A National Debate On Defence

A National Debate on Defence
~ A Dire Necessity
% of UK GDP
National security is the rst duty of Government. Britain as a country continues to have global responsibilities and global ambitions. We will remain a rst rate military power.
Current Cabinet Oce Brieng Note
We are agreed that the rst duty of government is to safeguard our national security and support our troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere and we will full that duty.
David Cameron and Nick Clegg
Foreword to the Coalitions 2010 programme for government
A UKNDA Report / 17 September 2012
AUTHORS
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon General Sir Michael Rose Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham Air Commodore Andrew Lambert Allen Sykes Antony Hichens (Coordinating Editor)
FOREWORD BY ANDREW ROBERTS
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the UKNDA.
UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity
Table of Contents
Foreword ..................................................................................................................4 Executive Summary ..............................................................................................7 Introduction..............................................................................................................9 Security and Defence ........................................................................................10 Budgetary Considerations: Defence is not the cause of the nancial decit ............................14 Strategic Choices..................................................................................................17 The American or Special Relationship ......................................................19 The European Relationship ............................................................................20 The Global Dimension ........................................................................................21 Going it Alone ......................................................................................................23 The Defence Calculus ........................................................................................24 Conclusions............................................................................................................29 Annexes ....................................................................................................................31 A: Force Comparisons UK Forces 1990~91/2011~12/post SDSR ......................................31 Forces by Country in 2012 ..............................................................32 B: The Armed Forces: Our country needs them by Gwythian Prins ..............................................................................33 C: Questions the Government Must Answer: On Relations with America ............................................................36 On Relations with Europe................................................................36 On the Global Dimension ................................................................37 On Going it Alone ..............................................................................37 On UK Defence ....................................................................................37
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Foreword
By Andrew Roberts
Nothing can ruin a British statesmans reputation quicker or more completely than being suspected of having neglected the nations defences. The witness of our political history is testament to this so often as to make it a truism. Yet still British Governments slice defence budgets through the muscle right down to the bone, despite the possible future danger to their own legacies. The fact that they could escape this threat to their own reputations simply by spending a mere 1% of GDP more on defence seems not to have occurred to them. These two excellent papers by the UKNDA are no Cassandra-like warning, rather they are a whisper in the ear of the decision-makers, made more in sorrow than anger, a nal plea to them to save their own reputations whilst yet there is time. In his day, Stanley Baldwin was considered one of the most adroit politicians of the post-Victorian era. The man who steered Britain through the General Strike and the Empire through the Abdication Crisis nally resigned in May 1937 after three premierships to paeans of praise from both sides of the parliamentary aisle. Yet only three years later he was a Guilty Man, whose constant paring down of the defence budget in the interwar years was rightly seen as leaving Britain woefully under-armed when the war broke out. He died a broken and widely-reviled man, whose many great political achievements were largely forgotten because of his failures over defence. Lord Aberdeen was forced to resign during the Crimean War due to defence failures; William Gladstone lost the premiership in 1885 after the death of General Gordon; Herbert Asquith was forced to resign during the Great War over a perceived lack of grip over defence; Neville Chamberlain was brought down in May 1940 after a debate over the defeat in Norway. How many more times do British politicians need to be reminded that however well they do in the areas of nancial retrenchment (Gladstone) or old age pensions (Asquith) or public health and municipal reform (Chamberlain), they will never be forgiven if they fail the nation over matters of defence? This paper and its companion have not been written in the spirit of the Fat Boy in The Pickwick Papers who wants to make yer esh creep. Rather they include perfectly believable scenarios and clear questions drawn up by some of Britains most distinguished generals, admirals, air chief marshals and military commentators
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showing why Britain needs to have a larger defence establishment than is presently posited in the Coalitions plans. In this paper the questions asked cannot be ignored. In its companion, readers can choose for themselves which scenarios they feel more or less likely to take place over the next 15 years or so, but can any single one of us truly say that they dont believe that one could? Yet the armed services that we will be left with once the Coalitions plans go through will simply not be large and credible enough to deal with such a situation, even if we are fortunate enough that they come singly, rather than in multiples, as is often the way with international crises, especially where weakness is perceived by antagonists. Lord Salisbury whose own defence policy was always to envisage the worst possible scenario and then ensure the British Empire had the wherewithal to meet it used to say that the four cruelest words in the British tongue were I told you so. These papers leave the UKNDA in a prime position to unleash that phrase should any of these scenarios materialize with Britain unable to respond powerfully. Needless to say, none of its authors want to indulge in such scapegoating, but the fact is that the British Parliament, media and people will castigate severely those whom it holds responsible for leaving us open to embarrassment and humiliation. The most mortifying moment in recent international aairs arose during the Brown premiership in March 2007 when Iran kidnapped a detachment of naval personnel from HMS Cornwall. Does anyone imagine that such shame and disgrace would have been visited upon the United Kingdom had the Royal Navy not by then been sliced back to little more than a home waters defence otilla? Reducing the amount spent on defence as a percentage of GDP by almost one-half since 1991 might have been understandable had a New World Order genuinely emerged from the ashes of Western Communism, one that justied that most chimerical of Nineties concepts, the peace dividend. Instead the world has become a place of multifarious threats rather than a single huge one with the result that the British armed forces have been busier than ever, only with just over half the resources of 1991. Politicians who wriggle and squirm when having to justify cuts to social programmes, disability benets, and the multifarious entitlement programmes that go to make up our ever-increasingly-ravenous Welfare State, nonetheless happily slice back the armed services, knowing that the senior ocers will not leak state secrets and the non-commissioned servicemen and women have no trade unions and cannot (and would not) go on strike. It seems astonishing that politicians themselves should not want a stronger military, as that and only that gives them a voice worth listening to in the councils of the world. Britain is an active participant in and indeed often a founder member of
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the United Nations, NATO, the Commonwealth, the G7, the European Union, the G20, the World Trade Organization, OECD, OESC, and the Special Relationship, yet British politicians are increasingly being sent naked into the Conference chamber, in Aneurin Bevans crushing rejoinder to the unilateralists at the 1957 Labour Party conference. Why do they themselves not revolt over this? Answering the questions posed in this paper might just begin this revolution. Even if our politicians wanted Britain simply to become another Holland or Belgium, our insular geographical position precludes this. If our overseas trade routes were ever seriously disrupted, let alone cut o, we would starve very quickly, as the Chiefs of Sta assessed at a time when more of the country was under cultivation than today and the numbers of mouths to feed far smaller. Simply becoming a social democratic fourth-rate power is not an honourable position for a post-imperial power like Britain with global responsibilities and trading interests. Further disarmament on the scale to which the Coalition is proposing 20% of the infantry, 14% of the Royal Navy; 13% of the RAF might possibly be justiable if the rest of the world was disarming too, although even then it would require caution and the minimization of risk. Yet in fact the exact opposite is the case. Russia is building aircraft carriers; what on earth does a country with such little overseas trade need them for? China is sabre-rattling in the South China Seas and building a drone force of terrifying capability (as well as launching cyber-attacks against us every single week of the year). Iran is building a nuclear bomb and thereafter will develop the capability to deliver it deep into Europe, to name but three foes of democracy in general, and potential foes of Britain in particular. The only rational thing to do under these increasingly perilous circumstances is look to the oft-repeated lessons of history, as well as to the politicians own reputational best interests, and halt the potentially disastrous disarmament programme as presently envisaged. Any other course would be illogical, dangerous and ultimately self-defeating. A loyal Tory to the marrow of my being, I do not want the present Cabinet to be arraigned at the bar of public opinion as tomorrows Guilty Men. For on present showing, on issues ranging from aircraft carriers to Hawker Harriers, they would be found culpable. Even though individually each Conservative minister is as patriotic and well-meaning as any of the authors of these papers, together they have been corralled by the Treasury just as Stanley Baldwins Cabinet was. It is not too late: Stop the defence cuts. Andrew Roberts
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Executive Summary
Prime Ministers acknowledge that defence is the rst priority of government; yet they also believe that there are few votes in it. The result in practice is to assign a low priority to defence expenditure so that, when total state budgets must be cut, defence suers. Yet, of all the forms of state expenditure, it is defence which requires the longest term outlook. Decisions taken now will largely determine the security options available to a prime minister in 2030. The introduction of new systems and the restoration of lost capabilities take that long. The 2010 National Security Strategy Review asserted as our national aspiration to build Britains prosperity, extend our nations inuence in the world and strengthen our security. Defence is not the only tool with which to assure a reasonable level of security, but soft power always needs hard power to back it. Britains security has been seriously compromised by SDSR 2010 which used arbitrary budgetary targets to determine its outcome. It is now clear that decisions made then have increased the risks we run in an ever more uncertain world. Capabilities have been discarded, numbers of men, ships, aircraft and weapons have been reduced without concern for the consequences. Defence expenditure did not cause the budgetary crisis. At close to a 2% share of GDP it has almost halved since the end of the Cold War. During that period the military have been constantly deployed. Yet the services have endured redundancy programmes far greater than any other government department. The Government faces substantial nancial challenges. Nevertheless, choices have been made. Money has been poured into welfare, health and education. It is not for us to tell the Government what it can aord. It is the duty of government to make priority choices that maximise our prosperity, inuence and security. Given the state of the world and the high priority that successive prime ministers have said should be accorded to defence, how can this Government justify the low priority it currently receives? Britains defence relies on two alliances, the special relationship with the United States and mutual defence arrangements in Europe, principally through NATO. The power of the United States has been key to Britains security. An ally is only worth what he contributes to a joint endeavour. Britain in the past has earned its place as Americas closest ally but it is now in danger of being able to contribute no more than token forces. This irreplaceable alliance is at risk. In Europe, Britains leadership in security has underpinned her inuence, in spite of her ambivalence over full integration into the EU. At a time when America is re-orientating her defence eorts
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towards Asia Pacic, Britain is discarding that leadership. In addition, Britain has its part to play in the maintenance of global security, at least where the interests of the West and global trade are threatened, as well as retaining the capacity for independent action where only our own interests are at stake. Do we still have the numbers for all these tasks? We can still contribute to the American alliance valued capabilities such as intelligence, diplomacy and some aspects of defence such as Special Forces. However, the reduction in the scale of the army, navy and air force makes anything more we can oer merely symbolic. For enduring tasks current force levels leave us able to deploy only six destroyers or frigates, an army brigade and little more than two Oensive Support squadrons. We believe that our armed forces have reached a watershed in their ability to respond to the threats we may face. The world around us is more, not less, unstable. In our view, the issue is not whether we can aord adequate defence, but rather what is the minimum level of strength required to meet our national objectives? We call on the Government to answer the questions we have posed and enter into a serious national debate on the priority Britain should accord defence within a total budget the nation can aord.
A National Debate on Defence

