Impact of Counter-Terrorism On Communities - France Background Report

Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report
RAPHAELLE CAMILLERI
Executive Summary
This report aims to provide an overview of French counter-terrorist and counter-radicalisation policies, and assess their potential impact on the Muslim community in France. Part One focuses on the demographic composition and socioeconomic profile of the French Muslim community; the largest such community in the European Union. It finds that the Muslim community has generally tended to be marginalised in socioeconomic terms in relation to the mainstream French population, and that Muslims frequently report higher rates of discrimination than other immigrant communities in France. This broad finding helps inform subsequent sections, which look specifically at perceived discrimination by French police and security services on the basis of racial or ethnic origin. Part Two focuses on the legal framework within which French counter-terrorism policy is anchored. It reviews the development of counter-terrorist legislation since the mid-1980s, and explains how French legislation has evolved in recent years to tackle the new challenges posed by novel forms of terrorism. This section of the report also outlines the key pieces of legislation governing the operation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved in the fight against terrorism in France. It concludes by providing an overview of the main constitutional and institutional mechanisms which place checks and balances on the operation of the police agencies responsible for implementing counter-terrorist policies. Part Three of the report focuses on the law-enforcement agencies responsible for enacting counterterrorist policies on the ground. It provides a comprehensive list of the key government departments, as well as policing and intelligence agencies, involved in the fight against terrorism, and assesses the nature of their (often troubled) relationship with affected communities. Although more research is needed in this area, initial findings seem to suggest that Muslim communities generally perceive themselves to be unfairly targeted by the police on the basis of their ethnic or religious background. In light of these circumstances, this section of the report also outlines official guidelines on non-discrimination and lists the various governmental and non-governmental institutions charged with protecting the rights of citizens.
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France Part Four of the report looks at the broader security context within which counter-terrorist policies and legislation have been formulated in France. It critically assesses the extent of the terrorist threat in France, both in real and perceived terms. Two significant findings emerge. Firstly, despite the focus on religiouslymotivated Islamist terrorism since 2001, separatism terrorism carried out by Basque and Corsican nationalist groups continues to be the most pressing threat posed to the French state. Secondly, despite the initial trauma caused by Mohammed Merahs killing spree, French public opinion nevertheless deems the terrorist threat to be quite low, suggesting that the French public does not regard terrorism as a pressing threat. Part Five builds on these initial observations by focusing on the way in which French political parties have framed the terrorist threat (particularly that emanating from suspected Islamists) especially in the aftermath of the Toulouse and Montauban shootings. It examines the impact of the shootings on the presidential race, but finds little evidence that they had any bearing on the final outcome of the election. Nevertheless, the strong performance of the far-right movement of Marine Le Pen (Front National) at the polls is underlined, but it is balanced against the conciliatory tone recently adopted by the left-wing government of Franois Hollande on security issues. Throughout this report, existing research by academic institutions, think tanks and government bodies on the impact of counter-terrorism policies on the Muslim community is referenced when relevant. Notable gaps in the literature are also highlighted, along with recommendations for further research. A full bibliography is provided for reference at the end of the document, as is an exhaustive list of academics, researchers, policymakers and civil society organisations, which may make a substantial contribution to future research in this area.
General Introduction
From the 18th Century state-sponsored Reign of Terror to the more recent lone wolf attacks in Toulouse and Montauban in March 2012, France has experienced terrorism for a long time. Since the end of the Second World War, terrorist attacks on French soil have been carried out by a variety of actors and in support of a variety of causes and ideologies. These have included attacks carried out by right-wing groups such as the Organisation de lArme Secrte in the 1950s and 1960s and left-wing groups such as Action Directe in the 1980s, as well as separatist terrorism principally carried out by Basque or Corsican nationalists. In recent times, France has also suffered from a spate of religiously-motivated Islamist terrorist attacks, initially as a consequence of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, but, more recently, as a result of the global war on terror sparked by the 11 September attacks on New York City and Washington DC.
Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France Although France has generally been more immune to Al Qaeda-inspired mass-casualty terrorism than neighbouring countries like Spain or the United Kingdom, the recent killing of seven people1 by a 23 yearold French citizen of Algerian descent, who claimed membership of Al Qaeda, has shone a spotlight on the latent security threat posed by violent Islamist fundamentalists. The attacks perpetrated by Mohammed Merah who, it later emerged, had been questioned by French intelligence agencies after returning from a trip to the tribal regions of Pakistan, where he allegedly took part in weapons training also spawned a fierce debate as to why French security services failed to stop him on time. With the attacks occurring only weeks before a tightly-contested presidential election, Merahs killing spree inevitably took on a political dimension. Thus the Far Right presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, controversially attempted to blame the killings on lax immigration policies, whereas the outgoing French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, promised to implement tougher anti-terrorist legislation should he be reelected to office. Sarkozy, along with the left-wing presidential hopeful Franois Hollande, nevertheless also warned against the stigmatisation of the French Muslim community as a result of what he deemed to be the isolated actions of a monster. Yet despite repeated calls for unity made by French political leaders at a time of national grief, the Toulouse and Montauban attacks induced a profound malaise within the French Muslim community, which feared an increase in Islamophobia and discrimination. With this broader context in mind, this report contextualises the extent to which French counter-terrorist and counter-radicalisation policies have impacted on the Muslim community in the country. The report does this by assessing: the French population in relation to historical immigration waves and the nature of contemporary ethnic communities; the nature of counter-terrorism legislation in France; how the legal framework is enforced and enacted on the ground; the assessment and perception of the threat posed by terrorism in France; and finally by investigating how political parties have framed terrorism and shaped the wider political discourse related to this issue throughout the country. The author has found no specific research highlighting the impact of counter-terrorism policies on the French Muslim community. The report draws from a broad range of studies looking at different aspects of this question: research about the effects of anti-terrorism legislation on civil liberties in general, research about discrimination of minorities, including Muslims, in many aspects of life, as well as research about the French publics attitude to terrorism in general and Islamist terrorism in particular. In this sense the report provides value added to the existing research by bringing together disparate findings and explaining their relevance in terms of how counter-terrorism policies and legislation may
Mohammed Merah, a 23 year-old French citizen of Algerian descent, gunned down seven people in three separate incidents. His first victim was a French paratrooper who was killed on 11 March 2012 in Toulouse. Merah then targeted a group of three paratroopers using a cash machine outside a barracks in Montauban on 15 March, killing two of them and seriously injuring the third one. Finally, on 19 March, Merah attacked the Ozar Hatorah Jewish school in a suburb of Toulouse. His four victims included three schoolchildren aged 3, 6 and 8, as well as a 30 year-old rabbi who taught at the school. The final shooting sparked a national manhunt as French security forces scrambled to identify the shooter. Merah was eventually killed by RAID forces (an elite anti-terrorist unit of the French National Police) on 22 March after a 32-hour siege of his flat in Toulouse. It was discovered that he had filmed the attacks using a camera strapped to his chest, and had been stockpiling weapons and ammunitions.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France disproportionately affect the French Muslim community. Further research specifically looking at this particular aspect of the problem is encouraged.
I.
Population and Community Context
With a total population of over 65 million people and a territory spanning over 670 thousand square kilometres, France is the largest country in the European Union, as well as the second most populous state in Western Europe.2 As a result of Frances long colonial history as well as its continued possession of overseas territories in all three oceans3, Frances ethnic makeup is generally very diverse. In addition, local customs and dialects have survived through the centuries and continue to thrive in many parts of the French state, contributing to strong regional identities. This is especially true of the Basque and Catalan communities in southwest France (both of which continue to maintain strong cultural links with their sister communities across the border in Spain) as well as on the Mediterranean island of Corsica, a Genovese colony which was incorporated into the French state in 1769, and where Corsican nationalists have been waging a protracted campaign against French authorities since the 1970s. The ethnic diversity of contemporary French society largely results from successive waves of immigration from different parts of the world. Grard Noiriel, who pioneered the study of immigration in France, claims that up to a third of individuals within the French population have at least one parent, grandparent or great-grandparent who was an immigrant.4 The largest contingent of immigrants initially came from neighbouring Italy in the 18th and 19th centuries.5 Other large ethnic groups of non-native origin include Spaniards, Portuguese and Greeks, many of whom settled in France during the late 19th Century and early 20th Century. In the second half of the 20th Century, new immigration waves were added to the various strata of earlier (mostly European) waves. This process was largely a direct result of the wave of French decolonisation in Africa and the Far East which followed the Second World War. Thus, many of the new immigrants settling in France from the 1960s onwards now came from the former French colonies in North Africa6, Sub-Saharan Africa7, and Indochina8 . The bulk of the Muslim community living in France today is
This figure is the July 2012 population estimate for metropolitan France and five overseas regions (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte and Runion). The population of metropolitan France (mainland France and Corsica) is 62,814,233. All figures taken from the CIA World Factbook entry for France, available online https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html [Accessed 31 May 2012]. 3 These overseas territories include the islands of French Polynesia and New Caledonia in the Pacific Ocean; Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Atlantic Ocean; and Runion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean. 4 Grard Noiriel, Guidebook of Immigration in France [Atlas de l'immigration en France], (Paris : Autrement, 2002), p. 11. See also Grard Noiriel, The French Melting Pot : History of Immigration in the 19th and 20th century [Le Creuset Francais: Histoire de limmigration XIXe-XXe sicle], (Paris : Seuil, 2006). 5 It is estimated that about five million French citizens (about eight percent of the general population) are at least partly of Italian origin if their parentage is retraced over three generations. A good overview of the history of (especially Italian) immigration into France can be found in MarieClaude Blanc-Chalard, History of Immigration [Histoire de limmigration], (Paris: La Dcouverte, 2001) and Marie-Claude Blanc-Chalard, et al., Italians in France since 1945 [Les Italiens en France depuis 1945], (Rennes: PU Rennes, 2003). 6 These include present-day Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. 7 These include present-day Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cte dIvoire, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 8 These include present-day Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France therefore principally constituted by North African immigrants and their descendants. In more recent times, those immigrants have been joined by a large contingent of immigrants from Turkish origin who have left neighbouring Germany to settle in France. As a result of these post-war migratory patterns, Islam has within half a century become the second largest religion in France after Roman Catholicism, and it is estimated that 2,368 mosques and prayer halls are scattered around the country.9 Consequently, France currently houses the largest Muslim community in Western Europe, and depending on the estimate one uses the followers of Islam account for anything between three to as much as ten percent of the total French population.10 Accurately determining the size of the Muslim community in France is a particularly difficult task given legal safeguards that were put in place under the Third Republic in 1872, which prohibit state authorities from collecting personal information about their citizens ethnicity or religious beliefs. At the time, state authorities believed that such information essentially fell within the remit of an individuals private life, and that collecting such data as part of the official census may ultimately lead to discrimination based on a citizens race or religious beliefs, thereby contradicting the revolutionary principles of Libert, Egalit, Fraternit (Freedom, Equality, Solidarity). In modern times, this fundamental principle has been reaffirmed by Article 8 of Law no. 78-17 (6 January 1978), which clearly emphasises that It is prohibited to collect or exploit personal data which would reveal, directly or indirectly, [an individuals] racial or ethnic origins, political, philosophical or religious opinions.11 As a staunchly secular republic where the principle of separation of state and religious authorities is strictly enforced, the French state therefore does not hold or produce official statistics concerning the religious affiliation of its citizens. Two notable exceptions exist to this rule. The first one relates to nonpublic organisms, such as privately-owned polling agencies, which are allowed to enquire about and record the religious affiliation of survey respondents. Nevertheless, although respondents are typically drawn from a sample representative of the broader French population, extrapolating results based on a limited number of participants is inherently not as accurate as conducting a systematic nation-wide census. Consequently, studies produced by polling agencies vary widely in their estimate of the number of Muslims living in France. For example, a TNS Sofres poll conducted in April 2007 found that Muslims accounted for three percent of the French population12, while a CSA study commissioned by French
According to estimates provided by the French Minister of Interior Brice Hortefeux in an interview with French TV station Canal+ on 6 December 2009. See Hortefeux: France must condemn Islamophobia [Hortefeux: La France doit condamner lIslamophobie], Le Figaro (6 December 2009), available online at http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2009/12/06/01016-20091206ARTFIG00190-hortefeux-lafrance-doit-condamner-l-islamophobie-.php [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 10 Other minority religious groups that constitute less than five percent of the population include Protestants, Buddhists, Jews, Evangelical Christians, Jehovah's Witnesses, Orthodox Christians, Scientologists, Mormons, and Sikhs. See United States Department of State, 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom France (17 November 2010), available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cf2d09b2d.html [Accessed 31 May 2012]; and CIA World Factbook entry for France, available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html [Accessed 31 May 2012]. 11 Law no. 78-17 (6th January 1978). The full text of the law is available online (in French) at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068624&dateTexte=20110405 [Accessed 31 May 2012]. 12 The French People and Religion [Les Franais et la Religion], poll conducted on a representative sample of 4,000 individuals in April 2007, La Provence (01 April 2007). Full results and analysis available online (in French) at http://www.laprovence.com/fiches/lesfrancaisetlareligion.pdf [Accessed 31 May 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France newspaper Le Monde in January of that same year found that this number was in fact closer to four percent.13 Two years later, in August 2009, an Ifop study concluded that Muslims constituted 5.8 percent of the French general population.14 Fortunately, a second exception to the general ban on the collection of personal data relating to the religious affiliation of French citizens exists. It concerns publicly-funded institutions whose task is precisely to collect demographic data about the French population so as to support their analysis of relevant socio-economic and political trends. Such institutions are allowed to ask respondents about their religious affiliation, provided that: a) the purpose of the study specifically requires [such personal data to be collected]; and b) prior approval has been granted by both the Commission Nationale de lInformatique et des Liberts/CNIL (National Commission for Computer-Stocked Data and Freedoms) and the Conseil National de lInformation Statistique/CNIS (National Council of Statistical Information).15 Thus, two publicly-funded institutions that are exempt from the provisions detailed in Article 8, Law no. 78-17 (6 January 1978) include the National Institute for Demographic Studies (Institut National des Etudes Dmographiques/INED) and the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques/INSEE). On this basis, the INED and INSEE joined forces in 2008 to conduct a special survey on population diversity in France, which reliably concluded that France has 2.1 million declared Muslims (about three percent of the population).16 This extensive survey was conducted in metropolitan France between September 2008 and February 2009 on an exceptionally large sample of 21,000 respondents representing immigrants and their descendants, as well as members of the general population. The survey aimed to assess the extent to which migratory origins were likely to affect an individuals social trajectory and living conditions, as well as access to housing, education, employment, public services, welfare provisions, etc. This extensive survey thus filled an important gap in statistical knowledge and information about minority populations in France. Indeed, although these minority groups had previously been the subject of studies in preceding years, never before had a survey used such a large sample or covered so many areas of social life.
Towards a Catholic Minority? [Vers un Catholicisme Minoritaire?], poll conducted on a representative sample of 2,012 individuals in January 2007, Le Monde des Religions, No. 21 (01 January 2007), full results and analysis available online at http://www.lemondedesreligions.fr/archives/2007/01/01/vers-un-catholicisme-minoritaire,8492603.php [accessed 31 May 2012]. 14 Analysis 1989-2009: Geographical spread and evolution of Islam in France [Analyse 1989-2009: Enquete sur limplantation et lvolution de lIslam en France], poll based on a cumulative analysis of 135 polls conducted between 1989 and 2009 by Ifop, each time on a sample of 950 individuals, full poll results and analysis available online at http://www.ifop.com/media/pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf [accessed 31 May 2012]. 15 Law no. 78-17 (6th January 1978). 16 This number also includes 260,000 repatriates French citizens living in the former colonial empire (particularly Algeria), who were repatriated to metropolitan France after these colonies gained independence in the 1960s. See Cris Beauchemin, Christelle Hamelle and Patrick Simon, Trajectories and Origins: Survey on Population Diversity in France, (Paris: INED, 2010), full text available (in English) online at http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_telechargement/45661/telechargement_fichier_fr_dt_teo_168_english.pdf [Accessed 1 June 2012], p. 19.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France The INED/INSEEs initial findings were published in a joint report in October 2010, entitled Trajectories and Origins: A survey on population diversity (hereafter referred to as TeO), with the final conclusions expected to be made available towards the end of 2012. Owing to its exceptionally large sample size, as well as exhaustive study of minority communities perception of discrimination in a variety of social contexts, the TeO study findings have been invaluable in informing many of the issues presented in this report. Although the TeO survey does not specifically focus on the Muslim community per se, an examination of disaggregated data detailing the national origin of the survey respondents allows us to understand how immigrants from Algeria, Morocco/Tunisia and Turkey (as well as their descendants) perceive themselves in French society, and how they compare (on a variety of socio-economic indicators), not only to the rest of the French population, but also to other minority groups living in France today. Such a degree of granularity is, indeed, quite remarkable.
D ET A IL S OF M I GR A T I ON A ND S E TTL E M E N T P A TT E RNS O F E TH NI C , R AC I AL OR RE L I G IO US P OL IC IN G GR OUP S TH AT MAY BE THE F OC US OF C O U NT E R- T ERR OR IS M
In the first instance, the TeO survey findings confirm generally-held assumptions about the migration patterns of Muslims into France, although it also reveals some slight differences among Muslims, depending on where they originally came from. For example, the number of Algerians and Moroccans/Tunisians arriving in France started to become significant in the late 1960s-early 1970s (1968 and 1971, respectively), whereas migration of Turks into France only picked up after 1975. The survey findings also indicate that migration from North African countries has taken place over an extended period of time, and is continuing at a steady pace to this day. To illustrate, 90 percent of those surveyed who indicated they were of Algerian origin had arrived in France between 1968 and 2004; a time span of 36 years. By way of contrast, 50 percent of Southeast Asian immigrants arrived in just eight years, from 1977 to 1985; a highly concentrated period of exile migration, which has since abated.17 As was already mentioned earlier, immigration from southern Europe mainly Italy, Portugal and Spain goes back the furthest, since most of those surveyed had settled in France before the mid-1970s.18 These older migratory waves also tend to be those that are best integrated in French society. The diagram below provides an illustration of migratory waves into France according to origin.
Thus, a clear correlation exists between an immigrants arrival period in France and their origin, with many North Africans arriving in France from the late 1960s onwards, at a rate which has continued at a fairly constant pace since. Note, however, that because the survey was conducted in 2008-2009, it does not reflect any changes in migratory patterns which may have resulted from the recent Arab Spring and the associated political and socio-economic upheavals it created in some of these North African countries (particularly Tunisia). See Trajectories and Origins: A Survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 20 18 The oldest immigrants from those countries arrived long before that date, but only respondents aged 18-60 are included in the TeO survey. Because of the age limits imposed by the sample, the TeO survey does not provide a full picture of the history of older migration flows.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France Figure One: Year of immigrant's first arrival in metropolitan France (aged 18-60)
Source: TeO, p. 20
Interestingly, the spatial distribution of many immigrant communities in France still bears the trace of their initial settlement in areas closest to their country of origin, and the Muslim community is no exception. For example, 53 percent of those of Italian or Spanish origin still live in the south of France, whereas immigrants from Turkey and their descendants tend to be clustered in the French regions closest to Germany, the epicentre of the Turkish communitys westward migratory movement. More specifically, one-fifth of immigrants from Turkish origin live in the dpartments of the Alsace, Lorraine and FrancheComt (along the French-German border), and a quarter live in the nearby Rhne-Alpes corridor and Auvergne regions.19 The settlement pattern of Muslims of North African origin reflects that of the broader (non-Muslim) immigrant community. Thus, more than 40 percent of immigrants aged 18-50 live in the Ile-de-France region20 twice the percentage of the mainstream population and North Africans similarly tend to be mostly clustered around large population and industrial centres.21 These TeO findings match those included in an August 2009 study by polling agency Ifop, which specifically focused on the spatial distribution of Muslim communities in France. The Ifop survey similarly found that Frances Muslim communities are mostly located in the east of the country, as well as those French dpartements that are most urbanised and/or industrialised.22 The map below is excerpted from the Ifop study and clearly indicates that the proportion of Muslims exceeds ten percent in suburban areas northeast of the capital Paris, and is situated between 5.8 and 9.9 percent in major metropolitan centres in regions such as the Rhne-Alpes, Provence-Alpes-Cte dAzur, Alsace, Lorraine and Picardie. In large part, this settlement pattern reflects an underlying socio-economic reality, which is that the Muslim community in France is generally constituted by low-paid wage workers, many with no or low
Trajectories and Origins, A Survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 16 The Ile-de-France region is constituted by a cluster of eight dpartements around Paris: Hauts-de-Seine; Seine-Saint-Denis; Val-de-Marne; Seine-et-Marne; Yvelines; Essone and Val-dOise. 21 Trajectories and Origins: A Survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 16 22 Analysis 1989-2009: Geographical spread and evolution of Islam in France [Analyse 1989-2009: Enquete sur limplantation et lvolution de lIslam en France], poll based on a cumulative analysis of 135 polls conducted between 1989 and 2009 by Ifop, each time on a sample of 950 individuals, full poll results and analysis available online at http://www.ifop.com/media/pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf [accessed 31 May 2012], p. 4.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France educational qualifications, and who are attracted by the employment opportunities afforded by large industrial and population centres (more on this below). Figure Two: Proportion of Muslims in France according to dpartement
Source: Ifop (2009), p. 4
The Ifop survey also found that the gender balance is slightly in favour of males, unlike the rest of France, where females are more numerous.23 This slight discrepancy reflects the fact that recent immigration waves from Muslim countries into France are made up of young North African males searching for better opportunities on the continent. Indeed, the survey also revealed that young people are significantly overrepresented among Muslim communities in France, with 60 percent of them under the age of 35 (compared to 32 percent of under-35s in the general population).24 Finally, Muslims also tended to account for a larger proportion of workers and employees, as well as a significantly higher proportion of those who are economically inactive (students, job-seekers, etc.), than the rest of the French population.25 Although this phenomenon is partly due to the overall younger age of the Muslim community in France (explaining why students and job-seekers tend to be more numerous), it nevertheless also reflects a community that has often tended to be marginalised in socio-economic terms.
SOC IO - EC O NO M IC D A TA O N E T HN IC , R AC I AL OR R EL I G IOU S GR OUP S T H AT M A Y B E T H E F OC U S OF C O UN T ER- T ER RO RI S M P OL I C I N G/ K E Y F IN D I NGS F R OM D AT A OR S T UD I ES O N P E RC EP T IO NS OF L EV E L S OR E XP E RI E NC E S O F E TH N IC / R AC I A L OR R E L I G IO US DI SC R I MI N AT I ON
Analysis of the socio-demographic and economic profile of the Muslim community in France reveals some important variations compared to the rest of the French population. The 2009 Ifop findings were
Ibid., p. 5 Ibid., p. 5 25 Ibid., p. 5

