The Phoenix programme

[back] Assassinations [back] Vietnam war

[CIA programme. The systematic killing and terrorising of civilians exposed in the My Lai massacre. Continues to exist and operate worldwide today (eg Iraqi and Palestinian civilians), was seen in Nicaragua under the code-name Operation Pegasus, and in El Salvador with the El Mozote massacre, and in Indonesia with the Santa Cruz Massacre. And you can see the same hand at work with the manufactured Serial killers, at least one of whom was part of Phoenix.]

See: Torture Serial killers Human Sacrifice Terror bombing

Nazi killing of civilians CIA Nazi connections My Lai massacre El Mozote massacre Santa Cruz Massacre

Articles
The Deadly "Operation Phoenix" by Texe Marrs [2004] Dead Spooks Don't Lie (And Don't Deal Drugs Either) by Uri Dowbenko [Book extract] The Phoenix Program, My Lai and the Tiger Cages excerpt from The Phoenix Program [2001] Bob Kerrey, CIA War Crimes, And The Need For A War Crimes Trial by Douglas Valentine

Book
The Phoenix Program by Douglas Valentine

External
[2003] Preemptive Manhunting: The CIAs New Assassination Program CIA and Operation Phoenix in Vietnam Information about the CIA's assassination program in Vietnam. CIA Support of Death Squads William E. Colby on July 19, 1971, before Senate Subcommittee testified that CIA's Operation Phoenix had killed 21,587 Vietnamese citizens between January 1968 and May 1971.

Documents from the Phoenix Program Created by the CIA in Saigon in 1967, Phoenix was a program aimed at "neutralizing"through assassination, kidnapping, and systematic torturethe civilian infrastructure that supported the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam. The CIA destroyed its copies of these documents, but the creator of Phoenix gave his personal copies to author Douglas Valentine. They have never previously been published, online or in print Phoenix Document: "Internal Security in South Vietnam - Phoenix" The latest in our collection of documents from the CIA's program of assassination, kidnapping, and torture in Vietnam

Quotes re Nicaragua [See: Nicaragua.]

The contras' brutality earned them a wide notoriety. They regularly destroyed health centers, schools, agricultural cooperatives, and community centers-symbols of the Sandinistas' social programs in rural areas. People caught in these assaults were often tortured and killed in the most gruesome ways. One example, reported by The Guardian of London, suffices. In the words of a survivor of a raid in Jinotega province, which borders on Honduras: "Rosa had her breasts cut off. Then they cut into her chest and took out her heart. The men had their arms broken, their testicles cut off, and their eyes poked out they were killed by slitting their throats and pulling the tongue out through the slit." After many contra atrocity stories had been reported in the world press, it was disclosed in October 1984 that the CIA had prepared a manual of instruction for its clients which, amongst other things, encouraged the use of violence against civilians. In the wake of the furor in Congress caused by the expose, the State Department was obliged to publicly condemn the contras' terrorist activities. Congressional intelligence committees were informed by the CIA, by present and former contra leaders, and by other witnesses that the contras indeed "raped, tortured and killed unarmed civilians, including children" and that "groups of civilians, including women and children, were burned, dismembered, blinded and beheaded". These were the same rebels whom Ronald Reagan, with his strange mirror language, called "freedom fighters" and the "moral equal of our founding fathers". (The rebels in El Salvador, in the president's studied opinion, were "murderers and terrorists".) The CIA manual, entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, gave advice on such niceties as political assassination, blackmailing ordinary citizens, mob violence, kidnapping, and blowing up public buildings. Upon entering a town, it said, "establish a public tribunal" where the guerrillas can "shame, ridicule and humiliate" Sandinistas and their sympathizers by "shouting slogans and jeers". "If ... it should be necessary ... to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town," guerrillas should explain that "he was an enemy of the people" who would have alerted the Sandinistas who would then "carry out acts of reprisals such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc." [2003] Nicaragua 1981-1990 by William Blum

Nicaragua 1981-1990
Destabilization in slow motion

excerpted from the book Killing Hope by William Blum ***** When the American military forces left Nicaragua for the last time, in 1933, they left behind a souvenir by which the Nicaraguan people could remember them: the National Guard, placed under the direction of one Anastasio Somoza ... Three years later, Somoza took over the presidency and with the indispensable help of the National Guard established a family dynasty which would rule over Nicaragua, much like a private estate, for the next 43 years. While the Guardsmen, consistently maintained by the United States, passed their time on martial law, rape, torture, murder of the opposition, and massacres of peasants, as well as less violent pursuits such as robbery, extortion, contraband, running brothels and other government functions, the Somoza clan laid claim to the lion's share of Nicaragua's land and businesses. When Anastasio Somoza II was overthrown by the Sandinistas in July 1979, he fled into exile leaving behind a country in which two-thirds of the population earned less than $300 a year. Upon his arrival in Miami, Somoza admitted to being worth $100 million. A US intelligence report, however, placed it at $900 million. It was fortunate for the new Nicaraguan leaders that they came to power while Jimmy Carter sat in the White House. It gave them a year and a half of relative breathing space to take the first steps in their planned reconstruction of an impoverished society before the relentless hostility of the Reagan administration descended upon them; which is not to say that Carter welcomed the Sandinista victory. In 1978, with Somoza nearing collapse, Carter authorized covert CIA support for the press and labor unions in Nicaragua in an attempt to create a "moderate" alternative to the Sandinistas. Towards the same end, American diplomats were conferring with non-leftist Nicaraguan opponents of Somoza. Washington's idea of "moderate", according to a group of prominent Nicaraguans who walked out on the discussions, was the inclusion of Somoza's political party in the future government and "leaving practically intact the corrupt structure of the somocista apparatus", including the National Guard, albeit in some reorganized form. Indeed, at this same time, the head of the US Southern Command (Latin America), Lt. General Dennis McAuliffe, was telling Somoza that, although he had to abdicate, the United States had "no intention of permitting a settlement which would lead to the destruction of the National Guard". This was a notion remarkably insensitive to the deep loathing for the Guard felt by the great majority of the Nicaraguan people. ***** After the Sandinistas took power, Carter authorized the CIA to provide financial and other support to their opponents. At the same time, Washington pressured the Sandinistas to include certain men in the new government. Although these tactics failed, the Carter administration did not refuse to give aid to Nicaragua. Ronald Reagan was later to point to this and ask: "Can

anybody doubt the generosity and good faith of the American people?" What the president failed to explain was: a) Almost all of the aid had gone to non-governmental agencies and to the private sector, including the American Institute for Free Labor Development, the long-time CIA front. b) The primary and expressed motivation for the aid was to strengthen the hands of the so-called moderate opposition and undercut the influence of socialist countries in Nicaragua . c) All military aid was withheld despite repeated pleas from the Nicaraguan government about its need and right to such help-the defeated National Guardsmen and other Supporters of Somoza had not, after all, disappeared; they had regrouped as the "contras" and maintained primacy in the leadership of this force from then on. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan took office under a Republican platform which asserted that it "deplores the Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua". The president moved quickly to cut off virtually all forms of assistance to the Sandinistas, the opening salvos of his war against their revolution. The American whale, yet again, felt threatened by a minnow in the Caribbean. Among the many measures undertaken: Nicaragua was excluded from US government programs which promote American investment and trade; sugar imports from Nicaragua were slashed by 90 percent; and, without excessive subtlety but with notable success, Washington pressured the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and the European Common Market to withhold loans to Nicaragua. The director of the IDB, Mr. Kevin O'Sullivan, later revealed that in 1983 the US had opposed a loan to aid Nicaraguan fishermen on the grounds that the country did not have adequate fuel for their boats. A week later, O'Sullivan pointed out, "saboteurs blew up a major Nicaraguan fuel depot in the port of Corinto", an act described by an American intelligence source as 'totally a CIA operation''. Washington did, however, offer $5.1 million in aid to private organizations and to the Roman Catholic Church in Nicaragua. This offer was rejected by the government because, it said, "United States congressional hearings revealed that the [aid] agreements have political motivations, designed to promote resistance and destabilize the Revolutionary Government.'' As Nicaragua had already arrested members of several of the previous recipient organizations such as the Moravian Church and the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) for involvement in armed plots against the government. The Reagan administration was not deterred. Cardinal Miguel Obando and the Catholic Church in Nicaragua received hundreds of thousands of dollars in covert aid, from the CIA until 1985, and then-after official US government aid was stopped by congressional oversight committeesfrom Oliver North's off-the-books operation in the White House basement. One end to which Obando reportedly put the money was "religious instruction" to "thwart the Marxist-Leninist policies of the Sandinistas''.

