Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites Author(s): Nilfer Gle Source: Middle East

Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp. 46-58 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329022 . Accessed: 08/10/2011 18:30
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SECULARISMAND ISLAMISMIN TURKEY: THE MAKING OF ELITES AND COUNTER-ELITES

Niluifer Gole

There is an inherentpower conflict between secular modernist elites and Islamist elites in Turkeytoday, which is fueled by two differentworldviewsand life-styles. politics, the opportunity for However, because of the inclusionarynature of Turkish social mobility, and the prevalent freedom of speech, Islamist movements have developed their own educated, technical and intellectual elites which resemble the secular modernistelites they criticize and oppose. Thisprocess of eliteformation in turnleads to defacto secularization,independently from the intentionsof the actors, as religion and professional careers follow separate and distinct paths.

the his articleis an attemptto understand contemporary debatebetween Islamismand secularism from the perspective of the formation and circulationof elites and counterelites. The concept of elite is used here to refer to those new social groups such as intellectuals and the technical intelligentsia (engineers and technicians)' which, through secular and modem education, have acquired a "culturalcapital,"2namely, a universal
Nilufer Gole is Professor of Sociology at Bogazi i Universityin Istanbul.She is a fellow at Wissenschaftskolleg (Institute AdvancedStudies) in Berlin during the 1996-97 academic year. Her book on Islamic veiling, The for ForbiddenModem, is published by the Universityof Michigan Press, 1996. 1. Alvin W. Gouldner claims that a "new class," committed to knowledge and the acquisition of technicalskills, is growing in the ThirdWorldas well as in the firstworld of late capitalism.Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979). 2. In the analysis of Frenchsocial scientist PierreBourdieu,there are differentforms of capitalthatgive strength,power and profitto their owner. Among these, Bourdieudistinguishes"economic capital"(convertible MIDDLE EASTJOURNAL VOLUME NO. 1, WINTER * 51, 1997

AND ISLAMISM 47 * SECULARISM

of scientific language and professional skills. "Islamism"indicates the reappropriation a Muslim identityand values as a basis for an alternativesocial and political agenda(to that of the state). "Muslim" is not synonymous with "Islamist,"in the sense that the first expresses a religious identity and the latter implies a political consciousness and social action. Accordingly, Islamist counter-elitescan be both actors in the Islamist movements and professionals and intellectualsaspiringfor political power. Islamism, however, does not only denote membershipin an Islamistpolitical organization,but also suggests a sense of belonging and a group identity. The Turkish experience allows for an in-depth analysis of the conflict between secularistsand Islamists.The reason is thatTurkeyhas had a very long traditionof ruling elites which, since the end of the 19th century, have been engaged in reforming, modernizing and secularizing Turkish society while Islamists have challenged this essentially Western model of change. Since the establishmentof an Islamist party, the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) in 1970, Turkish Islamism has been system. This incorporatedinto the political system and legitimatedby the parliamentary as the Refah Partisi(WelfareParty,RP), is currentlythe seniorpartner party,known today of a coalition governmentformed in July 1996.3 Turkeyis a unique example in the Middle East where such a radicalpolitical change in the natureof the governing elites can take place peacefully and by democraticmeans. Democracy has been successful in Turkey; it has been internalizedas a set of shared the values by Turks and has become the norm of political behavior.Furthermore, liberal of administration PresidentTurgutOzal (1983-91) introducedthe institutionsof a market economy and the privatizationof the mass media. As a consequence, civil society and associative life have expanded, and non-governmentalorganizationshave proliferated.4 These developments have taken place amid a lively public debate on issues of religious and ethnic identity, national unity, secularism and democratic pluralism. In short, the debate between the secularistKemalist5elites and the religious Islamist counter-eliteson the direction of social and culturalchange in Turkey is taking place in an environment accustomedto electoralpolitics andpublic debatesthatshape public opinion and influence
into money), from "culturalcapital"(conferredby educationalcredentialsand institutions),and "social capital" (achieved social connections and group membership),from "symbolic capital" (legitimated capital, source of prestige). Pierre Bourdieu,La Noblesse d'Etat. Grandes Ecoles et Esprit de Corps (The Nobility of the State. The Big Schools of Public Administrationand their Esprit de Corps) (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1989). 3. This process of legitimationdid not take place gradually;the military interventionsof 1960, 1971 this and 1980 interrupted process. But after each militarycoup, a returnto democracytook place, and the same political partieswere re-establishedunderdifferentnames but with the same leaders and organizations.In 1970, the Milli Nizam Partisi (National OrderParty,NOP) was establishedby those who left the center-rightAdalet Partisi(Justice Party).After being bannedby the militarycoup in 1971, the NOP was re-establishedin 1972 as the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) which participatedin two coalition governments from 1974-75. With the militarycoup of 1980, political partieswere bannedonce again. This time, the Islamistparty, which was legalized a second time in 1983, has continued to exist under the name of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party,RP). In the last municipalelections of 27 March 1994, the RP increasedits shareof the total votes to 19.09 percent,and in the last generalelections of 25 December 1995, received 21.3 percentof the total nationalvotes. 4. On the development of civil societal space during the last twenty years, see Binnaz Toprak,"Civil Society in Turkey,"in AugustusRichardNorton,ed., Civil Society in the MiddleEast vol. 2, (Leiden,New York, Koln: E.J. Brill, 1996), pp. 87-118. 5. Those who believe in Kemal Ataturk'sideas.

