RADIATION APPRECIATION COURSE

THE USE OF IONISING RADIATION FOR INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY

Types of radiation sources & Biological effects of radiation Typical equipment used on site Emergencies & protection

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 Working with Ionising Radiation ACOP 1999 Radioactive Substances Act 1993

TYPES OF RADIATION SOURCES & BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS

TYPES OF RADIATION

NATURAL (RADIOACTIVE DECAY)

MAN-MADE X-RAY

ALPHA

BETA

GAMMA

Co 60

Ir 192

Se 75

Yb 169

UNITS OF RADIATION
There are three principle units we need to be aware of: Activity - which is the measure of quantity of a radioactive source defined in terms of the number of nuclear transformations per second and is expressed as the Bequerel - 1 disintegration / second. Absorbed Dose - which is a measure of energy deposited in a particular material from radiation and is expressed as the Gray - 1 joule / kilogramme Dose Equivalent - which is the absorbed dose modified by a quality factor (Q) to take in the different biological effect of different types of radiation and is expressed as the Sievert - Gray X Q. For the type of radiation we are concerned with the Gray and Sievert

are the same.

IONISING RADIATION KEY FACTS

Radiation Travels In Straight Lines Radiation Travels At The Speed Of Light Radiation Penetrates Matter Radiation Can Impair Or Destroy Living Cells Radiation Can Not Be Detected By Human Senses

RADIATION EFFECTS ON BIOLOGICAL TISSUE

DEPOSITS ENERGY IN CELLS

99% DISSIPATED AS HEAT (NEGLIGIBLE RISE IN TEMPERATURE)

1% CAUSES CHEMICAL CHANGES. (RESULTS IN DAMAGE TO CHROMOSOME PROTEIN etc)

DAMAGES CELLS

DESTROYS CELLS

CAN IMPAIR THE CELLS ABILITY TO REPRODUCE ITSELF. THIS CAN BE MORE CRITICAL IN CELLS THAT REPRODUCE RAPIDLY, SUCH AS THOSE IN BLOOD FORMING ORGANS

DOSES IN PERSPECTIVE (SPECTRUM OF DOSES)

Spectrum of Doses Annual Dose Limit for Classified Workers Average Radiation worker Annual Dose Limit for Other persons Background (Natural), UK Background, Other places in the World (0.5 mSv average 260 mSv Ramsar Iran) Typical dose from a chest X-Ray Detectable damage to Chromosome Detectable blood count change Radiation sickness Death

Approximate Dose 20 mSv/Year 4 mSv/Year 1 mSv 1.9 mSv/Year 0.5mSv to 260 mSv/Year 0.3 mSv 100 mSv 300 mSv > 1 Gray (Body) > 3 Gray (Body)

TYPICAL EQUIPMENT USED FOR RADIOGRAPHY ON SITE

TYPICAL ISOTOPE SOURCE HOLDER

The radioactive isotope is usually disc shaped and is typically 2mm diameter and 2mm in depth. This radioactive disc is welded into a precision made tungsten holder Source

GAMMA RADIOGRAPHY PROJECTOR SYSTEMS

Source Guide Tube Source Projectors Control Unit

TYPICAL EQUIPMENT USED FOR RADIOGRAPHY

Equipment includes:Isotope container Guide tube Control mechanism Collimation (Shielding) Radiation monitor TLD

HUMAN SENSES

Radiation Can Not Be Detected By Any Of The Human Senses Radiation Monitors Are The Eyes And Ears Of The Radiographer

RADIATION (SURVEY) MONITORS

The radiation monitor is the eyes and ears of the radiographer. They contain a Geiger-Muller or similar tube, which detects the presence of radiation. They also measure the radiation dose level. The monitor has a graduated scale and an audible indicator (clicker). Monitors also have a battery test button which indicates that the batteries are OK.