~ A Dire Necessity
Introduction
Defence decisions taken now will largely determine the security options available to a Prime Minister in 2030. Adequate defence is a long term commitment; it has few champions, yet failure to provide it can be catastrophic. The decision materially to reduce our already stretched defence capability is an awesome responsibility and not one that should be taken without the risks being analysed and exposed, and unquestionably not without a public debate. Defence lies at the heart of what government is for: if the realm cannot be defended, it cannot perform its other functions 1 Hence, by denition, defence is the rst priority for government. It is all too easy to hide behind the nancial challenges facing us, but we are sleepwalking into a time when a Government could be confronted by its own impotence in the security eld. Our accompanying paper Disarmament & Consequences 2 suggests a number of scenarios in which this could be the case. Whilst some of these conjectures may seem far-fetched, they are not impossible and what is certain is that when the next situation arises requiring a military response it will be generated externally and be a surprise. It always has been and always will be; that is the way of the world. While we only look forward in that paper 13 years, the reality is that what is decided by the Government today will aect our security posture well beyond that time frame. The introduction of new systems takes that long; the restoration of lost capabilities and the expertise that goes with them is a lengthy process. Our Defence Industrial capacity is a shadow of its former self, and shrinking. We should remember that our armed forces are ghting now mainly with equipment designed and developed in the 1990s; in the case of a number of capabilities well before that.
1 2
Charles Moore, Daily Telegraph, 30th June 2012. Disarmament and Consequences, published by the UKNDA, 17th September 2012.
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There is a need for a full and informed debate on defence in this country, something that has simply not happened. Our security is too important to be considered as just another aspect of state expenditure. Security is also far too important to be just a party political issue. In opposition, political parties welcome reports on defence from independent sources such as ourselves; in power they ignore them. We hope that this paper, posing questions as it does, will promote both responsible answers and the non-partisan debate so urgently required.
Security and Defence

