuence of Ibn S na in relation with the interpretation of some ambiguous metaphysical terms, known as mutashabihat in the tradition of the Quranic exegesis, making an extensive use of his explanations. Ibn S na interprets some Quranic terms, which were left in vagueness and whose precise imports were not explained by Law (shar a), in line with his own philosophical system.81 For example, one can mention such Quranic terms as the Pen (qalam), the Protected Tablet (al-Lawh al-Mahfuz), the Command (amr ), and the creation (khalq). He interprets these terms in accord with his own conception of predestination and fate: Do not think that the Pen is a tool, that the Tablet is a broad surface, and that the writing is writing with letters. On the contrary, the Pen is an incorporeal angel, and the Tablet is an incorporeal angel, and the writing is the guring of things. The Pen receives the meanings that lie in the Command and commit them unto the Tablet in an incorporeal manner of writing. The fate stems from the Pen while the predestination comes from the Tablet. The fate contains the import of His command while the
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Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqsad al-Asna, 51. Al-Ghazzal , Kimya, 81; al-Arba n, 13. 81 Hammuda Ghuraba, Ibn S na bayn al-D n wa al-Falsafa, (Egypt: Dar al-Tibaa wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyya, no date), 137138.

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predestination contains the contents of the sending-down in measure. Something of these two is presented to the angels in the heavens. Then, it comes down upon the angels on the Earth. Finally, what is written in the fate takes place in actuality . . . Every occurrence has a cause . . . The external causes go back to the order, which goes back to the fate, which goes back to the predestination, which stems from the command. In result, everything occurs with a measuring-out.82 Ibn S nas view of the natural world relies on the chain of causes. He starts everything from the Necessary Being and extends down to the physical world and then traces the same chain back to its origin. In doing so, he interprets the related Quranic verses in conformity with his conception of predestination and fate as implicated by his philosophical system. The interpretations of the Quranic concepts of which Ibn S na makes mention when explaining the issue of predestination and fate are found in the works of his predecessor, al-Farab , too. Do not think that the Pen is inanimate, that the Tablet is a broad tool, and that the writing is writing with letters. On the contrary, the Pen is an incorporeal angel, and the writing is the guring of things. The Pen receives the meanings that lie in the Command and commit them unto the Tablet in an incorporeal manner of writing. The fate stems from the Pen while the predestination comes from the Tablet. The fate contains the import of the command of the One while the predestination contains the contents of that which is sent down in measure. Some thing whereof is presented to the angels in the heavens. Then, it ows down upon the angels on the Earth. Finally, that which is written in the fate takes place in actuality.83 In the al-Maqasid, al-Ghazzal says that the philosophers take the Protected Tablet as the souls and as intellects of the heavens, explaining their views on this issue as the following: What is meant by the Protected Tablet is the celestial souls. The engraving of the particulars in the world wherein is like the imprinting of the memorized data in the human memory. But this does not entail that it be a at solid body on which the things are written like the writing of a child on a blackboard. For this entails that it be multiple and that the things that are written on it be possible to be encompassed. If those which are written are innite, those on which are written have to be innite, too. But it is impossible to imagine an innite body.84 Al-Ghazzal explains the philosophers views of angels as the following: The philosophers hold that the heavenly angels are the celestial souls whereas the angels, who are attendants of God, known as the Cherubim, are the substantial incorporeal intellects which self-subsist, and are non-spatial, and do not act on the bodies. Particular forms are diffused from them over the celestial souls. These are superior to the heavenly angels for the former is benefactor as the latter is beneciary, and the benefactor is superior to the beneciary. Therefore, the superior party is called the Pen. The verse
