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TERRORISM IN INDIA SUBMITTED TOWARDS THE FULFILMENT OF THE COURSE TITLED LEGAL METHOD

Submitted to: Mr. Pushpendra pandey Faculty, (Legal Method)


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Submitted by: Rohit Sinha(601) 1st year 1st semester

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The views, opinions, statements and legal conclusions contained in this project are those of the author, and also represent official statements or opinions. Any errors or misstatements in this project are exclusively those of the author. These guidelines are provided by the LEGAL METHODS faculty MR. PUSHPENDRA PANDEY in an effort to provide better understanding of TERRORISM IN INDIA. These guidelines are NOT meant to constitute legal advice. They simplify and broadly generalize complex issues of law. I appreciate the assistance of my friends (LL.Bs), who provided the initial drafts of the materials in this assignment.

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Aims and Objectives: The aim of the project is to present a detailed study of the topic TERRORISM IN INDIA through decisions and suggestions and different writings. The aim has been to come to a conclusion very much indigenous. Scope and Limitations: The researcher is only restricted him himself only up to the effect of terrorism in society and how it effect emerging and developed nation as it is very difficult to find out the reason why terrorism occur and what is its aim and target. Sources of Data: This research has been done by using doctrinal and non doctrinal methods of doing research. In doing this research researcher went through many books, internet and visited society to get the effect of society. 1. Books 2. Website

Method of Writing and Mode of Citation: The method of writing followed in the course of this research paper is primarily analytical. The researcher has followed Uniform method of citation throughout the course of this research paper. Research and method: The researcher has critically examine the effect of terrorism in India and the social and legal remedies of it. How a people can be safe? What are the steps taken by legislature, executive and judiciary.

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Hypothesis: By terrorism researcher presumed the rebellion and naxalite which the wage war against the government established by law. They are many time boarder crosser which comes in our country and want to make people panic and fearful. Significance: As terrorism is global problem on which world is thinking about it,world powerful country are involve in war against terrorism and our country is also a victim of it so it makes compulsory to study it in depth.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction.................................................................................... 06 2. Meaning and Definition................................................................. 07 3. Terrorism global scenario.............................................................. 08 4. India and terrorism.........................................................................17 5. Terrorist group...............................................................................21 6. Pota................................................................................................22 7. Tada.............................................................................................. 24 8. Judicial view.................................................................................28 9. Conclusions..................................................................................32 10. Bibliography................................................................................35

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RESEARCH WORK

INTRODUCTION Terrorism is not new, and even though it has been used since the beginning of recorded history it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Obviously, a lot depends on whose point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear organization to defend against or to deter. First in Varanasi then in Delhi then In Mumbai local trains and do not think there is even a need to mentio the terroristsbarbaric activities in Kashmir . The bomb blasts have outraged every patriotic Indian. NOcivilised nation caln allow this kind of barbaric inhumanity to be partly or fully supported or sponsored by any neighbour or domestic insurgents.The only way we can combat it is to minimise ,if not eliminates, such occurrences. Prevention is crucial;and laws like POTA can prevent such occurances.Acquittals even in acase like Parliament attak iccured because of poor prosecution rather than because of POTA

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MEANING AND DEFINITION

Terrorism is also a form of unconventional warfare and psychological warfare. The word is politically and emotionally charged and this greatly compounds the difficulty of providing a precise definition. One 1988 study by the US Army found that over 100 definitions of the word "terrorism" have been used.. A person who practices terrorism is a terrorist.

Terrorism has been used by a broad array of political organizations in furthering their objectives; both right-wing and left-wing political parties, nationalistic, and religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling governments. The presence of non-state actors in widespread armed conflict has created controversy regarding the application of the laws of war.

An International Round Table on Constructing Peace, Deconstructing Terror (2004) hosted by Strategic Foresight Group recommended that a distinction should be made between terrorism and acts of terror. While acts of terrorism are criminal acts as per the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and domestic jurisprudence of almost all countries in the world, terrorism refers to a phenomenon including the actual acts, the perpetrators of acts of terrorism themselves and their motives. There is disagreement on definitions of terrorism. However, there is an intellectual consensus globally, that acts of terrorism should not be accepted under any circumstances. This is reflected in all important conventions including the United Nations counter terrorism strategy, the decisions of the Madrid Conference on terrorism, the Strategic Foresight Group and ALDE Round Tables at the European Parliament. That is why preemption is being considered to be so important. In some cases, terrorism has been a means to carry on a conflict without the adversary realizing the nature of the threat, mistaking terrorism for criminal activity. Because of these characteristics, terrorism has

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become increasingly common among those pursuing extreme goals throughout the world. But despite its popularity, terrorism can be a nebulous concept. Even within the U.S. Government, agencies responsible for different functions in the ongoing fight against terrorism use different definitions. The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Within this definition, there are three key elementsviolence, fear, and intimidationand each element produces terror in its victims. The FBI uses this: "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." The U.S. Department of State defines "terrorism" to be "premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

