'PQP ?

ECHET
SUBJEC'l' : PHOE:~ X/PUUHGlIOA:IG I Proj c c t

~!::28 J 1 ... TIOCSA

u y

19 t 3

31 J_ll~.T 1973 J-3 'DOCSA /Revised

BACKGHOU;~D:

1. ~DUrinG Exploitation

1967., the Intel.lisence Coordination and. (ICEX) prosrn~ which w~s the forerunner of the

PHOE~IX progra~, was developed

'-'ThiS
was an effort to identifj' the poli tical level or

the enemy and did provide an initial appreciation of the VC political and terrorist appar~tus. Thieu issued a Presidential PHOENIX pr-ogr-am,
1

In July 19G8,

President

directive which established the

~ I'

Its principal ch~racteristic was that it """'-'-

a pr-ogr am , not an or-gan i zation, to brinG about collaboration cooper~tion, and coordination a~on; all government agencies
,

which could contribute to the identiric~tic:l a~d ncutrali=c~1c~ of the VCl.

comnu ttees we r-e e stablished a~ the national,

regional, province and d i st r t ct level. 2

A. spgcial US adva scr-y

effort was developed, utilizinG available military officers wh!

1.

2.

GVi~ Pr-e cLden t LaI Decree, 1.July GVN l'rime 1''illlL~tcrDil'cct-ivl.;,

3.

Arnba!;~;~tiol'

Colby

1969 5 r~~rch 19G8 'I'c s t Lmo ny , Dc c emb e r' 1970

REG~:_O_:_E_~R_t~_~_m"",,!:r~j',~_f.1_r_.;_lS_mW.'
DATE

UNCLASSiFIED
'",

Augus,t 1986 AUTHORITY DAMO-OASO

18

..~.

'

..

'

TOP

SEQHJ';T

(-j

.r c: ITTVF

DurinG

the two and one-half a series of actions

years

fron

July

1968

to December and make

1970,
more

were

launched

to improve

effec tive the overall a. PHOENIX Structure.

PHOElIIX program, Operation centers

Lnc Ludd ng : were established level.

at the national, A training program personnel various

regional,

provincial,

and district wor-k i.ng

program

for GVH officials

in the PHOE:!n: advisory to the

was initiated. were centers given

On the American training

side,

special

and assigned

throughout

SVN~ On a number of occasions, the

b. Com~and President

Attenticn.

and the Prime

~linister stressed hi~h were level held

the importance A

of the program series

to assembled seminars

officials.

of special outlined

at 0hich

the Price was includec Plans

Minister within the

its cbjectives.

The program

1969

and

1970

Pacif1catio~

and Development

and was a prominent plans.6 c. National Development take ?cl~ce Plan,

element

in the implementation

of those

~ole.

In the

1970

Pacification called

and to wa~

the r:ational Police in the PHOENIX

were

upon

a leading

role

program

and an effort

-initiated

to upgrade

!rational Police

capability, This

authority, in May

and responsibility

for the program.

culminated

~. Ambassador Colby Testimony, December 1970 page unnumbered 5. MACCORDS Fact Sheet, 1 December 1970. 6. 1970 Pacificatioh and Development Plan, Annex II.

'f'8P 6ECRE':P

bB1SI9IYE

."~)l.

........

.:

",

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,-

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(.

1970 in the transfer of the Central PHUNG

HOfii1Q

office

from the Prime Minister's office to the Directorate General of the National Police and was established as a separate "bloc" therein.7 d. Identification.

The first application of the progra.

involved the identification of VCI individuals and organizations. A collation of available inforoation was

made throughout the country and over the years ~hese identifications have improved and overall estimate of Associated with identification is the G\

VCI had declined.

ID card program, designed to provide solid identificat~or. for all citizens over 15 years of age. This program has enjoyed considerable success and there is little doubt that the VC are concerned, as they h~ve been collecting ant destroying etc.8 e. Quotas. Quotas have been assigned to all levels of VCI. Over the years, asucces5i~ cards, counterfeiting them, tampering with the~,
"

for the neutralization

hardening of the quota system was instituted in order to obtain maximum incentive toward elimination of higher level VCl. A number of debates have occurred over the

7.
8.

