The subject of Hegel's conception of "Morality" can only be understood in the wider context of his system.

Rather than a simply- stated maxim such as Kant's universal imperative, we find a subtle and often frustrating line of intuition-driven reasoning. The conclusions of his reasoning themselves form a great circle as they can serve as the axioms by which the actually chosen initial starting axioms are derived as conclusion (____). In the course of this short paper, we shall examine how Hegel manages to construct from the notion of freedom and self the concept of Morality as a necessary consequence. In addition, we shall examine some of the details of Hegelian morality. In doing so, it shall prove helpful to say a few words about terminology. It is to this matter that we first turn our attention.

Perhaps, one of the greatest challenges in reading Hegel is becoming unfamiliar with familiar terminology. Such concepts as "right", "ethical, and "free" are to be found throughout his writings. Yet, they are not as familiar as they might at first seem. Emotional "baggage" is unavoidable when dealing with these terms; yet, Hegel uses them in an almost neutral sense with an often very precise meaning. It will be remembered that "right" is understood as "the existence of the absolute concept or of self-conscious freedom that is something sacrosanct." (30)-- and that the ethical and the moral are by no means synonymous in this context.

The notion of "self" is the starting point for much of Hegel's philosophy and a step in deriving morality. We might say that it is the concept of "myself" which gives rise to the notion of "self" in general, for it necessitates that there should be the concept of "otherself." The argument here seems to be what might loosely be called a "psychological" one. If there were only "my pen," then the "my" would be redundant with just "pen." No such term as "my pen" would ever be created. Thus in having the concept of "my pen," we admit other "pens." In having the concept of "self," we admit that there must be other "self's" such that the term "myself" needs to be distinguished from "to have identity." This is more than an interesting argument about how language and the mind works. It is a metaphysical requirement that an "x" depends upon its opposite for its ontological status. As Hegel puts it: A person by distinguishing himself from himself relates himself to another person, and it is only as owners that these two persons really exist for each other (pg56).

In conjunction with this line of thinking is Hegel's philosophy of freedom. It is clear that he accepts two main categories: the negative and the positive (5, 6). In the exercise of these, however, he sees a third and more fundamental form of freedom. By acting, we affirm our freedom. In this objectification, we will find freedom itself. Unlike the other freedoms, this freedom can never be stripped from us-- regardless of external circumstance. To see that this is so, we need only note that negative freedom can only reject categories insofar as they apply to the I. Once all categories have been rejected,

this leaves only the I. Thus, we see that the result of carrying the negative freedom to its fullest extent can only lead to one point determined in principle to be I. In a similar vein, the positive freedom can only affirm from a set of desires. These desires are not chosen by the self-- but are rather presented by the system as a whole. Thus, positive freedom is completely contingent upon other factors outside of the subject. According to Hegel, however, Free will which wills the free will (27) is contingent upon nothing but itself. From this, we see that freedom of the sorts known to exist from the start implicitly entails the existence of freedom which must be recognized regardless of external circumstance. This is defined by Hegel as the first and most fundamental right (36). Some interesting conclusions can follow from this if we grant that freedom is an integral aspect of the self. In brief, Hegel insists that in understanding ourselves as such, we must logically also admit the selfhood of others. With that admission, the freedom of others and therefore the rights of other selfs must be admitted. An interesting question arises at this point. If to be a "self" ultimately dictates via logic in that we must recognize the rights of others, does that also imply that as "selves," we can never encroach upon the rights of others? Can we, in effect, lapse in and out of selfhood? If so, then Hegels philosophy reminds us of Platos dictum that to know the Good is to do the good. The solution is not obvious to the us, but it does seem that we could recognize others as having rights and yet not respect them. Indeed this is the position the Hegel takes in saying (with regards to contracts): This performance is dependent again on the particular will which qua particular may act in contravention of right in itself (81). Because of Hegels belief in the rational necessity of "right, this right must take precedence over the individuals will. So long as the individuals will is at odds with respect of the right, then the will cannot be said to be moral. Indeed, to be moral for Hegel is precisely to have the will in one accord with the respect of the right. In fact, the claim being made is stronger than that. To be moral is to BE the right made manifest in the world (____). What may seem somewhat odd is that for Hegel, morality is an additional type of freedom. It is to this moral freedom to which we may now turn our attention. The assertion that to be "moral" is to be the "right" seems to arise, in part, out of Hegels strong distaste for accepting abstract explanations divorced from the particulars of history. In his introduction to The Philosophy of History, he points out that his view on this matter is not without philosophical precedence. He cites Socrates supposed encounter with the thinking of Anaxagoras (a natural philosopher) as how disappointed I was when I so eagerly took up the writings of Anaxagoras himself, and found that he brought in to his explanation merely external causes such as Air, the Ether, Water and the like---instead of Reason (PH, pg15). This is to say that Platos Socrates feels that broad stokes fail to capture adequately what is most important about the world process. To understand this, we consider the following question: "Why did the airplane crash?"