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governmentpolicies. In other words, the existence of alternativepolitical parties and the rule freedom of speech and organizationprovide the best guaranteeagainst authoritarian and totalitarianpractices. This articlediscusses four majorpropositions:first,that secularism,as a non-Muslim way of life, has contributedto the making of the politically dominant Kemalist elites; elites in Muslim second, that since secularism is often implemented by authoritarian countries,thereis a potentialconflict of interestbetween democracyand secularism;third, thatalthoughIslamismas a political movementchallenges the secularstate, secularization has shaped the identities and practices of the new Islamist actors;and fourth,that it is in the widening of the public sphereof debatebetween Islamistsand seculariststhatthe basic principles of democracy are defined. Disputes over life-styles, exposure of the self, expressions of art-in short body-politics-have become central to the political debate between the two groups. AND THE MAKINGOF THE MODERNIST ELITES SECULARISM Secularism and positivism are the two pillars of the Turkish modernization experiencethatbegan in the 19thcenturyand reachedits institutionaland ideological peak in 1923. Although positivism and secularism are the product of Western concepts of science and politics, they have acquired different meanings and roles in non-Western, Muslim contexts. Positivism is a universal model only when it serves to dissociate Western modernity from a particularisticculture or religion and is perceived to be a rational mode of thinking and acting applicable to all societies. Positivism served to legitimize the Turkish Republican elites' modernization attempts. From the "Young Turks"6 onwards,the secularvision of history shapedby the positivism of Auguste Comte provided the frame of reference for reform for progressive Turkish elites. Social engineering, seen as a corollary to positivism, became the reformistelites' model for a rationalreconstructionof Turkish society. The positivist motto of "progressand order" mirrored the views of the Turkish modernizers for a national order, without which, Ratherthan accordingto them, secularizationcould not be achieved in a Muslim country.7 Anglo-Saxon liberalism,FrenchJacobinism,with its highly centralizedmodel of change, became the prototype for reform of Turkish modernists. Hence, secularization itself became partof that process of social engineeringratherthan an outcome of the process of modernizationand societal development. or AlthoughTurkishsecularismis inspiredby the French"lalcit6,"8 the separationof church and state, religious affairsin Turkey are regulatedby the state. Furthermore, the
6. The Young Turks were a group of constitutionalists,exiled in France who founded a committee called Ittihatve TerakkiCemiyeti(Committeeof Union and Progress)and began publishingthe journalMesveret (Consultation)in 1895. The leading figureof this movement,AhmadRiza, was a radicalsecularistand positivist. See Erik J. Zurcker,Turkey:A Modern History (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 90-137. 7. M. aukrfiHanioglu,The YoungTurksin Opposition(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1996), pp. 3-32, passim. 8. The Turkish political concept laiklik is closer to the French word "lalcite" than it is to the word "secularism."For a comparison of secularism in France and Turkey, see "Laicite/Laklik:Introduction,"in

* SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM 49

state is not impartial towards all confessional groups because Sunni Islam remains implicitly the state religion, a concept that is being challenged today by the Alevis.9 It is only on the issue of taking religion out of the public sphere that French and Turkish secularismare similar.The headscarfdispute, which took place both in France,"l'affaire du foulard," and in Turkey, the "turban" issue, indicates the parallel between the two cases, and reveals the centralityof both the question of education and that of women in the debate on secularism. In France, the veiling issue was related to questions of immigration and multi-culturalism,and was basically limited to high schools. The demandsof Muslim girls to cover their heads, in accordancewith Islamic precepts,while attendingpublic schools, provokeda vigorous reactionfrom secularistsin both countries, who viewed these demands as a threatto secular public education and women's rights. of Secularizationand the disappearance religious symbols and practicesfrom public places, such as the removal of crosses from schools and courts, is a significantaspect of French secularismwhich took place graduallyduringthe Third Republic (1871-1940).10 of In Turkey,as in otherMuslim countries,secularismis consideredto be the prerequisite I Westernizationratherthan of democratization."Secularism,as a modernistideology in Turkey, is linked to the state's control of the public sphere (rigidly in the early years of the Republic, especially between 1923-46, but softening graduallyfrom the 1950s to the 1980s). Turkish secularism has meant the banning of religious orders, dress codes for at public servants,and the imposition of certaintypes of audio-visualprogramming state radio stations and television channels. Accordingto ErnestGellner, it became a "didactic moralistic and pedagogical, teaching and imposing a modern way of life. secularism:"'2 The Turkish model of secularism introduced radical institutional changes at the executive and legislative levels, such as the abolition of the Sultanateand the Caliphate in 1924; the abolitionof the Ministryof Pious Foundations,religious courts and religious titles; the adoption of a secular civil code of law from Switzerland in 1926; and the declarationthat the Turkishrepublicwas a "secularstate"by a constitutionalamendment in 1937. in Alongside these changes, secularismbecame instrumental creatingnew RepubliThis took place primarilyby means of the nationaleducationsystem, which was can elites. put under the authorityof the Ministry of Education in 1926. The state delegitimized religious education and established the supremacyof secular modern education nationwide. The building of the nation-state was thus accompanied by the centralizationof education and the formation of its nationalist elites. Reforming education in line with modernistand rationalistideals was not confined to its philosophicalcontent, but also to the mediumof education.The replacementof the Arabicscriptby the Latinscriptin 1928,
Jean-PaulBurdy and Jean Marcou,Laicite(s) en France et en Turquie (Secularism in France and in Turkey) (Paris: Cahiers d'etudes sur la Mediterraneeorientaleet le monde turco-iranien[CEMOTI],no. 19, 1995). 9. Alevis are members of a sect which is an offshoot of Shi'ism. Estimatesof their numberin Turkey range from 15-20 percent of the population. 10. Burdy and Marcou,Laicite(s) en France et en Turquie,p. 13. Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey,"in Augustus 11. Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian RichardNorton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, pp. 17-43. 12. Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981), p. 68.

EASTJOURNAL 50 * MIDDLE

the purificationof the Turkish language from Persian and Arabic influences, and the recreationof the iztfirkfe (pure Turkish) language secured by the establishmentof the TurkishLinguistic Society, Turk Dil Kurumuin 1932, created a radical break with the Ottoman past and the Ottoman elites. The Turkish language became compulsory in national education, and the use of "foreign"languages, other than Western ones, was 13 forbidden. The change of script from Arabic to Latin contributed to the consolidation of secularismas well.'4 It accomplishedthis by cutting the ties of the Turksto the language and the script of the Quran, and to the Arabic and Muslim world in general. In their endeavorto "demystify"religion, the Republicanelites encouragedthe translationof the Quraninto Turkish,and mandatedthatthe call for prayerfrom the mosques be in Turkish ratherthan in Arabic.'5 Thus, language and script reforms introduceda radical cultural shift towards the Western world both symbolically and literally. Republicanelites were the productof this new way of writing,readingand speaking. They used the Latin script, spoke "pure,""original"Turkish, without a local accent, masteredWesternlanguages(Frenchbeing graduallyreplacedby English afterthe 1950s), and referredthemselves to Westernsources in science and literature. The new Republican elites were thus cut off from their Ottomanpast, seemingly painlessly: They appearedto consider their cultural heritage cumbersome as they turned towards a new future and towards Western civilization. Language and script reforms endowed the new elites with a symbolic capital,conferringupon them legitimacy and prestige,and distinguishingthem as "progressive" in (because they were Western-oriented) contradistinction the previous to Those among the former educated elites who elites, which were judged "reactionary." could not adapt themselves to the new conditions, were disempowered, and lost their social status and authority. Such a rupturewith the earlierelites paved the way and facilitatedthe formationof new elites owing their existence and power to the Republic. As their "raisond'etre"was closely linked to the nation-state,they became the naturaltransmittersof the Kemalist ideology of progress. These new Republican elites identified themselves as ilerici Atatifrk~fi aydinlar (progressiveKemalist intellectuals),thus denoting their allegiance as intellectuals to Ataturk's reforms. Those intellectuals were not only academicians, novelists or journalists, but members of a Republican elite which was progressive, enlightened and felt responsible for improving the lot of society, and included public sector intellectualsand the political rulingelites. In short,Republicanelites were the ones endowed with cultural capital rather than financial power, who were faithful to the interestsof the nation-stateand were dedicatedto the values of secularismand progress.
13. It is ironicalto note that today English is the languageof educationin prestigiousuniversities,while Kurdishis still prohibitedin public education and in broadcasting. 14. Esra Ozyurek,"FromElifba to Alfabe: FromOttomanto Modem Turk,"paperpresentedat the 28th annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA), Phoenix, 1994. 15. The DemocratParty,which came to power in 1950, owed its popularityto removing those practices, and was denounced as counter-revolutionary the Republicanelites. by

