Proceedings of the 2012 9th International Pipeline Conference IPC2012 September 24-28, 2012, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

IPC2012-90172

A SYSTEM BASED APPROACH TO ACHIEVE LONG TERM INTEGRITY OF GAS FACILITIES

W. Sloterdijk DNV KEMA Energy&Sustainability P.O. Box 2029, 9704 CA Groningen The Netherlands M. Hommes DNV KEMA Energy&Sustainability P.O. Box 2029, 9704 CA Groningen The Netherlands

SUMMARY In todays challenging environment, the priority for many oil and gas operation companies is to design, build and safely operate facilities at optimum cost efficiency. This means that new facility designs must consider critical facility integrity and that existing facilities are operated well beyond their intended design life. Main gas transmission systems are now some 50 years old and operate for longer periods than anticipated during design and construction for reasons such as; the transition to renewables with another 50 years of service foreseen, and; gas transmission systems that operate satisfactorily, have very low failure rates and for which the planned safe life time extension is expected to be the lowest cost option. Thus, questions are raised how existing gas transmission systems can safely contribute to the total energy system in coming decades. Where a lot of developments are toward integrity assurance of pipelines (ASME B31.8S [1], ILI etc.), facilities receive less attention even though they are an integral and essential part of the system. In this paper a systematic approach for assessing integrity of new and existing facilities that leads to a structured inspection and test plan is developed and presented. This system based approach is introduced and explained and applied to two recent case studies. INTRODUCTION Nowadays, safety and cost efficient design, building and operation of facilities are among the priorities for many oil and gas operation companies. This means that new facility designs must consider implementation of system based facility integrity. For existing facilities a system based facility integrity approach can help provide safe and cost effective operation well beyond

their anticipated design life. Relevant approaches such as risk and statistical analyses and asset integrity and inspection programs are being developed and practiced to achieve optimal facilities integrity. Sufficient understanding of the importance of an effective asset integrity strategy generates the opportunity to achieve proven safety and provides a cost effective option that minimizes down time. This starts with a thorough analysis of the system under consideration. REASONS The motivation to start a system based integrity approach is quite often one or a combination of the following two main reasons: 1. Governmental regulation Many countries nowadays have regulations to promote and ensure safe pipeline operation. In the Netherlands, for example, regulation was approved in 2010 that makes pipeline operators responsible for having a system in place that "mitigates unusual incidents and its effect on human health and the environment" and "documents it". Governmental bodies were appointed to perform the verification of this regulation in 2007. 2. Life Time Extension Worldwide, gas transmission systems are aging with some being 50 years or older. Nevertheless, another 50 years of service is foreseen with the transition to renewables. This long term service was not anticipated during design and construction. This being said, gas transmission systems operate satisfactory and with very low failure rates, so planned safe life time extension is expected to be the lowest cost option for extending service. Where a lot of developments are focused on integrity assurance of pipelines (ILI etc.), facilities receive less attention even though they are an integral and essential part of the system. For

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gas pipelines, integrity analysis methods are available, but they do not include gas facilities. Thus, a structure has to be developed for gas facilities. A systematic approach for assessing integrity of gas facilities is presented and applied to existing facilities and a new offshore platform. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF GAS FACILITIES BACKGROUND In 1950 Deming presented and promoted, at a lecture in Japan, the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle [2], see Figure 1. This basic principle is still widely accepted and used to perform a structured approach. Figure 1: Demings PDCA cycle FOR

ASME PCC-3-2007 as well as API 571 [4] contain good information of damage mechanisms and defects screening that are very useful in performing a structured damage and degradation mechanisms analysis, bearing in mind that both are especially set up for the refinery industry. As indicated in ASME B31.8S, the system integrity analysis starts with a proper selection of relevant failure modes . Before this can start for facilities in gas transmission systems, a thorough process system analysis has to be performed, followed by a proper selection of relevant failure modes.. An overview of authors' own experience of more than 15 years with failure investigation in facilities in a gas transmission system of a European operator, was compiled and classified by failure cause (see Table 1). Time dependant mechanisms are in italics. Around 70% of the total failures are due to time dependant mechanisms. Table 1 Authors experience with investigation of 43 failures in facilities in a gas transmission system (1989-2006) Cause % Fatigue 27 Overstressing 14 Corrosion 12 Season cracking 7 Stainless steel SCC 5 Brittle fracture 5 Erosion 5 Hydrogen attack 5 Production failure 5 Construction failure 5 Galvanic corrosion 2 Wear 2 Leak and explosion 2 Pitting stainless steel 2 High temperature embitterment 2 Total 100

For gas transmission pipelines ASME B31.8S is available to set up an integrity management plan. The PDCA cycle is aligned with the integrity management process in ASME B31.8S and this can be used to give guidance to the structure of the integrity management plan for gas facilities. Nevertheless, ASME B31.8S has typically been made for gas pipelines, which is very clear in the overview of the 22 root causes mentioned as potential threats to integrity. These root causes, like for instance third party damage, are typically gas pipeline related. In gas facilities, gas processing is performed, sometimes using other materials and other operating conditions, thus resulting in other threats. For selection of relevant threats, a document that could give guidance is ASME PCC-3-2007 [3], which states that "it provides guidance to owners, operators and designers of pressure containing equipment for developing and implementing an inspection program". The integrity management process is again aligned with the PDCA cycle.

