Modern Soldiery Interrogated

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Philippine Political Science Journal

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Modern soldiery interrogated: cataloguing the local military's tasks and their perception of local civilian actors
Rosalie Arcala Hall
a a
University of the Philippines-Visayas, Iloilo, Philippines, Division of Social Sciences Version of record first published: 24 May 2012
To cite this article: Rosalie Arcala Hall (2012): Modern soldiery interrogated: cataloguing the local military's tasks and their perception of local civilian actors, Philippine Political Science Journal, 33:1, 1-21 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2012.684514
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Philippine Political Science Journal Vol. 33, No. 1, June 2012, 121
Modern soldiery interrogated: cataloguing the local militarys tasks and their perception of local civilian actors
Rosalie Arcala Hall*
University of the Philippines-Visayas, Iloilo, Philippines, Division of Social Sciences The recent expansion of the Philippine militarys tasks into areas not related to security and combat has had repercussions on their interface with local civilian actors. Through a survey of 93 soldiers from two communist front-line units in Western Visayas, the article examines the nature of tasks, civilian military engagements and the soldiers perception of local civilians. The soldiers perform predominantly non-combat tasks. They have more engagements with other local security forces and elected civilian authorities. These engagements are neither robust nor dense, with civilians providing material assistance to military-instigated activities. The soldiers have neutral views about elected authorities, civil society organizations and government agencies, and a moderately negative outlook towards the Commission on Human Rights, the media, the police and ex-rebels. The general skepticism over local government frameworks and capacity is tempered with the practical necessity of working with these local structures. There is homogeneity in the perception across functional groupings, suggesting close proximity between doctrine and practice. Keywords: military; local civilian actors; civil military relations
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In the years since 9/11, the Philippine military has seen profound changes in the way it does its business. Following renewed US military support under its war on terror platform, there has been a considerable widening and deepening of non-combat tasks by the Philippine armed forces, especially in Mindanao. Since 2002, joint activities between Philippine and US troops (under the Balikatan stream and Joint Special Operations Task Force or JSOTF) have moved beyond counterterrorism to include disaster relief, reconstruction and civic action outside and within known conict areas. While the Philippine militarys range of secondary tasks has been accruing with new mandates from civilian governments (e.g., environmental protection, assistance to the police for anticrime, post-disaster rehabilitation), the retooling of its counter-insurgency (COIN) repertoire to encompass community organizing, basic service delivery (e.g., education and health) and targeted (village-level) infrastructure projects has solidied the institutions stake in local development activities. Its added focus on urban centers as area of operations (as opposed to the rural areas where traditionally counter-insurgency measures are directed) also expanded their exposure to a wider set of civilian communities. Like their counterparts elsewhere, the Philippine military is on the cusp of redening what it means to be an armed force embodying new skill sets that enable them to perform across multifarious missions, be it humanitarian aid, disaster relief, stabilization and reconstruction or peace support operations.
*Email: rbarcala@hotmail.com
ISSN 0115-4451 print/ISSN 2165-025X online q 2012 Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2012.684514 http://www.tandfonline.com
R.A. Hall
These changes raise important theoretical questions. Firstly, they run counter to the idea that democratic control of the military is best achieved where the military is conned to a limited set of tasks in line with their expertise (i.e., management of violence). Because the militarys primary training is associated with the use of force, they must be accordingly removed from functions that are not consonant with these skills, damaging to their core competency and better performed by civilian actors.1 There are also concerns that additional missions are being given to the armed forces without parallel initiatives to build civilian capacity for oversight, leading to serious imbalances in civil military relations.2 Assigning the military to internal security tasks, which some scholars argue are better performed by a separate constabulary/police force, is also antithetical to the prescription that an external defense-oriented armed forces leads to better democratic governance (Huntington 1991; Welch 1976). Besides, as argued by Aguero (1997) and Stepan (1986), the militarys prolonged exposure to internal security operations (including counterinsurgency) generates politicized mindsets. The militarys forays into counter-insurgency and development tasks (whether for domestic or overseas deployment, a new or a longstanding practice) also introduces new nuances. Firstly, the military interfaces more with civilian populations and local groups to which they are not directly held accountable (Welch 2006). It is in this gray area that the dangers of abuse and military politicization can potentially arise as there are neither laws nor mechanisms granting local authorities supervisory powers over the troops deployed in their area. Secondly, the military is brought into competitive, complementary or collaborative relationships with civilian entities (governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations or NGOs) (Berkle, Woodruff, and Noji 2005). Because ground deployments embed the armed forces into communities, cultural sensitivity and good relations with local leaders are a priority. The semantics of military role expansion into civil governance also represents a shift in coding over what the military organization is, and how it differs from other societal organizations (Rosen 2009). The blurring of functional distinction between what is military and civilian points to an epistemic dilemma, which is open to abuse given the power differential between local authorities and the military unit. This paper probes the consequences of military role expansion on the soldiers perception of local civilian actors. Using two cases, a front-line army battalion and an urban-based civil relations focused unit, the paper describes the different tasks the military is engaged in and the types of local civilian actors they interface with on a regular basis.3 The two units are the 47th Infantry Battalion (IB) based in Calinog, Iloilo and the 32nd Civil Relations Unit (CRU) based in Iloilo City. The 47th IB is an army maneuver battalion deployed for anti-communist operations in rural areas throughout Panay Island, while the 32nd CRU is a composite unit (personnel drawn from various Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) service branches) primarily directed at countering activities by communist legal fronts (i.e., unarmed organizations the military considers as directly providing support to the armed movement) in urban areas. The data were generated through focus group discussions and interviews with the ofcers of the said units, eld observations of two civic action activities undertaken by both units (medical/dental and disaster relief) and from a survey questionnaire administered to 76 soldiers from the Alpha, Bravo and Charlie companies (tactical units; not garrison) of the 47th IB stationed in Tapaz and Dumalag (Capiz province) and Calinog (Iloilo province), and the entire 32nd CRU personnel (17 total).4 The survey questions were generated based on AFP mission areas (internal security operations; territorial defense; disaster response; support to national development; international defense and security engagement; international
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations; force level command-and-control, training and support) identied in the Armed Forces of the Philippines budget under the General Appropriations Act (these were introduced as functional budget items in line with the Philippine Defense Reform instituted beginning 2007). The instrument was pre-tested with 30 members of the 12th Infantry Division (Camp Monteclaro, Miagao, Iloilo) in August 2008. The questionnaire has three parts: (1) descriptive data of their position, years in service/in the current unit and relevant training; (2) tasks their unit performs, including the duration, location and types and nature of engagements with other actors during performance of task/s; and (3) 20 Likert-type questions probing their views about the police, paramilitary or Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), and various civilian actors. The subjects were asked to indicate what combination and intensity (most least) in terms of type of mission areas their unit performs: counter-insurgency combat operations, counter-insurgency non-combat operations and non-counter-insurgency activities. The author administered the survey to one third of the subjects and conducted the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) during a quarterly meeting at their battalion headquarters in September 2008. The rest were administered by their respective commanders and returned in November 2008. Given the array of tasks performed by these two units, the article explores whether soldiers deal differently with and feel differently towards their local civilian hosts, depending on the type of activities they perform in the eld. The study also examines nuances in the way the military personnel regard various categories of civilian actors (elected civilian leaders, government bureaucrats/employees, civil society actors and state