RADIATION (SURVEY) MONITORS

The scale is a graduated logarithmic scale. In this case the range is from zero to 1000 Sv per hour. The dose rate at a barrier for site radiography must be less than 7.5Sv/hr

RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO CONTROLLED AREAS

Because of the dangers site radiography is conducted in a restricted (controlled) area. The area is demarcated by barriers and boards. The area will be monitored throughout to ensure the dose levels outside are safe, less than 7.5Sv/hr.

RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO CONTROLLED AREAS

On site radiography often requires barriers to be established at different levels on a structure, not just the level at which the work is being done.

GAMMA ALARM

When the Alarm is switched on radiation below threshold 7.5Sv/hr is indicated by a amber flashing lamp. Radiation above the threshold is indicated by a red flashing lamp.

EMERGENCIES

EMERGENCIES INVOLVING RADIOGRAPHY

Incidences involving damage to radiography equipment resulting in loss of containment of the radioactive isotope are extremely rare. We are not aware of any such incidents in recent history. However, should such an instance occur the priority of the emergency services would be for the safety of the public and then property. Because of the nature of the work requiring other personnel to be excluded from an area, it is highly unlikely that other personnel would be in the vicinity of the radiographic equipment.

ACCIDENTS INVOLVING INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY

Equipment is regularly maintained and Radiographers conduct weekly check and before use , but from time to time things can go wrong. Most accidents which happen are the result of equipment damage or malfunction. However, such accidents result in the potential for higher dose levels and not contamination or loss of containment. Procedures called Contingency Plans are in place to deal with any foreseeable incident. Radiographers are trained to implement the Contingency Plan if an incident occurs. The law requires that radiographers receive adequate refresher training and that Contingency Plans are rehearsed on an annual basis.

EMERGENCIES AND CONTINGENCY PLANS

Following any incident, the approach to recovery of the equipment would be dependant on the circumstances. Any company involved in work with Ionising Radiation most have contingency arrangements for dealing with emergencies. These contingency arrangements involve; Measuring dose levels and setting safe distances Access, restriction of personnel to the vicinity Planning a course of action for recovery Telling relevant people what the plan is and how we will proceed Replacing the equipment into suitable container for removal Calling for external assistance if required Keeping the area clear of unauthorised personnel until it is safe

THE PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION FROM IONISING RADIATION ARE TIME, DISTANCE & SHIELDING

TIME, the shorter the length of time a person is exposed to a radiation source, the smaller the dose received. DISTANCE, the further a person is away from a radiation source, the smaller the dose received. Radiation obeys the inverse square law which, in simple terms means, if you double the distance away from the source the dose will be reduced by a quarter. SHIELDING, materials absorb radiation, by shielding people from the source dose levels are significantly reduced.

EMERGENCIES AND CONTINGENCY PLANS

SITE INCIDENTS WHEN SOURCE IS IN USE CONTINGENCY PLAN If a fire alarm or toxic alarm sounds when working with a source on site, the first priority is THE RADIOGRAPHERS OWN SAFETY If the source can be returned to a container without danger then it SHOULD BE If the operator can remove a container without danger then HE SHOULD If the operator is in any doubt, the container should be left where it is, AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY THE RADIOGRAPHER SHALL REPORT THE SITUATION TO THE CONTROL ROOM OR RESPONSIBLE PERSON. MAKING SURE THAT FIRE FIGHTERS OR RESCUE PERSONNEL ARE AWARE OF THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE BARRIERS AND THE CONTAINER. THEY SHOULD GIVE AS MUCH DETAIL AS THEY CAN REGARDING DOSE LEVELS IN THE AREA. They shall offer any assistance or advice they can. The radiographer should inform their RPS at the first available opportunity. The radiographer should remain available in case additional information or assistance is required.

EMERGENCIES AND CONTINGENCY PLANS

CONTAINERS DAMAGED BY FIRE OR COLLAPSE CONTINGENCY PLAN If a container is caught in a fire or structural collapse the radiographers initial responsibility is for, THEIR OWN SAFETY FIRST. THEY SHOULD REMOVE THEMSELVES TO A PLACE OF SAFETY AND INFORM THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL. They should make themselves available to offer any assistance or advice they can. They should inform their RPS at the first available opportunity.

ISO:3999 SPECIFICATION FOR APPARATUS FOR GAMMA RADIOGRAPHY

All radiography equipment is produced to the highest standards and licensed in accordance to rigorous requirements, which includes fire and impact resistance, also resistance to puncture.

Should the equipment be involved in a fire, it is unlikely that the emergency services would be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, however it would be appropriate if monitoring was carried out where practicable.

ACCIDENT IN THE USA IN 1979

In California in 1979 a radioactive source holder had become detached from its container, the radiography crew were unaware of this and the source holder was left at site. An unsuspecting worker had found it and put it in his pocket, it was left there for about 45minutes. After about an hour the man felt nauseated, and after about six hours the man noticed a burning sensation and reddening of the buttock. After two days the man went to his doctor, who thought it was an insect bite. The burn got worse and after seventeen days the man was hospitalised. After three days of questioning by the doctors the man recalled having the object in his pocket, at this point the Doctors realised that he had a radiation burn.

ACCIDENT IN THE USA IN 1979

Thirty one days after the event the man had a large open radiation burn to his right buttock.

ACCIDENT IN THE USA IN 1979

About fifty days after the incident a skin flap was sewn over the burn to close it.

ACCIDENT IN THE USA IN 1979

About six months after the incident a secondary burn had developed away from the original trauma.

ACCIDENT IN THE USA IN 1979

A second skin flap had been added 19 months after the accident, but the wound has still not fully healed.

Radiation Incident

February 20th, 1999

Incident Synthesis
Location Hydroelectric Construction Site in Yanango. Distance from Lima: 300km (East) District: San Romn, Department of Junn. What Happened A non-authorised person removed the screws of the security lock to free the radioactive source of a Gammagraph. No key is needed to remove the source, it can be done with a screwdriver.

Equipments Characteristics
Security Lock

Type: SPEC T-2 Radionucleid: Ir192 Activity Max: 3.7 TBq

Equipments Characteristics

With a screwdriver, the safety lock can be removed to make the source accessible

Chronology
Welder
- 4:00 pm: A worker (welder) finds the source of gammagraphy (192 Ir) abandoned in a water pipe. He puts it in the back pocket of his trousers. - He works for six hours with the source in his pocket and his assistant nearby - 10:00 pm: He leaves work, takes a bus and travels home (he felt little pain in his right leg). During his return, he travelled for 30 minutes with 15 people. - He thinks that the red skin is due to an insect sting. - His wife sat on the trousers for 10 minutes to feed their baby. Two children slept nearby. - 11:00 pm: The welder, takes the trousers off in the room.

Chronology
Operator
- 10:30 pm: The operator makes a gammagraphy. The radiation detector doesnt detect any readings. He assumes the equipment is not working well and stops to have dinner. - 00:00 am: He enters the water pipe, checks the gammagraphy equipment and finds no screws or radioactive source. They start looking for the source. - 1:00 am: They find the welder in his house (February 21st). He comes out with the source in his hands. The operator slaps the welders hand knocking the source to the street and puts a stone to cover it. - The source is recovered and secured in a container with iron walls 2 thick.

Chronology
What was done? Initially, the welder was hospitalized in the Cancer Centre of Lima. He was then sent to the Military Hospital Precy de Claart Grave Burns Treatment Centre in France.

Consequences
Severe Radiation Exposure To 1 Person and Minor Exposure to 18 Other People

16 Days After the incident

Effects on Leg (13:00pm 2/21/99)

3/8/99

Effects on Leg (70 days after the incident 5/3/99)

Consequences

Leg Amputation (10/18/99)

Severe Infection 12/14/99

What Went Wrong?

Organisation - Procedures were not implemented. - Absence of Safety Culture in the Companys Management. - Source inspection and measures were inadequate. - Lack of training and qualification of the operators. NATIONAL AUTHORITIES ESTABLISH: The evaluation of the authorisations and inspections should be developed by an experienced and trained team.