TERRORISM-GLOBAL SCENARIO1

www.terroreffect.com

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By global terrorism, one generally refers to the activities of Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist organisations of different countries associated with it in the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People. The IIF, which was formed by Osama bin Laden in February 1998, is a united front of like-minded pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist organisations. 2. None of the organisations, which joined Al Qaeda in forming the IIF, owed their existence to bin Laden or Al Qaeda. They were in existence before bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan from Sudan in July,1996. Only one of the members of the IIF---the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) of Pakistan--- came into existence after the formation of the IIF. It was formed in 2000 by Maulana Masood Azhar, a Pakistani national, who split from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) of Pakistan, which was a founding member of the IIF. 3. All the members of Al Qaeda are Arabs from different countries. Pakistani nationals and foreign nationals of Pakistani origin constitute the largest group in the IIF. The largest number of jihadi terrorist organisations from a single country in the IIF ---five-- are from Pakistan. They are the HUM, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the JEM and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). The LEJ is an anti-Shia terrorist organisation, which is not active in India. The remaining four are active in Indian territory--in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and outside. 4. The member-organisations have a common ideology, a common goal and an agreed perception of their adversaries. 5. Their common ideology holds ,firstly, that the first loyalty of a Muslim is to his religion and then only to the country of which he is a citizen or resident; secondly, that religious solidarity comes before cultural solidarity; thirdly, that Muslims don't recognise national frontiers and therefore have a right to go to any country where Islam and Muslims are in danger and wage a jihad; and, fourthly, that Muslims have a religious right and obligation to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and use them, if necessary, to protect their religion. 6. This ideology was born in Pakistan and not in any other Muslim country. The Binori madrasa of Karachi has contributed the most to the evolution of this ideology. The ideological mentors of the IIF in Pakistan look upon Islam as practised in India, Sri Lanka,
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Bangladesh, Myanmar and South-East Asia as having become soft due to the cultural influence of Hinduism and Buddhism. Hence, their emphasis on the greater importance of religious solidarity over cultural solidarity. They want to rid Islam as practised in these areas of what they look upon as the distorting influence of Hinduism/Buddhism by Arabising it. 7. Their common goal is a global Islamic Caliphate. Till April 2006, they looked upon Christianity and Judaism as their common adversaries. Since April, they look upon Hinduism too as their common adversary. The strengthening of Indo-US relations has contributed to this perception of Hinduism too as a common adversary. 8. The defining characteristics of global jihadi terrorism are:

Focus on mass casualty, mass disruption and mass destruction terrorism Attacks on soft as well as hard targets. Attacks on human beings as well as capabilities. Attacks on security forces as well as civilians. Adaptability and resilence. Exploitation of root causes as well as pretexts, domestic as well as foreign policy issues.

Non-conformity to the conventional mould. Leadership educated, from well-to-do social strata, professional expertise. Ability to keep abreast of scientific and technological developments and use them to improve their modus operandi (MO).

Gravitation from hand-held weapons to explosives, from timed and remote-controlled explosions to suicide explosions.

Ability to draw maximum destructive results from home-made material through sophisticated thinking and action.

Ability to circumvent even the latest physical security measures that the State can think of.

Better mastery of the Internet, the mobile telephones and explosives than the counterterrorism agencies.

Ability to act in small cells or even as individuals (miniaturisation) without the need for a centralised command and control.

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Constantly evolving new mutations---- maritime terrorism, WMD terrorism, terrorism directed at energy infrastructure, cyber terrorism etc.

Indifference to the impact of their actions on public opinion.

9. While Al Qaeda itself has not been active on the ground anywhere in India, the pro-Al Qaeda Pakistani jihadi organisations, which have joined the IIF, have been active in Indian territory since 1993. Their activities started long before the IIF came into existence in February,1998, and have picked up momentum since then. Jihadi suicide terrorism made its appearance in J&K only after the formation of the IIF.They first infiltrated into Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in large numbers between 1993 and 1998 and subsequently spread to other parts of India---either from J&K or directly from Pakistan via Dubai, Dhaka or Kathmandu. They operate in J&K through their own Pakistani cadres as well as through Kashmiri Muslims recruited and trained in camps in Pakistani territory. They operate in other parts of India through Indian Muslims recruited with the help of organisations such as the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) as well as through sympathetic members of the Indian Muslim diaspora in the Gulf recruited directly by these organisations. The Kashmiris recruited by them are taken to Pakistan for training overland across the Line of Control (LOC). The non-Kashmiri Muslims recruited by them are taken to Pakistan for training by air via Dubai or Dhaka or Kathmandu. While the Pakistani Muslims are in the forefront of the terrorist movement in J&K, non-Kashmiri Indian Muslims still play an important role in other parts of India---with the role of the Pakistani Muslims remaining as motivators and providers of training facilities, arms, ammunition and explosives and funds. 10. While Al Qaeda as an organisation is not yet active in Indian territory, its influence on the evolution and spread of jihadi terrorism in Indian territory is palpable. This could be seen in the trend towards hero-worshipping of bin Laden in small sections of the Muslim youth, particularly in Mumbai; a greater interest in Al Qaeda's ideology and goal but not yet active support for it by small sections of the Muslim youth; an identification with the foreign policy postures of Al Qaeda, which are marked by a strong hostility to the US and Israel; a trend towards an emulation of the MO used by Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations in other countries; and a growing indifference to the impact on public opinion of their acts of terrorism.2

