LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent. [G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001.

] PONENTE: VITUG, J p: FACTS: Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV No 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. EDACSa Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie. It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence. Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse. On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite. On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the NPQ Page 1

basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case. cDCSTA ISSUE: Whether or not the ground for psychological incapacity is valid. HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and responder valid and subsisting. Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs.Court of Appeals, 2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal. Indeed, there is no merit in the petition. The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family 6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we. aTAEHc WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No Costs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-30061. February 27, 1974.] PONENTE: ANTONIO, J p FACTS: Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1 The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. NPQ Page 2

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that night affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess an ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of official duties. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decisions in People v. Macarandang 2 and People v. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding that on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People v. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be acquitted based on the claims that he is a secret agent assigned by the Governor. HELD: We there held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant was conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must he absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. NPQ Page 3

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondent. [G.R. No. L-19254. March 31, 1964.] PONENTE: Barrera, J. FACTS: On December 5, 1960, petitioner Benguet Consolidated, Inc. filed with the Social Security Commission a petition alleging that its employee Lamberto Foroson suffered an injury while in its employ on September 3, 1960, as a result of which he was unable to work during the period from September 3 to October 8, 1960; that petitioner paid said employee the corresponding disability benefits under the provisions of Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act; that respondent Social Security System, through its regional representative at Baguio City, in its letter of October 12, 1960, requested petitioner to pay to said employee social security sickness benefits covering the same period of time for which he had been previously paid workmen's compensation disability benefits; that the Workmen's Compensation Act under which said employee was paid workmen's compensation disability benefits for the period of injury and disability (September 7 to October 9, 1960) provides that the rights and remedies granted by it to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation, "shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury"; that the demand of respondent's regional representative is invalid, considering said provision of law; and that 20% of the social security disability benefits sought to be paid to said employee will also be of petitioner's account, thereby "compelling it to pay disability benefits twice for the same injury and/or disability". Petitioner prayed that the demand of respondent's regional representative dated October 12, 1960 "be countermanded and declared of no further force and effect." To this petition, respondent (on December 12, 1960) filed an answer alleging as special defenses that the Social Security Act (Republic Act No. 1161, as amended) being a much later legislation than the Workmen's Compensation Act, its provisions were not contemplated by Section 5 of the latter Act when it was enacted in 1927; that insofar as subsequent legislations are concerned, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not applicable to the provisions of the Social Security Act; that under the provisions of the Social Security Act, the employees-members of the Social Security System are protected against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death, for which they and their respective employers contribute to the funds of the System their proportionate premiums fixed by law and, therefore, its members cannot be deprived of the benefits provided for therein, despite the provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act; and that the provisions of the Social Security Act and those of the Workmen's Compensation Act complement, rather than negate each other and, therefore, the respective benefits under both laws for the same injury and/or disability may be granted separately thereunder Respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed and that petitioner be ordered to pay the corresponding sickness benefits to its employee Lamberto Forosan, pursuant to Section 14 of the Social Security Act. Issues having been joined, the case was; heard and, after hearing, the Social Security

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Commission issued a resolution on September 11, 1961, dismissing the petition, and directing petitioner to pay its employee Lamberto Forosan the social security sickness benefits due him for the injury he suffered on September 3, 1960, conformably with the mandate of Section 14 of the Social Security Act. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution, but it was denied by the Social Security Commission, in its order of October 26, 1961. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not sickness benefits under the Social Security Act may be recovered simultaneously with disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. HELD: It is appellant's view that under this provision, when an injured employee receives any compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such compensation automatically precludes the employee for collecting any other compensation, benefit, and privilege of whatever kind and nature, arising from the same illness or injury by reason of which he was paid. The legislative history of the Social Security Act, clearly indicates the legislative intention to treat social security benefits as entirely distinct and separate from the statutory benefits provided for under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Observe that under Section 13 of the original Act, namely, Republic Act No. 1161, the payment of social security death and disability benefits was made subject to the condition that the death or disability is not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, because if the death or disability is compensable under the latter Act, no recovery for social security benefits was allowed by the original law; except in cases where the benefits recoverable under the Workmen's Compensation Act were less than what were provided under the Social Security Act, in which case, the System was liable to pay for the difference in the amount of benefits. When the original law was first amended on June 21, 1957 by Republic Act No. 1792, Section 8 of this amendatory law deleted the condition in Section 13 making the payment of social security death and disability benefits subject to the condition of non-recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act. When the same Section 13 was again amended on June 18, 1960 by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 2658, the original provision subjecting payment of social security benefits upon the condition of non-recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act, was not revived. It is, therefore, clear that although Congress originally subjected the payment of social security death and disability benefits to the condition that there is no recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the payment of social security sickness benefits under the present state of the Social Security Act was not made subject to that condition. This subsequent deletion of an exempting clause originally contained in the Social Security Act, is an indication to do away with the provision. For all the foregoing, we hold, as did the Social Security Commission, that sickness benefits under the Social Security Act may be recovered simultaneously with disability benefits under NPQ Page 5