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Ibn S na, Risala f al-Quwa al-Insaniyya wa Idrakatiha (in Tisu Rasail ), 6768. Al-Farab , Kitab al-Fusus, (Deccan: Dairat al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1345), 16. 84 Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 226227.
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reads, Who teaches by the pen85 for God is like an engraver who is benefactor. God compared the one who teaches to the Pen whereas He likened the one who is beneciary to the Tablet.86 In the same work, al-Ghazzal points out that the philosophers think that it is possible to get connected with the souls above. For them, we cannot get connected with the heavenly angels when we are awake because our senses and desires distract us at that time. But since the distraction of our senses disappears when we are asleep, our ability to get in connection with them appears. Al-Ghazzal adds that the philosophers contend that the prophets attain the knowledge of the Unseen in this way and their spiritual powers are strong enough to see when they are awake what the ordinary people see when they are in dream. If all the things were not xed in the Protected Tablet, they could not know the Unseen (al-ghayb) when they are awake or asleep.87 After quoting the interpretations of the Muslim philosophers on the Pen, the Protected Tablet, and the angels in the Tahafut, al-Ghazzal remarks as the following: There is no proof that requires to understand the Pen and the Protected Tablet occurring in Law as those of you [i.e., the philosophers] understand for the people of Law denitely did not understand from the Pen and the Protected Tablet what those of you have understood. So those of you have no footing in Law.88 Leveling such criticisms at the philosophers, al-Ghazzal , however, sets forth similar interpretations in his Faysal al-Tafriqa, Kimya-yi Saadat, and al-Madnun al-Sagh r. This shows that he is inuenced by the interpretations of the philosophers to some extent.89 One of his explanations on this issue is as follows: The divine predestination of affairs takes place in this way: They are rst planned and drawn on the Protected Tablet by the Pen, which performs this drawing according to a knowledge. The Tablet is a thing that is capable of the forms being written on it, while the Pen is the thing from which the forms ow onto the Tablet. So the Pen is dened as that which draws the forms. The Pen and the Tablet are not necessary to be made of reed and wood . . . On the contrary, they are conditioned not to be of corporeal body . . .90 In his Qanun al-Tawl, al-Ghazzal makes the following remarks on a frenzied person informing of the Unseen: As for the frenzied person informing of the Unseen, this is due to the fact all the things that occurred and will occur are xed in written form in the knowledge of God. This is sometimes referred to as the Tablet as in the verse, All things We have kept in a clear Register91 and at other times is called Book in the verse,
The Sura al-Alaq, 96/3. Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 226; Ibn S na, Risala f al-Quwa al-Insaniyya wa Idrakatiha, 6768; al-Farab , Kitab al-Fusus, 16. 87 Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 228. 88 Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 229. 89 Cf. al-Ghazzal , Faysal, 242; Kimya, 2526, 628; Qanun al-Taw l, 585; Ihya, IV, 459460. 90 Al-Ghazzal , al-Madnun al-Sagh r, 367. 91 The Sura Ya-S n, 36/12.
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It is noted in a clear Book.92 Things lie in it as the Quran lies in the mind of the person 93 who memorized it. Al-Ghazzal repeats similar explanations on the Tablet and the Pen in his Kimya-yi Saadat.94 All this demonstrates that al-Ghazzal is under the clear inuence of Ibn S na in connection with the interpretation of some Quranic terms. In addition, though he rejects the theory of emanation as set forth by the philosophers notwithstanding, he appropriates the philosophers interpretations of such Quranic terms as the Tablet and the Pen that are related to the belief of predestination and fate.