Amresh kumar,terrorism,www.terrorresearch.com

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11. The emulation of Al Qaeda's MO is the most worrisome aspect of the evolving jihadi terrorism situation in India. Among examples of such emulation, one could mention the gravitation from the use of hand-held weapons to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs); an increasing number of suicide and fidayeen attacks; increasing dependence on selffabricated explosives; increasing use of the Internet for communication, propaganda and other operational purposes; use of the mobile telephone as a trigger for detonating IEDs and selection of targets for attacks.3 12. Al Qaeda's influence on the selection of targets could be seen in the attacks on soft targets; indiscriminate killing of civilians; attacks on capabilities and human beings; orchestrated attacks on public transport and the terrorists' reported plans to focus in future on targets of economic and strategic importance such as tourism, information technology companies etc. 13. With bin Laden clubbing India together with the US and Israel as common enemies of Islam, possible targeting of American and Israeli nationals, establishments and interests in Indian territory is a possibility not to be under-estimated.4 14. Counter-terrorism has the following components: intelligence collection, analysis, assessment and co-ordinated follow-up action; rural and urban policing; physical security; and crisis management. The first three components play a preventive and protective role. The last component limits the damage if the preventive and protective role fails. In any counterterrorism strategy, the strengthening of all the four capabilities should receive equal attention and they should work together in such a manner that even if one fails, the others can neutralise the terrorists and the damage sought to be caused by them.5 15. The unearthing of a large number of jihadi cells in different parts of the country speaks well of the alertness and competence of the intelligence agencies. At the same time, the increasing frequency with which the jihadi organisations have been able to carry out terrorist strikes indicates continuing inadequacies in the preventive capability of the agencies. The

Ibid ibid ibid

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setting-up of a dedicated task force on Counter-terrorism to identify, inter alia, the inadequacies and suggest actions to remove them is the urgent need of the hour. 16. Effective rural and urban policing too has an important role to play in preventive counter-terrorism. Vigorous and sustained police patrolling, intensive police-community relations and local enquiries by the police provide valuable tactical intelligence. Successful investigation of terrorist incidents resulting in conviction has a deterrent effect on terrorism. We should not uncritically emulate American or Israeli counter-terrorism methods, which treat terrorism as a threat to be combated through military methods and not as a phenomenon to be tackled at various levels---political, economic, social and law and order.Historically, Indian counter-terrorism has always been based on the principle that except in the areas adjoining our international borders, in the rest of India, the Police should be the weapon of first resort and the army should be only the weapon of last resort, if the police is overwhelmed. This principle has served us well and should continue to govern our counterterrorism strategy. At the same time, it has to be admitted that there are indicators of inadequacies in our police administration and investigative capabilities. The state of the police administration in the areas affected by terrorism needs to be looked into by the proposed task force. The present police stations are too unwieldy with a large, unmanageable jurisdiction and with inadequate staff. We need police stations with a small jurisdiction and adequate staff---well trained, well motivated and well informed. 17. While we should not uncritically emulate the over-militarised American and Israeli methods of dealing with terrorism, we should emulate their excellent methods of data mining and storage. A good data base is the starting point of effective counter-terrorism. Our databases on terrorism are more in the heads of individual officers and not in the form of wellmaintained records to which all counter-terrorism agencies can have equal access.6 18. Physical security is as important as intelligence collection and policing. An ideal physical security mechanism should be so effective that it can thwart a terrorist strike even if intelligence fails---as it is often bound to. Intelligence agencies, however capable, cannot provide a 100 per cent coverage. There will be gaps in their coverage and, unfortunately, failures too. If physical security is tight, a terrorist attack can still be thwarted or neutralised even in the absence of preventive intelligence. Examples are the attack on our Parliament in
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ibid

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December,2001, on the Akshardam temple in Ahmedabad in September,2002, and on the Ram temple at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh in July,2005. All these incidents could have turned into catastrophies but for the alert physical security personnel, who neutralised the attacks despite being taken by surprise.7 19. We have well laid-out crisis management drills to deal with situations such as hijacking, hostage-taking, use of IEDs etc. A drill can be effective only if it is frequently rehearsed and fine-tuned keeping pace with the improvements in the MO of the terrorists. The hijacking of an aircraft of the Indian Airlines by Pakistani jihadi terrorists to Kandahar in December,1999, and the unprofessional manner it was handled showed that having a detailed drill on paper alone is not sufficient. It has to be frequently rehearsed so that all the potential participants in the drill know their role and perform it almost instinctively. Crisis management is even more important and complex in the case of new terrorism such as WMD terrorism, cyber terrorism, maritime terrorism, terrorism directed at energy security etc. These drills relating to new terrorism are based largely on theoretical visualisation of likely scenarios and not on actual experience and the insights and lessons drawn therefrom. These drills need to be constantly re-visited in order to identify omissions and rectify them. It is said that in a crisis there is always one more thing to do and one more thing to be thought of. This is particularly true of crisis management drills to deal with acts of new terrorism. One has to keep trying to identify that one more thing to be done or to be thougt of.8 20. The most lethal weapons used by the global jihadi terrorists are explosives, the mobile telephones and the Internet. To be able to counter their use of these innovations and to enable the police and other counter-terrorism agencies to use them even better than the terrorists, it is important to enlist the services of our S&T community. There cannot be effective counterterrorism in future without the active involvement of our scientists and technologists. 21. There is a need for new intelledctual tools to counter terrorism. Possible examples of such tools: Reverse analysis, that is, analysing a situation not only as a counter-terrorism expert would do, but also as a terrorist would do; scenario visualisation; counter-terrorism games similar to war games in respect of State adversaries; and preparation of terrorism-indicators to assist the intelligence agencies and the police stations similar to the war indicators prepared in respect of State adversaries.
7 8