SECULARISMAND ISLAMISM* 51

Womenand Secularism The penetration secularismin daily life is best illustratedby women's physical and of social visibility. Secularism pushed for the emancipation of women from religious practices such as veiling and the segregationof sexes. Participationof women in public life as citizens and as civil servants,and their socializationwith men, definedthe modem secular way of life and indicateda shift away from a form of social organizationframed by Islam. In Turkey's modernizingprogram,women were depicted as the buildersof a "new life," a modern way of living both in the private and the public spheres. The representativesof this modern life appearedin photographsas unveiled women, women in athletic competitions,women pilots, women professionals,and women with men, both in European clothing.'6 Even the body-language and the body-posture of the women portrayedwere differentfrom what they had been before the reforms. Advertisements, cartoons and novels depicted women in their fashionable short-cuthairstyles, Western style dresses, using new consumer products, and posing with their husbands in homes decoratedwith Western style furniture,and in public places such as theatres,restaurants, tea-rooms and streets. The modern way of living was not limited to the acquisition of of Westernconsumerproducts,but also includedthe appropriation modernvalues such as healthy living, the education of children, and equality of the sexes. Women thus became the primary conveyors of this new way of living, both in the private and the public domains. The visibility of women in public life-as students, citizens, professionals, in the city, walking hand-in-handwith their husbands, shaking hands, dining, dancing and playing sportswith men-signified a shift from a Muslim way of life to a secular,modern one. As such, modernity,in a Muslim context, acquireda genderspecific sense. Ironically, women have played a central role in the rise of Islamism as well; the veiling of women in the 1980s and 1990s has indicated the re-Islamizationof personal relations, public spaces, and daily practices. Life-Stylesand the Conflict between Secularism and Islamism Changes in life-styles and aesthetic values that reflectedthe shift from an Islamic to in a Westernculturecreatedculturaldistinctionsand social stratification Turkishsociety. More accuratelythanthe concept of "social class" thatexplains social inequalitiesin terms that of moneyed capital and economic power, the concept of "status-group" encompasses life-styles, "symbolic capital" and "habitus,"defines social stratificationat an intersubjective culturallevel.'7 According to Pierre Bourdieu,the habitus is a system of lasting,
Images of Women:the Portrayal of Womenin Photographyof the Middle 16. Sarah Graham-Brown, East, 1860-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 17. For an elaborationon the use of the concept of habitusin relationto life-styles, see PierreBourdieu, La Distinction, Critique sociale du jugement (The Difference: A Social Critique of Judgement) (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979), pp. 189-248.