In any enterprise, it is advantageous, if not essential, to have clear strategic goals. For a nation, this may be problematic; overt ambitions in a complex world may be misunderstood or misinterpreted. External events, over which a nation has little if any control, have a nasty habit of changing the assumptions unexpectedly, and compelling reactions often at odds with long term goals. Thus, if American ambition to remain the sole superpower were to be publicly stated, its relations with China and possibly Russia would suer. Nevertheless, that is surely what drives the USA. Of course America recognises that China in particular will in due course challenge this ambition; but staying at Number 1 ts the American psyche and excites national endeavour. Strategies to achieve this will include a variety of activities using a number of tools, from aggressive world trade to support for alliances both of which enhance security and inuence. The essential underpinning of all this are strong and capable armed forces. One can conjecture that other nations, too, have very clear strategic goals and strategies to eect them. In contrast, the United Kingdom has evolved, as its nature has changed over the last century, from the hub of British Empire and world leader to second class status and a leading alliance member. Our strategic goals have changed, indeed withered. We are now becalmed in a pragmatic web which avoids ambitious strategies and goals but enables, in fact encourages, actions in response to events at the time and as we choose. This approach served us well throughout the Cold War. It enabled us to position ourselves mid-Atlantic with strong connections to America and adequate links to
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Europe, a foot in both camps, without committing ourselves to any sphere totally. And yes, we could persuade ourselves that we were the perfect link between the US and Europe, the great bridge of common sense and persuasion. In looking for guidance to inform this paper on security and defence, we will not be able to harness a clear statement of British national ambitions as perhaps might be possible in the United States or China, or indeed India. We can do no better therefore than to look at the review of National Security Strategy in 2010 which gave as its backdrop: 3 to use our national capabilities to build Britains prosperity, extend our nations inuence in the world and strengthen our security. We cannot achieve the absolute in any of these three elements, prosperity, inuence or security, but we suggest that they represent useful aspirations against which to examine our strategic objectives and their value, and from this attempt to identify the resources needed for their achievement. However, we should rst remind ourselves of the relationship between security and defence. Security, like Inuence and Prosperity, is an objective. Defence is not the only tool to achieve it. Soft power, in the form of diplomacy and foreign aid, makes a major contribution to achieving security. There are other tools too. In the post-modern world, there are those who consider that defence is the least important of these tools. It is not however a point that stands serious analysis. For example, in the case of Russia they have announced that they will continue the increase of their military spending by 53 percent in real terms up until 2014. 4 In the Middle East, the Gulf and most especially in the Far East, something closely akin to a conventional arms race with nuclear overtones is taking place. Thus the idea that military capability is in decline is questionable. Let us be clear too that capability can turn into threat overnight, and that this is more likely when the military risks involved are low. Security is a state, not a tool. Defence, as we have said, is one of the tools by which this state is to be obtained. Often, ideologically-motivated or extremist activity will
3
Cm 7953, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, October 2010, p9. SIPRI: 17 Apr 2012, Carina Solmirano is a researcher with the Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). http://stratrisks.com/geostrat/5560
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need to be dealt with by military action; consider the growth of Al Qaeda in West Africa for example; it is hard to see any immediate role for soft power there. Moreover, strategy is not a vision, nor a policy, still less a series of pious hopes; it is a set of principal actions by which the desired end can be achieved. It is for Government to decide which tools to use in pursuit of a strategic aim. It was not the Army who asked to go to Afghanistan, nor the RAF and Navy who asked to go to Libya; it was the government who, with all other levers untenable, chose conventional military force to carry out its aims. Co-ordination between the various tools, the hard and soft power levers, is crucial in pursuing the goal of security. For now let us agree that security is an objective and that defence will make its unique contribution to its achievement. Why are we now putting forward the need for a national debate on defence? We submit that there have been only two intellectually sound strategic defence reviews in the last 50 years. Both, as it happened, were conducted under Labour Governments, Denis Healey was Defence Secretary for the review in 1966/67, and George Robertson for that in 1998. The Nott review 5, a classic example of a review led primarily by budget considerations, without clear assessment of the strategic consequences, was fortunately sunk before it had taken hold by the Falklands campaign. Nothing could better demonstrate the fragility of assumptions which characterise most such reviews. External threats outside Government control dictate defence needs; the provision of balanced forces is the best response to this reality. There has been sucient criticism both from Parliamentary committees and independent experts of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010 to justify the conclusion that this review, in which arbitrarily applied budgetary levels were used to determine the outcome, fails on all counts to meet the challenge of intellectual honesty. At best it conforms to the cost cutting exercises carried out under a number of fancy titles by the Conservative Government in the 1990s. At its worst it ies in the face of the words of David Cameron at the Sovereigns Parade, Sandhurst on 13th August 2010, some three months after becoming Prime Minister,
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The aim of the review was to reduce expenditure during the early 1980s recession and to focus on supporting NATO rather than out of area operations. This review proposed extensive cuts to the Royal Navy including the sale of the new aircraft carrier Invincible to Australia. Any out-of-area amphibious operations were considered unlikely. The entire Royal Marine amphibious force was in jeopardy of being disbanded and the sale of Intrepid and Fearless was mooted. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Defence_White_Paper
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There are dicult decisions ahead but I will never forget that the defence of the nation is the rst duty of any government. What is now clear is that the decisions made by the SDSR, and subsequently, have increased the risks associated with our security. Capability Holiday has become part of the lexicon of defence jargon, and numbers have been reduced across the board. These may be rectied by 2020 the assumption being that an expanding economy will allow a small increase in the defence budget from 2015 but that is far from certain. However, without positive action, Capability Holidays will soon become permanent capability gaps, and depleted forces are weakened forces, creating permanent risks. No unit however capable can be in two places at once; reduced numbers severely impact on our ability to deal with short notice and concurrent operations. It is of interest that in the Libyan operation all the ships initially employed were available because they happened to be transiting from other tasks. As it was, they were on their way to the scrapyard and would not have been available a couple of months later. This reduction in capability (see Annex A) and the associated risk should then have generated a national debate. Since 2010, worryingly, the risks to our security have increased, as the Foreign Secretary has admitted. The range of threats and dangers is, if anything, increasing. 6 The SDSR removed capabilities from the nations defence that could present this Government or future Administrations with no serious options to deal with a range of crises. But, if this alone were not bad enough, we now face the US Administrations decision 7 that from now on Asia Pacic will be the main focus of American defence activity. The implication is clear, the days of European freeloading on US military might are numbered. All of this reinforces the need to think again. There has been no serious debate at the highest level on defence since Tony Blairs address to RUSI in 2007 on board HMS Albion a few months before he resigned as Prime Minister. Let us remind ourselves of the points he made then:
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William Hague, 30 Apr 12, Evidence to the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. New US strategy document Sustaining US Global Leadership. Accordingly, ... while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacic region.
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In foreign policy values are as important as interests. Britains foreign policy is founded on two major alliances, America and NATO. Hard and soft power are combined in these alliances which employ both force and diplomacy. Then 11th September 2001 changed everything. The new frontiers for our security are seen to be global. Hard and soft power were and are driven by the same principles; we need both. Soft power always needs the back-up of hard power to be eective. Setting aside hard power will lead inexorably to the weakening of all power. The new situation for Government requires increased expenditure on equipment, personnel and training, and the need for better conditions for our Armed Forces; not just in the short term but for the long term. The world has changed. We must change with it. Tony Blair set out cogently the choices and looked forward to the debate. Of course it never happened as his resignation shortly thereafter, and the new Prime Ministers lack of interest, combined to condemn this seminal address to history. In this paper we hope to stimulate the debate Blair called for. We will do this by posing clear questions to the Government and suggesting that there are implications for our security and defence in the answers which must be placed in front of the nation. Of course, none of this can be done in a budgetary vacuum. So, let us briey address the issue of Britains considerable decit which the Government quite rightly must abate.
Budgetary Considerations: Defence is not the cause of the nancial decit

