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The Meaning of Words and the Role of Ideas in Lockes Semantic Theory
Paula Hicks

This essay discusses John Lockes semantic theory, found in Book Three of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. His overall theory is quite broad and touches upon the meaning of words, general classification systems of words, as well as the abuse of language and its remedies. The following shall focus simply on Lockes theory on the meaning of words. The general definition shall be explored, followed by a criticism launched by John Stuart Mill, and lastly an assessment of the criticism to show that Mills argument is founded upon a misinterpretation of Locke, and consequently the two theories are actually different formulations of the same principle. The simplest articulation of Lockes semantic theory is that words in their primary and immediate signification stand for nothing, but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them.1 Additionally, words do more than simply signify ideas, they are used by men to record their own thought for the assistance of their own memory; or as it were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others.2 Critical in understanding Lockes theory that words signify ideas, is the meaning of signify in Lockes day, as opposed to the present meaning. As Paul Guyer, author of Lockes

1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis, In: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), 178 (3.2.2). 2 Ibid.

Philosophy of Language, in the Cambridge Companion to Locke, 3 points out, to Locke, signify meant more than our contemporary term reference, and thus it should not be supposed that Locke means to argue that our words primarily refer to our own ideas.4 Guyer explains that signify, (significare) is a technical term from late medieval philosophy of language that means something quite general, namely representing something in some way to the cognitive faculty, and which thus includes functions like expressing, revealing, or making known, which apply to meaning as well, if not better than to reference (Ashworth 1981:309-11, 314).5

Furthermore, there were several schools of thought amongst the Scholastic authors of this meaning of signify.6 The prevailing view in Lockes time, and the one to which he subscribed, held that words had two functions; primarily as concepts in the mind, [] [and secondarily to] signify things, but by means of concepts.7 From this viewpoint, it should be clear that Lockes definition that words signify ideas means more than just the representation of ideas, but rather that words reveal something to the cognitive faculty. The definition of each individual word, cat, for example, is more than just a representation in the mind of cat or even the definition of cat, but the word actually reveals or expresses to the mind something about what a cat is. However, philosopher John Stuart Mill would later challenge this interpretation that words only signify ideas, or even things through the employment of ideas. In his work A System of Logic, he attacks this theory in the Second Chapter, entitled Of Names. There he is rebutting philosopher Thomas Hobbes theory, which is that a word (or set of words) serv[es] the double
3 Paul Guyer, Lockes Philosophy of language, In The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. By Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 120. 4 Ibid., 120. 5 Ibid., 122. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.

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purpose of a mark to recall to ourselves the likeness of a former thought, and a sign to make it known to others.8 This theory is sufficiently close enough to Lockes theory, and according to Paul Guyer, it follow[s] the argument although not the terminology of Hobbes,9 that we shall treat Mills criticism as also applying to Locke. Norman Kretzmann, in his article, The Main Thesis of Lockes Semantic Theory,10 was prompted to consider this criticism to apply to Locke as well. The main thrust of Mills criticism is that he feels as though words do not simply refer to an idea in the mind of a man, such as instances where the thing is not present and is thus simply being recalled, but that words refer to the actual reality of things themselves.11 He does acknowledge that at times words can be ideas, like the aforementioned instance of recollection, yet he argues that words have another role. This function is not simply the attempt to make known an idea one has to another, but rather, to actually express a belief concerning the thing itself, not concerning my idea of it. 12 It is clear from his objection that Mill makes a sharp distinction between an idea and objects or things. This is most vividly observed in the follow argument, [w]hen I say, the sun is the cause of day, I dont mean that my idea of sun causes or excites in me the idea of day : or in other words, that thinking of the sun makes me think of day. I mean, that certain physical fact, which is called the suns presence (and which, in the ultimate analysis, resolves itself into sensations, not ideas) causes another physical fact, which is called day.13

8 John S. Mill, A System of Logic, (London: Longman Group Limited, 1970), 14. 9 Guyer, Lockes Philosophy of Language, 119. 10 Norman Kretzmann, The Main Thesis of Lockes Semantic Theory, The Philosophical Review 77, no. 2 (April, 1968), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183319. 11 Mill, A System of Logic, 14. 12 Ibid., 15. 13 Ibid.

