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Conscience Introduction Once I started my attempt in formulating ontology (study of beings) I would like to extend it to a brief exposition of my opinions

about the nature of conscience (in the sense of knowledge) which had eventually dictated the branching towards the mentioned study. I am not though fully aware of whether I am acting as a genuine businessman in the field of editions for I do not perceive the subject to mark any remarkable sales demand! Perhaps you had better consider this attemp as my sweet vengeance against all those of the modern greeks who in the first place indulge themselves into gloating about the intellectual feats of some of the ancient greeks while they do not exhibit any real interest for those feats in themselves beyond their manipulation to achieve a certain social status and to obtain a particular trade advantage. It is for that reason exactly that these modern greeks do not exhibit similar performance for themselves. How could they have acted in similar ways anyway! Under this mentality of business undertaker! They are a classical example of all those that are pompous about the ancient prophets in the same time that stone away the contemporary ones. Subject The intellectual ability as a fundamental ontological one , at least in humans (certainly not only in humans) involves the abitity to consider together several objects. The result of such a consideration can be termed as conscience. I call that ability fundamental in the sense of its participation to the definition of beings along with the other abillities for communication and action. However, since to my opinion intellectual ability works in a reciprocal manner , meaning that the mind rather distinguishes one object from another rather than it recognizes an object in an absolute manner, then considerating together is a core trait of the intellectual abillity. Considering together may be classified into considering together in space , that is simultaneously , or considering together in time as a succession of phases. All that is meaningfull under the assumption of clarity of consideration since confusion cancells the discerning result of consideration. Is there any fundamental difference about considering in time as compared to considering in space? The field of application of these ideas is consicense where the answer must lie as I believe. Conscience can be regarded as the result of perception of the colours of senses. Senses constitute the primary supplier of the intellect by whose contribution the intellect is secured and does not wander about without the capacity to check upon its results. Actually there can be no sprouting of intellect without the contribution of senses , althought at a later phase of ablactation the intellect can be distorted in the direction of cutting the ends towards senses therefore becoming unverifiable. Considering together in the structure of conscience defines the space of conscience while the possibility of change of the a particular load of the space of conscience points to time succession within conscience. Conscience as product of the intellect involves both space and time for the perceived colors , or objects that exhibit those colors. In that respect there seems to be no unbridged separation between the quality of space and that of time in the structure of conscience, since if one could have perceived everything in the same time then the time dimension would have degenerated into space dimension.. The time dimension is therefore linked to the observer, the specific conscience that is that perceives things, and , given always the prerequisite of clarity of consideration , what makes the difference between the one temporal and the many perhaps spatial dimensions is the introduction of the causality principle in our world of perception according to which a certain group of causes yiels in a determinate way a specific result. The causality principle is for the time dimension whatever clarity of colors is for the space dimensions. The causality principle may facilitate but not necessarily provide the space illustration of clarity by yielding different results from different causes and the clarity in space may dictate a particular result after some time but not in an obligatory manner. Both the causality principle and the space lucidity consitute the complete system of clarity assumption for the conscience when that applies to it. The static differentiation in space and the dynamic differentiation in time provide not

only for the mutuallity of the distinguishment of objects but for the ability of that distinguishment to vary, that is for the ability of the perceived objects to change. Moreover the ability to perceive something within conscience that changes under the same identity can be compared with the ability to perceive several things in space as a whole. Only can the link of something that is considered as the particular cause to something else that is considered as the specific result help differentiating between the former and the latter. That sounds reasonable enough since if you were allowed to form any possible consideration connection of the causes towards results, including the causes themselves then you would obtain the space pattern , that is the removal of the differentiating quality between time and space causes time to subside into space. In this context of contemplations one can inquire into certain things and cultivate the formulated questions into answers. Let me start with some specific examples: -while being asleep an individual acts and moves but maynot after recall or recalls dimly of the acted process. Additionally one may feel things during sleep time as for example the pressure from a hard object but in a complete different and imaginary context than the actual lay out of things or one may not feel other objects at all. -After an accident one may loose any memory of the event and its consequences alhtough one might have reportedly been consciensously interacting with its enviorment during the forgotten time. The above are examples of an orientation of the investigation of the concept of conscience as the result of intellect. These can be refined to questions such as: How can one be sure of a subject's consciousness? Why to search for a subject that exhibits concience? Is consciense an isolated property or it describes a relation of the subject to its environment? How space and time notions are introduced in the conscience structure? How is the subject able to to identify a 'color' of the senses at one moment with the color perceived at the same space position at another moment? Usually to determine the sonsciousness level of a subject which then becomes an object of investigation the monitoring of its behaviour and its changes is employed. That is a recourse is taken to the determination of the interaction of the subject with its environment. However enclaves of imaginary conscience , as the previous examples may have hinted upon ,which accept different contexts of localization as is the case of dreams may be considered when the individual may not interact with the its observed by third environment. Though it surely interacts inside its imanigary environment with other imaginary objects. Or the interaction may exist but may be quite restricted.. Could that leave open the possibility of concience being a result of an automated process, in the lack of interaction with the subject's environment? Yet more, it is commonly obvious that neither the senses organs nor the motion limbs of our body are necessary for the conscience to emerge. One can close the eyes and continue to imagine the landscape that had seen previously or one's motion within it and to make decisions upon it. It is evident therefore that conscience uses the senses and instructs the limbs but it can be quite independent from all those. Nevertheless conscience structure is modified by the senses and the work of the limbs is regulated by conscience. Without the senses and motion equipment conscience cannot be checked upon and accordingly cannot acquire sufficient depth and extent. It is coincidental and isolated and discontinued, that is without the ends that could lead beyond and beneath a surface. The observation that the conscience enclaves such as dreams accept different contexts within which their content might occur is important for it suggests the way of elimination of controversial elements in the overall conscience structure of a certain subject. Furthermore it indicates that conscience when studied is in need of a context and does not appear in an absolute manner, without any context. Conscience is a fundamental aspect of beings but emerges out of the relations with other beings. In the case of dreams or other such rather autonomous conscience enclaves it appears that this relation is not deep and extensive enought and can be compared with the usefullness of a picture that can decorate many diffent places. But in any case it is the product of mutual differentiation of objects and the discrimination betwen the objects and the subject even when the big part of those objects forms the hidden infrastructure and scaffolding of conscience manifestation just as it happens with the picture's material. The material elements of a picture in this metaphor coming together in a certain way start