As part of a concerted effort to deprive the Nicaraguan economy of oil, several attacks on fuel depots were carried out. Contra/CIA operations emanating in Honduras also blew up oil pipelines, mined the waters of oil-unloading ports, and threatened to blow up any approaching oil tankers; at least seven foreign ships were damaged by the mines, including a Soviet tanker with five crewmen reported to be badly injured. Nicaragua's ports were under siege: mortar shelling from high-speed motor launches, aerial bombing and rocket and machine-gun attacks were designed to blockade Nicaragua's exports as well as to starve the country of imports by frightening away foreign shipping. In October 1983, Esso announced that its tankers would no longer carry crude oil to Nicaragua from Mexico, the country's leading supplier; at this point Nicaragua had a 10-day supply of oil. Agriculture was another prime target. Raids by contras caused extensive damage to crops and demolished tobacco-drying barns, grain silos, irrigation projects, farm houses and machinery; roads, bridges and trucks were destroyed to prevent produce from being moved; numerous state farms and cooperatives were incapacitated and harvesting was prevented other farms still intact were abandoned because of the danger. And in October 1982, the Standard Fruit Company announced that it was suspending all its banana operations in Nicaragua and the marketing of the fruit in the United States. The American multinational, after a century of enriching itself in the country, and in violation of a contract with the government which extended to 1985, left behind the uncertainty of employment for some 4,000 workers and approximately six million cases of bananas to harvest with neither transport nor market.' Nicaragua's fishing industry suffered not only from lack of fuel for its boats. The fishing fleet was decimated by mines and attacks, its trawlers idled for want of spare parts due to the US credit blockade. The country lost millions of dollars from reduced shrimp exports.' It was an American war against Nicaragua. The contras had their own various motivations for wanting to topple the Sandinista government. They did not need to be instigated by the United States. But before the US military arrived in Honduras in the thousands and set up Fortress America, the contras were engaged almost exclusively in hit-and-run forays across the border, small-scale raids on Nicaraguan border patrols and farmers, attacks on patrol boats, and the like; killing a few people here, burning a building down there,' there was no future for the contras in a war such as this against a much larger force. Then the American big guns began to arrive in 1982, along with the air power, the landing strips, the docks, the radar stations, the communications centers, built under the cover of repeated joint US-Honduran military exercises, while thousands of contras were training in Florida and California. US and "Honduran" reconnaissance planes, usually piloted by Americans, began regular overflights into Nicaragua to photograph bombing and sabotage targets, track Sandinista military maneuvers and equipment, spot the planting of mines, eavesdrop on military communications and map the terrain. Electronic surveillance ships off the coast of Nicaragua partook in the bugging of a nation. Said a former CIA analyst: "Our intelligence from Nicaragua is so good ... we can hear the toilets flush in Managua."

Meanwhile, American pilots were flying diverse kinds of combat missions against Nicaraguan troops and carrying supplies to contras inside Nicaraguan territory. Several were shot down and killed.' Some flew in civilian clothes, after having been told that they would be disavowed by the Pentagon if captured. Some contras told American congressmen that they were ordered to claim responsibility for a bombing raid organized by the CIA and flown by Agency mercenaries. Honduran troops as well were trained by the US for bloody hit-and-run operations into Nicaragua ... and so it went ... as in El Salvador, the full extent of American involvement in the fighting will never be known. The contras' brutality earned them a wide notoriety. They regularly destroyed health centers, schools, agricultural cooperatives, and community centers-symbols of the Sandinistas' social programs in rural areas. People caught in these assaults were often tortured and killed in the most gruesome ways. One example, reported by The Guardian of London, suffices. In the words of a survivor of a raid in Jinotega province, which borders on Honduras: "Rosa had her breasts cut off. Then they cut into her chest and took out her heart. The men had their arms broken, their testicles cut off, and their eyes poked out They were killed by slitting their throats and pulling the tongue out through the slit." Americas Watch, the human-rights organization, concluded that "the contras systematically engage in violent abuses ... so prevalent that these may be said to be their principal means of waging war." In November 1984, the Nicaraguan government announced that since 1981 the contras had assassinated 910 state officials and killed 8,000 civilians. The analogy is inescapable: if Nicaragua had been Israel, and the contras the PLO, the Sandinistas would have long before made a lightning bombing raid on the bases in Honduras and wiped them out completely. The United States would have tacitly approved the action, the Soviet Union would have condemned it but done nothing, the rest of the world would have raised their eyebrows, and that would have been the end of it. After many contra atrocity stories had been reported in the world press, it was disclosed in October 1984 that the CIA had prepared a manual of instruction for its clients which, amongst other things, encouraged the use of violence against civilians. In the wake of the furor in Congress caused by the expose, the State Department was obliged to publicly condemn the contras' terrorist activities. Congressional intelligence committees were informed by the CIA, by present and former contra leaders, and by other witnesses that the contras indeed "raped, tortured and killed unarmed civilians, including children" and that "groups of civilians, including women and children, were burned, dismembered, blinded and beheaded". These were the same rebels whom Ronald Reagan, with his strange mirror language, called "freedom fighters" and the "moral equal of our founding fathers". (The rebels in El Salvador, in the president's studied opinion, were "murderers and terrorists".) The CIA manual, entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, gave advice on such niceties as political assassination, blackmailing ordinary citizens, mob violence, kidnapping, and