Ambassador Ambassador

Colby Testimony, December 1970, pge 8 Colby Testimony, December 1970, pge 9

3
/

(
~ 'fOp

,
1:

srnu;-r
quotas, but the GVN after review
r-c t a f

ncd

t hcrn

for their

incentive effect upon lower officials.9 f. Operations. Since the VCI in great part now ihhabit

base areas away from populated zones, many operations against them have a military character. Individual arrests

check point detentions, cordon and searches of populated zones, etc., exist but the most prod~ctive operaticns arc those tarbetted against individuals during the course of larger scale raids 'on enemy bases and safe areas, or
by

ambushes again!:t vcr eler.:ents atter.:pting to regain contact 10 with the populated cor.:munities. g. Legal Proce5sin~. A variety of steps were taken by th

GVN to ir.:p~ove the legal handling of the VCI after captu~e. Some have been to provide a greater cor.:ponent justice in of the p~oceedinbs to include, outlining mandatory sentences for tertain category VCl, sending additional prosecutors to the provinces to assist in the proper handling of cases, an 12 time limit on detention before trial. h. Rehabil~taticn. As of December 1970, little or no action had been undertaken on a consistent basis to

9. Ambassidor
10. 11. 12.

Colby Testimony, December 1970,pgc 10 Amba ssaccr- Colby 'I'e st Lmo ny ,"December 1970, page 11 GVN I'11n1stC:~ of Interi6r Directive, 21 r'!arch 1969, paces 2 GVN Minis~cr of Interior Directive, 20 August 1969, pa~c 1 4

TOP Sr:C~N'F

2E:!SIl

\It /

\.' .
t::F.HfiHTIVE

r:

'

rehabilitate detainees.

However, cert~in areas had a

reorientation 'program, primarily as a result of the initiatives of an individual Province chief and the possibility of a parole system had also been studied. Eventually, an effort was made to extend reorientation to all communist detainees and to apply more sophisticated techniques in the handling and rehabilitation prisoner's. i. of political

13
.

Infor~ation Prosrar.. On 1 October 1969, the Prime

,

Minister initiated the PHO~:IX Public Infor~ation Progra~. This was designed to surface PHOENIX publicly, under the rationale cf protecting the people from terrorism. The

current goal is the public exposure of 100 percent of identified VCI. The information program has essentia12y

two elements: (1) general infor~ation about the need for and desirability of the PHOENIX program, a~d (2) specif!c . a nnouncecen~s j. .d 0 f' Indi Vl ua 1 VC I
W hose

-. 1.-'" 14 cap ture i S sougl.~.

Vietna~ese Attitudes.

A variety of explanations eXlS:

13. MACCORDS ?act Sheet, 10 December 1970

14.

MACV F4ct Sheet, 12 December 1970, pages 1, 2

5
SE?ISIWI"E /

(
S'~i1RIq'IV~
?

for the reluctance

on the part to engage

of many fully

lower

level program.

Vietnar.1ese officials These include:

in the PHOEnIX

(1) Penetration but not considered

by the enemy: drawback

True

to some degree

a major

to the prograc. program vice a

(2) It was considered Vietnamese (3) probably been program. Acco~~odatio0, exists where

an American

or live and let live: balance of power

~~is has

a rough

achieved

between

the opposing

forces. targettir.g of or

(4) Fear:
VCI might bring

In some ar,eas individual rapid retaliation

on the official

his family.

(5) A
involving struggle,

complex

of psychological grudging

attitudes, for the

a certain

admiration

vcr
E

an inferiority

complex

in regard

to it, and

disinclination . 2~~. friends,

to personalize

the battle

against

neighbors, PHOEHIX

and relatives. pr-ogr-amwas Safety, through PSOF, supported by COReS/ the

The overall

DOD/PIIOE:IIX, CORDS/USAID/Public 1ncidential territorial assistance security given (RF/PF),

and OSA, plus as

such programs and Chieu Hoi.

PHOE~IX

;nwn ITIVE

(
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;~-;;;-;T'TJ"D;:.r:-:--~~,
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!~-- '- ~.;. ... .. , ~

'"nr

....

