(READ) - Easterlin - What Will 1984 Be Like

DEMOGRAPHY?
Volume 15, Number4
November1978
WHAT WILL1984 BE LIKE?SOCIOECONOMIC OF IMPLICATIONS RECENTTWISTSIN AGE STRUCTURE*

Richard Easterlin A. Philadelphia, of Center, University Pennsylvania, Studies and of Department Economics Population 19104 Pennsylvania causes of fertility decline? new norm, caused by labor participation of young women
and highand immigration Abstract-Since 1940,underconditionsof restricted sustained growthin aggregatedemand, shiftsin the relativenumber of youngerversusolder adults have had a pervasiveimpacton Americanlife. short supply and their Before 1960, youngermales were in increasingly improved;after1960, the opposite relativeeconomicposition substantially conditionofyoungadultshas as was true.Since theearlysixties, therelative reduced. deferred and fertility deteriorated, marriagehas been increasingly of The labor forceparticipation young women has risenat above average rates,and thatof older womenhas risenat below averagerates.Changesin to of age populationhave also contributed a the age structure the working inflation. Cohort diand combinationof risingunemployment accelerating vorcerates,suicideamong youngmales,crimerates,and politicalalienation and rateshas beeninterrupted, have worsened.The risein collegeenrollment in SAT scoreshave declined.In contrast, the period 1940-1960,changesin sort.The United weretypically a morefavorable of thesevariousmagnitudes of scarcity youngadults Statesis now at thestartof a newperiodof growing ratedeclinethatset in after1960.This impliesthatthe as a resultofthebirth in of or 1980swillsee a turnaround amelioration a wide variety thesesocial, some of whichhave been takenas symppolitical,and economicconditions, tomaticof a hardening social malaise.
as a result of??
has inflation proveda sourceof embara (and, thereby, to rassment economists a around1960marked turnTheperiod coldelight to many noneconomist ing pointin manyaspectsof American for I experience. need not rehearse this leagues).On the social scene,therehas in a in decline fertilitybeenan acceleration divorce, risein the audience precipitous and an suicideratesamongthe young, Also wellratesthathas sinceoccurred. upturnin crimerates.In the political in shift the age knownis the dramatic in has in laborforce arena,there beena growth alienaof pattern increases female Someof system. the tionfrom established for rates-the acceleration participation have been takenas thesedevelopments for and slowdown older women younger Longsocialmalaise. a developments,indicatinggrowing these But women. beyond too, attitudes, appear cultural therehave been othermajoreconomic, established Therehas beengrowing On changes. theeco- to havechanged. social,and political and, childbearing more toward antipathy combination nomicside,the unexpected and growth, toward population and unemployment accelerating generally, of rising of as a questioning, neverbefore, tradi* Presentedas the PresidentialAddress to the tional women'sroles. Academiclife,a to concern manyhere,has been Population Association of America at its annual central in shakenby manyof thesedevelopments meeting Atlanta,Georgia, April 1978.
INTRODUCTION 397
398
DEMOGRAPHY, volume 15, number4, November1978
and others closer to home, such as the unexpectedbreak in the rise of college enrollment ratesand the steadydeclinein the SAT scores of studentsentering college. I thinkit is possible that these seemingly disparate developments-and, in fact, many others-are, in part (and I in stress, part),due to a commoncause, to a new typeof relationship betweenpopulation and the economy centeringon changesin the age structure the workof ing age population. These age structure effectsoperate largely via age-specific rates. Because of this, they have been overlookedin demographic researchthat focuses almost exclusivelyon compositional effectsof age structurechanges. And, ifI am correct about theimportance of shiftsin age structure, then the nearterm future will be different, perhaps strikingly fromthatforeseen those so, by who are extrapolating recent changesinto the future. is My interest notin year-to-year fluctuations or in verylong-term but in trends, so-called long swingsor Kuznets cycles, heretofore 15 to 25 years'duration, of that have markedthe historical recordof U.S. economicand populationchangesince at least earlyin thenineteenth century (Kuznets, 1958, 1961; Abramovitz, 1961, 1968; Easterlin,1968). Hence, the " 1984" in my title-I am interested in wherewe will not be next year or in the year 2000, but a decade or so hence.Thus, 1984standsas a convenient symbolforthe 1980s. The analysisrestson the view thatany projectionof the future mustbe based on a theoryconsistent withthe past. In consequence, I shall spend the bulk of my timeon the natureand causes of past experience. I shall range over several disciplines. In so doing, I follow in the tradition of a great social scientistwho introduced me to demography, and whom I miss verymuch,DorothySwaineThomas. Throughouther career-in her work on social aspects of the business cycle, on Swedish population and industrial-
ization, and on U.S. population redistribution economicgrowth-Dorothy and Thomas went beyond the usual confines of demography. seems most appropriIt ate, therefore, that this talk be dedicated to her. I should also like to acknowledge two othermentors who have perhapsunknowinglyleft their mark on this talk, Simon Kuznets and the chairmanof this session,JohnDurand. Finally,I mustadmit what you will see shortlywhen we come to the heart of the analysis,that I on have drawnfreely recent workof other scholars.
THE BREAK WITH PAST EXPERIENCE
Let me startwiththe assertion thatthe 1940s marked the dawn of a new age in the relationbetweenpopulation and the economy.Chart 1 summarizes essenthe tial featuresof the pre- and post-World War II contrast.The main point of the chartis thata reversal has occurred the in long swingrolesof aggregate demandand labor supply. Before World War II, swingsin labor supplyand, thereby, population arose chieflyfrom immigration and occurredusuallyonly in responseto corresponding major swingsin aggregate demand. Now, sizable swings in labor supply, involvingconcurrent changes in the proportion of young to old in the working population,occur as an echo age of priormovements thebirth in rate.As a resultof government management, aggregate demand fluctuates only mildlycomin pared with its fluctuations the past. Thus, changesin the supplyof labor now occur largelyindependently aggregate of demand. BeforeWorld War II, aggregate demand was the active factor in long swings,and labor supply was a passive factor;at present,the opposite is largely the case. Associated with this change in has demand/supply relationships been an approximatedoubling of the durationof long swings. What is the cause of thisnew era in the relation between longer term economic and demographicswings? Three causes can be given.
WhatWill1984 Be Like?
Chart 1.-Contrasting Patterns of Economic and Demographic Long Swings Beforeand AfterWorld War II Before WorldWar II Aggregate demand Since WorldWar II
35
Labor supply
investment Passive role:Relatively highand Activerole:Private in a sustained growth aggregate booms initiate majorswingin demand independemand maintained monetaryby aggregate of fiscalpolicy. dently labor supplyconditions. Activerole:Swingsin labor supply Passiverole:Swingsin labor and in proportion young of supplyoccurbecause of into old in theworking age immigration movements populationoccurindependently duced byaggregate ofaggregate demandas a lagged demandswing. of rate. effect birth 15-25years 35-40 years?
Durationof swings
First,severely restrictive immigrationrateof the 1940sand 1950scaused, witha legislation the1920s of meant sharp a cur- 20- to 25-yearlag, first growing scarcity a in tailment thelaborreserve hadtra- of youngerworkersand then a growing that the ditionally supplied demands major abundance. This is shown in Figure 1. of economic booms.Thus,in the1940sand (The underlying data forFigure 1 and all 1950swhenlaborforce growth from na- subsequent figuresappear in Appendix tive sources at an all-time a mas- A.) Note that between 1940 and 1960 was low, sive influx immigrants satisfy of to the there is a noticeable interruption the in labordemand a majoreconomic of boom pre-1940growthof the population aged the 15 to 29; after1960,growth resumedat didnotoccuras in thepast.In effect, is rolethat immigration served buffer a more rapid rate than in the pre-1940 had to of boomson thena- period. This pronounced fluctuation theimpact economic in tivepopulation eliminated there- thegrowth theyounger groupis not was by age of strictive legislation. matchedin the curveforthe older group. Act Second,the Employment of 1946 As a result,the proportion younger to of the to committed federalgovernment older workingage population, the solid maintaininghighand growing a levelof line at the bottomof the figure, shows a demand aggregate through monetary and sharpfluctuation theperiodafter1940. in fiscal policies. Also,thesubstantial in Throughthe late 1950s,youngerpersons rise thegovernment's of theGNP after are growing in relative scarcity; subshare to WorldWar II compared its sharebe- sequently,thereis a growingabundance to fore time that helped stabilize aggregate of younger persons.The brokenlinecurve the demand. Between 1942and 1974, an- in the bottomhalfof Figure 1 shows that nualunemployment roseabove6 per- this swingin the proportionof young to rate centin onlytwodifferent and even old is largely due to a corresponding years, thenby less thanone percentage point. movement the birthrate20 to 25 years in with prior Compared any 30-year period, earlier. thisis an unprecedented stretch relaof These shiftsin age structure-in the in tively uninterrupted growth labor de- proportion youngto old in theworking of mand. of age population-under conditions high for Finally, and most important the and sustained growth in aggregate dethe birth present purpose, declining rate mand and restrictedimmigrationhave ofthe1920s 1930s therising and birth had ramifications and that we are only now
400
volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,
scale million ratio 60 50 40 30 / 21 _alt birth rate, per thousand per year
3 I
-
Male Popuiption
Aged 30-64
I|
projected
pged Population 15-29

I
projected 0 ,15-29 cent
\CrudeBirth Rate 20-21

Y Years Etarlier
Ieratio,
I 2-
~~~~~~~Rt
20
15 1920 1930
Source: Appendix Table 1.