blowing up public buildings. Upon entering a town, it said, "establish a public tribunal" where the guerrillas can "shame, ridicule and humiliate" Sandinistas and their sympathizers by "shouting slogans and jeers". "If ... it should be necessary ... to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town," guerrillas should explain that "he was an enemy of the people" who would have alerted the Sandinistas who would then "carry out acts of reprisals such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc." **** In January 1983, the so-called Contadora group, composed of Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela, began to meet periodically in an attempt to still the troubled waters of Central America. Rejecting at the outset the idea that the conflicts of the region could or should be seen as part of an East-West confrontation, they conferred with all the nations involved, including the United States. The complex and lengthy discussions eventually gave birth to a 21-point treaty which dealt with the most contentious issues: civil war, foreign intervention, elections, and human rights. Then, much to Washington's surprise, on 7 September 1984 Nicaragua announced its intention to sign the treaty. ***** The American ambassador to Costa Rica likened Nicaragua under the Sandinistas to an "infected piece of meat" that attracts "insects." President Reagan called the country a "totalitarian dungeon", and insisted that the people of Nicaragua were more oppressed than blacks in South Africa. Members of the Kissinger Commission on Central America indicated that Nicaragua under the Sandinistas was as bad or worse than Nicaragua under Somoza. Henry Kissinger believed it to be as bad as or worse than Nazi Germany. Reagan was in accord-he compared the plight of the contras to Britain's stand against Germany in World War II. "Central America," noted Wayne Smith, former head of the US Interests Section in Havana, "now exercises the same influence on American foreign policy as the full moon does on werewolves. So all-consuming, so unrelenting, was the hatred, that Kissinger demanded that the American ambassador to Nicaragua be removed simply because he reported that the Sandinista government was "performing fairly well in such areas as education". And in the wake of the terrible devastation in Nicaragua wrought by Hurricane Joan in October 1988, the Reagan administration refused to send any aid nor to help private American organizations do so. So eager was the State Department to turn the Sandinistas into international pariahs, that it told the world, without any evidence, that Nicaragua was exporting drugs, that it was anti Semitic, that it was training Brazilian guerrillas. When the CIA was pressed about the alleged Sandinista drug connection, it backed down from the administration's claim.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig referred to a photograph of blazing corpses and declared it an example of the "atrocious genocidal actions that are being taken by the Nicaraguan Government" against the Miskito Indians. We then learned that the photo was from 1978, Somoza's time. ***** By the time the war in Nicaragua began to slowly atrophy to a tentative conclusion during 198889, the Reagan administration's obsession with the Sandinistas had inspired both the official and unofficial squads to embrace tactics such as the following in order to maintain a steady flow of financing, weaponry and other aid to the contras: dealings with other middle-eastern and Latin American terrorists, frequent drug smuggling in a variety of imaginative ways, money laundering, embezzlement of US government funds, perjury, obstruction of justice, burglary of the offices of American dissidents, covert propaganda to defeat domestic political foes, violation of the neutrality act, illegal shredding of government documents, plans to suspend the Constitution in the event of widespread internal dissent against government policy ... and much more, as revealed in the phenomenon known as Iran/Contra ... all of it to support the band of rapists, torturers and killers known as the Contras This then, was the level of charm reached by anti-communism after 70 years of refinement. The imperial sensibility of America's leaders could be compared favorably with that of Britain circa 1925. But it worked. On 25 February 1990, the Sandinistas were defeated in national elections by a coalition of political parties running under the name National Opposition Union (UNO). President George Bush called it "a victory for democracy"... Senator Robert Dole declared that "The final outcome is a vindication of the Reagan policies."... Elliott Abrams, former State Department official and Iran/Contra leading light, said "When history is written the contras will be folk heroes.'' The opposing analysis of the election was that ten years of all-encompassing war had worn the Nicaraguan people down. They were afraid that as long as the Sandinistas remained in power, the contras and the United States would never relent in their campaign to overthrow them. The people voted for peace. (As the people of the Dominican Republic had voted in 1966 for the USsupported candidate to forestall further American military intervention.) "We can't take any more war. All we have had is war, war, war, war," said Samuel Reina, a driver for Jimmy Carter's election monitoring team in Juigalpa. In some families "one son has been drafted by the Sandinistas and another has joined the contras. The war has torn families apart.'' The US invasion and bombing of Panama just two months earlier, with all its death and destruction, could only have intensified the commitment of hardcore Sandinistas to resist yanqui imperialismo, but it could not have failed to serve as a caution to the large bloc of undecided voters.

The Nicaraguans were also voting, they hoped, for some relief from the grinding poverty that five years of a full American economic embargo, as well as the war, had heaped upon their heads. Commented Paul Reichler, a US lawyer who represented the Nicaraguan government in Washington at the time: "Whatever revolutionary fervor the people once might have had was beaten out of them by the war and the impossibility of putting food in their children's stomachs.'' ... For ten years the people of Nicaragua had shouted [the] slogan-"Here, no one gives up." But in February 1990, they did exactly that. (Just as the people of Chile had chanted "The people united will never be defeated", before succumbing to American power.) The United States had more than war and embargo at its disposal to determine the winner of the election. The National Endowment for Democracy spent more than $11 million dollars, directly and indirectly, on the election campaign in Nicaragua. This is comparable to a foreign government pouring more than $700 million dollars into an American election, and is in addition to several million dollars more allocated by Congress to "supporting the electoral infrastructure, and the unknown number of millions the CIA passed around covertly. As a result of a controversy in 1984-when NED funds were used to aid a Panamanian presidential candidate backed by Noriega and the CIA-Congress enacted a law prohibiting the use of NED funds "to finance the campaigns of candidates for public office." The ways to circumvent the letter and/or spirit of such a prohibition were not difficult to conceive. NED first allocated millions to help organize UNO, building up the parties and organizations that formed and supported the coalition. Then a variety of other organizations-civic, labor, media, women's, etc.-run by UNO activists received grants for all kinds of "non partisan" and "pro-democracy" programs, for voter education, voter registration, job skills, and so on. Large grants made to UNO itself were specified for items such as office equipment and vehicles. (Rep. Silvio Conte of Massachusetts pointed out that the $1.3 million requested for vehicles would pay for renting 2,241 cars for a month at $20 per day.) UNO was the only political party to receive US aid, even though eight other opposition parties fielded candidates. Money received by UNO for any purpose of course freed up their own money for use in the campaign and helped all of their candidates. Moreover, the US continued to fund the contras, some of whom campaigned for UNO in rural areas. Afterwards, critics of the American policy in Nicaragua called it "a blueprint" for successful US intervention in the Third World. A Pentagon analyst agreed: "It's going right into the textbooks.

Quotes
Colby's C.I.A. specialty, the "Phoenix Operation" in Southeast Asia, was known for its torture, political assassinations, mass murders (20,000 to 40,000 civilians), tiger cages, rigged elections, and slanted intelligence. The fact that this person was approved for appointment as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by a Senate vote of 83-13 indicates that the Senate both agrees with, and rewards, an agent of theirs for these acts against mankind. It is no coincidence that the same Senate turned down a vote, after 25 years of stalling and

debating, on an agreement that would outlaw genocide as late as March, 1974. A government that funds, promotes, recognizes, and allows war criminals to direct their domestic affairs reveals a total disrespect for our lives. This monster and its vicious machinery will now turn upon us at home. The Phoenix program was an indiscriminate murder program in Asia, utilizing terror and the killing of innocent people. The Hearst kidnapping is part of the Phoenix program inside the United States. INSIDE THE HEARST KIDNAPPING So, I volunteered for this Operation Phoenix, which was a psychological operation. To make a long story short, it would make Charlie Manson look like Abigail Van Buren. It was basically a psychological operation, and it was very well done. Americans have done it many times before and in essence we did it inadvertently in Libya. The theory is you don't kill the leader, you kill his children, or his family. Basically, what you do is you destroy the chief's family very ignominiously, and I mean ignominiously. I mean, Charlie Manson would look like a "sweetie" compared to what this stuff was. And so when the guy comes back, he sees this mess -- you know his wife beheaded, and her infant child stripped out of her abdomen, and beheaded and bleeding on her body, hung from a rafter, shit all over the walls, those kind of things -- that's how you do it. And when that happens, then these guys lose confidence in themselves, and the village loses confidence in them, but they're not martyrs. So the whole operation loses its fighting will. And that's basically "The American Way." [1993 Interview with Dr. Alan Levin.] Modern Medicine and its Military Links On August 25, 1970, an article appeared in The New York Times hinting that the CIA, through Phoenix, was responsible for My Lai. The story line was advanced on October 14, when defense attorneys for David Mitchell a sergeant accused and later cleared of machine-gunning scores of Vietnamese in a drainage ditch in My Lai citing Phoenix as the CIAs systematic program of assassination, named Evan Parker as the CIA officer who signed documents, certain blacklists, of Vietnamese to be assassinated in My Lai. When we spoke, Parker denied the charge. ......As in any large-scale Phoenix operation, two of Task Force Barkers companies cordoned off the hamlet while a third one Calleys moved in, clearing the way for Kotouc and Special Branch officers who were brought to the field to identify VC from among the detained inhabitants. .....The CIA, via Phoenix, not only perpetrated the My Lai massacre but also concealed the crime. ....As Jeff Stein said, The first thing you learn in the Army is not competence, you learn corruption. And you learn to get along, go along. Unfortunately not everyone learns to get along. On September 3, 1988, Robert TSouvas was apparently shot in the head by his girl friend, after an argument over a bottle of vodka. The two were homeless, living out of a van they had parked under a bridge in Pittsburgh. TSouvas was a Vietnam veteran and a participant in the My Lai massacre. .....TSouvass attorney, George Davis, traveled to Da Nang in 1970 to investigate the massacre and while there was assigned as an aide a Vietnamese colonel who said that the massacre was a Phoenix operation and that the purpose of Phoenix was to terrorize the civilian population into submission. Davis told me: When I told the people in the War Department what I knew and that I would attempt to obtain all records on the program in order to defend my client, they agreed to drop the

