Critical Analysis of Thomas Nagels Sexual Perversion

In this paper I will focus on a pioneering article in contemporary philosophy of sex Sexual Perversion, by Thomas Nagel. The article concentrates on the question of what constitutes a sexual perversion. Nagel intends to defend the concept of perversion against the charge of unintelligibility (Nagel 1969: 5), showing that the concept is meaningful and justified. He gives a negative definition of perversion, providing a formulation of what constitutes a complete sexual relation, and then defines perversion as an incomplete sexual relation that lacks certain characteristics. Overall, he provides a model that enables to check whether engagement in particular action counts as a perversion or not. Schematically, his argument could be outlined as follows:
P1: Sexual relation is complete if and only if it involves interpersonal awareness. P1: If sexual relation lacks interpersonal awareness, then it is incomplete. P2: If sexual relation is incomplete, then it is perverted. If sexual relation lacks interpersonal awareness, then it is perverted.

In this schema, P1 is a logical derivative of P1, and the conclusion is further drawn from P1 and P2. Presented as such, this is a logically valid argument. Next, I will analyze whether the premises are correct. Since P1 is a derivative, I will only concentrate on P1 and P2.

1. Complete Sexual Relation and Interpersonal Awareness At first, I will try to give a short account of what Nagel means by saying that sexual relation is complete only when it involves multi-level interpersonal awareness1. Nagels notion of complete sexual relation constitutes a sexual evaluation. When sex is described as incomplete, it implies that better sex or better specimen of sex, is possible. By better he does not mean better in moral sense or better as in more pleasurable. In fact, he admits that [i]t may be that sex which receives the highest marks for perfection as sex is less enjoyable than certain perversions (ibid: 16-17). For him, perfection as sex simply refers to goodness according to his own standard that regards sexual desire as a feeling about other persons (ibid. 8), and sex as an interpersonal relation:
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Whenever I speak of just interpersonal awareness I just use it as a shorter version to stand for multi-level interpersonal awareness.

It cannot be denied that sex may serve various functions [---] but it also has its own content as a relation between persons, and it is only by analyzing that relation that we can understand the conditions of sexual perversion. (ibid. 8)

Since sexual relation is an interpersonal relation it is complete only if it involves multi-level interpersonal awareness. Nagel presents us with a sophisticated example case in order to illustrate the stages of interpersonal awareness. Since it involves mirrors that enable free-quarter views, I will refer to it as the Mirror Case. It involves Romeo and Juliet sitting at opposite ends of a cocktail lounge, with many mirrors on the walls which permit [---] mutual unobserved observation (ibid. 10). According to my interpretation we could differentiate between the following stages that each participant (X) goes through:

First stage: awareness of ones own sexual embodiment (ibid. 14) (X is aroused). Romeo notices Juliet in a mirror. The sight arouses him, but Juliet remains unaroused. Intermediate stage2: awareness of the sexual embodiment of the other (X notices Ys arousal). Juliet notices Romeo in another mirror and becomes aroused, too. Romeo notices Juliet being aroused and this arouses him, too, but he does not realize that Juliet is aroused by noticing him. So, at this point Romeo just notices Juliets arousal (and is aroused by it).

Second stage: awareness of oneself as an object of desire (ibid. 14), recognition of ones own sexual embodiment via the others sexual embodiment (X recognizes Y is aroused by his arousal). Romeo finally realizes that both see each other from a mirror, and is further aroused by recognizing that Juliet is aroused by his own arousal.

The second stage involves considerable self-awareness to begin with (ibid. 10), self-awareness of ones arousal (stage one), which is then further recognized via being aware of the others arousal that has been brought about by ones own arousal. In a complete sexual relation, both should reach to the third stage. In more general, Nagels theory of interpersonal awareness is a psychological account of sexual perversion (ibid. 5-6). His claim that sexual perversion is a concept of psychological, not physiological interest reflects a general shift from anatomical style of reasoning to psychological style, when speaking of sexuality3. It also means that external observation is not sufficient to detect whether sexual relation is complete or incomplete4. Unless the physical facts, such as the other party being an unconscious object,
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Nagel later only differentiates between first stage and second stage (Nagel 1969: 14). However, in order to give a more complete account of the Mirror Case I have also differentiated an intermediate stage that would logically have to precede the third one. 3 This shift has been well described by Arnold I. Davidson according to whom: Sexual identity is no longer exclusively linked to the anatomical structure of the internal and external genital organs. It is now a matter of impulses, tastes, aptitudes, satisfaction, and psychic traits. (Davidson 1987: 21-22) 4 As Davidson has suggested: Only a psychiatrist [---] could recognize a pervert (Davidson 1987: 47).