1940 1950
1960
19%40
2000
1970
1990
Figure 1.-Male PopulationAged 15 to 29 and 30 to 64, Actual and Projected,1920-1995,and Crude Birth Rate 20 to 25 Years Earlier
Notall agestrucof males. to Let to starting appreciate, me turn the position young income, relative work effects through and the causal ture natureof these effects do. of butmany them To maketheargumechanisms work. at I mentas clear as possible, shall make EFFECT OF AGE STRUCTURE ON THE assumptions. simple somevery RELATIVE ECONOMIC POSITION OF is of The essence thereasoning outlined YOUNG MALES fedisregard in Chart2. To startwith, of the Considerfirst effect theseage malesand supposethatthelaborsupply economic consistsof only two typesof laboron shifts therelative structure
401
younger and older males-as in theupper panel. Younger males are a relatively inexperienced and low-skilled groupthatis fairly new in thelabor market, withrather tentative commitments. This group,a job "career-entry" group,is engagedin a considerableamountof job searchwithconsequent high job turnover.Older males are an experienced, skilledgroupthatoccupies higherlevel career jobs and has relatively job turnover. low The degreeof substitutability betweenthesetwo groups is low, but notzero. Both groupsare fully in thelabor force; thatis, their labor force rates are close to 100 perparticipation cent. Now, assume that the growthin the economy's aggregatedemand for labor comprisessome normaldivisionbetween
(One neednot and olderworkers. younger assume that the demand for each group grows at equal rates, only that for each group the rate of growthin demand remainsconstantovertime.)Suppose, now, thateverytwo decades or so a substantial shift occurs in the relative supply of youngerversus older workers,reflecting age changesin theworking corresponding workpopulation.In one period,younger scarce, in the next they ers are relatively abundant. are relatively in Given the steadygrowth demandfor both groups,thesechangesin the supply of labor will createimbalancesin the labor marketfor youngerand older workers. What will be the consequences of these imbalances?As shownin the upper panel of Chart 2, a scarcityof younger
in of Model: CeterisParibus Effects Shifts Relative Chart 2.-The Easterlin-Wachter Scarcityof Young Adults AssumptionA: WorkingAge Population ComprisesOnly Younger and Older Males variables Independent Labor demand: growingat trendrates forboth groups in versusolder males due to corresponding Labor supply: large shifts younger shifts the workingage population in in Adjustments of If Abundance Young of If Scarcity Young variables dependent older older younger younger males males males males + + Wages + + rates Unemployment + + Occupationalmobility Assumption B: Working Age Population Comprises Younger and Older Males and Females variables Independent Labor demand: Growingat trendrates forall fourgroups in Labor supply: largeshifts youngerversusolder personsdue to corresponding in shifts the workingage population in Adjustments of If Abundance Young of If Scarcity Young variables dependent older older younger younger males males males males A) (same as forAssumption older older younger younger females females females females (-) (-) (+) (+) Wages (-) (-) rates (+) (+) Unemployment + + Laborforce rates participation malesand females malesand females younger younger + Marriage + Fertility
current Philippine situation more newly graduates are having a hard time getting a job
402 DEMOGRAPHY, volume 15, number4, November1978
to favorably their relative uates a possiblequalification thisarguworkers willaffect rates,and upward ment.) wages, unemployment A variety evidenceindicatesthatthis of mobility. The opposite would be true when thereis an abundance of younger has, in fact,been thecase. The dottedand an workers. There would also tend to be brokenlinesof Figure2 (updatedfrom some substitution between older and earlierpaper of mine) give some illustrasuch tive measures-for relativeemployment but younger workers, by assumption and There might also throughthe mid-fifties, relativeinpossibilities limited. are fromthelabor supply come thereafter. be feedbackeffects These showthattherelademand-affecting both tive economic position of young males side to aggregate of desince 1940 has, by and large, varied dithe size and composition aggregate mand. (For some discussionof this, see rectlywith their relativescarcityas inWachter and Wachter, forthcoming.) dicated in Figure 1. [For additionaleviThus, in periods when young males are dence relating to the period of see Easterlin (1968), pp. scarce, their relative economic position improvement, would improve; when young males are 114-118, and Easterlin(1973). For more to abundant, their relativeeconomic posi- evidencerelating the periodof deteriotionwould deteriorate. (AppendixB eval- ration,see Wachter(1976a, 1977).] as Youngmen'sincome of percentage thatin of family orientation (%) TFI R -75
Youngmen's employment of force rate(percentage labor employed) thatXin mil1y fa em ) less ployed lessthatinfamily oforientation points) (% . 10.0 -5.0r1/
O
TFR 4.0
t \
gOg @0* I
E
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ncome
-70
6
3.5 -3.0
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1 \
-65
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1EmploymentI -10.0 _55 1:
60 ~~~~~~~-2.5
t
_ 2.0
I
1940
I
1950
I I
1960 Year
2.
~~~~~~~~~~~~1.5
1970 1980
Source:
Appendix
Table
of Figure2.-Total Fertility Rate, 1940-1977,RelativeEmployment Experience Young Adult Males, 1940of 1955,and RelativeIncome Experience Young Adult Males, 1957 On
EFFECT OF AGE STRUCTURE ON FERTILITY AND FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
403
spouses experienced as they grew up, which depends, in turn,largelyon their parents' incomes. Hence, when young Next, let us add to the analysisthe ef- males' income is high relativeto older maymoreeasily on and fectsof age structure fertility females',it meansthatthey and their thatthey the male labor force participation.Here, I support aspirations in shall use what I have elsewherecalled potentialspouses formed theirfamilies Young peoplewillthenfeelfreer the Easterlin-Wachter model (Easterlin, of origin. and have children. 1978). The working populationis now to marry age of Now, let us considertheeffect imbaltaken to consistof fourgroups-younger and older males and youngerand older ances in the labor marketarising from of in are sizable shifts theage distribution the Threeadditionalassumptions females. workingage population (Chart 2, lower made. First,thereis a traditional divisionbe- panel). As before,it is assumed that the of tween male and female roles-that is, growth labor demandforall labor force males are the primary"breadwinners" groups (this time four in number)is at rates.One thoughnot identical, rates constant, and have labor forceparticipation whereasfemales'at- mightalso suppose therewas a normal close to 100 percent, in tachment the labor marketis less per- trendincrement labor forceparticipato manent (participation rates are sub- tion rates of youngerand older females. of stantiallybelow 100) and their primary Suppose, now, that thereis a scarcity is child rear- youngerworkersas a resultof a correresponsibility childbearing, age changein theworking popuing,and care of the home. This assump- sponding tion impliesno judgmentabout the desir- lation. With regard to the labor market abilityof thesesex roles; I view it simply foryoungerand older males, the adjustas a reasonableassumption about reality. mentswould be the same as those in the Second, thereare threeclasses of jobs: upper panel of Chart 2; that is, younger favorconsiderable males would experiencerelatively (a) "careerjobs," involving experienceand skill, that are typically able changes in wages, unemployment filled older males because of theircon- rates, and upward mobility.Now, howby the labor forceattachment and accu- ever, one must consideradditionally tinuing mulated experience; (b) "career-entry implicationsof the improvedrelativeinheld by younger come of young males forthe situationof jobs," that are typically males; and (c) "noncareer jobs," typically females. First, it would be easier for and start held by women.As a result, thereis only youngmenand womento marry dampenand This would,in turn, limited substitution possible between families. in the younger and older males and between perhapseliminate normalincrement of women -and men, but a high degree of labor forceparticipation youngfemales statusand childdependency substitution possible between older and as themarital toward of distribution this group shifted women. younger vary categorieswith below average participaThird,marriageand childbearing of withthe incomeof younger relation rates.The scarcity young women directly on tiveto oldermen. [In economics, rela- would tend to have favorableeffects the tiveincomehypothesis first was appliedto their relativewages and unemployment (1949).] rates,but,because thereis possiblea high savingsbehaviorin Duesenberry of The reasoningis thatthe relativeincome degreeofsubstitution olderforyounger would be relatively of younger men may be takenas a rough women, these effects ability moderate-this is the reason for the paindexof theprimary breadwinner's in to supporta younghousehold's material rentheses thelinesforthesevariablesin These aspirations formed the bottom panel of Chart 2. The more aspirations. are would be thereplacement effect that the important by the material environment
404
of youngerby older females.This means in that the less than normal increment participationrates for younger females would be compensatedby a more than normalincreasein the rates forolder females. [Wachter's (1972) empirical analysis of the effectof relative versus permanent income on labor force participation rates of youngerand older females supports this inference.Other studiesnotinga possiblelinkbetweenthe differential changes in participation rates and olderwomenand therelaof younger tivescarcity youngpersonsin thepostof World War II period are Bancroft (1958), Oppenheimer (1970), and UnitedNations (1962).] The entry olderwomenintothe of labor marketmightbe further stimulated by thesituationof oldermales,whoserelas ative incomesituation, shownin Chart 2, is unfavorable. we comparein simple If price-quantity terms labor market the adof for justments males and females, males the scarcity young personsinducesan of in adjustment primarily termsof relative in income,forfemales, primarily terms of relativequantities,that is, participation rates. This analysisalso shows that a cohort carriesits fortunes, good or bad, depending on its size, throughout life cycle. its The cohort implicationsof Chart 2 are and last seen by a comparisonof thefirst columns. Note how the signs remainthe same-as a scarce cohortages, it carries withit relatively favorablewage and employmentconditions. (The argumentis if most clear-cut theyounger takento are be those aged 20 to 39, the older those in aged 40 to 59, and a turnaround age structure occurs every20 years.) this is a highlysimplified Admittedly, view of the makeup of the labor supply at and thecausal factors work.One might, forexample,distinguish within group the males a "noncareer"group of of younger disadvantaged workers, and within females a "career" group of college graduates. I believe, however,that this view, simpleas it is, capturesan important part of the forcesshapingpost-WorldWar II
of Considerthepatterns fertilexperience. ity and female labor forceparticipation the shownin Figure3. (In the figure, ferperiod is tilityrate in a given five-year plottedagainst the labor forceparticipation rate at the end of the period; for rate example,thefertility for1971-1975is rate for plottedagainst the participation around 1940, therewas a 1975.) Starting marked break with previous experience. trendsbeforethe 1920s,for (The fertility which data are not available, would, of course,be downward.)Between1940 and 1960, the upward trend in participation rates of young women was interrupted, rose markedly.Particiand theirfertility pation rates of older women,which had previously shown only mild increases, shot up dramatically.Since 1960, there of has been a reversalin thisage pattern participation rates-rates for younger whilethosefor womenhave risensharply, older women have risen only slowly or leveled off. At the same time, a sharp in has downturn fertility occurred. back to the lower panel of Referring Chart 2, one finds that the analytical behaviorof modeljust sketched generates just this type-an inverseassociation bein tweenthegrowth labor forceparticipationratesofyounger versusolderwomen, the an inverse associationbetween growth in labor force participationof younger and women and theirfertility, a positive association betweenthe growthin labor force participationof older women and women.But fertilthe fertility younger of rate ityis notcausingparticipation change or vice versa.Rather,all of thesedevelopmentsflowfromthe imbalancein the labor markets of younger versus older in workersdue to shifts the relativesupplies of the two groups. I am not claimingthat the model explains completely the magnitudes of change observed; it clearly neglects,for of example,the determinants the general upwardtrendin labor forceparticipation rates of femalesas a whole. It does capthe ture,however, essentialoutlinesofthe long-termswings since 1940, and, for
WhatWill1984 Be Like? LFPR, % 20-24 I " 200-200 '

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Tables 3 and 4.