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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France confirmed by the 2010 TeO survey, which found that unemployment rates among immigrants from Algeria, Morocco/Tunisia and Turkey were particularly high, even in relation to other immigrant communities. Figure Three: Employment rates among immigrants
Source: Teo, p. 54
Interestingly, unemployment was even higher among the descendants of immigrants from these countries. For example, only 61 percent of males of Moroccan/Tunisian descent; 67 percent of those of Turkish origin; and 69 percent of descendants of Algerian-born parents reported being employed. However, employment rates among descendants of immigrants from Spain/Italy (86 percent), Portugal (82 percent), or other EU countries (81 percent) match the average employment rate of the mainstream population (81 percent).26 Figure Four: Employment rates of descendants of immigrants
Source: Teo, p. 54
For women, the ranking by origin is somewhat different: the lowest employment rates are among women immigrants from Turkey and their descendants (a little over 33 percent). Next come women immigrants from Algeria (48 percent) and Morocco/Tunisia (49 percent). As with the men, the highest employment rates are those for descendants of immigrants from European countries. See Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 54
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France The TeO researchers recognised that age differences between minority groups might explain this phenomenon to a certain extent; since Muslim communities have considerably higher numbers of young people within their ranks, it made sense to expect relatively higher unemployment within these communities. To control for this possibility, they compared the unemployment risk of young people under the age of 30 only (where a figure above one denotes an increased risk of being unemployed). Although the disparities in unemployment risk were much less pronounced (since youth unemployment is quite high even among the mainstream population), the study nevertheless found that the unemployment risk of descendants of immigrants from Turkey (1.3), Morocco and Tunisia (1.6) and Algeria (1.8) was still higher than among young people in the mainstream population.27 Figure Five: Relative risk of being unemployed in relation to the mainstream population
Source: TeO, p57.
Thus, although age differences between different minority groups had a definite effect on unemployment rates, the analysis nevertheless showed that, all else being equal and after many structural factors had been taken into account, Muslim immigrants and their descendants suffered from markedly higher unemployment rates than the mainstream population.28 This objective result agreed to a large extent with subjective perceptions of discrimination; the immigrant groups most hard hit by unemployment were also the ones who most often indicated they had had a job application unfairly rejected within the past
Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 56. The TeO researchers report that these results are consistent with those of other studies (e.g. by Dupray, Frickey and Silbermann) using different data sets. See Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 53. See also Silbermann, Roxanne; Alba, Richard and Fournier, Irene, Segmented Assimilation in France? Discrimination in the labour market against the second generation, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 30 (1 January 2007), pp. 1-27
27 28
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France five years.29 More specifically, 27 percent of descendants of Tunisian/Moroccan immigrants, 21 percent of those of Algerian origin and 17 percent of those with Turkish parents reported that they had experienced an unfair rejection of a job application (in comparison, only five percent of respondents in the mainstream population reported a similar incident).30 Moreover, for those immigrants and their descendants from Algeria, Morocco/Tunisia and Turkey that were fortunate enough to be in paid employment, the TeO survey found they were paid an average hourly wage lower than that of the mainstream population.31Part of this phenomenon reflects the lower educational achievements of people from those origins. For example, 34 percent of Turks, 33 percent of Moroccans/Tunisians and 27 percent of Algerian immigrants reported having no formal qualifications whatsoever (compared to only nine percent of the mainstream population).32 More tellingly, among the descendants of these Muslim immigrants, the proportion of men aged 18-35 with no qualifications or low qualifications (primary or lower secondary school certificates) is almost twice as high as for the mainstream population.33 These results indicate that children of Muslim immigrants tend to leave the French educational system with no or low qualifications, and that many of them choose to take short-term technical/vocational courses as opposed to the general baccalaurat (which is usually a pre-requisite for higher-paid employment opportunities). This trend is partly explained by the fact that most descendants of immigrants generally come from working-class families (as determined through their fathers positions).34 Thus over 70 percent of descendants of immigrants from North Africa and Turkey have fathers that were employed as manual workers. These modest social origins partly help to explain the low levels of education achieved by young people in Muslim communities.35 Interestingly, however, many of those children also report having been less than well treated when deciding on the track to follow in higher education. This sense of injustice is particularly marked among descendants of immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia (23 percent), Turkey (22 percent) and Algeria (20 percent), who reported experiencing ethnic or racial discrimination at school. Indeed, the central motive given as a possible reason for this unfavourable treatment at school is origin, followed by skin colour.36 This widespread sense of injustice can undermine the legitimacy of the French educational system and therefore explain why children of Muslim immigrants quickly grow disillusioned of the opportunities for social mobility it supposedly creates. Discrimination (real or perceived) extended to other areas of social life for those children and their parents. A large proportion of respondents reported perceived discrimination in access to housing. This included 21 percent of immigrants from Algeria (15 percent for their descendants); 16 percent of immigrants from Morocco/Tunisia (14 percent for their descendants); and seven percent of immigrants from Turkey (17
Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 53. Ibid, p. 58. 31 Ibid., p. 71. 32 Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 39. 33 Ibid. p. 43. 34 More specifically, 65 percent compared to only 41 percent of young people in the mainstream population. 35 Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p.47; p. 64. 36 Ibid. p. 50.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France percent for their descendants). In comparison, the proportion of respondents in the mainstream population reporting discrimination in access to housing is only just above five percent.37 Figure Six: Perceived discrimination in access to housing by immigrants/descendants of immigrants
Source: Teo, p. 96
Unsurprisingly, Muslim immigrants and their descendants were also less likely to be home owners, and more frequently likely to occupy social housing than the mainstream population. Thus, more than half the immigrants from Algeria live in social housing (55 percent, higher than any other immigrant group in France), followed closely by those from Morocco/Tunisia (45 percent) and Turkey (41 percent). These percentages are slightly lower for their descendants (45 percent, 35 percent and 39 percent respectively), but are still significantly higher than the overall average for descendants of all immigrants (19 percent), and twice that of the mainstream population (15 per cent).38 Figure Seven: Dwelling occupancy status by origin
Source: Teo, p. 94
37 38
Ibid., p. 93. Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 94.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France Apart from reflecting the relatively impoverished nature of this community, these results reflect a mentality of once a social housing tenant, always a social housing tenant, with little upward social mobility. Combined with perceived inequality of access to higher education, as well as a lack of prospects on the employment front, it can create a deep distrust of public institutions and contributes to a large pool of disillusioned young men, who can be readily attracted to more extremist ideologies as an outlet for their resentment. Significantly, the TeO findings confirm those of previous studies on this topic which found that, although lower education attainment levels of immigrants plays a role in immigrants experience in the labour market, inequities in the labour market are caused by other factors beyond lower education attainment levels of the first- and second-generation workforce. Lopez and Thomas (2006) report that immigrant youth are often unsatisfied with their professional situation and feel they are in positions that do not recognise and/or take advantage of the skills they have to offer. Irne Fournier and Roxane Silberman similarly show that the greater risk of unemployment among second-generation youth with backgrounds from outside the EU cannot be accounted for by their education levels. Finally, not only are French Muslims more likely to be unemployed than the rest of the population, they also encounter more problems finding long-term and full-time jobs.39 French counter-radicalisation policies (which will be assessed separately in Part Three below) must therefore be assessed against this broader socio-economic backdrop. Please note that details of perceived discrimination by the police will be assessed in Part Three below.
M EC H AN IS M F OR C O OP ER AT I ON A N D DI A L OGU E B E T W E E N M I NO R I T Y GR OUP S AN D C O MM UN I T I ES A ND GO V E RN M E NT P O L IC Y M A K ERS OR OF F I C I AL S
The absence of a single privileged interlocutor representing the interests of the Muslim community vis-vis the French state has complicated the process of integration and contributed to some extent to the socio-economic marginalisation of this community within France. Unlike strongly hierarchical organisations such as the Catholic Church, Islam in France largely operates on the basis of a decentralised network of mosques and prayer halls which are distinct from one another. Consequently, the Muslim community in France has been at a unique disadvantage because it has generally lacked cohesion and institutional mechanisms for developing consensus and organising advocacy against the state.40 In order to remedy the chronic under-representation of Muslims, and so as to provide the French authorities with a single point of contact for issues affecting the Muslim community in France, the then-French Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevnement launched a consultation on this matter in 1999. This process was continued by Chevnements successor, Daniel Vaillant, and eventually led to the creation of a
See Elizabeth Sebian, Islam in France, available online at http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/france/ [accessed 2 July 2012]. 40 Elizabeth Sebian, Islam in France, available online at http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/france/ [accessed 2 July 2012].
39
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France centralised representative body for the Muslim community in 2003, with the explicit support of the thenFrench Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy. The Conseil Franais du Culte Musulman/CFCM (French Council of the Muslim Faith) is a national elected body which aims to act as an official representative of the French Muslim community vis--vis government officials and policymakers. The CFCM regroups a number of smaller regional associations (Conseil Regionaux du Culte Musulman) and federations of associations administering places of worship and mosques, as well as individuals associated with the latter. Article 1 of the CFCM Charter indicates that its aims are to defend the dignity and interests of the Muslim faith in France; facilitate the sharing of information and services among places of worship; encourage the dialogue between religions; and represent Muslim places of worship vis--vis government authorities.41 To this end, the CFCM also outlines a number of courses of actions and activities it might engage in, such as: Representing the Muslim faith at all events and public demonstrations when relevant, and acting as a spokesperson for that community in public debates and with the media; participating in all committees or workshops related to the exercise of the Muslim faith; organising colloquia, conferences and public events centred on Islam; organising courses and training workshops raising awareness of Islam; publishing written, audio-visual or electronic material to support these aims.42 The creation of the CFCM was followed in 2005 by the controversial creation of a government-backed Fondation de lIslam (Foundation for Islam) to help support the financing of new mosques and prayer halls. This foundation, also championed by Nicolas Sarkozy, was created in response to government claims that the shortage of mosques in France may encourage extremists to gain a foothold in clandestine prayer halls scattered around the country.43 Both the Foundation for Islam and CFCM have, however, been criticised for being too heavily vulnerable to state interference and have also faced claims that they do not adequately represent the diverse ethnic and religious makeup of French Muslims. For example, seats on the Council are apportioned according to the physical square footage of each mosque, a system that benefits groups with substantial financial resources, especially those that receive funding from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.44 Moreover, the first elected president of the CFCM was Dalil Boubakeur, the Rector of the Great Mosque of Paris, who was, incidentally, also the preferred candidate of the French government. Although Boubakeur has come under criticism for not representing the broader community and for being too agreeable to the state, he was nevertheless re-elected to lead the Council on 19 June 2005.
Statutes of the French Council for the Muslim Faith [Les Statuts du Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman], available online (in French) on the CFCMs website at http://www.lecfcm.fr/?page_id=16 [accessed 31 May 2012]. 42 Ibid. 43 Emma Charlton, Sarkozy calls for change to 1905 secularity Law, Middle East Online (31 October 2007), available online at http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=14899 [Accessed 6 August 2012]. 44 Elizabeth Sebian, Islam in France, available online at http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/france/ [Accessed 2 July 2012].
41
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France Despite its weaknesses, the CFCM has acted as a spokesperson for the Muslim community in France and has showcased its leadership in prominent controversies concerning Muslims. These have included the controversies surrounding the banning of ostentatious religious symbols (particularly the Muslim headscarf) in schools and public administrations in 2004; the riots in Paris suburbs in 2005; the Prophet Mohammed cartoon controversy in 2006; the banning of the full-length burqa in 2011; and, more recently, the Toulouse and Montauban killings in March 2012. The various manners in which these incidents have affected public opinion of Muslims as well as the relationship between the Muslim community and the state are explored in more detail in Part Three below.
II.
Legal Context
The adoption of dedicated counter-terrorism policies, including an associated judicial apparatus, is not a recent development in France. France has, indeed, confronted a wave of terrorist-related acts (both of domestic and international origin) from the 1970s onwards. These intensified throughout the 1980s and 1990s, particularly as a result of the Algerian civil war, and created a widespread climate of fear, especially in the capital Paris. As a result, French legislators adopted dedicated anti-terrorism legislation as early as 1986. French counter-terrorist policies and anti-terrorist legislation have subsequently been reinforced, improved and extended, in response to the emergence of novel terrorist modes of action (the greater use of electronic communications, for example), as well as the appearance of new terrorist threats. From the onset, French legislators have attempted to strike a balance between strong legislation that effectively addresses the peculiar law-enforcement challenges posed by terrorism, while simultaneously continuing to guarantee individual and public freedoms. Owing to this carefully balanced approach, France has managed to avoid having to adopt exceptional legislation, and has instead kept its anti-terrorist legislation within the remit of the ordinary provisions contained in criminal law. This also explains why France unlike other European countries did not need to implement a complete overhaul of its legislation following the 9/11 attacks, but has instead only had to reinforce and/or extend existing provisions already contained in available legislation, in a limited number of cases.
AN Y L EG AL D EF I NI T I ON (S ) OF T E RRO R IS M
Thus, rather than create a separate and specific offence for terrorism, French legislators have instead opted to apply exceptional rules to a variety of acts that already fall within the ambit of French criminal laws (e.g. murder, kidnap, extortion, etc.). Such criminal offences become terrorist offences only when they are committed in a specific context and with a specific intent. Strictly speaking, terrorist offences in France are therefore a range of common criminal offences which become terrorist offences as a result of
16
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France the aggravated specific motive of being committed intentionally in relation to an individual or collective undertaking, the purpose of which is to seriously disturb the public order by intimidation or terror.45 The criminal offences liable to become terrorist offences are defined in Article 421-1 of the French Code Pnal/CP (Penal Code, hereafter referred to as CP). They include: wilful attacks on life and on the physical integrity of the persons; abduction and unlawful detention; hijacking of means of transport; theft; extortion; destruction, defacement and damage; computer-related offences; offences committed by prohibited combat organisations and disbanded movements; production or keeping of dangerous or explosive devices; the purchase, keeping, transport, or unlawful carrying of explosive substances or of devices made with such explosive substances; detention, carrying, and transport of weapons and ammunition; designing, production, keeping, stocking, purchase or sale of biological or toxin-based weapons; developing, producing, stocking and use of chemical weapons; money laundering; and insider trading (Art. 421-1, CP).46 Article 421-2 of the Penal Code additionally prohibits so-called ecological terrorism, which it defines (somewhat vaguely) as the introduction into the atmosphere, ground, soil, water and food products of substances liable to imperil human or animal health or the natural environment (Art. 421-2, CP). Under Article 421-2-2, the financing of a terrorist organisation by providing, raising, or managing funds or providing advice regarding the management of such funds, with the intention of seeing those funds being used wholly or partly to commit any of the acts mentioned above (regardless of whether that act occurs) is also considered an act of terrorism (Art. 421-2-2, CP). Finally, it is also prohibited to harbour individuals suspected of terrorism or wanted in connecting with terrorist offences (Art. 434-6, CP). Perhaps the most controversial terrorist-related offence is the one described in Article 421-2-1 of the Penal Code, according to which the participation in any group or association established with a view to the preparation, marked by one or more material actions, of any of the acts of terrorism provided for in previous articles shall in addition be an act of terrorism (Art. 421-2-1, CP). Thus, the mere participation in a criminal group in relation with a terrorist undertaking is considered a terrorist offence in itself, even when the terrorist act has not yet occurred. According to existing case law, the defining feature of the undertaking is the level of professionalism required and strategy used a minimum degree of planning and preparation is required for the offence to be deemed to have been committed.47 This article was introduced in the French Penal Code in order to allow state authorities to prevent terrorist attacks by allowing them to intercept potential terrorists before they have committed their act. In practice, it allows investigators to initiate judicial proceedings against suspected terrorists before they have
Olivier Cahn, The Fight against Terrorism and Human Rights: The French Perspective in Marianne Wade and Almir Maljevic (eds), A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications, (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 474. 46 The full text of the Code Pnal is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719 [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 47 Eva Steiner, Legislating Against Terrorism: The French Approach, London: Chatham House (8 December 2005), available online at www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/.../ilp081205.doc [Accessed 5 June 2012].
45
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France committed their act, utilising relevant intelligence collected by specialised bodies.48 Unsurprisingly, this has been a very controversial article, as it has been used to justify waves of arrest and indiscriminate detention of suspects on suspicion of preparing to commit a terrorist offence. The vagueness of the wording of the law has also been strongly condemned.49 Anti-terrorist legislation passed since 1986 (detailed below) also sets out special arrangements relating to the investigative tools and procedures governing the investigation and arrest of terrorist suspects. The classification of a criminal act as a terrorist act (when the aggravating circumstances mentioned above apply) carries important legal consequences for those accused, since all normal sentences are increased for common criminal acts deemed to have been committed for the purpose of terrorism. For example, whereas in ordinary circumstances a certain criminal offence would be punished by a sentence of 30 years in prison, if this act is categorised as a terrorist act, the suspect may be handed a life sentence (Art. 421-3, CP). Consequently, under French law, whether or not a criminal act is categorised as a terrorist act has many important consequences, even before the suspect is brought to trial. Although the public prosecutor will initially categorise the facts surrounding an offence and may classify the act as a terrorist offence, the investigating magistrate is not bound by that decision, nor is the court. Because of its important legal ramifications, the suspect has a right of appeal against that classification at any stage of the legal proceedings, including during trial. The rules governing the trial of terrorist suspects do not contain any procedural specificities, however, and the common rules are applied.
OUTL I N E O F T ERR OR IS M
THE
KEY
L E G ISL AT I ON
US ED
IN
R EL A TI ON
TO
C OU NT E R-
Historically, the first anti-terrorist legislation passed in France dates back to the late 19th Century. The pejoratively-called Lois Sclrates (villainous laws) were a series of three laws passed in 1893 and 1894 after a series of bombings and assassination attempts carried out by anarchists and proponents of the propaganda of the deed. These laws severely restricted freedom of the press and freedom of speech, and allowed state authorities to detain and/or prosecute anyone directly or indirectly involved in or preparing for a propaganda of the deed act (even if no actual killing ensued). The laws also allowed state authorities to prosecute any individual or newspaper advocating a crime or reproducing anarchist propaganda (interestingly, the Lois Sclrates were only formally repealed on 23 December 1992!). In modern times, the adoption of anti-terrorist legislation has been a much more consensual affair in France, although the massacres recently perpetrated by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse and Montauban have re-ignited the debate about the balance between strong legislation designed to ensure collective
Olivier Cahn, The Fight against Terrorism and Human Rights: The French Perspective in Marianne Wade and Almir Maljevic (eds), A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications, (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 474. 49 Eva Steiner, Legislating Against Terrorism: The French Approach, (London: Chatham House, 8 December 2005), available online at www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/.../ilp081205.doc [Accessed 5 June 2012].
48
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France security and the need to protect civil liberties. The first piece of legislation specifically designed to combat terrorism was introduced in France in 1986, following a series of 13 attacks committed by Middle Eastern terrorists, which left 11 people dead. Law no. 86-1020 (9 September 1986), which was passed on 9 September 1986, introduced the notion of a terrorist act in the Penal Code for the first time, but only so as to introduce procedural specificities relating to the investigation and prosecution of such acts. Indeed, until 1986, all judicial proceedings relating to crimes against the fundamental interests of the nation were heard by common law jurisdictions (juridictions de droit commun, i.e. ordinary courts that are competent to deal with all proceedings, except those that fall under exceptional legislation). Law no. 86-1020 (9 September 1986), instituted an exception to this rule for terrorism-related offences. Specifically, it created a specialised section of prosecutors and investigating magistrates, based in Paris, which deal exclusively with such offences.50 Although in theory this judicial body does not supersede the local jurisdictions where the offence has been committed (and/or one of the suspects resides), in practice all judicial proceedings relating to terrorist offences have since been centralised and are heard by this specialised Paris court (section anti-terroriste du Parquet de Paris).51 Law no. 86-1322 (30 December 1986), which was passed shortly after, confirmed the special status accorded to terrorist offences under French law.52 It detailed that all terrorism-related crimes must be heard by a special court (cours dassises), where the jury is composed exclusively of independent professional magistrates rather than ordinary citizens (Art. 706-25, CPP). This reflects the fact that terrorist trails are often complex and sensitive legal cases which require a certain degree of expertise and objectivity. It has also been argued that putting the fight against terrorism into the hands of independent judges has depoliticised the issue of terrorism.53 In practice, the centralised nature of the judicial apparatus allows better coordination of the judiciary authorities with the intelligence agencies in charge of collecting evidence to support terrorism investigations. In 1992, Law no. 92-686 (22 July 1992) inserted terroristrelated offences in the new Penal Code, so as to define a specific category of offences which are more severely punished than common criminal acts.54 This law provides the legal basis for the heavier sentences handed to those accused of terrorist acts, as explained above. Following another wave of Algerian terrorism in 1995, new legislation was again passed to extend the powers and prerogatives of investigating magistrates and law enforcement authorities involved in the fight
The full text of Law no. 86-1020 (9th September 1986) is available online (in French) at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000693912 [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 51 See Article 706-17 and Article 706-22-1 of the Code de Procedure Pnale (Penal Procedural Code), hereafter referred to as CPP. The full text of the CPP is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154
50
The full text of Law no. 86-1322 (30th December 1986) is available online (in French) at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000317306 [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 53 Eva Steiner, Legislating Against Terrorism: The French Approach, (London: Chatham House, 8 December 2005), available online at www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/.../ilp081205.doc [Accessed 5 June 2012].
52
The full text of Law no. 92-686 (22nd July 1992) is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000722860&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id [Accessed 8 July 2012].
54
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France against terrorism. Law no. 96-647 (22 July 1996) created a category of criminal offence relating to participation in any group or association established with a view to the preparation of an act of terrorism (association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste).55 This law provided the basis for the creation in the French Code Penal of the controversial Article 421-2-1 mentioned above. It also extended the period of time within which French nationality (having been granted) can be removed from a person found guilty of a terrorist offence (Art. 55, Law no. 96-647). Law no. 96-1235 (30 December 1996) modified the provisions included in the French Code de Procedure Pnale, relating to the investigation of terrorist offences and the arrest and detention of terrorist suspects.56 For example, it allowed authorities to carry out house searches and seize personal belongings without the consent of suspected individuals (Art. 706-24, CPP) or to carry out such searches outside the regular hours of between 6am and 9pm (Art. 59; Art. 706-89 to 706-94, CPP). On 15 November 2001, in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC, Law no. 2001-1062 (15 November 2001) reinforced and extended some of the counterterrorist dispositions enshrined in existing pieces of legislation.57 This law reflected the new challenges posed by transnational terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda, and specifically sought to target the financial underpinnings of such organisations. As a result, it created a new category of offence relating to the financing of terrorist organisations (Article 421-2-2 of the French Penal Code mentioned above), and gave state authorities the power to seize all the assets of individuals found guilty of acts of terrorism. In addition, along with relatively minor juvenile delinquency measures, the law substantially expanded police powers. For example, stop and search of vehicles in the context of terrorism investigations became legal without prior court approval. It also became legal to search unoccupied premises at night with a warrant but without notifying the owner, whereas police records that had hitherto been considered private were now made available to investigating magistrates (juge dinstruction) and policemen. Probably most controversial, however, has been the push to have much more extensive monitoring and recording of electronic transactions. The records of email communication (not content) can now be monitored much more easily, and the new law required records to be kept tracking communications. All the elements of this policy clearly have the potential for being abused. In a similar vein, Law no. 2004-204 (9 March 2004) introduced a wide range of new measures so as to respond to changes in the way in which modern organised crime and terrorist organisations now
The full text of Law no. 96-647 (22nd July 1996) is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000367689 56 The full text of Law no. 96-1235 (30th December 1996) is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000562805&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 57 The full text of Law no. 2001-1062 (15th November 2001) is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000222052 [Accessed 8 July 2012].
55
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France operate.58 Specifically, it allowed state authorities to use novel ways of investigating terrorism-related offences, such as using wire-tapping or electronic bugs during preliminary investigation of terrorist suspects and the infiltration of suspected terrorist networks by law-enforcement officials. Law no. 200664 (23 January 2006) also introduced a number of new measures and extended the powers available to investigating magistrates and law enforcement officials.59 These included greater use of CCTV surveillance in places considered as potential targets for terrorist attacks (including places of worship or shopping malls); the obligation for internet service providers and cyber-cafes to store files on all their customers activities for a period of up to one year; and the possibility for law enforcement agencies to access the data stored without the need for a warrant. It also gave general power of access by the police to computerised record systems and files held by various official bodies such as driver vehicle license records (Article 9) and extended the period of time during which it is possible to initiate proceedings to take away French nationality from a person found guilty of an act of terrorism, from 10 years to fifteen years (Article 11). That law also extended the detention without charge of terrorist suspects to a maximum of six days, provided that the risk of an attack is both proven and imminent. Most recently, Law no. 2011-267 (14 March 2011), also known as Loppsi II, contained a number of measures relating to the fight against organised crime and cyber criminality, many of which can also be used for the fight against terrorism.60 This includes generalised video-surveillance (including trebling the number of CCTV cameras to 60,000) as well as the ability of police services to install remote spyware on PCs under judicial control, so as to collect evidence that suspects are preparing for a terrorist attack. Finally, Law no. 2011-392 (14 April 2011) reinforced the presence of a lawyer during detention in terrorism-related matters (more below).61 As a result of the successive legislative reforms initiated since 1986, police officers involved in counterterrorism investigations are usually on public prosecutor or investigating judge authorisation allowed to enforce the following powers.
The full text of Law no. 2004-204 (9 March 2004) is available online http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000249995 [Accessed 8 July 2012].
58 59
(in
French)
at at at
The full text of Law no. 2006-64 (23 January 2006) is available online (in French) http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006053177 [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 60 The full text of Law no. 2011-267 (14 March 2011) is available online (in French) http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023707312&categorieLien=id [Accessed 8 July 2012].
61
The full text of Law no. 2011-392 (14th April 2011) is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023860729&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id [Accessed 8 July 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France