the Workmen's Compensation Act.The resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. YU HAI alias "HAYA", defendantappellee. G.R. No. L-9598. August 15, 1956 PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J p: FACTS: On October 22, 1954, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for having allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action or liability therefore had already been extinguished; and the Justice of the Peace of Court, in its order of December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in two months. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Did the court err in considering the offense committed as a light felony? No, since the light offenses as defined in art 9 of the R.P.C states that an offense which penalty arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." The argument of the SolGen on the matter is erroneous since the basis for his argument of classifying the offense committed as a correctional penalty, is Art 26 of the RPC which classifies fines not offenses. Also, if the SolGens interpretation of the law is accepted then it will lead to and absurd situation wherein a light felony as defined by Art 9 will have 2 prescriptive periods, and 1 peso will mean the difference of 9 years and 10 months, and there is no reason for a law-maker to raise the prescriptive period for certain light offenses over other light offenses Therefore it is more sensible and to apply Art 9 over Art 26 since we are discussing the prescription of a crime not the penalty. An as this construction is more favorable to the accused, it should be the one to be adopted. HELD: THE DECISION IS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS DE OFICIO. Headnotes or epigraphs- When a statute is divided into several subjects or articles, having respective appropriate headings, it must be presumed that the provisions of each article are controlling upon the subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such questions therein. Construction to avoid absurdity- If the words of the statute are susceptible of more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation as will avoid such result. NPQ Page 6

ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, respondents. [G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000.] PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J. FACTS: This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 25, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39193, which nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 261, in Civil Case No. 64931. It also assails the resolution of the appellate court, dated August 13, 1996, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737. On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 261. Docketed as Civil Case No. 64931, the complaint sought the demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from constructing the commercial building and/or engaging in commercial activity on the lot. On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. On June 29, 1995, Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion. Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39193, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police power. Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in limiting its decision to the cited zoning ordinance. It avers that a contractual right is not automatically discarded once a claim is made that it conflicts with police power. Petitioner submits that the restrictive clauses in the questioned contract is not in conflict with the zoning ordinance. For one, according to petitioner, the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 did not prohibit the construction of residential buildings. Petitioner argues that even with the zoning ordinance, the seller and buyer of the re-classified lot can voluntarily agree to an exclusive residential use thereof. Hence, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the condition imposing exclusive residential use was effectively nullified by the zoning ordinance. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners contention is valid. NPQ Page 7

HELD: Laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and are not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have a retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. 10 Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. 11 Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. 12 Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs.Intermediate Appellate Court, 13 we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 8101 as a legitimate police power measure. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1996, as well as the assailed resolution of August 13, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

VALENTIN CAMACHO, BONIFACIO MACARANAS ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ANGELES CANSON and TERESA MELGAR DE CARRETERO, respondents. [G.R. No. L-1505. May 12, 1948.] PONENTE: FERIA, J p: FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations which reversed that of the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice that ordered a 70 per cent and 30 per cent division in favor of the petitioners herein, after deducting from the gross produce the expenses of harvesting and threshing, of the palay planted in the haciendas of the now respondents located in the municipality of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, during the agricultural year of 1946-1947. The decision appealed from declares that the participations of the parties in this case should be governed, not by the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 34 which amended section 8 of Act NPQ Page 8