security forces which are civilian by nature, e.g., the police and paramilitary). The two cases are treated as windows into how embedded forces understand the nature of their job and how civilians t into this equation. The militarys expanded tasks at the local level do not necessarily lead to denser interface with local civilian actors. While military units collaborate more with civilian players in non-combat and non-counter-insurgency-related tasks, this does not translate to more meaningful engagements. More collaboration is recorded between the military and other state security forces, but premised on the idea that their tasks differ from those of the local police. Among civilian actors, the military personnel have neutral views of local authorities, civil society organizations and government agencies, and moderately negative to strongly negative views of the Peace and Order Council, the police, the Commission on Human Rights and the local media. Overall, soldiers on the ground are skeptical of the capacity for governance by local authorities. Military tasks and civilian engagements Whether by law or norm, the fact that the Philippine military dabbles in a wide variety of counter-insurgency-related or unrelated tasks does not mean they are all equally welcome across the ranks and services. de la Cruz (2000) probed the receptivity of ofcers to nontraditional roles by examining the link with rank, branch of service and educational attainment. Among his ndings are: (1) junior ofcers are more receptive to nontraditional tasks than senior ofcers, but not signicantly; (2) non-ground forces registered a higher mean score than ground forces in terms of receptivity to non-traditional roles, but this link is not signicant; (3) education bears a positive and signicant relationship to receptivity to non-traditional roles, with those possessing higher educational attainment scoring higher than those with lower educational attainment; and (4) of the various categories, ofcers are most receptive to rehabilitation and least receptive to law
R.A. Hall
enforcement. The non-signicant ndings for rank and service branch are explained by the fact that all ofcers, regardless of rank, are exposed to non-traditional tasks and are given civilian responsibilities in their job. Furthermore, anti-insurgency operations involve all branches. Those who are better educated also tend to have greater appreciation of noncombat tasks and their usefulness in achieving military goals. The nding that ofcers are the least receptive to law enforcement arises because such a task is clearly the functional responsibility of the police. The relatively high mean scores for search and rescue depict the ofcers understanding that they address a serious gap in civilian capability. Rehabilitation enables the military to gain public sympathy and ultimately, support in terms of valuable intelligence which is critical in operations.5 Previous studies by Hall (2006) and Brillantes and Tanate (2008) empirically established the variety of non-traditional tasks performed by Philippine soldiers as part of their counter-insurgency repertoire and beyond. Hall (2006) pointed out that the army deployed in the front line was more frequently involved in non-combat activities than combat, from community meetings ( pulong-pulong) to civic action, CAFGU creation and patrolling. Some units in the front line are also involved in non-counter-insurgency matters such as law enforcement and policing at the village level. It is in these non-combat capacities that the front-line ofcer (usually a company lieutenant) engages local civilian authorities (most frequently village leaders and mayors), soliciting or disseminating information or obtaining nancial or logistical support for their activities. Military civilian engagements are typically mediated by: (1) the type of activity; and (2) the ideological credentials of the local civilian authority. The military is seen to engage civilians more in civil military operations rather than combat, and less so when the local civilian in question is deemed left-leaning (Brillantes and Tanate 2008, 71). In both studies, ofcer interface with local civilian authorities was neither robust nor meaningful. No civilian input made a difference in the COIN design, which for the most part remained military-fashioned. However, there are also different levels of civil military engagement depending on the nature of the military unit. Of the two units examined by Brillantes and Tanate (2008), the urban-based unit appears to have more encounters with civilian leaders than the ruralbased unit. While many respondents from both expressed a healthy skepticism about the civilian leaders ability to address the insurgency problem, the rural unit appeared generally more trusting of civilian contributions than the urban unit (Brillantes and Tanate 2008, 75). Other studies have explored the militarys attitudes towards civilians across varying types of missions. A recent redesign of the USs counter-insurgency doctrine (US Army Field Manual 3-24) reveals enduring lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan and features a more nuanced understanding of the need to engage local leaders and communities (see Nagl 2007; Kilcullen 2006). Some of the fresh elements of the said doctrine include: (1) prioritization of population protection rather than force protection; (2) the importance of civic action (delivery of basic services, good governance, economic development) rather than use of force; (3) working with civilian actors and local partners, including warlords and armed groups (co-opted into the state security apparatus); (4) investing in the training of indigenous forces for long-term security; and (5) maximizing intelligence to generate effective but minimum use of force in the theater. Under this new doctrine, the local civilian population is seen as subjects of persuasion, whose hearts and minds must be won over in order to sever their ties with the rebel groups. In addition, the civilian population is seen as a source of actionable intelligence and provision of manpower for local defense or home guards, which are essential to the counter-insurgency strategy.
On the whole, the recent redesign acknowledges the utility of working with rather than against civilians to meet broader counter-insurgency goals. The tendency to subsume civilian contributions under broader strategic military goals is not limited to counterinsurgency. The adoption of NATOs civil military cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine in Afghanistan has earned criticism that humanitarian efforts have been militarized (Mandel 2002). Unlike humanitarian organizations conducting work under the principle of neutrality, the military is seen as serving the political ends of the state that sent them. Looking at parallel humanitarian efforts in Bosnia and Haiti, Muller (1999) also observed the serious gap between the US military and NGOs owing to differences in their organizational culture and prole of recruits. US soldiers saw NGO workers as a bunch of do-gooders with little appreciation of the political exigencies in a conict area. In his study of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan, Rietjens (2008) similarly found the soldiers to have a limited network of civilian contacts and to be oblivious to the provincial and national organizations doing parallel development work in their area of operations. In the 2004 tsunami response in Aceh, Hall (2009, 25 6) argued ` that the Indonesian and foreign militaries predictably took lead roles vis-a-vis the NGOs as they had control over the assets necessary for relief delivery in remote areas. In order to ensure that relief activities did not yield benets to the insurgents, the Indonesian military controlled relief delivery by requiring civilian actors to register and provide information on deliveries outside of the capital. To summarize, there is sufcient empirical evidence that the military is engaged in non-traditional roles and tasks for which they interface with civilians. Philippine ofcers in particular are receptive to these non-traditional tasks, indicating a nexus between doctrine and practice. Among these categories of non-traditional tasks, distinctions are made between those that directly contribute to the achievement of military goals and those that do not (e.g., law enforcement). Other national militaries also tend to view their engagements with local civilian authorities and NGOs along pragmatic lines, that is, through the lenses of security imperatives and strategic military goals. Across a variety of mission types, serious gaps remain between military and civilian actors due to differences in organizational cultures and mutual suspicion. New wine or old bottle? Changes in the roles of the Philippine military The Philippine military is atypical of its counterparts in the Asian region because of its prolonged involvement in internal security operations (Hall 2004, 108). It was and continues to be routinely employed for a whole variety of tasks in conjunction with counter-insurgency. Their usual COIN repertoire, drawing inspiration from American strategies in ghting low-intensity conicts, features non-combat elements designed to win hearts and minds. Included in these are civic action, infrastructure building and civil military operations. It is embedded in army doctrine, for instance, that there is no purely military solution to insurgency; that military expertise must also be applied to deliver basic services and goods to insurgent-affected communities (whether medical services, vocational education or roads and other infrastructure). Civic action, in particular, is designed to shore up support for the government and public approval of military operations in communities (Mandocdoc and Pasaraba 2004, 11). In fact, Lim (2004) candidly mentions that the military tends to do more of this winning hearts and minds activity rather than combat. He even stressed that for modern-day soldiers to be effective requires mastery in dealing with a whole gamut of civilians on a daily basis government ofcials, politicians, NGOs and the media.