ibid ibid

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22. The oxygen for jihadi terrorism in India comes from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Their intelligence agencies and armed forces are actively, but clandestinely involved in keeping the capabilities of the jihadi terrorist organisations sustained so that they continue to bleed us and keep large parts of the country destabilised. Their intelligence agencies keep constantly reexamining their MO in order to ensure that they can keep the jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory sustained without damaging the deniability of their sponsorship of jihadi terrorism.There are indications of a change in the MO of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). While it continues to help the terrorists in J&K, whom it looks upon as freedom-fighters, directly across the LOC, it has been helping the jihadi terrorists operating in the Indian territory outside J&K, whom it cannot project as freedom-fighters, through Bangladesh, where organisations such as the HUM, the HUJI and the LET have set up a wellorganised jihadi terrorist infrastructure. 23. For travel to and from Pakistan for training by the non-Kashmiri Muslims, it has been advising them to avoid Dubai, which they were using in the past, and to come via Teheran instead.They go to Teheran ostensibly on pilgrimage with regular visas and then proceed to the training camps in Pakistan by road, thereby not creating a paper trail. 24. In the past, the Pakistani intelligence agencies were using Bangladesh and Nepal for providing financial and logistic support to their intelligence collection and terrorism operations in India. Since 2004, they have started using Sri Lanka too. 25. However effective the capabilities of our counter-terrorism agencies, they cannot totally stop the Pakistan-sponsored and Bangladesh-aided jihadi terrorism, unless their sources of oxygen supply are cut off. The initiative for this has to come from our political leadership. There cannot be a professional operational initiative without a political initiative.

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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TERRORIST AND INSURGENT A key difference is that an insurgency is a movement - a political effort with a specific aim. This sets it apart from both guerilla warfare and terrorism, as they are both methods available to pursue the goals of the political movement. Another difference is the intent of the component activities and operations of insurgencies versus terrorism. There is nothing inherent in either insurgency or guerilla warfare that requires the use of terror. While some of the more successful insurgencies and guerilla campaigns employed terrorism and terror tactics, and some developed into conflicts where terror tactics and terrorism became predominant; there have been others that effectively renounced the use of terrorism. The deliberate choice to use terrorism considers its effectiveness in inspiring further resistance, destroying government efficiency, and mobilizing support. Although there are places where terrorism, guerilla warfare, and criminal behavior all overlap, groups that are exclusively terrorist, or subordinate "wings" of insurgencies formed to specifically employ terror tactics, demonstrate clear differences in their objectives and operations. Disagreement on the costs of using terror tactics, or whether terror operations are to be given primacy within the insurgency campaign, have frequently led to the "urban guerilla" or terrorist wings of an insurgency splintering off to pursue the revolutionary goal by their own methods .The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved Terrorism does not attempt to challenge government forces directly, but acts to change perceptions as to the effectiveness or legitimacy of the government itself. This is done by ensuring the widest possible knowledge of the acts of terrorist violence among the target audience. Rarely will terrorists attempt to "control" terrain, as it ties them to identifiable locations and reduces their mobility and security. Terrorists as a rule avoid direct confrontations with government forces. A guerilla force may have something to gain from a clash with a government combat force, such as proving that they can effectively challenge the military effectiveness of the government. A terrorist group has nothing to gain from such a clash. This is not to say that they do not target military or security forces, but that they will not engage in anything resembling a "fair fight", or even a "fight" at all. Terrorists use methods that neutralize the strengths of conventional forces. Bombings and mortar attacks on civilian targets where military or security personnel spend

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off-duty time, ambushes of undefended convoys, and assassinations of poorly protected individuals are common tactics.

INDIA AND TERRORISM 1. SOCIAL ASPECT

PROOFS ABOUT BAD IMPACT ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT & SOCIALIZATION DUE TO TERRORISM9
It is a matter of everyday now that we hear; there was a terrorist attack somewhere in the world & due to which the Economy of that country was affected in a negative manner & people of that country stopped investing

etc. Now these terrorist attacks jolt the economy of the country from its roots, from Government to a small school going child everyone is affected because of Terrorist attacks.

Among the blizzard of reactions to the September 7 bomb blasts in Delhi, the one allegedly aired in a classroom in Jamia Millia Islamia was truly shocking. On that day, P K Basu, an honorary management professor, parroted the anti-Islamic rhetoric of the West, declaring to his class that Islam "sanctioned" violence. Basu, who later denied the charges, has since been banished from jamia.

The professor did it openly but the scenario is not uncommon. After every blast, Muslims face a fresh wave of hate-mongering, taunts and vilification. In Mumbai too, the numerous terror attacks have forced the community to reconcile to the fact that Muslims must carry the albatross of being "sympathisers" of terrorists, if not actual terrorists themselves.