The graph overleaf shows conclusively that Defence has not contributed to the current massive decit. Indeed, one might easily argue the opposite. There has been a welcome increase in money allocated to Public Order and Safety in recognition of the increased internal threat, but Defence has at lined with its share of GDP virtually halved (see cover page); all this in the face of a marked increase in external threats, and a huge increase in operational commitments. Although Ministers cling to the sound bite that we are spending the fourth greatest amount in the world on defence, in the same breath they argue that other European nations are not spending enough. Yet we are palpably not achieving anything like the fourth greatest amount of military capability France, of at least equivalent capability in many areas, has larger forces, Italy has more combat aircraft (see Annex A), and
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Government Spending in 2012Bn
we have the smallest army amongst Western nations of comparable size. Moreover, the proper measure is surely, are we spending enough for our safe defence, not are we spending more than someone else? It is true that there have been too many cases of equipment overspend, although the MoD is hardly unique in this area; almost every major public project has suered the same fate. Indeed the whole governmental system of conducting major projects lends itself to such failure and we have seen it in the NHS, HMRC, Scottish Parliament, London Underground and many others. Nonetheless it is reprehensible and a waste of resources. The causes are many. They include insucient nancial expertise in the Civil Service, poor nancial control by Accounting Ocers, inordinate bureaucratic delays in approvals, politically inspired sourcing of products from inecient industries, changes of mind and delays often forced from outside the MoD, short term savings measures which have increased costs, and a failure to support the defence industry with the work necessary to keep it skilled and ecient. There has been a lack of honesty in identifying these causes and a rush to nd scapegoats conveniently amongst those who cannot defend themselves and are anyway not nancially accountable the Chiefs of Sta. Today there is little understanding of defence in Parliament; indeed it is viewed as an optional extra by some, having themselves had the luxury of being brought up
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in a world made relatively peaceful by strong defence and deterrence. Thus the defence budget, not responsible for the nations budgetary problems, has been seen both as part of the problem and solution, and cut accordingly. Governments, who claim that the electorate are indierent to defence concerns, have chosen to neglect their duty to explain the nature of the world around us which justies expenditure on defence. This is the responsibility that comes with high oce and it should not be shirked. While presiding over the reduction of the defence share of national revenues, governments have still felt able to commit service personnel and equipments almost continuously in a series of operations since 1991; and, as is always the case, the Services have delivered a unique record no other government department can match. But the cost of this has been a tragic expenditure of human life, a loss of wider operational training, a shortening of the life of expensive equipment and a severe running down of equipment stocks, ammunition and spares. Industry no longer has the capacity, as it did in the 1930s, even in the 1960s, to recover this situation quickly, and will shrink further if not supported. In the context of balancing the use of homebased industry against oshore acquisition, it is worth remembering that a signicant proportion of money spent on acquisition in the UK returns to the treasury in the form of VAT. Money spent abroad results in VAT (or equivalent) being paid to the Treasuries of those countries a transfer of UK taxpayers money to the taxpayers of another country, possibly at the cost of their own jobs. There seem to be good nancial arguments for support to UK industry. Simultaneously over the last two decades, the Services have endured redundancy programmes, one after another, far greater than any other government department; it is doubtful whether the military cover for national emergencies, so often called on, will be available in the future. The next generation, our childrens generation, to whom the Government owes a clear duty, are at risk of being left dangerously exposed to even relatively minor increases in threats. The defence decisions of the present Government and its Labour predecessors stem from an insucient appreciation of why defence is so dierent from all other calls on the public purse. Defence needs are dictated by existing and potential external threats outside government control against which government must be prepared. A sound economy is dependent on a sound defence, as Gwythian Prins argues in his article (see Annex B). Defence requires steady, committed long-term funding for two reasons: rst to provide long-term defence projects at minimum
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cost; and second to attract, motivate and retain well qualied service personnel which high technology defence systems require. The belief in attractive long-term careers in the armed forces is fading, as ocials have admitted. This dangerously compromises future security. We fully appreciate that the government faces a substantial nancial challenge. Nevertheless, we have shown that choices have been made over the last 20 years; money has been poured into Welfare, Health and Education. It is not for us to tell the Government what it can aord; but the duty of a government is to make priority choices that maximise our prosperity, inuence and security; the last being a necessary condition for achievement of the rst two. At present we spend about 2% of GDP on core defence. This might well need to rise but it would take a number of years to do so. Even in todays dicult economic climate, it need not be unaordable, and this must be borne in mind when the choices are made. The key question that the government has to answer is:
In the light of the state of the world, the threats facing us, and the high priority publicly stated by successive Prime Ministers, how can the Government justify the lower priority now accorded to Defence?
Strategic Choices
As we have said, there are no absolutes in prosperity, inuence and security, but we can make improvements. If it is accepted that the NSS objectives of building our prosperity, extending our inuence and strengthening our security represent British strategy, how should these objectives be achieved? Historically, our mid-Atlantic posture has enabled us to retain a foot in two camps America and Europe and our leading role in the Commonwealth has allowed valuable global relationships to be maintained. Will this philosophy serve us for the future? Will we still want it in 20 years time? We can answer this best by asking some fundamental questions of these key relationships which have helped deliver our aims in the past. As background, the diagram on the following page shows the relative importance of the markets with which we trade. Though it is only a snapshot for Q4 at the end of last year plotting
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Figure 1 UK Export Markets export share against export growth it indicates the importance of America and Europe to our prosperity, whilst indicating likely trends for the future.8 This point was conrmed by the BIS in 2010: The top ve markets for both goods and services exports from the UK have remained the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Ireland for decades. However, other markets have changed substantially in their importance for UK exporters, with emerging markets such as China and India overtaking many historically important trading partners. 9 Our inuence in the world is a function of our prosperity and our diplomatic and military strengths. Our permanent membership of the UN Security Council, our leading role as a member of the G8, G20, NATO and the Commonwealth, are all key to our ability to make our presence felt. Our security is bound up in our membership of NATO and in our relationship with America, Europe and our residual commitments around the world. We now examine these relationships.
Cm 8303 Oce for Budget Responsibility: Economic and scal outlook Mar 2012-07-31 p 67 http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/category/topics/public-nance-forecasts-topics/ Department for Business Innovation and Skills, November 2010
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The American or Special Relationship

For America, the relationship with the United Kingdom brings a staunch ally in diplomacy, a good market for American goods, and a military and Intelligence contribution historically valued. In the important international forums the UK can normally be relied on for support We have shown the importance of the USA to us as a trading partner. In security terms, our relationship with America brings a powerful ally and an opportunity to inuence American thinking. Yet, our inuence in America should not be overstated. However much Britain wants a strong Special Relationship, it means much less to the American Government and military than it does to us. And, as Sir Max Hastings 10 and others have pointed out, the relationship has always been based on a hard-headed assessment of benets to America rather than sentiment. Nevertheless, it can be said with some condence, that for a relatively small nation we have had more inuence on America than most if not all others, and that working with us in a complex world has been the normal and often preferred course of action for Washington. That this relationship has been built on common language, shared values and experiences in WW2 and thereafter, is certainly true; that the closeness of our Diplomatic, Intelligence and Military communities has been at the root of this is also not contestable. The US has often oered assistance to us even when we operated independently (the Falklands) and it is clear that our security has been massively enhanced by our relationship with America in NATO and in other arrangements. This relationship has not gone unnoticed by other nations, mostly to our benet. Now, as America increasingly looks to Asia Pacic for her prosperity, inuence and the source of potential threats, we have to ask ourselves whether this historic benet can be maintained. Our weaknesses in post-conict Iraq, and in Afghanistan, have damaged our credibility, particularly with the American Military. We may have some world class capabilities but our numbers have been depleted to the extent of appearing token in many cases. As an example, just one Wing at a USAF Main Operating Base can bring to bear close to the oensive air power of the whole of the Royal Air Force
10
See Defending the Essential Relationship: Britain and the United States Fighting Together in the 21st Century, Centre for Policy Studies, 12th July 2011.
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Tornado Fleet of today. 11 And in terms of surface eet, one US Naval Task Force (of which they have eleven) would be similar in tonnage and numbers to the entire readily deployable Royal Navy. If we accept, as we surely must, that we get much more from the American relationship than we put in and that it is irreplaceable for our security, then we must conclude that we should retain it at all costs. The questions that arise therefore are:
What armed forces do we need to have, and what do we need to do, to ensure that America continues to see the UK as a worthwhile ally? Should we now support America in her Pacic interests? Would this also be in the UKs interests bearing in mind our trade with the Asian Tigers and our Common Security Interests?
The European Relationship