R.A. Hall
Historically, the military has taken on other roles not related to ghting insurgents. Under the Marcos dictatorship, the military took on political and economic roles, governing in conict-ridden areas in Mindanao in place of civilian authorities, administering government-owned and controlled corporations and serving as a judiciary arm. The Aquino administration pared down the militarys roles after the transition in 1986 and also established constitutional mandates against the militarys involvement in politics and the business of running government enterprises. Under President Ramos, a serious attempt was made to reorient the armed forces towards external defense under a modernization program. The program was later scuttled by the scal troubles following the 1997 Asian nancial crisis, but nevertheless legitimized the militarys new environmental protection mandate. Under President Arroyo, the militarys involvement in development tasks deepened as they were tasked to implement key development programs under the Ofce of the President. The Kalayaan sa Barangay program, which started in 2004, is one such effort targeting conict-aficted communities for infrastructure projects, with the military as implementer.6 Correspondingly, the military in 2007 reorganized its civil military operations by creating the National Development Support Command (NDSC), placing all engineering battalions under one umbrella. The NDSCs purported mandate is to undertake infrastructure projects as directed by the national government in conict- and disaster-affected villages. Apart from internal security and external defense, there is a phalanx of secondary missions for which the Philippine soldiers may also be deployed. Such missions include peacekeeping operations, disaster relief and rehabilitation, environmental protection, assisting the police in law enforcement and election monitoring. These missions are often labeled non-traditional in that they depart signicantly from those for which the military possess expertise (i.e., war ghting). The armed forces have participated in numerous peacekeeping operations in Asia and beyond from as far back as 1950 53 during the Korean War to more recently in East Timor (1999 2004) and Sudan (2005 to date) (Quilop 2008, 4). The militarys involvement in disaster response, meanwhile, is more historical and institutionalized. The AFPs mandate draws from Presidential Decree 1566 (1978), which identies their tasks as: (1) organization of evacuation teams in all military institutions; (2) establishment of communication linkages and their availability for disaster operations; (3) assistance to police in disaster areas; (4) assistance in reconstruction of damaged roads, bridges, structures and facilities; and (5) providing transport facilities for relief supplies and personnel and for evacuation of victims. The Philippine disastercoordinating framework recognizes the military as an actor and denes their parameters of involvement (logistics, evacuation and reconstruction) and dealings with the civilian authorities (receiving instructions from the local chief executive of the disaster area). The expanded reach of the armed forces into non-traditional tasks carries some serious implications for civil military relations. At its core is the poor understanding of the limits/boundaries of military presence in Philippine society. Because the Philippine military has been regularly deployed internally, Filipinos are very used to seeing the men in uniform in their midst. Ground deployment of government troops is so commonplace in many conict areas (in many cases, the soldiers are the lone government institution present) that their presence and the variety of tasks they perform no longer invite questions from civilian hosts. The militarys forays into nation building, even purportedly tied in with its counterinsurgency goals, nevertheless pose a serious question about civilian oversight. The civilian leadership appears no less keen in deploying the armed forces for these tasks, despite their clear encroachment into areas of civil governance (Hall 2004, 124; Gloria
2007 2008, 34). How the military could be held accountable for these tasks as well as the money they handle is not well established. This seeming condence in the armed forces to ll in development gaps also brings them into closer interface with local civilian authorities and government line agencies with whom they have no dened institutional relationship. Incipient efforts are starting to bring the military and civilian players to one table, for example the Regional Kalahi Convergence groups, which bring the local government units and the AFP together with regional line agencies in anti-poverty initiatives centered at insurgent-affected villages. However, the record of such engagements is uneven, remaining contingent as it was on the nature of the personal relationship between ofcers and local government ofcials. The Department of National Defense (DND)s purported lead in the Arroyo administrations anti-poverty thrust (nancially supported by foreign aid) has been criticized as projecting the centrality of the governments anti-insurgency agenda. As pointed out in IBON Facts and Figures on 28 February 2006, the deployment of special AFP teams to implement these development projects coincided with alarming trends of human rights violations. In recent years, there has also been a fundamental change in the militarys anticommunist insurgency strategy arising from an altered assumption about the nature of the communist enemy. There has been an increased focus in the militarys counter-insurgency plan towards so-called legal fronts of the armed movement leftist political parties and organizations are deemed to be taking advantage of the democratic legal space. Correspondingly, the militarys strategy encapsulated in Oplan Bantay Laya 1 and 2 calls for operations in the so-called white areas, which are urban places where government agencies are present but where front organizations freely operate and receive support from the middle class, students and businessmen (Gloria 2007 2008, 39). This has accordingly led the armed forces to direct their actions against personalities in leftist organizations deemed to be linked with the communist movement. These actions range from innocuous public information drives against these organizations (e.g., what they are doing, where they get their funding, etc.), media monitoring and offensives (e.g., countering their allegations in print and on air) and campaigning against their local candidates during elections. There are allegations that the disappearances and extrajudicial killings of many leftist personalities in recent years are part of this counter-insurgency strategy (Gloria 2007 2008, 36). The involvement of the armed forces in what otherwise are political activities targeting unarmed civilians is a cause for concern to many, particularly for human rights advocates. Given the relative freedom commanding ofcers have in the design and implementation of their respective operations on the ground, there is always the possibility that some may push the envelope too far. Although there are legal restrictions against abuse of human rights during the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, only a few cases against soldiers and ofcers for such offenses ever proceed to the civilian courts. Prior to the Supreme Courts afrmation of the writ of Amparo (requiring the military to submit to queries by the court) and the tenacious efforts of crusading human rights commissioner Leila de Lima, the military has never been candid or open towards civilian questioning of the manner in which they conduct counter-insurgency operations. Combat and beyond: a look at the activity proles of two military units The stereotypical impression of the Philippine military as primarily a war-ghting machine has little empirical basis. The prole of activities of the two military units in the study reveals that they are also equally immersed in non-combat and non-counter-
R.A. Hall
insurgency-related work. Parallel large numbers of 47th IB respondents claimed that they were doing counter-insurgency combat operations, counter-insurgency non-combat operations and non-COIN activities. In terms of volume of activities, the majority described their work as mostly COIN combat, some COIN non-combat, and little non-COIN or mostly COIN non-combat, some COIN combat, and little non-COIN. By contrast, subjects from the 32nd CRU were primarily involved in COIN non-combat operations. Less than one third identied non-COIN activities as their task, while none chose COIN combat. This suggests that non-combat activities are mainstream in both units repertoire. When it comes to counter-insurgency combat tasks, the 47th IB soldiers collaborate the most with other state security forces (other army units, AFP units, CAFGU and local police) rather than with civilians. When ranked in terms of frequency of collaboration, the same security forces are also rated highly. Of the security forces, CAFGU ranked second only to other army units the 47th IB personnel collaborate with on a sustained basis. This nding is in line with the nature of combat operations wherein CAFGU units (territorial paramilitary forces) are utilized alongside regular army personnel. Combat operations also require police involvement (COIN is also a mandate for the police); they are often deployed for blocking. From the focus group discussion, the ofcers pointed out that they have carried out joint operations not only with the town-based police but also with the mobile Philippine National Police (PNP) Special Action Forces. They argue that the army, because they are the ground forces, always has the lead role in combat, even in joint operations with the police or other AFP units, although lateral coordination with them is emphasized. The majority of the respondents also claim that their unit solely provides the goods and services (food, transportation and logistics) necessary for the operations. This corresponds with the idea that the army operates as an independent, self-contained unit employing its own resources for combat activities. The military is given combat pay of 240 pesos a month (lower than that received by the air