P O W ERS T O S TOP , S E ARC H A ND QU E S T I ON I ND I V ID UAL S IN T H E S TR E E T
Law enforcement officials are allowed to carry out administrative identity checks on any individual, provided they have one or more reasons to suspect that this individual: Has committed or tried to commit an offence; Is about to commit an offence; Is able to provide useful intelligence to aid the investigation of an offence; Is wanted by a judicial authority
In addition, the identity of any individual regardless of their behaviour can be checked to prevent a disturbance to public order, particularly as it relates to the safety and security of members of the general public and their property (Art. 78-2, CPP). If that individual is unable to provide a proof of identity, they may be held or taken to a police station to allow necessary checks to take place. Individuals may not be held for longer than necessary to carry out the check (and in all cases no longer than four hours), unless they refuse to declare their identity or provide fake documents. In this case, the public prosecutor or investigating judge can request that fingerprints and/or photographs be taken to help establish the identity of the person (Art. 78-3, CPP). These provisions apply to all individuals, whether they are wanted in connection with terrorism-related offences or not. However, when law enforcement officials are investigating terrorism-related offences, they are also allowed to stop and search vehicles parked or circulating on a public road or in public places, in addition to carrying out the regular identity checks mentioned above. To do so, however, they must first get a written warrant issued by the Procureur de la Rpublique (public prosecutor) which defines the exact times and places where vehicle searches are allowed. This time period must not exceed 24 hours, renewable once. In addition, vehicles can only be stopped for as long as is required to carry out a search, which must be conducted in the presence of the vehicle driver or in the case of parked cars a member of the public requisitioned to that effect to act as a witness (unless there is a possibility they might be exposed to danger as a result of it) (Art. 78-2-2, CPP).
P O W ERS TO S T OP , S E ARC H A N D QU ES T I ON I N DI V I DU AL S A T T H E BO RD E RS (P O RT S, A IR P OR TS , E TC )
Law enforcement officials are allowed to carry out administrative identity checks on any individual present within the public areas of ports, airports, railway stations and bus stations which serve international destinations, to ensure that these individuals carry the required documentation. When identity checks are conducted on board an international train, they can be carried out until the first railway stop inside French territory (Art. 78-2, CPP).
22

