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Let's 'do philosophy' like an Academic Pyrrhonian

Nothing in the world is difficult; it's just our thoughts that give the things this appearance. - from Arabia Since the publication of the 'Philosophical Investigations' (PI), different writers have tried to comprehend this complex work of philosophical endeavour. Scholars within the domains of sociology, politics, language analysis and philosophy have been busy interpretating Witgenstein and looking at the consequences which should be taken from this work. Although the variation between these domains and within these interpretations is interesting enough on its own, the stakes became even higher as scholars tried to place the PI within a complete conception of Wittgenstein's work and often extrapolating these conceptions into more claims. The fact that these debates exist, however, isn't entirely uncontroversial. Most of the critique on these debates, as formulated by e.g. David Stern, is aimed against the reductionistic feature of the analyses done by scholars. They find that Wittgenstein's thought is reduced to an argument for scientists and philosophers own insights and theories. An example of this is the sociological theory of Peter Winch. Instead, Stern argues for an interpretation 'at face value', which is to read Wittgenstein as attempting to either destroy or to reform philosophy. Stern argues for the first position. These two readings regarding destruction and reform are called 'Pyrrhonian' and 'non-Pyrrhonian' readings; a distinction named after Pyrrho, a Sceptic from ancient Greece. Pyrrho himself believed that both traditional sceptics, whom were called Academics, and traditional philosophers, whom were called Dogmatists, were both erroneous, since both attained the dogma that they believed in a form of certain knowledge, the first being that certain knowledge is impossible, the second that certain knowledge is possible1. In the light of the and debates the between the 'face value interpretation' there is one Wittgensteinians Academics, via 'reductionist' Hume Wittgensteinians,

particular philosopher who has an interesting position. Beginning with the Descartes, and Kant, Neil Gascoigne positions Wittgenstein as a sceptic in the tradition of the Academics and precisely Carneades. This type of scepticism wants to expose the underlying dogmatic
1 (Gascoigne, 2002), p32-35.

assumptions in order to stress the importance of another, less fundamental and more pragmatic, basis. The positions regarding Wittgenstein's devotion to, in some form, destroy philosophy is certainly an aspect on which Gascoigne and Stern overlap. However, as said above, they both link this to a different ancient sceptical tradition. What makes a comparison between these two interpretations more interesting but also more difficult is that we can distinguish at least two different versions of both Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism. In recent years, the differences between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism have therefore been debated (Thorsrud, 2004). Also, where Stern argues only from the PI, Gascoigne takes into account the OC as well. Still, I think a comparison between the two will shed a new light on Wittgenstein's work. Moreover, I will argue that the apparent differences between these two philosophers aren't that big as they position themselves. Arguing for the similarities will require a positioning of the analyses of both Gascoigne and Stern in the Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian debate. To understand Gascoigne's conception of scepticism in which Wittgenstein is placed, I will follow his historical argument for this conception. This intuition is based the two representatives of the Academic Sceptics from the last two centuries AD, Arcesilaus and Carneades. Gascoigne argues that the Academic sceptics weren't as dogmatic as the Sceptic Sextus Empiricus has expressed, but actually had an anti-foundational attitude regarding higher order (philosophical) propositions. This form of scepticism is called both mitigated scepticism and dialectical scepticism as it involves positioning two positions against each other in order to attain a less foundational position. Wittgenstein will eventually be positioned as such a mitigated sceptic. What the Academic Wittgenstein tries is, using ordinary language, to solve the philosophical problems by experiencing the solution to them in ordinary life. Stern will apply a systematic approach to also conclude a dialectical position in Wittgensteins work. Stern argues that it is meant to destroy philosophy all together as the theory proves philosophy to be inconsistent. His main argument consists of an analysis of the three different 'voices' which are portrayed within the PI: the 'traditional philosopher', the 'academic sceptic'

and the 'Pyrrhic' voice. According to Stern, the first two voices are positioned against each other by the third voice. This, together with the general tendencies explicated by a number of remarks throughout the PI, e.g. the allegory between philosophy and a cure, lets him conclude the Pyrrhonian Wittgenstein. For both, then, the role of philosophy is that of the Tractatian ladder, which we can throw away when we are finished.