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transposabledispositions, integratingpast experiences and informationhandeddown as a matrix of perceptionsand actions.'8 Hence, this author posits that it is in this realm of "habitus,"cultural codes and life-styles, thatthe power strugglebetween Republicanelites and Islamistsis takingplace. In other words, the question of life-styles is not a trivial matter of fashion, trends, and individualchoices but reveals much more complex relations of intersubjectivity,stratification, and power. One can argue that uppermiddle-class Kemalist women, in particular, but also Kemalist men, who acquired an education and a professional career, and who changed their body-language and their way of life in a "secular,"that is non-Muslim, manner,garneredprestige and social recognition, and thus acquired"symbolic capital." Ultimately, they became a distinct status group. Western, secular life-styles have distinguishedthe Republicanelites from the parochialelites attachedto more traditional, local and religious mannersand customs. Social recognition and social status, rooted in the exclusion of the Islamic life-world,'9 is the main social and political bone of contention between secularists and Islamists. Unlike groupsat the periphery,urbanmiddle and upper-middle classes in Turkeyhad access to education for several decades, and were located in the vicinity of the center of the productionof values, both in the geographicaland the symbolic sense.20They were thus able to empower themselves throughthe masteryof "Westernized" ways of life and idiom. The radical break with the local culture, under the modernizingprogramsof the Republicanists, rendered difficult the process of identificationof the rising peripheral classes with the established elites. This cultural gap between the elites of the center and those at the periphery has become anotherfeatureof the asymmetricalrealitiesof Turkishpolitics and society today. The very project of modernization,based on external references, alien to local customs and traditions,has pervertedthe relationshipbetween the secular elites and the people. The established elites no longer provide a familiar model for the newly rising social groups to identify with, and to aspire to emulate professionally. Islamism is an attemptto provide Muslims from the peripherywith a new guide of conduct for their daily lives and new forms of political expression. In a seemingly paradoxicalway, the more those peripheralgroups have access to urban life, a liberal education, and modernmeans of expressing themselves politically, the more they appear to seek Islamic sources of reference to redefine their life-world. ContemporaryIslamist movements in Turkey emerged after the 1950s and grew duringthe post-1980 period. During that same period, peripheralgroups were moving to urbancenters and gaining access to secular education and to the opportunityof upward
18. For a criticalevaluationof the concept of habitusand Bourdieu'swork, see CraigCalhoun,"Habitus, Field and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity," in Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma and Moishe Postone, eds., Bourdieu. Critical Perspectives (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 4-88. 19. Accordingto JiirgenHabermas,life-world encompassesthreestructural components:culture,society and personality.Juirgen Habermas,The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). 20. Edward A. Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975).

SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM 53 *

social mobility.2'Islamistmovementsattemptedto respondto the aspirationsof these new groups and help them come to terms with modernityin generaland with the secularelites in particular.Islamism became the political expression of a conflictual link between an Islamic-Turkishidentity and a secular Westernmodernity. The veiling of women has emerged as the most visible symbol of the Islamizationof the Turkish life-world. Islamist politics clearly define the role of the individual in the community, and the central issue has become the control of women's sexuality and the social separationof the sexes. But, in additionto that, Islamists have imposed beardsfor men, and taboos on promiscuity,homosexuality,alcohol consumption,and defined new moralist practices and the semiology of the Islamic way of life. Islamic faith and the Islamic way of life have become a reference point for the ideologization of seemingly simple social practices such as the wearing of scarfs for female students at university, the permission for prayer spaces in public buildings, the constructionof a mosque at the center of Istanbul, the segregation of the sexes in the public transportation system, the censorship on erotic art, and the discouragementof alcohol consumptionin restaurants. these issues demonstratethe way Islamists have All politicized social and culturalpractices in orderto criticize the "secularway of life."22 The conflict between Islamists and secularists is defined by different normative values, gender relations,and life-styles. Islamistsand secularistsare fightingover control of a culturalmodel of Turkishidentity which has roots in class conflict. Alain Touraine defines a social movement as a struggle for the "controlof historicity,"i.e. for a cultural model that is not separablefrom the one based on class conflict.23This authorproposes the idea that Islamic movementsare not solely a reactionto a given situationof class and culturaldomination,but also present a counter-cultural model of modernity,and a new paradigmfor self-definitionthat has led to the formationof Islamist counter-elites. THE EMERGENCE ISLAMIST OF COUNTER-ELITES Islamic oppositionalmovements are far from being monolithic-they have taken on very different meanings throughouthistory, and have varied in different political and cultural contexts. Still, one can discern certain common features among contemporary Islamist movements, throughoutthe Muslim world, that have developed since the end of the 1960s. For instance, both the leaders and the followers of Islamist movements in Egypt, Iran,Pakistan,and Turkeyare among the recentlyurbanizedand educated.In high school or at university,recent migrantsto the cities encounterthe works of contemporary Islamist thinkers, such as those of the Pakistani Abu al-'Ala' Mawdudi, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, the Iranian'Ali Shari'ati,and the TurkishAli Bulag and Ismet Ozel, who
21. Yilmaz Esmer and Muge GoNek, "Boundariesof Religious Fundamentalismin Turkey," survey conducted in Istanbuland in Konya in 1994. Paper presentedat Bogaziqi University, Ankara,May 1995. in G6le, "TheQuest for the Islamic Self Withinthe Contextof Modernity," ReqatKasabaand 22. Niliufer Sibel Bozdogan, eds., Rethinkingthe Project of Modernityin Turkey(Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, forthcoming). 23. Alain Touraine,The Voice and the Eye, An Analysis of Social Movements(translatedfrom French) (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981).