Interpretation of the Verse of Light

Ibn S na seems to have inspired al-Ghazzal in connection with the interpretation of th the 35 verse of the Sura al-Nur. The former is of the opinion that this verse symbolizes the degrees of the perception of the human soul.95 In his al-Isharat and Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, he explains this verse in similar terms.96 Inspired by the commentaries of Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal makes use of the same verse in his system of thought with minor changes. God is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The similitude of His light is as a niche wherein is a lamp. The lamp is in a glass. The glass is as it were a shining star. (This lamp is) kindled from a blessed tree, an olive neither of the East nor of the West, whose oil would almost glow forth (of itself ) though no re touched it. Light upon light. God guides unto His light whom He will. And God speaks to mankind in allegories, for God is Knower of all thing.97 Ibn S na maintains that the term light (nur ) occurring in the verse above is an equivocal word. As one of its two meanings is essential, the other is analogical. The former meaning, as pointed out by Aristotle, is the perfection of transparency of something transparent whereas the latter has two aspects: it is either the good itself or that which leads to the good. As with the meaning intended in the verse, it is the analogical meaning in both aspects. The same holds true of the essential and non-essential meanings. The heavens and earth occurring in the verse are nothing other than the whole being.98 So, Ibn S na interprets the term light occurring in the rst phrase of the verse as God in harmony with his philosophical system. For in his system, the Real Being is that whose existence is necessary and whose nonexistence cannot be thought of, i.e., the Necessary
The Sura al-Anam, 6/59. Al-Ghazzal , Qanun al-Taw l, 585; To compare with Ibn S na, see Ibn S na, al-Isharat, IV, 121124. 94 Al-Ghazzal , Kimya-yi Saadat, Turkish translation by A. Faruk Meyan, (Istanbul: Bedir Publishing, 1979), 628. 95 Al-Raz , Mafat h al-Ghayb, XXIII, 203205; A. Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 130. 96 Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 389392; Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4952. 97 The Sura al-Nur, 24/35. 98 Ibn S na, Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4950.
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Being. In fact, the term being itself suggests Him. As for the contingent beings, they are in need of Him in their being a fact that places them in the category of the shadow being, i.e., the quasi being. What is meant by the words heavens and earth are the whole beings who are contingent in themselves, depending in their existence on the Real Being, wich is good in Itself and named Light, too. The contingent beings are non-existent with respect to themselves and existent with respect to the Light. They may also be referred to as contingent in themselves and necessary by others. Ibn S na explains the remaining terms in the verse on the grounds of the theory of intellects. He holds that the human soul has some powers through which it develops its substance. By making use of these, it can attain to the level of the Active Intellect. The rst of these powers prepares the soul for perceiving the intelligibles. Some call this material intellect (al-aql al-hayulan ). This power is like the niche.99 There is a superior power that the soul obtains once it acquires the primary intelligibles and it thus becomes ready to receive the secondary intelligibles. The soul obtains the secondary intelligibles through its intuitive power (hads) if it is strong enough, and if not, through its cogitative power (al-quwwa al-mufakkira). The former is symbolized by olive tree (al-shajar al-mubarak) and the latter by olive oil (zayt).100 In either case, the soul that has reached the second level has attained to the level of the intellectus in habitu (al-aql bil-malaka), which is like the glass. As for the exalted soul that has the holy power, to it corresponds the symbol of whose oil would almost glow forth (of itself ) though no re touched it. Once passed through this stage, the soul obtains such a power that through which it perceives the intelligibles in actuality. The engravings of the intelligibles become like light upon light in his mind. Next to this is such a power that through which the intelligibles, that the soul has already acquired and no longer needs to re-acquire, become present to it and it beholds them whenever it wishes. This power, being like glowing forth (of itself ), is analogous to the lamp. This level of perfection is called the acquired intellect (al-aql al-mustafad) as this power is called the intellect in actuality (al-aql bil-l ). Once passed through all these stages, the intellect becomes like the re (nar ) that gives off light.101 That which brings the intellect from potentiality into full actuality and from materiality into the state of being in habitu is the Active Intellect (al-aql al-faal ), which is symbolized by the re.102 In the Mishkat that he composed as a commentary on the verse of light, al-Ghazzal interprets the analogies related to the terms in the verse in a manner similar to that of Ibn S na.103 To recognize the inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in connection with the interpretation of this verse, it sufces to look at the exegetical literature written before al-Ghazzal . For his interpretation of the verse differs from the explanations of the Su