From this we learn that Mill takes a very literal approach to Lockes theory, strictly defining ideas as nothing more than thoughts. Furthermore, he makes it clear that these thoughts are independent of actual objects. Using this strict definition, his criticism makes sense upon first glance. This is because although there are times when words are employed to represent mere thoughts and to convey ideas from one man to another, there certainly are instances when words are intended to make a direct statement about objects in the external world. However, upon closer examination, it seems that Mills criticism rests upon a failure to properly understand Locke. Once this misinterpretation has been resolved, the conclusion that both theories are similar shall be easily understood. Essentially, Mill misinterpreted Lockes theory of ideas, which is a foundational principle in understanding his semantic theory. Book Two of Lockes Essay Concerning Human Understanding, is devoted to his theory of ideas. His definition from the very outset, in Chapter One, is that an [i]dea is the object of thinking [] [and that] [a]ll ideas come from sensation or reflection.14 This means that for Locke, everything we know comes from our physical experiences (sensation) or our mental reflective process, and that all of this information takes the form of objects in our mind called ideas. These ideas are further broken down into categories of simple or complex, where the latter is a combination of several of the former.15 Yet, there is still a deeper meaning to ideas which shall be explored, and for the purposes of this essay, we shall concentrate on the ideas of sensation. In Chapter Eight of Book Two, Locke explains the relation between ideas of sensation (also perception) and the things themselves. Again, he reiterates the meaning of idea to be
14 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 33 (2.1.1&2). 15 Ibid., 66

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[w]hatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding.16 However, in this chapter, he explains the way objects stimulate our perceptions. He posits that objects posses qualities which have the power to stimulate sensations so that we may form ideas of objects. In Sections Nine and Ten he distinguishes between what he calls primary and secondary qualities of objects. Essentially, primary qualities are what he calls the insensible features such as solidity, extension, figure, and mobility.17 Whereas secondary qualities are the sensible features we recognize in objects, the common way of speaking18 about an object, such as colors, sounds, [and] tastes.19 The salient point from this discussion for our present purpose is that for Locke, the secondary qualities do not actually reside in the object. These qualities are nothing more than powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities.20 This is an import point, in that it shows that for Locke the way in which we commonly think of and experience an object, by use of secondary qualities, is something that only goes on in the mind, and does not have an external reality that mirrors our mental perceptions; [t]here is nothing existing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves.21 With this definition of ideas and secondary qualities in mind, let us again look at Mills challenge that words refer to actual things or physical processes. In looking at the causation of day by the sun argument, he makes specific reference to the fact that by the suns presence, he specifically means the sensation of it. By use of the senses, we know the sun by its color and its warmth, both of which qualify as Lockes secondary qualities. Yet, as we have pointed out, Locke
16 Ibid., 48 (2.8.8). 17 Ibid., 49 (2.8.9). 18 Ibid., 49 (2.8.10). 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 51 (2.8.15).

feels that these qualities only reside in us in the form of ideas. Thus it becomes clear that for Locke, to speak of the word sun meaning the idea of the sun in terms of ones mental thought as well as the way Mill argues, to the thing itself, are one in the same. For Locke, the way we know a thing, and commonly refer to things are by ideas, generated by secondary qualities, and words are simply spoken sounds signifying these ideas. Through this analysis, it seems as though the point of Mills argument, that words refer to more than mere thoughts, would be agreeable to Locke, only with the understanding that the secondary qualities exist only as ideas in the minds of men. Further proof of this may be found in Book Four of Lockes Essay, entitled Of Knowledge and Opinion. In Chapter Four, Of the Reality of Knowledge, Locke explains that while we only know things through the intervention of our ideas [] there is conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.22 This conformity is the fact that while we perceive things primarily in our mind, there exists in reality an object with the ability to produce those perceptions.23 Despite the fact that secondary qualities are only in the minds of men, their potential is housed in the primarily qualities, therefore, our ideas do conform to the external world. They may not appear in reality the way they appear in our minds, but these qualities do correspond to something in the actual world; their potential. In the final analysis, Lockes general theory of the meaning of words should now be clear. Words signify ideas, and it is through the use of ideas that we gain knowledge about the world. For Locke, to say that a word refers to a thing, one must acknowledge that he can only know his idea of the thing. In this view, it seems that Mill and Locke have an epistemological difference.
22 Ibid., 251 (4.4.3). 23 Ibid., 251 (4.4.4).

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This is because Mill asserts direct knowledge of things, while Locke asserts secondary knowledge through our mental ideas of things (which, as mentioned above do have a correlation, yet not mirror reflection of the external world). If this difference can be put aside, it certainly seems as if both men intended to express similar notions in their semantic theories; which is that words do refer to things.

Bibliography Guyer, Paul. Lockes Philosophy of language. In The Cambridge Companion to Locke, edited By Vere Chappell, 115-145. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Kretzmann, Norman. The Main Thesis of Lockes Semantic Theory. The Philosophical Review 77, no. 2 (April, 1968), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183319. Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis, In: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996.

Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic. London: Longman Gourp Limited, 1970.