BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff, vs. FRANCISCO X.

VELEZ, defendant December 26, 1964 FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went away and Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not find this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public humiliation. ISSUE: Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages? RULING: The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple had already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.

DE JESUS V. SYQUIA (58 Phil 866) FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila. After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned. ISSUES: 1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. 2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco. HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status. Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the

amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.GONZALES, respondents February 19, 1993 FACTS: Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner. The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner. RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, deflowered her since she believed that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitioner.