Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
MAMI,A
rNc.,
Petitioner,
- yersus -
G.R. No.
OCHOA, fR., in his oflicial capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEIITA, M. DE LIMA, in her oflicial capacity as Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Information and
ROJAS,
as
BARTOTOME,
GENERAIJ
in his ollicial
.Respondenfs.
A.
PETITION
Petitioner PHIIJPPINE BAR ASSOCIETfON, INC. (PBA), by
counsel, unto the Honorable Court, respectfully states:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
it
Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 (Republic Act No. 10175) that was signed
S.
September 2QL2.
THE PARTIES
LI
is
duly
RON.f,LD OLIVAR SOUS. former Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission, and RODEL
A.
CRUZ, PBA
processes
documents and papers by the other parties at the address of its counsel-of-record, Solis Medina Limpingco & Fajardo Law Offices,
1106 East Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Centre, Exchange
Road, Ortigas Comrnercial Center, Pasig City.
EXCEITITENGY PRESIDENT
AQIIINO
the Constitution to implement the sarne. He may be served with orders and legal processes of the Honorable Gourt, as well
as
1.3
N. OCHOA, JR.
1.4
the Secretary of Justice. She may be served with orders and legal
processes
1.5
C.
CAS.EMBRE,
Executive Director
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), the inter-agency body created by said law for policy coordination
for the
formr.rlation and
as
well
as
1.6
is the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Under Section l0 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of.2OI2 (Republic Act
No. 10175), the NBI and the Philippine National Police shall be
responsible for the efficient and effective enforcement of the
provisions of said law. He may be served with orders and legal
processes
documents and papers by the other parties at the Office of the Director, NBI Compound, Taft Avenue, Manila.
1.7
2.1.
our
(a)
Section a(c)(a)
(b)
(c)
penalized
by the
as
if
committed by,
(d)
Section 7
offenses under
(e)
Section 12
given
to
by technical or
(5)
2.3.
the
to due process of law under Section l, Article III thereof; (b) the
copy of
downloading
at
http://www.gov.pb/ 2012/
/ l2/republic-act-no-
proceeding
I,EGAI,INTEREST
3.1
comrnunication technology
z 3
(ICT) in their
Yusay vs. Coutl of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, 06 April 20I l; See also: Ter vs. The Honotahle Court of Appeals, C.R. No. 164966, (2007).
See Afcentana vs. Ennila,,Reso.lufibn, G.R. No. I69813, (2006).
3.2
upheld (Canon
l,
4.1-
was
published
circulation.
in
the
Manila Bulletin,
newspaper
of
general
publication, thus:
"Section 3I- Ttris Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation."
Court,
2OL2,
t0
RELEVANT FACTS
the
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2796 and House Bill No. 5808 which were passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on 05
June 2012 and 04 June 2012, respectively.
signed into law Republic Act No. 10175, otherwise known as the "Cybercrime Prevention Act
of. 2012"
.
ARGUMENTS
I
SECTIONS 4(G) 4 and 5 OF RA l0lz5 VIOI,ATE THE RIGIIT TO DI'E PROCESS AS WEII, AS THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, oF E!(PRESSTON, A,ND Or THE PRESS THE I98Z GUARANTEED BY
CONSTITTTTION.
il
6.2.
deemed
"Proscription against prior restraint, however, is not sufficient as constitutionally protected speech can nevertheless be chilled by the sleight of hand of its subsequent punishment. This voice-of-Jacob-but-handof-Esau situation thus calls for proscription, not only of prior restraint, but also of subsequent punishment to give full protection to speech traditionally regarded to be within the purview of the free speech clause. Subsegnent punishment shares the evils of prior restraint as explained, viz.:
existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion . . . . .H, like threat is inherent in a penal statute (subsequent punishment), like that in question here, which does not aim specilically at evils within the allowable area of state control but. on the contrary. sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordina4r circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press. The existence of such a statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against partieular groups deemed to merit their displeasure, results in a continuous and penrasive restraint on all freedom of
be regarded as within its punriew. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
12
discussion
6.3.
Sections 4(c)
"(4) L,ibel. or prohibited -inThe unlavufulof the Revisedacts of libel as defined Article 355 Penal Code, as amended, committed throucrh a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future." [Emphasis and underscoring
suppliedl
6.4.