P O W ERS T O D E T A IN P E OP L E I N R EL A TI ON TO T ER RO RI S M
Unlike common criminals, who can be held in police custody before being charged for up to 48 hours (garde vue), terrorist suspects can be held in police custody without charge for up to six days. In the first instance, if the investigation requires it, the initial 48-hour garde vue can be extended twice by a period of 24 hours (or, exceptionally, once by a period of 48 hours). To obtain these extensions, a written request must be presented to the investigating judge, and evidence must be provided in support of the request. Prior to the start of the first 24-hour extension, the suspect must undergo a medical examination so as to establish that he is fit to stand further detention (Art. 706-88, CPP). More recently, new legislation extended the period of garde vue to up to 6 days when there is a real and proven danger that a terrorist act is about to be committed. In addition, unlike common criminals who are allowed to have access to a lawyer from the start of their detention period (Art. 63-4, CPP), in the case of terrorist suspects, access to a lawyer can be delayed for a period of up to 48 hours, if it is necessary to collect or preserve incriminating evidence, or to guarantee public safety. This can be extended to up to 72 hours for more serious offences (Art. 706-88, CPP). Once charged, a suspect may be held in pre-trial detention for up to four years (two or three years without trial in non-terrorist cases, depending on the severity of the offence) (Art. 145-2, CPP). The European Court of Human Rights has condemned France for these lengthy time periods in both cases. For example, France was condemned on 26 January 2012 for holding members of the Basque terrorist group ETA, suspected of preparing to commit terrorist acts, in pre-trial detention for periods of up to five years.62
P O W ERS T O T ERR OR IS M
D EP OR T
I N DI V I DU AL S
IN
R EL A T IO N
TO
IN VOL V E M EN T
IN
French law affords a certain measure of protection to immigrants and asylum seekers awaiting a decision by immigration authorities regarding their status. However, according to two laws passed in 2003, the ordinary provisions contained in immigration law no longer apply if there are serious reasons to believe that an individuals presence on French territory constitutes a serious threat to public order, public safety, or national security (in the case of asylum seekers).63 Similarly, whereas immigrants who have been living within French territory for a long period of time, or can demonstrate a substantial link to France, cannot be expelled, those who are suspected of behaviour susceptible of endangering the fundamental interests of the nation, linked to terrorist activities, or incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence on the basis
ECHR, Berasategi v France, n 29095/09 (26 January 2012). Other cases where France was condemned by the ECHR for similar reasons are: ECHR, Gosselin v France, n 66224/01 (13 December 2005); ECHR, Cretello v France, n2078/04 (23 February 2007); ECHR, Maloum v France, n 35471/06 (8 October 2009); ECHR, Naudo v France, n 35469/06 (8 October 2009). Details available on the ECHR website.
62
See Article 1 of Law no. 2003-1119 (26 November 2003). The full text of the law is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000795635&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id [Accessed 8 July 2012].
63
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France of ethnic origin or religion can be expelled.64 These two laws therefore make it substantially easier to deport individuals whose behaviour threatens public order, and was indeed invoked by French President Nicolas Sarkozy following the massacres perpetrated in Toulouse and Montauban, when France took steps to expel five radical Islamists.65 In addition, according to Article 25 of the Code Civil (Civil Code, hereafter referred to as CC), individuals who either before acquiring French citizenship, or within 15 years of acquiring French citizenship are convicted of a terrorist offence or any offence targeting the fundamental interests of the nation can be stripped of their citizenship (Art. 25, CC).66
AD D IT I ON AL P O W ER S R EL AT I NG TO T E RR OR IS M IN V ES T IG A T IO NS
Other powers held by law-enforcement agencies investigating suspected terrorist offences include: Phone tapping of terrorist suspects during preliminary investigations for a period of one month, renewable once, subject to authorisation by an investigating judge (Art. 706-95, CPP). Access to electronic data in real time, which allows investigators to access, save, keep and transmit electronic messages and data as they are being broadcast and before the user is able to either encrypt or destroy this data (Art. 706-102-1 to 706-102-9, CPP). However, this access to electronic data can only be put in place for a period of four months, renewable only once (Art. 706-102-3, CPP). Finally, law enforcement officials investigating offences relating to the glorification of terrorism (apologie du terrorisme) and incitement to terrorism are also allowed to take part in electronic correspondence under a false name; use electronic communication to maintain contact with those suspected of committing such offences; and extract, acquire or save through these means elements of proof and data concerning the identity of the authors of these offences (Art. 706-252, CPP).
C H EC K S AN D B AL A N C E S O N T H E OP ER A TI ON OF T H E C O UN T ER - T ER RO R IS M L A WS A ND P OL IC I ES
There are two main institutional mechanisms by which civil liberties are protected in France. The first is by way of review by the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council). This body scrutinises legislation for compatibility with the Constitution (which incorporates the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
Article 38 and Article 78 of Law no. 2003-1119 (26 November 2003). The full text of the law is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000795635&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 65 France expels radical Islamists after Merah killings, BBC News (3 April 2012), available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-17592569 [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 66 The full text of the Civil Code is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721 [Accessed 8 July 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France the Citizen). There is ongoing debate as to the nature of the relationship between the Constitutional Council and the European Court of Human Rights, and, although the Council does not technically examine compatibility of domestic legislation with European legislation, in practice it is increasingly forced to ensure legislation upholds the provisions contained in the European Convention on Human Rights.67 As anti-terror legislation is inherently susceptible to contravene civil liberties, French Parliamentary opposition parties have usually asked the Conseil Constitutionnel to intervene every time a significant piece of anti-terror legislation has been put forward for consideration. This was the case for all the major pieces of legislation mentioned above (i.e. Laws of 9 September 1986; 22 July 1996; 18 March 2003; 9 March 2004; 23 January 2006). The only major exception to this rule concerns Law no. 2001-1062 (15 November 2001), which was not presented to the Conseil Constitutionnel for prior approval, largely because of the trauma associated with the 11 September attacks in New York City and which created a consensus, among legislators, about the need for stronger anti-terror legislation.68 On the whole, the Conseil Constitutionel has generally tended to validate the legal dispositions adopted by Parliament. On a number of occasions, however, it has deemed some provisions within the laws to be anti-constitutional and/or has voiced reservations concerning them, but never has it questioned the fundamental principles of these laws put forward by legislators69 (see paragraph below the Constitutional Council did not determine that exceptional measures implemented under anti-terror legislation are anti-constitutional. In most cases it has simply asked for tweaks to the wording of legislation). In all of these cases, the Conseil Constitutionnel has therefore taken a rather relaxed approach to scrutinising anti-terror legislation, provided the presumption of innocence and the fundamental human rights of the accused are not infringed in any way.70 The second system of checks and balances is related to the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights is directly applicable in French law. Thus, if a conflict arises in court between the provisions contained in French Law and those applicable within the European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention rights will prevail and French law can be cast aside. In October 2010, the European Court of Human Rights condemned France for the first time for failing to ensure that those persons held in garde a vue were able to see a lawyer from the very start of their period of detention and throughout every interrogation after that. The ECHR thus upheld a complaint by Claude Brusco, whose right to remain
For a better explanation of what is a technically complex issue, see Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, Influence of the European Court of Human Rights on the Constitutional Council [Influence de la CEDH sur le Conseil Constitutionnel], available (in French) on the ECHR website at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/8785265C-1579-4321-8A2FFA2FD37A8708/0/OlivierDutheilletdeLamotheInfluencedelaCEDHsurleConseilConstitutionnel.pdf [Accessed 6 August 2012]. 68 Proposed law on the reinforcement of legislation for the prevention and repression of acts of terrorism: Impact study [Projet de Loi renforant la prvention et la rpression du terrorisme: Etude dimpact], available online at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/2652/18679/version/2/file/ei_prevention_repression_terrorisme_cm_11.04.2012.p df [Accessed 7 June 2012], p. 11. 69 Ibid., p. 11. 70 Eva Steiner, Legislating Against Terrorism: The French Approach, (London: Chatham House, 8 December 2005), available online at www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/.../ilp081205.doc [Accessed 5 June 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France silent was not respected, and who was not able to see a lawyer until 20 hours into his detention. Brusco argued that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights relating to the right to a fair trial had been breached on this occasion and that he had been forced to incriminate himself. The seven European judges unanimously concluded that French legislation is not compatible with the requirements of a fair trial and consequently fined the French state 5,000 euros.71 On 30 July of that year, the French Constitutional Council had already stated that legislation governing the garde a vue breached the individual rights and freedoms of citizens and had given the government until 1 July 2011 to implement new legislation more respectful of the rights of the defence. However, the Constitutional Council nevertheless did not find that exceptional measures of garde a vue implemented for offences related to terrorism and organised crime were anti-constitutional.72 In addition, there are several pieces of anti-discrimination legislation in France. Although none of them relate specifically to the police or security services, the IGGN, IGPN and IGS can be called to intervene by judicial authorities if members of the security services are found to be breaking the law. The relevant pieces of legislation in this area include: Law no. 72-546 (1 July 1972), relating to the fight against racism, prohibits incitement to racial hatred or racial discrimination based on an individuals origin, or belonging to a certain ethnicity, nation, race or religion, which is punishable by a fine or imprisonment from one month up to a year. Law no. 90-615 (13 July 1990) which reinforces the provisions contained in Law no. 72-546 and which prohibits any racist, anti-Semitic or xenophobic act. Article 225-1 of the Penal Code, which defines discrimination as any distinction between individuals based on their origin, sex, family situation, pregnancy, physical appearance, surname, health condition, disability, genetic characteristics, sexual orientation, age, political opinions, labour union activities, belonging (or lack thereof) whether real or perceived to an ethnicity, nation, race or religion. Article 225-2 of the Penal Code, which states that discrimination is punishable by three years of imprisonment and a 45,000-euro fine. These laws apply to all individuals, including public servants.
Garde a Vue: The European Court of Human Rights condemns Paris [Garde a Vue: La Cour Europeenne des Droits de lHomme condamne Paris], Le Monde (14 October 2012) , available online (in French) at http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/10/14/garde-a-vue-la-coureuropeenne-des-droits-de-l-homme-condamne-paris_1426031_3224.html [Accessed 6 August 2012]. 72 Decision no. 2010-14/22 QPC du 30 Juillet 2010 relative a la garde a vue, text available online (in French) at http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2010/2010-14/22qpc/decision-n-2010-14-22-qpc-du-30-juillet-2010.48931.html [Accessed 6 August 2012].
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III. Policy and Policing Context