A few days after Kasab's terror attack on Mumbai, a Muslim journalist visited a an event in an art gallery in South Mumbai. Looking at the journo's card, the manager remarked,
9

www.terrorism.com

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"Terrorists are not allowed." Sensing the pain he had caused, he quickly added, "I was joking. Please come in." "That was a cruel joke I will never forget," recalls the scribe.

Mohammed Altaf, who works with a multinational company, saw the attitude of his colleagues change after the July 13 bomb blasts in Mumbai. "A co-worker told me. 'Yeh sab tum logon ki wajah se hota hai (All this is happening because of you people),' " he says ruefully. Another Muslim had to endure an entire train journey listening to an angry copassenger say that Hindu youngsters would have to "keep pistols to deal with these Pakistanis" (read Muslims).

"Muslims undeniably carry the guilt that Muslim terrorists are wreaking suffering on innocents," says Salim Alware, convener of the Federation of Muslim NGOs in Maharashtra. "Even if the involvement of Muslim terrorists is not proved, the impression is that Islamic terrorists are behind all blasts." The Federation strongly condemned the September 7 Delhi blasts through a press conference and keeps a banner saying 'We condemn the bomb blasts' always at hand

The need to repeatedly condemn every act of terrorism shows the pit of fear that Muslims have fallen into: the fear of being maligned and framed. The practice began after the Mumbai train blasts of July 2006 with a big conference being held at KC College. Thereafter, Muslim clerics, especially those belonging to Jamiatul Ulema-e-Hind, held a series of anti-terrorism conferences. Exactly a year after the terrorist attacks on the Taj and Trident, an international conference against terrorism was held at the Taj. Even Islamic seminary Darul Uloom Deoband sounded a fatwa against terrorism.

Today it has become a ritual to hold a conference against terrorism immediately after every attack. "Take the speeches made on Ganpati visarjan day at the podium created near Nagpada junction to welcome Ganesh bhakts," says Maulana Mustaqeem Azmi, president of Jamiatul Ulema-e-Hind (Maharashtra). "Hindu speakers invariably talked of Bappa's blessings and raised slogans like 'Ganpati bappa moraya'. But almost all Muslim speakers said they wanted the culprits of the Delhi high court bomb blasts hanged outside Parliament House. This betrays the fear in the Muslim psyche."

Azmi gives his own example. "A few months ago, I was going from Nagpada to Haj House,"
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he recalls. "It was raining heavily and I saw a young man with a briefcase standing near the JJ Hospital junction. When he put out a hand, I stopped but apologised that I couldn't give him a ride because I didn't know him." The story of Ghulam Yahya, the imam of Haj House who was accused of sheltering terror suspects a few years ago, was at the back of Azmi's mind. "What if the youth was a suspect and I got framed too for sheltering him even if just for a few minutes?" he asks.

The antennae of anti-Muslim folk also get activated after terror episodes and vitriol is spewed from different platforms. Janata Dal president Subramanian Swamy's poisonous piece in a national daily after the July 13 blasts in Mumbai titled 'How to wipe out Islamic terror' declared, "The Muslims of India can join us (in the fight against terrorism) if they genuinely feel for the Hindus. That they do I will not believe unless they acknowledge with pride that though they may be Muslims, their ancestors were Hindus."

"It was an open humiliation of Muslims and an attempt to create discord among communities. Yet the police ignored it," protests former vice-chairman of Maharashtra state minorities' commission Abraham Mathai, who petitioned the high court after the police refused to lodge a complaint. Little wonder, therefore, that most Muslims now dread their own shadow and feel the need to reiterate their patriotism at every opportunity.

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2. LEGAL ASPECT

Chronology of major incidents Chronology of major incidents

Western India Mumbai

Mumbai has been the most preferred target for most terrorist organizations, primarily the separatist forces from Kashmir. Over the past few years a series of attacks including explosions in local trains in July 2006, to the most recent and unprecedented attacks of 26 November, 2008, where two of the prime hotels, a landmark train station and a jewish Chabad house, in south Mumbai, were attacked and sieged. Terrorist attacks in Mumbai include:* 12 March 1993 - Series of 13 bombs go off killing 257 6 December 2002 - Bomb goes off in a bus in Ghatkopar killing 2 27 January 2003 - Bomb goes off on a bicycle in Vile Parle killing 1 14 March 2003 Bomb goes off in a train in Mulund killing 10 28 July 2003 - Bomb goes off in a bus in Ghatkopar killing 4 25 August 2003 - Two Bombs go off in cars near the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar killing 50 11 July 2006 - Series of seven bombs go off in trains killing 209 26 November 2008 to 29 November 2008 - Coordinated series of attacks killing at least 172.