'glowing' and showing the picture. At any rate the properties of the perception manifest themselves even within the frame of a fragmented and detached conscience and without the interference of any external excitement by the senses. Which means that these conscience enclaves do not stop being structured as space and time loaded with all the colors that the senses equipment may provide excitement for perhaps in a somewhat faded manner. This leads to the conclusion that the colors in the strict sense or the sounds do not require radiation or vibrations respectively in order to emerge within the frame of conscience. They are subjective representations of the reality. When the element of subjectivity is removed then we get to the objective part which then may supply the scaffolding for the impression in the mind of another subject. Moreover the objective part of the information does not become altered , increased or decreased with pieces of information because of the subjective part of the object. A quick proof of this follows: If we are to keep the names of the colors that the eyes expose to our mind , but in a way so that when two subjects with intellect can commuicate over an overlapping part of the space and time of their consciences they can refer to the same name but with permutated subjective impact for one of them for two colors , say red and green, then they can talk as if they lived in parallel worlds meaning the same things but perceiving them in differnt ways. In particular if the individuals had the names red and green for colors but at the same place in space and at the same moment in time one of them perceives under the term red the green color and under the green term the red color where and when (this is the important part of the proof ) the other perceives the red and green colors respectively then they use the same language to discern the same things in space and time but in different subjective ways. That means that the objective part of information does not change since after all the same things are perceived by both individuals and the discerning capability remains the same. Through this narrow consideration no difference could be known and each individual could never know the difference that emerges due to the subjective part of the information. To know the difference in perception one must turn the two individuals from subjects to objects of study and then try to find the correspondence of feelings to a specific mode of function of the mind (meaning hte biological mind) , In all likelyhood, and that serves the notion of the plasticity of the mind (it is the idea that if parts of the mind are removed then the rest of the mind finds ways to make up up to a point for the loss) that sort of correspondence cannot be strictly located at certain areas of the mind but it must be between a conscience field and the state of function of the mind as a whole which glows then to present the subject with the structure of concience. The existence of different located centers can be explained by the exisetence of particular located sources of excitement of the mind through the different channels of the senses which then has to be distributed in a specific way to the rest of the mind in order that the subject who bears the conscience becomes enlightened. Ofcourse the existence of this specific apparatus that activates the mind as a whole provides for the specific qualities that can be perceived under the broad term: senses colors, protracting the use of the term color to apply to all of our senses. The way that the mind then glows is beyond our understanding not in some magical way but because that refers to the fundamental properties of beings , to the core of substance which is well beyond the color crust of the mutual differentiation between objects, one from another and therefore because it excedes that sort of conscience's capabilities. Since we refer to perception units, colors as we called them , another clarification seems necessary at this moment. One specific color simplifies a composite effect from the point of view of organization of the space and time loads. When we perceive the red color for instance for a place in space during a time period then we perceive as a simple and static quality whatever is actually pulsing as a composite effect beneath the surface of simplicity. Ofcourse that sort of simplification cannot be arbitray but it must correspont to a specific mode of function inside the mind of the perceiving subject, if things are to be considered with clarity. In addition the instantaneous (am instant is a theoretical notion since any instance possesses duration and is perceived without such only by the employment of the afore-mentioned simplifying effect of perception) identification of the same space load over several time instances can only be achieved on the basis of the mind impact or

physiological impression to the subject that perceives. It is the qualities perceived that define their limits and the shapes across the space and the phases along time for in a different case how the subject could have known that the content of the shapes is preserved through time! In fact for a single mind the same mode of action corresponds to the same glowing of perception effects and in that respect the qualities are given for that mind so that it can build up its conscience of shapes and phases. There lies the infrastructue of identification of a color along time or across space provided that the correspondence between mode of function for the mind and the state of its conscience is kept unchanged under conditions of clarity so that neather the space lucidity nor the causality principle is contravened. And in a way the perception of the environment becomes the necessary extension of the subject's self or the subject's self the other way arround becomes the necessary center of the perception of the particular environment. It mustn't be that the environment causes the subject to exist or the subject causes its surroundings to exist since we cannot apply the causality principle in simultaneous settlements but it is about the mutual determination of the subject and the objects in its conscience which is somewhat different to the differentiation between objects in the same conscience since the subject remains invisible to itself save for its parts that become objects within its conscience. This corroborates the assumption that the subject is in a sense whatever it perceives with a unified conscience pointing out to one subject , the unit of perception. In a similar manner the subject is as much hidden as the objects' core behind the color shell which are only known as an extension of substance that must suport the color exhibition. One must be very carefull with those matters because they can prove to be quite abstruse and can easily derail to become paradoxes. Up to this point our thoughts describe feelings as simplifications of complex processes which constitute together the field of conscience. The quality of feelinngs becomes useful to the subject when time and space is assigned to it, that is if it integrates into its conscience. However it can be usefull for the subject in an unconscious manner if the process behing it integrates with processes of the body bypassing conscience. Then we have to stude the indirect effect to consciousness of processes at levels of unconsciousness or subsconciousness of varying degress. In any case the perception of simple qualities as feelings which constitute the conscience of a subject exhausts the perceptive mechanism of mind meaning that it doesn't leave space or time for anything else (another proof of the relative recognition of objects) though within a studying subect's conscience that needs a context just because objects withing conscience appear in a context.These qualities dictate all about space and time of conscience of a specific knowlegdge apparatus (mind) with different feelings as the different impacts of the environment on the mind (there applies the causality principle under the clarification that we mean the environment of the studied object in the context of another conscience and not the environment of the object within its conscience) which show as simple qualities of the same color corresponding to the same impact. Then the distinciton between same or different can be built in an objective manner beyond the subjective part of the information for subjects to be able to communicate with each other. In the same manner the diffence between the objects and the subject can be built in parallel to the color crust of feelings and under the assumption that both the subject and the objects extend a hidden substance to their chromatic shell. Which means that within conscience and in parallel to the perception of feelings a function takes place that assigns these qualitites to beings either the subject or objects and determines them so that the co-feeling dimension emerges within conscience and is continually refined by the data of the senses or the inference mechanism. The co-feelings term is used in this context as a tool to describe conditions of the mind that usually are characterized as either emotions or desires besides the condition which is called knowledge both of which must be knowledge in some way if knowledge is to be used as the term which describes the building blocks of conscience. Beings , as the loads of space and time within conscience are called , only exist within conscience. It is reasonable to suppose such a condition since one has to suppose the considering together ability. What is not clear from the beginning is why conscience should be beared by a being while from the mentioned above there isn't any fundamental distinction between objects and subjects beyond the attribution of conscience to a certain being. Beings serve as the commons substance so