charges. .....Bart Osborn (whose agent net Stein inherited) is more specific. I never knew in the course of all those operations any detainee to live through his interrogation, Osborn testified before Congress in 1971. They all died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those individuals was, in fact, cooperating with the VC, but they all died and the majority were wither tortured to death or things like thrown out of helicopters. [book extract] The My Lai Massacre and The Tiger Cages by Douglas Valentine But the American establishment and media denied it then, and continue to deny it until today, because Phoenix was a genocidal program -- and the CIA officials, members of the media who were complicit through their silence, and the red-blooded American boys who carried it out, are all war criminals. As Michael Ratner a lawyer at the Center for Constitutional Rights told CounterPunch: "Kerrey should be tried as a war criminal. His actions on the night of February 24-25, 1969 when the seven man Navy Seal unit which he headed killed approximately twenty unarmed Vietnamese civilians, eighteen of whom were women and children was a war crime. Like those who murdered at My Lai, he too should be brought into the dock and tried for his crimes." ......A famous Phoenix operation, known as the My Lai Massacre, was proceeding along smoothly, with a grand total of 504 Vietnamese women and children killed, when a soldier named Hugh Thompson in a helicopter gunship saw what was happening. Risking his life to preserve that "social contract," Thomson landed his helicopter between the mass murderers and their victims, turned his machine guns on his fellow Americans, and brought the carnage to a halt. .....It was the CIA that forced soldiers like Kerrey into Phoenix operations, and the hidden hand of the CIA lingers over his war crime. Kerrey even uses the same rationale offered by CIA officer DeSilva. According to Kerrey, "the Viet Cong were a thousand per cent more ruthless than" the Seals or U.S. Army. [2001] Bob Kerrey, CIA War Crimes, And The Need For A War Crimes Trial by Douglas Valentine Page 63 (hardcover edition) "Now everyone knows about the airborne interrogationtaking three people up in a chopper, taking one guy and saying. Talk,' then throwing him out before he even gets the chance to open his mouth. Well, we wrapped det [detonator] cord around their necks and wired them to the detonator box. And basically what it did was blow their heads off. The interrogator would tell the translator, usually a South Vietnamese intelligence officer, 'Ask him this.' He'd ask him, 'Who gave you the gun?' And the guy would start to answer, or maybe he wouldn'tmaybe he'd resistbut the general idea was to waste the first two. They planned the snatches that way. Pick up this guy because we're pretty sure he's VC cadrethese other two guys just run errands for him. Or maybe they're nobody; Tran, the farmer, and his brother Nguyen. But bring in two. Put them in a row. By the time you get to your man, he's talking so fast you got to pop the weasel just to shut him up." After a moment's silence he added, "I guess you could say that we wrote the book on terror." The Phoenix Program by Douglas Valentine Page 85 As for the American role, according to Muldoon, "you can't have an American there all the time watching these things." "These things" included: rape, gang rape, rape using eels, snakes, or hard

objects, and rape followed by murder; electrical shock ("the Bell Telephone Hour") rendered by at- taching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body, like the tongue; "the water treatment"; "the airplane," in which a prisoner's arms were tied behind the back and the rope looped over a hook on the ceiling, suspending the prisoner in midair, after which he or she was beaten; beatings with rubber hoses and whips; and the use of police dogs to maul prisoners. All this and more occurred in PICs. The Phoenix Program The Ultimate Cold War Apparatchik, Ted Shackley was the notorious Director of 'Operation Phoenix' in Laos and Viet Nam, and thus responsible for a slaughter which claimed the lives of over 40,000 Vietnamese civilians under the guise of neutralizing communist sympathizers. Dead Spooks Don't Lie (And Don't Deal Drugs Either) by CONSPIRACY PLANET "During the next several days, the state became very upset at the U. S. military because the US. military said I was involved in a military group in Vietnam called Phoenix and that all members who were in Phoenix their military records were sealed and in Langley, VA. with the CIA." Johnny Todd Bloodlines of the Illuminati by Fritz Springmeier: Collins This is a program that was the CIA folks go behind the lines and assassinate civilian leaders Transcript of 12 hours of radio interview of Chip Tatum on Intelligence Report. Ted Gundersson interviewe 1999. As Douglas Valentine writes in The Phoenix Program (Morrow, 1990)- concerning the CIA's assassination, torture and terror program waged against the people of Vietnam - the Phoenix teams consisted of SEALs working with "CTs," described by one participant as "a combination of ARVN deserters, VC turncoats, and bad motherfucker criminals the South Vietnamese couldn't deal with in prison, so they turned them over to us." The spooks were only too happy to employ the services of these men, who "taught [their] SEAL comrades the secrets of the psy war campaign." So depraved were these agency recruits that some of them "would actually devour their enemies' vital organs." All in a day's work for America's premier intelligence agency. Henry - Portrait of an MK-ULTRA Assassin?
From Library Journal

Designed to destroy the Vietcong infrastructure and ostensibly run by the South Vietnamese government, the Phoenix Program--in fact directed by the United States--developed a variety of counterinsurgency activities including, at its worst, torture and assassination. For Valentine ( The Hotel Tacloban , LJ 9/15/84), the program epitomizes all that was wrong with the Vietnam War; its evils are still present wherever there are "ideologues obsessed with security, who seek to impose their way of thinking on everyone else." Exhaustive detail and extensive use of interviews with and writings by Phoenix participants make up the book's principal strengths; the author's own analysis is weaker. This is a good complement to Dale Andrade's less emotional Ashes to Ashes (Lexington, 1990) and such participant accounts as Orrin M. DeForest and David Chanoff's Slow Burn (S. & S., 1990). - Kenneth W. Berger, Duke Univ. Lib., Durham, N.C. Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/

CIA Support of Death Squads

by Ralph McGehee
Posted on RemarQ, 9 October 1999

The information below is from CIABASE files on Death Squads supported by the CIA. Also given below are details on Watch Lists prepared by the CIA to facilitate the actions of Death Squads.
Angola Chile Eastern Europe Georgia Honduras Italy Panama South Africa Uruguay Bolivia Columbia East Timor Germany Indonesia Latin America Paraguay South America USSR Brazil Costa Rica Egypt Greece Iran Mexico Philippines Syria Vietnam Cambodia Cuba El Salvador Guatemala Iraq Nicaragua Puerto Rico Thailand Central America Dominican Republic Europe Haiti Israel Norway Russia Turkey

Death Squads: Miscellaneous CIA set up Ansesal and other networks of terror in El Salvador, Guatemala (Ansegat) and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua (Ansenic). The CIA created, structured and trained secret police in South Korea, Iran, Chile and Uruguay, and elsewhere organizations responsible for untold thousands of tortures, disappearances, and deaths. Spark, 4/1985, pp. 2-4