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A withoutbeing apologetic to Westernmodernity.24 return redefineIslamic "authenticity" to the original sources, the Quran,the sunna and the hadith (sayings and traditionsof the Prophet),and the "asr-i saadet"period (the age of the ProphetMuhammedand the four orthodoxcaliphs [622-61 AD]) is a common theme of the programsof almost all Islamist movements that call for the revival of pure Islam and the struggle against the corrupting influence of Western modernity. The way in which Islamist movements view Western modernity is the main differencebetween the new generationof Islamists and that of the 19th centurymodernist Islamists. While Muhammed'Abdu, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida, tried to radicalIslamists adaptIslamic values to democraticand modernvalues, the contemporary take an anti-modernist stand, in the name of an Islamic alternativemodel. The search for an alternativeparadigmin Islam has promptedMuslim intellectuals to launch a major attack on permissiveness, consumerism, pollution, corruptionand nationalism, all considered to be the sinful by-productsof Western modernityand civilization. ContemporaryIslamism criticizes both traditional interpretationsof Islam and modernism. It is neither a direct product of religious and cultural traditions, nor a Islamism is a cultural straightforward representationof Muslim identity. Contemporary and political deconstruction of the category of "Muslim." It is a critique of and a discontinuitywith the given categories of Muslim identity; it is an endeavourto rename and to reconstructMuslim identity by freeing it from traditionalinterpretations and by challenging modernism. It is radical both in its critique of traditions, considered of responsiblefor the passivity and the "enslavement" Muslim people, and in its desire to set up a radicallydifferentcivilization based on the Islamizationof all spheresof life from the conception of the self, to the organizationof the life-world, and to the politics of government. Islamism, both in its ideological formulationsand sociological practices,has created new hybridizationsbetween traditionand modernity,religion and secularism,community and religion. The new Islamist counter-elites in Turkey incarnatethe paradoxical and ambivalent nature of contemporaryIslamist movements: They owe their professional identity and social visibility to both the modernseculareducationsystem and the Islamist movements to which they belong. The emergence of contemporary Islamism in Turkeycan be tracedto the post-1983 period when Islamist engineers rose to power within the ranks of the MotherlandParty, veiled women became visible on modern university campuses in big cities, and Islamist periodicals,newspapersand books shifted the intellectualdebatein Turkeyaway from the dominance of leftist intellectuals to that of the Islamists. These new agents of change representedthe move of Islam from the peripheryof the system to its center,and yet were themselves a productof that center, of its educationalinstitutionsand its urbanlife. As these new agents of Islamism began to obtain the same culturalcapital as the Republican
24. Michael Fischer, "Islam and the Revolt of the Petite Bourgeoisie," Daedalus 111, no. 1 (Winter 1982), pp. 101-25. EmmanuelSivan, Radical Islam (New Haven and London:Yale UniversityPress, 1985), pp. 50-82.

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and of classes,occupythe ranks parliament, participate elites, sharethe sameuniversity in publicdebates television,they started gainpublicvisibility,socialrecognition, to on in secularelites, in turn,reactedprimarily legitimacy,and prestige.The Republican and Islamic fundamentalism in defense terms,andbeganto wagea battleagainst political of secularism.
Engineers and the Islamist Counter-Elites