e.g. a shoe, exclude the possibility of interpersonal relations, one must analyze what going on in partners minds, for example when partners in heterosexual intercourse indulge in private heterosexual fantasies, that obscures the recognition of the real partner (Nagel 1969: 16)5. Now that I have explained what Nagel means by holding that sexual relation is complete only if it involves interpersonal awareness, I will call this premise into question by analyzing whether interpersonal awareness is a necessary and sufficient condition for sexual relation to count as complete.

a) Is interpersonal awareness necessary to make a sexual relation complete? In this section I will be concentrating on the question whether interpersonal awareness is necessary for the sexual relation to be complete. That Nagel believes this, is evident from his saying that relations involving only part of the complex [interpersonal awareness] are significantly incomplete (Nagel 1969: 12). Next, I will be considering some counter-examples where it has been suggested that sexual relations that do not involve interpersonal awareness can be complete as well. At first, I will consider what I will be referring to as the Case of Regular Partners. Namely, a number of critics have acknowledged that interpersonal awareness plays an important role in novel relationships that include seduction and flirtation but denied its necessity in case of relationship that has been described as: spontaneous and heated sex between two familiar partners (Goldman 1977: 277), sexual behavior of regular partners (Moulton 1976: 538), an intimate and satisfying sexual relation begun without any preliminary exchange of multi-level arousals (ibid. 540) or the sexual relations of happily married couple enjoying their seventh anniversary (Solomon 1974: 337). Since it would be counter-intuitive to categorize ordinary intercourse between a regular partners as perverted, all these commentators conclude that the multi-level interpersonal awareness that Nagel described could not constitute a necessary condition for the sexual relation to be complete. However, I would like to turn attention to the fact that in his preliminary comments Nagel relies on the assumption, according to which practices, such as unadorned sexual intercourse, will not be perversions (Nagel 1969: 5). Since all the above-mentioned cases seem to categorize under unadorned sexual intercourses, either the criticism must be ungrounded or Nagels later claims must be in contradiction with this initial assumption.
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Nagel leaves it open whether the fantasy-based intercourse is a perversion or not, acknowledging that it is not generally regarded as perversion, and suggesting that perhaps simple dichotomy between perverted and unperverted sex is too crude to organize phenomena adequately (Nagel 1969: 16). However, it seems to me that on the background of the fact that only a psychiatrist could recognize a real pervert it could be suggested that cases like that are usually just not recognized as perversions because one cannot see what is going on in another persons mind.

I will try to argue for the former and show that the fact that Nagels model seems rather complex does not mean it could not describe simple unadorned sexual intercourses as well. He only illustrates his model with the Mirror Case (which, he admits, is rather artificial) because he wants to consider a case in which the elements can be separated (ibid. 10). Also, the example is a good one to demonstrate the psychological nature of his model that might otherwise be overshadowed by physical elements. After presenting the reader with the Mirror Case, he adds:
Physical contact and intercourse are perfectly natural extensions of this complicated visual exchange, and mutual touch can involve all the complexities of awareness present in the visual case, but with a far greater range of subtlety and acuteness. (ibid. 11)