force). When the army goes to combat, each member is supposed to bring rice, canned goods, toilet paper, personal medicine, noodles, salt, cooking oil and soy sauce, along with a pot and a portable stove. If they are close to houses during their operations, they may pool their money to buy fresh vegetables and native chicken. The army unit may also augment CAFGUs munitions supply when necessary. Sometimes, they enlist the municipal governments help with logistics (e.g., borrowing the dump truck). In terms of counter-insurgency non-combat activities, there are interesting parallels between the two units. An overwhelming number of 47th IB respondents and a majority of the 32nd CRU identied tree planting, pulong-pulong, civic action, clean-up drives and community organizing as key activities, also in terms of frequency. There is consistency in the types of COIN non-combat activities undertaken, except for one item propaganda. Propaganda was rated high by the majority of the 32nd CRU respondents, compared to a low rating by the majority of the 47th IB respondents. Both units rated intelligencegathering activities, CAFGU recruitment and seeking nancial aid from Local Government Units (LGUs) as low. The range of activities that both consider as typical COIN non-combat form the generally accepted repertoire of activities approved by the military command and are doctrinally supported (e.g., civic action, administering the guns for cash program, pulong-pulong, tree planting and clean-up drives). Tree planting and clean-up drives are usually low-cost endeavors requiring only muscle power, and are also quite popular among local chief executives as environmental projects. Civic action, in turn, usually requires more contributions from other units and civilian actors, but carries the most mileage in terms of winning hearts and minds. It is a
core element of the COIN non-combat repertoire. Implementing the guns for cash program is an army mandate, while community organizing and pulong-pulong are typical special operations activities of community mapping for the purpose of identifying supporters and non-supporters. Neither unit is engaged in CAFGU administration as other units specialize in this (e.g., cadre and engineering battalions). In the focus group discussion, the ofcers identied a similar set of non-combat tasks, among which are spotting for prospective CAFGU recruits, repairs of schools and chapels and provision of services such as circumcision and haircuts. There are usually members of the unit with the corresponding skills, although a civilian doctor retainer and dentist from other units are also involved. They pointed out that their role varies depending on whether the civic action activity is military or local government led. They mention that the GMA Kapuso Foundation and some NGOs have carried out such activities in their area, for which they have provided some support. More typical activities include clean-ups after local estas or after a disaster in their host community (i.e., where the troops are billeted or have their camps). In COIN non-combat activities, both units gave almost equal ratings to state security forces (other army/AFP units, CAFGU and police) and civilian actors. However, there are pronounced differences between the two units when it comes to civilian actors they collaborate with more often. The 47th IB personnel collaborate more with elected civilian leaders and professionals but less with NGO and Peoples Organization (PO) workers, local government employees, government agencies and the media. The 32nd CRU respondents, meanwhile, collaborate mostly with local elected leaders and local government employees, and less with professionals and the media. It is interesting that two thirds of the 32nd CRU respondents say they do not work at all with NGOs and the media. These survey results differ somewhat from the ofcers contentions. They acknowledge seeking permission from the village chief or council if the activity is local government initiated. Otherwise, they rarely approach the local government for help. In a few instances they did so to obtain limited support (e.g., cement and sand) for local development projects. In civic action activities, they have also requested medicines from doctors and pharmaceutical companies and limited money from politicians. But these requests were mostly made through personal connections (Marquez 2008). Alongside this, there is also greater cognizance of civilian contributions to COIN noncombat activities. While most respondents reported that their unit provides most of the goods and services for these activities, there is a larger number saying that other units and civilian partners also contribute, in particular with supplies. A comparison of the type of non-COIN activities pursued by the two units yields further differences. In addition to disaster relief, which is rated high by both units, the 47th IB also rated election deputization and peace and order as high in volume/frequency. Both units rated providing security to politicians and ghting crimes as low. In addition, the 32nd CRU rated monitoring protests and strikes as low. From this trend, one can glean that the military tries not to do too much in the way of policing duties. Historically, the military is also involved in disaster relief and is deputized to make sure the ballots are protected during elections. The ofcers views parallel the survey results. They said they are deputized by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to protect the ballot and by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to apprehend illegal loggers. They are also tasked by the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) to respond to disasters, and they routinely cooperate with the police on peace and order concerns. However, they rarely get involved in anti-criminal efforts, as they are a police matter.
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In assessing non-COIN partnerships, most of the respondents from both units acknowledge collaborations with civilian actors, notably with village chiefs and mayors. At the same time, the highest number of no responses was registered for local government employees, PO members and clients. This pattern largely follows the trend for COIN non-combat activities, where some reported also collaborating the most with local civil authorities. Civilian partners are recognized to contribute most in terms of food, supplies and services. According to the ofcers, they receive contributions from the local government during disaster relief (particularly at the beginning, augmenting the soldiers food rations). As their gasoline allocation is primarily intended for combat operations, the requesting party (the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), local government or the NGO that has to move the relief goods) usually provides the gasoline if military vehicles are to be used for transport. The dynamics between the local military command and the civilian actors in the response to the 2008 Typhoon Frank illustrated this connection. Civilian representatives from the disaster-coordinating council and a DSWD employee were present throughout the militarys relief sorties using US air assets. Decisions as to where relief deliveries could be made were taken in close consultation with local politicians (Pasion 2008). From the aforementioned discussion, it is clear that the scope and nature of the local militarys interface with civilians exhibit tell-tale variations depending on the task involved. That said, it appears that such civil military engagements are concrete at the tactical and local level, notably for COIN non-combat and non-COIN tasks. How these interfaces are mediated by the local militarys perception of civilian actors on the ground is explored below. Through the looking glass: military perception of civilian and other actors Table 1 presents the distribution of responses by 47th IB personnel on various items measuring their perception of various civilian actors, frameworks and state security forces. Items 1, 3, 9 and 17 pertain to local civilian authorities (elected); 2, 4, 15 and 18 to local civilian security frameworks (LGUs in general and the Peace and Order Council); 5 and 12 to CAFGU; 11 and 20 to the police; 10, 13 and 16 to civil society (POs and NGOs); 6 to the Commission on Human Rights; 7 to media; 8 to government agencies; 14 to politicians/ candidates; and 19 to ex-rebels. Half of the 20 statements posed are worded negatively while the other half are expressed as positive statements. The positive items (agree/strongly agree responses indicate acceptance of civilian direction) are: 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 19 and 20. The negative items (disagree or strongly disagree responses indicate acceptance of civilian control) are: 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16. In most of the positively worded statements, the majority of the soldiers answered on the contrary (items 2, 4, 6, 7, 17, 18, 19 and 20). Instead of agreeing/strongly agreeing with the said statement, the majority disagreed/strongly disagreed. As to the cluster of negatively worded statements, four items generated contrary responses in the majority (that is, more disagree/strongly disagree rather than agree/strongly agree responses). Five negatively worded statements generated split answers, three of which (items 10, 13 and 16) pertain to NGOs and POs. The soldiers skepticism of elected local leaders, government agencies, local security frameworks and the media is evident. The majority (75%) agreed that left-leaning ofcials should not be trusted and that on the whole their efforts at addressing the insurgency problem are insufcient (67% agree or strongly agree). The majority (75%) also disagreed or strongly