elite the who engineers, represent technical and educated Islamists, Amongtheurban, role play development, a crucial in thepolitics havebeenagentsof socialandeconomic force engineers as Sincetheir emergence a professional in the 1950s,Turkish of Turkey.25 some of the dominant supporting have takenan active partin politicalmovements, the supported then ideologicaltrendsof the times.Duringthe 1970s,manyengineers In leftist movements. the post-1983period,the deputieswith an engineering popular and Todayamongthe a in constituted majority the parliament government.26 training The cannot underestimated. be of of and cadres theRP,thenumber theinfluence engineers is Turkey'sPrimeMinister,NecmettinErbakan, an party'schainnan,and currently and as Ozal,who was primeminister Turgut StleymanDemirel. engineer, is President was president, also an engineer.27 of elites' conceptof developin havebeencritical the modemist Engineers Turkey Thereis a double with the Islamistmovement. ment. They have also had problems to and development, of commitment manyengineers todayto bothIslamism industrial Islamistengineersreveal the tensionsthat exist between a faith and to rationality. between prerequisites the Islamic and technical education a political identity, professional of and prescriptions. of scienceandrationality the priorities religious
Ayse OncU Heper, in Identity," Metin of and G6le,"Engineers theEmergence a Technicist 25. Nililfer I.B. Identitis(London: Tauris, and Political Cultural and Changing eds., andHeinzKramer, Turkey theWest: and (Islamist engineers veiled ct voil6esen Turquie," islamistes 6tudiantes G6le,"Ingenieurs 1993);NilAfer de et eds., Intelkctuels militants l'Islam in womenstudents Turkey)in GlUesKepeland YannRichard, le Gle, "Entre Seuil,1990); Niltlfer Islam)(Paris: of and contemporain (Intcllectuals Militants Contemporaiy en (BetweenLeftismand et 1'emergence l'id6ologietechniciste Turquie," de 'gauchisme' l"islamisme': et in ed., Longuenesse, BEiisseurs Ideologyin Turkey) Elisabeth the of Islamism: Emergence a Technicist and and (Builders Bureaucrats: Engineers au et et Ingtnieurs sociftN Maghreb au Moyen-Orient bureaucrates: 1990). Maison l'Orient, de East)(Lyon: and Societyin theMaghreb the Middle 50 were of rule the 26. During periodfrom1923-1950(thesingle-party period), percent the deputies the 1960-80, the wereengineers. During periodfironm and and officers only 1 percent civil servants military to increased 12 whees thatof engineers fell of amongthe deputies to 18 percent, percentage civil servants Periodin Turkey), on (Encyclopedia the Republican Ansiklopedisi See DonemiTurkiye percent. Cumhuriyet were 45 of elections, percent the parliamentarians fascicle 10 (1983),pp. 2671-81. Afterthe 1987general 2 1987. engineers architects. Cwnhuriyet (Istanbul), December or See
27. lhe role of engineers in politics is not confined to Turkey. Egypt, too, has a long trdition of professionaltrainingof engineers. Today in Egypt, the syndicateof engineers plays a very significantpolitical role. See ClementHenryMoore,Images of Development,EgyptianEngineersin Searchof Indsty (Cambridge:

contributes with of engineers Ph.D.sfromUS universities the Ibe MITPress,1980).InIran, influence Islamist chi'ite(Shi'ite in L'Iskun See govemment Tehran. YannRichard, to of significantly the stability the Islamic 1991),pp. 247-48. Fayard, Islam)(Paris:

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Islamist Intellectuals

of such As producers symbolsandvalues,Islamist intellectuals, as Ali Bulag,Ismet Ozel, and Abdurrahman Dilipak, define and transmitthe ideology of the Islamist In and movementthrough newspapers, periodicals books.28 Turkeyduringthe 1970s, in in intellectual was basically thehandsof theleftistintellectuals; thepast 15 years, life Islamic publications are it has come under the influenceof Islamistintellectuals. At Islamist proliferating. firstit was the worksof radical thosefrom thinkers, especially like and otherMuslimcountries, 'Ali Shari'ati SayyidQutb,thatwere translated; then towards local Islamists gradually interest the turned suchas Bula, andOzel. Therewas in also interest the debateson modernity, and leadingto the translation, the publication such as Ivan Illich, Paul Karl and discussionof the works of Westernintellectuals and Feyerabend, MichelFoucault. The new Islamistintellectuals, both men and women,are quitedistinctfromthe in Turkey. thinkers earlier Islamist referto Western Theyuse modemTurkish language, in withsecular discussissuessuchas post-modernism, thinkers, participate publicdebates Western foreignlanguages. in and Islamist intellectuals, master Although theirwritings, seek to definean alternative Islamicidentityand society, in their social intellectuals profiles,theirwritingandcommunication styles,andtheiruse of the massmedia,they have a lot in commonwiththe secular intellectuals.
Womenand the Islamist Counter-Elites

who are professionals intellectuals, The educated Islamistwomenin Turkey, and such as CihanAktas,Sibel Eraslanand HamideToros,constitute distinctcategory a Their in Islamists. among participation Islamist movements activeagents influenced as has of boththe definition Islamicelites andthe courseof changeof the Islamist movement is itself.Thegender issueoranepiphenomenon the of question farfrombeinga derivative Islamistmovement. conceptof womenas auxiliaries men is a central The to issue that definesthe basic stakesof the Islamist It movement. also highlights powerrelations the betweensecular Muslimwomen,andbetweenMuslimmenandMuslimwomen.29 and In all Muslimsocieties,the Islamistmovements have gainedpublicvisibilityby meansof theveilingof women.Veilingsymbolizes Islamization a wayof life, and the of of conveysdifferent conceptions gender identities, spatial organization aesthetics. and The veil, on the one hand,recallsthe traditional definition Muslimwomanhood of basedon valuesof modesty virtue, segregation thesexes,andtheinterdictions women and the of on to participate publiclife. Theveilingof womentoday,on theother in hand,also signifies
28. Michael E. Meeker,"TheMuslimIntellectualand His Audience:A New Configuration Writerand of Reader among Believers in the Republic of Turkey,"in 5crif Mardin,ed., Cultural Transitionsin the Middle East (Leiden, New York, Koln: EJ. Brill, 1994), pp. 153-88. 29. On the question of women as a touchstone of modernizationand Islamization,see Nilafer Gole, Modern Mahrem:Medeniyet ve Ortunme (ForbiddenModem: Civilization and Veil) (Istanbul:Meti, 1991). Niltifer Gole, 7he Forbidden Modern, Islamist Veiling and Civilization in Turkey(Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press, 1996).

