180

Dan Sperber
theid. If we cannot be superior in the same world, let each people li v
in its own world. . .
The best evidence against relativism is, ultimately, the very acttvtl V
of anthropologists, while the best evidence for relativism to l11
in the writings of anthropologists. How can that be? In retracmg tluu
steps, anthropologists transform into unfathomable gaps the s?allo
and irregular cultural boundaries that they not so
to cross, thereby protecting their own sense of 1dent1ty, and prov1d111
their philosophical and lay audience with just what they want to hl'lll
Relativism and Universals
Ernest Gellner
pectre haunts human thought: relativism. If truth lllany faces,
d11 u not one of them deserves trust or respect. Happily, there is a
'' mcdy: human universals. They are the holy water with which the
Ill' tre can be exorcized. But, of course, before we use human
1111ivcrsals to dispel the threat of cognitive anarchy, which would
111 II rwise engulf us, we must first find them. And so, the new hunt for
1 lit Holy Grail is on.
The underlying and interconnected issues, as I see thj(!m, are these:
111 1 what is the problem of relativism, or rather, what are the problems
''' n:lativism? How are they related to the issues uniqueness
'" the existence of human universals? What are the geneTalfeatures of
planation of human conduct which are pertinent to tJhis? What are
!111 influential themes in recent though! which provide theterms and
'' 111nptions in which they are likely to formulate both questions and
''" wcrs?
1111rc are (at least) two problems, but those two probl,ems are abso-
'"'' I fundamental: is there but one kind of man, or are there many? Is
'"' l'l' but one world, or are there many? These two are not
"'' 11tical; but they are not unconnected either. But it is ciUite wrong to
''" ntify or confuse the two questions, as is sometimes done. The
ond problem- one world or many- can also be forn']lulated as: are
"" 1 t many truths or one?
I'll preoccupation with the issue of human or social 'universals' is
111 1 l'f ct a concern with whether there is but one kind of man, or
' tuhtlcd from B. Lloyd and J. Gay (eds), Universals of H;uman Thought :
''""African Evidence. (Cambridge University Press, Cambri.clge, 1981).
in Rationality and Relativism. Ed Martin
Hollis & Stephen Lukes. Cambridge: MIT Press,
1984
182 Ernest Gellner
whether there are many kinds of men; or alternatively, what shull'll
features unite all men or all human societies. This the unity of 1r11111,
rather than the unity of worlds, which is in the foreground of th
discussion. Yet behind this, one senses a concern with relativism.
The two issues are of course intimately connected, as indeed I
visible from the occasions at which the discussion strays from nt 111
the other: if man is not one but many, then will not each kind of 111 11
also make his own kind of world, and if so, how can we choose am on I
them? What happens then to the uniqueness and objectivity of trill hI
Our moral intuitions tend to impel us in different directions at thl
point. Liberalism, tolerance, pluralism, incline many to find plcu Il l
in the idea of a multiplicity of men and visions; but the equal!
reputable and enlightened desire for objectivity and universality I 11 I
to a desire that at least the world and truth be but one, and not m11 11 Y
(The tolerant endorsement of human diversity becomes very
one realizes that very many past and alien visions have themselv I
turn been internally exclusive, intolerant and ethnocentric; so th t
we, in our tolerant way, endorse them, we thereby also end or 1
encourage intolerance at second hand. This might be called tl
dilemma of the liberal intellectual.) By contrast, extreme leftist
sometimes addicted to the thesis of the plasticity or malleabilit y
man. This tends, especially in the case of Marxists, to form part 11f
polemic against the alleged habit of their opponents of turnin)C tl
conceptual artefacts of one particular social order into a human univ
sal, so to discourage any questioning of that social order.
The pursuit of universals, of the unity of man, is also on occu h
inspired by the desire to underwrite the brotherhood and equalit y
man. Whether indeed our values are or should be so directly 11 1 tl
mercy of scholarly fmdings may well be doubted. I do not antidp
that on the day of the publication of a generative grammar of colloqu
Bongo-Bongo, defmitely establishing the absolute uniquen
Bongo-Bongo syntax, I shall promptly conclude that thl al
criminatory measures imposed on the Bongo-Bongo by hostile autl u
ities are henceforth justified.
But it is, I believe, profoundly significant that by and large, wh I
the ultimate motive of the enquiry may be the establishment of
unitary world, the method employed is the pursuit of the unity of "'''
Yet the unity of the world seems at the same time tacitly a.11w
within the enquiry, as providing the framework within which II
carried on (even though one also senses the tacit hope that it willnl 11
Relativism and Universals
183
I 11 111 be demonstrated, through the unity of man).
I believe this to be significant twice over. It tells us something about
II II' urrent intellectual climate: we are fairly sure about which world
I ,. inhabit, and that there is but one, though we are much less sure
"ltnut the foundations of this conviction, or its precise definition. We
ll11 I with relativism, which we then try to refute by showing mankind
1
" h one, by means of an enquiry nevertheless carried on within a
llrllt nry, unrelative world ... We are less sure about the unity of man
"' precisely it would mean. This also constitutes a clue, to m;
11
11 11d, concernmg the only solution to which the problem of relativism
1 1 nlly susceptible.
1
1
1 11ivism is basically a doctrine in the theory of knowledge: it
1
'rt s that there is no unique truth, no unique objective reality. What
1 11nively suppose to be such is but the product- exclusively, or in
11 11' proportion, which varies with the particular form the relativism
1
'-of the cognitive apparatus of the individual, community, age or
hnl ver. (Relativisms differ in many respects, including the identifi-
11 on of the units to which the relativity is meant to apply.) If this is
tttlwl'cntly and necessarily so, then perhaps no sense attaches to
I'' 11king about a unique, absolute or objective truth, but only of a
11
tll lt or reality relative to the unit or cognitive apparatus in question.