"Art. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."
6.5.
Ttrus,
elements must
radio, phonograph,
painting,
theatrical
exhibition,
r3
of the
6.8.
it
"netizens") in the varied ways this can be done in the internet are left unaware of how to express their opinions freely without fear of incurring criminal liability under the Cybercrime Law.
6.9.
clearly results in the questioned provision constituting a "chilling effect" on netizens communicating through the ICT media. Ttris is particularly true in cases of legitimate dissent or criticism against
14
2008,
Law
"First, although the regulatory provision contains an enumeration of particular or specific words, followed by the general phrase 'and other similar
'
Patay'ao vs. Jowlanos, G.R. No. 148408, (2006).
t5
senrices,' such words do not constitute a readily discernible class and are patently not of the same
be
the
"Section 22. No ex-post facto law ot bill of attainder shall be enacted" fEmphasis supplied]
action, done before the passing of the law and which was innocent
is
l5
Section 4(c)
of the
it
necessarily follows
that Section 5 of the same law should also be struck down for being
(b).
Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who wiltfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable."
6.16.
In
People
"x x x in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the
citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain
understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
t/
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.' [Emphasis suppliedl
an
or abetting."
6.19.
of a crime, or to promote
its
in the physical
realm, it is not difficult to determine whether an accused's actions constitute "aiding or abetting". To illustrate, the Honorable Court
and reasonable technical description in the statute whether an individual's actions already constitute "aiding or abetting" under
Black's Law Dictionary (9h ed. 20Og). People rzs. DeVera,312 SCRA 640 (1999); People rrs. Tannayo,38g SCRA 540 (2002).
r9
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous
desistance."
ICT
to the peculiar
is
whether or not such individual has not performed all the acts of
execution of such cybercrime.
the
commission of certain acts differ greatly from physical acts which are easily quantifiable as overt acts. Clearly, the intricacies of IGT
reprehensible territory of
unconstitutional legislation that allow law enforcement agencies to turn into roving commissions, particularly in cyberspace.
questionable
6.27. It is elementary
2l
it by Congress. This is
precisely the abhorrent situation that is caused by legislation that is vague, overbroad and lacking in necessary standards.
For this reason, the guestioned provisions of the Cybercrime Law clearly fail to meet constitutional muster.
il
SECTION 6 OF THE CY-BERCRIME I,AW vlor,aTEs THE EQUAT, PROTECTTON CI,trUSE GUABANTEED IN SECTION I, ARTICI,E III OF THE I98? CONSTITUTION.
6.30. Article III, Section of the 1987 Constitution giuarantees
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." "Section
6.31. In City of Manila vs. Laguio, 495 Phil. 289 (2005), the
l. No person
22
"Egual protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The 'equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.' It limits governmental
discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned."
6.32. On the other hand, Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law
provides:
"Section. 6. Ail crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (l) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be."
6.33. A reading of the provision reveals that the same is akin
(l)
a different means
ZJ
I) It must be based
if the classification or
6.35.
discriminates
between two crimes which have exactly the siune elements. There can be no reasonable connection for increasing the penalty
if
the
tz f3
SenEaJ
ng Pitipinas,
148208, 15 December
24
statute at bar, the State sees the need to protect and safeguard the
ilI
SECTION Z OT RA TOIZS VIOI,ATES THE RULE ON DOUBLE IEOPARDY GUARANTEED IN ARTIGI,E III, SECTION 2l or THE r98Z CONSTTTUTTON THUS,
voII)
"Section 2I. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."
6.38. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established:
to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.Ia
La
IJ
Parenthetically, Iegal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before
a competent
a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed
or
of
the
accused..
"Section 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or other special laws." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
6.40. To gain the
reads:
"Section. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Gode, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (l) degree hiqher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be." fEmphasis and underscoring suppliedl
above, which categorically states that a prosecution under the Cybercrime Law is without prejudice to any liability for violation of
any provision of the Revised Penal Code. rs
People 9s. Ylagaa, 58 PhiI. 851 (1933).