that the speficic conscience structure of different subjects , including the case of a subject that studies another subject in its own consciousness , can be overlapped or integrated to a single structure of conscience. Beings become known because they owe the ability to produce feelings in the same extent that possess the alility to know feelings. The subject itself in its consciousness occupies space and time for that matter, and it can cause co-feelings (the using of feelings to determine beings) . That way the self consciousness is not separable from a specific consciensous context. Since there is not any fundamental difference between the subject and objects beyond the role in a specific conscience then each being must possess the ability to bear conscience exactly to the extent that is defined in a certan context and assuming that it can define clearly itself. But why each concience to be assigned to a certain being? Exactly because the simpification under the feelings instrumentation points to that and only that. A paradox that can show in the direction of these thoughts is when the self perception is based on the impact , or change that the mind of the subect undergoes so that for it to know itself must change. There comes to assist us the essential difference between the role of subject and the objects within conscience and the fact that beings , both subects and objects are more than their colored shell within conscience. The subject perceives objects and the change on its knowing device is the operation by which it perceives the objects. So for it to know itself directly from the feelings becomes impossilbe as beings are well beyond that. But for it to know part which it may attribute to itself is feasile. The more it knows about itself the more objects and their operation are exposed to its study as parts of itself. There happens a progressive objectification of the subject which is then perceived as an organism of objects which can be felt. That process has limits and the prevention of the above paradox appears to be the main limit. For one can measure is own blood pressure but if one had invented and insturmentation to feel its own biological mind as a sustem of nerves he could have never felt the glowing conscience of that mind at object's time since at subject's time (observastion time) a conscience of the same being is already glowing , and between object's time and subject's time there is always some elapsed period. . After the above contemplations we can explain how subjects can view an aspect of themselves without knowng that it is they, as for example but not exclusively there when memore lapse is suffered. The underlying ground is that we do not know the whole of us beyond what we can make out along the process of objectification of ourselves. It is evident before all that those feelings that we usually call sentiments like joy or sadness or other feelings that are classified as volitions like desires or disgusts are something more than the internal impact of an environmental excitement: they detemine conditions of the subject itself. However these feelings for that matter sometimes are characterised by a similar simplicity and directness to that of ordinary feelings excited by senses. And they are co-feelings in the sense tha tthey define the subject. They are not clearly the product of an interpretation of ordinary feelings in the context of conscience with respect to the subject.. They are felt as qualities that do not accept any interpretation or different reasoning. Moreover there are such co-feelings that cannot be clearly classified as either sentiments or desires. Such is the case of pain which is rather a mixture of a sentiment and a strong desire rather than a clear sentiment or a clear desire. That points to the fact that such a classification is not absolute and that beneath all these categories of building blocks of conscience lies a common infrastructure. Co-feelings that have the quality of ordinary feelings in terms of their immediate nature and simplicity. This is particularly evident to us when we wonder while aching about the reasons or the utility of such an orderal. Which means that we do not understand the reasons for it, we can't interprete the unfortunate reality, while we experience the feelings. It seems that the story of co-feelings is not an easy one to be told. Anyhow the story of sentiments and desires as parts of the structure of conscience is readily understood if one resorts to the notion of task performance in the light of conscience: we have the knowledge of the task as a starting point and then we have the disposition of the subject before the task which is described by the color of desire to perform the task and after the task conclusion of the task we have the disposition of the subject with respect to the result which may be the exultation of success or the sorrow of the failure. This is task-centric aspect within conscience that can drive this complex of co-feelings about the subject. Another quality of those co-feelings is that