1920
2ata Comparable
Source:
Appendix
= and Quinquennially, and Ratesfor 1950-1975, Index (1940-1945 100)ofFertility Age Specified Groups,
1921-1925to 1971-1975 QuinquennialAverages(9
Rates of Females Aged 20+, byAge Group, Decennially,1890-1950a, Figure3.-Labor Force Participation
some variables,it may even do well on by This is suggested Figure2, magnitudes. rate shows a in which the total fertility clear parallelwithrelativeincomeand its rate.It proxybased on theunemployment in illustrated Figure4, in which is further ratesincethelate 1930sis plotted thebirth againstage structure-inthiscase, thera-
males, theinverse tio of older to younger of the solid curveat thebottomof Figure 1. The two curves are not identical,but is the similarity striking-theswingin the ratelooks verymuchlike thatin the birth relative number of older to younger males. (Figure 4 looks much the same if thetotalfertility is used insteadofthe rate
406
per thousand per year
birth rate,
Crude irthRate in i Currenlt5 Years
Iag
rtge ratio
25 20 _~~~ I/ /
2.2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ r1ae30-64
15
I
/ I
~~~~projected 1970 1980 1990 2000
~~~15-291. 1940 '190
1950
Source:
Append.ix Table
5.
Figure4.-Ratio of Males Aged 30 to 64 to Males Aged 15 to 29, Actual and Projected,1940on, and Crude BirthRate, 1935-1940to 1970-1975
the crude birth rate,and Figure2 looks much tivity, tentativeness their of job comand the same if the crude birthrate is used mitments, so on. Withoutanychange in the unemployment insteadof the total fertility rate.) rate foreach older or younger group,a risein theproportion EFFECT OF AGE STRUCTURE ON of younger workers in the labor force ECONOMIC STABILITY (thatis, in theproportion thosesubject of rates)would,other We can build on the foregoing analysis to highunemployment raise the economyto show how shifts age structure in since thingsbeingconstant, rate.This is thestan1940 have contributed the macroeco- wide unemployment to nomic problem of risingunemployment dard age composition effectof democombined with accelerating inflation. graphic analysis. But, as shown in the Here, I shall again borrow in part from rightside of Chart 2, an abundance of researchdone by my coworker,Michael youngerworkerswould also affectageWachter(Wachter, 1976a, 1976b; Wach- specific unemployment those rates,raising ter and Wachter,forthcoming; Easterlin of youngerworkersrelativeto those of older workers, and thiswould further inet al., 1978). unemployment First, note that the developments crease the economy-wide are sketchedin Chart 2 would tend,in a pe- rate.The ratesforolder workers typiis room for riod of growing abundance of younger callyquitelow, and there little in workers, raise the economy-wide to aver- a changeof much magnitude the rates age unemployment rate. The economy- for these groups. But there could be a changein theratesforyounger wide rate can be viewedas an averageof substantial two component rates-a low rate for persons,males and females.In fact,since has olderworkers and a highrateforyounger the 1950sthere been a markeddeteriorates workers, latter the reflecting their newness rationin the relativeunemployment men and women. in the labor market, their job-seekingac- of younger
407
of the Consider,now, the implications this mixof the labor supply, extrademand foreconomic stabilization policy. Mone- does not correspondto this alteredmix. tary and fiscal policies to correctunem- Given imperfect substitution between the conditionsare geared to affect- older and youngerworkers, extradeployment ing the overalllevelof aggregate demand, mand generatesrelatively littleimprovebut not thestructure thatdemand.Spe- mentin employment of conditionsand spills and fiscalpolicies are over into priceincreases-hence, thephecifically, monetary rate not shaped to influence the nomenon of a risingunemployment differentially inflation. relativedemands fortwo groups,such as coupled withaccelerating so youngerand older workers, as to comThe relevanceof this argumentto reis by pensate forchangesin theirrelativesup- centAmericanexperience illustrated ply. But,as we havejust seen,undergiven the series plotted in Figure 5. The solid conditions of aggregatedemand, an in- linecurvelabeled UNI chartsthecourseof crease in the relativesupply of younger the "fullemployment" ratethatwould be workers would tendto raisetheeconomy- consistent of withthe changingeffect the wide unemployment rate.If monetary-fis-population'sage mixon labor supplyconcal policy is initiatedto correcta rising ditionsin our economy,as estimatedby unemployment caused by an altered Wachter.Note how UNI swingsupward, rate
per cent 7-
UnemploymientRate (annutlly)
'I~~~~~~~~~O
5_ j 'J
t
projected
per cent peryear
GrowthRate of Consumer
I \(annual)
Source:
Appendix Table
6.
Rate Figure 5.-Unemployment UNI andGrowth Price IndexSinceWorld War eI RateofConsumer
408
after late 1950s, to therisein the tive the due income relative or status notions have proportion young of in working never adults the beentheprivate preserve econoof in age population shown Figure1. As it mists. Quite the contrary-economists swings upward, however,the actual cametothescene late (relatively) andeven unemployment in the 1960s,shown todayare,forthemostpart, rate restrongly bythebroken which reflects im- sistant suchnotions. contrast, line, the to In there pactofaggregate demand gov- is a strong tradition sociology in and,thus, running ernment monetary-fiscal as wellas from Durkheim's theory of anomie policy supply, movesbelow UNI. Reference through to Stouffer's on relative work deprithetwolowercurves showsthatit is just vationdown to the present, whichsees aboutat this time that average the annual relative status considerations pervasive as rateofprice increase from level rises a not in social phenomena (Durkheim, 1951; much abovezeroto theincreasingly high Stouffer al., 1949).Let me citetwoexet levels recent of in years. Thisrise theinfla- amplesfromrecent workby demogrationrateis, in part,the consequence phers of whohavestrayed somewhat beyond to an attempting correct imbalance the theusualconfines their on in field. labor supply side withinappropriate agFigure is taken 6 from paperbySama gregate demand policies. uel Preston and JohnMcDonald (1977) Accelerating inflation UNI rises not that presents as is historical estimates diof an inevitable result aggregate of demand vorceby marriage cohort and then-our management. Over the past decade,the interest here-speculates the causal on and monetary fiscalauthorities seemto factors work. at The point Figure is of 6 have underestimated effect thede- thata trend-adjusted for the of series cohort dion mographic swing thesustainable, non- vorce ratesshowsa longswing much like inflationary unemployment Main- thatin fertility, rate. the although relationship old taining unemployment for targets too is inverse. Thus, the trough children in in long resulted overexpansive demand everbornforthecohort first in married in policiesand an increase the inflation 1930-1934 accompanied a peak in is by rate. Moreover, higher a inflation rate thetrend-deviation divorce. next for The for persisted some timeafter aggregate turning in points thetwoseries close, are demand down- but not identical: had policy beenreadjusted to corresponding the ward,becauseof thelaggedresponse fertility forthemarriage of peak cohort of and built the 1950-1954, into expectations, theinertia there a trough thetrend is in due of economy tothe presence fixed price deviation divorcefor the cohortof in and wage contracts. the sustainable 1945-1949. general, the marriage If In for rate deunemployment through aggregate cohorts produced babyboom, that the dimand management could be estimated vorce wasconsiderably belowtherateexwith accuracy,and if the government on pected thebasisofpasttrends. the For adoptedthatrate as the target ratefor most recent marriage as cohorts, their ferdemandmanagement, the correla- tility turned then has divorce downward, has tion between and rising unemployment risen toward trend rates. ininflation would broken, be accelerating A close associationbetweenfertility sofaras thatcorrelation due to theal- and anothersocial magnitude, is suicide tered laborsupply mix. among has young males, beenpointed out and studied Martin by O'Connell(1975). EFFECT OF AGE STRUCTURE ON For theperiod1940-1976 the (excluding SOCIAL VARIABLES waryears1941-1945), correlation the beLet me turn to briefly somesocialand tweenthe total fertility of females rate of effects therecent shifts age aged15to49 andthesuicide ofmales in political rate structure. The theoretical underpinning aged 15to24 is - .88,between fertility the forsucheffects straightforward. is Rela- rateandthesuicide rateofmalesaged25
409
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I . III<
410
againtherela- evidence significant to 34,also -.88. Notethat among of differences fertility goes demographic groupsin thedata for tionship inverse-higher is age with lower suicide. politicalalienation.But these are exof and Suchcorrelations divorce suicide amplesof variables thatin sociological imply theory with fertility not necessarily do status influrelative shouldreflect I argued thatthe ences,and there a hint theevidence causality. havealready in is the in inverse correlation between growth that thisis thecase. of felabor force participation younger EFFECT OF AGE STRUCTURE ON is malesand their fertility due,not to a HIGHER EDUCATION relation between two,but the cause-effect of I want conclude discussion the this to to a common to response thesamecause, of noting by relative income. Both the Preston- effects age structure briefly imimportant that identify studies suggest two studies McDonaldandO'Connell on environment-one thatthesameis trueforthecorrelationspactson thecollege on enrollment and theother rates theyobserve. [Simon(1968, 1969,1975) college to relative-income-type scores.In each case, in contrast SAT developed analogous and has modelsto explainfertility suicide.] theforegoing, structure itseffect age my lag. a Both the Preston-McDonald and with substantial As before, interage working through on O'Connellstudies, drawing thelitera- est is notin effects for income hypothesis composition such(although college as ture, advance relative a this is in different and enrollments effect an important form) (though somewhat on The working agetestforitsexplanatory power. results one), but in influences in are positive-a deterioration relative specific rates. which, as for fre- Letmestart with SAT scores, income theyoung of makes more divorce a riseinsuicide and among shownin Figure8, have been declining quent has youngmales;and improvement the sincethe early1960s.RobertZajonc, a social psychologist the University at of effect. opposite whoseworkthischart is from is income Ifa relative mechanism influ- Michigan, of has an and should its taken, offered explanation this not encing divorce suicide, in effects apparent othersocial phe- decline based on average birthorder be a havefound low is The answer, course, yes; (1976).Variousstudies of nomena? between birth association in that but significant andthere somehints therecord are birth and homicide 7 are. rates, order intelligence-higher order they Figure presents withslightly lowerinas which mayperhaps taken represen- beingcorrelated be The War II baby of and telligence. post-World moregenerally crime rates, tative in in two measures of political alienation boom resulted an increase average order.This is shownby thelower are birth the the Although series among young. in is of for there curve Figure which plotted inis 8, and short notadjusted trends, year form. Thosebornin a given of a common pattern-asuggestion slight verted to improvement around 1960 (a down- take theirSATs about 17 yearslater. in to and according Zajonc,thedecline wardmovement thecurves) a no- Hence, of in thereafter up- SATs thatstarted the 1960scan be ticeabledeterioration (an with back to babyboom cohorts ward movement). (Evidence that the traced order. rising averagebirth recent in crime rise ratesreflects changes progressively whenthecurves for in age-specific as wellas in theage As Figure8 shows, rates birth are order plotted in SATs and average is of composition thepopulation given for allowance theleadthat withappropriate Wellford, 1973.)I am not claiming a they income"are lag relationship, do exhibit suband age structure "relative similarity. in stantial 1940 the wholestory thepostof change has there beena puzSinceabout1970, In crimerates and politicalalienation. inthe in interruption uptrend enrollHouse and Mason(1975)failto find zling fact,
WhatWill1984 Be Like? Homicide Rate Political Alienation
411
Ioct populatn
per1 10 15
10
l
r
It
418-24
pr
1 15-24
7-0 I
II40 no sayb
~~
I
/\ooHcompa
10
20'
20
125-34
125-34
19 1 1940 1960 19B0 1950 1970 1950 19 ' atoo comp=% agreeingwith statement "Sornetl rnes olitics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand whaYsgoingon." bno say--% agreeingwith statement "People likeme don'thave any say about what the government does." 1940
Source: Appendix Tables 8 and 9.