The therapeutic reading of Academic scepticism

In his book Scepticism, Gascoigne distinguishes two sceptical arguments. The first argument is the Agrippan Argument, following our main source for scepticism Sextus Empiricus. This argument is probably the oldest sceptical argument and is intended to challenge the arbitrariness of foundational arguments2. The Agrippan argument concludes that justification is always charged with on of three fallacies: 1.The justification leads to a regressus ad infinitum. 2.The justification leads to a circular reasoning. 3.The justification leads to an arbitrary stipulation of an argument which doesn't have to be justified (foundationalism). To understand the basic intuition underlying this argument, one can think of a little child constantly asking 'why' questions. The parent will either have to continue this 'why'-game infinitely, will at one moment say 'That's why' (arbitrary stipulation) or will refer back to an argument already used (circular reasoning). The second argument is the called the 'Argument from ignorance'. This argument is casting doubt by suggesting that I haven't got any adequate argument to rely on the status of my perceptions, e.g. because I don't know for certain that I'm not dreaming3. This argument is due to Rene Descartes, who used this demon in his search for a stable basis for further enquiries, i.e. the well-known cogito ergo sum. To understand why Gascoigne places Wittgenstein in the tradition of the
2 (Gascoigne 2002), p18-p19. 3 Ibid, p9.

Academic Sceptics as he perceives them, it is necessary to understand his historical arguments for this unusual notion of philosophy and of scepticism as Gascoigne argues was the case in Ancient Greece. As a last remark before I lay out Gascoigne's argument, it is useful to realise that scepticism always has been seen (and criticised) as a reactive method: as some have remarked haughty, without some 'real theories', scepticism couldn't exist, since it wouldn't have anything to react to.

Meaning of Philosophy in Ancient Greece

Scepticism is, especially within the analytic tradition, bounded to the study field of epistemology, while some other philosophers focus on the subject of living happily. In Ancient Greece, Gascoigne argues, these two were a lot more interwoven: It is important to recall that central to Greek Philosophy is the concern with living a good, virtuous or tranquil that is to say, happy, life. The knowledge that the Dogmatist philosopher seeks is not therefore to be equated with the narrowly theoretical conception [].4 Knowledge as seen by the Greek philosophers is an essential requirement in order to obtain a good life. It is important to realise what type of knowledge is meant here. What type of knowledge can help us achieve the goals of a Dogmatist philosopher? According to Gascoigne, Dogmatists and Academics discussed whether p-knowledge, defined as higher-order (philosophical) knowledge5, is possible. Gascoigne calls this the 'Essential Problem'. Let us then look at the first of the Academics, called Arcesilaus. Arcesilaus attacks all the Dogmatist theories in a similar way, namely to use a form of 'deconstruction' i.e. searching for a situation in which the theory can and should give two opposing answers. Gascoigne proposes to read his arguments from a dialectical point of view as he sees Arcesilaus as trying to expose the dogmatic assumptions underlying the Dogmatist theories. His argument against the Stoics is a thought experiment: suppose there are two people seeing a cow, where person A is experienced enough to see a cow clear and distinct and person B isn't experienced enough. Then, according to the Stoics,
4 (Gascoigne 2002), p34 (Emphasis by Gascoigne). 5 Ibid, p33.

person A has knowledge, but person B doesn't. But how then could the cognitive impressions be the sole criterion of truth? After all, how could person B know that he didn't see the cow clear and distinct, while person A did? Still, they have to keep their proposition that knowledge also is determined by the wise versus the ignorant, since this is their only way to explain how people can make mistakes6.

Towards a therapeutic and mitigated scepticism

Arcesilaus' scepticism isn't actually being 'dogmatic' as Sextus Empiricus described him. He isn't claiming that knowledge isn't possible, but instead opts to show the inconsistency in the Stoic thought. However, with this his theory is lacking any practical guidance (remember that philosophy had as its task to practically guide practitioners to a good life) and is therefore indeed negative7. There was, according to Sextus Empricus' reading of Carneades, however indeed a positive reading, but now based on the 'subjective conditions of judgement'8. It is through this Socratic dialogue with the Stoics that Carneades comes to something I think we could call pragmatism. As Gascoigne notices:The general criterion of judgement is the convincing expression that is clear and distinct (or 'fully manifested'). Since this criterion is compatible with the falsity of the impression, it is fallible and not a criterion for truth. [] This generic fallibilism is then reinforced by two further 'criteria' of convincingness. In recognition of the holistic character of impressions, the first of these refers to the 'undiverted nature of an impression', or what we might call its 'contextual consistency'. [] Finally, a belief is still more credible if it is 'fully explored', or what we would call contextually justified.9 This step removes the requirement of truth and replaces it with a criterion of judgement. Where we recognise that our judgements can be false, we still can judge whether one of our beliefs is stronger or weaker, because we can look whether our sensations fit our earlier sensations (e.g. that we perceive a cow walking, and thus strengthen our conviction that the cow is alive) and we can
6 (Gascoigne 2002), p51-p52. 7 Ibid, p52-p53. 8 Ibid, p55. 9 Ibid idem.