26
an
a
in
second
or
later
prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subseguent
inJormation charges another and diflerent offense, although arising
special laws,
In fact, the questioned provision has in reality all other special laws that impose
People
rr,
Quijada,259 SCRA
I9l
(1996).
27
under the Cybercrirne Law for the same offenses for so long as
IGT was used in the commission of the same offenses.
of the Cybercrime Law is exactly the same crime, with exactly the
same elements, as provided in the Revised Penal Code and other
special laws, save for the use of ICT in the commission thereof
who do not use ICT. Obviously, this detracts from the declared
objective of the statute and in fact retrogressive in this information
age.
w
SECTION 12 OT THE CYBERCRIME I.AW IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITTITIONAI, CONSIDERING THAT:
A.
6.46.
l7
See also Section 3 (0) and (p) of the questioned statute lor related definitions.
28
Court
"Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the rright to be let alone.' In the 1965 case of Griswold vs. Gonnecticut, the United States Supreme Gourt gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras
Amendments, x x x
toprivacy.xxx
Indeed, if we extend our judicial g'aze we wifl find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(l) of the Bitl of Rights
xxx
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights,
viz:.
'Sec. l. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Sec. 2. fhe right of the people to be secure in their persons! houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
29
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
xxx.
Sec.
including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. I7. No person shall be compelled to be a witress against hirnself."' pmphasis and underscoring suppliedl
6.48. The Honorable Court has affirmed that
our right to
'[elvery person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
and
neighbors and other persons' and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual
of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping
revelation
underscoring suppliedl
liable for damages for any violation of the rights and Iiberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Gode makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an oflicer, the
Iraw, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code." [Emphasis and
an
individual's right
of
agencies, upon "due cause", the authority to record or collect "traffic data" in real time, viz: "Section 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. due cause. - Iraw enforcement authorities, withby technical shall be authorized to collect or record
Traffic data refer only to the communication's origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
or
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
xx
breakdown the comrnunication process into three (3) parts: (a) the
6.51.
12 of the
it
communication's origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or tytrle of underlying senrice, but not content, nor identities.
the
AII other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a coutt warrant." [Emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
I{atz vs. United Sfates, 389 U.S. 437 (1967), which was cited by the Honorable Court
in
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowinsly extrroses to the pb!!g, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ,See Lewis vs. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 2I0; United States vs. Lee,274 U. S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to presene as private, even in an area accessible to the public. may be constitutionally protected, See Rios vs. United States, 364 U, S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
6-53. Pertinently, when an
to constitutional
protection
I8
The finer legal poErts on ttus matter are discussed in a later sectron of the Petitron-
33
6.55.
right, but such waiver must be clear and unequivocal and courts
6.56.
"Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 'Computer Use Policy (CUP)' explicitly provides:
xxx
of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create,
Waiver
5.
Internet
understand that the GSC may use human or automated means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
The GSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. Tttis implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that
the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes." [Emphasis and
underscoring suppliedl
Anonymous lretter-Complarnl aganst Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Mettopolitan Tlial Court of Manila, 5?1 SCRA361 (2008).
34
the
6.58. Thus, even assuming that individual citizens expressly and categorically waive in favor of their ISP access to such "traffic
data" as defined in the law. such waiver does not extend to benefit
the State such that law enforcement agencies may seize such traffic
prior judicial intenrention, whenever they believe that there is ttdue causett, to rnonitor, track and record where netizens
cornrnunicate, including but not lirnited to which sites they visit,
dft,
what they do
while in the virtual world, when they do it and how often they do
it - all without the netizens knowing it. All that the statute has to
offer is the feeble assurance that their identities and the content
6.62.
6.63. I'Due cause" that would justify the seizure of traffic data by law enforcement authorities was not defined under the
law
enforcement agency.
6.64.
"x x x Ttris is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Glearly. the indefiniteness of .f,.O.
No, 308 can crive the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN.
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal
misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some
[Emphasis and
the offending law in OpIe vs, Totres, supra, because of the absence
of a showing as to how difierent forms of data may be segregated:
address and other basic personal information about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will not save.H,.O. No. 308 from constitutional inflrmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and cateaorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purtr ose. These faqtors are essential to safegnrard the privacy and gruaranty the integrity of the information. WelI to note, the computer linkage gives other governrnent agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. \itltren the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an inbnrder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever puq)ose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
"We can even grant. argruendo. that the computer data file will be lirnited to the name.