Figure 7.-Homicideand Political Alienation Among Young the
age-a levof for ment rates those college and a decline elingoffamong females amongmales. Goldbergand Anderson for an (1974)haveadvanced explanation of in basedon changes theproportion this two that households haveatthesametime age. of children college Thefinanormore colthrough a of cial burden puttingchild
conlegeis obvious.But,Goldberg says, of siderthe financial predicament those withtwo children collegeage at the of same time-not to mention three! Through ingenious workwith Public the sevUse Tapes,Goldberg constructed has of eralmeasures thechanging magnitude in of this predicament the post-World
412
Testir-g Year 60-61 65-66 70-71 National AverageSAT
75-76
SAT 490
obid2.5 r
2.6 2.7 28B
\<\
24470
~~~~~~~~~~460 ~~~~~~~~~~~450 AverageBirth Order (inverted)
3 0_ 1940
Source:
1945
1950
1955
1960
Year of birth
Appendix Table 10.
Figure8.-Average SAT Score and AverageBirthOrder forAnnual BirthCohorts of 1940 Through 1960
in The showan up- causedinpart therecent by WarII period. measures increase the in of of aboutthetime the supply thoseofcollege an effect surge this problem of age, enroll- thepost-World War II babyboom. The interruption therisein college of in ment rates. The movement thepropor- Freemanand Goldberginterpretations with chil- may be viewedas complementary, betionofhouseholds twoor more an cause both involve in different of of age dren college is itself, course, ways movements. Thus, lagged effects the baby boom. The of echo of priorfertility fromthose is differs baby Goldbergargument theimplication thatthepostwar in presented thispape'r that its in boomis currently taking tolloncollege previously of errors in argument implies enrollment because theriseinthe thetheoretical rates proportion householdsexperiencing of judgment. of in strains having ormore two I havespoken themovements enof thefinancial children college at thesametime. rollment of age rates and SATs as reflecting age de- structure ofthe but Another interpretation recent changes, foreach of these ratesis suggested variables causalchaininvolves the several by clinein enrollment work Richard Freeman's (1976, especially links. bothcases,theimmediate In deterThe decline maybe due to a mining is pp. 64 ff.). factor compositional-the popfrom education, ulation drop thereturns higher in mixwith to order or regard birth
413
proportion twoor morecollege with age children. has been noted,however, As each of the latter depends, turn,on in prior movements fertility. bythe in And, reasoningpreviously stated,the postWorldWar II swing fertility been in has largely governed age structure its by and relative income effects. thissetofconBy nections, therefore, structure age shifts have,witha lag, affected collegeenrolland SAT scores. ment rates
to deprivation, the exrelative ones. of clusion psychological As (1972) and othershave Keyfitz of the suggested, experience relamay tivedeprivation haveitsoriin for in ginsearlier life, example, classand largefamilies crowded rooms. thatthemechan2. One wouldexpect their ismsdescribed here,whatever wouldhaveleft their nature, specific of on imprint a variety otherpheRESEARCH IMPLICATIONS by nomena. One clue,suggested the and but Spaceis running short, I wouldlike Preston-McDonald O'Connell at leastto touch outline in form some on of be might thedegree correstudies, and social, economic, of of theresearch lation other possibilities suggested by withfertility. In thepresent indicators analysis. political appear might is somecases,theeffect 1. First, much morework needed on as fertility in thelevelofa series, for age structure changes themselves it be in itself; others, might inmoveand the underlying mechanisms as mentsaroundthe trend, forfewhich work. through they and here male labor forceparticipation a. I havefocused ontheproover The range of workdivorce. possibilities to portion younger older ingage population, withtheage thevarious disciplines. of30 as thedividing Experia. In the area of demography line. with proper,one would expectthat mentation needed is alternaof on For example, pressures theyoung thesort tiveage ratios. the would I have been discussing ratioof thoseaged 20-29 to 30markon illegitimacy leave their series movement 39 showsa time is and I believethere measures, since1940muchlikethatforthe in ratioshown Figure1. The apsome evidence to this effect. that (1978)finds Thus,O'Connell propriate ratio age might difwell from subject one in recent decadestheproportion fer, course, of to of premarital legiticonceptions and one to another, from society a shows posimated marriages by another. to conformingtherelative swing too stress laid is b. Perhaps much of tiveeconomic position young of here theimportance relative on of males.Estimates thefirst-birth numbers. Thereis needto look ratio order illegitimacy (thenumof intotherelative "quality" diforder beroffirst-birth illegitimate ferent age groups,as reflected, births per 1,000totalfirst-order of say,in measures educational contrast also births) showa sharp and attainment workexperience and after1960consistent before (although thesemay,in part,be the Beyond this with relationship. on dependent relative numbers). and areaoffertility, mortality mic. The appropriate measureof too. grationmightbe affected, a income itself subject relative is and suicide The results abovefor forresearch. One wouldnotexof homicide be symptomatic may to pectthesamemeasure be apin a moregeneral pattern stressplicableto different groups age and related morbidity mortality, of and all subjects study. as IngridWaldronand Joseph d. I have perhapsfocusedtoo In of Eyer (1975) have suggested. muchon economic indicators
414
turesimilar theUnited to States. Severalexploratory studies suggestthatparallelmovements in and fertility relative incomeor age structure have occurred in several other countries. Reversals in the age pattern growth of in femalelabor forceparticipation ratesalso seemto haveoccurred elsewhere (see O'Connell,1975, size. forthcoming; Easterlin Conand b. Turningto economics,the dran, 1976;Brunborg Lettenand has analysis already efsuggested strom, 1976; Sweetser and on fects a number other of labor Peipponen, 1967;Leridon, 1978; marketvariables,such as job and UnitedNations,1962).But turnover occupational and mobilstudies other of times places and ity.One might expect imwell an mustbe conducted a context in pact,too,on thesizedistribution sensitive thespecialhistorical to of income variouswage through andinstitutional circumstances of and workchannels. the deOn each country. mand side, effects be might exb. My attention focused has on on for time-series pected demands many the data, but clearly spemechanisms described here cificgoods, such as schooling, and otherchild-related should evident cross-section be in housing, dataas well.The results farof items. so c. In sociology,an impacton cross-section studieshave been in family formation, mixed, probably partbecause dissolution, and structure suggested the is incomemechanisms relative by are previous discussion of marriage obscured cross-section by in data and divorce. Also, variations in factors change that little notat or theeconomic between all over time.But cross-section gap young and old carryobviousimplicastudies mayultimately the clarify tions for the degree of internature themechanisms specific of at work. generational conflict. 3. There need, is too,to extend line this this 4. In concluding section, liketo I'd ofinquiry other to bodiesof data. add a note on implications the of of a. The possibility investigating present for trainanalysis graduate these in for Whereasderelationshipsevidence ing in demography. other times placesis obvious, and the mographers typically emphasize it although mustbe done with effects age strucof compositional care.It wasonly the the under special tureshifts, present foanalysis conditionsthat emergedafter cuses on effects workingchiefly 1940intheUnited States that rates. Theseefage through age-specific structure variations cameto play fects stemfrom mechanisms identisucha pervasive role.One would fied in economicand sociological notexpect find of to evidence the with theory, usuallyin connection same mechanism earlier in perisuch notionsas relative incomeor ods or in markedly different conrelative To deprivation. the extent ditions.The most obviouscanthat demographic analysismoves didates are other developed more in the present direction, countries which haveexperienced in greater training theseunderlying recent in will majorshifts age strucdisciplines be necessary.