and then the response Because of gravity. This is true to be sure, but it is so poor an answer for what it elucidates that we are inclined to deem it false. This relates directly to the notion of freedom. It is not enough to have in mind some abstract freedom. For Hegel, it is a descriptive fact of history. Freedom is that actuallyexisting process which we are now embodying. If it were ever abstract, it was only in the sense of potential energy which exists as a concept resulting from the arrangement of the physical world. Morality is frequently considered a necessary-- but otherwise undesirable restriction upon our freedoms. For Hegel, however, it is not a curbing of our naturally-free self-- but our becoming a freedom that is more free. We now unpack this curious idea. So long as our will is contrasted with the universal will (as some wills must in light of the dialectic), there will be crime. The rights bearers (and there must be this as well) will seek to bring about justice. At all sides, there is myriad opposition to the disrespect of rights. The moral individual does not contrast his will over and against the respect of rights-- but rather recognizes that it is his own. As a simple analogy, we consider a child whose will is opposed to that of his parent. This child will find opposition in abundance. In contrast, for the child whose will is the same as that of his parents, opposition disappears without the slightest encroachment. To be certain that we have not misunderstood Hegel, we find in the text the following passage: The second sphere, morality, therefore, throughout portrays the real aspect of the concept of freedom, and the movement of this sphere is as follows: the will, which initially is only for itself and is immediately identical only in itself with the universal will or the will that is in itself, is superseded and raised above its difference from the universal will, above this situation in which it sinks deeper and deeper into itself, and so is posited as identical for itself with the will that is in itself(pg109). Now the concept of "self-determination" is introduced explicitly. This term is needed to remind us of the implications of saying that we are more than freedom divorced from actualization. In willing, we act with intent. In doing so, we immediately have a sense of ownership over the intended results of our actions. Thus we feel as if our arms belong to us because they are so intimately connected with our will. From the will into the universe, a wave of intentionality propagates. In having the right of ownership, we also have self-determination; in self-determination, the right to ownership. As Hegel puts it, The content of the subjective or moral will contains a determination of its own, i.e. even when it has acquired the form of objectivity, it must still continue to enshrine my subjectivity, and the deed is to count only if on its inward side it has been determined by me, if it was my purpose, my intention. Beyond what lay in my subjective will I recognize nothing in its expression as mine (pg112). The issue arises as to whether moral freedom is contingent upon external factors or if it is absolute (as we saw in the case of the first right). To answer this question, Hegel presents a neat little argument as follows: Since the human being wishes to be judged in accordance with his own self-determination, he is free in this relation to himself whatever the external situation may impose upon him. No one can break in upon this

inner conviction of humanity, no violence can be done to it, and the moral will, therefore, is inaccessible (pg110). The thought here seems to be that in wishing to be judged in light of our self-determination, we set ourselves up as both judge and judged of our capacity in this regard. The world may burn, but this courtroom is asylum for free moral will for so long as we shall live.