1953-94 Sponsorship by CIA of death squad activity covered in summary form. Notes that in Haiti CIA admitted Lt. General Raoul Cedras and other high-ranking officials "were on its payroll and are helping organize violent repression in Haiti. Luis Moreno, an employee of State Department, has bragged he helped Colombian army create a database of subversives, terrorists and drug dealers." His superior in overseeing INS for Southeastern U.S., is Gunther Wagner, former Nazi soldier and a key member of nowdefunct Office of Public Safety (OPS), an AID project which helped train counterinsurgents and terrorism in dozens of countries. Wagner worked in Vietnam as part of Operation Phoenix and in Nicaragua where he helped train National Guard. Article also details massacres in Indonesia. Haiti Information, 4/23/1994, pp. 3,4 CIA personnel requested transfers 1960-7 in protest of CIA officer Nestor Sanchez's working so closely with death squads. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, p. 294 CIA. 1994. Mary McGrory op-ed, "Clinton's CIA Chance." Excoriates CIA over Aldrich Ames, support for right-wing killers in El Salvador, Nicaraguan Contras and Haiti's FRAPH and Cedras. Washington Post, 10/16/1994, C1,2 Angola: Death Squads Angola, 1988. Amnesty International reported that UNITA, backed by the U.S., engaged in extra-judicial executions of high-ranking political rivals and ill-treatment of prisoners. Washington Post, 3/14/1989, A20 Bolivia: Death Squads Bolivia. Between October 1966-68 Amnesty International reported between 3,000 and 8,000 people killed by death squads. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 264 Bolivia, 1991. A group known as "Black Hand" shot twelve people on 24 November 1991. Killings were part of group's aim to eliminate "undesirable" elements from society. Victims included police officers, prostitutes and homosexuals. Washington Post 11/25/1991, A2 Bolivia: Watch List Bolivia, 1975. CIA hatched plot with interior ministry to harass progressive bishops, and to arrest and expel foreign priests and nuns. CIA was particularly helpful in supplying names of U.S. and other foreign missionaries. The Nation, 5/22/1976, p. 624 Bolivia, 1975. CIA provided government data on priests who progressive. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 259 Brazil: Watch List

Brazil, 1962-64. Institute of Research and Social Studies (IPES) with assistance from U.S. sources published booklets and pamphlets and distributed hundreds of articles to newspapers. In 1963 alone it distributed 182,144 books. It underwrote lectures, financed students' trips to the U.S., sponsored leadership training programs for 2,600 businessmen, students, and workers, and subsidized organizations of women, students, and workers. In late 1962 IPES member Siekman in Sao Paulo organized vigilante cells to counter leftists. The vigilantes armed themselves, made hand-grenades. IPES hired retired military to exert influence on those in active service. From 1962-64 IPES, by its own estimate, spent between $200,000 and $300,000 on an intelligence net of retired military. The "research group" of retired military circulated a chart that identified communist groups and leaders. Black, J.K. (1977). United States Penetration of Brazil, p. 85 Brazil: Death Squads Brazil, circa 1965. Death squads formed to bolster Brazil's national intelligence service and counterinsurgency efforts. Many death squad members were merely off-duty police officers. U.S. AID (and presumably the CIA) knew of and supported police participation in death squad activity. Counterspy 5/6 1979, p. 10 Brazil. Death squads began appear after 1964 coup. Langguth, A.J. (1978). Hidden Terrors, p. 121 Brazilian and Uruguayan death squads closely linked and have shared training. CIA on at least two occasions co-ordinated meetings between countries' death squads. Counterspy 5/6 1979, p. 11 Brazil, torture. After CIA-backed coup, military used death squads and torture. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 190 Cambodia: Watch List Cambodia, 1970. Aided by CIA, Cambodian secret police fed blacklists of targeted Vietnamese to Khmer Serai and Khmer Kampuchea Krom. Mass killings of Vietnamese. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 328 Cambodia: Death Squads Cambodia, 1980-90. U.S. indirect support for Khmer Rouge U.S. comforting mass murderers. Washington Post, 5/7/1990, A10 editorial Central America: Death Squads Central America, circa 1979-87. According to Americas Watch, civilian non combatant deaths attributable to government forces in Nicaragua might reach 300, most Miskito Indians in comparison 40-50,000 Salvadoran citizens killed by death squads and government forces during same years, along with similar number during last year of

Somoza and still higher numbers in Guatemala. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, p. 101 Central America, 1981-87. Death toll under Reagan in El Salvador passed 50,000 and in Guatemala it may approach 100,000. In Nicaragua 11,000 civilians killed by 1968. Death toll in region 150,000 or more. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, p. 29 Central America. See debate carried in Harpers "Why Are We in Central America? On Dominoes, Death Squads, and Democracy. Can We Live With Latin Revolution? The Dilemmas of National Security." Harpers, 6/1984, p35 Central America, 1982-84. Admiral Bobby Inman, former head of NSA, had deep distaste for covert operations. Inman complained that the CIA was hiring murderers to conduct operations in Central America and the Middle East eventually Inman resigned. Toohey, B., and Pinwill, W. (1990). Oyster: the Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, pp. 215-6 Chile: Watch List Chile, 1970-73. By late 1971 the CIA in near daily contact with military. The station collecting the kind of information that would be essential for a military dictatorship after a coup: lists of civilians to be arrested, those to be protected and government installations occupied at once. Atlantic, 12/1982, p. 58 Chile, 1970-73. CIA compiled lists of persons who would have to be arrested and a roster of civilian and government installations that would need protection in case of military coup against government. Corn, D. (1994). Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, p. 251 Chile, 1972-73. Drew up lists those to be arrested immediately, or protected after a coup by military. Sergeyev, F.F. (1981). Chile, CIA Big Business, p. 163 Chile late 1971-72. CIA adopted more active stance re military penetration program including effort to subsidize anti-government news pamphlet directed at armed services, compilation arrest lists and its deception operation. CIA received intelligence reports on coup planning throughout July, August and September 73. U.S. Congress, Church Committee Report. (1976) v 7, p. 39 Chile. Chilean graduates of AIFLD, as well as CIA-created unions, organized CIAfinanced strikes which participated in Allende's overthrow. In 1973 AIFLD graduates provided DINA, Chile's secret police, with thousands of names of fellow unionists who were subsequently imprisoned and tortured and executed. Counterspy 4/1981, p. 13 Chile. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, 240

Chile, 1973-74. After 1973 coup, U.S. Embassy intelligence types gave their files on the Chilean and foreign left to the junta's military intelligence service (SIM). NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 8/74, p. 28. Chile, 1973. The military prepared lists of nearly 20,000 middle-level leaders of people's organizations, scheduled to be assassinated from the morning of the coup on. The list of some 3,000 high-level directors to be arrested. Lists detailed: name, address, age, profession, marital status, and closest personal friends. It alleged U.S. military mission and the CIA involved in their preparation. Moa 186. From late June on plotters began to finalize lists of extremists, political leaders, Marxist journalists, agents of international communism, and any and all persons participating with any vigor in neighborhood, communal, union, or national organization. The Pentagon had been asked to get the CIA to give the Chilean army lists of Chileans linked to socialist countries. Names sorted into two groups: persons not publicly known but who important in leftist organizations; and, well-known people in important positions. 20,000 in first group and 3,000 in second. Second group to be jailed, the first to be killed. Sandford, R.R. (1975). The Murder of Allende, pp. 195-6 CIA provided intelligence on "subversives" regularly compiled by CIA for use in such circumstances. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 194 Columbia: Watch List Colombia. Luis Moreno, an employee of State Department, bragged he helped Colombian army create a database of subversives, terrorists and drug dealers. Haiti Information, 4/23/94, pp. 3,4 Columbia: Death Squads Colombia. MAS (Muerte A Secuestradores): "Death to Kidnappers," Colombian antiguerrilla death squad founded in December 1981 by members of Medellin cartel, Cali cartel, and Colombian military. Scott, P. and Marshall, J. (1991). Cocaine Politics, p. 261. Colombia, 1993-94. Amnesty International called Colombia one of worst "killing fields." U.S. is an accomplice. William F. Schultz, human rights group's newly appointed Executive Director for the U.S., told a news conference that using fight against drugs as a pretext Colombian government doesn't reign in [its forces]. About 20,000 people killed since 1986 in one of Latin America's most "stable democracies." only 2% political killings related to drug trafficking and 70% by paramilitary or military. U.S. probably a collaborator and much of U.S. aid for counternarcotics diverted to "killing fields." AI report said human meat is sold on black market and politicians gunned down along with children, homosexuals, and drug addicts. U.S. support because of Colombia's strategic position. No one is safe, people killed for body parts. Washington Times, 3/16/1994, p. a15 Costa Rica: Watch List