I 111riously, there is no room for the assertion of relativism itself, in a
" ld in which relativism is true. The previous sentences have
ldtcd out a world; but if they did succeed in painting a relativist
"' ld, do they not at the same time willy-nilly say something absolute
'"'111 it? This difficulty should not be overstressed. It does not inhibit
'
1
11 l11 1uitive capacity for visualizing a relativist world; and to use this
I ti l It ulty as a reason for treating the fear of relativism as groundless
"' to me facile and superficial. Despite all the problems which
1
111 It to articulating the idea of a plurality of worlds and truths
""Ill ivcly this notion does make sense, and I believe this intuition
1 11 tilied.
Ntt ll however that such relativism is perfectly compatible with the
1 I 11 c of any number of, so to speak, de facto or contingent human
111
rtillls'. In a world unbounded by any unique truth, it might still
du ase, by accident, that all human languages had a certain
'''"'"'"tical structure, that chromatic perception was identical in all
rli 11
1
, that all societies proscribed certain relations as incestuous
1
, 1 I r. A priori one would perhaps have less reason in such a world
184
Ernest Gellner
expect that these universals or constants should obtain. This i 11
because one reason, but one reason only, for this expectation would h
absent in a 'relative' world: this reason being the direct constraint h
objective truth. 'Objective truth' being absent, it could no Ion ' I
constrain anyone. But other constraints could still operate.
If, on the other hand, in objective and unique truth, or in Ill
dependent reality, colours 'really' are such and such, and if c 11 nil
types of relationships 'really' are wrong and incestuous, etc., th1.n , '"
so far as the human mind also apprehends the unique and ratio11 I
truth it will be canalized into a unique, universal and constant moult I
Dive;sity of perception or opinion could then only spring from t h
presence of error. But truth is only one factor influencing the 11111111
amongst other possible ones, and incidentally not always a powt"l lui
one: so despite the uniqueness of truth, some societies might sttlll
under the sway of chromatic, moral or other error. In fact, sod II
have often believed this about each other, and sometimes about th
own past.
On the other hand, whilst not necesarily led to a unique posit io11l
Reason- which notoriously holds but a feeble sway over the hum
spirit - men might still be led to a unique position which was 11111 II
'right' one, and by other and possibly less praiseworthy factors. ' I h
might be non-rational constraints of a neurological, social or uti
kind, compelling mankind to remain within some moral, lin ui tl
other universal, even though objectively this single path wu I
unique - or possibly not even correct at all.
So it is conceivable that relativism be true, and yet human univ 1
obtain; and equally, it is possible that relativism be false, and v t
universals obtain (or only trivial ones) ... There seems noth111
least intuitively or prima facie absurd about a uniquely deti' lllll
universe, available in principle for cognition in one correct for1n "
but one such that, within it, inside such a metaphysically
favoured and attractive universe, it should so happen that
ical, conceptual, kinship, moral, etc., systems were so highlv
gated that comparative grammarians, anthropologists et ., h 1
despair of ever fillding any universal traits. A God outsid tlu
verse would know how its variegated sub-systems all sun""'"-
operated within one total system, without any one ofthem 1.-'11 !111 1
the totality and without any being mutually translatable. l11 11 I
this diversity extended to all aspects of life, things 11
become very difficult. First of all, if the cognitive equipm 11
Relativism and Universals 185
varies so much in such a unique-truth universe it follows that
ulltheir (with at most one exception) must b; cognitively in
1
JTOr, at least ill some measure; and their inability to grasp the others
uu tst them, at best, incomplete. There is nothing absurd, or at
lc ust nothillg unusual, in such a supposition. More difficult still if the
0 '
1
e_qmpment of societies differs radically, there may be some
old IJ_culty ill the practice of intercultural anthropology at all, for
1thVIOUS reasons.
It is an interesting fact about the world we actually live in that no
tll1h.ropol?gist, to my knowlede, has come back from a field trip with
tlw report: their concepts are so alien that it is impossible to
It rnbe the1r land tenure, their kinship system, their ritual. . .. As far
I know, there is no record of such a total admission of failure.
1
11
'haps sanctions applied by anthropology departments are too
I vtrc? Perhaps such anthropological failures do not present their
"" I.'S or even back from field work at all. This doesn't prove,

1 1
ntrse, that 1t has never occurred; and if it had occurred it would
""' prove that it was due to the inherent inaccessibility of the' material ,
1
opposed to the deficiencies of the particular investigator. What one
'"
1
quite often hear is admissions of partial failure of comprehension:
1 uuply cannot imagine what the so-and-so, a West African tribe,
"" '" they they speak of washing their souls'; 'I thought I knew the
I I ultiiHyan hill folk well, having lived amongst them for a considerable
''"' , but when a death occurred in the family, I saw from their
"1tons that I did not understand anything'; etc. Such partial in-
'"'P'' hensions are common, but they have not, to my knowledge,
1 I V
1
the drawing-up of an account of at least large parts of the
ltlltfc, language, etc., of the community in question. I have heard
''
1
tttlaropologist who had come back from a but-recently discovered
liP 111 New Guinea say that they really were 'very very distant' in
1 11 w 1 y of thinking, and implying that the strenuousness of his effort
1 10 be much greater than on his other field experiences with
1

1
' I'Uitural communities; but he did not report failure.