K E Y IN S T I TU TI ON AL S TR UC T UR E S F O R C OU NT E R- T ER ROR IS M P OL I C Y A N D P OL IC IN G: D IS TR I B UT IO N OF ROL E S AN D R E SP O NS I BI L IT I E S A C R OSS GO V ER N M EN T D EP A RT M EN TS A ND A G EN C I ES
Having outlined the legal framework within which counter-terrorism policies operate, we now turn to the institutional framework within which counter-terrorism policing is carried out. French counter-terrorist policy aims to develop specific tools to help combat terrorism. As part of these efforts, the work of intelligence agencies and law enforcement organisations has become increasingly centralised and specialised in recent years. The following is an exhaustive list of the main intelligence agencies and lawenforcement organisations in charge of combating terrorism in France.
DCRI (Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence/Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intrieur)

In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the various agencies in charge of the fight against terrorism, a substantial reform of French intelligence services was initiated in 2007. This reform led to the creation of a single internal intelligence agency, the DCRI, which is based within the French Interior Ministry. The DCRI officially became operational on 1 July 2008. It was born through the merger of two hitherto distinct intelligence organisations: the DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire/Directorate of Territorial Security) and the DCRG (Direction Centrale des Renseignements Gnraux/Central Directorate for General Intelligence). According to the French Ministry of Interior, the aim of the DCRI is to act as a French FBI. Its roles are to help prevent and/or combat terrorist acts or those acts that may endanger national security and to contribute to the monitoring of electronic communications and individuals, groups or organisations susceptible of endangering national security.73 The fight against terrorism is therefore listed as one of the DCRIs top four priorities. In 2009, the DCRI had 3,306 employees, although recent personnel cuts have meant a reduction in about 400 employees over the period 2009-2011. Little is known about the DCRIs internal organisational structure and work, since its missions are considered to be top secret.74
DGSE - Direction Gnrale de la Securit Extrieure/Directorate-General for External Security

The DGSE is the French external intelligence agency (equivalent to Britains Secret Intelligence Service or MI6). Unlike the DCRI, it is based within the French Ministry of Defence. The DGSE was historically formed through the merger of various French intelligence agencies after the Second World War. These were regrouped under a single centralised command in 1945, which later became the DGSE in 1982. The
Article 1, Dcret no. 2008-609 (27th June 2008), full text of the edict is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000019078545 74DCRI website, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_l_interieur/la_police_nationale/organisation/dcri/dcri [Accessed 25 June 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France DGSEs two main priority areas are counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation.75 In 2009, the DGSE had an estimated staff of about 5,000, many of those working outside French territory.76 The personnel numbers and capabilities of the DGSEs counter-terrorist department have increased in recent years, according to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although exact numbers were not provided.77
Bureau de Lutte Anti-Terroriste BLAT