Anonymous Letter4omplaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Coun of Manila, supra.
within the
suppliedl
system."
is an appalling
absence
of
adequate
6.69.
an
"Unlike the dissenters, we prescind, from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundatnental right guaranteed by the Constitation, hence, it is the burden of governtnent to show that A.O, No. 308 is justified by sotne cornpelling state interest and that it
is nawowly drawn. A,O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations:
(l) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
eradicate,
"Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes the vital role of hformation and cornrnu.nications industries such as content production, telecommunications, broadcasting
39
there is a need to "protect and safeguard the integrrity of computer, computer and communications systems, networks, and databases,
and data stored therein, from all forms of misuse, abuse, and
illegal access", yet Section
12 grants
III of
the
"Section. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affisnsfle4 of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
development. Ttre State also recognizes the impodance of providing an environrnent conducive to the development, acceleration, and rational application and exploitation of information and communications lechnology (ICQ to attair free, easy, and intelligible access to exchange and/or delivery of information; and the need to protecl and safeguard the integrity of computer, compute! and communications systems, networks, and data.bases, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of hlormation and data stored therein, from all forms of misuse, abuse, and illegal access by making punishable under the law such conduct or conducts. In this light, the State shall adopt su.fficient powers to effectively prevent arld combat such offenses by faciJitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and ulternational levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable internalional cooperation."
40
by a cold
and
of
suspicion supported
in
themselves
exercise of their judicial function. As such, the power to guash the same also rests solely with them. After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause
exists.
"The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the
it
22
23
2a
Clay & Feather International, lnc. vs. Lichaytoo, 649 SCRA 516 (201l).
41
be
examine the applicant for the warrant and the witnesses he may
the
Cybercrime Law, Iaw enforcement agencies are given unbridled discretion to determine what constitutes "due cause". As a result,
42
through its law enforcers, cannot make arbitrary searches against individuals based on the purported standard of "due cause" since
that is precisely the evil which the Constitution seeks to prevent.
traffic
CI. Valeroso vs. Coutl oI Appeals,sg8 SCRA 4I (2008) wherein the Honora.ble Court enurnerated
the allowable rnstances of warrantless searches:
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recogm.ized instances where searches and seizu.res are allowed even without a valid warrant:
[Seiaure] of evidence in "plain view.'' The elements are: a) a pnor vaLd intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence wjthout further search;
l. 2.
3. 4. 5, 6. 7. 8. 9.
Search of a movrng vehicle. HigNy regulated by the goverrunenl, the vehicle's inherent mobility reducs erpectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares fumishes a highly reasona-ble suspicion amounthg to probable cause that the occupant corrunitted a criminal
activitli
lnspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building
regulations.
43
through
6.80.
questioned provision
amounts
6.81.
analogy, equivalent
to mandating all
telecommunications
44
6.82. To
bill of a member
details will not be looked into -- for the moment. This is clearly
to a
which
will by agents
45
of the
a
in
an
internet cafe, has a reasonable expectation of privacy that such private information of his traffic data will not be intruded into by
the State at will. 6.85.
an
having
information on his or her traffic data by virtue of said contract, such consent cannot be constnred as having been extended in
will
much the same way why the State cannot simply seize and
examine an individual's telephone bill.
6.86. In the case of. People vs, Chua Ho San,308 SCRA 432
6.87. Based
that
6.88. Although Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law expressly states 11a1 11effic data does not include identity or content, there is
6.89.
is
further
47
in Section LZ of
the
to privacy and
v
CY'BERCRIME r,aw, wHIcH ArJLows THE DOI TO RESTRICT OR BIJOCK ACCESS TO GoMPITTER D.ETA, IS LIKEWISE CONSTITIITIO NAIJLY INTIRM.