I tlttttk this is significant, and indicates something (at worst, it
"'" tttthcate complacency and a misguided supposition that we
1.
1
1 tnd when in fact we do not); but on the often rather a priori
'" lllfl of relativist philosophers, who start out from doctrines such
It ttltimacy and self-sufficiency of 'forms of life', we might have
' '
1
d such failure to be much more common. It is success in
' culture A in the language of culture B which is, in the light
186
Ernest Gellner
of such a philosophy, really puzzling. Yet shelves groan with th
weight of such books.
So, the truth of the matter seems to me this: the issues of relat iv1 111
and that of the existence of human universals, are not one and th 11 111
issue. The problem of relativism is whether there is one and om c nl
world, in the end; whether all the divergent visions of reality can i 11 I h
end be shown (leaving out cases when they are simply mistaken) tnl
diverse aspects of one and the same objective world, whose divtt II
can itself be explained in terms of the properties or laws of that wwl l
There are some reasonably persuasive, if not formally compdlut
reasons for holding the belief in such unique reality.
But this is not the same question as that concerning whether 01 1111
man is one and unique, whether in basic features humanity is inlc 11
ally alike, and perhaps also externally unique (whether all mtn 1
alike, and unlike everything non-human). Not only are the two qu
tions about whether there is one world, and whether all men ar ull
not identical, but the widely diffused assumption that a pu Il l
answer to the first depends on a positive answer to the second s cut t
me quite mistaken. In my view, the reasons for which will be HI V I
the reverse relationship obtains: the positive answer to the first htu
on a negative answer to the second. The uniqueness of the wntl
hinges on the diversity, the non-universality of man. There i ut
world only, there are many men; and just because there arc 11 1111
kinds of men, there is one world. Forthe unique world is the a hu
ment of some men only; and had men and cultures not been diver II II I
the single world might never have emerged, for social forms would 11
have differed enough to hit on this special one; and all this is ol tl
essence ofthe thing. But this paradoxical claim requires clarifil'uth
and defence.
It is, as stated, a striking feature of the explorations - one is tempi
to say, flirtations- with the idea of the diversity of man, of rud h
differentiation in the human conceptual or other equipment , I hut
carried out in the context of one unitary world. The assumptiou, II
becomes conscious and explicit as a result of challenge, can, I SliJll'''
be defended as follows: but what else do you wish us to do? Wh t'r c I
other than in the shared and assumed common world of the scknll l
and scholarly tradition in which we were trained, do you waut 11
carry out our investigation into the Diversity of Men? This doc II
mean that we necessarily grant that shared world more than a kitul
Relativism and Universals 187
11111 1 im status. If our researches lead us to conclude that man is
'''' ducibly diverse, and that each kind of man has his own kind of
11 tl d, then we shall accept and endorse that kind of plurality of men,
I Inns, worlds, and refuse to endow the unique world, within which
Ill t nquires were initially conducted, with any kind of special status.
It wus the door through which we entered the many-chambered
1111111 ion, but once safely within it we see that it is not a unique or
101 vilged door. This ladder we may throw away when we have
r nded ....
l'trhaps such an attitude is possible. But I doubt it. I believe that our
'''" hment to the unique world, within which alone the enquiries into
"" diversity of man and hence the diversity of his visions is carried
Il l , ls far deeper and more significant than that. It is not a world; it is
''" wurld.
11. ftll' discussing why this should be so, it may be essential to con-
t. I 1 as briefly and schematically as possible, what this world- the
tt ld - is like: what are its general traits?
I his one privileged world is a public and symmetrical world:
111 111 trical in that it contains within itself no privileged places,
""'' , individuals or groups, which would be allowed to exempt
J'I II Iive claims from testing or scrutiny. On the contrary, all claims
.. .tnll evidence are deemed to be ultimately equal: some of course are
,, Ill d with respect due to past distinction, and some with derision; in
1111 ll tctual matters as in social, equality is far from complete. But an
'' I 1 an idea for a' that: and their status differentiation is not
t. tt ll it , total and eternal. Reality is not ranked and stratified in
ltHty and availability for scrutiny, as it is in other and more tra-
1111 Htt l kinds of vision. Amongst civilized members of the republic of
'" t11 111d, it is recognized that in principle no idea is so silly as not to
t 1 Vt any hearing at all, and none so elevated as to be exempt from
'' 11 ion. All must submit to the same base-line of evidence. Quite
,,dly, this means that nothing is sacred. Decent cognitive com-
tiiiH' nt, the observance of proper epistemological rules, cast a
t1l111 izcd world as their own inescapable shadow. Evidence in turn is
lo 11 up into small packages, and is not allowed exemption from
< ~ 1 1 l 1 1 y . Practice may not fully live up to this ideal, but it does not
'I' 1 hrr violate it either.
I put lity of ultimate civic rights of all ideas and evidence, so to
cl , 1 m>t theonlyfeatureofthis shared and unique world of ours. It
188 Ernest Gellner
also has traits which seem to attach more directly to the stuff ol II
world rather than to the ideas about it (though this distinction 111
itself be questioned). What are these substantive traits? A kiaul
orderliness of behaviour: it is assumed that like causes will havt II
effects, thereby making generalization and theory-building po tl I
This feature used to be given names such as the Regularity of Nnlll
or the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and no doubt others.
The orderliness of the world is also assumed to be systematic 1
only are there regularities to be discovered, but they also fmn
system, such that, if we are successful in our enquiries, th 11111
specific regularities turn out in the end to be corollaries of 1111
general ones. Ideally, the system might even one day turn out
possess an apex, an all-embracing theory. In the meantime, tht I
ments of it which we do possess seem to point towards such an 111
and seem to urge us on in the pursuit of it.