No. 4054, as decided by the said Tenancy Division of the Department of Justice, but by an oral contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties, in accordance with section 8 of Act No. 4054 which according to the lower court's theory recognizes the validity of an oral contract. The ground on which the Court of Industrial Relations bases its decision is that, although "the records show that Act No. 4054 had been proclaimed effective in the Province of Pangasinan in January, 1937, Act No. 53 seems to recognize an oral contract inspite of section 4, of said Act No. 4054;" and there being an "oral contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties prior to 1945-1946 agricultural year," Republic Act No. 34, which amended Act No. 4054 in force in Pangasinan since 1937, can not be applied to tenancy relation between the parties in this case without impairing the obligations of contract and infringing the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 4053 as amended by Republic Act No. 34 in force in Pangasinan can be applied to the tenancy relation between the parties. HELD: Yes. The conditions set forth in section 8 of Act No. 4054, as amended by section 3 of the Republic Act No. 34, are complied with in the present case as found by the lower court in its decision that is, that the tenant owns the work animals and the necessary implements, that he defrayed the cost of plowing and cultivation, and that the costs of harvest and threshing were deducted from the gross produce, the decision appealed from is reversed or set aside, and the decision by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice, in so far as it applies the provisions of said Act No. 34 to the present case, be carried out, with costs against the respondent. A subsequent general law should not be construed to repeal or modify a prior special law; and repeal by implication is not favored, and therefore the former and subsequent act must, if possible, be so construed as to give effect to both.

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. [G.R. No. 125359. September 4, 2001.] PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J p: FACTS: Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23, 1996, by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 had affirmed the order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it denied petitioners' respective Motions to Quash the Informations in twenty-five (25) criminal cases for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Therein included were informations involving: (a) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda R Marcos, Roberto S. Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892 filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 also against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the Court of Appeals already dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-101884. NPQ Page 9

On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Section 34 2 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank. 3 It also required all residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act. That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC, which docketed these as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission of the offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, amounts in the foreign exchange accounts maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where such accounts were held by the accused. All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial court. Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights. 34 ISSUE: Whether or not Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto legislation? HELD: No. An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 35 The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take "from an accused any right that was regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him?" As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. 23 This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person NPQ Page 10

who committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. 24 Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused. 25 The crucial words in the test are "vital for the protection of life and liberty." 37 We find, however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively. 38 Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused. 39 Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased petitioner, Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-01884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in the aforesaid cases are declared extinguished by reason of his death on May 15, 2000. No pronouncement as to costs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., petitioner, vs. MARIANO PINEDA, in his capacity as Securities and Exchange Commissioner, respondent. CONSOLIDATED MINES, INC., intervenor. [G.R. No. L-7231. March 28, 1956.] REYES, J. B. L., J p: FACTS: Appeal under Rule 43 from a decision of the Securities and Exchange Commissioner, denying the right of a sociedad anonima to extend its corporate existence by amendment of its original articles of association, or alternatively, to reform and continue existing under the Corporation Law (Act 1459) beyond the original period. The petitioner, the Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (hereafter termed "Benguet" for short), was organized on June 24,1903, as a sociedad anonima regulated by Articles 151 et seq., of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1886, then in force in the Philippines. The articles of association expressly provided that it was organized for a term of fifty (50) years. In 1906, the governing Philippine Commission enacted Act 1459, commonly known as the Corporation Law, establishing in the islands the American type of juridical entities known as corporation, to take effect on April 1, 1906. As the expiration of its original 50 year term of existence approached, the Board of Directors of Benguet adopted in 1946 a resolution to extend its life for another 50 years from July 3, 1946 and submitted it for registration to the respondent Securities and Exchange Commissioner. Upon advice of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 45, Ser. 1917) that such extension was contrary to law, the registration was denied. The matter was dropped, allegedly because the stockholders of Benguet did not approve of the Directors' action. NPQ Page 11