they cannot exist out of a feelings context out of which they are meaningless. We can infer from the feelings nature of some of those co-feelings that the self-awareness is not always the product of some intellectual process or inference but it is the more fundamental and immediate and primary inside the being's conscience , in a determining manner. The subject cannot feel itself but every feeling has a determining for the subject value which is called the co-feeling aspect of the feeling. And it is exactly what we should expect about the subect since the feeling simplification happens after the impact in the subject's mind in a clearly subjective manner. The subject cannot feel itself in the same simplifying manner that it perceives the objects under ordinary feelings since that wouldn't permit for composite structure of consciece, for how could it then have supported that composite nature of conscience of different impacts for each excitement! That means that the self notion is always about an organism within conscience and not some particular spot of the structure of that conscience. It has been already infered that there is not any absolute distinguishment between categories of co-feelings and that all possess something of the nature of ordinary feelings in terms of their directness. All that makes us suppose that each ordinary feeling has the capacity to determine the subject and therefore it extends to comprise some co-feeling property. We all know that the same conditions that produce sorrow or pain for a certain being within its conscience, are indiferrent with respect to co-feelings for another subect . This means that the cofeelings as expected are highly subjective as they determine in a direct manner the subject and therefore cannot be felt by another subject for they bear no relation to it. But we have then pushed through the idea that the subject cannot feel itself. Insead we have come to believe that with each feeling the subject completes the feeling of itself and that seems more reasonable since with the perception of each object beneath certain feelings the self notion is completed in a manner that is immediate and direct and fundamental with the directness of feelings. Ofcourse that happens as long as the clarity assumption is not violated and no mean circle of perception is introduced. Another conscern that emerged through this paragraph of controversies was about the case when the subject perceives an aspect of itself without the ability to classified it as self. Then we see the the co-feeling value of an arrangement of feelings is not mandatory and that the integration nature of the co-feelings becomes more evident. But for a feeling not to have a mandatory co-feeling value means a serious blow to the previous attempts to connect the feelings with a direct self determing value. That cooncern is fed as well by the observation that the same conditions produce that co-feelings for a subject are neutral with respect to that formation for another subject. Given that the co-feelings are not independent from feelings we have to refine the explanation further on and we are left to rely upon the integration notion of co-feelings pretty much in the same way perhaps that the colors of conscience integrate to the structure of conscience. In the case of pain there are channels of perception that produce that feeling which can then be intercepted. In addition to the previous case there is the similar case of delightful feelings as during the orgasmic phase of sexual activity but in the positive direction if pain was considered negative. If two subjects perceive an overlapping part of space and time through of their consciences it is exactly as expected that the co-feeling value of feelings differs since the same space and time is seen through the impact to different minds. Each feeling possesses a co-feeling value inside the brain after the idea that the brain glows as a whole to show conscience. But that co-feeling value may not express but within a certain degree of integration with other feelings co-feeling value. Or it may turn to a part of a composite co-feeling effect. For example when more than one limbs are sore the effect is a composite pain effect. In the case of internal organs that do not produce normally a feeling the cofeeling value seems to be independent contrary to the earlier assumptions unless we consider the complex nature of feelinng that possess co-feeling values once again and then we observe the marked importance of the co-feeling value of the feeling of the organ against the feeling value of the organ. This is totally corroborated by the different color of the pain as to the object characterization which is the organ in that case, the co-feeling colors or qualities of pain that refer to the subject. The qualities of pain that are the result of objectification of the subjects self permit the spacial and timely location of pain usually in contrast to non-pain areas. Since the important part in the complex is that of the cofeeling value we would not expect that the pain differs much between organs which is actually the

observed situation. Beings are perceived within the context of a conscience by their feelings that differ from each other across the space simultaneously or change along time. That sort of mutuality of appearacne in the space of the conscience of the several feelings is not so much determinate as to prevent a quality to exist in different settings of other qualities. Therefore while the conscience space is characterized by the mutuality of the identification of the feelings with respect to other differing feelings the felt qualities and the beings beneath that colored surface tend to give some idea of absolute bearing of the qualities. Yet more, if one closes the eyes everything becomes black and the quality of the black color falls into our perception without the requirement for any other color. But even if no other color could have been perceived or even if no other channel of senses had been available in a setting like that through a simple quality it would have emerged the distinction between the subject and a simple object. Considering therefore differing qualities of feelings acrosse the space and along time is somethng different from the determination of beings behind that setting that manifest themselves within the context of a conscience by their mutual determination. Ofcourse beings go beyhond their chromatic surface within a conscience and not well understood or not at all understood changes happen to them in that consciencous context. If a change occures to the brain then instantly the perceived environment in subject's conscience changes without the needfullness that the causality principle apply . Ofcourse the preceived environment is different aspect to the environment for the subject turned to object within the context of another conscience of a subject that studies the previous subject. In that way things might be thought to have no reason to change , but the existence of a quality within diffent settings, the depth of objects beyond the surface of appearance within a conscience allow both for changes and for the spread of changes in a dynamic way. Additionally under conditions of presumed clarity of perception and knowledge the changes in the structure of conscience that a subject perceives need time and do not overlap towards confusion. Therefore the causality principle may apply well as presumed and the model escapes the trap of stagnation. A necessary correction that happened along this paragraph was about the mutual determination of beings and not of the qualities through which these are felt in the context of a conscience. The limits of being in space and time assure of that mutuality which is observed across the limit. If we were to push these ideas to some ideals by turning some properties to their extreme values we could distinguish between a conscience of only space where everything is perceived statically because there is no potential for change because everything are simultaneously apparent and a coscience of a single object beside the subject with eternal changes that make up for the lost information by the simplicity of space. The idea of everything known in advance points to a unique such conscience that includes everything. But the idea of everything known with the eternal course of time points to diffent subjects of such an elementary perception according to the sequence of perceptual events. This idea is more problematic one in terms of space arrangement, since it does not allow for acurate space conception between the subject and the possible different objects that seem overlapping along time. Both ideas are ideal situations and cannot be acomplished within our conscience as real structures. However this extremities are useful in determining the strength of our ideas in the present study included the ideas about feelings and their co-feeling value. After supposing a conscience of flat knowlegde of everything one must further assume that the causality principle holds through the lack of evidence for the opposite allegation and further more assume that the causality principle can be applied in many different ways. Therefore one should not have expected that the subjects of elementary perception though eternal due to the attempt to include everything can exhaust every possiblitiy. And the many different ways of application of the causality principle do make sense then in terms of materialization to beings. In the case of the flat undestanding of everything the subject that perceives everything in an absolute manner , if any such subject is linked to such a conscience, shouldn't glow an aspect of the reality through through special coloring of it. If ever there was an objective perception of beings beyond subjective restrictions that is the one! Ofcourse then that conscience lay-out can't be attbibuted to a being confined to a particular spot of that superspace. For then that spot must have been beyond the subject's capacity to perceive objects