do some extra tests, e.g. try to feed the cow and see whether it reacts. This gives us practical guidelines for living our lives without making the principle move of calling these methods true and Gascoigne therefore calls this type of scepticism 'therapeutic scepticism'. He also calls it mitigated scepticism, since in a certain sense we can speak of a 'scepticism-light', a scepticism with space for conditional judgements. As we now have a workable definition of what Gascoigne sees as therapeutic or mitigated scepticism, it is now time to look at his arguments for reading Wittgenstein as a therapeutic sceptic. However, there is one important last thing to note. Gascoigne makes a statement regarding the theoretical attitude and its vulnerability to the Agrippan argument. According to his analysis, the Academic Scepticism of Carneades isn't vulnerable to the Agrippan Argument since it denies the necessity of truth for its practical guidelines. Therefore, the focus of the Agrippan argument on justification of knowledge doesn't have any target10.

Wittgenstein as a 'Therapeutic Sceptic'

In his analysis of Wittgenstein, Gascoigne looks at both the PI and OC. Regarding the first book, he uses Saul Kripke's analysis of the private language argument and Kripke's interpretation of the private language argument as basically being a variation of his Wittgenstein's comments on rule-following. As I will argue below, for Gascoigne the latter book is a continuation of the PI, an explication based on the so-called hinge propositions functioning as a rule for a language game. Therefore, I will only briefly discuss the point made in the OC and show the relation between the PI and the OC.

Wittgenstein on rule-following
In Gascoigne's analysis, to be able to give a criterion which isn't susceptible to the Agrippan argument is to get away from the theoretical notion of truth. In his vision, Wittgenstein tries this when he is talking about rule-following. According to 'Kripkgenstein', which leans heavily on 201: It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented
10 (Gascoigne 2002), p65-66.

us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. 11 Following a rule in this interpretation is exerting a habit and rule-following is the concept by which we understand making judgements. When we are talking about habits, we are talking about 'doing' something', which isn't anything private, but something which is a feature of our culture and our social and institutional practices. In this way, the fact that we are following rules presupposes an external world, as these rules cannot be privately created.12 This is also linked to 150, in which Wittgenstein distinguishes between knowing a disposition and knowing as in understanding or mastery of a technique. This knowing as understanding is referring to the knowing a rule as in understanding how one uses it. According to Gascoigne, this is a form of the 'mitigated' or 'therapeutic' scepticism. For him, it isn't able to refute the Agrippan argument directly, since the sceptic can still make a move outside of the practices and ask how these practices are related to 'the way things really are'13. However, when we try to perceive this rule-following argument as 'therapeutic', it affirms the sceptic attack against an internalist justification such as Descartes' prove of the external world from inside and it's foundationalistic tendencies (I think, therefore I am and the existence of God are non-refutable arguments). However, it tries to put us in engagement with common life, where these rules don't need any form of justification14. Within the OC, Wittgenstein begins to relate the hinge propositions to these rules in language games. The idea of a 'hinge proposition' is largely based on Moore's anti-sceptical argument. Moore claimed to know all sorts of things, such as I know that the earth existed long before my birth and I know that I have never been on the moon. For Wittgenstein, these 'hinge propositions' aren't cases of knowing at all. Instead, these 'stand fast' for Moore and Wittgenstein, meaning that we cannot really claim to 'know' them, as we do
11 (Wittgenstein, 1963), 201. See also (Gascoigne 2002), p128-130. 12 (Gascoigne 2002), p129. 13 Ibid, p130. 14 (Gascoigne 2002), p131.