Critics seem to have focused on the first part where physical contact is mentioned as a mere extension of this complicated visual exchange but it seems to me that Nagel is not trying to say that intercourse would therefore count as a complete sexual relation only if preceded by foreplay: He just seems to be referring to the incidental fact that the Mirror Case might continue on different levels. Turning attention to the second part of the sentence, he claims that mutual touch can involve all the complexities of awareness present in the visual case, but with a far greater range of subtlety and acuteness. So, instead of regarding intercourse as an extension of foreplay, he regards it as analogical to the visual exchange, only in this case vision is substituted with sense of touch that can trigger the same model of multi-level interpersonal awareness. In the Mirror Case arousal is conveyed via visual means but it can also be conveyed and sensed via touching the partner. So, it would be wrong to say that Nagels model could only be adapted to a sophisticated seduction scene, not real sex. In the Mirror Case it takes longer for the participants to recognize each others arousal and work out that this arousal has been brought about by their own arousal, making it easier for the reader to follow all the steps involved. In case of direct communication with no mirrors involved the partners would not be so slow-minded, the same stages would simply be more evident rather than non-existent. In fact, Nagel even admits that all these complexities of awareness can manifest themselves with far greater range of subtlety and acuteness in case of physical contact. Secondly I will consider a cases proposed by Alan H. Goldman who questions Nagels model on different levels. He interprets the second stage of Nagels model as an egoistical desire that ones partner be aroused by ones own desire and therefore does not find it necessary for the sexual relation to be complete (Goldman 1977: 278). I will refer to it as the Lack of Selfish Desire. It is true that he describes the second stage as [h]e [Romeo] senses that she [Juliet] senses that he senses her. Since he 4

defines sensing as X regarding Y with sexual desire, the sentence above could be translated so that: Romeo regards it with sexual desire that Juliet regards it with sexual desire that he regards it with sexual desire but I would not interpret this regarding with desire as a selfish obsession but just something that is usually desirable, even if this desire is not conscious, something desirable in a sense that if he got what he desired it would make him feel (more) pleased, sometimes further aroused. After all, why should one not want the other to be aroused by his arousal? If one would wish the other to be repulsed by his desire instead we would probably categorize him as a pervert, e.g. a sadist. Of course, there is also a possibility that one might want his arousal to have no effect on the partner but would it not be weird if the partner would be equally aroused by me regardless of whether I am aroused or not (other things being equal)? It seems natural to think that arousal produces further arousal. Instead of regarding it as a selfish obsession, it could just be regarded as a natural course of things. However, Goldman goes further and also criticizes the intermediate stage, claiming that during sex acts one may like ones partner to be sometimes active and aroused, sometimes more passive (ibid), be it due to his own arousal or something else. I will refer to it as the Wish for Passiveness. But here, it seems to me that Goldman fails to distinguish between two distinct dichotomies: that of active and passive, and that of aroused and not aroused. This seems to be evident in the fact that he starts by speaking of active and aroused on a par but then goes on to contrast it simply with more passive. However, being passive does not mean that one could not be aroused. Wanting the other to be passive does not exclude wanting him/her to be aroused. If one wants the other to be passive but not aroused, then this seems to approach to sadism if one would seek to make her/him afraid or feel pain instead, and that constitutes a perversion. Or if one wants the other to be passive without evoking any feelings whatsoever then it might be preferable for him/her to engage in corpophilia. So, it seems that the second stage is still important. In this section I have considered the Case of Regular Partners, Lack of Selfish Desire, and Wish for Passiveness cases that different critics have regarded as complete sex regardless of the lack of interpersonal awareness, as required by Nagel. In the Case of Regular Partners and Wish for Passiveness I have shown that both can nevertheless categorize as complete sex, whereas in case of Lack of Selfish Desire I showed that naturally it is nevertheless desirable that the other be aroused by ones own arousal, and the lack of it would be likely to result in perversion. Of course, I have only considered a limited number of counter-arguments and there may be many others, but at least so far it seems that regarding interpersonal awareness as a necessary condition of complete sexual relation is not that unintuitive as some critics have claimed it is.