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Table 1. Frequency distribution of 47th IB respondents perception of civilian and other actors. SA % 1. Barangay ofcials sympathetic communists not to be trusted 2. POCs are useful venues in responding to insurgency 3. Need to inform mayor and barangay captain of troop movement into their jurisdiction 4. LGU, not army, must implement foreign-funded development projects in the front line 5. CAFGUs better for counter-insurgency than disaster relief 6. Commission on Human Rights investigations on alleged soldier violations welcome 7. Local media portrays a balanced view of militarys position on issue of leftist disappearances 8. Government agencies not interested in delivering services to front line due to security concerns 9. Barangay captains and mayors in operation area not doing enough to address insurgency 10. Civilians who le human rights complaints against the army prompted by leftists 11. The police ignore/downplay rebel threat in barangays far from town 12. CAFGU units better under police than army 13. NGOs in the front line are communist fronts 14. Army has right to deny requests for security by visiting politicians in front line 15. Army better at service delivery than local government 16. Farmer orgs, coops and womens groups not organized by the military in front line most likely linked to communists 17. Need for mayor to request local commander directly for deployment to help during disaster 18. Need for LGU to share burden of securing community from rebel threat by providing money or supplies to local army unit 19. Amnestied rebel returnees no threats in front line 20. Intel sharing with police enhances success in combat operations 38.4 5.5 31.9 1.4 6.8 0 0 12.5 11.0 16.7 5.6 30.6 5.7 13.9 14.3 6.9 1.4 1.4 4.3 0 A % 37.0 17.8 48.6 13.9 56.2 8.3 12.3 33.3 56.2 27.8 45.1 54.2 15.7 47.2 32.9 30.6 8.3 12.7 20.0 2.8 N % 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 0 0 1.4 1.4 4.1 43.1 2.8 0 54.3 15.3 27.1 44.4 0 1.4 21.4 0 D % 17.8 54.8 16.7 65.3 30.1 70.8 61.6 41.7 27.4 11.1 40.8 8.3 21.4 20.8 21.4 18.1 69.4 73.2 51.4 58.3 SD % 5.5 20.5 1.4 18.1 6.8 20.8 24.7 11.1 1.4 1.4 5.6 6.9 2.9 2.8 4.3 0 20.8 11.3 2.9 38.9
disagreed that the POC is a useful framework or that the LGUs ought to be implementing development projects in the front line (83% disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement). Other government actors are equally regarded with skepticism. The majority of respondents (91.6%) disagreed about investigations of alleged soldiers violations by the Commission on Human Rights (item 6). A parallel majority (86.3%) also do not think the local media present a balanced view in their accounts of the insurgency issue. However, on the question of service delivery in general (not conned to the front line), the respondents are split. A substantial number (27%) are undecided. The viability of service delivery by government agencies in the front line given the security concerns is also questioned. Roughly equal numbers of respondents agreed/strongly agreed versus disagreed/strongly disagreed with the statement about government agencies ability to do so under such conditions (item 8). From these responses, it is suggested that the soldiers tend to
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R.A. Hall
inate their importance in directly providing development assistance and service in the front line, but only because the civilian actors are hampered from doing so given the security risks. An overwhelming majority are nevertheless cognizant of the need to observe protocols, particularly when a contingent of armed soldiers moves into a local area (80% agree or strongly agree on item 3) and in requesting assistance during disasters (item 17). The majority (90%) disagreed that local chief executives defy the chain of command by directly approaching a local commander for assistance during disasters. While many are not too pleased with the local governments performance in counter-insurgency, the majority nevertheless do not expect the LGUs to shell out money and supplies directly to them to do the job (84% disagree or strongly disagree on item 18). The same cannot be said of politicians and candidates the majority (61.1%) of the respondents agreed/strongly agreed that the army could deny requests for security. For the most part, the military thinks such tasks are not part of their mandate in the front line. The soldiers response to items pertaining to NGOs, POs and ex-rebels are worth noting. An almost equal number agreed/strongly agreed (44%) or were undecided (43%) on the link between human rights complaints directed at them and leftist instigation (item 10). In the same manner, the majority (54%) were also undecided over the communist credentials of NGOs and POs operating in the front line (item 16). By contrast, the majority of the soldiers (54.3%) were doubtful of amnestied rebels presence in the front line (item 19). These responses suggest that the front-line soldiers have a healthier view of civil society actors in general than they do ex-rebels and elected government ofcials. As to other state security forces, there appears to be a difference in the way the soldiers regard the police versus CAFGU. An overwhelming majority (97.2%) disagreed/strongly disagreed that intel sharing with the police yields better success in combat operations (item 20). In terms of the polices response to rebel threats, the troops were ambivalent (item 11). However, the majority (84.8%) agreed/strongly agreed that CAFGU units are better handled by them. The majority (65%) of the soldiers recognize CAFGUs indispensability in counter-insurgency operations (item 5) compared to disaster relief (although under the law they could also be deployed for emergency tasks). Table 2 presents the responses of 32nd CRU personnel to statements pertaining to civilian actors and state security forces. It must be noted that none of the respondents answered neither agree nor disagree to any of the items and that the responses are generally uneven, with some items left unanswered. The majority of the soldiers answered on the contrary (items 2, 4, 6, 7, 17, 18, 19 and 20) to seven out of ten positively worded items. Instead of agreeing/strongly agreeing with the said statement, the majority disagreed/strongly disagreed. By contrast, the majority responded in the expected direction (towards disagree/strongly disagree) in ve out of ten negatively worded items (1, 5, 13, 15 and 16). These items pertain to NGOs/POs, elected local leaders and local civilian frameworks for security. A substantial number (28% and 100%, respectively) of the 32nd CRU soldiers are skeptical of left-leaning local leaders (item 1) and generally discount their efforts at solving the insurgency issue (item 9). While the respondents are split (54% agree/strongly agree versus 45% disagree/strongly disagree) over the need to inform local authorities of troop movement (item 3), all (100%) do not approve of leaders not following army protocol in requesting disaster assistance from the military by directly appealing to local commanders (item 17). All (100%) are equally critical of the POCs as a security framework (item 2) and LGUs capacity to implement development projects in the front line (item 4). On government agencies intent to deliver services in front-line areas (item 8), the respondents are split (53% agree versus 46% disagree/strongly disagree). Yet the majority (86%) do not

Table 2. Frequency distribution of 32nd CRU respondents perception of civilian actors. SA % Barangay ofcials sympathetic communists not to be trusted POCs are useful venues in responding to insurgency Need to inform mayor and barangay captain of troop movement into their jurisdiction LGU, not army, must implement foreign-funded development projects in the front line CAFGUs better for counter-insurgency than disaster relief Commission on Human Rights investigations on alleged soldier violations welcome Local media portrays a balanced view of militarys position on issue of leftist disappearances Government agencies not interested in delivering services to front line due to security concerns Barangay captains and mayors in operation area not doing enough to address insurgency Civilians who le human rights complaints against the army prompted by leftists The police ignore/downplay rebel threat in barangays far from town CAFGU units better under police than army NGOs in the front line are communist fronts Army has right to deny requests for security by visiting politicians in front line Army better at service delivery than local government Farmer orgs, coops and womens groups not organized by the military in front line most likely linked to communists Need for mayor to request local commander directly for deployment to help during disaster Need for LGU to share burden of securing community from rebel threat by providing money or supplies to local army unit Amnestied rebel returnees no threats in front line Intel sharing with police enhances success in combat operations 21.4 0 18.2 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 40.0 0 58.3 0 69.2 0 6.7 0 0 0 0 A % 7.1 0 36.4 0 15.4 0 13.3 53.3 92.3 60.0 60.0 41.7 0 30.8 13.3 0 0 0 0 0 D % 57.1 28.6 27.3 61.5 84.6 23.1 26.7 20.0 0 0 40.0 0 46.2 0 80.0 93.3 26.7 66.7 93.3 26.7
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SD % 14.3 71.4 18.2 38.5 0 76.9 60.0 26.7 0 0 0 0 53.8 0 6.7 0 73.3 33.3 6.7 73.3
believe that the army is better at the job of service delivery than the LGUs (item 15), nor do they think the LGUs should provide direct payments in cash and in kind to the army for the purpose (100% disagreed/strongly disagreed for item 18). Of the investigations by the Commission on Human Rights (item 6), all (100%) do not welcome them. All respondents also assert that the military is right in disapproving requests for security by visiting political gures and candidates in the front line (item 14). The 32nd CRU respondents have differential perception of civil society players. All think that leftist organizations (what they consider communist fronts) have a hand in civilian human rights complaints against soldiers (item 10) but the NGOs and POs in the front line (whom they consider are doing actual development work for the local populace) are a different breed (items 13 and 16). They are less likely to impute a communist connection among the latter group. The majority (86%) likewise think the local media does not present a balanced view between army and leftist positions on the insurgency issue (item 7). They are equally circumspect about ex-communist rebels whom they still consider threats (100% disagreed/strongly disagreed for item 19).