not see them as cognitive achievements15. Instead, their role is like those of the rules for a game. He even goes further in OC 309, where he states: Is it that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another?. However, this cannot be the case, as Gascoigne agrees with Wittgenstein, since where rules can be neither true nor false, this isn't the case with these special empirical propositions: we do think they are true, even if they are outside of the framework and even if they are contingent facts (i.e. not a logical truth)16. That these hinge propositions are contingent is expressed in 204, where he states: [...], justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of our languagegame.17 Here, Wittgeinstein's anti-foundational tendencies become quite explicit: he does not accept the Cartesian clear and distinct propositions: the fact that we feel these are true isn't because they have some special property ('truefulness') of which we have ways to determine them. Instead, these propositions have a similar status as the impressions (or seemings), which have [...] normativity 'built in' (in the form of an ability to participate in the enquiry) and which is therefore not vulnerable to the sceptics doubt.18 I'll come back later to Gascoigne's interpretation of Wittgenstein when I discuss both Gascoigne's and Stern's reaction to Fogelin's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Interestingly, Gascoigne and Stern react the same to Fogelin's suggestion of Wittgenstein having both Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian interpretations. Both do not want to see a struggling Wittgenstein, but instead opt for one who is 'in control' of his material and tries to trick his opponents into a discussion in order to prove his own point.

15 Ibid, p144-145. 16 Ibid idem. 17 (Wittgenstein, n.d.), emphasis by myself. 18 (Gascoigne 2002), p146.

Stern's rehabilitation of the Philosophical Investigations

In the beginning of his book on the PI, when he discusses the differences between Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian readings of Wittgenstein, Stern gives expression to a feeling of reductionism of Wittgenstein's work in a lot of the secondary literature:"There is some truth in all these approaches, but each of them gives us a Wittgenstein who was much more single-minded and doctrinaire than the books he actually wrote. What is really interesting about both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations is neither a metaphysical system nor a supposedly definitive answer to systembuilding, but the unresolved tension between two forces: one aims at a definitive answer to the problems of philosophy, the other aims at doing away with them altogether."19 In the end of the chapter regarding rule-following, however, he seems to advocate a strong Pyrrhonian vision on the chapter of rule-following, seeing Wittgenstein as an adept neo-Pyrrhonian who sets out against all forms of 'Dogmatism' to conclude that we cannot really say anything regarding the world.

Stern's rule-following paradoxes

Stern describes three dominant theories regarding rule-following: the Kripkgenstein against which he places struggling Wittgenstein. The Kripke-Wittgenstein is quite similar to the Kripke interpretation by Gascoigne, although Stern's one is even more focussed on the sceptical tendencies. Stern confirms Gascoigne's therapeutical interpretation of Kripke's work:"So Kripkes Wittgenstein gives a sceptical solution: he concedes that the sceptic is right. Despite this, he still maintains that our ordinary practice is, in a sense, justified, for it does not require the kind of justification tihe sceptic has shown to be untenable."20 However, he is quickly to note that this is partly based on an according to him falsely interpreted 219. Where the word 'blindly' always is associated by interpreters as meaning ignoring any form of reason, Stern argues, together with Baker and Hacker, that a more reasonable interpretation would be to interpret 'blindly' using the metaphor of
19 Ibid, p36-37. 20 (Stern 2004), p153.

the Winchgenstein and Fogelin's

the blindfold of Justice21. Stern associates this with a form of 'obedience', a devotion of not willing to stray from the laid down path. Let us look at the PI itself for a moment here and take a look at the preceding and succeeding paragraphs. Here, the narrator and the interlocutor discuss how a rule can be followed about the analogies between following a rule and obeying an order. When we look at 211, Wittgenstein is talking in the Kripkean sense about following a rule blindly. One simply continues to interpret the rule one was following: My reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons22. The next paragraph 212 could be read as an authoritative argument, when we interpret the "someone whom I am afraid of"23 as the law or governmental system. 217 however seems to argue against the idea of an authoritative argument: How am I able to obey a rule?[] If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: This is simply what I do. (Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form. [...]24 The underlined part suggests that, when we are asking for a very high degree of justification, we often didn't put much thought in it. This doesn't mean that we didn't have any justification upon making a decision, but that we didn't require for ourselves the ultimate level of justification. This relates to perhaps the most important passage regarding this discussion, which is after the passage itself. Wittgenstein relates the word 'rule' and the word 'agreement' to each other.25 So, more than just a blindfold, it also seems to have the properties of a social convention in it. But a convention is typically something arbitrary, something which we do follow, but not because it is laid upon us as a law. It isn't implied that we have that devotion that Stern
21 Ibid, p155. 22 (Wittgenstein 1963), 211. 23 Ibid, 212. 24 Ibid, 217, emphasis added. 25 Ibid, 224.