6.92. Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law likewise suffers from
SECTION
19 OF THE
cited
Cybercrime Lawstates:
"Section. 19. Restricfrng or Blocking Access to Computer Data. lMhen a computer data is prima facje found to be - violation of the provisions of this in Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block
access to such computer data."
that the same nrns contrary to several constitutionally safeguarded rights, r'.e., the right to due process of law, the right against unlawfirl
search and seizr:re, as well as the right to freedom of speech and of
l,
48
6.94.
vs. People, 510 SCRA 429 (2006), prima facie evidence is such
"[e]vidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue it supports, but which
may be contradicted by other evidence". From this very definition,
citizen to rebut and contradict any evidence that the DOf has before an order to block or restrict cornputer data is issued.
for a unilateral
executive
49
growing presence in the internet. Today, a growing number of our citizens rely on online publication as their source of news and
inJormation. The Arab Spring was chronicled as one fuelled by
access
the
internet among
6.99.
provision grants the DOJ, senring as the alter ego of the ruler of
the day, the sole and unfettered discretion without any judicial
50
6.100.
6.101.
of
the Cybercrime Law should be declared null and void for clearly being violative of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
6.102.
Second, Section
I9 of the Cybercrime
Law
of
Section
2. Article III of
the
6.103. It is respectfully
5t
6,I04. A
decision
computer necessitates
Cybercrime Law. In clear violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the questioned provision does not require an
examination under oath of a complainant and the witnesses that
may be produced before a cold and impartial judge.
6.105. It is difficult to
block access to private computer data that is prima facie violative of the provisions of the Gybercrime Law.
Such
6.106. It
III
of our
Constitution to a cold and impartial judge who is rnandated to personally determine whether or not there is probable cause to
52
issue a search warrant, which may ultimately result in the seizure of our private computer data. The intenrention of a
in
6-108.
6.109.
6.110.
advance
freedom
of expression if
the government
could arbitrarily punish after the words have heen spoken. The threat
prior
restraint."28
6.1I
l.
19
54
restrict and block access of others who may want to seek their
views and opinions on pressing social issues-
6.113.
guestioned provisions allow constitutes a clear and present danger freedom of expression in our democratic society. AI,I.EGITTION IN SUPPORT OF THE PRAYTR TOR THE ISSUANCE Of A TEMPORIIRY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRrT Or PRETJMTN^f,RY INJUNCTION
foregoing
and
unconstitutional provisions of the Cybercrime Law as the same would cause grave and irreparable injury, not merely to petitioner
PBA and its members, but to the Filipino people.
q4
7.4. There
Court to enjoin and/or restrain respondents and/or any person acting on their behalf from implementing the Cybercrime Iraw
is
an
CONCLUDING STITTEMENT
never existed in a vacuum and continuously evolves
L,aw has
often credited for the speed of its spread and reach resulting in its
phenomenal success that ushered the age of information. It has changed life as we know it. These individual freedoms enjoyed
through the advent of new technologry challenges our legal system
world or the virtual world, must never reign. The RuIe of Law is
essential in our physical world as it is in cyberspace.
as
express our dissent against measures that allow the State to discriminate against netizens while grranting itself broad and
sweeping powers
fundamental rights that we have resenred for ourselves under our Constitution.
is relying on new
technologies and the power of ICT as an important piece of its reform agenda, we come before the Honorable Court seeking that the questioned provisions be thoroughly examined to determine
whether they pass constitutional muster.
WHEREFORE,
Honorable Court that:
the
L 2.
RESTRAINING ORDER and,/or WRIT Of PRELIMINARY IN[UNCTION be ISSAED restraining and/or enjoining
respondents, as well as all persons acting in their behalf, from implementing and./or enforcing Sections 4(c)(4), 5, 6, 7, 12 and
Prevention Act of 2OI2".
19
57
3.
(a)
(b)
of
Act of 2012".