Costa Rica, 1955. Ambassador Woodward reported the government should be urged to maintain closer surveillance over communists and prosecute them more vigorously, and the government should be influenced to amend the constitution to limit the travel of communists, increase penalties for subversive activities and enact proposed legislation eliminating communists from union leadership. Meanwhile USIA aka USIS programs "to continue to condition the public to the communist menace" should be maintained. Z Magazine, 11/1988, p. 20 Cuba: Watch List Cuba, 1955-57. Allen Dulles pressed Batista to establish with CIA help, a bureau for the repression of communist activities. Grose, P. (1994). Gentleman Spy: the Life of Allen Dulles, p. 412 Cuba: Death Squads Cuba, 1956-95 CIA's war against Cuba and Cuba's response. In 1956, CIA established in Cuba the infamous Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities, BRAC secret police that became well known for torture and assassination of Batista's political opponents. Unclassified W/1994-1995 16-17 Dominican Republic: Watch List Dominican Republic, 1965. CIA composed list of 55 communist ringleaders of projected takeover of government. Crozier, b. (1993). Free Agent, p. 58 Dominican Republic: Death Squads Dominican Republic, cover, 1965. 18 public safety program advisers, 6 of whom CIA. Police organized La Banda, a death squad. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People, p. 187 Eastern Europe: Watch List East Europe, USSR, 1952-93. Radio Free Europe researchers have hundreds of thousands of file cards on prominent east bloc citizens and a staff of 160 researchers. Washington Post, 4/4/1993, p. A19 East Timor: Death Squads East Timor, 1975-76. Role of U.S. Government, CIA/NSA, and their Australian collaborators in East Timor is another example of support for genocide which joins a long list of similar cases. Carter and Ford administrations have been accomplices in the massacre of anywhere between one-in-ten (Indonesian foreign minister Mochtar's latest figure) and one-in-two Timorese. Counterspy, Spring 1980, p. 19 Ecuador: Watch List

Ecuador, 1962. Subversive control watch list. With agent from Social Christian party CIA will form five squads composed of five men for investigative work on subversive control watch list. Agee, P. (1975). Inside the Company: CIA Diary, pp. 240, 247 Ecuador, 1963. The CIA maintained what was called the lynx list, aka the subversive control watch list. This a file that might have 50 to 500 names. People on the list were supposed to be the most important left-wing activists whose arrest we might effect through the local government. Would include place and date of birth, wife's name, where they worked, and biological data on the whole family, including schools the children attended, etc. In Ecuador the CIA paid teams to collect and maintain this type information. Agee, (1981). White Paper Whitewash, p. 55 Egypt: Watch List Egypt, Pakistan, 1993. 4/16/1993 2 teams from CIA and FBI to Peshawar to check information given them by Egyptian intelligence services. Egyptians reported terrorist groups based in Peshawar belong to "Arab Afghans" with ties to fundamentalist Muslims in U.S. CIA specialists met with officers of Mukhabarat Al-Amat who had list of 300 Egyptians believed to be hard inner core of Jihad led by Mohammed Sahwky Islambuli. Names of various terrorists. On request by CIA and others, 100 expulsions on 4/10. Intelligence Newsletter, 4/29/1993, pp. 1,5 El Salvador: Watch List El Salvador, 1980-89. On TV D'Aubuisson, using military intelligence files, denounced teachers, labor leaders, union organizers and politicians. Within days their mutilated bodies found. Washington had identified most leaders of death squads as members Salvadoran security forces with ties to D'Aubuisson. Washington Post op-ed by Douglas Farah, 2/23/1992, p. C4 El Salvador, 1982-84. Significant political violence associated with Salvadoran security services including National police, National Guard, and Treasury Police. U.S. Government agencies maintained official relationships with Salvadoran security establishment appearing to acquiesce in these activities. No evidence U.S. personnel participated in forcible interrogations. U.S. Did pass "tactical" information to alert services of action by insurgent forces. Information on persons passed only in highly unusual cases. Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, pp. 11-13 El Salvador: Death Squads El Salvador, 1961-79. Vigilante organization called Democratic National Organization (Orden) created early 1960s to further control countryside. Created in 1961 but abolished in 1979. But quickly regained and even surpassed former vicious role. Today its members form the core of civil defense corps. White, R.A. (1984). The Morass, p. 133 El Salvador, 1961-84. During the Kennedy administration, agents of the U.S. government set up two security organizations that killed thousands of peasants and

suspected leftists over the next 15 years. Guided by Americans, these organizations into the paramilitary units that were the death squads: in 1984 the CIA, in violation U.S. law, continued to provide training, support, and intelligence to security forces involved in death squads. Over the years the CIA and U.S. military organized Orden, the rural paramilitary and intelligence net designed to use terror. Mano Blanco grew out of Orden, which a U.S. ambassador called the "birth of the death squads;" conceived and organized Ansesal, the elite presidential intelligence service that gathered files on Salvadoran dissidents and gave that information to the death squads; recruited General Medrano, the founder of Orden and Ansesal as a CIA agent; supplied Ansesal, the security forces, and the General Staff with electronic, photographic, and personal surveillance of individuals who later assassinated by death squads; and, trained security forces in the use of investigative techniques, weapons, explosives, and interrogation with "instruction in methods of physical and psychological torture." The Progressive, 5/1984, pp. 20-29 El Salvador, 1963. U.S. government sent 10 special forces personnel to El Salvador to help General Jose Alberto Medrano set up Organizacion Democratica Nacionalist (Orden)--first paramilitary death squad in that country. These green berets assisted in organization and indoctrination of rural "civic" squads which gathered intelligence and carried out political assassinations in coordination with Salvadoran military. Now there is compelling evidence to show that for over 30 years, members of U.S. military and CIA have helped organize, train, and fund death squad activity in El Salvador. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1990, p. 51 El Salvador, 1963. National Democratic Organization (Orden) formed as progovernment organization with assistance from CIA, U.S. military advisers, AID's police training program. Orden supervised by Salvadoran national security agency, intelligence organization of military. CIA chose "right hand man," Jose Medrano, to direct Orden. Orden served as base for death squad operations and sanctioned in 1970-79 all "above ground" unions. Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, p. 33 El Salvador, 1965-85. For a report of CIA supporting death squad activities in El Salvador see "Spark," 4/1985, pp. 2-4 El Salvador, 1966. Developed death squads with help of green berets. Campaign used vigilantes to employ terror. Later called civil defense corps. White, R.A. (1984). The Morass, pp. 101-3 El Salvador, 1968. AIFLD creates Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS) which emphasized self help for rural farmers and not peasant organizing. Initially, UCS had support military government. By 1973 UCS seen as too progressive and AIFLD officially expelled. U.S. funding UCS continued through training programs and private foundations. UCS charged with ties to Orden, organization which carried out death squad activity. With failing pro-government union efforts, AIFLD called back to control UCS in 1979. Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, p. 34