b) Is interpersonal awareness sufficient to make a sexual relation complete? There have also been suggestions that some perversions actually pass the test of interpersonal awareness. One example of that kind is that of sadomasochistic pair (Levy 1980: 193), a pair that is complementarily sado-masochist (Solomon 337), so that one is a sadist and the other a masochist (later simply referred as complementary SM). Of course, it could also be the case that both are sadomasochists, but in this case they would just be switching sides from time to time. The reason why Nagel regarded sadism as incomplete was that it constitutes a denial of oneself as an object of desire. Since he only cares about his own arousal his exercise of control does not let the other be aroused, through which he could become aware of himself as an object of desire. However, if his/her partner were a masochist, then he would actually not deny himself as an object of desire, for he would know that his controlling action is of the kind that arouses the partner. Seeing that the partner desires and enjoys the pain inflicted, he would become aware of himself as an object of desire. Reverse is true for a masochist who does not let oneself be an object of anothers sexual desire but only object of his/her control. However, if the masochist was together with a sadist, the fact that he would be an object of his/her control would be exactly why he would also be an object of desire. So, what to do about complementary SM? It seems that since Nagel regards completeness as a predicate of sexual relation, not isolated actions of one person, then one must agree that according to Nagels theory complementary SM does indeed constitute a complete sexual relation, not perversion. This is an interesting conclusion of Nagels theory: whether the sexual relationship counts as perversion or not depends on with whom you do it with, it depends on whats going on in your partners mind. But this conclusion is no novelty, for is it not the same idea that makes it okay to have sex with an adult but condemns sex with young children as pedophilia? I would instead like to ask: why is it important to categorize complementary SM as a perversion? Nagels account does not rely on any given definition of perversion, but is to constitute one. Whereas it is important for him that his theory would correspond to our main intuitions about perversion 6, it could surely not be expected that his definition would include all kinds of relations that would be regarded as perversion by some people7. Though Donald Levy has said that according to ordinary usage perversion applies to complementary SM as well (Levy 1980: 193), it could be suggested that perhaps even the fact that Nagel speaks of sadism and masochism in the context of non-complementary relationship is an indication of that this is how they are ordinarily spoken of when categorized as perversions. I do not
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As he lists down: certain practices will be perversions if anything is, such as shoe fetishism, bestiality, and sadism (Nagel 1969: 5) 7 I find it rather unlikely that any definition would correspond to how all the people would use the word.

think that all people would undoubtedly categorize complementary SM as perverse. One might just be tempted to draw from the analogy with non-complementary cases but it does not seem totally counterintuitive not to regard complementary SM as perversion. Overall I would also like to add that in logical terms, the fact whether interpersonal awareness is sufficient or not makes no difference to the main conclusion about perversion that Nagel wants to draw. P1 could also be derived from a less demanding claim than P1, according to which sexual relation is complete if and only if it involves interpersonal awareness. P1 could also be derived from the following statement: If a sexual relation is complete then it involves interpersonal awareness (P1). If this statement would be true then a sexual relation that does not involve interpersonal awareness could not be a complete one (for if it were complete, it would also have to include interpersonal awareness), and would therefore count as incomplete (P1). The argument would then be the following:
P1: If a sexual relation is complete, then it involves interpersonal awareness. P1: If sexual relation lacks interpersonal awareness, then it is incomplete. P2: If sexual relation is incomplete, then it is perverted. If sexual relation lacks interpersonal awareness, then it is perverted.

So, even if interpersonal awareness would not be a sufficient, but only a necessary condition of complete sex, the argument could still hold. Along with other commentators, e.g. Solomon and Levy who proposed the objection of complementary SM, I have taken Nagel to hold that he regards interpersonal awareness as a sufficient condition of complete sex, but perhaps it could be suggested that overall it seems a bit unclear. He holds that I believe that some version of this overlapping system of sexual perceptions and interactions [interpersonal awareness] is the basic framework of any full-fledged sexual relation (Nagel 1969: 12; my italics). Claiming it is the basic framework makes his claim to approach to the one according to which it is sufficient but since basic does not exclude any other minor components then it might just be only necessary as well. Lets regard the softer claim. After all, though Nagel attempts to outline the features of complete sex, his main goal seems to be the detection of perversion and that does not necessarily presuppose a full account of complete sex. But now, lets move on to analyze the second assumption.