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Regarding the police, the majority of the 32nd CRU personnel express disappointment. More (60%) think the police discount rebel threats in their area (item 11). All respondents also think cooperation with them in intel does not yield better results in combat operations (item 20). However, all believe it is a better set-up for CAFGU to be placed under the police (item 12). The majority (86%) do not agree that CAFGU is more suitable for counter-insurgency than other types of non-COIN activities (item 5). Comparing the two units, we see patterns of consistency in the responses. The majority of the respondents (ranging from 54% to 97% for 47th IB, and from 93% to 100% for 32nd CRU) consistently responded on the contrary to the same set of positively worded questions (items 2, 4, 6, 7, 17, 18, 19 and 20). These items pertain to local civil authorities, local civilian frameworks, the Commission on Human Rights, media, ex-rebels and the police. This pattern suggests that the units share the same ill feeling towards these civilian actors and the tasks these civilian actors perform relating to counter-insurgency. By contrast, the direction of responses to ve negatively worded questions diverges between the two units. While respondents from the 32nd CRU expressed disagreement (ranging from 71% to 100%) towards items 1 (not to trust left-leaning barangay ofcials), 5 (CAFGU better for COIN than disaster relief), 13 (NGOs as communist fronts), 15 (army better at service delivery than local government) and 16 (NGOs and POS linked to communists), those from the 47th IB agreed or were neutral on the same items. While the 32nd CRU respondents appear to be more afrmative of local civilian actors and the job they do, the 47th IB respondents are ambivalent or have contrary feelings. Both units, however, are critical of the civilian governments counter-insurgency efforts: 55% for the 47th IB and 53% for the 32nd CRU agree that the government is not interested in COIN (item 8); 67% and 100%, respectively, also think that the local leaders are not doing enough for COIN (item 9) and their capacity to implement development projects in the front line (83% of 47th IB and 100% of 32nd CRU do not agree that LGUs can implement foreign-funded projects (item 4)). Both also do not think that the LGUs should provide direct monetary contributions to the military for counter-insurgency purposes (84% from 47th IB and 100% from 32nd CRU disagreed/ strongly disagreed with item 18, that LGU needs to provide nancial support for COIN). They also tend to discount POCs as frameworks for discussing and proposing solutions to a local counter-insurgency problem (75% of 47th IB and 100% of 32nd CRU disagreed/ strongly disagreed with item 2, that POCs are useful frameworks). They are equally dismissive of investigations carried out by the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) (91% of 37th IB and 100% of 32nd CRU disagreed or strongly disagreed on item 6, that CHR investigations are welcome) and skeptical over the medias ability to provide a balanced coverage of news on the insurgency issue (86% of both units disagreed or strongly disagreed on item 7, that local media provides a balanced coverage). On item 19 (ex-rebels being no threat to the front line), both units similarly disagreed or strongly disagreed (54% for 47th IB and 100% for 32nd CRU). With regards to civil society actors, there is a difference between the two units. The majority of the 47th IB personnel exhibit ambivalence over NGOs and POs (on the communist link of NGOs and POs under items 13 and 16, 54% and 44% of the 47th IB were neutral, respectively). They appear undecided whether the latter are friends or foes. By contrast, we see a more nuanced understanding of the differences between civil society actors among the 32nd CRU respondents. For the same items, 100% and 93% of the 32nd CRU, respectively, disagree that NGOs and POs are tied with the communists. They appear to differentiate between civil society actors that are considered communist legal fronts and genuine, grassroots and service-oriented NGOs and POs. With respect to other state security forces, both units appear to discount the local polices capability in terms of
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threat assessment (50% of 47th IB and 60% of 32nd CRU agreed/strongly agreed that the police downplays rebel threats) and intelligence gathering (97% of 47th IB and 100% of 32nd CRU agreed/strongly agreed that intel sharing with the police enhances combat operations). Yet, intuitively, both understand that the paramilitary/CAFGU is better placed under the polices administrative control than the armys (84% of the 47th IB and 100% of the 32nd CRU agreed/strongly agreed that CAFGU is better placed under the police). However, the units have different views with regards to CAFGUs function. While the majority (63%) of the 47th IB agreed/strongly agreed that CAFGU works primarily as a counter-insurgency force, an opposite majority (84% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing) for the 32nd CRU think otherwise. The 32nd CRU also considers CAFGU to be useful in non-counter-insurgency-related tasks such as disaster relief. This differential view of CAFGU is explained by the fact that the 47th IB works more closely with CAFGU in their COIN combat activities, while the 32nd CRU, owing to their placement and nature, have had little or no occasion to work with CAFGU in a non-combat or non-COIN capacity. Table 3 presents the means for each item indicating perception of civilians. The following ve-point index is adopted to indicate direction: 1 1.8 (strongly positive); 1.81 2.6 (moderately positive); 2.61 3.4 (neutral); 3.41 4.2 (moderately negative); and
Table 3. Comparison of means of perception of civilian and other actors. 47IB Barangay ofcials sympathetic communists not to be trusted POCs are useful venues in responding to insurgency Need to inform mayor and barangay captain of troop movement into their jurisdiction LGU, not army, must implement foreign-funded development projects in the front line CAFGUs better for counter-insurgency than disaster relief Commission on Human Rights investigations on alleged soldier violations welcome Local media portrays a balanced view of militarys position on issue of leftist disappearances Government agencies not interested in delivering services to front line due to security concerns Barangay captains and mayors in operation area not doing enough to address insurgency Civilians who le human rights complaints against the army prompted by leftists The police ignore/downplay rebel threat in barangays far from town CAFGU units better under police than army NGOs in the front line are communist fronts Army has right to deny requests for security by visiting politicians in front line Army better at service delivery than local government Farmer orgs, coops and womens groups not organized by the military in front line most likely linked to communists Need for mayor to request local commander directly for deployment to help during disaster Need for LGU to share burden of securing community from rebel threat by providing money or supplies to local army unit Amnestied rebel returnees no threats in front line Intel sharing with police enhances success in combat operations All (Mean) 2.1507 3.6712 2.0694 3.8472 2.7397 4.0417 3.9863 3.0556 2.5205 2.5278 2.9577 2.0694 3.0000 2.5139 2.6857 2.7361 4.0000 3.8028 3.2857 4.3333 3.09975 32CRU 3.3571 4.7143 2.9091 4.3846 3.6923 4.7692 4.3333 3.2000 1.9231 1.6000 2.8000 1.4167 4.5385 1.3077 3.8000 3.8000 4.7333 4.3333 4.0667 4.7333 3.52063
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R.A. Hall