contrary to its knwing everyhting. That conscience must be attributed to a subject that exists everywhere but can't be to any ordinary time and space synthesis of beings. The whole of it can exist everywhere in the same way that the product of a synthesis of parts of a machine is the machine that spans all the space where parts exists, yet at the location of every part one in parallel thinks of all the machine. Now this is no disregard for that subject , at least no more than the baby's groping at the face of its parent. And no parent would ever punish his or her child for attempting to feel the parent. The equivalence of space and time dimensions suggests the opossite situation as well: space should be able of becoming time as an application of the causality principle, hence the assumtion for the beings of elementary perception. It is worth investigating how space should show in such a being's conscience. Ofcoure at any stage of perception the subject is able of distingushing between itself and objects that do not occupy clear spatial locations. Therefore it should not be able of clean localization of itself in that conscience. It is like the sense of smell deprived of the any spatial hint. In a way that subject fill the whole space of its conscience and the structure of that conscience does not give a clean idea of its space let alone any spatial extentions. The causality principle is in full effect along a specific materialization but there isn't any sense of options for choice. There isn't much foreseeing capacity as well! That sort of subject is more evidently defined as the ability to glow the content of its concience. Since there isn't any choice then there must be no clear discern between joy or sorrow for the result. Consequently the appearance of the specifing cofeeling value of desires must sink back to the an indicernible state of sheer knowledge within conscience. Can a conscience hold in a unifying way everything that can be born? Can a subject's conscience hold everything including the subject? Can a subject be defined upon itself? That is certainly a bad definition that does not produce anything useful. Therefore a subject is only defined upon the objects which are given birth within its conscience and bear definition value for the subject..That is the subject that perceives everything allocates space and time in its conscience for every possible object. But the subject itself cannot be classified as object within the context of any concience nor can be allocated space and time in that context. For then it would have resulted as a differentiation from its environemnt beyond it where that could not have existed. And its view would have downgraded into a shallow aspect of the picture which is not the complete and full story . What about the volition or emotion within that concience then? There are many different paths of causality succesions but no choice again in the sense that every choice is made within that context by the included objects rathern than by the subject.. Here we have neither the desire for fulfillment nor the emotional check upon that progress. But we have the provision for every object and if that is called love then that love bears no relation to desires or sentiments. There pops in the popular verse that love is about what you do not about what you say or feel or desire. Love is the contribution to creation. Love is not the attraction or the admiration. To reproduce humans depend on attraction and admiration feelings that manifest themselves in courting. Those feelings are not the individuals' love for each other but a wish and a reward respectively. Finish This aspect about perception is not conclusive for many issues. Still more it may be wrong in many ways. Even yet it may have not any practical value beside the value of demystification that waves away the possibilities on manipulation of these issues. Since folk that wish to manipulate choose to enhance their opinion through the use of an imposing authority which remains mysterious. Anyway this point of finish delineates more a limit than a conclusion. Not only have the composers of music the privilege of producing unfinished work with some market value though! Besides politicians usually work for the benefit of society in unfinished tasks. For example they fight unemployment but for pure quality matters of the scenario avoid the hollywood style happy ending. They have developed a notion about the justification of it. It is called feasibility. But that notions tends to be quite obscure in explaining how some are able of pulling the cow's (=society's) breast to get tones of milk and others find the milking quite an ordeal! Appendix A. What is the determining factor of where self lies within the space of consceince? It is evident