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Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 388389. Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 390. 101 Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 391392. 102 Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 392. 103 Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, 130.
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exegetes. In relation to the interpretation of the verse, al-Ghazzal is thus under the inuence of Ibn S na, rather than such Su exegetes as al-Tustar (d.283/896), al-Sulam (d.412/1021), and al-Qushayr (d.465/1073).104 For he, just like Ibn S na, takes the terms occurring in the verse as symbolizing the perceptive powers of the human soul.105 In the Mishkat, al-Ghazzal mentions ve faculties of the human soul in the context of the interpretation of the verse in question. The rst of them is the sensitive soul (al-ruh al-hassas), which receives the sensual perceptions. The second is the imaginative soul (al-ruh al-khayal ), which saves the sensual perceptions, keeping them available to the continuous use of the third soul. The third is the rational soul (al-ruh al-aql ), which perceives the meanings that are inaccessible to the perception of the senses and the imaginative soul. The objects of the perception of the rational soul are the self-evident knowledge of universal character. The fourth is the cogitative soul (al-ruh al-kr ). The function of this soul is to produce new knowledge by making comparisons between the simple constituents of knowledge. The fth faculty is the holy prophetic soul (al-ruh al-quds al-nabaw ), which is special to the prophets and the saints. By this soul is obtained the knowledge related to this world and the Hereafter that cannot be acquired through the rational and cogitative soul. In other words, this soul attains the knowledge of revelation and inspiration.106 Al-Ghazzal suggests the possibility of the existence of another realm that are beyond and inaccessible to the reason. The level of the holy prophetic soul is called intuition (dhawq) and inner experience (wijdan). That the fth level is taken as the level of intuition and inner experience that transcends the reason suggests that al-Ghazzal regards it as a mystical experience, distinguishing it from the other levels.107 Ibn S nas symbolic explanations of the verse of light are undoubtedly more rened and more philosophical than those of al-Ghazzal . Al-Ghazzal appropriates the terms used by Ibn S na, in particular such terms as the cogitative soul, the theoretical soul, and the holy faculty. Al-Ghazzal s parallelism to Ibn S na in terms of using Ibn S nas general philosophical scheme and terminology is the result of his earlier acquaintance with the works of Ibn S na.108 In the Mishkat, al-Ghazzal employs the concept of light as an equivalent of the concepts of intellect and being.109 He also explains such terms as spirit, intellect, heart, and soul in the same meaning.110 If we follow in the footsteps of al-Ghazzal by focusing on the meaning rather than the words, we can conveniently say that these two

104 Al-Tustar , Tafs ru al-Tustar , (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2007), 111; Al-Sulam , Haqaiq al-Tafs r, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2001), II, 5051; al-Qushayr , Lataif al-Isharat, (Egypt: Markazu Tahq q al-Turath, 1981), II, 612613. 105 Al-Raz , Mafat h al-Ghayb, XXIII, 203205 106 Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 285286. 107 Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Inuence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, 89. 108 Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Inuence, 1112. 109 Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 271; al-Arba n, 151; Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, 132. 110 Al-Ghazzal , Kimya, 18; al-Arba n, 151, 155.

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explanations make a common point, proving that al-Ghazzal is inuenced by Ibn 111 S na. But one should add that this inuence is expressed in allusive language. As rightly put by Davidson, Mishkat al-Anwar is simply a new version of the Ibn S nan system adapted to al-Ghazzal s system of thought, partially disguised in allusive language.112 Al-Ghazzal sets forth a gradation in which the sensitive soul is posterior to the imaginative soul, and it is posterior to the cogitative soul, and it is posterior to the rational soul, and it is posterior to the holy prophetic soul. This gradation reminds of Ibn S nas gradation of the intellects.113 The scheme below that shows both Ibn S nas and al-Ghazzal s allegorical interpretations of the same verse of light more claries the inuence of the former on the latter.114 Ibn S na Material Intellect Intellectus in Habitu Cogitative Power Intuition Intellect in Actuality Holy Power Active Intellect Acquired Intellect al-Ghazzal Sensitive Soul Imaginative Soul Cogitative Soul Rational Soul Holy Soul Gabriel Prophet with revelation

Niche: Glass: Olive Tree: Olive Oil: Lamp: Glowing if not touched by re: Fire: Light upon light:

So it is clear that in his interpretation of the verse of light, al-Ghazzal rested largely on Ibn S nas analogical interpretation of the verse, rather than the earlier Su interpretations whereof.