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the political participationand the active voluntaryreappropriation an Islamic identity of by women. As such, the new veiling has almost nothing in common with the traditional image of Muslim women as uneducated,docile, passive, and devoted to their family life. On the contrary,young, urban,educatedgroups of Islamistgirls are politically active and publicly visible. The way they have chosen to wear an Islamic outfit is also differentfrom the way women dressed traditionally,in terms of fabrics, colors and style. The educated Islamist women, both in terms of their appearance-in stylish fabrics with widened shoulders-and in their energetic outlook-taking buses and going to the universitiesremind one more of the secular and self-assertive modem women than of the traditional Muslim ones. In short, although Islamist women play an importantrole within their movement, they also have multifacetedlives and professionalcareers,and are thus partof the emerging Islamist elite. Islamistwomen are, however, facing difficultiesin theirrelationswith both secularist women and Islamist men. Being publicly visible, mixing socially with men and having intellectualand professionalaspirationshave createdtension between their collective role as Islamist militants, and their individualroles as female members of the counter-elite. CONCLUSION In short, all three categories of the Islamist counter-elites(the engineers, the women and the intellectuals),reveal a new profile of Islamist actors;all three are the productof secular education, urbanizationand Islamization;all three are the result of the hybrid natureof modernismand Islamism;and all three are in conflict with the previous modem Westernizedelites. The latterbecame elites when their membersemancipatedthemselves from their religious beliefs and traditionalties, and acquiredknowledge and education to apartfrom, and in contradistinction religion. Islamization,therefore,can be seen as a counter-attackagainst the principles of the Kemalist project of modernizationand the vested interests of the Westernized elites. The concept of an Islamist elite is itself antitheticalto secular elites who see it as anachronistic. Ironically,the new Islamistcounter-elitesare almostthe mirrorimage of the previous secular Republicanones. Women as markersof secularism,engineers as transmitters of positivism and rationality, and intellectuals incarnatingprogressive Republican values were central to the Republicanproject. As humanisticand technical elites, the Islamists have also acquireda rationaleducationand a universallanguage at the same universities as the Republicanists. Like the previous elites, their social status is defined not by economic power, but by culturalcapital. Yet their social ascendancy througheducation has reached its limits because their provincial, Muslim habitus is an obstacle to their achieving social recognition and prestige. The questioningof the Muslim identitythroughradicalIslamismhas empoweredthe new actorsof the Islamistmovementsto seek social-recognitionof theirrecently acquired culturalcapital throughsymbols of a Muslim habitus,namely, the veiling of women, the wearing of beards for men, and particularways of greeting, speaking and eating. The

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Islamists are the counter-elitesof Republicans,but the elites of their followers. They have become the new models. The utopiandesire to change society is what distinguishesIslamist movements from other contemporarysocial movements, such as feminism and environmentalism,which recognize pluralism and contribute to the strengthening of civil society. Islamist movements, on the contrary,aim at a complete change that can threatensecularism.They want to have moral control over the public sphere throughcontrol of women's sexuality, limiting public encountersbetween the sexes, and the right of censorshipover the media and the arts. Engineers,intellectualsand women play a distinct and significantrole in the Islamist movement and countervailthe totalitarian tendency of the movement. Engineersembody the conflictual tension between rationality and faith; intellectuals reflect that between critical thinking and Islamic morality; and veiled women express the tension between communitarianmorality and individualism.To the extent that rationality,individualism and critical thinkingemerge as autonomousvalue-referencesfor the Islamist elite formed throughthe modem system of education, the process of secularizationcan be said to be ongoing. In other words, the more the Islamists acquire a professional identity, as engineers or intellectuals, the more the realms of the sacred and the profane will be separated.Thus, becoming a member of an elite activates a process of secularization, independentof the intentionsof the actors, that leads to the separationof the two realms.