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TERRORIST GROUP
1.AL-BADAR 2.AL QAUDEA 3.ALL TRIPURA TIGER FORCE 4.BABBAR KHALSA 5.DEENDAR ANJUMAN 6.HARKAT UL JIHAD UL ISLAMI 7.HIZAB UB TAHRIA 8.ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION 9.JAISH-E-MOHAMMED 10.MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on Dec 13,2001 made every leader vulnerable to any such attack and the urgency of taking measures against growth terrorism became more serious. On Sept. 21, 2002 the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution seeking all nations to enact laws to curb terrorism. The U.K. had already passed Anti -Terrorism Act 2002 and India followed her by issuing Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) on Oct 25, 200l. The promulgation of POTO triggered boisterous debate and controversy in different segments of the political arena. The opposition stated it to be the black mark in the ruling coalition's way of governance. The main point of opposing the POTO was the fear of misuse of the ordinance, as experienced in case of TADA(Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act) and other such detention laws enacted earlier which were grossly abused to suppress the voice
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and views of the political opponents, The so called advocates of minority communities, were raised lot of hue and cry on the grounds. After independence several such laws were passed by the Union and State legislatures as per the requirements or whims of the ruling party, for varying purposes like Prevention of Detention Act 1950, Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1980. Terrorist and Disruptive Act 1985. POTO the ordinance was promulgated to a create a feeling of fear of gross penalties in the minds of terrorists and their accomplices, after an attack was made on Indian Parliament, later on became an Act in 2002, popularly called Prevention of Terrorism Act POT A.

POTA10
Under the prevailing situation of growing terrorism in the country and world wide none could dispute the necessity of appropriate laws to curb the terrorism. Surely, the safety and security of the nation is of paramount importance and when the neighboring countries are supporting and mobilizing the terrorism in our country, It is but natural to have some dreaded laws to tackle such a threatening situation. Though in a large democratic country like India, many times opposition is made only for the sake of opposition, yet for any act to be acceptable, must have reasonable fringes so that innocents are not made the victim to square up one's political or personal scores. The Act does not de tine the term 'terrorism', which caused a fear of misuse among the minority community particularly. Section 3 (8) and 14 of POT A attracted strong protests of National Human Rights Commission and the media in general. Under these Sections an accused can be imprisoned up to one year or be fined or both penalties be imposed, if the accused is filed without reasonable cause to disclose any information in his possession which could prevent a terrorist attack. The journalists feared that this provision can well be used against them.

10

www.vakilno1.com

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Under this Act, the Central government has power to notify any organization as practicing terrorists activities, by naming such an organization in the schedule under the Act. This provision can also be misused, feared by the minority community In order to avoid and prevent the misuse of POT A, the Central"Government titled a review committed headed by former justice Arun B.Saharya, under on60 of the Act, to take a comprehensive view of the use of POT A in various and come up with its findings and suggestions to ensure that the Act was invoked tally for combating the terrorism and not against an ordinary criminal under section of POT A, the Central and State Governments shall wherever necessary constitute committee for the purpose of the Act. The broad power of review is provided Section 19 and it relates exclusively to the review committee appointed by the Government. Under the Provisions of Section 19, an organization can be field from the lists of terrorists organization. Recently an amendment to POT A was passed in the Lok Sabha to prevent and the misuse of POT A. It is important to note that MDMK leader Mr. Vaiko was jailed by Jaylalitha government under POT A. Mr Vaiko's crime was to allegedly express support for the L TTE designated as a terrorist organization. On the same day the Supreme Court delivered a judgment whereby upholding the validity of the law, but at the same time laid down a host of guidelines about the way the Act should be read. One can't be charged under POT A unless it is proved that the accused has the criminal intention of aiding terrorist organization. While that may get Mr. Vaiko off the Jayalalitha hook, the law still remains open to abuse. How does one for example detern1ine when similar verbal support for outlawed groups became full blown 'aid" Does the hosting of lectures or rallies in support of the Jaish-E-Moharnmed for instance amount to support or aid? The Apex court also upheld that individuals can't withhold information about terrorists activities, can one be sure that there won't be a repeat of the fiasco that involved Delhi University lecturer S.A.R. Geelani ? POTA despite the removal of a fang, here and there, remains a flawed law. In Indian perspective POTA is misused less, but got criticized much and in a democracy where opposition is always in search of an opportunity to criticizer the ruling party it is inevitable. The much hype raised by minority community that most of the accused under POT A belongs to minority community, it also reflects that the criminals of minority

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community receive support from their clan members in India. Can we imagine without direct or indirect support from here, can anyone from out side commit any act of terrorism ? If it is not termed as impossible, then can be termed as difficult task. India is a secular country where everyone has the right to follow religion of his choice, but every citizen must feel its duty towards the nation and do not forget that Nation is on priority over the religion. The politicians who misuse POTA to score their personal vendetta must realize that politics of vengeance never pays in long run. In a nutshell POTA is the necessity of hour but it must not be misused. Nations safety and security has paramount priorities and POTA is meant to make the nation safe, secure and united.

TADA11

India has the lengthiest constitution in the world, with a section on fundamental rights. It has a Supreme Court, which prides itself in influencing the transformation of a primitive society into a progressive one and which treats the constitution as a living organism rather than a rigid framework. It has made some landmark decisions in the protection of rights, which have attracted the admiration of leading jurists around the world. The Constitution of India safeguards many fundamental rights (Part 3 articles 13 35 Indian Constitution). These include the life and liberty of the person (article 21) and the freedom of expression (article 19) However, article 21 which insures that no person shall be deprived of there life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, was suspended during 1987 for a period of 2 years in the Punjab by the 59th amendment of the constitution. This was later repealed. During this period the Indian security services were deemed to have to have a licence to kill.