For Europe, the UK is not just an important market for goods. Despite our ambivalence over full integration into the European Union(EU) and its monetary arrangements, our membership of the EU is important to most if not all the other members. If we were outside the EU, Europes relationship with the rest of the world would suer. As for the security of Europe, we have hitherto contributed signicantly in capabilities, experience and also in credibility. For the smaller nations, we are an important security counterbalance to larger nations domination. With declining military strength, all these may now be at risk. The 27 nations which make up the EU are Britains largest trading market, with 31% of our exports going to Europe. Our prosperity is therefore signicantly dependent on this trading relationship. However, globally, the EU is in relative economic decline. It once accounted for 30% of global trade. Now it is only 16% and falling. 12 The centre of economic growth is moving to Asia, Africa and South America. Despite this Europe will remain our major trading partner for decades to come. Whilst our values and concepts of democracy link us to the Continent, our inuence in Europe rests less on our trading relationship as on our position in the wider world. Our seat on the UN Security Council has seen us take the lead in Europe on security
11
The RAF has 5 Operational Tornado Sqns of 12 aircraft each (60); a US Base has 3 Sqns of 24 aircraft (72). CIA World Factbook.
20
12
matters, often in concert with the French. Our defence capabilities, in contrast to most European nations, have been a clear foundation for strong links to the US an outcome of some benet when Washington has become exasperated with European free-loading on defence. All this buys us inuence on both sides of the Atlantic. We share a number of key security concerns with other European countries, particularly those emanating from a resurgent Russia, the Middle East and Iran.This closeness for security and defence will remain whatever our future within the EU. But, there are tensions; only France appears to take defence seriously. Most nations are spending around 1% GDP on defence and, despite much talk, collaboration and role specialisation, paths which might deliver more bang for the buck, have made little progress. The money spent on defence by Europe produces a poor return, and reductions in the United Kingdom budget will add to the problems. The conclusion must be that on all three counts, Prosperity, Inuence and Security, we have very important links to Europe and, whilst the relationship may blow hot and cold, it will remain important. The questions that follow are:
What defence capabilities should Britain maintain if we wish to remain a leader in European defence? What will we need to do to compensate for the pending reduction in Americas commitment to Europe?
The Global Dimension

Britain is nothing if not a trading nation, and our trade is fundamental to our prosperity. In turn, successful trade hinges on security, on secure workplaces, on secure lines of communication, not only over the oceans, but across overland corridors and through pipelines, via air routes and now even along bre-optic and radio electronic links. As the Chinese have shown across Africa and elsewhere, hand-in-hand with trade comes inuence and together they require nurturing through a secure environment in which they can prosper. As we have shown in the graph above, our trade with the so-called BRICS nations is in most cases increasing substantially. Recent visits abroad by the Prime Minister accompanied by large business delegations would indicate this opportunity is recognised by the Government. Of course our interests are not just focussed on
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the BRICS; we must also look around the world for markets which underlines the need for global stability and security. It is in the global policing role, in support principally of America, that our inuence is mainly felt. Historically, Britain has made a signicant contribution to the security of the world. It was once able to enforce the freedom of the seas almost single handedly. For over half a century Britains global role has been as a leading ally of the United States deterring aggression, at least where it could threaten the interests of the democratic west and, particularly, in providing the security context for sustaining global trade. With increased instability since the end of the Cold War and ever greater globalisation of developed economies, this task has become more onerous but essential. Our history is important. The leading role we play in the Commonwealth, the treaty obligations we have to assist in defence of countries once part of our empire, together with the less tangible obligations of the ex-colonial power, all add to the range of emergencies to which we may have to respond. Sierra Leone is an obvious example. Beyond these historic ties, as a nation we have stood for freedom from tyranny and for humanitarian intervention, seldom alone but as part of the rich worlds need to help with the problems of the weak, the poor and the oppressed. All this has enhanced our moral authority and inuence. We have been a force for good, even for nations for whom we have no treaty or legacy obligation; Bosnia and Kosovo for example. Military intervention is by no means the only solution in this arena but it nearly always has a role to play; in the case of Sierra Leone, a leading role. The military capabilities required to be an eective ally of the United States, as a leader in Europes defence, and of course in the defence of our own special interests, are likely to cover almost any capability we may be asked to contribute to international policing, but ships, aircraft and battalions cannot be in two places at once. Our share of global policing aects any responsible calculation of the adequacy of resources. Only one example of present overstretch may suce. The Royal Navy averages over 200 days a year away from home ports, in contrast to less than 100 days for the French navy. In addition, we must look to the future. In the volatile world in which we live there is clear merit in strengthening security ties through Alliances such as the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) 13 between UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia. It is reasonable to assume that the UK military presence of the right
13
For a description of thee Five Power Defence Arrangements see: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/treaties/

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sort and right frequency can assist in promoting our inuence, and adding to our security and prosperity. If our conclusions are right, then the questions for the Government are:
Do we wish to continue our force for good interventions around the world? What are the benets of maintaining a Global capability; what are the implications if we do not? Can we meet these requirements and any other likely security needs from the forces available from other commitments, or do we need to adjust our force levels?
Going it Alone
Independence of action is always important to a nation; indeed, for this very reason we preserve an independent nuclear deterrent. Of course, in the great majority of cases where Britain might be involved in conict in the future, we will be acting in concert with other allies such as NATO or a coalition of the willing. But there are times when Britain must act alone to protect purely British interests, in situations where we could not rely on allies and friends, such as across our littoral and Exclusive Economic Zones, in Gibraltar, the Falklands, the Cyprus Sovereign Bases, in providing Military Aid to the Civil Power, on specic piracy patrols, and even for evacuation of British nationals from a state in collapse. Moreover, given the global uncertainty, there will be many occasions when the Prime Minister would need to have the freedom of action of operating independently against unforeseen problems in locations where we had no planned commitments. In such cases we may well not have to commit military forces to ghting as long as we have the right defence capabilities to deter aggression; just the presence of British military forces can suce. This is always the best outcome. The forces needed for Britain to act in specic circumstances is a matter for MoD. In general, it is likely to require an army rapid reaction force, as well as air power including aircraft carriers with the right aircraft amphibious shipping, sucient destroyers and frigates and submarine escorts. This would be complemented by long-distance supply ships and tankers, Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) aircraft and very long range maritime patrol aircraft 14. This, of course, does not inevitably mean a
14
These same aircraft are equally necessary to protect our nuclear deterrent, submarines entering or leaving shallow British waters.
23
separate range of forces for independent operations, because most of those capabilities will be needed anyway if Britain is to be a credible military ally of America, in NATO, and with Europe. We need then to ask:
Is it essential that the UK has the capability to operate independently? What military capabilities are required?
The Defence Calculus