SYSTEM BASED APPROACH FOR FACILITIES In order to use this information and incorporate it into a system based facility analysis, the following structured approach, presented in the phases of the PDCA circle, has been used (see Figure 2). 'Plan' Data gathering and (process) system analysis Selection of relevant failure modes Define sections with similarity in degradation mechanism(s); so called "corrosion loops" Perform a damage and degradation mechanisms analysis. Formulate the inspection and test plan.

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'Do' Perform inspection and tests in accordance with the plan from the previous phase. 'Check' Analyze the results, check for compliance, perform 'fitfor-purpose' analyses Select action for mitigation, monitoring or repair Plan start of next cycle. 'Act' Implement actions selected in previous phase Figure 2: Overview asset integrity scheme
(emergency) Response
Repair systems Operational change (p, T, Q, ) Replacement

The goal was to perform a baseline wall thickness measurement survey for later use in a risk based inspection program. Focus was given to the prevention of failures that would cause availability and safety problems. 'Plan' The approach started with gathering all relevant information. The platform was still under construction and the design information was readily available, like a process flow diagram with process parameters. Most relevant degradation mechanisms for this evaluation were internal corrosion and erosion, and external corrosion, also under insulation (CUI). The platform had been designed to be re-useable at more locations than the first one. Piping in the process stream was mainly duplex stainless steel and all vessels were clad with a corrosion resistant alloy. The process system was analyzed with the aid of the process designer. In the overview PFD (process flow diagram, see Figure A1 in Annex A) the selected corrosion loops were indicated as well as all the main equipment. The analysis led to an inspection program for 6 vessels and 12 corrosion loops, leading to 700 measurements. Everything was reported in accordance with the produced working procedures in a sheet that was designed for this purpose, see Annex A, Figure A2. An example of a measuring point is Photo A3 in Annex A. 'Do' and 'Check' The measurements were performed and reported and checked for code compliance. The system based approach has worked very well in selecting the sections that are most sensitive to the relevant degradation mechanisms and as a starting point for monitoring integrity and application of Risk Based Inspection. 2. Old gas pressure reduction and metering facility

System & Degradation Analysis

Pipeline Facility Equipment

Adjusting plans/procedures

ASSET integrity

Data analysis
Defect assessment Risk assessment Cost calculation

Inspection / monitoring
CP/Coating MIC monitoring NDT (visual, US, MPE, ILI) Aerial surveys Leak detection

Data verification
Regulatory requirements Codes and Standards

Deming cycle

Most important is performing the 'Plan' part of the cycle right. A thorough process system analysis is essential for the selection of relevant failure modes for every section of the facility. CASE STUDIES In this paper, two examples are given using the presented system based integrity analysis. These include: 1. Baseline survey for a new gas production facility on an offshore platform. 2. Minimize future leakage in an existing 45 years old onshore gas facility. Both examples are presented showing the following phases of the PDCA cycle 1. New Offshore Gas Treatment Facility The facility integrity approach has been used to perform a baseline survey for a treatment plant of a gas production facility on a platform. This platform was at that time under construction at the Heerema wharf in Zeeland, Netherlands and was designed to produce 2.6 million m3/d of natural gas and 400 m3/d of liquids. The selected approach is in Figure A1 of Annex A, being the "Plan" phase of the developed approach.

This example includes a system based integrity analysis of an old, existing facility in a gas transmission system. The goal set was to minimize future leakages. In the previous example all process, design and material data were easily available, but production data and operational experience was lacking. The old gas facility originates from the middle of the sixties and is now some 45 years old. Original design data and specifications are sparsely available. Process design and process calculations are not available. Some operational data is available, including inspection and maintenance information. 'Plan' A system based integrity analysis on an old system starts with gathering all information, if necessary together with information from site visits. From this, a process system analysis is performed, that results in an overview PFD with relevant process parameters. With old systems it is sometimes

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necessary to produce the PFD it on the spot. A hand drawn example of this can be seen in Figure 5. To assess pressures, temperatures and gas velocities throughout the system, a small computer program was developed to perform process calculations. Measured process Figure 5: Hand drawn PFD

parameters for flow, pressure and temperature were used as input. As a result gas velocities of up to 33 m/s were calculated in the bends directly after pressure reduction and temperature down to -5C in the section after pressure reduction.