thearea of migration, Hope Eldridge's (1964)workhas demonstrated cohort how migration was affected boom and bustKuzby netscyclesof thepast. It seems reasonable supposethat, to with thereversal demand of and supin plyrolesnoted Chart1,recent and current migration patterns might show an effect cohort on
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS
415
thatstress women's the movement the or development adoption newfertility and of Whatof competing of interpretations control measures at least,moreconare, recent experience? dramatic The decline sistent with facts. the However, these desince1960inthefertilityyoung of women velopments may themselves attributbe andtherapid intheir rise laborforce par- able partly to age structure effects ticipation excited has much scholarly dis- operating a relative via incomemechacussion.A variety reasonshave been nism. of Withregard fertility to afcontrol, given these for developments, as ex- ter 1960withthegrowing such abundance of ceptional employment for opportunities young menand therelative deterioration young new labormarket women, possibilities regu- intheir for position, families felt latingfertility, new conceptions greater and of pressure adoptavailablefertilto women's due move- itycontrol methods-oldor new-to rerolps to thewomen's ment. strict births. rapid The spread new of meaWith regard employment to opportuni- sures of fertility controlwas, in part, ties foryoungwomen, argument induced thepressures young the is by on adults thatthesehave expandedrapidly since described here. 1960, thereby encouraging substitution of To turn thewomen's to movement, the work themarketplace childbearingrecent in for in acceleration thegrowth young of and workat home.The basic question, women's laborforce participation is rates is however, notwhether employment sometimes opcitedas indicative theimof of portunities youngwomenhave been pactofthemovement a (although lookat expanding since1960, whether la- theoccupational ofthegrowth febut the mix in bormarket young for women was better maleemployment giveonepausemight in,say,the15years after 1960than the seeAppendix It should noted, in D). be how15years before, is,whether mar- ever, thepresent that this that model, which adopts ketwas better whenyoungwomen were a traditional view of male and female in increasingly plentiful thepopulation, roles,predicts upturn labor force as an in after 1960,thanbefore, whenthey were participation amongyounger womenin increasingly scarce.I believe mostlabor theperiod after 1960.Thus,thisupturn is market students wouldargue, I would, notpresumptive as evidence theforce of of that post-World II labormarket thewomen's the War movement. for women young for was,likethat young Ratherthan the women'smovement men, exceptionally good,and thatyoung beingthecause of therecent accelerated womenopted for marriage and child- rise in youngerfemales'participation not bearing, becauseof inadequate em- rates, research the findings KarenMaof ployment but opportunities, inthefaceof son and others thatthe reverse suggest very good opportunities. [The recent appears more likelyto be the caseButz-Ward analysis (1977)adopts op- namely, therise laborforce the in that participosite view.] Developments 1960 since can pation to attitudinal led favorable change be hardly attributed an improvement to thewomen's to in movement (Mason et al., labor market conditions for young 1976).And, sincetheaccelerated in rise women. The economy's occupational labor force asparticipation in turn, is, structure not changein a way espe- cribable to the mechanisms did described women cially after favoring as 1960, com- here, changing structure thus age was one paredwith before 1960(see Appendix C). of the forces recently the furthering the in since late1940s theunem- women's Changes movement. in Elsewhere, regard ployment ratesof females aged 20 to 24 to theantinatalist inpopulation shift attilabor market implya stronger through tudes, havesimilarly I thatattituargued 1960thanthereafter. dinalchange primarily effect, is an rather ofthe Interpretations lastdecade's shift than cause, changed a of behavior (Easterofyoung females from home workplace lin,1973, 206-212). to pp.
416
A more general objection to ex- others, War,more such as the Vietnam planations centering fertility on control generally.am arguing or I the onlythat evimovement thatthey is are denceis consistent theviewthatage the women's with confined the periodof the 1960son- structure relative to and incomehavebeen ward. A basic tenetof the approach much influmore important pervasive and adopted here is that a plausibleinter- encesin experience since 1940thanhas pretation experience of since1960should heretofore recognized. been be consistent thecontrasting with experienceofthebabyboomperiod. Neither of THE FUTURE theseviewscan offer explanation of any thebabyboom.Indeed, faras fertility We comefinally thequestion so to posed controlpossibilities concerned, are the in thetitle: I whatwill1984be like? have whatmust arguedthatshifts therelative baby boom occurred despite in number have been a major advance in con- ofyounger versus older adults under contraceptive knowledge amongyoungper- ditions restricted of and immigration high sons as a result information of dissemi- and sustained in degrowth aggregate in natedby thearmed forces World War mand have had a pervasive impacton II and theKoreanWar. American since1940.If I am correct, life Moreover, behavior the thatthoseex- thenwhathappens thenearfuture in deplanations seekto interpret muchnar- pends, important on theagestrucis in part, rower thanis truehere.Theyapplypri- ture outlook. marilyto fertility youngwomen's The age structure and in outlookis shown in- Figure which laborforce participation. relative The to 1, presents projection the I am comeinterpretation suggesting seems 1995 of the younger olderworking and to fit onlythese not A developments as age population. highdegreeof conbut, we haveseen,a much wider range evi- fidence be placed in thisprojection of can dence,including such magnitudes di- since is basedalmost as it wholly persons on vorce,suicide, homicide, alienation. already and in born.As one can see,growth Theseother variables onesthat are theory thegroup slowaged 15 to 29 is currently wouldleadone to expect a wouldfit rela- ing,and,after number 1980, absolute the tivedeprivation-type and they do. willactually model, The begin period decline. a of The fact that present the is interpretation proportion those aged 15 to 29 to those of with consistent a wider of downeven range socioeco- aged30 to 64 is slated turn to nomicdata, and thatit fits as earlier, a pre-1960 showing declinefrom1975to well as post-1960 experience, tendsto 1980.Thisdecline becomes moreprecipione's in tousin thedecadeofthe1980s. Thus,the strengthen confidence it. I amnotclaiming agestructure and outlookis fora growing relative that scarcity relative are income thebe-alland end-all ofyounger evenmore adults, pronounced in theexplanation these of and other de- thanin the1940sand 1950s. velopments thelast fewdecades.The of in newtwist age The implication this of women'smovement may have a lasting structure thatthere be a return will is to effect females' on rolesthrough institu- thepatterns the1940sand 1950s. of Spethe with to tionalizing attitude thathave cifically, regard thedevelopments changes and fertility there wouldbe: controldevelop- discussed occurred, here, ments have not necessarily in inbeen wholly 1. an improvement the relative induced. is quitepossible It that these decomeofyoung males; haveexerted independent 2. an upturn thecrude an in velopments birth rate; effect behavior. on inManyadditional fac3. a return thepattern larger to of tors havedoubtlessly influenced movethe rates for creases in participation mentsof the variablessurveyed here, olderthanforyounger women; somespecific an individual to of variable and 4. an abatement theproblem risof
417
rates,not via "age comingunemployment acceleratingvia "age-specific" and inflation; should, of course, position." Both effects 5. an eventual dropbelowtrend levels be takeninto account. Heretofore, demographic analysis has been largely or in cohort divorce rates; 6. a declinein the suicide rates of wholly confinedto age compositioneffects. In the currenteconomy,however, young males; rates effects age-specific via 7. an improvement crime in rates and age structure than the are oftenmuch more important political alienation; of 8. a resumption the risein college traditional age composition effects Experiencewith enrollment and rates; stressedin demography. regardto the crude birthrate providesa in 9. an upturn SATs. I that good example. In the post-World War II More generally, am suggesting rate will on the1980s seea turnaround amelio- period,theeffect thecrudebirth of or in of ration a widevariety social, political, age compositionchangeshas been much and economic developments the last less than that due to changesin age-speof have been cificrates.Moreover,theage composition decadeor so, some of which of so- effect been in the opposite direction has taken symptomatic a hardening as cialmalaise. And,althoughamprobably from the effect of age-specific rate I alone in predicting such a sweeping re- changes,and has dampened only mildly versal,otherscholars, reasoning along the effect the crude birthrate of the on lineslikethosepresented above,havear- latter.For example,the negativeimpact at for rateof thedeclinesince rived similar conclusions a number on thecrudebirth rates has been offset ofspecific RonaldLee (1976, 1960 in age-specific magnitudes. 1977) and David Goldberg (1978) have only slightly an age compositionshift by each developed fertility projections that favorableto a higherbirthrate. I realizethatsome of you think thatmy foresee sizableupturn. a (See also Goldthattheremay be a substantial berg al., 1977;Wachter, et 1975.)Michael suggestion Wachter's(1977) projections labor rise in fertility the nextdecade or so of over force rates to participation showa return is just plain foolish,if not irresponsible. for thepattern higher of increases older Althoughfertility admittedly difficult is a than foryounger womenin the 1980s. magnitude predict, to how can I ignoreor and Goldberg Anderson (1974)anticipate discount so heavilythe weightof many In a resumption therisein college of enroll- factors tending to depress fertility? as rates thefinancial ment squeezeonpar- much of the demographiccommunity, in moderates presentthinking entsof college-age students about Americanfertility theearly Robert 1980s. Zajonc(1976)pre- is, I believe,reasonablywell capturedin in dictsan upturn SATs starting around the followingquotation (Population In1980. dex, 1948): in A fewstraws thewindare provided Short-run rates... are unpredictable birth of by the experience the last couple of of unlessbased on a combination demoand cyclereattitudinal, business which that years, suggests somechanges graphic, birth not ofthelastdecade havebeenarrested. search yetachieved.... Long-run may quesrates involve even more difficult ratesare no longer and Fertility falling, uncertain facto tions.... In regard these therisein homicide suicide and rates has of is torsthere at leasta minimum agreeat It is ceased, leasttemporarily. tooearly ment among demographers.No one such movements into tell whether are of of the anticipates restoration levels fertilof but of dicative a turnaround, thetiming as in that couldbe regarded high a world ity is with suchdevelopmentsconsistent the is between of The setting. range uncertainty present analysis. belowpermanent ratessomewhat replaceI wantto emphasize I am talking ment ratesslightly that abovesuchreplaceand of abouttheeffect changing structure ment. age
418
Thatstatement, which for numerous par- dropping the mediating of the out role allels expressedwith equal assurance birthrate,yields,alternatively, current in couldbe found current writing for agestructure (see, depending pastagestrucon example, in Westoff, 1978), appeared Pop- ture.) ulation Indexexactly years 30 ago, when The empirical plausibility thisreaof thepost-World War II babyboom was soning illustrated Figure The curis in 9. takingoff.The fertility prediction was rent birth is thesolidlineatthetopof rate wrongthenbecause,in my view,it ig- thefigure; pastbirth the rate, shaping that nored a major demographic influencethe current birth ratevia its impacton tending to turn fertilitybehavior current structure, thebroken age is line around-thegrowing scarcity young curve themiddle. of in Inverting current the adults and theresulting in their rise rela- birth curve, obtains solidline rate one the tive affluence. on behalf the But, of writer, curve thebottom. at Notehowclosely the a plea of ignorance couldjustifiably current be in swing thebirth rateechoesin entered thattime.I think at sucha plea inverted form thatin thebirth 20 to rate cannotnowbe madeand thatdemogra- 25 years It earlier. seems safeto saythat, phers, after enumerating ofthefactors without theory presented, one all the just no making continued fertility, for low should wouldhaveanticipated dramatic this simacknowledge there at leastoneim- ilarity eventhought juxtaposing that is or of the factor in portant di- two seriesthisway.And,if the current working theopposite a rection, factor that, judge from to the birth ratefluctuation closelymirrors so has record, dominated others all overthe that thepast,maynotthefuture of birth past40 years. rateshowa swing mirroring of the that Letmeturn from 1980s theques- present? so on intothefuture?do the to And I tionof thelonger-term Willthe not know the answer, outlook. and, even if the in changes agestructure theattendant analysiswerecorrect to this point, and up effects thatwe are witnessing continue unforeseen factors maysubsequently inintothemore distant future? Clearly, this tervene. But the recordso far seems on hinges thequestion thelonger-term of consistent withthe possibility a selfof outlook theage structure for itself. mechanism produces generating that reThe age structure, any giventime, peatedswings the birth at in rateand age echoeswitha lag chiefly birth the in rate. structure thus, socioeconomic and, conThis is shownin Figure1, where move- ditions a widevariety. newKuznets of A in ments theage ratioare seento follow cycle may have replacedthe old-one in movements thebirth some20 to 25 with duration around years rate a of 40 rather earlier. years Thus,thelonger-term future than20. of age structure on depends theoutlook Today, inthepast, economic as the forforthebirt-h rate. tunesof different generations shaped are According the analysis have pre- in important to I part by circumstances besented, under however, current conditions yondtheir control. Before World WarII, thebirth rateis largely beingshapedby it was theluckofthedrawas to thestate in ongoingdevelopments age structure.ofaggregate demand-whether came one Thiswas thepoint Figure We have, of age in a boom or bustperiod;since of 4. of then,the possibility a self-generating World WarII, it has largely on depended mechanism that,in simplest is terms, of whether comes one from large a small a or the following sort.Current defertility cohort-from "babyboom"ora "baby a pendson current structure. age Current bust."Butsuchconditions notimmuare age structure dependson past fertility. table.We havelearned from study the of Hence,deleting mediating ofage pastexperience moderate the role to substantially current structure, fertility on depends past the variations to aggregate due demand fertility. (An equivalent formulation, fluctuations-to tame the old Kuznets
419 I
current rate, per thousand per year 25
I 20
rude BirthRate inCurrent
~~~~5 Years
earlier rate
25
Crude Birth! Rate 20-25 Years E,arlier

I1
Crude
~~~~~~~~~~inverted),
per thousand peryear
current rate
15
CHudeBirth Rate in Current 5 Years(nverted)
25
1940\ T 1960
1S50
1. Source: Appendix Table
1970
198(- 1
1990
3WU0
Rate 20 to 25 Years Earlier Five Years ComparedWithCrudeBirth Rate in Current Figure9.-Crude Birth
CulturalChange :225-248. . 1968. The Passing of the Kuznets Cycle. Economica 35:349-367. The research whichthispaperre- Bancroft,Gertrude. 1958. The American Labor on was HDports funded NICHHD grant by Force. New York: JohnWileyand Sons. held with 05427, jointly Robert Pollak Brunborg,Helge, and G. S. Lettenstrom.1976. A. Trendsin Norwaysince 1965. Paper preand MichaelL. Wachter. comments Fertility For I and assistance am grateful Robert sented to the Nordic DemographicSymposium, to Rungsted,Denmark,June 10-12, 1976. Morton Butz,WilliamP., and M. P. Ward. 1977.The EmerCohen, Frank R. Lichtenberg, Owen Schapiro,and Deborah C. K. gence of CountercyclicalU.S. Fertility.Santa I from Wenger. have also benefited the Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
cycle.It is reasonable supposethat, comments Eileen Crimmins, to Robert of because recent of experience, public policy Higgs, and MichaelL. Wachter. may eventually turned, well, modbe as to ifying variations thefortunes generain of REFERENCES tionsdue to theirrelative numbers, Abramovitz,M. 1961.The Nature and Significance to the tempering newKuznets cycle. of Kuznets Cycles. Economic Developmentand
420

Thomas N. E. Greville(ed.), PopulationDynamics. New York: Academic Press. Kuznets, Simon. 1958. Long Swingsin the Growth of Population and in Related Economic Variof ables. Proceedings the AmericanPhilosophical Society 102:25-52. . 1961.Capital in theAmericanEconomy:Its Formation and Financing. Princeton:Princeton Press. University and Lee, Ronald D. 1976.DemographicForecasting the EasterlinHypothesis.Populationand DevelopmentReview 2:459-468. Age . 1977. Fluctuationsin U.S. Fertility, and Income. Report to the National Structure, Instituteof Child Health and Human Developof ment.Bethesda,Md.: National Institute Child Health and Human Development. DemograLeridon,H. 1978. Feconditeet Structures sur phiques: Une Hypothese l'Evolutionde la Feconditedepuis 1940. Population33:441-447. Mason, K. O., J. L. Czajka, and S. Arber. 1976. Change in Women's Sex-Role Attitudes,19641974. AmericanSociological Review 41:573-596. O'Connell, Martin. 1975. The Effectof Changing on and Age Distributions Fertility Suicide in Developed Countries. Unpublished Ph.D. disof sertation. Philadelphia:Department Sociology, of University Pennsylvania. . 1978. A Cohort Analysisof Teenage Fertility in the U.S. Since the Depression. Paper presented to the annual meetingof the Population Association of America, held in Atlanta, April 13-15, 1978. The Effect ChangingAge of . Forthcoming. An ComDistribution Fertility: International on parison.In JulianSimon (ed.), Researchin Popuof lation Economics, vol. 1. Urbana: University Illinois Press. Valerie K. 1970. The Female Labor Oppenheimer, Force in theUnitedStates:Demographicand Economic Factors Governing its Growth and Changing Composition. Population Monograph of University California. Series No. 5. Berkeley: Population Index. 1948. The Population Forecasts of the Scripps Foundation. Population Index 14 (3): 188-195. Preston,Samuel H., and J. McDonald. 1977. The Incidenceof Divorce WithinCohorts of American Marriages ContractedSince the Civil War. of at Paper presented theannual meeting thePopulation Association of America,April 1977, St. Louis, Missouri. Simon, J. L. 1968. The Effectof Income on the Suicide Rate: A Paradox Resolved. American Journalof Sociology 74:302-303. of Pop.1969. The Effect Income on Fertility. ulationStudies 23:327-341. . 1975. Response to Barnes's Comment. AmericanJournalof Sociology 80:1460-1462. Samuel A., et al. 1949.The AmericanSolStouffer, dier: AdjustmentDuring Wartime Life, vol. I. Press. Princeton Princeton: University
James S. 1949. Income, Saving, and Duesenberry, the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cambridge, Press. Mass.: Harvard University Durkheim,Emile. 1951. Suicide,A Studyin Sociology. New York: Free Press. Easterlin, Richard A. 1968. Population, Labor Force, and Long Swings in Economic Growth: The AmericanExperience.New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. . 1973. Relative Economic Status and the American FertilitySwing. In Eleanor Sheldon (ed.), Family Economic Behavior:Problemsand Prospects. Philadelphia: J. B. LippincottCompany. and . 1978.Fertility Female Labor Force Participationin the United States: Recent Changes and Future Prospects.Paper preparedforthe InStudyof Popternational Union forthe Scientific ulation Conference on Economic and Demographic Change: Issues for the 1980s, Helsinki, August28, 1978. , and G. A. Condran. 1976. A Note on the Canada, EngSwingin Australia, RecentFertility land and Wales, and the United States. Pp. 139151 in Hamish Richards(ed.), Population,Factor Studies and EconomicDevelopment: Movements, to Thomas. Cardiff, Great BritPresented Brinley of ain: University Wales Press. , M. L. Wachter,and S. M. Wachter.1978. on Demographic Influences Economic Stability: The United States Experience. Population and DevelopmentReview 4:1-23. Eldridge,H. T. 1964. A Cohort Approach to the Differentials. Demography Analysisof Migration 1:212-219. and TrainingReportof the President. Employment PrintD.C.: U.S. Government 1977. Washington, ing Office. Freeman, Richard B. 1976. The Over-Educated American.New York: Academic Press. Goldberg,David. 1978. Futureof AmericanFertility: Some Speculations. Paper presentedto the of annual meeting the PopulationAssociationof America,Atlanta,April 13-15, 1978. of , and A. Anderson.1974. Projections Population and College Enrollmentin -Michigan, 1970-2000. Paper presentedto the Governor's Commission on Higher Education, Lansing, Michigan. and F. Cartford. , J. M. Coble, A. Anderson, of 1977. Projections Populationand Employment forthe Great Lakes States: 1970-2000.Paper prepared forthe Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission.Lansing,Mich.: Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission. Grabill, Wilson H., C. V. Kiser, and P. K. Whelpof ton. 1958. The Fertility American Women. New York: JohnWileyand Sons. House, J. S., and W. M. Mason. 1975. Political Alienationin America,1952-1968.AmericanSociological Review40:123-147. Keyfitz,N. 1972. Population Waves. Pp. 1-37 in
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Sweetser, L., and P. Peipponen. F. Employment.Special Report No. 12. Washing1967.Postwar in Fertility Trends Their and Consequences Finton, D.C: U. S. Government Printing Office. land and the U.S. Journal Social History of .1977. Intermediate Swings in Labor Force 1:101-118. Participation. Brookings Paperson EconomicAcUnitedNations. 1962. Demographic Aspectsof tivity 2:545-576. Manpower. NewYork:United Nations. , and S. M. Wachter.Forthcoming. The FisU.S. Bureauof theCensus.1973.Census Popuof cal Policy Dilemma: Cyclical SwingsDominated Final lation,1970,DetailedCharacteristics, Reby SupplySide Constraints. 71-99 in Thomas Pp. port, United States Summary. Washington, D.C.: J. Espenshade and W. J. Serow (eds.), The EcoU.S. Government Printing Table226,pp. Office, nomic Consequences of Slowing Population 761-763. Growth.New York: Academic Press. Wachter, Michael 1972.A LaborSupply L. Model forSecondary Workers. Reviewof Economics Waldron, I., and J. Eyer. 1975. Socioeconomic
Causes forthe RecentRise in Death Rates for1524-Year-Olds.Social Scienceand Medicine9:383A Fertility Equation: The . 1975. Time-Series 396. for Potential a BabyBoom in the 1980s.InterWellford, F. 1973. Age Compositionand the InC. Review national Economic 16:609-624. 1976a.The Changing Cyclical Responsive- crease in Recorded Crime. Criminology (May):61-7 1. on nessofWageInflation. Brookings Papers EcoWestoff, F. 1978. Some Speculationson the FuC. nomic Activity 15-167. 1:1 ture of Marriage and Fertility. Family Planning The on . 1976b. Demographic Impact UnemPerspectives 10:79-83. ployment: Experience Outlookforthe Past and Commission for Zajonc, R. B. 1976. Family Configuration InFuture. 27-100in National Pp. and and Manpower Policy, Demographic Trends Full telligence. Science 192:227-236. and Statistics 54:141-151.
422
APPENDIX A AppendixTable 1.-Actual and ProjectedU.S. Male Population(in Thousands) Aged 15 to 29 and 30 to 64 and the Ratio of Young to Old, 1920-1995,and Crude BirthRate (per Thousand per Year) 20 to 25 Years Earlier
Date
Male Population Aged 30-64 15-29 Actual
Ratio of Groups Aged 15-29 30-64
Crude Birth Rate Rate Period
1920 1930 1940 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
13,739 15,955 17,442 17,216 16,772 17,794 21,151 25,262 28,793 Projected
20,607 24,550 27,664 31,671 33,781 35,478 36,295 38,115 38,908
.667 .650 .630 .544 .496 .502 .583 .663 .740
1896-1900 1900-1905 1905-1910 1910-1915 1915-1920 1920-1925 1925-1930 1930-1935 1935-1940 1940-1945 1945-1950 1950-1955
31.6 30.0 29.6 27.5 26.1 25.0 21.5 18.3 18.3 21.2 24.5 25.2/24.8
1980 1985 1990 1995 Sources:
30,426 29,717 27,626 25,864
42,184 46,210 50,585 54,759
.721 ,643 .546 .472
1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975
24.6 22.2 18.1 15.9
Male population by age. 1920-1930: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of U.S. GovernPopulation, 1950, United States Swnmary(Washington, D.C.: ment Printing Office, 1953), pp. 1-93. 1940-1995: U.S. Bureau of the U.S. Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25 (Washington, D.C.: Printing Office), as follows for 1940-1950 -- No. 98, p. 115; Government for 1955 -- No. 265, p. 25; for 1960 --No. 286, p. 42, Series C; for 1965 -- No. 519, p. 20; for 1970-1975 -- No. 614, pp. 11-16; for 19801995 -- No. 704, pp. 40-60, Series II. 1870-1955: Except as noted subsequently, the basic Crude birth rate. source was Kuznets (1958), p. 37, Table 1, colum 4; Table 3, column 5; p. 41, Table 5, column 7; and p. 43, Table 6, column 5 (underlying 1950-1976: U.S. Bureau of unrounded quinquennial estimates were used). the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1977), No. 706, p. 7. The break in the series in 1950-1955 is due to the shift in sources described above.
423
Appendix Table2.-Total Fertility 1940-1977, Rate, Relative Employment Experience YoungAdult of Males,1940-1955, Relative and Income Experience ofYoungAdultMales,1957-1977
Total Fertility Rate 2.30 2.40 2.63 2.72 2.57 2.49 2.94 3.27 3.11 3.11 3.09 3.27 3.36 3.42 3.54 3.58 3.69 3.77 3.70 3.71 3.65 3.63 3.47 3.33 3.21 2.93 2.74 2.57 2.48 2.45 2.47 2.28 2.03 1.90 1.86 1.80 1.76 1.82 Relative Employment Experience -10.2 - 8.6 - 5.8 - 4.4 - 3.2 - 2.9 - 3.3 0.4 3.5 6.1 7.2 7.0 7.2 7.5 7.6 6.7 73.1 73.3 73.3 72.7 71.5 70.9 69.7 68.0 66.2 64.8 65.0 65.9 66.2 66.5 64.4 66.5 64.4 62.1 60.2 58.2 55.9 Relative Income Experience
Year 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Sources:
Total fertility rate. Easterlin (1968), p. 247, column 4; unpublished data provided by Campbell Gibson and Martin U.S. Bureau of the Census, O'Connell, Washington, D.C. Relative employment experience. Easterlin (1973), p. 195, Table 6, columns 5-6. Relative income experience. Easterlin (1973), p. 185, updated with unpublished data provided by Campbell Gibson, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.
424
Rate Table3.-Labor ForceParticipation of U.S. Females Appendix Aged20+ byAgeGroup, Specified Dates,1890-1975
Labor Force Participation Year 1890 1900 1920 1930 1940 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 20-24 32.7 34.2 40.0 44.3 48.1 46.1 46.0 46.2 50.0 57.8 64.3 25-34 18.8 21.4 25.7 29.1 35.3 34.0 34.9 36.0 38.6 45.0 54,6 35-44 16.6 18.9 23.1 25.6 31.2 39.1 41.6 43.5 46.1 51.1 55.8 45-54 17.4 19.1 22.8 24.6 27.3 38.0 43.8 49.8 50.9 54.4 54.6 Rate 55-64 14.8 16.0 17.7 18.7 20.0 27.0 32.5 37.2 41.1 43.0 41.0 65+ 9.4 10.1 9.1 9.1 7.8 9.7 10.6 10.8 10.0 9.7 8.3
Sources:
Labor force participation rates: 1950-1975, EmpZoyment and Training Report of the President (1977); 1890-1940, extrapolation of 1950 value in EmpZoymentand Training Report by percentage point change shown in Bancroft (1958), p. 207.
425
= Appendix Table 4.-Index (1940-1945 100) of Average Age-Specific Fertility forSpecified Rate Age in Groups Each Five-Year 1921-1925 1971-1975 to Period,
Index Year
of Age-Specific 20-24
Fertility 25-34
Rate 35-44
10-49 a
1921-1925 1926-1930 1931-1935 1936-1940 1941-1945 1946-1950 1951-1955 1956-1960 1961-1965 1966-1970 1971-1975
a - Total fertility
1.23 1.07 .91 .88 1.02 1.23 1.36 1.47 1.31 1.01 .78
rate.
1.08 .97 .83 .84 1.00 1.30 1.49 1.69 1.50 1.13 .84
1.18 1.01 .88 .87 1.02 1.20 1.31 1.38 1.27 .98 .78
1.84 1.51 1.20 1.00 1.04 1.10 1.11 1.14 1.01 .71 .44
Sources:
Fertility rates. 1940-1975: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: CoZoniaZ Times to 1970 U.S. GovernmentPrinting (Washington, D.C.: Office, 1975), Series B 11-19, and U.S. Public Health Service, MonthZyVitaZ StatisU.S. Governtics Report (Washington, D.C.: 1920-1939: ment Printing Office). Extrapolation of 1940 value in HlistoricaZ Statistics, based on series in Wilson H. Grabill, C. V. Kiser, and P.K. Whelpton, The FertiZity of American Women(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 31.
426
AppendixTable 5.-Actual and ProjectedRatio of U.S. Males Aged 30 to 64 to Males Aged 15 to 29, 19401995,and Crude BirthRate (per Thousand per Year), 1935-1940to 1970-1975
Year
Males Aged 30-64 15-29
Period
Crude Birth Rate
Actual
1940 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 Projected 1980 1985 1990 1995 Sources: 1.386 1.555 1.831 2.117 Same as for Appendix Table 1. 1.586 1.840 2.014 1.994 1.716 1.509 1.351 1935-1940 1940-1945 1945-1950 1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 18.3 21.2 24.5 25.2/24.8 24.6 22.2 18.1 15.9
427
AppendixTable 6.-UnemploymentRate, UNI, and GrowthRate of ConsumerPrice Index, 1948-1985

Unemployment Rate 3.8 5.9 5.3 3.3 3.0 2.9 5.5 4.4 4.1 4.3 6.8 5.5 5.5 6.7 5.5 5.7 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 4.9 5.9 5.6 4.9 5.6 8.5 7.7 7.0 U Growth Rate of Consumer Price Index 7.77 -.97 .98 7.91 2.18 .75 .50 -.37 1.50 3.56 2.73 .81 1.60 1.01 1.12 1.21 1.31 1.72 2.86 2.88 4.20 5.37 5.92 4.30 4.12 5.38 10.97 9.14 5.77 5.98
Year 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Sources:
NI
4.52 4.42 4.34 4.18 4.06 3.97 3.94 3.96 3.99 4.00 4.03 4.10 4.19 4.23 4.24 4.35 4.47 4.61 4.74 4.79 4.82 4.93 5.05 5.17 5.31 5.40 5.44 5.46 5.49 5.52 5.49 5.44 5.35 5.23 5.13 5.00 4.84 4.71
Economic Report of Unemployment rate: U.S. the President (Washington, D.C.: 1976), p. Government Printing Office, 199, Table B-24.
et al. (1978), UI : Easterlin See text for ekplanation. Table 2.
Economic Report Consumer price index: of the President (Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), Smoothed values p. 221, Table B-43. for in Figure 4 are averages plotted 19501940-1950 and five-year periods 1955 through 1970-1975.
428
AppendixTable 7.-Children Ever Born and DeviationsFrom Trendin Divorce Among MarriageCohorts of 1910-1914Through1955-1959
Year of First Marriage 1910-1914 1915-1919 1920-1924 1925-1929 1930-1934 1935-1939 1940-1944 1945-1949 1950-1954 1955-1959 Source: Preston
Children Ever Born 3.337 2.968 2.637 2.449 2.417 2.497 2.605 2.838 2.984 2.734 and McDonald
of Marriages Expected Percentage Ending, in Divorce Less Actual PerAverage centage Ending in Divorce: From Trend of 5-year Deviations .67 -.19 -.16 -1.00 -2.29 -1.63 -.88 2.10 1.67 .09 (1977).
AppendixTable 8.-Homicide Rate Among Males Aged 15 to 24 and 25 to 34 (per 100,000Population), 1940-1975
429
Homicide Rate Age Group Year 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 15-24 7.3 7.3 7.1 6.1 5.9 7.1 7.7 7.4 7.3 6.7 6.3 5.9 6.2 5.9 5.9 5.4 6.0 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.8 6.3 6.8 7.6 9.1 10.1 11.0 11.7 12.7 13.5 13.4 14.2 13.7 25-34 12.2 11.5 11.2 8.9 9.4 10.5 11.6 11.2 10.8 9.6 9.9 9.1 10.0 9.0 9.1 8.8 9.0 9.0 8.7 9.3 9.6 9.6 9.9 10.2 10.5 11.9 12.3 14.6 15.3 15.9 16.6 18.5 18.5 19.0 19.3 18.4
430
AppendixTable 9.-Percent of Males Aged 18 to 24 and 25 to 34 Answering Affirmatively Two Measures on of PoliticalAlienation,1952-1976 18-24 Agrees that Government is Too Complicated 71.4 62.2 65.7 59.5 72.3 71.9 69.9 72.0 Agrees that He Has No Say In Government 26.1 23.4 24.5 25.0 34.9 41.0 35.9 39.9 25-34 Agrees that Government is Too Complicated 69.9 60.1 61.8 67.0 67.7 74.4 67.9 70.4 Agrees that He Has No Say In Government 29.9 24.5 22.9 31.2 32.9 38.1 33.3 41.3
Year 1952 1956 1964 1966 1970 1972 1974 1976
AppendixTable 10.-Average SAT Score and Average BirthOrder forAnnual BirthCohorts, 1940-1960 Testing Year 1956-1957 1957-1958 1958-1959 1959-1960 1960-1961 1961-1962 1962-1963 1963-1964 1964-1965 1965-1966 1966-1967 1967-1968 1968-1969 1969-1970 1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 1975-1976 1976-1977 Sources: Average SAT 484.5 484.0 486.5 487.5 484.5 485.5 490.0 486.5 484.5 483.5 479.0 479.0 478.0 474.0 471.5 468.5 463.0 462.0 453.0 451.5 449.5 SAT scores: New Jersey. Birth order: Educational Zajonc Year of Birth 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 Average Birth Order 2.78 2.69 2.57 2.63 2.75 2.78 2.55 2.44 2.52 2.59 2.63 2.64 2.70 2.74 2.78 2.82 2.86 2.88 2.92 2.94
Testing Service, p. 233.
Princeton,
(1976),
APPENDIX B
431
youngpersonsat each date. Comparison of the averagerate of changein thistotal that It is theoretically possible laborde- during1940-1960withthatfor 1960-1976 shift showshow the actual changein theeconin persons might mandsforyounger omy's occupational structure would have for differential a way compensating employment the youngif they of in changes labor supplies.For example, affected of structure theeconomy had always been employed at standard theoccupational in favor- ratesforeach occupationalclass. The rehavechanged a waymore might 2.12 percentper workers sults are, for 1940-1960, for able to thedemand younger 2.13 One of abundance the yearand, for1960-1976, percent. of intheperiod growing withthat of growing may have reservationsabout the techyoungcompared period nique used here,but, so faras it goes, it that scarcity, is, in thepost-1960 did If 1940-1960. occupations impliesthattheoccupationalstructure with compared for account a dis- not change in the post-1960versus preinwhich young persons labor large proportionately share of employ- 1960 periodin a way thatgenerated and demands that would have compensated laborers, ment,such as operatives, clericalworkers, grewat much higher forthe adversechange in labor supplyof to ratesrelative the averageafter1960 the young. The occupation distributionof total a thenthiswouldgenerate than before, favorablechange in the demand for employment was from the following unpublished BLS CPS to workers wouldtend com- sources.1940-1960: that younger pensateforthe adversechangein their data, excludingAlaska and Hawaii; 1960, Reand cal- 1970, 1976: Employment Training To the supply. testforthis, following (1977), Table A-115, simi- port of thePresident was a culation madeusing procedure lar to that of Oppenheimer (1970). At pp. 161-167. The matricesof occupation date from1940 through by age and sex used in computingthe each decennial from 1970,and 1976,theactualtotalemploy- standardshareswere,for1940-1960, ment(forbothsexes,all age groups)in unpublished BLS CPS data; for 1970, classwas multi- fromU.S. Bureau of the Census (1973), eachmajoroccupational of Table 226, pp. 761-763. share "standard" pliedbyan estimated
occupation. aged 14 to 34 in that persons the "standard" (For each occupation, APPENDIX C of was share thesimple average theactual in To test whether the demand for shares young of persons thatoccupafavored womenwas especially dates 1940-1970.) younger by tion at the decennial for Thisyielded eachdatethehypotheticalchanges in the economy's occupational that in of persons wouldhave structure theperiod 1960-1976,as comnumber young in been employedin that occupationif pared withits structure 1940-1960,the or same procedure was used as that dehad standard young persons had their For ex- scribed in Appendix B, except that the usual sharein the occupation. to ample,for1940,theactualtotalnumber standardsharesrefer females aged 14 to in and than all personsaged 14 to 34. employed professional technical 34, rather in show a hypothetical at growth occupations thatdate,about 3.5 mil- The results share the employment youngerfemalesdurof by lion,wasmultiplied thestandard of persons aged 14 to 34 in thatoccupa- ing 1940-1960 of 2.89 percentper year; It to 42.9 percent, obtaina hypotheti-during1960-1976,of 2.74 percent. does tion, of that cal employment 1.5 millionpersons not appear, therefore, after1960 the at aged 14 to 34 in theoccupation that occupational structureof the economy for date.The resulting products each oc- changed in a way thatespeciallyfavored to of class werethensummed ob- theemployment youngwomen,as comcupation of total tainthehypothetical employment pared to before1960.
432 APPENDIX D
departure the1940-1960 from pattern, the similarities thepastaremore with impresGiven below is the percentage distribuMoreover, in tion of the incremental change in female sive than the differences. in thoseoccupations which women have employment beforeand after1960: made a significant breakthrough-in the 1940- 1960- 1970sense of a substantial increasein their 1960 1970 1976 in shareofemployment theoccupationAllfemales 100.0 100.0 100.0 it might argued be thatoften occupathe Professional/ in tion has been downgraded socioecotechnical 11.0 20.5 24.0 and for status potential further ad6.2 2.8 Managerial 11.4 nomic of For the Clerical 40.0 46.4 37.1 vancement. example, position which is bankteller, today almost entirely Sales 8.3 5.3 4.9 Craftsmen 1.0 1.4 3.9 femalebut four decades ago was preOperatives 11.0 12.4 -2.7 dominantly male,appearsto have been Laborers -0.2 0.7 4.9 demotedto a clericalfunction. largely Private household for Sources thedata aboveare:for1940service -0.2 -5.5 -7.8 1960, unpublished BLS CPS data, exOther service 18.4 21.5 25.4 cludingAlaska and Hawaii; for 1960, Farmers -0.6 -0.4 0.2
Farm laborers 5.2 -5.2 -1.4 Although the recentchanges show some 1970, 1976,Employment Training and Reportof thePresident (1977), Table A-l 15,
pp. 161-162.

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Volume 15, Number4

WHAT WILL1984 BE LIKE?SOCIOECONOMIC OF IMPLICATIONS RECENTTWISTSIN AGE STRUCTURE*

DEMOGRAPHY, volume 15, number4, November1978

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

pged Population 15-29

projected 0 ,15-29 cent

\CrudeBirth Rate 20-21

1EmploymentI -10.0 _55 1:

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

WhatWill1984 Be Like? LFPR, % 20-24 I " 200-200 '

LFR N1~\i0 35-44 LFPR FR 2~3544\

190 for 1910 not ava lable.

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

per thousand per year

Crude irthRate in i Currenlt5 Years

~~~15-291. 1940 '190

Rate Figure 5.-Unemployment UNI andGrowth Price IndexSinceWorld War eI RateofConsumer

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

WhatWill1984 Be Like? Homicide Rate Political Alienation

Figure 7.-Homicideand Political Alienation Among Young the

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

Testir-g Year 60-61 65-66 70-71 National AverageSAT

~~~~~~~~~~460 ~~~~~~~~~~~450 AverageBirth Order (inverted)

DEMOGRAPHY, volume 15, number4, November1978

DEMOGRAPHY, volume 15, number4, November1978

DEMOGRAPHY, volume 15, number4, November1978

current rate, per thousand per year 25

rude BirthRate inCurrent

Crude Birth! Rate 20-25 Years E,arlier

CHudeBirth Rate in Current 5 Years(nverted)

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

Male Population Aged 30-64 15-29 Actual

Ratio of Groups Aged 15-29 30-64

Crude Birth Rate Rate Period

1920 1930 1940 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975

20,607 24,550 27,664 31,671 33,781 35,478 36,295 38,115 38,908

.667 .650 .630 .544 .496 .502 .583 .663 .740

1980 1985 1990 1995 Sources:

30,426 29,717 27,626 25,864

42,184 46,210 50,585 54,759

.721 ,643 .546 .472

1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975

24.6 22.2 18.1 15.9

DEMOGRAPHY, volume 15, number4, November1978

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

Males Aged 30-64 15-29

Crude Birth Rate

AppendixTable 6.-UnemploymentRate, UNI, and GrowthRate of ConsumerPrice Index, 1948-1985

Economic Report Consumer price index: of the President (Washington, D.C.:

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

DEMOGRAPHY, volume 15, number4, November1978

Year 1952 1956 1964 1966 1970 1972 1974 1976

Testing Service, p. 233.

volume 15, number4, November1978 DEMOGRAPHY,

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460 ~450 AverageBirth Order (inverted)