What reasons have we to believe in such a world- and in its unt t
validity - over and above the contingent and in itself plainly in 1
elusive and indeed suspect fact that it happens to be the vision Will
which, at least in office hours, most of us think and work? This i tl
one world, within which we enquire whether mankind is unitary. Y 1
is itself the world of some men only (including us). Is it more than 11
our vision, is it the account of how things actually are? And if so, wh
There is of course no non-circular way of establishing this Sin
World or Unique Truth. (Other visions validate themselves by 11
own rules, and will not play according to ours. Hence any move wh
eliminates them also breaks their rules, and is consequently que lin
begging.) But there are at least partially non-question-begging wnv
supporting this position, and these are probably all we can ever h
If it were the case that there existed a number of centres of
sciousness or knowledge, each as it were plugged into a dift
cosmic programme, which in turn remained unrelated to each nth
then that would be that, and there would be nothing we could do nl 1
it. (I leave aside the intriguing question whether in such a univer, ,I
above sentence would not nevertheless contain a unique a11d
embracing truth, relating the centres and their experiences to
other precisely by the assertion that they are not congruent.) Buil l
does not seem to be our world. What reasons can we adduce in supJ
of such a conviction?
There are two converging arguments, the epistemological 01111 I
Relativism and Universals
189
,,, Htlogical. They need to be sketched out briefly.
f'h, epistemological. Here we start out with the minimum of assump-
111 , so as to beg no questions. Initially anything may be true. We ask:
ltw t'lln we pick out the correct option of belief, seeing that we have no
I''"" indication of what it may be? The answer is contained in the
pi ltmological tradition which has accompanied the rise of modern
11 Hl'c, at first to help it along, and later so as to exlain its miraculous
Ill 1 I'SS.
l'h answer is, in rough outline: eliminate all self-maintaining
"1 11lnr belief systems. As the main device of self-maintaining systems
I I he package-deal principle, which brings about the self-maintaining
Ill ll' of ideas, break up information into as many parts as possible,
~ ~ ~ . 1 Tutinize each item separately. This breaks up the circles and
I 1mys the self-maintenance. At the same time, assume nevertheless
'" regularity of nature, the systematic nature of the world, not
1 .. 1111sc it is demonstrable, but because anything which eludes such a
I'' llll'iple also eludes real knowledge; if cumulative and communicable
wlcdge is to be possible at all, then the principle of orderliness
1111 1 nlso apply to it .... The inherently idiosyncratic has no place in a
"'!Ill S of knowledge. Unsymmetrical, idiosyncratic explanations are
"' ll dcss - they are not explanations. Unconvertible currencies are
"'' ' uitable for trade, and ungeneralizable explanations are useless for
1 l tlt'l ical and cumulative body of knowledge. If like conditions did
'"' pmduce like effects, then the experimental accumulation of know-
,,, c would have no point and would not be feasible. Only theories
Iotti It 1)11 the assumption of symmetry and orderliness can be negotiated
tt ol upplied. Material not amenable to treatment within this assump-
""" t ' worthless, and must either be reinterpreted or discarded.
111 hrief: the atomization of information and the orderly systematiz-
'""' of explanation are imperative. Neither of them is established
' pi as a precondition of having real knowledge at all. But, ex
~ . Jrl/1/t:si, they do generate a unique world, one subject to a unique set
tluw only. Information is atomized and thus obliged to shed exces-
' nnd covert theoretical loading; and theories are systematized and
lou incoherences and putative idiosyncrasy are eventually elimin-
""
I,,, sociological. In our actual and shared world, diverse cultures,
"'"'' h not sharing their beliefs, nevertheless seem to have little
" '" hil' in communicating with each other. The world contains many
'llllnllnities, but they visibly inhabit the same world and compete
190
Ernest Gellner
within it. Some are cognitively stagnant, and a few are even regressive,
some, on the other hand, possess enormous and indeed growiu
cognitive wealth, which is so to speak validated by works as wcllu
faith: its implementation leads to a very powerful technology_. Then I
a near-universal consensus about this, in deeds rather than m wol'd
those who do not possess this knowledge and technology endeavout ' "
emulate and acquire it.
As it happens, the cognitively cumulative and cc u11
munities apply, in their serious intellectual life, an_
roughly of the kind singled out previously in specification I It
epistemological argument. Powerful technology IS on a sct_tm
which in turn seems to observe the rules of an informauon-atornm11
enquiry, and of symmetrical and orderly theory-con_struction.
The epistemological argument is abstract and, on Its own, shan II
the weaknesses of abstract arguments. The history of thought "'"
contain countless specimens of abstract arguments which sound pl uu
sible enough but which either failed to carry conviction or w
eventually shown to be false or both. The sociological argument cHI t I
other hand is crude and pragmatic to the point of meretricious OJll "'
tunism.
Moreover the conjunction of the two is extremely inelegant I I
epistemological one deliberately starts from scratch with the oht
minimum of assumptions, whilst the sociological one makes 11 II
present of the world which we think we in, of ?ur_ shared and nit
unexamined views of what is going on m It, and InCidentally ot "
rather crass earthy values prevailing in it. Thus, a totally impnu II
abstraction, an argument beyond all contexts, excogitated inn pill
tive 'cosmic exile', is fused with a meretriciously crude and nil "
worldly consideration based on greed for wealth and scramhl
power. What strange bedfellows! - but they do point one and t
way, and jointly constitute the grounds we have for choos111
accepting the unique world we think and live in. .