Interpretation of the Verses Associated with the Conception of the Human Soul
Al-Ghazzal makes an extensive use of the explanations of the Muslim philosophers like al-Farab and Ibn S na in connection with psychology, too. In this context, he takes up both their psychological views and their interpretation of some Quranic verses in harmony with their system.115 As pointed out by Uthman Najat , it is al-Ghazzal who 116 incorporated the psychology of Ibn S na into the Asharite theology. Adopting most of
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Qasim, al-Aql wa al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , 201202. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averoes on Intellect, 180. 113 Ibn S na points out that the holy intellect is the nal end, and that the material intellect, the intellectus in habitu, and the intellect in actuality serve it. Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, 168. 114 Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 388392; Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4952; Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 286287. 115 M. Uthman Najat , al-Dirasa al-Nafsaniyya inda Ulama al-Muslim n, Cairo: Dar al-Suruq, 1993, p. 167. 116 Frank Griffel, al-Ghazalis Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into Asharite Thelogy, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 14 (2004), pp. 101144.

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Ibn S nas psychological views, al-Ghazzal makes use of the texts and examples of Ibn 117 S na as the same. He reproduces his predecessors interpretations of the various Quranic verses that are ascribed with philosophical connotations. In line with the Aristotelian physics and psychology, Ibn S na denes the soul as the entelechy (kamal ) of natural body. In consistence with his system, he denes the human soul as a substance that moves the body to attain its own entelechy. He divides the soul into three kinds, as the herbal, the animal, and the human soul, setting forth a number of proofs to establish the existence of the last.118 He acknowledges that the human soul, referred also to as the rational soul, has two powers, knowing and acting, called collectively reason. This division of Ibn S na takes place in al-Ghazzal s al-M zan as the same.119 It is from Ibn S na that al-Ghazzal took some of his argumentations in relation with the existence of the soul. For example, Ibn S na mentions two proofs for the soul. One is the natural proof (al-burhan al-tab ), and the other is the proof of continuation. The latter proof is built on the fact that though all the cells of a human being change and renew, he remains the same person. He also makes mention of his famous analogy of the ying man (al-rajul al-tair ) to establish that a man, who is isolated from all physical things, including his own body and limbs, is to be aware of his own soul. All these psychological argumentations of Ibn S na occur in the works of al-Ghazzal as the same.120 Al-Ghazzal adopts the way Ibn S na explains the creation of the human soul, interpreting the Quranic verses in harmony with this way. For instance, after mentioning the stages of the formation of human embryo described in the Quran, the Peripatetic philosophers argue, relying on the verse And then We produced it as another creation,121 that the soul is created after body. They take another creation (khilqa ukhra) occurring in the verse as the blowing of soul (ifadat al-ruh) into the embryo that 122 has the capacity of receiving it. Accordingly, Ibn S na suggests the idea of the simultaneous creation of soul and body.123 In the same way, al-Ghazzal in his Tahafut points out that Ibn S na and the Enlightened Sus (muhaqqiqun) preferred the view that the soul came into existence at the same time with the body.124 Inuenced by this view of Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal , in his al-Madnun al-Sagh r, which th nd he composed as a commentary on the 75 of the Sura Sad, interprets the 172 verse of
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Qasim, al-Aql wa al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , pp. 200. Ibn S na, Risala f al-Saada wa al-Hujaj al-Ashara ala anna al-Nafs al-Insaniyya Jawharun, pp. 511. 119 Al-Ghazzal , M zan al-Amal, pp. 202203. 120 Al-Ghazzal , al-Arba n, p. 167; Kimya, p. 18, 19, 59; al-Maqsad al-Asna, p. 101; Qas m, al-Aql wa al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , p. 200. 121 The Sura al-Muminun, 23/14. 122 Semseddin Gnaltay, Felsefe-i l, Istanbul: Insan Publishing, 1994, p. 230. 123 Ibn S na, al-Najat, pp. 222223; al-Risala al-Adhawiyya, pp. 8990; al-Mabda wa al-Maad, pp. 157158. 124 Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut, p. 275.
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the Sura al-Araf in a way different from the classic and Su exegetes who advocate the preexistence of the souls. In contrast to the Su approaches, al-Ghazzal in this work follows in the footsteps of Ibn S na by claiming that the human soul is not preexistent but created together with body. So he explicitly interprets the verses at issue in parallel to the view of Ibn S na.125 So al-Ghazzal takes up Ibn S nas psychology, interpreting the related Quranic verses in line with this, and diverging from the notion of the preexistence of soul, held by the classic and Su exegetes.