suggests. Moreover, the arbitrariness in a social convention has something in common with the satisfying lower level of justification which I attributed to 217. When we engage in a social convention, we often ask about the information in the small print, but we still take a lot of definitions for granted (e.g. whether I am writing in Dutch or in Flemish (which has quite a lot of different meanings and connotations different) or in the same language whether I use the same meaning with a ambiguous word). If a rule is indeed such a social, arbitrary, convention, Kripke's idea of following the rule in blind fate becomes far more attractive than Stern is arguing for. Stern continues by looking at the sociological interpretations of Wittgenstein, of which one of the proponents is Peter Winch (hence the Winchgenstein). His main argument here is that, while the theories are counterpoints (i.e. interdependent), Kripke circumvented the discussions regarding some problematic parts in Winch's theory 26, specifically Winch's argument for a conception of practice as a system of rules. This idea is mainly based on Wittgenstein's use of 'forms of life'. Many philosophers found this theory to endorse a strong verificationism.

The aftermath: Wittgenstein staying in control

After probing with seeing Wittgenstein's rule-interpretation via a holistic interpretation, Stern discusses quietism (the vision that Wittgenstein at all doesn't have anything to say about the relation between language and the world) and Fogelin's struggling between Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian readings. Here, in the passage where he seems to create his own theory regarding Wittgenstein's sceptical tendencies, he is showing far more 'sceptical tendencies' than those he expressed when he discussed Kripke:"But what looks to Fogelin, Wright, and many other readers like an author whos not entirely in control of his material, oscillating between global statements of a Pyrrhonian method and endorsing particular non-Pyrrhonian philosophical views, is better understood as a matter of different voices within the dialogue setting out opposing philosophical views, within an argument that is in service of a Pyrrhonism about philosophy."27
26 (Stern 2004), p162. 27 Ibid, p170.

Gascoigne also wants to get rid of the internal conflict. After describing Fogelin's argument for a Wittgenstein with both positive (a contextualist, holistic framework, i.e. language games) and destructive tendencies (dogmatic thoughts), he complements Fogelin for the adequacy of its theory. 28 However, he quickly adds: [R]ather than a conflict in Wittgenstein's thought, then, one might suggest an alternative: that it is not the neo-Pyrrhonians that are the model for his method but the Academic Sceptics. On this interpretation, Wittgenstein is a 'therapeutic' (mitigated) sceptic, offering an excavation of our concepts; dialectically playing off dogmatist against sceptic (the two strands) [...].29 Gascoigne claims many interesting things here, but most important of all he claims that Wittgenstein was an academic sceptic because he wasn't a fullfledged Pyrrhonian. To be more precise, he argues that to make some general remarks about philosophy as Wittgenstein e.g. does when he says that Philosophy may not interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is., he cannot hold a purely Pyrrhonian standpoint as he is clearly making positive statements. So, where Stern argues that Wittgenstein is a Pyrrhonian because he opposes the views of both Sceptics and Dogmatists against each other, Gascoigne argues that Wittgenstein is an Academic Sceptic because he opposes the views of both Pyrrhonians and Dogmatists against each other. While the method is quite similar with both theories, we can now look at the purpose of this dialectical move. Stern describes how Wittgenstein's voices try to use one of the strategies as described by Sextus Empiricus: to position both types of 'dogmatic philosophies', in Sextus' case the Dogmatists and the Academics, and playing them out against each other. Continuing this sceptical Pyrrhonian argument, Stern states we should: [R]ather than construing the author of the Philosophical Investigations as genuinely conflicted between quietism and substantive philosophical views [] approach him as a quietist who sees that any attempt to explicitly articulate quietism will lead to
28 (Gascoigne 2002), p 149. 29 Ibid, p 150.