that when the perception of space separates self from others then the perception of space bears selfdefining value in parallel to the others-defining value. But in order to know the subject's self or the objects' selves within the subjects conscience there must be some prosessing of the information gathered by senses to produce the notion of objects by extending the depth and expanding the surface of direct feelings. There is in the space structure that points to the subject of the conscience since that structure may as well be obvious within the context of another conscience. There is however subjective value inside direct feelings because they are about how the subject produces an aspect of the objective space. If we consider the case of a subject that suffers an injury we may beyond any doubt witness that the same picture that involves no pain to ourselves might be combined with severe pain for the subject of a conscience. Clearly we do not perceive that same data within the common space of our and its concience. Moreover those data are not linked to the visional perception of the injured part of the subject's body. And those data's transmission to the integrating brain can be intercepted with drugs for instance resulting in no feeling of pain while the body part remains even severely injured. On the other hand each feeling alone though direct possesses small value as an information bit even when that information is about the objects around. It is the integration of feelings within a conscience either directly into conscience's space and time or after some processing that produces large amount of information. That integration permits the expansion and extension beyond the direct feelings surface that utilizes the co-feelings' value in determining beings as the substance of the felt surface. Taken granted that beings are mutually defined with the reciprocation occuring eigther between the subject and objects or among obects within the context of a conscience that each emerges in contrast to the others to the felt surface then each feeling bears co-feeling bits of information. One can't assume that a being is absolutely defined outside any context of relations to other beings for that eliminates any reason for that sort of consideration. However there is qualitative difference in the relationship between a subject and the objects it perceives to the relationship between two objects that are allocated parts of the same space and may not perceive each other at all or may possess a very transient line of bordering to each other which might not go beyond the range of a subjective aspect. For example sun touches earth as he sets in the west but that touch is not real in terms of space contact. The aspects of the sun and the earth touch each other within the field of vision which constists of neihbouring angles of information transmitting visible light rays. Such ray does not bear any means to define the position of the optical message along the ray itself , and that is the reason that we experience mirroring effects where a bent ray does not reveal any information about this bending. To conclude this first appendix , the really true mutualism in beings definition is revealed when the fundamental properties of theirs are examined. Beings are defined under this study as combined ability for perception of data, communication of data and action (change of data) . . That is the reason that these properties are labeled fundamental once they are the absolutely necessary general frame for a being's definition. In fact the perception part renders beings as subjects of concience and the communication part renders them as objects of conscience. The action part supports both the subject's role and the object's role if the change conscerns themselves or not respectively. Moreover whatever is perceived bears its equivalent in terms of communication within another concience's context and an underlying equivalent in terms of action in both cases. That aspect of affairs is not to be confused with the cause and effect sequence of changes. A feeling corresponds to a situation in the brain which then glows the feeling.This situation is a complex activity of the brain which unfolds at different levels of organization from causes to purposes (more analytic levels of organization provides the causes of phenomena while more synthetic levels provide the purposes , while conditions might be used in more proper sense for the prerequisites to a result). Conditions provided by an activity outside the brain which may have taken part in a complete different time and space setting ( for example when one observes stars through a telescope he sees with reference to the present what has taken place in the past exactly at the time that the rays which were emitted by the star began to travel until they reached the observer's eye through the telescope. ) may in turn yield as a result a situation in the mind which then will glow the feeling in the context of the subject's conscience. In an oposite way the situation in one's mind may provide the prerequisite for an activity

of one's body which along a chain from conditions to result might produce the situation in another brain that will glow the corresponding feeling within its conscience. In this way the first mind communicated a message (data sent) to the second mind through a chain of action. Data are conceived in the context of a conscience but may or may not be apparent to a subject. Not every bit of data is a feeling to a being but each feeling represents the most primitive and direct form data for the construction of the conscience. Feelings are primitive in the sense of the starting point for processes that yield more sophisticated data, especially encoded, and direct in the sense that though they simplify the perception of an activity they correspond directly to an activity without the need of any other interference. B. In this second appendix to this study I will refer to the question of what renders accumulated information within states of the brain legitimate to be conceived. We are all aware that as the brain glows as conscience not everything that lies behind the curtains that form the colored surface shows itself within perception , rather it is that the details behind the perceived colors as feelings are concealed. But then what governs what is hidden and what is a feeling? Ofcourse what is felt pertains to the indentity of the conscience and the subject that bears that conscience. So it's pretty meaningless to try to figure out a theory about what is felt without any consideration of the subject that feels. One can go as far as telling that the subject's senses function in that way because this function is part of the definition of what the subject is. But that is a form of knowledge that though true does not give any insight to the subject's brain and given that we really do not know subjects unless we investigate them and to the extent that we do that then the above definition of subjects (describing what they can sense ) can become extremely theoretical and not really aplicable. That sort of explanation does not give a clue about the causes in the analysis of the brain or causality laws that may be discovered at some of these levels that then would allow prediction of the states of the mind and its glare of conscience. How are we to perfom an identification of the subject and in the same time a formulation of its complete picture based on the local knowledge that we get ? What makes two subjects differing in perception or perceiving the same things? I believe the answer to this lies in the fact that the feelings nature is the nature of a task which manifests itself in the concience of subject as a simplified color. Any such task refers to the brain's operation thought it encodes a lot of what it is going on outside the brain . Actually the sense organs are burdened with the job of securing this meaning of the brains state with respect to the outside world. That task may be seen through different structure and function levels but some levels are more revealing about the task and fitted to its description. As an example when one examines a machine though there are many ways to dissect theoretically the machine entity into parts that are connected together only a specific analysis reveals immediately the functional relation of some parts that is essential to the machine's operation understanding. If you try and analyse a car machine without respect to the integrity of its operating parts, therefore dividing the space of the fuel tank for example in that analysis then that sort of coining makes it harder to acquire the role of the fuel tank and to achieve this end you must reunite the separately considered parts to a whole again. At this point one might ask this as well: if one were not interested in the transportation function of a car then there would be absolutely no reason for its mind to dwell at a certain analysis level that explained that function of a car through the operation of its engine and the way that this rotates the wheels. For the brain that interest lies in serving the body which however is not able to enjoy that service, rather the brain enjoys the service it provides to the body (including the brain) . Obviously one cannot clearly separate the brain from the rest of the body at least without extreme difficulty in terms of pain for example. Parts of the brain may be overwhelmed with bits of information that each could have showed directly as a feeling within conscience but that does not happen and all this information stays beyond conscience though it may affect somehow the surface of perception within conscience. But if one had managed to assemble an indentical brain brain in an identical state to the state of the subject's brain then that brain should have glowed as conscience the same things. The fact that feelings represent tasks means the subject feels changes. And that is the best fitted way to govern