Some six years later in 1953, the shareholders of Benguet adopted a resolution empowering the Director to "effectuate the extension of the Company's business life for not less than 20 and not more than 50 years, and this by either (1) an amendment to the Articles of Association or Charter of this Company or (2) by reforming and reorganizing the Company as a Philippine Corporation, or (3) by both or (4) by any other means." In pursuance of such resolution, Benguet submitted in June, 1953, to the Securities and Exchange Commissioner, for alternative registration, two documents: (1) Certification as to the Modification of (the articles of association of) the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, extending the term of its existence to another fifty years from June 15, 1953; and (2) articles of incorporation, covering its reformation or reorganization as a corporation in accordance with section 75 of the Philippine Corporation Law. Benguet contends that the period of corporate life relates to its organization and the rights of its members inter se, and not to its relations to the public or public officials. ISSUE: Whether or not aforesaid statutory prohibition is valid and impairs no vested rights or constitutional inhibition where no agreement to extend the original period of corporate life was perfected before the enactment of the Corporation Law. HELD: We find this contention untenable. . Benguets contention that the possibility to extend its corporate life under the Code of Commerce constituted a right already vested when Act No. 1459 was adopted is not agreeable according to the court. The term of existence of association (partnership or sociedad anonima) is coterminous with their possession of an independent legal personality, distinct from that of their component members. When the period expires, the sociedad anonima loses the power to deal and enter into further legal relations with other persons; it is no longer possible for it to acquire new rights or incur new obligations, have only as may be required by the process of liquidating and winding up its affairs. By the same token, its officers and agents can no longer represent it after the expiration of the life term prescribed, save for settling its business. Necessarily, therefore, third persons or strangers have an interest in knowing the duration of the juridical personality of the sociedad anonima, since the latter can not be dealt with after that period; wherefore its prolongation or cessation is a matter directly involving the company's relations to the public at large. Of course, the retroactive application of the limitations on the terms of corporate existence could not be made in violation of constitutional inhibitions specially those securing equal protection of the laws and prohibiting impairment of the obligation of contracts. It needs no argument to show that if Act No. 1459 allowed existing compaias anonimas to be governed by the old law in respect to their organization, methods of transacting business and the rights of the members among themselves, it was precisely in deference to the vested rights already acquired by the entity and its members at the time the Corporation Law was enacted. Since there was no agreement as yet to extend the period of Benguet's corporate existence (beyond the original 50 years) when the Corporation Law was adopted in 1906, neither Benguet nor its members had any actual or vested right to such extension at that time. Therefore, when the Corporation Law, by section 18, forbade extensions of corporate life, neither Benguet nor its members were deprived of any actual or fixed right constitutionally protected. NPQ Page 12

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitionerappellant Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTEBAN ZETA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-7140. December 22, 1955.] PONENTE: LABRADOR, J FACTS: This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Samar, finding Esteban Zeta guilty of a violation of Republic Act No. 145 (which took effect on June 14, 1947), for having solicited, charged demanded and collected a fee or compensation of P300 for assisting one Eugenio Albiza in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits under the laws of the United States. Eugenio Albiza, an enlisted man of the Philippine Army and later of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), suffered disability in the course of rendering services for the army in Aparri, Cagayan in the year 1942. On November 6, 1946, he promised to pay Mr. Esteban Zeta 5 per cent of any mount he may receive as a result of his claim for backpay, insurance or any other privileges granted by law (Exhibit 1). Zeta prepared the necessary papers for disability compensation and as a result Albiza received the sum P5,919 from the United States Veterans Administration. In pursuance of the contract, Albiza paid Zeta the sums of P200 on June 7, 1951 and P100 on June 11, 1951. The trial court held that upon the passage of Republic Act No. 145, the agreement for the payment of a 5 per cent fee on the amount collected was voided and compliance therewith became illegal; so it sentenced the defendant-appellant to pay a fine of P200, to indemnify Eugenio Albiza in the sum of P280, or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 145 should be retroactively applied in the case. HELD: No. Which limits the fee collectible for the preparation, presentation and prosecution of claims for benefits under the laws of the United States to P20 per claim and punishes violations thereof, must be given prospective application only, and may not be given retroactive effect such as to affect rights that had accrued under a contract expressly sanctioned by a previous law (C. A. No. 675). The judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant-appellant, acquitted, with costs de oficio.

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents. [G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.]