2. Is incompleteness sufficient to categorize a sexual relation as perversion? 7

According to P2 incompleteness is a sufficient condition to categorize a sexual relation as perverted. That does not mean that it would be a necessary condition, however. Logically, there is room for some other actions besides incomplete sexual relation to count as perversions as well. However, if one knew that a sexual relation is incomplete (one and perhaps the most important way of knowing it, as suggested by Nagel, is that it lacks interpersonal awareness), one could conclude that the relation is perverted. According to this interpretation, Nagels theory would be an account of how categorize something as perversion with full certainty. If there is no interpersonal awareness, so that the relation counts as incomplete, the relation is perverse. This is what gives ground to categorizing bestiality, pedophilia, various fetishisms, sadism, masochism, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and perhaps most cases of group sex as perversions (ibid. 14-15). The only relation that he attempts to redeem is homosexuality. He maintains that it remains psychologically unilluminating to class it as perverted but he does not claim with full certainty that it is not a perversion. He admits that if homosexuality is a perversion, it is so in a very different sense from that in which shoe-fetishism is a perversion (ibid. 16), accepting the possibility that perhaps there are other reasons besides incompleteness due to the lack of interpersonal awareness to counts some relations as perversions. So, whereas he seems to regard incompleteness due to the lack of interpersonal awareness as a sufficient condition to detect perversions, he seems doubtful about whether it is always a necessary condition. And it seems to me that this is the main slipping point of Nagels account because, as he points it out himself as well: even if the proposed model is correct, it remains implausible to describe as perverted every deviation from it, undermining the sufficiency of his account. He himself illustrates this point with an example of a heterosexual couple who indulge in private heterosexual fantasies during intercourse, so that the recognition of the real partner is obscured, admitting that [i]t is not, however, generally regarded as perversion (Nagel 1969: 16). Whereas I personally do not see a problem categorizing this as a perversion (perhaps it could be assigned a position of hidden perversion, fantasy fetishism or something alike), I would like to point out another example that lacks true interpersonal awareness but does not seem to account as a perversion. This is what I will be referring as the Prostitute Case. The question of what if Juliet in the cocktail lounge was instead a prostitute, skillfully mocking the signs of innocent arousal is mentioned by Robert C. Solomon (1974: 337) and further discussed by Donald Levy:
Another trouble with Nagels view is that the prostitute, for example, who hardly participates at all in the interpersonal awareness Nagel refers to, would be perverted, yet neither ordinary usage nor any traditional classification of the perversions has such a result. (Levy 1980: 193)

Whereas the sexual relation involving a prostitute who pretends is surely incomplete it seems weird to categorize any of the partners as perverts. However, as we saw before, for Nagel perverse is a predicate that applies mainly to a relation. So, the question arises whether the fact that a certain activity is perverse makes the people involved perverse? It could surely not make all people involved necessarily perverse because even though a pedophile would be a pervert, the child he molests would not. But could it be the case that the person accountable for the incomplete sexual relation is a pervert? In the Prostitute Case it is the prostitute whose pretense makes the relation incomplete. Does that make the prostitute a pervert? The answer is NO. A prostitute is not a pervert because she engages in the sexual relation mainly for money, not for pleasure8. It is not as if she/he would get sexual satisfaction from pretending arousal in order to earn money. In sexual terms she would probably still prefer and get greater satisfaction from an intercourse where she would not have to pretend that she is aroused. As Nagel mentions in his preliminary comments: if there are perversions, they will be unnatural sexual inclinations rather than merely unnatural practices adopted not from inclination but for other reasons (Nagel 1969: 5). According to this distinction, prostitution is only a practice adopted for earning money, not an inclination, and therefore prostitute is not a pervert.

The main problem of Nagels account However, an inclination is something that describes a person, not a relation. Therefore, the question remains whether some relation constituting a perversion means that one of the participants has to be a pervert, or is it the case that perversities could take place without any of the participants being a pervert. If it were the latter case when it could also be that non-perverse relations could take place between people who would be regarded as perverts in an isolated context for example, though a sadist and a masochist would often be regarded as perverts, their relation could nevertheless count as a complete sexual relation. It seems to me that this is also the main source of confusion in criticism. Since Nagel only notes this only briefly in the beginning that perversion must include an inclination and does not mention it later, it remains unclear whether he actually regards incompleteness as a sufficient condition of perversion or whether it should be accompanied by one or more participants having an inclination toward the activity in question.
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Of course, in general a prostutite may engage in the relation for pleasure as well, but in this case she/he would probably not have to pretend arousal, and the relation would not count as incomplete. The prostitute in the Prostitute Case who pretends arousal, however, probably just does it for money if she has to pretend.