the functions of the body or the functions of the brain itself as its parts interrelate to each other and a state of operation determines to an extent the next stage of its operation. However even at this point of interpretation of phenomena about intellect one is not really at a position to explain the absolute nature of colors . The sort of glare that the brain emits as conscience goes deep beyond the surface of things as they appear within any limited conscience and is closely linked to the substance that exhibits that surface. Actually as it has already been said these colors define the subject that bears the conscience . The subject ,being as that , within the domain of ontology has already been defined as a complex capacity to perceive, communicate and act. Given that last observation one should not expect that the action -rather than using the term task- which is simplified to an impression of the senses be completely determined. But this is something different from the cabling of neural networks that can stimulate a muscle or through muscles a capable of motion limb. At higher levels of integration where purproses of things at lower levels are sought things can be missed or ignored through the simplification of an action into the quality of an impression. If one considers the case of light then one may convince oneself that at small intervals of frequencies of the visible spectrum the color impression is the same. Which means that the action which corresponds to an impression can vary. However the impression is definite. This makes it evident that it is not at the immediately below levels of analysis that the impression is defined. But details at even deeper levels of analysis are important for the characterization of the impression. Additionally one must take into consideration that impressions are collected as aspects of the world (complementary in the frame of conscience) and not treating the world as an absolutely discerned from self object. Beyond a particular aspects. When a threshold effect is discovered that can filter out differences so that the impression is preserved then that explains things in the particular level but in any case it has been proven impossible to explain the colors of impressions beside shapes. The notion of defining a sensation including infinite many levels of analysis for consideration of phenomena that evade the grosser higher level of analysis (nevertheless the simple color of the sensation indicates states of the mind and not states of objects in conscience and the action that corresponds to them, though the states of the mind are affected possibly by the states of several objects ) has become powerful through this course of contemplations but may contradict several outcomes from natural sciences though not directly but at the level of their interpretation. For example with respect to the conspicuous physics of quanta approach., the interpretation for a compulsory loss of determinate nature of phenomena as a universal characteristic and not as a characteristic of the observer impinges on that notion. On the other hand if one adopted an attitude of relating quanta theories to inherent observer's weaknesses then they would only infer that understanding the exact nature of sensations goes well beyond the capability of a subject furnished with limited conscience. Nor does all this mean anything specific with respect to supernatural phenomena as the life beyond this life. It is clearly undestandable that the coloring of reality applies perhaps in the same way with different animals. Ofcourse according to any reasonable approach progression of life beyond death is almost equivalent as a notion with the extension of life before birth. That happens because the reason which might support life beyond death though unknown would not differ from the reason that supports life before birth. And in few words that reasoning involves the argument that life is not restricted to its manifestation within this world. It is simply a question that our minds are not capable of producing a credible answer beyond speculations. To say that probability and a probalistic distribution determines the frequencies of phenomena without maintaining any reasoning that supports this notion , just out of an attempt to fit theories to data, does not justify a probabilistic approach as a universal approach rather than a subjective approach (with reference to the capabilities of a certain observer) . It is a pity when natural sciences lead the way of philosophy since it is then that both philosophy and natural sciences forfeit their true purpose. Then data are distorted to fit into our theories and fictional prodcuts come to the point of confusion with science. As is the case with all the otherwise called scientific theories for the genesis of the universe and such things. Natural sciences come then to a state of stagnation and people tend to believe that all that oughts to be known is known. Ofcourse in the line of such approaches people manipulate other people and certain people make a lot of money. One should always recall that for two thousand years Aristotle had been

considered the only true science and that clearly is an indicator for stagnation. When man turns to believing that they know perhaps all things but little then stagnation and arrogance and manipulation follow if they haven't already been so. One must recognize when true science revolutions happen against when the application of the already known is just extended to its fullest size in order to make the most of it perhaps in an accelerated manner of resolving technical issues. Only then does one know that we know nothing compared to what is left to be known.

C The colour of the impressions through the sensor organs. By the term colour of the impressions we certainly do not mean the actual colour in the narrow sense of the feeling whose creation is influenced by the eyes. Each sensor organ , be it located or scattered troughout the body , is connected with a specific set of colours , certainly not in the visual sense, that signals the state of the mind as is influenced by the excitement of that sensor organ. The lack of the excitement, the rest state of the organ is connected with a corresponding colour as well , let it be for example the dark colour which the mind sees through eyes or the silence colour which the mind sees through ears. The resting colour for a sensor organ is equivalent to the other colours in terms of the amount of the information that is enveloped within the influence of the organ but it is special in the sense that it does not represent an excitement of the organ , that is a specific condition of the organ being the negation for the occurence of any excitement of the organ. We can't say that the world would have been red had the lack of agents to excite the eye been the case. In that case the world would be black. In a similar way silence is the starting point for the brain to mark sounds aided by the ears. Silence is the state of absence of sounds.Likewise the absence of smell , or taste , or touch mark the negative state for excitemensts of the corresponding sensor organs though there might not be any dedicated word in our languages for those states. This fact perhaps shows the importance of some senses for the language itself. For instance sounds are of fundamental nature in the utterance of the language phrases as well as visions matters for the scripted form of communication. What is realy remarkable with the colours of the senses is that they do not add to the amount of the information percieved. A fair example about that is when the colours are considered under the same set of names but at the same place of space , at the same time , the visual impact to each of two subjects is commuted. That is, both of two subjects may agree to name the colour effect produced by radiation from a certain place of space at certain time as the green colour and equally the same to name the effect of radiation from another place of space at another time as the red colour. That agreement permits them to communicate just fine in terms of colours provided additionally that the perception of colours is consistent in all places and times within limits.. Then if for one of them the experience of the red and that of the green colour are taken to be produced right according to a reference convention but for the other the experience of the red and that of the green colour are taken to be inversed with respect to the impact on the first individual.that state of affairs does not at all influence the communication of the two individuals being the subjective part of the information , provided that every other colour is experienced in the same way by the individuals in question , and neither subject can really tell the two ways of experiencing the red and the green colours apart with reference to the individuals. If the second subject liked to express to the first the fact of feeling green colour where the first feels red and that of feeling red colour where the first feels green that would be equivalent to saying that it feels diffently the same place at the same time with the first but how could be that found out? We have the same parts of the world sensored and the same names for what is sensed there so how the experiences could be told apart? The difference does not lie either to the name or to the spot of the world but in the state of the minds of the subjects. Unless that state of mind becomes the object of examination every effort to tell the experiences appart will be in vain. That is the alteration of the state of the mind due to the excitement of the sensor organs. But even if we could told appart these experiences we could not have possibly by verifying the difference explain the nature of the colour of the feelings against any possibility. Especially when the amount of information that can be processed

through the use of language has limitations. That is another expression for saying that we cannot explain in an absolute manner the nature of the colours. We may only go as far as taking them for granted regarding a subject. The nature of the feelings then being of unlimited depth escapes our comprehension even as we perceive the difference of experiencing them. To simplify the perception of a composite action , bears clearly and by all means , an arbitrary element of choice as to the final result. That correspndence between actions and the feelilngs of them can't happen in a unique manner . That means that each action does indicate the final colour of its feeling.