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J p: NPQ Page 13

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local GovernmentCode, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such NPQ Page 14

status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United StatesDistrict Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General inSan Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected ViceGovernor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. MANUEL L. QUEZON UNIVERSITY/AUGUSTO B. SUNICO, President, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division), NOEMI B. JUAT and EDILBERTO AZURIN, respondents. [G.R. No. 141673. October 17, 2001.]

PONENTE: PARDO, J p: FACSTS: Petitioner herein is a private university which established its own retirement plan for its employees. Herein private respondents were college instructors of the said University who reached their retirement ages. They retired on different dates and were given their retirement benefits according to the retirement plan of the University. However, the amount of retirement benefits they received was far below that which was provided for under Republic Act No. 7641. Both demanded for the payment of the deficiency in their retirement benefits. But the petitioner failed and refused to heed private respondent's demand. Private respondents separately filed their complaint against petitioner asking for the payment of deficiency in their retirement benefits and attorney's fees. Unfortunately, the labor arbiter dismissed their complaints. They filed their memorandum of appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter and ordered the petitioner to pay their retirement differential pay, plus legal interest until the actual payment thereof. Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal. The issue raised herein is whether private respondents are entitled to retirement benefits provided for under Republic Act No. 7641, even if the petitioner has an existing valid retirement plan. NPQ Page 15

ISSUE: Whether respondents are entitled to the retirement benefits provided for under Republic Act No. 7641, even if the petitioner has an existing valid retirement plan. HELD: Republic Act No. 7641 is a curative social legislation. By their nature, curative statutes may be given retroactive effect, unless it will impair vested rights. Republic Act No. 7641 has retroactive effect to include in its coverage the employees' services to an employer rendered prior to its effectivity. It applies to employees in the employ of employers at the time the law took effect and who are eligible to benefits under that statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. According to the Court, Republic Act No. 7641 is intended to give the minimum retirement benefits to employees not entitled thereto under collective bargaining and other agreements. Its coverage applies to establishments with existing collective bargaining or other agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are less than those prescribed under the proviso in question. TEOTIMO BILLONES, CELSO VALLECER, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION and/or BYRON S. HULE, as Vicepresident and General Manager, respondent. [G.R. No. L-17566. July 30, 1965.] PONENTE: PAREDES, J p: FACTS: Petitioners herein were allegedly employees of the respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, which required them to work 18 hours a day, without giving them additional compensation. In June 1954, petitioners together with the crew members of respondent's Luzon Stevedoring tugboats and barges, formed a Union, known as the Universal Marine Labor Union. As a Union, they presented with the Wage Administration Service (WAS), Department of Labor, a claim for accrued overtime compensation, covering the period from 1948 to 1954. The claim was, however, dropped by the WAS, it appearing that before the hearing could be terminated, the Union, thru its officers, entered into an amicable settlement with respondent Luzon Stevedoring and presented with the WAS on November 26, 1954 Under date of April 11, 1960 and February 26, 1959, petitioners herein filed with the Court of Industrial Relations cases Nos. 1328-V (L-17566), and 1183-V (L-17567), respectively, both for overtime compensation, money value of their vacation leaves and Christmas bonuses, covering the period from 1948 to 1956, the same as those they had presented and asked to be dismissed, before the WAS. Petitioners opposed the Motions to Dismiss. They claimed that their causes of action were neither released nor barred by prior judgment, since the dismissal of their complaint with the Regional Office, were without their knowledge and consent; and that if they ever presented their individual motions to dismiss, it was because they were intimidated and coerced into signing them. Regarding prescription of action, petitioners alleged that the amendatory provision of Republic Act No. 1993, cannot be made retroactive, so as to affect their claim. To make a retroactive application of the law would render the same unconstitutional, for being against the doctrine of prospective application of laws, more so when a retroactive application affects vested rights. NPQ Page 16