11

ibid

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Thus it must be noted that provisions that provide for the government to suspend them, restrict them and even alter them, weaken the fundamental character of fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution. From the outset of the rise of the modern movement of Sikh nationalists in the early 1980s, the Indian state has sought to break such movements by any means and responded by introducing the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act 1987 (TADA). The Act established special courts or designated courts to try those arrested for terrorist acts and disruptive activities. It conferred broad discretion upon the authorities to arrest persons and to try them. One of the most important points about TADA was the effect it had on the population of Punjab, it erased the distinction between violent and peaceful protests. Under the definition used in TADA, the state saw it self justified in ordering police forces to break up demonstrations and detain thousands of people, particularly those connected with political organisations, however weak those connections are. Under TADA a person could be detained, without charge or trial for suspicion of belonging to, supporting or having knowledge of militant groups. The police were given strong search and seizure powers under the Act, they could indict any person on the basis of suspicion. Once indicted under TADA, the accused would be tried by a special court under extraordinary procedures. In such trials, protections normally available to an accused in a liberal society would be ignored. Once under trial the accused could be convicted on the basis of minimal evidence that would have been insufficient for conviction by an ordinary court under normal Indian law. Under Section 15, a confession allegedly voluntarily made before a police officer, not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police, and recorded by such police officer in writing or by using any mechanical device such as audio cassettes and video tapes, was admissible in court against an accused (or co-accused, abettor or conspirator) for an offence under this Act. There were widespread allegations that police routinely used torture to obtain confessions from detainees and/or planted evidence as a means of detaining them under TADA. Preventative detention legislation facilitates custodial torture and places detainees at the risk of very serious harm. For example TADA permitted detention in judicial custody for up to a year (2 years in Punjab) without formal charges (s 20 (4)(b)). Bail was not allowed as of
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right; a magistrate had to be convinced of the innocence of the prisoner before it was granted and imposed a mandatory five-year sentence for those convicted of terrorist related activities in Camera (in private) trials and identity of witnesses was kept secret, so that no cross examination of them was allowed. It is to be noted that terrorism was defined very widely, including those who conspire or attempt to commit or advocate, abet, advise, incite or knowingly facilitate the commission of a terrorist act or any act prepatory thereof (s 3) or harbouring or conceal terrorists (s 4), were treated as such for the purpose of the Act. This included attending a meeting or participating in a peaceful demonstration that challenged the territorial integrity of India. disruptive activities are so broadly phrased that they encompass peaceful expression of political or other conscientiously held views. The government used TADA as a tool to fight trade unions and to detain Muslims, Sikhs, Dalits, and political opponents. Over 76,000 people were arrested while TADA was in force from 1987 to 1995. The conviction rate for these arrests was less than two percent. In the period since 1987 to its repeal in 1995, some 17,544 (The Tribune 1.6.94) persons suspected of terrorist activities were detained in Punjab under its provisions. However, no one has ever been convicted under section 3, which defines a terrorist and only 1.8% of those detained under T.A.D.A have been convicted. Although TADA lapsed in May 1995 after immense international pressure from the organs of the United Nations and non-governmental organisations, it has been given retroactive effect and people are still being charged and held according to its provisions. People in Punjab and other States of India continue to be charged under TADA retrospectively and continue to be harassed under it. In addition, the position is that those wanted in connection with offences committed whilst TADA was in operation are subject to its provisions. In addition there are further legislation permitting pre-trial detention of those suspected of involvement with militant activities on very loosely defined grounds of national security. These include the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act allowing the security forces wide powers of arrest, to conduct searches without warrant and prohibiting a detainee from being legally represented when an Advisory Board conducts review of the detention period. Reasons for the detention do not have to be disclosed if it is not in the public interest to do so.
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Further, the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Court) Act amends the Indian Evidence Act so that when a person accused of committing an offence can be shown to be in an area where firearms or explosives were used against the security forces, they are considered to be presumed guilty if an offence and must rebut the presumption at trial. The majority of those detained under TADA were released on bail on the orders of the Supreme Court and cases were reviewed by the "Review Committees" which often recommended release. According to official figures, as of December 1999 TADA charges against almost 24,000 people had been dropped as a result of such reviews.

TADA v/s POTA12


POTA and TADA are not identical Acts. TADA also covers the disruptive activities while POTA covers only the terrorism activities. POTA allows appeals against rejection of bail in High Court while a detainee under TADA,could appeal before the Supreme Court only. POTA also lessen the victim's rigors beyond the first year of detention and reduces the period of detention without a charge sheet. POTA's scope extends beyond the terrorist to terrorists organizations and their supporters and accomplices who by definition are not terrorists, but supports the terrorists indirectly. The POT A empowers the government to tap telephone and other communication medias of the accused. Government could also confiscate the proceeds and remunerations of the accused, he received for committing acts of terrorism. As such POT A has more harsh and ruthless provisions than T ADA to some extent

12

www.jurisonline.com

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JUDICIAL VIEW

Malimath

Committee

On

Criminal

Justice

Reforms

The Malimath Committee on criminal justice reforms has opined that some of the intrinsic merits of the Inquisitorial System(followed in France, Germany and other Continental countries) can be incorporated into the Adversarial System (presently followed in India) in order to make it more effective. This includes the duty of the Court to search for truth, to assign a proactive role to the judges, to give directions to the investigating officers and prosecution agencies in the matter of investigation and leading evidence with the object of seeking the truth and focusing on justice to victims. The committee had further recommended that Courts should resort to a paradigm shift in the standard of proof, in which the standard of proof should be higher than preponderance of probabilities and lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt described in different ways, the proof should be one of a 'clear and convincing' standard in order to increase the conviction rate. It is further imperative that the victim should have a right to be represented by an advocate of his choice and thereby produce evidence, both and documentary.