Thus for all the inelegance of their juxtaposition, the 11 11
this biz;rre marriage of convenience, and for all their great fault I
singly this conjunction and its two elements are the best we hu
most shall probably ever have, and they do, infact, joint ly
conviction and- I am myself tempted to add - rightly so. But I'''
that adds nothing (other than complacency) to the precedi11
ment.
But if it be accepted that it is by this kind of reasoning thtl I w
Relativism and Universals 191
a Singl_e World and Unique Truth, then the somewhat para-
doxical conclusiOn follows that a Single World, and Single Man, do not
o _together at all. On the contrary: for the particular thought style
wluch_alone generated this unique, converging, cumulative world, as
the obJect of human cognition, was not universally dispersed amongst
11
1 n. On contrary, it was but one tradition amongst many, and a
\lt ry one. It prevailed, and we hold it to be valid. Within it,
untl on Its terms, we carry out investigations into the other visions
whi_ch once its rivals. It provides the single context, within which
mvestigate and interpret all other visions. We do not hold it to be
vulid only because it has prevailed, but the fact that it generates a kind
"' tcc_hnology he_lps its adherents to prevail also indisputably
11 11 st1tutes a consideratiOn.
This position differs from pragmatism in a number of important
11ys. For one thing, practical success is but one consideration as
Indicated. This view asserts that a given vision is valid and therefo;e is
1'111 tically effective, but it does not identify validity and effectiveness.
llirrc is in fact no reason to suppose that effective science does
1111 r ase the survival-prospect of the species which carries it. The
' I I of humanity, through nuclear or other war or ecolog-
" II th_saster, IS perfectly possible and perhaps probable in the post-
'' ' lttlfic whereas mankind did not possess the power
'" dtNLroy Itself; and, owmg to its dispersal, was virtually certain not to
'
11
'' by any outside force. So if truth were equated with
It'' which mcreases the probability of survival, then science would
1tninly be untrue.
11111 philosophically the most significant and profound
111ft 1 nee hmges on the fact that pragmatism, like various related
11
1111l s in the evolutionist and Hegelian thought-styles; believed the
' 'I' 1 'ogni ve on, or rather practices, to be something ever-present
Ill tory (mcludmg, for pragmatism, biological history), only becom-
''1 vcr more effective and manifest with the progress of time. In one
11
11'111 N formulation of this kind of view, the amoeba and Einstein use
1
ll lll C method, which is the key to all real knowledge (namely, trial
11
' '' 'ror). On the view which is here advocated, and presented as the
11
1Y) way in which we have overcome relativism, or can ever do so,
1

1
l not a_t the correct vision or cognitive style appears at a
1 nile pomt m time, and thus introduces a radical discontinuity in
'"I y. Just as it is not universal in space - it characterizes some men
1
,t/1 men - so it is also not universal in time. Pragmatists and
192
Ernest Gellner
Hegelians believed in a kind of Permanent Revolution; the vnli I
thought-style or its nnderlying ultimate principle was confirmed hy
eternal repetition, and its authority reinforced by such reiteration. ( h
the ptesent view, no such reiteration occurs to underwrite the ( >n
True Vision. This difference is the crucial difference between th
nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophical uses of history. Tl
twentieth-century version has not yet been properly formulated philu
sophically.
So the Singleness of Man is not required for the Uniqueness of tl
World or of Truth. These were initially carried only by an ecccntrl
minority, and they are not underwritten either by human universnhl
or by permanence in time. This vision is underwritten- if valid at II
as I hold it to be - in quite a different manner which was bri II
sketched out.
So the universality of a single model of man, so to speak, is 1111
required for the philosophical purpose (the overcoming of relativi 1
for which it is, I suspect, often introduced. But, whether or 1111
required for this end, it also has an inherent intrinsic interest, 1111
deserves consideration for its own sake. So, what is the state of pi
with respect to the Universality of a Single Human Model?
There are (at least) two ways of approaching this: first, by as 111
whether there are manifest and, if you like, surface similarities in 111 1
and secondly whether there are underlying identities or similarit i
explanatory principle or mechanism. Furthermore, of course, carh
these questions can be asked separately for various aspects of hum
activity and experience, and the answers may vary from field to fid1l
A proper survey of the phenomena in each field could only ~ e CHill
out by competent specialists in that field. None the less, 1t mnv I
useful for a non-specialist to give a general impressionistic overvir
what the findings suggest, when such surveys are completed.
In fields such a sensory sensibility and motor performance, dill
ences do exist but are not very striking or extensive. It appears hn1 I
to locate them than it is to locate intercultural or inter-ethnic sin Ill
ities in these fields. Moreover, when they do occur, it seems qu
1
Cf. for example an excellent survey of this problem in connection with tl
perception and conceptualization of colour: Voir et Nommer les Cau/11
Laboratoire d'Ethnologie et de Sociologic Comparative (Serge Tornay, N
terre, 1978).
Relativism and Universals 193
11 11 onable to expect differences to be explained by the impact of, for
~ n 1 1 1 p l e , climatic or social environment on basically similar underly-
II If physiological equipment. So, differences are not striking and
"'' rhcrmore, they tend to become eliminated at the next explanatory
f, vtl. To put this in another way: men seem to move and act in pretty
IJII II'h the same world and with much the same physical equipment.