Our review so far has suggested that our future defence posture will have a key part to play in our dealings with America, Europe and in the wider global arena, including independent action on occasion. We can achieve our objectives if we have the necessary military capabilities and sucient force levels to support our allies and defend our interests. How can we do this? First, we must take into account that our Defence Industrial base has become gravely reduced, which, at its current level, means that it enjoys few economies of scale and has a low regeneration capacity. Taken together, these factors argue that there is a good economic and security case to consider for a stimulus to our defence industry. Secondly, in calculating necessary force levels, we can be reasonably certain that If our armed forces are able to serve eectively alongside the United States both in numbers and prociency then, from them, we should be able to meet (most of) our obligations in Europe and our interests world wide. These numbers must, of course, recognise our independent operating requirements elaborated above, including the need to police and defend UK airspace and maintain a sucient presence in the Falkland Islands. We can be reasonably certain that, historically, our Intelligence and Defence contribution to the Special Relationship with America has been valued and brought us great benet. But, how strong are these ties now? The cuts to our front line and the loss of capabilities have not gone unnoticed. In Libya, over 70% of the support sorties own in the air campaign were by the USA. Moreover, it was the USA, almost alone, who conducted the Day 1 campaign to suppress enemy air defences, allowing us to operate more safely thereafter. This relatively modest air campaign should not be trumpeted as a demonstrable British success despite its crucial contribution
24
to the rebel victory and the ne performance of units taking part. In fact it should have prompted serious thought on the deciencies of European air power. It should have been a wake up call. We may delude ourselves, but we do not delude the Americans, and we may not have fooled the rest of the world. Annex A shows just how much we have reduced our front line numbers since 1991. Whilst there is no doubt that capabilities have improved technically, some superbly, the harsh fact is that most nations capabilities have improved equally. It is in the numbers game that our drawdown is most telling. With about 50 ships and submarines of all types, of which 19 are Destroyers and Frigates, the RN can only meet a new contingency by withdrawing from an existing commitment; a point made by the CNS and for which he was reprimanded. The facts speak for themselves; he was correct and it should not go unacknowledged. We must remember that it is not possible for all forces to be deployed and operational all the time. Partly this is because of the sheer stress of deployment, partly the need for maintenance and restoration of both people and equipment, partly the need to retain an uncommitted reserve against emergency or surge requirements, partly the need to oer a lifestyle which allows people to spend at least some time with their families in the Navy this is expressed as an aspiration for ships to be in their base ports for 40% of the time averaged over three years and partly it is the need for continuous training to develop and enhance core skills that are not in demand on a particular task. There is also a need for around 10-15% of ships to be in major repair and capability update at any one time to prolong their useful lives as threat systems are enhanced. This has allowed ships to be extended well beyond their original design lives, in the case of the T23 frigates from 18 years to well in excess of 30 years. Although we consider the Navy in detail, these principles apply equally across all three Armed Forces. In each Service, this results in a one to three ratio for enduring tasks: one unit deployed operationally; one preparing, training and deploying (and deploying may take three or four weeks to distant places); and one returning, having leave, undertaking maintenance and preparing to deploy again. It was this calculation which led the Defence Review in 1998 to conclude that the Navy required a minimum of 32 destroyers and frigates. For the same scale of tasks, we now have 19. For an emergency or surge around 80% of the eet can be sailed, as 1982 demonstrated. If this happens, however, there will be a corresponding recovery period at the end of the emergency. If only single ships are used, then 19 destroyers and frigates can support perhaps only 5 or, occasionally, 6 enduring tasks at once.
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In the much more likely case of several ships together being needed for some operations, the number if concurrent tasks that can be undertaken will be signicantly reduced. Today, the British Army, with an established manpower of 102,000, nds it dicult to maintain one continuous brigade size operation in Afghanistan without signicant support from the Reserve Force. Indeed, during the past decade some 25,000 members of the Reserve have served both in Iraq and Afghanistan including 18,000 members of the TA. However, the proposal in Future Force 2020 to place even greater reliance on the TA by increasing its strength to 30,000, and thereby further to reduce the strength of the Army to 82,000, raises some fundamental concerns. First, excepting specialist trades, TA soldiers, serve on average only 3 years before leaving. Therefore, the expectation that TA soldiers especially in the infantry where manpower cuts have been the greatest will be as combat capable as regular soldiers cannot be met. Second, the number of fully trained TA soldiers needed to produce a soldier in the front line historically is 15:1. This ratio is based on a six month tour of duty. The calculation in Army 2020 however has been based on a ratio of about 8:1 requiring a far greater frequency of operational deployment for each TA soldier. This inevitably will place a great strain on the individual, his family, and his employer, and is almost certainly unsustainable in the long term. A realistic assessment, therefore, is that the future TA will actually only produce an in-theatre force of just 2,000 far short of that planned. The RAF has 5 Sqns of Tornados and 2 Typhoon Sqns capable of Oensive Support (OS). Like the Navy, the RAF could produce a surge of 70%, perhaps more, for a short-duration campaign of less than 30 days but, given the current aircrew to aircraft ratios and aircraft modication states, even this would be in doubt. It would, however, be at the expense of most if not all other training, and with damaging consequences to the through life cost assumptions on which aircraft service life depends. For prolonged operations, planners have to assume that little more than 2 squadrons would be available for all air-to-ground attack tasks. This, we suggest, is far short of what is required for even the most limited conict. Moreover, if 2 or more British operations were to occur simultaneously, the problems for all the armed forces would be compounded, with considerable doubts over our ability to support 2 theatres, each with separate lines of communication, and entailing a duplication of all other support and logistic functions.
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That we need armed forces that are Agile, Adaptable and Capable, as described by Ministers, is clear. It meets the requirement for deployment in support of America, Europe, our overseas territories and in the wider world. But what exactly are these forces and in what numbers are they required? We assume that the US will not deploy large numbers of ground forces again in pursuit of nation building. That must be the conclusion in light of the comments of the US Administration. But of course, Presidents change, so do policies and so do circumstances. But, we too have learnt some lessons and the Defence Secretary is positioning us away from campaigning towards contingencies, as Gwythian Prins has reminded us (see Annex B). We suggest that the belief so widely peddled before the SDSR that military actions of the future would predominantly be land-centric has also been shown to be seriously misguided. So, let us consider how we would be likely to contribute to a campaign alongside the USA. Any forces we deploy with the US Forces must be seen as a positive asset to the campaign, not a liability. To ensure our inuence, they would be need to be fully capable combat forces, not just reserve or support units. For the foreseeable future these operations are likely to be limited to a strong naval presence and air power. Our Special Forces, already greatly respected by the Americans, would also likely have an increasing part to play. To contribute eectively we will need to plug in to the American hi-tech infrastructure, such as the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), which will be the base line for US forces. As Sir Max Hastings has suggested we will be valued by what we provide: In international relations, an ally is worth as much as, and no more than, the resources and specically military resources it is capable of contributing towards implementing a shared purpose by force or threat of it. 15 This begs a number of questions:
Can we maintain the privileged and inuential position we have held in the US operational HQs in every allied campaign since the rst Gulf War? Is todays combat eet capable and large enough to retain a place at the US table?
15
Sir Max Hastings. Centre for Policy Studies, 12th July 2011.
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Operationally will our Oensive Support capabilities be any more than a useful token when taking part in an American led No-Fly Zone or air campaign in future? Do we have enough Special Forces to meet demands today? Can we recruit and train more with an Army of just 82,000? Can we adequately protect our Overseas Territories?
Turning to our European role; here our Navy is now smaller than that of France; our Army too is the smallest of similar Western Powers, and the RAF combat aircraft numbers are notably lower than those of both France and Italy and only just a few more than Spains. Most Air Forces on the Continent have a Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability; we do not. Our Transport and AAR eets are very old but will be the most up to date in Europe in due course, albeit with smaller numbers. Our helicopter capabilities have improved although numbers have also suered. The GR4 Tornado with its excellent weapons suite, and the Typhoon with Paveway and impressive air to air weapons, command respect. But when Italy (See Annex A) and France have more combat aircraft and larger armies than do we, and with a Royal Navy smaller than Frances and only just larger than Italys, we should have some concerns for our inuence in European military matters. Even Spain has virtually the same number of combat aircraft and, when fully mobilised, her army dwarfs ours. Further cuts to our capability outlined in SDSR, and due to take eect over the next 5 years, take no account of an increasingly unstable world. Of great importance is the message we send to our European allies. Britains decline is having a profound eect on European eorts to do better in the defence eld. We should recall that much of the European force is hollow and incapable of even modest operations. For example, to the dismay of the USA, several NATO nations actually ran out of weapons in the very small-scale Libya campaign of last year. Moreover, there is a marked reluctance by some nations to deploy for combat at all. The Prime Minister has urged Europe to do more, and so too repeatedly has the US Administration. Yet the United Kingdom is doing less. We have therefore to ask:
What must be done to ensure that Europe will face up to its obligations under NATO and the EDF? Have the risks already taken with our defence posture reduced our credibility in Europe?
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Should we role-specialise, or do we need balanced forces with sucient numbers across all three services in the absence of real signs of European convergence in defence? How can we regenerate our armed forces, now that we no longer have the defence Industrial base to do so in less than a decade? Is there a case for an economic stimulus to the Defence Industries? Does the Government agree that soft power needs hard power to back it?
Conclusions
The defence budget has been raided in one way or another since the end of the Cold War. Defence is the irreplaceable insurance which guarantees that everything else in national life can be enjoyed in safety. Defence has not been responsible for the nations budgetary problems. The military has delivered constantly in an unrelenting series of military engagements from Gulf War 1 through Former Yugoslavia, the 9/11 aftermath, to Libya. It is our contention that the armed forces have now reached a watershed in their ability to respond to the critical contingencies we may face in the next 10 years and more. We have suggested possible scenarios in our companion paper, Disarmament and Consequences; nowhere have we tackled concurrent operations but this possibility cannot be ruled out. It has happened all too recently. There are clear indications that the struggle for diminishing resources will intensify; the Middle East, vital for our energy supplies, is poised once again for conict, with Iran and Israel at centre stage. Russia is exing her muscles under Putin, and the problems in SW Asia and relations with China could easily take a turn for the worse over the next decade. The Arab Spring has a long way to go and the establishment of new governments by no means guarantees an improvement in the stability of the Middle East. Terrorism is moving its base to Africa, a Continent far from stable. Argentina is openly gathering friends in her historic claim to the Falklands. Against this background, if hard power, as Tony Blair has suggested, is the foundation for eective soft power, should we really run the risks inherent in our present weakened defence posture?
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To the authors, the national debate we ask for on this subject should not be about the aordability of defence but a clear headed analysis of our national objectives and the role of defence in their support. The Questions we have posed should be answered. These are assembled for ease of reference at Annex C. If, as we believe, that where we are now, and will be for at least the decade ahead, is putting at risk our relationship with America, in danger of reducing our inuence on the Continent of Europe at a critical moment, and sending unclear signals on the wider global stage, then this should be of concern to the whole nation. The legacy of this Government at the next election may yet be an economy on the mend; but history may judge that its real legacy was a failure to understand its long term responsibilities for the defence of the realm and the security of future generations. If we are wrong, then let us learn publicly why so that all can hear. However, if we are right, then the national debate we seek needs urgent attention. Governments have a duty to inform the public about security matters in an increasingly dangerous world; this is the fundamental responsibility of high oce. The common sense of the British public should not be underestimated; Ministers may yet nd that there are votes in defence.
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ANNEXES
ANNEX A TO UKNDA PAPER A NATIONAL DEBATE ON DEFENCE A DIRE NECESSITY
Force Comparisons
UK Forces 1990~91/2011~12/post SDSR
Main Source data from IISS By 2011/12 RN had already reduced from pre-SDSR establishment of 38 Post-SDSR data for 2018
31
Forces by Country in 2012

Combat aircraft (FJ) includes naval ac Army manpower in thousands, Reserves shown separately
32
ANNEX B TO UKNDA PAPER A NATIONAL DEBATE ON DEFENCE A DIRE NECESSITY
Gwythian Prins
Extracts from Daily Telegraph
8th June 2012
The Armed Forces: Our country needs them

by Gwythian Prins
These (Iraq and Afghanistan) ... were campaigns that morphed as they dragged on, radically so in Afghanistan; campaigns that puzzled, strained and poisoned public trust. Above all, they were campaigns where the lack of clear strategic aim and mismatch of scale to task placed our Armed Forces under extreme stress. ... Finally closing that book was the main message of Philip Hammonds speech yesterday (7 June 2012). In describing how the regular strength of the Army will be cut from 102,000 to 82,000, the Defence Secretarys intent was plain: to shift the focus from campaigns to contingency. Mr Hammond did a workmanlike job of stating his case in his terms; but it is his terms that should worry us. Mr Hammonds terms in eect, the prevalent culture in Whitehall and the Ministry of Defence reveal no sense of what makes the defence of the realm an activity unlike any other that governments conduct with public money. ... military professionals worry about the loss of critical mass in key skill areas where the whole is always more than the sum of the parts; and while Mr Hammond had warm words for those who will be made redundant, arguing that it is more humane to tell them now so that they can get on with their lives, there is and will be an undeniable impact on morale, especially if people dont really know why they are serving, and if the country at large doesnt understand what the point of armed forces is nowadays. But maybe this doesnt matter? Well, it doesnt if you hold the three key submerged assumptions that, over the past 15 years especially, I have observed becoming
33
widely absorbed into the unspoken consensus of Whitehall. They underpin the Coalitions infamous Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), upon which current policy still stands, yet which two select committees of Parliament (Defence and Public Administration twice) found to be so axiomatically awed as to be unsafe. So lets haul them up and look at them. The rst assumption is that something wonderful has happened. For the rst time, since the end of the long, intermittently Hot and Cold European civil war of 1914-91, peace has become the default condition of modernity. ... the second assumption: that at last soft power has become more powerful than hard power. This means that it is more cost eective to put defence money into the conict prevention programmes of the Department for International Development than into regiments or frigates. ... And the third assumption, which facilitates the other two, is that the purpose of strategy is principally one of management. Strategy for defence is no dierent from strategy for any large business, the thinking goes; it is about delivering the CEOs top-line objective. ... The problem is that each of these three unspoken assumptions is dangerous and wrong. We have not escaped history. The role of all armed forces today remains to prevent bad things from happening; and they do this by projecting an aura of power that comes from a combination of capability (procured against the certainty of uncertainty) with perceived national will. That was the enduring Falklands eect that helped keep us safe for a generation and that materially helped to persuade Gorbachev to end the Cold War. Paradoxically, it is usually cheaper to pay for this up front because the logic of realpolitik is that those with the aura of power do not need to use it; while those who erode it, as we have, are more likely to have to do so. The second fallacy is that soft power is autonomous. It isnt. Without hard power behind it, soft power is just limp. But central to the failure of the SDSR, and the National Security Strategy behind it, is the loss of understanding that operational strategy is dierent from and subordinate to national or what we used to call grand strategy. Grand strategy understands all those geopolitical factors that aect our national security, both as risks and as threats, but which it is beyond the power of any government to control; and then it is about strategies to project our enduring
34
national interests. Its relationship to operational strategy is to inform it of the range of capabilities that should be procured against uncertainty: the opposite of the elaborate scenario-based ways that the MoD denes force requirements nowadays. Grand strategys relationship to politicians is to inform their ignorance and to help them to choose actions wisely. Gwythian Prins is a research professor at the London School of Economics and a visiting professor in war studies at the Humanities Research Institute, University of Buckingham.
35
ANNEX C TO UKNDA PAPER A NATIONAL DEBATE ON DEFENCE A DIRE NECESSITY
Questions
Questions the Government Must Answer: On Relations with America
What armed forces do we need to have and what do we need to do to ensure that America continues to see the UK as a worthwhile ally? Can we maintain the privileged and inuential position we have held in the US operational HQs in every allied campaign since the rst Gulf War? Is todays combat eet capable and large enough to retain a place at the US table? Operationally will our Oensive Support capabilities be any more than a useful token to take part in American led No-Fly Zone and air campaigns in future? Should we support America in her Pacic interests? Would this also be in the UKs interests bearing in mind our trade with the Asian Tigers and our Common Security Interests? If so, what are the implications for our forces bearing in mind that rotating force levels becomes more demanding with distance.
On Relations with Europe