4.21 5.0 (strongly negative). The overall mean for both units indicates a neutral perception (3.3). Clustering items according to the type of civilian, we nd more variance. Both have a moderately positive perception of politicians (1.9 for item 14). The perception of CAFGU lies between moderately positive and neutral (2.6 for items 3 and 12). Both units appear to be neutral towards elected civilian authorities (3.05 average for items 1, 3, 9 and 17), civil society (3.18 average for items 10, 13 and 16) and government agencies (3.1 for item 8). There is a moderately negative outlook of the local security frameworks (3.88 average for items 2, 4, 15 and 18), the police (3.675) and ex-rebels (3.6 for item 19). The Commission on Human Rights and the media elicited a strong negative perception (4.35 for item 6 and 4.6 for item 7, respectively). The descriptive analysis results (Table 4) reveal that there seems to be little difference in the mean for the COIN non-combat subgroup (average is 3.36) and the entire group (3.325), while a slightly lower mean (3.22) is recorded for the non-COIN subgroup. Even given the very small population, it is suggested that the respondents share a similar perception of civilian actors across functional distinctions. Analysis This research project posed three questions at the outset: (1) What are the range of tasks the local military units are involved in and the nature of their engagement with various actors (civilian and military) in undertaking these tasks?; (2) How do members of these local military units regard civilian actors (direction and intensity)?; and (3) Does this view of civilian actors vary depending on the type of task they conduct in the eld? Specically, the research project hypothesizes that this view of civilians will vary across task/functional distinctions (counterinsurgency combat, counter-insurgency non-combat, and non-counter-insurgency) and across types of civilian actors/frameworks (elected civilian authorities, government agencies/bureaucrats and civil society groups). This variation is then used to infer possible modalities of interface between local military units and civilian actors. COIN combat is a specialized task more readily assumed by the front-line unit in this study. Both military units are equally engaged in COIN non-combat and non-COIN activities. However, non-COIN activities are clearly secondary only to those tasks related to counter-insurgency operations. The non-COIN tasks included are in line with the AFPs mandate for secondary missions, of which disaster relief is most prominent. Of the COIN non-combat activities, the two units identify a parallel set of tasks, the only difference between them being the prominence of propaganda for the urban-based unit. There is also a clear understanding of the distinction between police/constabulary tasks (e.g., law enforcement, apprehension of criminals, monitoring protests/strikes) and those of the military (i.e., targeting armed insurgents and neutralizing their supporters). These ndings afrm what has been recorded elsewhere (Hall 2004, 2006), that the military considers counter-insurgency and non-counter-insurgency as legitimate spheres of activities. The relative homogeneity of the answers also indicates a close proximation of doctrine and practice. This consistent pattern perhaps is not surprising given the militarys historical involvement in counter-insurgency operations and in disaster relief, as a particular type of non-COIN. A distinction between what the military does versus the local police is also maintained given the informal territorial/operational jurisdiction of the two forces the police usually stays in the town proper and within a dened radius whereas the local military is posted in remote areas (which are still part of the municipality). In terms of engagements, the military personnel consistently ranked other state security forces (army, police, CAFGU) higher than civilian actors. Regarding civilian
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actors, most reported that collaborations occur more with elected civilian authorities and less with government bureaucrats and civil society groups. Between the types of functions, there is a slightly higher civilian rating for collaboration in non-COIN activities (but in which professionals are identied as key collaborators). In terms of material needs for activities, the results also conrm that the units are mostly self-sufcing, sourcing their own food, logistics and other needs by themselves or with the help of other military units. If and when civilian actors are identied as contributing something, often it is non-material (expertise) or information dissemination. What these ndings reveal is that local military units do not have as robust engagements with civilian actors as with security forces. These connections are likewise selective (happening more so for COIN non-combat and non-COIN activities) and particularistic (only with some civilian actors and not with others). On one hand, this is understandable given that in the front line the success of any combat operations (with minimal cost to the lives and physical well-being of the combatants) seriously depends on their ability to work well with other security forces. The nature of their job also means they have closer ties with these other security apparatus, of which trust (that the other security forces are working on the same side) is a critical element. By contrast, the engagements between the military and civilian actors are mediated by the political credentials of the civilians (known or presumed). Prejudices about the civilian actors willingness to go out of their comfort zones and deliver services in the front line abound, and continue to color such interactions. Why are there more reported collaborations with elected local civilians than other civilian actors? As local military units, the soldiers understand the operational necessity of being nice to local authorities. Village chiefs and mayors enjoy local support; it is axiomatic that the success of any type of military activity involves them at least acquiescing (not causing any political noise), if not giving their full blessing. By contrast, POs, NGOs, the media and local government bureaucrats are of the least consequence to their operational activities. They are also not proximate, hence their presence has little impact on the day-to-day activities of the unit. The soldiers reveal a nuanced outlook towards different civilian actors. With elected civilian authorities, civil society and government agencies, they are neutral, while their moderately negative regard goes to the Commission on Human Rights and the media. This result suggests the continuing ambivalence of front-line soldiers towards local civilian actors because of the shortcomings in governance that they witness. That they have an adverse perception of the CHR and the media shows how they feel targeted by these institutions and subjected to closer scrutiny on the way they operate on the ground. The moderately negative outlook towards local security frameworks perhaps reects their overall skepticism of local governance structures in addressing pressing community issues. While ex-rebels cannot be arrested under the law, their connection with the armed movement remains highly suspect. Regarding NGOs and POs, we nd some key
Table 4. Mean scores by functional group. Group Counter-insurgency (COIN) combat operation Counter-insurgency (COIN) non-combat operation Non-counter-insurgency operation All 47thIB 3.1026 3.0990 3.0856 3.1074 32nd CRU 0 3.6400 3.3763 3.5526 Average 3.1026 3.36 3.22 3.325
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differences in the perspectives of the urban-based versus the rural unit. While the 47th IB responses suggest uncertainty, the 32nd CRU respondents exhibit a more sophisticated understanding of the differences between them. This difference suggests that perhaps rural units, whose encounters with POs and NGOs tend to be few to begin with, have less experience to balance the doctrinal supposition of leftists being in cahoots with the Communist Party of the Philippines- New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). By contrast, their urban location and the nature of their job allow the 32nd CRU to be more familiar with POs and NGOs, many of which have ofces in the urban center. Moreover, this nding contradicts what POs and NGOs often accuse the military of of demonizing them and lumping them together with armed insurgents as targets. Both units interact with the police and CAFGU on a sustained basis. Of the two, the soldiers have a moderately negative outlook towards the police. There also appears to be some ambivalence over what CAFGUs tasks are, yet the opinion that CAFGU is better off under the police is shared across the military units. This ambivalence over police and CAFGU is suggestive of unresolved boundary issues and functional concerns between local state security forces. In the end, we nd that the soldiers have a neutral perception of civilian actors and that there is a greater group homogeneity in their views of civilian actors. There is little variation in the responses between specic sets of respondents (i.e., those that chose COIN combat, non-COIN combat and non-COIN). Their views about civilian actors and the direction of these views (tending to be neutral) exhibit a great degree of similarity (as attested by the near equal mean scores). These ndings suggest that the soldiers think and act more alike. The variety of tasks the military performs seem to offer little interface with civilian actors (less dense interactions compared to state security forces) and therefore fewer opportunities for meaningful engagement. Legitimate power by local elected ofcials is recognized only to the extent that it aids popular receptivity to military-initiated activities on the ground. The soldiers on the whole are critical of the shortcomings of the local authorities, the POCs and government agencies in addressing the root cause of the insurgency problem, constraining further possibilities of them becoming equal partners.