J' ruly enormous intercultural differences, on the other hand, occur
Ill l'l'l'(ain other areas, where societies, as one is tempted to say, are free
'" tudulge their fantasy: mythology, cosmology, metaphysics, and in
ll lll : measure, in social, political, ritual organization. The profound
IIId rndical differences in world vision between sophisticated cultures
"' ,. asonably evident: when they translate their doctrines in each
I h r's language, the resulting translations sometimes sound very odd
IIII IItd. Yet the translations are widely recognized as reasonably
,, ' lll'nte by bilingual or bicultural persons. In this area, the view that
du oddity enters only through mistranslation is implausible and
olilfii ' Ult to SUStain.
I 'h situation is somewhat different and complex when it comes to
l i 111 ifying and interpreting the 'world-view' of 'primitive' peoples,
1 1 hose which have no script and no clerical class to codify that view.
11 . , ,.,the interpretation and systematization is carried out by outsid-
' ( IU' those WhO Were trained by OUtsiders), and the view that the
oo idll y lies in the translation, and not in the view translated, acquires
""'' ' plausibility. In what sense, for instance, can a tribesman who is
"" 1 htologian, and whose society does not have theologians, be cre-
lilo d with a theology which seems implicit to the outsider in his ritual
,, 111 ylhs? This question is highly pertinent to the once fashionable
ll tthut ion of a distinctive 'primitive mentality' to populations living
111 11uplc societies; but it is equally pertinent to the more recent revival
o1 II II' nltribution to them of the scientific and experimental spirit . The
II< is open and methodologically difficult. Just how different one
"' ' 1 ltc savage seems to hinge largely on whether one goes by what he
I 11 which is not strange- he acts in the same world as we do, and in a
''''i lni' way), or by what he says (very odd by most translations), or by
'""' lhmalist interpretations of what he says (not odd after all), or
111 ll ur in the end one is swayed by the thought that though odd the
II I li CHt is context-bound in ritual (hence also not odd). And yet, its
"'1''11 '1 on him of the ritual hinges on it sounding odd to him as well, if
"'' pntcd in parallel with daily ordinary statements-and so it is odd
'" 1 nil. Asfarasi can see,you can pick and choose as towhichofthcs
194
Ernest Gellner
levels of sophistication you select as your resting-place, and luu 1
which conclusion you reach.
So to sum up: minor and so to speak explicable differen T
sensory and motor level; very great differences at the level of II
conscious, codified civilization with codified criteria of valid b lid
though interestingly a very good measure of translatability exi , t I
the same time which facilitates the highlighting of this 1
' -
does not seem to mean agreement.) There :m II
kinds of 'translatability' - from giving equivalents which are a 'l'tpt
able in one's own language, to declaring 'they say such-and-sw h
combining what seem to be equivalents of such-and-such notiou II
our language, in a way which makes no sense to us but does appl'lll h
make sense to them.' In between these extremes, dealing Will
societies which do not themselves codify their own views, one ih 1111
clear what one should say: the answer appears to hinge on just how"'
codify their views for them.
But the really significant difference is between what may be cull
validation systems: the procedures and principles employed l 11
extending and deciding the acceptance of new items. Primtll
societies do not codify these, and they can only be extracted from t h I
practice, which need not be consistent. Literacy, by a 11111 1
outside custom, or rather, providing the means for stab1hzmg Sil l h
norm, is supremely important. In the end, however, it is the estnhll I
ment and institutional underpinning of the one outstanding cumul
tive cognitive style, atomistic and symmetri_cal, which produ l' tl
really decisive parting of the ways. It is then that the practice ol 1111
men finally generates one world.
Such, roughly, are the intersocial differences at the
or descriptive level. What about the explanatory or structural ltv I'!
The Chomskian theory oflanguage may serve as a useful base lilt
precisely because it is so very clear on the issue both of the ' I' till
and uniqueness of man. If thattheory is correct, then human lmgut I
competence is explained by an innate equipment which is identi1 ttl
all men, but which is not shared by any other organism. The arguut 1
for the identity of this equipment is simple and important: tl w I
dence available to language-learning children is so very fragml' lll ll
and feeble that the transition from it to internalizing the COIIII ' I
grammatical rules involved in the generation of an indefinite d u
utterances, as employed by mature language-users, constitutes :1 I till
tremendous leap. But infants of any genetic background appear nhh t
Relativism and Universals
195
11111kc this transition to whatever language they are exposed to: hence
1101 only is there a tremendous leap, inexplicable without hidden
I ll mate) aid, but it also appears to be the same leap which is made by all
111nkind. If a hidden key (which is not seen, but which is inferred
lun our amazing linguistic competence), opens a multitude of doors,
VI' may conclude that the locks are identical.
Th_e t_heory claims the leap is towards one and the same underlying
lu HlllStlc structure. Hence the acquisition of familiarity with the
traits of individual languages must somehow be explicable
,, n consequence of the reiterated use of the same shared innate
pt inciples, as identical bricks can be used to erect different structures
. '
II !1lternat1vely, as something requiring only very small and hence
haps less mysterious 'leaps', which might consequently be explic-
d k without any recourse to the assumption of special innate linguistic
ti "ipment. To a non-specialist, this seems a difficult programme: the
tol111syncratic aspects of languages also seem most complex, over and
tlovc the complexities which they share, and the prospects of explain-
'''H them all in the manner indicated, dubious. I doubt whether the
''1-l' "nent for innate equipment loses its force even with the tiniest
h nps' . But we can leave that problem with structural linguists. Our
I" nt use of this theory is a kind of yardstick, and does not actually
,, ti uire that theory to be true or demonstrated.