After this analysis relevant degradation mechanisms were selected using the overview tables of ASME PCC 3-2007. The damage and degradation mechanisms analysis was performed for the selected "corrosion loops", resulting in a test and inspection plan, thus finalizing the "Plan" phase of the developed approach. 3. 'Do' and 'Check' The facility was inspected based on the prepared test and inspection plan. The results were evaluated and measures were proposed. The results include: 1. Internal erosion. Due to the high gas velocity of 33 m/s at the measured flow of 102000 m3/h erosion could take place. To assess this, a wall thickness measurement was proposed at the first 90 degrees elbow after pressure reduction; see Photo's B2 and B3 in Annex B. 2. Pulsation analysis. Due to the high gas velocities, pulsation could develop in single branches that could lead to fatigue failures. This has happened in the past, see Table 1. A pulsation check was performed resulting in resonance frequencies together with the gas velocity of occurrence for some single branch geometries, see Table B3 in

Annex B. Lengths of single branches were measured, see Photo B4 in Annex B. No 2" single branch exceeds the length of 200 mm and it was concluded that at measured maximum flow and gas velocities, no pulsation problems exist with the single branches. Seeping valves, see Photo B5 in Annex B. In the old facility a lot of valves are present that depend on gas tightness on the rubber seals. These seals often have a long service period and operate under various and sometimes fluctuating temperature conditions. An overview of applied seal materials, together with some of their material properties, is provided in Table B6 in Annex B. Both NBR and FKM rubbers are used for achieving tightness in valves. It was advised to elaborate service performance of these materials in order to select, when necessary, the proper replacement material, with the goal of achieving minimized future leakage.

This analysis has led to a list of priorities and Things to DO, based on risk, determined as a combination of estimated probability of occurrence and accompanied consequences

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(leak/fracture, loss of availability). An example of such an analysis for the reported examples is presented in Table 2. Table 2 Results of inspections
US WT measurement elbow str.1 Prevent soft seal leakage Fatigue by pulsations mechanism probability consequence Rank <IE> H H 1 <Aging/Wear> H L 2 <F> L (~0) H 3

In conclusion, the old gas facility is still very well fit for purpose and has adequate integrity. Some additional actions and checks must be performed in order to guarantee integrity over next 50 years in service that is foreseen in the transition towards renewables. This approach was able to generate a dedicated test and inspection plan and is a good process for managing integrity and risk and minimizing future leakage. Challenging with old facilities is the gathering of data, necessary to perform a process system analysis. CONCLUSIONS Facility integrity can be best structured and analyzed with a system based approach. An assessment of the process design, together with a thorough understanding of failure modes is a prerequisite for a good facility integrity analysis. It is experienced that the 'Plan' part of the PDCA cycle is very important for the success of the structured approach. For the new offshore gas treatment facility example, the system based approach has worked very well in selecting sections that are most sensitive to degradation and is a good start to monitor integrity and to perform Risk Based Inspection. In the example of an inspected old gas facility, the facility is still very well fit for purpose and has adequate integrity. Although it is a challenge to obtain proper data for performing a process system analysis, the applied system based approach was able to generate a dedicated test and inspection plan and is a good system for managing integrity and risk of gas facilities. REFERENCES [1] ASME B31.8S-2010: Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines [2] Ronald Moen, Clifford Norman: Evolution of the PDCA Cycle, (2009), Detroit [3] ASME PCC-3-2007: Inspection Planning Using Risk Based Methods [4] API RP 571, 2nd edition, April 2011: Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry

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ANNEX A INSPECTION RESULTS OFFSHORE GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY

Approach: Gas Production Platform

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Design: Fluid, BOD, PFD/facility diagram, P&ID, Design codes and material specifications Operational parameters Define Corrosion Loops Check for (code) compliance Damage and Degradation Mechanisms analysis

Results: Inspection and Test Plan

Figure A1: Overview PFD with corrosion loops and schematic facility integrity approach

Figure A2: Example of reporting sheet for baseline survey

Photo A3: Selected inspection point

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ANNEX B INSPECTION RESULTS GAS PRESSURE REDUCTION AND METERING FACILITY

Photo B2: Measurement for internal erosion Photo B1: First elbow after pressure reduction

Table B3: Result of pulsation check for 2"single branch

Photo B4: Length measurement of single branch

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Photo B5: Seeping valve in old gas facility

Table B6: Overview of polymers used for sealing purposes with properties

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