The French Gendarmerie Nationale, a branch of the French armed forces78 charged with police duties among the civilian population, also has a dedicated brigade tasked with counter-terrorism matters. The Bureau de Lutte Anti-Terroriste/BLAT (Anti-Terrorist Bureau) was created in 2006 as a direct result of the provisions contained in Law no. 2006-64 of 23 January 2006.79 The BLAT is one of the lawenforcement services specifically tasked with the prevention and repression of acts of terrorism.80 To a minor extent, other institutions involved in the fight against terrorism in France include: The DRPP (Direction du Renseignement de la Prfecture de Police de Paris/Directorate of Intelligence of the Paris Police Prefecture). The DRPP was not merged within the newly-created DCRI due to the specificities involved in the fight against terrorism in Paris. It has therefore retained a separate institutional identity and focuses mostly on threats to the capital and its inhabitants.81 The DRM (Direction du Renseignement Militaire/Military Intelligence Directorate). Created in 1992, the DRM has a similar role to Britains Defence Intelligence Services and collects intelligence relevant to the work of the French armed forces.82 The DPSD (Direction de la Protection et de la Scurit de la Dfense/Directorate for the Protection and the Security of Defence). The DPSD was created in 1981 as part of the Ministry of Defence. Its roles include counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism, as well as the collection of relevant intelligence in general. Its main aim is to ensure the safety of personnel, data and sensitive facilities (military bases, etc.) which are considered to be vital to national security.83
DGSE website, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgse/tout-le-site/deux-defis-majeurs [Accessed 25 June 2012] Federation of American Scientists website, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/france/defense/dgse/ [Accessed 25 June 2012] 77 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/enjeux-internationaux/defense-et-securite/terrorisme/ [Accessed 25 June 2012]. 78 The Gendarmerie Nationale has been placed under the political, operational and budgetary authority of the Ministry of Interior since 1 January 2009, and it now forms one of the Directorate-General of that Ministry. However, members of the Gendarmerie have retained their military status, and therefore the Ministry of Defence is in charge of all disciplinary matters involving members of the Gendarmerie. 79 Arrt du 8 aot 2003, full text available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000796858&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id [Accessed 25 June 2012]. 80 Arrt du 31 mars 2006, full text available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=AF02F4DCD38D654A8894BB0A73641E8D.tpdjo08v_1&dateTexte=?cidTex te=JORFTEXT000000456295&categorieLien=cid [Accessed 25 June 2012]. 81DRPPwebsite, http://www.prefecturedepolice.interieur.gouv.fr/La-prefecture-de-police/Missions-de-police/La-direction-durenseignement [Accessed 25 June 2012]. 82DRMwebsite, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/interarmees/la-direction-du-renseignement-militaire [Accessed 25 June 2012]. 83 DPSD website, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dpsd [Accessed 25 June 2012].
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TH E DI S T RI BU T IO N OF ROL E S A ND R E SP ONS I B IL I T I ES W IT H I N P OL IC I NG AN D SE C UR I T Y AG E NC I ES
Inter-departmental coordination on terrorism matters is overseen by the Unit de Coordination de la lutte anti-terroriste (UCLAT) the Counter-terrorism Coordination Unit. Founded in 1984, this structure coordinates the work of all the various departments involved in the fight against terrorism. It performs a daily analysis of all information relating to terrorism collected by other agencies such as the DCRI, DGSE and BLAT. The UCLAT also coordinates the sharing of operational information from all relevant authorities and services involved in the fight against terrorism, including anti-terrorist judges and the prison administration. The UCLAT is directly attached to the Office of the Director-General of the Police Nationale within the French Interior Ministry in Paris and has a number of regional offices. It is estimated that the UCLAT has a core staff of about 80.84 In 2009, a Conseil National du Renseignement (National Intelligence Council) was created, alongside the post of National Intelligence Coordinator reporting directly to the French President. The National Intelligence Council aims to enhance the coordination of the work of the various intelligence agencies, and to facilitate the sharing of information, especially in counter-terrorist matters. The focus on counterterrorism was obvious in the statement made by the National Intelligence Coordinator at the French Parliament in January 2010, when he explained: We would not be forgiven if we didnt react to a terrorist attack as a result of poor coordination of the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies. He also declared in January 2011 that our priority is the fight against terrorism, whether it threatens our interests abroad or, naturally, at home.85
AC C OU NT A BI L I T Y M EC H AN IS M S F O R P OL I C I N G, S E C U RI T Y AN D O T H ER IN S T I TU TI ON S A ND OR G AN IS A T IO NS TH A T H AV E R E SP ONS I B IL I T Y F O R C OU NT E R- T ER ROR IS M P OL IC IN G AN D P O L IC Y
A number of accountability mechanisms exist within the various law-enforcement agencies in charge of implementing counter-terrorist policies. Within the Police Nationale, the task of the Inspection Gnrale de la Police Nationale/IGPN (General Inspection of the National Police) is to ensure that members of the National Police obey laws and regulations as well as their internal code of professional conduct (code de dontologie) in the exercise of their duties. The IGPNs jurisdiction extends to the entire French territory, including French overseas territories, with the exception of Paris and the surrounding departments, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Inspection Gnrale des Services (discussed below). The IGPNs headquarters are located in Paris but it also operates through three regional antennas located
UCLAT, on French Ministry of Interior website, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_l_interieur/la_police_nationale/presentation-generale/ [Accessed 25 June 2012]. 85 Quoted in Nathalie Cettina, Anti-terrorism : A fragile coordination [Antiterrorisme : Une coordination fragile], Note de Rflexion no. 9, Conseil Franais de Recherche sur le Renseignement (10 April 2011), available online at http://www.cf2r.org/fr/notes-de-reflexion/antiterrorisme-unefragile-coordination.php [Accessed 28 June 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France in Lyon, Marseille and Bordeaux.86 Only judicial authorities or the Director-General of the Police Nationale can ask the IGPN to investigate possible breaches of the law or professional code of conduct by members of the police. Just like the IGPN, the Inspection Gnrale de la Gendarmerie Nationale (IGGN) (General Inspection of the Gendarmerie Nationale) ensures that laws and regulations are upheld internally by members of the Gendarmerie. It does so through internal audit or administrative enquiries, when members of the Gendarmerie Nationale are suspected of having breached internal rules, lacked discipline, or broken the law. Judicial authorities can ask the IGGN to carry out internal investigations in the case of offences suspected to have been committed on the national territory or abroad by personnel belonging to the Gendarmerie Nationale, whether they were on or off duty.87 Members of the public cannot ask the IGGN to intervene; it does so only by decision of the Interior Minister, the Director-General of the Gendarmerie Nationale, or judicial authorities. The Inspection Gnrale des Services, commonly nicknamed the police of the police, was created in 1854 and is a unique institution subordinated to the Prefecture de Police de Paris. The IGS investigates all disciplinary and criminal matters relating to law enforcement officials or administrative personnel in Paris and surrounding departments. It usually intervenes at the request of judicial authorities or after a direct complaint is received from members of the public. The IGS is the only internal affairs directorate of the French law-enforcement agencies which allows individual citizens and members of the public to directly submit their complaint in person.88 Every year, about 2,500 individuals lodge a complaint against police forces with the IGS, and around 500 sanctions are pronounced. The IGS does not provide a breakdown of this data, so it is difficult to determine whether any of these complaints relate to policing connected to counter-terrorism or involving religious, ethnic or racial discrimination. In addition to these official institutional mechanisms that oversee the work of the different law enforcement agencies involved in counter-terrorism policing, an independent administrative authority (similar to the British ombudsman system) was created in 2011. The Dfenseur des Droits (Defender of Rights) is appointed by the French President for a six-year mandate. As the name indicates, the mission of the Dfenseur des Droits is to defend the rights of citizens who may have complaints related to the way in which they have been treated by public and official administrations. This institution replaced a number of other similar organisations, such as the Mdiateur de la Republique (which existed from 1973 to 2011), the Commission Nationale de Dontologie de la Scurit (CNDS), which existed from 2000-2011, and the Haute Autorit de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour lEgalit (Halde), which was created in 2005.
Website of the Police Nationale, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_l_interieur/la_police_nationale/organisation/igpn/igpn [Accessed 28 June 2012]. 87 Website of the Gendarmerie Nationale, http://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/ [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 88 Website of the IGS, http://www.prefecturedepolice.interieur.gouv.fr/La-prefecture-de-police/Missions-de-soutien/L-inspectiongenerale-des-services [Accessed 28 June 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France The newly-created Dfenseur des Droits therefore reflects the range of activities that its various predecessors, particularly the CNDS and Halde, were engaged in. For example, just like the CNDS, a specific department within the DdD is tasked with ensuring that individuals carrying out security duties on the national territory (whether they belong to public institutions such as the Police, Gendarmerie, prison guards, customs officials, etc., or private organisms such as private security firms, private investigators, etc.) uphold a professional code of conduct. The DdD can be asked to intervene via a written request from an MP by any individual who is either a victim of, or a witness to, a breach of the professional code of conduct by any of the individuals mentioned above. Concerns were raised about whether the disappearance of the CNDS and its merger into the newly-created DdD would undermine this aspect of the DdDs work. However, Dominique Baudis, who was appointed as the nations first Defenseur des Droits, recently indicated in an interview that complaints against security and lawenforcement officials had increased by nearly 100% since the creation of this new entity.89 Indeed, the website of the DdD lists 33 decisions it made concerning allegations of misconduct by the security services, which include a detailed account of each incident. Most decisions relate to complaints about excessive use of force by police forces; however, none of those relates to counter-terrorism policing specifically. Since the names or ethnic/religious origin of complainants are not provided, it is difficult to ascertain whether minority groups were targeted in those instances. In two cases, however, the complaint arose specifically from perceived discrimination on the basis of ethnic/racial origin. For example, Decision no. 2010-90 concerns a man who was stopped by police for a minor breach of the Highway Code, and who upon contesting the decision - was told if youre not happy, go back home to the Congo. In another incident, described in Decision no. 2010-161, another man was also stopped by police for allegedly driving without a seatbelt, and was called a dirty Arab by the policeman when he refused to pay a fine. In both cases, the DdD was unable to verify the facts and was therefore not in a position to decide whether racial discrimination occurred and/or excessive force was used.90 Similarly, just like Halde, which could be asked to intervene in all matters relating to discrimination, direct or indirect, prohibited by the law or by international treaties and conventions to which France is a party, a specific department exists within the DdD dedicated to the fight against discrimination and the promotion of equality. In 2011, the DdD dealt with nearly 90,000 complaints, through a nation-wide network of 411 delegates.91 Finally, the Contrleur gnral des lieux de privation de libert, commonly called contrleur gnral des prisons (General Controller of Prisons) is an independent administrative
Tense relations between citizens and administrative authorities [Des relations tendues entre administration et citoyens], Le Figaro (25 June 2012), available online at http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/06/25/01016-20120625ARTFIG00730-des-relations-tenduesentre-administration-et-citoyens.php [Accessed 26 June 2012]. 90 See Decision de la deontologie de la securite no. 2009-181 ; 2009-207 ; 2009-212 ; 2009-216 ; 2010-40 ; 2010-61 ; 2010-89 ; 2010-90 ; 2010101 ; 2010-112 ; 2010-142 ; 2010-161 ; 2010-175 ; 2010-177 ; 2011-84 ; 2011-306. All available online (in French) at http://defenseurdesdroits.fr/connaitre-son-action/la-deontologie-de-la-securite/decisions [Accessed 6 August 2012]. 91 Tense relations between citizens and administrative authorities [Des relations tendues entre administration et citoyens], Le Figaro (25 June 2012), available online at http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/06/25/01016-20120625ARTFIG00730-des-relations-tenduesentre-administration-et-citoyens.php [Accessed 26 June 2012]. 91 CGLPL website (in English), http://www.cglpl.fr/en/ [Accessed 8 July 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France authority tasked with ensuring that the fundamental rights of individuals that are incarcerated are respected.92
P OL IC I ES AN D G U ID EL I N ES O N N ON -D IS C R IM I N AT IO N AN D HU M AN RI G HT S TH A T A R E G I V EN TO P O L I C E, S E C UR IT Y OR O T H ER AG E NC I ES TH A T I MP L E M EN T C OU NT E R-T E RR OR IS M M E ASU RE S
All personnel serving within the Police Nationale are bound by a professional code of conduct (Code de dontologie) which was adopted in 1986. A copy of this code of conduct is given to each member of the police during their initial training. It subordinates all law enforcement activities to an absolute respect for the law, and imposes on policemen the obligation to be loyal, honest, objective, and to intervene to help endangered people even when they are not on duty. In particular, Article 7 states that a policemans duty is to serve the general population and he must therefore act in an exemplary manner vis--vis the general public. He must demonstrate absolute respect for all individuals, whatever their nationality or ethnic origin, their social background, or their political, religious or philosophical beliefs. Article 10 also adds that any individual who is arrested by the police is placed under the responsibility and protection of the police; this individual must not be subjected either by members of the police or a third party to any type of violence or inhuman or degrading treatment.93 Any breach of the code of conduct exposes its author to disciplinary sanctions which can lead to legal (including criminal) proceedings if an offence is proven to have been committed. On the other hand, policemen and their families can benefit from extra legal protection when they are the victims of crime as a result of their professional occupation or during the exercise of their professional duties. Unlike the Police Nationale, the Gendarmerie Nationale does not have an official code of conduct which sets down all the internal rules and regulations which members of the Gendarmerie must obey. Because it is institutionally part of the military hierarchy, the Gendarmerie Nationale instead relies on a variety of texts, such as the 1975 Rglement de Discipline Gnrale dans les Armes (Regulations for General Discipline in the Armed Forces)94 or the statut gnral des militaires (General Statute of members of the
Armed Forces).95
CGLPL website (in English), http://www.cglpl.fr/en/ [Accessed 8 July 2012]. The full text of the Code de Dontologie de la Police Nationale is available on the Ministry of Interior website (in French), http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/misill/sections/a_l_interieur/la_police_nationale/deontologie/code-deontologie/ [Accessed 8 July 2012]. 94 Website of the GIGN, http://www.gign.org/groupe-intervention/?page_id=24 [Accessed 28 June 2012]. 95 Website of the GIGN, http://www.gign.org/groupe-intervention/?page_id=24 [Accessed 28 June 2012].
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DA T A AN D S T UD I ES ON L E V EL S O F G EN E RAL T RUS T A ND C O N F I D EN C E IN T H E P OL IC E OF E TH N IC , RAC I AL OR R EL IG I O US G RO UP S T HA T M A Y B E TH E F O C US OF C OU NT E R- T ER RO RI SM P OL I C I N G. K E Y F I N D IN GS F RO M D A TA O R S TU D I ES ON P E RC EP T IO NS OF L E V EL S O R EX P E RI E NC E S OF E T H NI C / R AC I AL O R RE L I G IO US DI SC R I M I NA T IO N B Y T H E P OL I C E
While a number of institutional mechanisms exist to ensure that all members of the general public are treated fairly and equally by law enforcement agencies, Muslim immigrants and especially their descendants nevertheless often report experiences of discrimination by such organisations. The TeO survey results are particularly illuminating in this respect. The survey researchers asked respondents about their levels of trust in a variety of state institutions, including the police and the judiciary. Within the mainstream population, 75 percent of respondents indicated that they trusted the police, and 71 percent reported trusting the judicial system. Among descendants of immigrants from North African or Turkish origin, however, trust in these two institutions was significantly lower. For example, trust in the judicial system stood at 69 percent for those of Turkish origin, 62 percent for those of Moroccan/Tunisian origin, and barely 61 percent for those with Algerian roots; a full ten percentage points below the mainstream population average.96 Figure Eight: Level of trust in various institutions by origin of immigrants
Source: Teo, p. 108
This divergence was even more marked in the case of the police; descendants of immigrants reported that their mistrust of the police force was especially high. For example, only 62 percent of those of Turkish origin reported trust in the police. This percentage falls to 56 and 52 percent respectively for those from Moroccan/Tunisian and Algerian origin, i.e. up to 23 percentage points lower than the mainstream
96
Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 108
