Contents Page Preface ix Introduction 1 1 The perspective of scientific realism. 1 ‘The plasticity of perception 7 2 The semantics of observation predicates 7 3. The conceptual exploitation of sensory information 14 4. The expansion of perceptual consciousness 35 5, The argument from measuring instruments 36 6 Some consequences an The plasticity of understanding 6 7 The analytic/synthetic distinction 46 8 Meaning and understanding 54 9 Translation: some competing views 6 10 Communication and commensurability 7 11 Intertheoretic reduction and conceptual progress 80 (Our selfconception and the mind/body problem 89 12 One's knowledge of other minds 89 13 Self-knowledge: a preliminary look % 14 The incongruent nature of the P-theory 100 15 The mind/body problem 107 16 The expansion of introspective consciousness 16 Sentential epistemologies and the natural science of epistemic engines 121 17 Normative epistemology: the problem in perspective 121vill Contents 18 The sentential kinematies of orthodox epistemology 19 Continuity: the problem of the early stages 20 The poverty of the ISA approach: further considerations 21 Other horizons Bibliography Index 1s 127 137 12 155Preface ‘This volume is descended from a paper delivered to the Western Division meetings of the Canadian Philosophical Association in 1971. That paper sketched the argument of chapter 2 and the princi- ppal thesis of chapter 5. In the interim, several intermediate versions Of that material have been presented on a variety of occasions, and I should like to thank the participants, audiences, and departments involved for their kindness and critical suggestions. The present essay is addressed simultaneously to two distinct audiences. The frst audience consists of my professional colleagues, other academics, students, and lay readers, who are less than inti- mately familiar with the philosophical position commonly called scientific realism. For them I have here attempted to make available in fairly short compass a coherent and comprehensive account of that position as it bears on the philosophy of perception, on the theory of meaning, on the philosophy of mind, and on systematic epistemology. The view proposed is not merely eclectic, however. ‘The synthesis effected is novel in various respects, and the support- ing arguments are for the most part novel as well It is my earnest hope, therefore, that the discussion wall be found entertaining, and valuable as well, to those of my colleagues who already share a familiarity with the philosophy of science in general and with scientific realism in particular. This group constirutes the second audience to whom this essay is addressed, and it is my special concern to bring to their attention some generally unappreciated ‘consequences of scientific realism concerning the future directions that epistemological theory and rational methodology must take. ‘These consequences are drawn and explored in the final chapter, and itis there, 1 think, that the reader will find the most important contribution of this essay. T should like to express thanks to my teacher, Wilfrid Sellars, for his enormously stimulating influence during and after my years, at the University of Pittsburgh. And I must acknowledge a debt of