Conclusion
Examining the views of almost all the schools in his age, al-Ghazzal is a careful reader of Ibn S na in philosophy. He composed works to criticize and refute the views of the philosophers notwithstanding, he was inuenced by philosophy in general and by some of Ibn S nas views and interpretations of various chapters and verses of the Quran in particular. The inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in the interpretation of the verses associated with the demonstration of the existence of God and in the explanation of the divine names and attributes is obvious. Al-Ghazzal reproduces the interpretation of the verse that Ibn S na suggests to establish the ontological proof of the existence of God. Another context in which the inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal is clear is the interpretation of the verses associated with the notion of the gradation of beings. Though he does not adopt Ibn S nas theory of emanation completely, al-Ghazzal however appropriates his gradation, interpreting some verses and sayings of the Prophet along this line. One can observe the clear inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in the interpretation th of the 35 verse of the Sura Nur, too. Ibn S nas interpretation of the terms in the verse, known as the verse of light, as symbolizing the levels of the perceptive powers of man inuenced al-Ghazzal deeply. So he interpreted the verse of light in Mishkat al-Anwar, which he dedicated to the exposition of the verse involved, in terms parallel to the interpretation of Ibn S na. Al-Ghazzal is inuenced by Ibn S na in his psychological views and in his interpretation of the verses associated therewith. He adopted Ibn S nas claim of the simultaneous generation of soul and body, and not the former existing before the latter. He took some verses of the Quran as proof for this view, carrying them beyond the traditional Su lines and closer to the psychology of Ibn S na. All this shows that al-Ghazzal , who refuses to follow any school of thought blindly, did not oppose the views of the philosophers as a whole; on the contrary, he made use of them in his own system of thought. Though he conformed to the conception of the Ahl al-Sunna in the form of Asharism in most cases, he however went off the Asharite
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Al-Ghazzal , al-Madnun al-Sagh r, pp. 359360; M zan al-Amal, p. 143. For more information, consult Mesut Okumus, Kurann ok Boyutlu Okunusu: Imam Gazzali rnegi, Ankara: Ankara Okulu Publishing, 2006, pp. 223232.
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track at times. His notion that the present universe is the best possible universe and his view that soul and body are created simultaneously form two conspicuous and palpable instances of this. The inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in connection with hermeneutics appear in his works on both the Islamic rules on transactions and on spirituality. The inuence of Ibn S nas interpretations of the Quranic verses on al-Ghazzal is quite obvious in his such works as Mishkat al-Anwar, M zan al-Amal, Kimya-yi Saadat, al-Arba n, and al-Maqsad al-Asna. This inuence is far more conspicuous in his al-Madnun al-Sagh r which he wanted to be prevented from the public circulation. As for the views occurring in Maarij al-Quds that is attributed to al-Ghazzal , they are set forth entirely along the lines of Ibn S na. However, since al-Ghazzal s authorship of this work is doubtful, we ignored the views and interpretations in it.

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