D Mirages-Illusions-Hallucinations The fact that the impressions gained by the senses actually describe states of the mind underpins the phenomena of mirages or even hallucinations, while perhaps, if I am not very much mistaken, illusions refer to wrong ideas as the outcome of mental processing rather than mental intake. At any rate there is not that unbridged difference between the former and the latter by all accounts. There are situations when the misconception can be most direct and under other circumstances the misconception needs further mental construction. Anyway on the other side of that of the subjet, the side of the objects, many things might happen beyond notice or even with the same impact in the subjects mind. This means that the subject's mind is allowed with several possibilities in many of the times that may explain the data through senses. But why the mind does not remain on the ground of certainty and is engaged into the interpretation? Sometimes forcefully! For if you are looking through a mirror you may become forced to believe that there is something where in the right perspective you would have determined as the inside of the mirror. An extremity of how the states of mind extend and fill , through the perception or imagination and interpretation of its data lies on the side of the dreams or hallucinations. A first answer that pops in my mind about that has to do with the fact that any organism maintains the impact of its surroundings through its senses on its mind with the intention to use it. And in the direction of using it needs to adopt assumptions. There fits the interpetation. When the mind will not perceive the presence of a mirror then it will deal with the reflection on a mirror as the real thing on the imaginary side of the mirror. In this case the assumption is that there is no assumption about or notice of the mirror. In any case the mind of an organism is not made to process things right all the time. Limited in capacity it is built on the basis of forming assumptions and testing them but , and here lies the adaptative importance, in a primarily safe and at the same time fruitful manner. Additionally the complete state of the mind which is not the state of the objects but is affected by their state is decisive to lesser or greater depths for the making of the feelings , since locality of an impression is the way of its integration to the whole and even a simple feeling is analysed in many directions through brain channels to pass its information necessary for that process of integration C Pain Pain is undoubtedly the feeling which forms a negative pole that governs our lives. Pain is more than a threatening feeling and is there so that the threatening feeling cannot be overidden. That happens because a threatening feeling along a course without a real threat at the end of the course would fail to interraupt the destructive course a good many times Furthermore, pain which is reallly an indisputable feeling unlike fear grows by degrees as the damage increases -pain marks a damage that is already there while fear shows the danger of a damage- so that one might step back in time before damage grows too big. I must confess something: that all such contemplation sometimes fails to be scientific when it has become much personal. People attempt always to arrange matters of sorrow in their minds so that the arrangement gets them out of the way temporarily in order to get on with their lives. Nevertheless matters of sorrow and more than anything pain, nomatter how much one has been prepared for them take people by surprise and

shake severly if not destroy completely the structure of their preparation. They are said to destroy life sometimes let alone mental preparations! So there is pain that is sufferable and pain unbearable over a certain period. There is always that point of distinction perhaps depending on the state of the subject and the type of pain as well , which shows that the talks about heroism sometimes if not most of the time is a matter of lack. This is an important clarification against the propaganda that urges people to sacrifice themselves for greater causes in the sense of manipulating them. In the above respect pain is necessary to a form of life that is prone to damages and permits for the correction of many types of damages below a certain level of destruction. Pain is the mark of imperferction however perferction is the mark of no development. The biological effect which corresponds to pain is the affected damage , but not -this is important- not alone. It is the affected damage as is relayed to the brain. It might have been another short of harm that had affected the brain in the same way and created the same feeling of pain. Feelings are always states of mind and their biological correspndence are the states of brain. Pain modifies the behaviour of the subject but when that modification is not combined with a correction potential has little evolutionary impact. The capacity for self repair however increases greatly the survival rates and affects the population in the direction of evolution as well. There comes the critical question: Great pain that accompanies fatal conditions exists because the machinery of pain that creates less pain is there which serves the individuals as well as the species but great pain seems unecessary for there is not any possible usefull reaction then. So an individual that much impaired need not have suffered the accompanying great pain if evolution had had the chance to develop a mechanism of bypassing the pain. To state more clearly the question I ought to ask whether the individual is that much unimportant compared to the population and the evolution branch? That question is not within science as it clearly shows. Population and evolution branch need rigorous individuals and individuals need the survival skills that will determine the evolutionary branch and the population. Another question is : are some individuals of less value than others? Are there any lost souls? Again a non-scientific question. Every individual is eventually lost and yes with respect to a certain type of environment some are of greater value regarding their abilities to survive and reproduce and extend the evolutionary branch. And there are individuals among a population that not only did not manage to complete the life cycle but they did not survive birth. They are there because biological organisms are not born to fit to their environment but they build their fitness to it within their genetic frame and allow for modifications of that frame in the long term to secure the adaptation process beyond the individual. Are these individuals less unique? No! Are they losses along the process of adaptation? Yes in a sense they are casualties. Are they less fortunate? Is there providence? Why them and not others? This may sound different from what I mean it to mark but is a cockroach not so happy as a cat?