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France population. Among other immigrant groups, only descendants of Sub-Saharan immigrants reported a lower trust level (45 percent) in the police.97 Figure 9: Level of trust in various institutions by origin of descendants of immigrants.
Source: TeO, p. 109
The marked discrepancy between levels of trust in the police between the mainstream population and descendants of Muslim immigrants cannot be explained merely by a general aversion to repressive institutions, or there would be no statistical difference between their perceptions of justice and of the police. To explain why descendants of immigrants of Muslim origin have a distinct mistrust for the police, it is necessary to take into account the frequency of contact these people have with the police force, especially in the form of police identity checks. Such identity checks have long been a source of controversy among young people from working class backgrounds, especially those of immigrant origin. Indeed, a 2009 OSI study based on in situ observations of such identity checks in Paris established that police controls often targeted young men that visibly belonged to ethnic minorities and who adopted youth dress codes.98 The Trajectories and Origins survey similarly recorded the frequency of police controls as reported by respondents. It found that the likelihood of being controlled by the police once over the course of a year was the same for all respondents, whatever their origin. However, there were significant differences when it came to multiple police identity checks over the course of the same year. Whereas only 13 percent of those in the mainstream population reported being controlled more than once annually, this proportion rose to 21 percent for descendants of Algerian immigrants, 23 percent for descendants of Turkish immigrants, and almost 24 percent for descendants of immigrants from Morocco/Tunisia. Only
Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 109 Quoted in Elizabeth Sebian, Islam in France, available online at http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/france/ [Accessed 5 June 2012].
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France descendants of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa reported being controlled more frequently (27 percent).99 These findings suggest that police forces tend to target these ethnic groups more frequently than other groups within the population. Figure 10: Frequency of police controls over the previous year by origin of immigrants.
Source: TeO, p. 11
According to the TeO researchers, the main parameters governing the frequency of controls were age, residential area, and gender.100 Indeed, among males in the 20-25 year age group, and all other things being equal, the descendants of North African immigrants had a 47 percent probability of being controlled several times by the police. By way of contrast, descendants of Spanish or Italian immigrants only had a 32 percent probability of being controlled by the police (33 percent for individuals with no foreign origins). Thus, ethnic or religious belonging clearly plays an important role in determining the frequency of police identity checks, with those from North African origin at more risk of being targeted. This observation in turn explains these individuals low levels of trust in the police force; 25 percent of those who had not been controlled claimed they did not trust the police, but the percentage rose to 54 percent for those who had been controlled several times.101
K E Y IS SU ES OR I N C I D EN TS T HA T H A V E AF F E C T E D B ET W E E N M IN OR I T Y GRO UP S A ND T H E P O L IC E
THE
R EL AT IO NS H IP
Low levels of trust in the police force and concomitant perceptions of discrimination by law enforcement agencies have been reflected in and in part fuelled by a series of incidents that have adversely affected the relationship between these minority groups and the police. The most serious incident involved widespread rioting by French youth of North African origin in October and November 2005 in the
Trajectories and Origins: A survey on Population Diversity in France, p. 109 Ibid., p. 110 101 Ibid., p. 110
99 100
35
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France suburbs of Paris and other major cities. The civil unrest was sparked by the death of three young men who died from electrocution after attempting to hide from the police following a botched break-in attempt in Clichy-sous-Bois, a deprived neighbourhood just outside Paris, on 27 October 2005. The unrest quickly spread to other housing projects in various parts of France, and involved cars and public buildings being set alight by rioting youth. The extent of the rioting prompted the government to declare a state of emergency on 8 November 2005, which was extended by Parliament for three months on 16 November 2005. This was the first incident to highlight the plight of these youth, but also led to deep resentment. Looking back on this episode now, scholars and politicians are more inclined to recognise that socio-economic factors played a role in the course of events, but, at the time, right-wing politicians and members of the government connected violence with the problem of Islam and immigration.102 Indeed, then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy was accused of having provoked the unrest by calling young delinquents from housing projects "rabble" ("racaille") in Argenteuil near Paris, and controversially suggested cleansing the minority suburbs with a Krcher. Two years later, on 26 November 2007, the death of two teenagers -whose motorcycle collided with a police vehicle while they were being chased following a suspected misdemeanor- also sparked a wave of unrest in the Val-d'Oise department just outside Paris. By then, Nicolas Sarkozy, who had been elected President, stated that what happened at Villiers-le-Bel has nothing to do with a social crisis; it has to do with hoodlums, provoking another wave of condemnations. Other incidents that have strained the relationship between the Muslim community and French authorities include the 2003 debate about the banning of ostentatious religious symbols (such as the Muslim headscarf or the Jewish kippah) in government schools. The so-called Law no. 2004-228 on secularism and conspicuous religious symbols in schools was passed on 15 March 2004 and came into effect at the start of the academic year on 2 September 2004.103 Although the law does not mention any particular symbol, it was considered by many Muslims to specifically target the wearing of the Muslim headscarf (hijab). The ban was an extremely controversial issue which divided French public opinion. A February 2004 survey by CSA for Le Parisien showed 69 percent of the population supported the ban while 29 percent indicated being against it. Among Muslims, however, the same survey showed that 53 percent opposed it. Finally, among surveyed Muslim women, 49 percent approved the proposed law, and 43 percent opposed it.104 In a similar vein, a new law was adopted in 2011 which prohibits concealing ones face in public. Again, although the law refers neither to Islam nor to Islamic veils, it effectively banned Muslim women from
Elizabeth Sebian, Islam in France, available online at http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/france/ [Accessed 5 June 2012]. The full text of Law no. 2004-228 (15th March 2004) is available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id [Accessed 3 July 2012]. 104 The French population and the 1905 Law [Les Franais et la Loi de 1905], CSA poll conducted in February 2005 on a representative sample of 970 individuals. Full poll results available online at http://www.csa.eu/multimedia/data/sondages/data2005/opi20050203c.htm [Accessed 8 July 2012].
102 103
36
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France wearing the full-length burqa (which entirely conceals a womans face) in public and was again seen by the Muslim community as a measure aimed at ostracising them.
IV.
Security Context
Assessments of the impact of counter-terrorism measures need to be understood in the context of assessments and perceptions of the threat posed by terrorism. Broadly speaking, there are three types of terrorist threats in France today. The first includes traditional threats posed by national and separatist movements such as the Corsican Front de Libration Nationale de la Corse (National Front for the Liberation of Corsica) and the Basque ETA (Euskadi Ta Atasuna). The second is the threat posed by religiously-motivated radical Islamists, including those inspired by Al Qaeda. The final one includes nonconventional threats posed by various violent anti-globalisation movements, environmentalists and anarchists, as well as all kinds of lone wolf extremists that use terrorism as a way of publicising their cause.105
TH E NU M B ER OF AR R ES TS A ND C O NV I C T I ONS R EL AT I NG T O T ER RO R IS M
According to the 2012 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) report, produced annually by Europol, there were 174 terrorist attacks in EU member states in 2011, and 484 individuals were arrested in relation to terrorist offences. The majority of the terrorist attacks reported that year took place in France (85), considerably ahead of Spain (47) and the United Kingdom (26). This suggests that France actually faces a higher terrorist threat than its European neighbours. Interestingly, the TE-SAT report also notes that not a single religiously-inspired terrorist attack on EU territory was reported by member states in 2011. Thus, all 85 attacks reported by France (foiled, failed or completed) relate to separatist groups. Similarly, most arrests were reported by France (172), followed by the Republic of Ireland and Spain (69 and 64 respectively). Again, the vast majority of arrests (126) were made within separatist groups, although France also arrested 46 individuals in relation to religiously-inspired offences in 2011, by far the highest number compared to other EU countries.106 Unfortunately, only aggregate figures are provided by Europol (which are themselves provided by member states), and the names and origin of those arrested or convicted for terrorism offences is not available. However, in most cases, the type of terrorism (Islamist, separatist, etc.) is included. There were respectively 75, 39 and 46 individuals involved in concluded court proceedings on terrorism charges in France. France has an exceptionally high conviction rate, since 45 of these 46 individuals were convicted. 35 of these cases involved a final verdict, whereas in the other 11 cases judicial appeals were still ongoing
Alain Rodier, The Terrorist Threat in France in Fall 2011 [La Menace Terroriste en France lAutomne 2011], Note dActualit no. 256, Centre Francais de Recherche sur le Renseignement, available online (in French) at http://www.cf2r.org/fr/notes-actualite/la-menace-terroriste-en-francea-automne-2011.php [Accessed 3 July 2012]. 106 All figures drawn from the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) report 2012, full text available online at https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2012-1567 [Accessed 1 July 2012].
105
37
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France at the time when the report was produced. Of the 46 individuals that were either convicted/acquitted in 2011 in France on terrorism charges, only nine were tried in connection with religiously-inspired terrorism, whereas 33 others were linked to separatist groups.107 In addition, since 2002, 13 terrorist networks (these figures are provided by a government source, based on numbers provided by the Ministry of Justice; no more details are available) facilitating access to jihad overseas have been dismantled in France, and 93 of their members convicted.108
The table below summarises the number of terrorist attacks in France for 2006-2011, based on Europol data for this period (data taken from TE-SAT 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, all available on the Europol website).
Type of terrorism Islamist Separatist Left wing Right wing Single issue Not specified Total
2006 0 283 0 0 n/a 11 284
2007 0 253 0 0 0 14 267
2008 0 137 0 0 5 5 147
2009 0 89 0 0 1 5 95
2010 0 84 0 0 0 0 84
2011 0 85 0 0 0 0 85
The table below summarises the number of arrests per type of terrorism in France from 2006-2011 Number of arrests Islamist Separatist Left wing Right wing Single issue Not specified Total 2006 139 188 15 0 n/a n/a 342 409 2007 91 315 3 0 0 0 402 2008 78 283 37 0 3 1 315 2009 37 255 11 6 1 5 219 2010 94 123 0 0 0 2 172 2011 46 126 0 0 0 0
Ibid. Proposed law on the reinforcement of legislation for the prevention and repression of acts of terrorism: Impact study [Projet de Loi renforant la prvention et la rpression du terrorisme: Etude dimpact], available online at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/2652/18679/version/2/file/ei_prevention_repression_terrorisme_cm_11.04.2012.p df [Accessed 7 June 2012].
107 108
38
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France The table below summarises the number of individuals tried for terrorism charges in France from 20062011 (note: affiliation is not known and only an aggregate figure is provided).
Number of individuals tried for terrorism charges
2006 21
2007 54
2008 75
2009 76
2010 40
2011 45
The table below summarises the number of individuals convicted of terrorism offences in France from 2006-2011, per affiliation (not available before 2008). Number of convictions Islamist Separatist Left wing Right wing Single issue Not specified Total 2006 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 21 2007 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 54 2008 31 44 0 0 n/a 0 75 2009 18 59 0 0 n/a 0 77 2010 14 26 0 0 n/a 0 40 2011 9 33 0 0 0 4 46
ES T IM A T ES OF T H E NU M B ER OF I ND I V ID UAL S AN D OR G AN IS A T IO NS TH E P OL IC E O R S E C UR I T Y SE R VI C ES M A Y HA V E UN D ER SUR V E IL L A N C E
It is extremely difficult to assess the number of individuals and organisations that the police and security services may have under surveillance, as these numbers are not made public. Therefore, any estimate is necessarily a rough one. Nevertheless, the Toulouse and Montauban shootings have prompted a lot to be written in the media on this topic. Thus, sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar, director of research at EHESS, gave an interview to lExpress after the shootings, where he indicated that, two or three years ago, we were talking about several thousand jihadists in all of Europe, but a number of militants have been arrested and incarcerated.109 Back in October 2010, Rmy Ourdan, in an article for newspaper Le Monde, cited French intelligence sources as saying that 68 radical Islamist preachers had been arrested since the start of the year, 23 of whom were charged. In addition, five preachers advocating jihad were evicted from French territory and five places of worship are subject to a reinforced surveillance.)110
Catherine Goueset, Structured Jihadist networks easier to monitor [Les rseaux jihadistes structurs sont plus faciles surveiller], LExpress (21 March 2012), available online at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/toulouse-les-reseaux-jihadistes-structures-sont-plusfaciles-a-surveiller_1096022.html [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 110 Rmy Ourdan, Europeans and Americans facing terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan [Europens et Amricains face a la menace terroriste venue du Pakistan], Le Monde (7 October 2010), available online at http://www.lemonde.fr/asie109
39
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France Finally, the Nouvel Observateur newspaper noted that in 2010, between 200-300 persons were being monitored by the DCRI.111
C O MM E NT S F RO M SEC UR IT Y O F F I C I AL S , GO V E RN M E NT MI N IS T ERS ,
P OL IT IC I AN S OR T H I N K T AN KS ON T H E L E V EL OF T H R EA T F R OM T E RR OR IS M , IN C L U D IN G C O M M EN TS O N GR OU P S, L OC AT I ONS OR C OM M UN IT I E S T HA T T H I S TH R EA T C O M ES F RO M
Although objectively the main threat to France emanates from separatist groups such as ETA and the FLNC, French security officials have tended to focus on Islamist terrorism in their public statements. On 11 September 2010, the head of the DCRI, Bernard Squarcini, thus indicated that the possibility of a terrorist attack being committed on French soil had never been so high, and cited Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb as being the principal source of the threat.112 In September 2011, days before the
tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the French Interior Minister Claude Guant reiterated that the terrorist threat remained high.113
DA T A OR S T UD I ES ON P U BL I C OR M I N OR IT Y G ROU P P E RC EP T IO NS OF T H E TH R EA T F RO M T E RRO R IS M AN D VI E WS A ND/ OR A TT I T UD ES TO W A RD S P AR T IC U L A R C OU NT E R-T E RR OR IS M M E ASU RE S O R P OL I C I ES
Interestingly, these statements by French government officials do not seem to be shared by the rest of the population. Already in September 2010, a BVA poll indicated that more than 65 percent of the French population felt that the risk of terrorist attacks had not increased in previous weeks. More tellingly, 59 percent of them felt that the government had been communicating too much about the increased risk of terrorism, echoing concerns by senior members of the left-wing opposition who denounced a manipulation of the population on security issues.114 In a poll conducted shortly after the Toulouse and Montauban massacres, and despite a media environment heavily saturated by the aftermath of the attacks, only 11 percent of respondents felt that the terrorist threat in France was very high, while 42 percent perceived it to be high. Conversely, 40 percent of respondents felt that the terrorist threat was low and seven percent viewed it as very low.115 Thus,
pacifique/article/2010/10/06/europeens-et-americains-face-a-la-menace-terroriste-venue-du-pakistan_1420918_3216.html [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 111 Sarah Diffalah, How do intelligence services track jihadists? [Comment les services de renseignement traquent les jihadistes?], Le Nouvel Observateur (23 March 2012), available online at http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20120323.OBS4455/comment-les-services-derenseignement-traquent-les-djihadistes.html [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 112 The terrorist threat in France has never been greater [La menace terroriste en France na jamais t aussi grande], LExpress (11 September 2010), available online at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/la-menace-terroriste-en-france-n-a-jamais-ete-aussigrande_918729.html [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 113 The terrorist threat remains high [La menace terroriste reste leve], Europe1 (6 September 2011), available online at http://www.europe1.fr/France/La-menace-terroriste-reste-elevee-Gueant-704053/ [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 114 Terrorism : The French remain unconcerned [Terrorisme : Les Franais sereins], Le Journal du Dimanche (30 September 2010), available online at http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Actualite/Terrorisme-Les-Francais-sereins-223609 [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 115 Barometer of the terrorist threat [Baromtre de la menace terroriste], poll conducted by Ifop in March 2012 on a representative sample of 977 individuals. Full poll results available online (in French) at http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1813-1-study_file.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2012].