Whilst postula:ting a pan-human shared mechanism as the expla-
WIIton of human linguistic competence, the theory at the same time
111 1 ts on the radical discontinuity between human language and
11d11utl systems of communication. Thus, on this theory, in the field of
11111 uistic phenomena, one mechanism explains all men, and nothing
I oii i men. The situation can be represented diagrammatically (Figure
I I, where horizontal shading covers humanity, and vertical shading is
olutl which is covered by the theory.
II IJ indicates the apex or genus, so to speak, covering all living or
B
Fi gure I
196
Ernest Gellner
biological phenomena, and H and L cover human and lingu1 t j
phenomena respectively, then the areas covered by H and / , 11 1
congruent, and jointly constitute a single segment of the b i o l o ~ i t I
More simply: the class of men and that of proper language-user. 11 1
the same class.
The thesis of the uniqueness of man, or of the existence of 'hum
universals', presumably means that such a congruence does hold . II
the fields of linguistic and other behaviour. Schematically, it Oil' II II
that if, once again horizontal shading covers humanity, and vert il I
shading cover the field of application of some explanatory theory, I h 1
one might require that situations should not arise which can I
schematized as in Figure 2.
Type I
8
T ype I I
8
Figure 2
T ype Ill
8
But it seems obvious that non-congruence of type I does ocnt
mankind obviously shares physiological mechanisms with olh
organisms. One's inclination is to say that these mechanisms expl I
aspects of behaviour which are not characteristically or distinctiv I
human. But if only behaviour which is 'distinctively human' need I
be explained by distinctively human explanatory mechanisms, lh
the uniqueness-hypothesis clearly risks becoming tautological.
Non-congruence of type II raises more complex issues, as does lVI
III. In a sense, it is obvious that explanatory mechanisms or structur
of type II also occur. Suppose a political anthropologist or a poli I i I
scientist develops a theory of all possible forms of political organ11
ation, by isolating the elements which go into state-formation, 1111
then deducing all the possible forms generated by their various con
binations. This theory- if the elements had been correctly isolated 1111
the manner of their possible combinations correctly described- woul
Relativism and Universals 197
1 1111 t itute an explanation of possible political forms, but clearly would
""' cover societies too small or too decentralized to have a state at all.
ould such a theory contradict the 'human universals' thesis?
. ' imilar considerations apply to non-congruence III. It is quite
I"' sible that some explanatory mechanisms or principles are applic-
.dtlt both in some human societies and some non-human ones (say
Jlltlllates, or insects). Does this contradict the 'human universal s'
tlw is?
<)nee again, this thesis risks becoming tautological or trivial, if it is
'' duced to the mere assertion that there are some (unspecified) human
1 planatory universals in some fields, covering all mankind, but
1 11 hout excluding the possibility of important specific explanations for
IIIII' men only in other fields. What presumably those who uphold the
iolt n of 'universals' mean, that in important fields (politics, kinship,
1 1 .;nomy, mythology, ritual- either in all, or perhaps more modestly
111 t in some of them) identical principles do operate for all human
wi ties: and if the uniqueness of man is added to universality, that
lwy operate only in human societies. What would be the evidence for
111 nJ;tainst such a view?
I 'nrtly, this will turn out once again to be a matter of definition, in a
o111111ber of ways . If some organizational principles only apply to, say,
ul'ieties endowed with agriculture, or to societies above a certain size,
tlun nevertheless pre-agrarian or small societies can be incorporated
'" the scheme, if the absence of a certain factor or variable (e.g.
IJoll'Uiture, size) is itself included as one possible variant in the range
.. 1 .ituations 'generated' by the elements in the theory.
In brief, in as far as theories endeavour to unify, the question about
till' unity of mankind, at the explanatory level, risks having a trivial
111 wcr, an affirmation which simply reflects our theoretical aspiration
t11wnrds unitary explanation.
N vertheless, I suspect that those who assert the unity-of-mankind
tlu Nis have a non-trivial point in mind, and one which hinges on the
.11 tinction between genetic and social explanation: what is asserted is
duu social forms are so to speak indifferent to the individual human
ott otftrial which is fed into it. Just as any man could have been brought
'IJ' 111 any language, so also no social formation depends on the genetic
totl'ificityofthe men composing it. There is a good deal of evidence to
"t'Pl>rt such a supposition: the diversity of human performance
IJ 'I" nrs to depend on socio-cultural factors to an incomparably greater
olo rr than it does on individual genetic equipment. The regions of
l
198 Ernest Gellner
the world which produced most of the innovations which lie at the b11 c
of modern industrial civilization, for instance, were themselves cui
tural backwaters a fairly small number of generations earlier, and ytt 11
is unlikely that their 'gene pool' changed radically. (If anything, 0111
might suspect that medieval clerical and monastic celibacy may have
caused it to degenerate.)
At the same time, the argument requires refinement. Genetic eqUip
ment imposes a ceiling on performance, even if socio-cultural facto1
are crucial within that ceiling; and a community with a higher a v e r a ~ ! '
ceiling would presumably have a different range of possible perfonu
ances from one with a lower ceiling. A community artificiall y
recruited, say, from physics professors, would presumably, in 1 h
next generation, have a different range of possible performance from u
randomly selected one, even if the two new populations were givt' ll
similar training.