dogmatism of one kind or another, and that therefore the best way to advocate quietism is to write a genuinely conflicted dialogue in which nonPyrrhonian participants play the leading roles. This is, after all, the classically Pyrrhonian way out of the dilemma presented by the anti-Pyrrhonian philosopher: the text really does contain philosophical argument, but the author regards the argument as a ladder that we should throw away after we have drawn the Pyrrhonian moral.30 In this citation, Stern suggests that Wittgenstein wasn't really interested in philosophy at all. This is what has been called the position of quietism. It suggests that Wittgenstein didn't at all want to tell us something about the relationship between the language and the world. The problems of philosophy then become 'pseudo-problems', which only exist because we ask ourselves the wrong questions.31 It would therefore be better to abandon philosophical arguments. Now of course this Wittgenstein faces a dilemma, since he presumably needs 'philosophical' arguments in order to prove that we do not need philosophical arguments, which is a contradiction in terms. Therefore, he uses the dialectic to prove that those questions are useless and then throws away the ladder itself. The Wittgenstein Gascoigne portrays uses the dialectical method [...] in order to draw the public nature of our commitments in the way that Carneades brought out the idea of the 'convincing' in our thinking. In this sense, the nonPyrrhonian elements are not dogmatically imposed on the space of philosophizing, but as it were revealed ('deduced', even) dialectically about common life as one 'returns' to it. 32 Gascoigne isn't entirely clear here about whether Wittgenstein wants to get rid of philosophy. On one hand, he clearly doesn't, as he talks about 'revealing' 'non-Pyrrhonian elements'. Wittgenstein would then still be trying to get some useful answers by using philosophy and therefore would still try to make a philosophical point. On the other hand, however, he states that one gets these 'non-Pyrrhonian elements' revealed by
30 (Stern 2004), p170. 31 Ibid, p169. 32 (Gascoigne 2002), p149.

'returning to common life'. What is more, the whole point of this argument is to place Wittgenstein in Gascoigne's framework of mitigated scepticism. This mitigated scepticism is meant as a full scepticism against philosophical knowledge, but maintaining that we do have the possibility to judge events and phenomena when we remove the criterion of truth, in other words that we aren't sceptical of other forms of knowledge such as scientific knowledge. Instead of the Carneadian alternative criterion of truth, Wittgenstein introduces the public nature of commitments. Now remains the question what this 'public nature of commitments' would mean. Here, Gascoigne's earlier discussion about language-games comes into play. What we should see when we 'return to common life' is that the philosophical problems are only existent when we take a stance outside of the language-game. But the stance outside of the language-game isn't our stance in common life, so why should we bother with these problems in the first place? In other words, we should realise that philosophy only delivers the Sternian ladder which can be thrown away when we realise that these problems are of no importance.

Academic / Pyrrhonian (circle which is applicable)

Can we speak of Wittgenstein as either an Academic or as a quietistPyrrhonian Sceptic? It seems to me that answering this question will often tell more about the person arguing for one of these interpretations than that it would give new insights on the debate about Wittgenstein's goals while writing the PI. One could argue against this that the Academic Wittgenstein lays a great emphasis on the mentioned public commitments (i.e. language-games), where the quietist Witttgenstein does not at all want to prove anything but the pseudo-state of philosophical problems. However, this would be short-sighted. As I showed above, Gascoigne's mitigated sceptic does want philosophy to end, but finds ways to deal with it in common life. And I think also Stern would acknowledge that one of the main reasons that Wittgenstein doesn't need philosophy is because of the language-game. The playful element of a game (or 'play', as the German word 'Spiel' encompasses both) is that one is able to find creative ways to deal with problems.

I therefore guess that Wittgenstein would have endorsed the motto which has been described at the first page of this essay, placing all the different versions of 'old philosophy' against each other, thereby showing their dogmatic positions. After showing the inconsistencies of all these foundationalists, he would look at how language works in the ordinary games and outside of the philosophical spectrum. He would have acknowledged that, as long as we wouldn't think to deeply, we wouldn't have to cure so many philosophical problems.(Fogelin, 1996)

Fogelin, R. (1996). Wittgenstein's critique of philosophy. In H. Sluga & D. G. Stern, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (2 ed., pp. 34-58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gascoigne, N. (2002). Scepticism. (J. Shand) (p. 218). Chesham: Acumen Publishing. Thorsrud, H. (2004). Ancient Greek Scepticism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from Wittgenstein, L. (n.d.). On Certainty. Retrieved from df. Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Philosophical Investigations/Philosophische Untersuchungen. (G. Anscombe(Translator). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.