Jonathan Worrel Professor Rolf Johansson PHIL 101 Metaphysics March 8, 2012 Metaphysics (PHIL 101) Midterm On Universals

ls 1) Summarize a) Russells regress argument for the existence of relations, and b) Russells argument for the non-mental nature of universals. a) In his regress argument for the existence of relations, Bertrand Russell advocates a realist position on universals by undermining the logical validity of the nominalist account of relations. Russell begins by introducing a thought experiment asking to suppose a world where there does not exist a property of redness, but only red things. In this hypothetical world, for any object X to have the property red, it follows that the object must resemble other red things. Russell claims, however, that there is a logical regress in a nominalists view of this thought experiment. For when asked is resemblance itself a universal? the nominalist would be forced to admit that the concept of resemblance itself is not a universal. As an expression of resemblance relations, the nominalist would say A resembles B resembles B resembles C which leads to a non-vicious infinite regress. Russell concludes his argument by stating that the infinite regress is absurd and is something metaphysicians cannot accept. In his argument for the non-mental nature of universals, Russell introduces a thought experiment that presupposes Edinburgh is north of London is true independently of human conceptions of their two geographical locations in physical space. In this argument, it is assumed to be true that nothing mental is presupposed by the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation north of, which according to Russell, is a universal. In the second part of his argument, he claims that if universals were purely mental, no two people could simultaneously think of the same universal. (Russell p18) Furthermore, no single person could think of the same universal on more than one occasion. He concludes we must admit the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create. (p18) In other words, Russell claims that universals are ultimately the non-mental objects of thought, not the mental thoughts themselves.

b)

2) What does Price think is the relevance of the inexactness of resemblance for adopting resemblance nominalism rather than Aristotelian realism about universals? In his quest to advocate resemblance nominalism over Aristotelian realism about universals, H.H. Price asserts that resemblance, by observation, has two dimensions of variation intensity and extent. Aristotelian realism treats resemblances as if they were degreeless either present in maximum degree or not present at all. Price insists that Aristotelian realists avert their attention from the fact that very few resemblances between particulars are exact, and resemblances of a lower degree are neglected altogether. (Price p28) He provides an example between two pennies that are exactly alike in their shape, both classified as having roundness. He then compares the resemblance between these

Worrel 2 two pennies with the resemblance between a penny and a sixpence, where the penny has a smooth edge and the sixpence has a milled edge. He concludes that there is no single characteristic present in them both, upon which the resemblance could be dependent. (p28) The Aristotelian realist asserts that resemblance is derivative, not ultimate, that when two objects resemble each other in a given respect, it is only because the very same universal is present in both. Price claims that resemblance nominalism solves the insufficiency behind wholly present universals versus not wholly present universals by making room for inexact resemblances. Furthermore, Price concludes that in Aristotelian realism (the Philosophy of Universals), what holds a class together is a universal, something of a different ontological type from its members. In resemblance nominalism (the Philosophy of Resemblances), there are just particular objects without universals.

3) What are Armstrongs reasons for taking states of affairs as the basic ontological category? In Armstrongs theory of classifying the most basic constituents of reality, he asserts that philosophers should treat the world as broken up into facts and states of affairs rather than particulars and universals and the relations between them. Armstrong asks us to suppose that object a is F, were F is a universal. He claims that for object a to have the universal F, there must exist a state of affairs such that a is F. (Armstrong p74) He calls this observation the truth-making principle, which states that for every contingent truth, there must be something in the world that makes it true. From this principle, he claims that facts and states of affairs explain what may appear to be multiple locations for properties as well as the absence of location for relations. He goes on to illustrate that states of affairs may be plausible explanations for causal relations among particulars. For instance, the state of affairs of as being F may be the cause of bs being G, and so on. By this understanding, it is plausible to admit that in a Naturalist view of the world (where the universe is a giant spatiotemporal manifold), there would be an enormous plurality or conjunction of states of affairs in which all the particulars in those states of affairs are linked up together by spatiotemporal relations. (Armstrong p82) When attempting to locate the presence of universals in this space-time manifold, however, Armstrong insists that universals are constituents of states of affairs and that it would be rather absurd to place them inside of the analogy of a space-time manifold box. Furthermore, he concludes that universals and particulars are the constituents of facts and states of affairs, which themselves are the most basic ontological category.

4) According to Grossman, what are the differences and similarities between nominalism, realism, and conceptualism with respect to the existence / subsistence of a) particulars, b) universals, and c) the connecting nexus between particulars and universals? What is the main criterion or reason for adopting each of these views? Grossman begins his account of the differences between nominalism, realism and conceptualism by identifying two underlying ontological criterion that separate the theories namely, the independence-

Worrel 3 criterion of human perception and the naming-criterion of existent objects. From here, he asserts that Platonic realists are driven by the naming-criterion, for by this principle it must follow that whatever can be properly named by definition has the property of existence. Grossman gives the example of a visual field containing two red spots of the exact same shade of red. From a realists account, the spots of red are two instantiated particulars namely this red spot and that red spot and they both exemplify the same property red. In total, the realist accounts for three things together the two individual red spots and their one common property and claims that since this red spot, that red spot and red are all names, they must all exist in objective reality. In contrast to the realists view, Grossman explains the nominalists view as being one that is driven by the independence-criterion instead. In the same example of a visual field containing two red spots, the nominalist claims that this red spot and that red spot are the only two objective existents identified by proper names, whereas their shared property red is a common name or more formally, a resemblance between them. Unfortunately, this presents a problem for nominalism. It now becomes impossible to account for the is relation between this is red and that is red, and the causal nexus between these particular red spots and their shared common property now allows the nominalist to claim both spots as being numerically identical to each other and not separate, discreet objects. One class of nominalists hold that the red relation between this red spot and that red spot belong to the same whole of redness in the world, which frustratingly presents a fourth entity of wholeness and ultimately leads to a need for subtler similarity theories as H.H. Price attempts to illustrate in his position on the inexactness of resemblance. Nevertheless, a third intermediary theory driven out of the frustrations of predicate-nominalism is the conceptualist account of particulars, universals and the relations between them. As Grossman explains, both realists and nominalists speak of being presented with objects in perception through the faculties of the senses. A conceptualist, in divergence, will attempt transcend the empirical nature of perception and ask, What does it really mean to be presented with something that is red? (Grossman p249) From this rhetorical question, the conceptualist draws that redness cannot be completely presented to perception by a single red object perception can only present the particular, and in turn, only the confines of thought can present the general property of red. Furthermore, as with nominalism, the conceptualist notion of universals seems to imply that they cannot objectively exist, but can only subsist in the realm of thought.

Works Cited: Grossman, Reinhardt. "Conceptualism." Review of Metaphysics (1960/1961): 243-54. Print. Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings. 2nd ed. New York and London: Routledge Contemporary Readings in Philosophy, 2008. Print.