In other words, if some potentialities are genetically limited (or
rather, if the limitations are not distributed with absolute evenness), 11
indeed is plausible, and if communities were recruited so as to accent II
ate such uneven distribution, we could then possibly have a so to Spl'll
non-universalistic sociology. This doesn't however appear to be th
world we actually live in. Whilst there is no reason to suppose that th
genetic ceiling is absolutely even and flat all over humanity, any m1u
than anything else is distributed with total evenness (such an assump
tion is terribly unplausible), yet the differences in performance by tlu
same and genetically continuous community at different times arc 111
much greater than are the differences between individuals which m IV
be attributed to differences in inherent equipment, that for mo 1
problems it would seem bad strategy to seek genetic explanations. It
seems to me extremely unlikely, moreover, that such genetic uneven
ness as may exist correlates at all with the historic performance of
communities. The two things are probably often related inversely. F111
instance: some gene pools must be richer than others in potential gmll
footballers. But is there the slightest likelihood that the point of hi11h
concentration of such talent is also the area where football historicall y
emerged? The same argument applies to other cultural achievement
But it would be wrong to treat any interest in genetic preconditions 11
logically absurd.
Those who exclude it moreover make what could be called t h
Continuity Assumption, which has at least two aspects: that, althou11h
the genetic ceiling can be assumed to vary, and that its distribution
Relativism and Universals
199
ell d not be even, any more than the land surface of the earth is totally
lint , nevertheless, it only varies statistically and the unevennesses are
nnt very extreme. If, for instance, a given social performance requires
clw presence of some individuals with special talents, i.e. with a high
t cling with respect to some specific kind of performance, then the
lwnbers required to ensure that some such individuals are found will
""' vary very much in different human populations. If a given social
11 durmance requires the presence of, say five people of unusual
tttnthcmatical potential, the population size required so that it should
IIII IHin five such persons may vary in different parts of the world, but
ttnlmbly does not vary very much.
The second aspect of the continuity thesis is this: that although
httcnnn performance or individual ceilings vary, they vary in degree
1111 h r than in kind. The difference between the ability to speak at all
111tl to use language like Shakespeare is great and important, but it is in
11111 sense much less radical than the difference between having and
"''' having the potential of speech at all. Not all men are Shakespeares,
!1111 nil sane healthy men have the power of speech. The genetic
I'll ondition of social forms consists of the former kind of potential
1 tl hr than the latter.
N ither aspect of the Continuity Thesis has been formulated with
111 Y precision; and perhaps it would be in principle impossible to do so.
' h 11 precisely is, in general, the difference between a difference in
I r e and in kind? Nevertheless, despite this imprecision there is
"'"ct hing like a natural interpretation of the Continuity Thesis; and it
I ttl o reasonable to suppose that it holds true. In other words, the
I nee of explanatory schemata which apply to some human
1
' ' ilt ies only, if such schemata exist at all, need not be attributed to
1111 non-universality of some human element, but only to the specificity
d 1 nc forms of social organization, which however remain open to all
htttlllll populations in similar circumstances.
ll w lc, as far as I can see, are the ideas or issues which underline the
fl" I ion about 'human universals'. The issue can be advanced, but it
111 hardly be settled. But to recapitulate:
I 'h problems of relativism and that of the existence of human
ll lil vrrsals are not identical.
l'h doctrine of 'human universals' is often tacitly conjoined with
ll mt ol' the uniqueness of man: the claim is not only that the essentially
200 Ernest Gellner
human is present in all of us, but also that it is not present in anyt hin
else.
Universality at the, phenomenological level is highly questionablt u
trivial. At the explanatory level, the notion is complex and obscun.
The solution of the problem of relativism does not hinge on th
establishment of human universals. If it has a solution, it lies d
where.
Relativism is about the existence of One World: and the concept II I
unification of the world is, precisely, the work of one particular sty I ul
thought, which is not universal amongst men, but is culturally sp
cific.
But this in turn does not actually subvert the Universality Thl 1
for although the conceptual unification of the world does have spcnll
socio-historic roots, it is evidently accessible to all men, and is in 111 1
now being diffused generally.
Science needs one world. It does not need one kind of man within at
But one kind of man did make the single world. His historical situat iut
may have been unique, his basic constitution was not. The single wurl l
seems to be gradually adopted by all of them, and appears m a n i ~ tl
accessible to all men.
Tradition and Modernity Revisited
Robin Horton
I INTRODUCTION
In an article published in 1967,
1
I compared and contrasted patterns of
thought in Africa and the West, taking Africa as a living exemplar of
' traditionality' and the West as the pioneer of'modernity'. I began the
urticle by elaborating on Durkheim's neglected insight concerning the
,ontinuities between, on the one hand the spiritualistic thought of
mtditional cultures in Africa and elsewhere, and on the other the
mechanistic thought of modern Western cultures. I showed how the
I ormer, no less than the latter, gave rise to theoretical systems whose
lmsic raison d'etre was the extension of the magnificent but none the
lt:ss limited causal vision of everyday commonsense thinking. I also
proposed a technological/economic/sociological explanation for the
divergence in theoretical idiom as between Africa and the West.
I laving made much of continuities between the two streams of
ll 10ught, I went on to redress the balance by setting out a scheme of
rontrasts. Here I proposed an amended and developed version of
l'opper's celebrated 'closed' /'open' dichotomy, with Africa
, xcmplifying the 'closed' and the West exemplifying the 'open' .
Finally, invoking once again a technological/economic/sociological
d tcrminism, I alluded to a number of factors that seemed to me to
huve underpinned the transition from 'closed' to 'open' ways of
1 hinking in earlier Europe.
Down through the years, this article has enjoyed a certain notoriety.
, 'orne few scholars have agreed enthusiastically with part or all of it .
1
R. Horton, 'African traditional thought and Western science' , Africa, 37,
I 2 ( 1967).