40
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France French public opinion seems to be split almost evenly between those that perceive the risk to be high and those that dont. Although one in two French individuals currently perceive the terrorist threat to be high, this proportion is, in fact, the lowest ever recorded since the Ifop polling agency launched this regular barometer in October 2001. To illustrate, 78 percent of respondents felt that the terrorist threat was high/very high in May 2011, shortly after the death of Osama Bin Laden, and 60 percent still felt the same in September 2011. That public perceptions of the terrorist threat are at their lowest historically-recorded levels in more than a decade suggests that, although the Toulouse and Montauban tragedies affected French public opinion, they did not create a security psychosis. Interestingly, however, older respondents tend to view the terrorist threat as being higher than younger people. Thus, 14 percent of respondents aged 65 and above view the threat as very high, against only five percent of those aged 18-24. Similarly, respondents from the working classes seem to be more worried about the threat of terrorism than those belonging to the upper classes (14 percent of the working classes view the threat as very high, compared to six percent only for those in the upper classes). Finally, the perception of the terrorist threat is significantly higher among sympathisers of the extremeright movement Front National (37 percent) than it is among sympathisers of the right-wing UMP (14 percent) and left-wing PS (6 percent).116 Unsurprisingly, attitudes towards the perception of the terrorist threat, as well as support for tougher antiterrorist legislation, vary according to the political beliefs of individuals. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Toulouse and Montauban, the French president Nicolas Sarkozy promised to introduce tougher legislation if elected. One of the measures put forward concerned the punishment of habitual and unjustified consultation of websites inciting to terrorism or glorifying it. Asked about this measure, 55 percent of respondents said that they would support such a measure (84 percent of right-wing voters; 34 percent of left-wing voters), whereas 38 percent said they opposed it. 52 percent nevertheless recognised that such measure would restrict the freedom of internet users (34 percent of right-wing voters; 63 percent of left-wing voters). Finally, only 37 percent said such measures would be effective (68 percent of right-wing voters, 18 percent of left-wing voters).117 Finally, it seems that events in Toulouse and Montauban mostly affected the publics views of the effectiveness of the security services. Thus, although a majority of respondents felt that the police and RAID had effectively carried out their mission (84 percent and 79 percent respectively), assessments of
Ibid. The criminalization of the consultation of websites inciting to terrorism or jihad [La pnalisation de la consultation des sites faisant lapologie du terrorisme ou du djihad], BVA poll conducted in March 2012 on a representative sample of 1039 individuals, full results available online at http://www.sondages-en-france.fr/sondages/Actualit%C3%A9/Terrorisme [Accessed 20 June 2012].
116 117
41
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France the effectiveness of the intelligence agencies were almost evenly split among those who felt that they had failed to carry out their mission (43 percent) and those that believed they were successful (57 percent).118
V.
Political and Wider Context
Islam has been part of public political discourse in France since the 1980s, when the declining socioeconomic situation led to the scapegoating of many North African immigrant workers and an intensification of xenophobic attitudes in France.119 The atmosphere of suspicion regarding Muslims in France increased in the 1990s, when the country endured several terrorist attacks linked to Algerian fundamentalist groups, and led to growing debate about the Islamisation of second-generation Muslims. Increasing concerns about the role of Islam in French society coincided with the rise of the far-right political party Front National/FN (National Front) to prominence in French politics over that same period. Indeed, by the early 2000s, the Front National, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, had established itself as the third largest political force in France (behind the right-wing Union pour un Mouvement Populaire/UMP and left-wing Parti Socialiste/PS). In the 2002 presidential elections, which had been heavily marked by debates about immigration and security issues, Le Pen created a surprise by unexpectedly beating the PS candidate Lionel Jospin to make it to the second round of the election, where he was nevertheless defeated by Jacques Chirac by quite a large margin. Unlike the 2002 elections, however, such issues were mostly relegated to the background during the recent presidential campaign, with most candidates choosing instead to focus on socio-economic issues linked to the global economic crisis. The Merah killings in Toulouse and Montauban inevitably brought the issue of Islamist terrorism (and by extension debate about the role of Muslims in France) back to the fore. Although presidential candidates initially rallied together after what they deemed to be a national tragedy, soon the campaign was back in full swing. Nicolas Sarkozy, known for his tough stance on immigration and security issues, seems to have capitalised the most from the attacks. Sarkozy had been trailing behind the PS candidate Franois Hollande in polls, but managed to close the gap with his adversary in a matter of days following the tragedy. A Harris Interactive poll conducted shortly after Merah was killed by security forces asked respondents to assess the behaviour of the presidential candidates. 32 percent of respondents said they found Sarkozys attitude to be very good against only 17 percent for Franois Hollande, and a mere 10 percent for Marine Le Pen.120 An Ipsos poll carried out at the same time found that 36 percent of respondents felt that Sarkozy had very much adopted the right tone when communicating to the public on the tragedy,
Barometer of the Presidential election 2012 [Le Baromtre de la prsidentielle 2012], OpinionWay/Fiducial poll conducted for Le Figaro and LCI in March 2012 on a representative sample of 1148 individuals, full results available online at http://www.opinion-way.com/pdf/opinionwayfiducial_pour_le_figaro_et_lci_le_barometre_de_la_presidentielle_2012_-_v6.pdf [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 119 Elizabeth Sebian, Islam in France, available online at http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/france/ [accessed 2 July 2012]. 120 The attitude of different candidates towards the events in Toulouse [Le jugement sur lattitude des diffrents candidats face aux vnements de Toulouse], poll by Harris Interactive for VSD, conducted in March 2012 on a sample of 1,231 individuals. Full results available online at http://www.harrisinteractive.fr/news/2012/28032012.asp [Accessed 10 July 2012].
118
42
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France against 19 percent for Hollande and 15 percent for Le Pen.121 Finally, a TNS Sofres poll also found that 41 percent of respondents found that Sarkozy had very much adopted the right attitude when confronting the tragedy, against 18 percent for Franois Hollande and only 12 percent for Le Pen.122 This suggests that the Front National failed to cash in on possible anti-Muslim sentiment following the attacks. Nevertheless, Le Pen came third in the first round of the election, with 17.9 percent of the votes; the FNs best score ever. In the legislative elections that followed, the FN also won two seats at the French National Assembly (Parliament), another good showing for the party. Indeed, since succeeding her father as the head of the party in 2011, Marine Le Pen has sought to soften the partys discourse on Islam and immigration somewhat, making it a more mainstream, and hence acceptable, player in French politics than it was during the 1990s. In particular, Marine Le Pen has focused mostly on the threat posed by Islam to the secular values of the French Republic, rhetoric echoed in some respects by Nicolas Sarkozy during his time as Interior Minister and later as President in the 2000s. The newly-elected president, Franois Hollande, has adopted a much more conciliatory tone towards the Muslim community. Indeed, one of the first measures put forward by his new Interior Minister, Manuel Valls, aims at bolstering the trust between law enforcement agencies and the general public by tackling the problem of repeated police controls targeting North African communities. Valls has suggested that police issue a receipt to those stopped and searched, which would help curb excessive and repeated controls targeting certain individuals and communities. Since the frequency of such controls has been cited as a factor explaining the breakdown of trust between police and young Muslims, such a measure may help improve what are currently strained relations. It is, however, too early to tell whether such measures would be effective at easing the deep-seated malaise that characterises relations between immigrant communities of Muslim origin and broader French society. Indeed, the findings of the present report highlight the dearth of unbiased research examining the impact of state policies on the Muslim community in France. While it has drawn on a multitude of books, articles and reports suggesting that the Muslim community is marginalised in socio-economic terms and tends to be viewed with increasing suspiciousness by the mainstream population, there has been very little in the literature concerning the way in which counter-terrorism measures affect the Muslim community specifically, and if so, to what extent. Part of this phenomenon may be explained by the strict separation of state and religion in France which limits, to some extent, assessment and evaluation of how state policies affect particular religious groups. However, a better understanding of how such policies are
Voting intentions for the presidential election Wave 14 [Baromtre dintentions de vote pour llection prsidentielle Vague 14], poll by Ipsos for FT/Radio France/Le Monde conducted in March 2012 on a sample of 978 individuals. Full results available online http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-affairs/actualites/2012-03-26-presidentielle-l-ecart-se-resserre-au-second-tour [Accessed 10 July 2012]. 122 Presidential elections 2012: The tragedies of Toulouse and Montauban in the campaign [Prsidentielle 2012: Les drames de Toulouse et Montauban dans la campagne], poll by TNS Sofres for Mediaprism/CQFD conducted in March 2012 on a sample of 1,016 individuals. Full results available online http://www.tns-sofres.com/points-de-vue/E07442A5B790481996E7DC6F20C9AFD0.aspx [Accessed 10 July 2012].
121
43
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France perceived by these communities would ultimately allow policymakers to make more informed policy choices; choices which would help bolster counter-terrorism policies without alienating the Muslim community whose support is, in fact, pivotal to effectively combating Islamist extremism in all its guises.
Dr Camilleri is a faculty member in the Department of Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.
44
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France Khosrokhavar, Farhad, Young Peoples Islam [Lislam des jeunes], (Paris: Flammarion, 1997) Noiriel, Grard, Guidebook of Immigration in France [Atlas de l'immigration en France], (Paris: Autrement, 2002). Noiriel, Grard, The French Melting Pot : History of Immigration in the 19th and 20th century [Le Creuset Francais: Histoire de limmigration XIXe-XXe sicle], (Paris : Seuil, 2006). Proposed law on the reinforcement of legislation for the prevention and repression of acts of terrorism: Impact study [Projet de Loi renforant la prvention et la rpression du terrorisme: Etude dimpact], available online at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/2652/18679/version/2/file/ei_prevention_re pression_terrorisme_cm_11.04.2012.pdf Rodier, Alain, The Terrorist Threat in France in Fall 2011 [La Menace Terroriste en France lAutomne 2011], Note dActualite no. 256, Centre Francais de Recherche sur le Renseignement, available online (in French) at http://www.cf2r.org/fr/notes-actualite/la-menace-terroriste-en-france-a-automne-2011.php Sebian, Elizabeth, Islam in France, available online at http://www.euro-islam.info/countryprofiles/france/ [accessed 2 July 2012] Silbermann, Roxanne, Alba, Richard and Fournier, Irne, Segmented Assimilation in France? Discrimination in the labour market against the second generation, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 30 (1 January 2007), pp. 1-27 Steiner, Eva, Legislating Against Terrorism: The French Approach, (London: Chatham House, 8 December 2005), available online at www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/.../ilp081205.doc
L E GA L M A T ER I AL
French Penal Procedural Code [Code de Procdure Penale] available online (in French) at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154 French Penal Code [Code Pnal] available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719 Law no. 78-17 (6th January 1978) available online (in French) at:
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068624&dateTexte= 20110405 Law no. 86-1020 (9th September 1986) available online (in French) at
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000693912
46
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France Law no. 86-1322 (30th December 1986) available online (in French) at
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000317306 Law no. 92-686 (22nd July 1992) available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000722860&dateTexte= &categorieLien=id Law no. 96-647 (22nd July 1996) available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000367689 Law no. 96-1235 (30th December 1996) available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000562805&dateTexte= &categorieLien=id Law no. 2001-1062 (15th November 2001) available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000222052 Law no. 2004-204 (9th March 2004) available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000249995 Law no. 2004-228 (15th March 2004) available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977&dateTexte= &categorieLien=id Law no. 2006-64 (23rd January 2006) available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006053177 Law en=id Law no. 2011-392 (14th April 2011) available online (in French) at no. 2011-267 (14th March 2011) available online (in French) at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023707312&categorieLi
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023860729&dateTexte= &categorieLien=id
P OL L S
Analysis 1989-2009: Geographical spread and evolution of Islam in France [Analyse 1989-2009: Enqute sur limplantation et lvolution de lIslam en France], poll based on a cumulative analysis of 135 polls conducted between 1989 and 2009 by Ifop, each time on a sample of 950 individuals, full poll results and analysis
47
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France available online at http://www.ifop.com/media/pressdocument/48-1-document_file.pdf [accessed 31 May 2012]. Barometer of the Presidential election 2012 [Le Baromtre de la prsidentielle 2012], OpinionWay/Fiducial poll conducted for Le Figaro and LCI in March 2012 on a representative sample of 1148 individuals, full results available online at http://www.opinion-way.com/pdf/opinionwayfiducial_pour_le_figaro_et_lci_le_barometre_de_la_presidentielle_2012_-_v6.pdf Barometer of the terrorist threat [Baromtre de la menace terroriste], poll conducted by Ifop in March 2012 on a representative sample of 977 individuals. Full poll results available online (in French) at http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1813-1-study_file.pdf Presidential elections 2012: The tragedies of Toulouse and Montauban in the campaign [Prsidentielle 2012: Les drames de Toulouse et Montauban dans la campagne], poll by TNS Sofres for Mediaprism/CQFD conducted in March 2012 on a sample of 1016 individuals. Full results available online http://www.tns-sofres.com/pointsde-vue/E07442A5B790481996E7DC6F20C9AFD0.aspx Terrorism : The French remain unconcerned [Terrorisme : Les Franais sereins], Le Journal du Dimanche (30 September 2010), available online at http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Actualite/Terrorisme-LesFrancais-sereins-223609 The attitude of different candidates towards the events in Toulouse [Le jugement sur lattitude des diffrents candidats face aux vnements de Toulouse], poll by Harris Interactive for VSD, conducted in March 2012 on a sample of 1231 individuals. Full results available online at http://www.harrisinteractive.fr/news/2012/28032012.asp The criminalization of the consultation of websites inciting to terrorism or jihad [La pnalisation de la consultation des sites faisant lapologie du terrorisme ou du djihad], BVA poll conducted in March 2012 on a representative sample of 1039 individuals, full results available online at http://www.sondages-enfrance.fr/sondages/Actualit%C3%A9/Terrorisme The French People and Religion [Les Franais et la Religion], poll conducted on a representative sample of 4,000 individuals in April 2007, La Provence (01 April 2007). Full results and analysis available online (in French) at http://www.laprovence.com/fiches/lesfrancaisetlareligion.pdf The French population and the 1905 Law [Les Franais et la Loi de 1905], CSA poll conducted in February 2005 on a representative sample of 970 individuals. Full poll results available online at http://www.csa.eu/multimedia/data/sondages/data2005/opi20050203c.htm Towards a Catholic Minority? [Vers un Catholicisme Minoritaire?], poll conducted on a representative sample of 2,012 individuals in January 2007, Le Monde des Religions no. 21 (01 January 2007), full results and
48
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | France analysis available online at http://www.lemondedesreligions.fr/archives/2007/01/01/vers-uncatholicisme-minoritaire,8492603.php
Voting intentions for the presidential election Wave 14 [Baromtre dintentions de vote pour llection prsidentielle Vague 14], poll by Ipsos for FT/Radio France/Le Monde conducted in March 2012 on a sample of 978 individuals. Full results available online http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsospublic-affairs/actualites/2012-03-26-presidentielle-l-ecart-se-resserre-au-second-tour [Accessed 10 July 2012]. Appendix
49

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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Population and Community Context

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Source: Ifop (2009), p. 4

Ibid., p. 5 Ibid., p. 5 25 Ibid., p. 5

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Source: TeO, p57.

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

M EC H AN IS M F OR C O OP ER AT I ON A N D DI A L OGU E B E T W E E N M I NO R I T Y GR OUP S AN D C O MM UN I T I ES A ND GO V E RN M E NT P O L IC Y M A K ERS OR OF F I C I AL S

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report