RODEL A. CRUZ Counsel for Pditioner Philippine Bar./lssociation, Inc. Suite 347 Valero Plaza 124 Valero Street, Salcedo Village Makati Gity 1200 Philippines
Tel. Nos: 815-3080; 813-5631 Fax Nos: 813-5631 PTR No. 1404663 - Ol/O2/12 - Tagruig City IBP Life Member RoIl No. 4208 - l0/Ol/02 - RSM RoII of Attorneys No. 38789 MCLE Compliance No. III - 0016454 - 05/13/10
-and58
SOLIS MEDINA I,IMPINGCO & fAIARDO r,f,W OTTTCES Counsel for Petitioner Philippine Bar Association, Inc. I106 East Tower Philippine Stock Exchange Centre Exchange Road, Ortigas Commercial Center Pasig City, Metro Manila Tel. No. (632) 634 6788 to 89
www.solismedina.com
THUR ANTITT|TY S. ALICER PTR No. 7572513 - 0l/12/2QI2 - Pasig CitY IBP No. 88406? -01/13/2012 - Makati City RolI of Attorneys No. 56815 MCLE Compliance No. III-0010814 O3/20/2OLO
MI
PTR
59
1.
2.
have read and understood the contents of the foregoing Petition, and I attest that all the allegations contained
3.
certify that neither I, nor the Associatoin, have commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
4.
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency and to the best of my knowledge, there is no such other action or claim pending therein.
Based on media reports, there are other petitioners who have filed petitions similar to the instant Petition' However, I nor the ,{.ssosiation are not parties to said petitions. If I should learn thereafter that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending before any other court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency, I shall notify or cause to notify the Honorable btti". of such fact within five (5) days from receipt of such
5.
suBscRIBED AND ORN to before me this @- o"t of October 2012 in Makati City, Metro Manila, affiant presenting comPetent evidence of his identity, Driver's License No. N0t-12-007580, bearing his photograph and signature, issued bY the Land Transportation Office (l,TO)' with expiration <iate of July 14,2014.
Doc.
';
;
i ., ri . -..01
!1,'l-' j ii '- , ii:, ' ,. i i. *t -hln^'l:.,.1 ()r'r, r i .rrr, r,:,tr..r!,Crly i; (1. iioir(rl .{:t :; rj!;.in :,l.li: .i,' P lii .lrll.1,/l_ll. t-,1,]ii[ Itl')i.'. l:1'' .',:- .,-i!il1rilrr.in60
I
.1)
Copy Furnished (By Registered MaiI) Hrs ExcELLENCy PRESTDENT BENTGNO S. AQUTNO Office of the President Malacaffang Palace, Manila
HON. I-'EILA M. DE LIMA Secretary Department of Justice Padre Faura St., Manila HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE Executive Director Information and Communications Technolog-y Office National Computer Center (NCC) Building, C.P. Garcia Avenue U.P. Diliman, Quezon City
NONNATUS CAES.f,R R. ROJAS,
Director
National Bureau of Investigation NBI Compound, Taft Avenue, Manila
DIR^EGTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. BAR'TOLOIVIE Chief of the Philippine National Police
PNP Headguarters Camp Grame, EDSA, Quezon
City
OFTICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 143 Amorsolo Street Legaspi Village, Makati City WRITTEN EKPI-,ANtrTION
the same by registered mail due to the numerous parties to be served in different locations and the lack of material time and
manpower to do so.
61
BAR .C,.SSOCIATION, INC. (the "Association"), the petitioner in the instant case;
cause, as I have caused, the preparation and filing of the instant Petition, including the execution of this Verilication and Certification Against Forum Shopping. Attached is a copy of the Secretary's Certificate evidencing my authority;
2.
have read and understood the contents of the foregoing Petition, and I attest that all the allegations contained therein are true and correct based on my own personal knowledge and./or authentic records;
have commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency and to the best of my knowledge, there is no such other action or claim pending therein.
Based on media reports, there are other petitioners who have filed petitions similar to the instant Petition. However, I
3.
4.
5.
nor the Association are not parties to said petitions. If I should Iearn thereafter that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending before any other court, tribunal or quasijudicial agencyr I shall notify or cause to notify the Honorable Office of such fact within five (5) days from receipt of such knowledge.
OLrVAR SO Affiant V ,-lt. SUBSCRIBED AND S ORN to before me this lTl day of October 2012 in Makati City, Metro Manila, affiant presenting competent evidence of his identity, Driver's License No. N0l-12-007580, bearing his photograph and signature, issued by the Land Transportation Office (LTO), with expiration date of July 14,20L4.
Doc. No. Page No.
tilb -s-T-
EDUARDO
ffz,an
D. GAANAN. -1:.