What defence capabilities should Britain maintain if we wish to remain a leader in European defence? Have the risks already taken with our defence posture reduced our credibility in Europe? What must be done to ensure that Europe will face up to its obligations under NATO and the EDF? Can Britain credibly demand greater European eort as we reduce our own?
36
What will we need to do to compensate for the pending reduction in American commitment to Europe? Should we role-specialise, or do we need balanced forces with sucient numbers across all three services in the absence of real signs of European convergence in defence?
On the Global Dimension

Do we wish to continue our force for good interventions around the world? Can we meet these requirements and any other likely security needs from the forces available from other commitments, possibly concurrently, or do we need to adjust our force levels?
On Going it Alone
Is it essential for the UK to have the capability to operate independently?
On UK Defence
Do we have enough Special Forces to meet demands today? Can we recruit and train more with an Army of 82,000? Does the Government agree that soft power needs hard power to back it? How can we regenerate our armed forces now that we no longer have the Defence Industrial base to do so for at least a decade? Is there a case for an economic stimulus to the Defence Industries? In the light of the state of the world, the threats facing us, and the high priority publicly stated by successive Prime Ministers, how does this justify the lower priority accorded to defence in the last twenty years?
37
AUTHORS
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon. Retired as Chief of the Air Sta after 40 years in the Royal Air Force in 1997. In that time he ew as ghter pilot and as an Instructor at a number of venues home and overseas. Sta tours in 11Gp, MOD Joint Warfare, Holland and Belgium with NATO. Commander-in-Chief of both Support and Strike Commands of the RAF. Has been Non Executive Director of Thales plc 2000-2010, Advisor and Consultant EADS Germany, Chairman Symbiotics. Chairman of United Church Schools Group since 2012, Council member since 1997. Active in Air Cadet Council, Vice-President RNLI, Chairman Suttons Hospital in Charterhouse, President Battle of Britain Memorial Trust, Vice-Chairman Council Wyclie College, Governor of ESU, Chairman Lincolnshire Branch ESU. A long standing interest in Turkey and Cyprus since living on the island of Cyprus in the 1960s. Vice-President of UK National Defence Association. General Sir Michael Rose. As well as commanding 22 Special Air Service Regiment, he was Commander UNPROFOR Bosnia in 1994 during the Yugoslav Wars. He joined the Coldstream Guards in 1964. After attending the Sta College, Camberley, Rose was Commanding Ocer of 22 SAS Regiment from 1979 to 1982, as part of which he was in control of the operation to free the hostages of the Iranian Embassy Siege in 1980. He commanded Special Service operations in-theatre during the Falkland Conict. He then served as the commander of the 39th Infantry Brigade from 1983 to 1985. In 1987, Rose was the Commandant of the School of Infantry until 1988, when he became the rst Director Special Forces until 1989. After the Royal College of Defence Studies, Rose was General Ocer Commanding North East District and Commander 2nd Infantry Division based in York. Between 1991 and 1993 he served as Commandant of the Sta College, Camberley. Then, from 1993 to 1994, Rose was Commander UK Field Army and Inspector-General of the Territorial Army. Finally, from 1994 to 1995 he was Commander, United Nations Protection Force, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rose became Adjutant-General and Aide-de-Camp General to The Queen in 1995 until he retired in 1997. Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham is a former Captain of Ark Royal, Deputy CINC Fleet in 1999, and from 1999 to 2003 he was the rst Deputy Chief of the Defence Sta (Equipment Capability) and a member of the Navy Board. Now an independent consultant in Defence and other elds, he is a former Vice President and an Associate Fellow of RUSI, and Editor of the Naval Review and a lecturer in Public Management at Kings College, London. He is the co-author of three previous UKNDA Reports with Andrew Lambert and Allen Sykes including the September 2011 report Inconvenient Truths.
38
Air Commodore Andrew Lambert is a writer and commentator on Defence, particularly air power. A late Fellow Commoner of Downing College, Cambridge, he has written widely on the psychological aspects of warfare and is the author of several monographs on coercion. He has been Commander British Forces for the Northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq, Air Commander British Forces Falkland Islands, and Deputy Commander for NATO Air Operations in Norway. His most recent post was as Assistant Commandant (Air) at the Joint Services Command and Sta College at Shrivenham. He is the co-author of ve previous UKNDA Reports with Allen Sykes, including the September 2011 report Inconvenient Truths. Allen Sykes is a retired international businessman and a Vice President of the UKNDA. He was the principal author of the UKNDAs rst discussion paper, Overcoming the Defence Crisis, in September 2008; co-author with the historian, Andrew Roberts, of the UKNDAs third paper, A Compelling Necessity the case for increasing the defence budget despite the present severe economic crisis, in July 2009; and co-author with Air Commodore Andrew Lambert of UKNDAs fourth paper, UK Defence Needs, in February 2010. He is the co-author with Sir Jeremy Blackham and Andrew Lambert of the September 2010 UKNDA Report, Submission to the Government and the Nation on the Strategic Defence and Security Review and the September 2011 report Inconvenient Truths. Antony Hichens. After a career working in the international mining industry, rst in Rio Tinto and later as a managing director of Consolidated Goldelds, separated by a decade in Redland, the building materials manufacturer, he was chairman of a number of public companies, including Caradon, LASMO and DS Smith. He was also a non executive director of several companies including South West Electricity, The British Coal Corporation, Courtaulds Textiles, Candover Investments and the London Insurance Market Investment Trust. He was a member of the Takeover Panel. He was Chairman of the Magdalen College Development Trust and is a member of the Oxford Court of Benefactors and the Coastal Forces Heritage Trust.
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Published by the United Kingdom National Defence Association (UKNDA), September 2012. UKNDA, PO Box 819, Portsmouth PO1 9FF. Website: www.uknda.org

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A UKNDA Report / 17 September 2012

FOREWORD BY ANDREW ROBERTS

UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity

UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity

UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity

UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity

UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity

UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity

UKNDA: A National Debate on Defence A Dire Necessity