Conclusion Philippine civil military relations post-Marcos era have been described as problematic and challenging, in part due to the convoluted tasks and functions the armed forces have assumed throughout the years, which, as pointed out by scholars, ran counter to the ideal of an externally oriented force. Decades of involvement in counter-insurgency operations have produced an armed forces that is more locally immersed and exposed to the decits of democratic governance at that level. It is a do-it-all military, accepting additional functional mandates concocted by the national government. The additional tasks bolster the militarys credentials but offer little marginal benet in terms of their relationship with local civilian actors. ` The local military outts examined exhibited a great deal of parallel thinking vis-a-vis civilian actors. They discount the importance of local authority and local frameworks; they are critical of government representatives; and they are unsure of the political leanings (pro- or anti-insurgent) of civilian groups they encounter. In their realm of activities, engagements with local civilian actors are peripheral. There is a level of acceptance that one must work with local authorities (particularly COIN non-combat and non-COIN) but
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this is neither sufcient nor necessary to the success of activities, which they for the most part can carry out independently. The study explored but a small population of front-line units in a relatively lowintensity communist-insurgency theater (Iloilo in Western Visayas) with few parallels in other locations. Given these limitations, further generalizations cannot be made about how soldiers situated in other units perceive local civilian actors. Yet the ndings provide a window into how soldiers perceive civilians to whom they are not directly accountable under the regular notion of civilian supremacy but whose presence they must reckon with inasmuch as they function within the same space. Local civilians are more invested in the politics of that space than ground troops who come and go depending on marching orders. As long as society makes distinctions between men in uniform and those who are not, these perceptions are crucial in mediating engagements between these two sets of actors. What does all of this bode for local democratic governance? The ground troops do very little with, have mostly neutral to moderately negative views about and are largely questioning of local civilian capacity for governance. Given these odds, any type of substantive engagement can only come about with politically enterprising local leaders and organizations able to shift the local armed forces away from this debilitating mode. It has been empirically established elsewhere (e.g., Bohol) that local government can engage the military more constructively towards commonly dened goals. That the local military will continue to creep into functional areas where there are clear civilian gaps is a foregone conclusion. Whether such development will engender more substantive rather than passive or confrontational dealings with local players will depend largely on the civilian side. The ball is in their court. Acknowledgements
This paper is based on the authors research project under the University of the Philippines- Visayas returning PhD grant from 2008 to 2009. The author acknowledges the comments of two anonymous reviewers but assumes full responsibility for the nal paper.
Notes
1. The debate over the appropriateness of missions performed by the US military has been elevated owing to the latters deployment for a variety of non-traditional missions (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, sanctions enforcement) and after 9/11, counter-insurgency and stabilization operations. The debate follows many strands: (1) tension between civilian and military leaders over how to utilize the US forces conventional warfare structure to ght lowintensity conicts abroad; (2) how civilians (president, Congress, public) inform organizational and cultural changes within the US military; (3) civil military coordination framework in multinational settings for rehabilitation/reconstruction missions; and (4) transformation of the humanitarian space owing to military involvement in this activity (see Nagl, 1999; Rosen, 2009; Segal and Tiggle, 1997; Avant and Lebovic, 2000; Metz, 2003; Hills, 2006). Reecting on Latin American cases, Goodman (1997) argues that the rush to assign new tasks to the military was not premised on a serious policy examination of whether and how such military role expansion undermines or competes with power vested upon political parties and government agencies, or how it affects the armed forces capability to do their core mission. His recommendation is to write into a new statute the timetable-restricted missions and precise procedure for which exemptions to these missions (i.e., extraordinary powers given to the armed forces) may be given. The two units were selected as cases because they offer contrasting organizations in carrying out the militarys core mission of providing internal security in two operational environments (red area/rural versus white area/urban). The army infantry (as opposed to the air force or navy) as a ground force comprises the militarys core element (the other being the Marines) for counterinsurgency operations. Further, the army is organized with a high level of homogeneity and
2.
3.
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R.A. Hall
therefore lends itself to easier generalization because of this character. An infantry unit deployed in the front line in Iloilo would be subject to the same rules, function under the same commandand-control principles and operate under the same rules of engagement (ROE) and doctrinal premises as a unit stationed elsewhere in the Philippines. The 73 soldiers included 67 enlisted men and 6 ofcers, who on average have served in the army for eight years, seven of which with their current unit. The 17 soldiers in the 32nd CRU include 14 enlisted men and 3 ofcers drawn from detachments in Iloilo, Negros Occidental and Aklan. They have served in the military for 20 years on average, but only ve years in their current unit. A parallel study conducted among 546 mid-level ofcers at ve US military command and staff colleges in 1999 points to a similar lack of enthusiasm for new missions. Traditional missions (ghting a conventional war) received a higher rating in terms of appropriateness compared to non-traditional missions such as drug interdiction, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian missions and sanctions enforcement. Support for missions on the low end of the conict spectrum increased with perception of public and Congressional support. Those with combat roles and with expectations for career advancement tended to exhibit greater support for new missions (Avant and Lebovic, 2000). The Kalayaan sa Barangay program is aimed at transforming communities previously affected by internal conict into development areas through infrastructure projects and expeditious delivery of basic services (Quilop, 2007).
4.
5.
6.
Notes on contributor
Rosalie Arcala Hall is a Professor of Political Science and current Chair of the Division of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines-Visayas, Miagao, Iloilo. She has authored journal articles and one book on civil military relations in counter-insurgency, disaster response, overseas deployment for humanitarian missions, gender and rebel integration experiences in the Philippines, Japan, Indonesia and Austria. She was a recipient of research grants/fellowships from Fulbright, The Nippon Foundation, Toyota Foundation, Austrian Exchange Services and the East Asian Development Network. She earned a PhD in Public and International Affairs from Northeastern University, Boston, USA, in 2002.
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