El Salvador, 1976-85. Attended conferences of World Anti-Communist League: Roberto D'Aubuisson, El Salvador. Former major in military intelligence; charged with being responsible for coordinating nation's rightist death squads. Established Arena political party with assistance of U.S. new right leaders. Anderson, J. L.. and Anderson, S. (1986). Inside the League El Salvador, 1979-84. House Intelligence Committee investigation of U.S. intelligence connections with death squad activities concluded U.S. intelligence agencies "have not conducted any of their activities in such a way as to directly encourage or support death squad acts." House Intelligence Committee, annual report, 1/2/1985, pp. 16-19 El Salvador, 1979-88. Death squads recruited under cover of boy scouts. Boys operated as a death squad known as Regalados Armed Forces (FAR). They murdered union officials, student leaders and teachers accused of being guerrilla sympathizers. Herman Torres, a death squad member, learned that the scouts part of nationwide net based on the paramilitary organization known as Orden and coordinated from the main military intelligence unit known as Ansesal run by D'Aubuisson. After coup of 1979, Orden and Ansesal officially disbanded. In 1982, when Arena won control of the constituent assembly, the top legislative body was turned into a center for death squads. Another death squad called the secret anti-communist army (ESA). Bush and North in 12/11/1983 were sent to make it clear U.S. would not tolerate death squads. Perez Linares boasted he killed Archbishop Romero on 3/24/1980. Catholic Church's human rights office reports 1991 death squad and government killings in first half of 1988 double the number of 1987. Mother Jones, 1/1989, pp. 10-16 El Salvador, 1980-84. Colonel Roberto Santivanez, former chief of the Salvadoran Army's special military intelligence unit, testified before U.S. Senators and Congressmen. He charged that Roberto D'Aubuisson was the principal organizer of the death squads, along with Colonel Nicolas Carranza, the head of the country's Treasury Police. He said Carranza also serves as a paid CIA informer. Other reports said Carranza received $90,000 a year for providing intelligence to the CIA. Washington Post, 4/1/1984 El Salvador, 1980-84. Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White, said the Reagan administration covered up information that Salvadoran rightist Roberto D'Aubuisson ordered the killing of Archbishop Romero. Washington Post, 2/3/1984, 2/7/1984 El Salvador, 1980. Former U.S. Ambassador Robert White, said D'Aubuisson presided over a lottery to select which Salvadoran military officer would assassinate Archbishop Romero, gunned down on 3/24/1980. White said the U.S. Embassy received an eyewitness account of the 3/22 meeting that plotted Romero's murder. Washington Post from Associated Press, 3/1984 El Salvador, 1981-83. Colonel Carranza, leader of Salvador's infamous Treasury Police, oversaw the government reign of terror in which 800 people were killed each month.

Carranza received $90,000 a year from the CIA from 1979-84 Reportedly living in Kentucky. The Nation, 6/5/1988, p. 780 El Salvador, 1981-84. House Intelligence Committee concluded "CIA did not directly encourage or support death squad killings." Report added that "some intelligence relationships with individuals connected with death squads" may have given the impression that the CIA condoned, because it was aware of, some death squad killings. Washington Post, 1/14/1985, A20 El Salvador, 1981-84. Senate Intelligence Committee reported several Salvadoran security and military officials have engaged in death squads acts. Large numbers of lowlevel personnel also involved. Death squads have originated from the Treasury Police and the National Guard and police. Washington Post, 10/12/1984 El Salvador, 1981-84. The CIA and military advisers have helped organize, trained, financed and advised Salvadoran army and intelligence units engaged in death squad activities and torture. Information from two well-informed sources in Salvadoran government. Christian Science Monitor, 5/8/1984, p. 1 El Salvador, 1981-88. Discussion of the use of death squads in El Salvador (No indication of direct CIA participation). The Nation, 5/8/1989, p. 625 El Salvador, 1986. Despite extensive government labor clamp down (including National Guard raid of hospital workers strike), Irving Brown, known CIA and head AFL-CIO's Department of International Affairs, issues report claiming "a shift away from violent repression and an improvement in human rights." Statement incredible in light of death squad attacks on unionists. Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, p. 35 El Salvador, 1987. Central American death squads reported operating in the Los Angeles area. NACLA (magazine re Latin America), 6/1987, pp. 4-5 El Salvador, 1988. Americas Watch in September said the military killed 52 civilians in first 6 months, compared with 72 in all of 1987. In 1988 the Salvadoran rebels have stepped up the war. Washington Post, 11/26/1988, A1&18 El Salvador. AID public safety advisors created the national police intelligence archive and helped organize Ansesal, an elite presidential intelligence service. Dossiers these agencies collected on anti-government activity, compiled with CIA surveillance reports, provided targets for death squads. Many of 50,000 Salvadorans killed in 1981-85 Attributable to death squad activity. National Reporter, Winter 1986, p. 19 El Salvador. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly) 12:14-15;12:5-13. El Salvador. Medrano "the father of the death squads, the chief assassin of them all," according to Jose N. Duarte. On 23 March 1985, Medrano was assassinated. Medrano in 1984 admitted he had worked for the CIA in 1960-69. The Progressive, 6/1985, p. 11

El Salvador. Administration sources said at height of rightist death squad activity, Reagan administration depended on commanders of right wing death squads. The U.S. shared some intelligence with them. U.S. intelligence officers developed close ties to chief death squad suspects while death squads killed several hundred a month and totaling tens of thousands. Washington Post, 10/6/1988, A 39 and 43 El Salvador. Article contrasting results of Senate Committee 1984 news accounts of official cooperation between CIA and Salvadoran security officers said to be involved in death squad activities. First Principles, 12/1984, pp. 2-4 El Salvador. CIA supplied surveillance information to security agencies for death squads. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, pp. 321, 327 El Salvador. Falange mysterious death squad comprising both active and retired members security forces. Conducts death squad activities. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 4/1981, p. 14 El Salvador. Formation of Organisation Democratica Nacionalista Orden Formed in 1968 by Medrano. Forces between 50,000 and 100,000. From 1968-79, Orden official branch of government. First junta attempted to abolish, but group reorganized as National Democratic Front. Example of Orden death squad acts. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 4/1981, p. 14 El Salvador. See Dickey article re slaughter in El Salvador in New Republic, 12/13/1983, entitled "The Truth Behind the Death Squads." fn Dickey, C. (1985). With the Contras, p. 286 El Salvador. The CIA and U.S. Armed forces conceived and organized Orden, the rural paramilitary and spy net designed to use terror against government opponents. Conceived and organized Ansesal, the presidential intelligence service that gathered dossiers on dissidents which then passed on to death squads. Kept key security officers with known links to death squads on the CIA payroll. Instructed Salvadoran intelligence operatives "in methods of physical and psychological torture." Briarpatch, 8/1984 p. 30 from the 5/1984 Progressive El Salvador. UGB (Union Guerrilla Blanca) (white warriors union). Headed by D'Aubuisson, who trained at International Police Academy. D'Aubuisson claims close ties CIA. Former ambassador White called D'Aubuisson a "psychopathic killer." Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 4/1981, p. 14 El Salvador, 1979-88. See "Confessions of an Assassin," article. Herman Torres Cortez is the assassin who was interviewed and tells of death squad operations in El Salvador. Mother Jones, 1/1989, p. 10 El Salvador, 1983. Vice President Bush delivered an ultimatum to Salvadoran military to stop death squad murders. Mother Jones, 8/1986, p. 64

El Salvador, 1987. Assassins, certainly sponsored by and probably members of Salvadoran security forces, murder Herbert Ernesto Anaya, head of Salvadoran civil rights commission and last survivor of commission's eight founders. Prior harassment of Anaya solicited neither protest nor protection from Duarte or U.S. administration. Contrary to popular opinion, death squad activity has not waned. "Selective killings of community leaders, labor organizers, human rights workers, rural activists and others have replaced wholesale massacres" since signing of Arias plan. Los Angeles organization "El Rescate" has compiled chronology of human rights abuses. The Nation, 11/14/1987, p. 546 El Salvador. CIA took more than two years 1980-83 begin seriously analyzing papers captured from D'Aubuisson. ICC 242. Papers said reveal death squad supporters, atrocities. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, p. 22 El Salvador, 1988. Death squad activity surged in El Salvador in 1988 after a period of relative decline. Amnesty International report "El Salvador: Death Squads- A Government Strategy," noted in NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 3/1989, p. 11 El Salvador, 1989. Although human rights monitors consistently link death squad acts to the Salvadoran government, many U.S. media report on death squads as if they an independent or uncontrollable force. Extra, Summer, 1989, p. 28 El Salvador, 1989 Member of Salvadoran army said first brigade intelligence unit army troops routinely kill and torture suspected leftists. First brigade day-to-day army operations carried out with knowledge of U.S. military advisers. CIA routinely pays expenses for intelligence operations in the brigades. U.S. has about 55 advisers in Salvador. Washington Post, 10/27/1989, A1,26 El Salvador, circa 1982-84. Ricardo Castro, a 35 year old Salvadoran army officer, a West Point graduate, said he worked for the CIA and served as translator for a U.S. official who advised the military on torture techniques and overseas assassinations. Castro personally led death squad operations. The Progressive, 3/1986, pp. 26-30 El Salvador, domestic, 1986-87. Article "The Death Squads Hit Home." For decades they terrorized civilians in El Salvador, now they are terrorizing civilians in the U.S. The FBI shared intelligence about Salvadoran activists in the U.S. with Salvador's notorious security services. The Progressive, 10/1987, pp. 15-19 El Salvador. Office of Public Safety graduate Colonel Roberto Mauricio Staben was, according to journalist Charles Dickey "responsible for patrolling if not contributing to the famous death squad dumping ground at El Payton a few miles from its headquarters." also, Alberto Medrano, founder of El Salvador's counterinsurgency force Orden, was an operations graduate. Finally, Jose Castillo, who was trained in 1969 at the U.S. International Police School, later became head of National Guard's section of special investigations which helped organize the death squads. The Nation, 6/7/1986, p. 793