The problem is that Nagel lets perversion appear as the opposite of complete sexual relation 9, whereas it would perhaps be more appropriate to define perversion as an inclination towards preferring incomplete sex as means of gaining sexual satisfaction (not for other reasons, such as earning money, etc). So, instead of describing sexual relations as perverse, it would be more appropriate to describe peoples inclinations as perverse.

Re-evaluation of some previous cases When taking into account the necessity of the existence of an inclination, it becomes a lot clearer why some previously mentioned cases seemed problematic. For example, Nagel regarded the fantasy-based intercourse as a defective sexual relation (my italics), finding it problematic to categorize it as a perversion and suggesting that perhaps a simple dichotomy between perverted and unperverted sex is too crude to organize the phenomena adequately (ibid. 16). However, when looking at peoples inclinations it could be said that people who just happen to fantasize do not count as perverts because they have no inclination to prefer it over complete sex. However, if one had an inclination towards preferring indulging in fantasies any time when having an intercourse (even if the intercourse would in fact take place with a partner one actually dreams of), then I see no problem regarding the inclination perverse. It would constitute a kind of special fetishism that only a psychiatrist could detect. And in case of complementary SM it could just be an arbitrary fact that a sadist happens to be together with a masochist, so that the relation happens to account as incomplete. However, there are actually two possibilities: a) the sadist has an inclination towards looking for sexual satisfaction from inflicting pain, b) the sadist has in inclination towards looking for sexual satisfaction from making somebody feel sexually aroused by inflicting pain. In the first case the sadist would be a pervert who does not case whether his actions arouse the other and whether he could become aware of his own arousal via the others arousal. In the latter case where he would only prefer inflicting pain on somebody who is aroused by that, he does not have to be regarded as a pervert.

Conclusion
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For example, he holds that various familiar deviations [perversions] constitute truncated or incomplete versions of the complete configuration (Nagel 1969: 13)

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Whereas I did not find any major problems in regarding interpersonal awareness as a necessary component of complete sexual relation, it remains a bit obscure whether Nagel regarded it as a sufficient constituent of complete sexual relation or not. Interpreting him to hold the softer claim according to which it does not have to be sufficient, his theory could still provide ground to detect incompleteness via lack of interpersonal awareness, and so provide ground to detecting at least some perversions but not the relations that do not constitute a perversion. However, when considering whether incompleteness is sufficient to categorize some relations as perversions it was revealed by the Prostitute Case that it is not, because, as Nagel notes it in the beginning of his article himself as well, a perversion must be an inclination, not just a practice adopted for other reasons (e.g. earning money). But whereas incompleteness describes a sexual relation, inclination is a word that can be ascribed to people, not practices. So, we can see how Nagel slips from regarding perversion as an inclination to attributed to people into speaking of it as a sexual relation. I regard this as the main source of confusion in his theory. However, if one were to correct Nagels definition of perversion and regard it not just as an incomplete sexual relation but as an inclination towards such relation, then the theory might seem more credible, and would also manage to deal better with counter-examples that arouse from the tendency to attribute perversion to sexual relation instead of peoples inclinations. So, even though it would be beyond the scope of this essay to give a full defense of Nagels theory, I hope that I have managed to show that actually he has a point in what he says and if peoples inclinations would not be confused with relations then a lot of criticism would lose its ground.

Heidy Meriste

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Literature Davidson, A. I. 1987. Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality. Critical Inquiry 14, pp. 16-48. Goldman, A. H. 1977. Plain Sex. Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol 6, no 3, pp. 267-287. Gray, R. 1978. Sex and Sexual Perversion. The Journal of Philosophy, vol 75, no 4, pp. 189-199. Levy, D. 1980. Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories. Ethics 90: 191-202. Moulton, J. 1976. Sexual Behavior: Another Position. The Journal of Philosophy, vol 73, no 16, pp. 537546. Nagel, T. 1969. Sexual perversion. The Journal of Philosophy, vol 66, no 1, pp. 5-17. Solomon, R. C. 1974. Sexual Paradigms. The Journal of Philosophy, vol 71, no 11, pp. 336-345.

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