On June 12, 1959, a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss was presented by respondent in L-17567, adding to the grounds already stated that of lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case. But petitioners contend that to give the amendment a retroactive effect will be a violation of the constitutional mandate regarding abridging the right of obligations and contracts and that it will prejudice their rights to their accrued overtime compensations and to bring actions for collection originally provided to be within six (6) years. ISSUE: Whether or not Repyblic Act No. 193 should be given retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 1993, on June 22, 1957, and because of its retroactive effect, the claims covering 1954 to 1956, could still be validly instituted. Because Act No. 1993 shortened the period within which to bring such actions, and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate about due process, the claimants should have a reasonable time from the enactment of said law, or one year from 1957, within which to sue on said claims. Unfortunately, however, petitioners lodged their claims in 1959 and 1960 only, beyond said period of time. Lex reprobat romam, the law disapproves of delay; lex dilationes semper exhorret, the law always abhors delay. Court ruled that; (1) the order of June 15, 1960 in case L-17566, should be as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects; (2) in case L-17567, the order of August 13, 1960, is modified, in the sense that the claims for overtime pay which has prescribed are those from 1948 to February 25, 1956, not from 1948 to February 18, 1956, as stated by the Court. For the resolution of their claims from February 26, 1956, to December 31, 1956, and other claims which petitioner therein may have against the respondent Luzon Stevedoring; the case is hereby remanded and let the respondent Court proceed with the hearing thereof, for the purpose of receiving evidence on the matters treated in the complaint, and to render judgment accordingly. No pronouncement as to costs. VICTORIANO F. CORALES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Lands), respondents. [G.R. No. L-44063. March 15, 1982.] PONENTE: MAKASIAR, J p: FACTS: The Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) filed these motions for clarification and/or reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decisions in L-44063 (Corales), L-46200 (Villones), L-46922 (Caeja), and L-49227 (Barga) which had been declared final and executory. The question raised by respondent ECC in its first point of clarification is: what entity is liable to pay the compensation benefits of herein petitioners? It maintains that the respective employers of petitioners should be the one to pay the benefits as mandated by the Workmen's Compensation Act, which was the law applied to their compensation claims. On the other hand, respondent GSIS under its initial point of clarification manifests its willingness to pay the aforesaid benefits provided its right to seek reimbursement from the respective employers will be recognized. Respondent ECC is silent on the GSIS offer. On the second and third points of clarification of respondent ECC, it sought to clarify the legal NPQ Page 17

implications of the application by the Honorable Court of the 10-year prescriptive period to the claim filed in the Corales case on the claims filed under similar circumstances in relation to the provision in the New Labor Code on prescription of actions whereby all workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to January 1, 1975 are required to be filed not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise they shall be forever barred; and the legal basis for the ECC to assume jurisdiction over and apply the provisions of the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act to compensation cases involving causes of action accruing prior to Jan. 1, 1975. ISSUE: Whether or not the vested rights of claimants to file their claims within the 10-year prescriptive period should be recognized. HELD: With respect to the clarification sought by respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) on the legal implications of the application by this Honorable Court of the ten (10)-year prescriptive period to the claim filed in the Corales case on claims filed under similar circumstances in relation to the provision in the New Labor Code on prescription of actions whereby all Workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to January 1, 1975 are required to be filed not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise they shall be forever barred; and the legal basis for the Employees' Compensation Commission to assume jurisdiction over and apply the provisions of the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act to compensation cases involving causes of action accruing prior to January 1, 1975, the subject points of clarification sought for are clear from OUR pronouncement that the vested rights of claimants, whose causes of action accrued before the regime of the new compensation scheme, over the more favorable and compassionate provisions of the previous compensation statute, including the right to file their claims during the ten-year prescriptive period, should be recognized and respected. The Supreme Court ruled: (a) on the initial points of clarification that compensation benefits paid by the GSIS may be reimbursed from the claimant's/petitioner's employer since the reimbursement aspect will not be tainted with arbitrariness as due process is assured by affording the respective employers of petitioners in these cases opportunity to be heard; and (b) on the second and third points of clarification of respondent ECC that the vested rights of claimants, whose causes of action accrued before the regime of the new compensation scheme, over the more favorable and compassionate provisions of the previous compensation statute, including the right to file their claims during the 10-year prescriptive period, should be recognized and respected; consequently, respondents GSIS and ECC, as the only existing agencies presently entrusted by law with the processing of claims for compensation benefits, have jurisdiction over claims the causes of action of which arose during the effectivity of the old workmen's compensation law, which must be resolved by them on the basis of the provisions of the old workmen's compensation law which is more sympathetic to the plight of the working man as it is more expressive of the social justice guarantee of the supreme law of the land.

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