Case Law - S. Srinivasa Vs. M/s Deccan Petroleum Ltd. 2001 Cri LJ 659 The court said where the order of refusal to issue summons for production of document was prejudicial to accused then such order is not sustainable. The most important part of the section says that the power to take samples is not given to the police authorities but when a police officer investigating a case requests a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to obtain samples of any accused person reasonably suspected to be involved in the commission of this act and then if only the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate gives the order to obtain such samples its only then
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he can force the accused to give such samples. If any accused person refuses to give such samples the court shall only then draw adverse inference against the accused.13

Case Law- Sanjay Duttt Vs. State through C.B.I 1994 SCC 410 The expression possession though that of section 5 of Tada has been stated to mean a conscious possession introducing thereby involvement of a mental element i.e. conscious possession & not mere custody without awareness of nature of such possession and as regards unauthorized means and regards without any authority of law.14 CASE OF 26/1115 Last year, the trial court handling 26/11 acquitted two Indians - Faheem Ansari, Sabahuddin Shaikh - who were accused of helping the 26/11 terrorists to plan their attack against Mumbai. The government had appealed against their acquittal, but in this matter too, the High Court has agreed with the trial court's decision

13 14

www.terrorismcase.in ibid

15

http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/death-for-kasab-says-bombay-high-court-he-killed-kamtesalaskar-karkare-86751&cp

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CONCLUSION
Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim. The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the publics or governments reaction to the act. For example, in 1972 at the Munich Olympics, the Black September Organization killed 11 Israelis. The Israelis were the immediate victims. But the true target was the estimated 1 billion people watching the televised event.

The Black September Organization used the high visibility of the Olympics to publicize its
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views on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Similarly, in October 1983, Middle Eastern terrorists bombed the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Their immediate victims were the 241 U.S. military personnel who were killed and over 100 others who were wounded. Their true target was the American people and the U.S. Congress. Their one act of violence influenced the United States decision to withdraw the Marines from Beirut and was therefore considered a terrorist success.

There are three perspectives of terrorism: the terrorists, the victims, and the general publics. The phrase one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter is a view terrorists themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for what they believe in, by whatever means possible. A victim of a terrorist act sees the terrorist as a criminal with no regard for human life. The general publics view is the most unstable. The terrorists take great pains to foster a Robin Hood image in hope of swaying the general publics point of view toward their cause. This sympathetic view of terrorism has become an integral part of their psychological warfare and needs to be countered vigorously. Industrial design rights are intellectual property rights that make exclusive the visual design of objects that are not purely utilitarian. An industrial design consists of the creation of a shape, configuration or composition of pattern or colour, or combination of pattern and colour in three dimensional forms containing aesthetic value. An industrial design can be a two- or three-dimensional pattern used to produce a product, industrial commodity or handicraft. Under the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs, a WIPO-administered treaty, a procedure for an international registration exists. An applicant can file for a single international deposit with WIPO or with the national office in a country party to the treaty. The design will then be protected in as many member countries of the treaty as desired. "Terrorism"-the word itself is horrifying, though it is a world wide disturbing phenomenon but also in India it has become a hindrance in the progress of the nation. Terrorism- a name give to the violent acts performed by some groups to get things done, which are against the law. The Main causes of this are: -.

1) Poverty, 2) Illiteracy, 3) Unemployment and 4) Putting once interest prior to social Welfare.

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An individual who is poor, not able to get proper meal per day, and if this individual is promised money, food and shelter by some people who want to disturb the peace of the nation. The poor will do anything to get his life changed if he has suffered a lot. He might just become the next SUICIDE BOMBER, if some one promises his family proper food.

Although, The position of India on the basis of terrorism index has declined from 16 to 18 th position (according to a recent survey by mapplecroft). But still there is a long way to go, unless we fight the terrorism in our country like ULFA, Maoists. The tranquility would remain disturbed. So, we as citizens have to be vigil too, and not leave everything to the government.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 1.http///:terroreffect.com.www 2.kumar amerash,http//:terrorresearch.com.www 3.http///:vakilno1.in.www 4.http///:jurisonline.in.www 5wright Lawrence,the looming light,2010,pg no-320 6.Ballen ken,terrorists in love:the real lives of islam 7. Clarke, Richard A : Against all enemies. ( Free Press, New York, 2004) (NHRC LIB) 8. Dewan, Vijay Kumar : Law relating to terrorists. (Capital Law House, Delhi, 1993) (NHRC LIB)

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