Police

training

and =~~entati=n

2nd ther~ ~ere frequent

occasions

in

S:'nce
this was co~bi~cd with

a lack

of foc~:

of respa~sibility

for

~ajor burden initial

of the pro~ra~

in ~,jistrict.

This

created

many

,probl~~~
2S
',';2S

and aj~ersEl~ al'f~2~ed the pro;ra~,

rcsards

particularly
s ub seq u en L ly

[ublie

aC2~rt~nc~.

~o~cver,

trainin~

Lrnp r-ov ed

and, as c: r-e U 'l.1:;, t he ef fee: t i veness s

~ is more appare~t. F'

3

-,

q1~ Inl t ially

tho

PlLO::::::;:):/?::','::~;

wa s

1
-

c: '7 ""',
_" I .

" :,:;.

u-.;

... ~

"'1

....

-~
., ~

.-.

y'

In 197::', the US furnished ~7.4 ~i11ion piasters ~~d

1,704,000.
:.; ', ..
.., ~,....
,~

In 1972,

Ho fie;ures are availa':Jle for 1973.--

15.
16.

r.
.
.

_SlOB

c?,!:: \ ,~'" _, i _t

(0,
4'~ht
program totaled peak, the US advisory effort to the ?~OENIX ana

473

persor.r.el; 450 Army personnel 262 were assigned

23

civilians.

Of this total

at key district levels. ~he and

and city levels, with the remainder primary d~ties of these advisors

at higher

were

to give advice

assistar.ce or.: (2) procedures ana:ysis

(1) organization
of intelligence

and management collection

techniques,

and files, 17

(3)

ar.d aissemination

of intelliger.ce.

By mid-197l, where

the P~UNG HCA~G progra~ it waa feasible and assign National phase

had progressed

to the point

to close some

of the ?HU~G HOANG

offices

responsibility

for further 1972,

Police.

In August

'. as

efforts

over to the

part of the military were still assigned

out, 136 US military advisory

advisors By

to PHUXG HOANG

duties.

31

Deeember

1972,

only

45 remained ar.d they were to be curtailed

at

or reassigned

=-97C, ~~CV issued ~irective

established policy and responsibilities ~OA~G

525-36,

Khich

gcverfiing US participaoperation~. 7he with GV~

tior. and su;port directive states

of ?~CEXIX/?~UXG

that if GS persor.nel come in contact

..,- ... r 17. j.~/~ to CJCS ~':~~:):-,a~~~::: ;,-'o-'r~ vu v..), 18. CORDS Fact Sheet, 9 August 1972

27 Acril ::'971

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Ccnv Lc t i on of t:;~2-::

legislation secu:'ity.

' .. ;hic:-1 Gst:':jlis:1ed these

~:':.::;~sa ga i ns t n a t t cn aI

This for~al

judicial

prccc~~:,e is sup~le~ented
fo:' a ~aximu~

ty a
+- ... -- __ v;.

for 2~~inistrative years of perso~3 security.

The

s~ntenci~g

of

regarded

as dangero~s sentencin~

to the national rests on the

ad~inistr~tive

, :--: Law s an c. .o r-c :... 2. !1 C e s .

"

other countries
iMa1aya,

~uch

25

Kenya,

2nd the

Ph11!rrinos,

and even the US suspended

emergency.

so,

Secticns

/92,

et.

seq. ) .

The

dated

Minister

of Defense

decree

7~7 =f 1 ~arch 1969 p~ovidcd

o~fenders

specific

definitions

of clas~es

of c:~~~~i~t

and outlined
t be Lr' part y

the appr-opr aa t e ~'e;,i s of' C'2:: e n t i o n ; depend ing upon cd status stated

and !'e:spo!:sibl1itl-25. ~he pr2~::;ble of' this decree is to co~p1etely eli~inat~ the

10

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possible."(.2. (U)

c Le r-gy r e n )

involve

t c.r-t

uze ,

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to
rnur

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de

r-

of b ct ':
is

r.e

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Or!

nur.e

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r-ous

Lons

inference
authorlt:.:. latter 22

e 2C'.:S

t:-:-::

ta

cit

part

t .:~:. ~.h 0'J t

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h2s

that t i:::e ::-.o:c

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d i c d. cl 0',';:-:

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As far

&s

<.J -

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to

clete~::::jr:2)

informal

ccc~i~~~~!c~ ~!th

c:~~,

.. __ . \ .1.l,.,.'\

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r: (

T,.. ,~ )

Lnve s t Lg at Lon

~ -_.;......... '--

.....,

21. COi:U sr,;:'\cv :::5;, 21;l)3:JIZ [~':.:c[:-:::t S2"J 1969 22. Hc\'!sraper a~:i~lc3 3 ~ucu:t
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11

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I .~

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apparently

norie

is c on t err.pLa t e d at t l.e present

t.Lrr.e ,

Inspector the

G~~~r~l,

:~~art2~nt General

of th~ in an effort

end the

Office

of

to deter~ine

if any

allegation:. examination investicatic~ c~ t~~i~ ~ecor~s !ails to reveal any report c!

i~i:~~7sj

oft h e Ge n e '.':. Cc c.' '~' t :. S n 011 resurface

c.v
r- .

:.

n d the

~ n t i r-e p~ 0 b 1em

C0 U

1 d

c:c~.-:-... u..., ..... o t-,, __ . ....__

c.:~"'r. 23 :. ............

.,.

,,\,;
_ ~'.

..
_

..

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centers

hajbeen

c~t~tlished

at the national,

resional,

program.

23. Concres~icnal ~ecord,

3 AUGust 1971, paGes E7761-~77~2

12

..
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1

,,~

..(

.....-:-'"'jTL'

,., ..

o t he r- o I'f'dc

I a Ls
2~d

control the role each

or forcE's plays ~as ~2r~ cl~arly

been

strea~li~ej

2z~ncy

results.

?or e x a.np Le , the official January

19GB to July

ne u t r-a lLz a t Lon cl:.i::l 1972,

for the period availabl~, during advisors

the latest

data clai~ej

totals
24

81,740

vcr of which

over 22,000 ~ere

1970.

With the departure

1972,

of the last US ~ilitary ~as considerable sreculatio~

in Cecc=ber

there

as to \';i:et!:er :10t the G'n~ -.oulo be able to ccr.t r.: the 0:' .. i ...:e
pr'ogr-a:a as p La nr.e d ,

Howe v er , on 1 Apr-I I 1972,

the lTationc.l
a co~olJarv

Police

Ln I t La t ed

a Spec1c..-l Anti-Vcr "':hich lasted

~

ca~rai~n, ,

of
DU~'::'r:::

the PIlOLr:Z

pOO~!'2:::,

un::11 2

:an~~2ry 1::73.

the nine mon t.h of s limited

adv

the pr-ogr-ams

exis t enc e , and :-;i cn Ly th reduced force of

TIC' u ..

a~sistance

from a substantially

Isor-s, the

:Jatlonal Police

a r-r-c d o ver- 2~' ,'J80 ct.c

s us ro c t e o

'.'c::

and sent~nced almost 12,000 to ter~s ran;ing from t~o ~eeks . 25 to two years. Consequent Ly , it appears that the :.IS :122

h a v e en a b 1 c c:l organizat:'on~ Victna=cse be continued

:. t

';: b u i 1 d 0

the e 1 em e n t s c f a re 2. s en o.:.~: will probably

=-~: :0 c Ii ci-'
more

~~ile

the operation there

v

beco~c

in character,

is evidence
_'

t ha t E:,= eff0!"t n2!"t:'cu!arly

at a reasonablv secure
.-

effective where

level,

in the relatively
already
1.

areas

the infrastri:c~~re has

been zer~ously
...,...... . .

weakened.
?~n('r> .... , . ::l.!' .::

25.

2~. IS,!'/'.~_':" . ',,~n~scl""c:~on .J.. f':ACCOED3 Fa ct Sh~et,

LIJ: I'-:TJ",

18 '-' ... ernce- r Se ~ t _ .. ~.... .. 7 j7arch 1972

13

.................

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