El Salvador. Former death squad member Joya Martinez admitted death squad operations carried out with knowledge and approval 2 U.S. military advisers. LA Weekly, 1/25/1990 El Salvador. DCI report to House Intelligence Committee re CIA connections with death squads. National security archives listing. El Salvador. FBI's contacts with the Salvadoran National Guard. Information in Senate Intelligence Committee Report, 7/1989, pp. 104-5 El Salvador. Former San Francisco police officer accused of illegal spying said he worked for CIA and will expose CIA's support of death squads if he prosecuted. Tom Gerard said he began working for CIA in 1982 and quit in 1985 because he could not tolerate what he saw. He and Roy Bullock are suspected of gathering information from police and government files on thousands of individuals and groups. Information probably ended up with B'nai B'rith and ADL. CIA refused to confirm Gerard's claim. Gerard said there is proof CIA directly involved in training and support of torture and death squads in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala during mid 1980s. Proof in his briefcase San Francisco police seized. Gerard said several photos seized by police show CIA agents attending interrogations, or posing with death squad members. Washington Times, 4/28/1993, A 6 El Salvador, 1963-90. In 1963 U.S. sent 10 Special Forces to help General Madrano set up Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (Orden), a death squad. Evidence this sort activity going on for 30 years. Martinez, a soldier in First infantry brigade's department 2, admitted death squad acts. Said he worked with two U.S. Advisers. Castro, another soldier, talks about death squads and U.S. contacts. Rene Hurtado, former agent with Treasury Police, gives his story. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly) Summer 1990, pp. 51-53 El Salvador, 1973-89. El Salvador's ruling party, Arena, closed off fifth floor of National Assembly building to serve as HQ for national network of death squads following Arena's 20 March 1988 electoral victory. Hernan Torres Cortez, a former Arena security guard and death squad member, said he was trained and recruited by Dr. Antonio Regalado under orders of Roberto D'Abuisson intelligence service, Ansesal, in 1973. Official network was broken up in 1984 following Vice President Bush's visit, but was reinstated in 1988. Intelligence Newsletter, 1/18/1991, p. 5 El Salvador, 1979-90. A detailed discussion of Salvador's death squads. Schwarz, B. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, pp. 41-3 El Salvador, 1980-84. Expatriate Salvadorans in U.S. have provided funds for political violence and have been directly involved in assisting and directing their operations. Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, p. 15

El Salvador, 1980-84. Numerous Salvadoran officials involved in death squad activities most done by security services especially the Treasury Police and National Guard. Some military death squad activity. Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, 15 El Salvador, 1980-89. D'Aubuisson kept U.S. on its guard. Hundreds of released declassified documents re relationship. Washington Post, 1/4/1994, A1,13 El Salvador, 1980-89. Declassified documents re 32 cases investigated by United Nations appointed Truth Commission on El Salvador reveal U.S. officials were fully aware of Salvadoran military and political leaders' complicity in crimes ranging from massacre of more than 700 peasants at El Mozote in 1981 to murder of 6 Jesuit priests in 1989, and thousands of atrocities in between. Lies of our Time 3/1994, pp. 6-9 El Salvador, 1980-89. President Reagan and Vice President Bush instituted polices re fighting communists rather than human rights concerns. From 11/1980 through 1/1991 a large number of assassinations 11/27, 5 respected politicians; 12/4, rape and murder of 3 American nuns and a lay workers; 2 American land reform advisers on 1/4/1981. Archbishop Romero killed 3/1980. There clear evidence D'Aubuisson's involvement but Reagan administration ignored. On TV, D'Aubuisson, using military intelligence files, denounced teachers, labor leaders, union organizers and politicians. Within days their mutilated bodies found. Washington had identified most leaders of death squads as members Salvadoran security forces with ties to D'Aubuisson. With U.S. outrage at bloodshed, U.S., via Bush, advised government slaughter must stop. Article discusses torture techniques used by security forces. Washington Post op-ed by Douglas Farah, 2/23/1992, C4 El Salvador, 1980-90. COL Nicolas Carranza, head of Treasury Police, on CIA payroll. Minnick, W. (1992). Spies and Provocateurs, p. 32 El Salvador, 1980-90. State panel found that mistakes by U.S. diplomats, particularly in probing 1981 massacre of civilians at El Mozote, undercut policy during Salvador's civil war. Findings in 67-page study ordered by Secretary of State Christopher. Sen. Leahy said report "glosses over...the lies, half-truths and evasions that we came to expect from the State Department during that period." Sen. Dodd said "report is sloppy, anemic and basically a whitewash..." Washington Times, 7/16/1993, A12 and Washington Post, 7/16/1993, A16 El Salvador, 1980-91. Truth Commission report says 19 of 27 Salvadoran officers implicated in 6 Jesuit murders were graduates of U.S. Army's School of Americas in Fort Benning, Ga. Almost three quarters of Salvadoran officers accused in 7 other massacres were trained at Fort Benning. It called school for dictators. Since 46 it has trained more than 56,000 Latin soldiers. Graduates include some of region's most despicable military strongmen. Now, when U.S. wants to build democracy, school an obstacle. Newsweek investigation turned up hundreds of less than honorable grads. At least 6 Peruvian officers linked to a military death squad that killed 9 students and a professor were graduates. Four of five senior Honduran officers accused in Americas Watch report of organizing a death squad, Battalion 316, were trained there. A coalition charged 246

Colombian officers with human rights violations; 105 were school alumni. Honored graduates include General Suarez, a brutal dictator of Bolivia; General Callejas Ycallejas, chief of Guatemalan intelligence in late 1970s and early 1980s, when thousands political opponents were assassinated; and Honduran General Garcia, a corrupt person; and, Hernandez, armed forces chief of Colombia suspected of aiding Colombian drug traffickers. Newsweek, 8/9/1993, pp. 36-7 El Salvador, 1980-92. "Secret of the Skeletons: Uncovering America's Hidden Role in El Salvador." Pathologists uncovered 38 small skeletons in El Mozote. In 1981 soldiers of ACRE, immediate reaction infantry battalion created by U.S., herded children into basement and blew up building. U.S. officials denied any massacre had taken place and kept on denying for years. About 800 residents killed. Armed service leaders said they conducted war on part of Reagan and Bush administrations with bi-partisan support Congress since 1984; received daily assistance from State Department, DOD and CIA. Truth Commission investigating via U.S. Government interagency committee. State and CIA not cooperating with commission. CIA not giving one document on formation of death squads, prepared in 1983 for congressional intelligence committees. Kidnap-forprofit ring against Salvadoran business community. With U.S. Encouragement, Salvadoran government arrested several members of ring. One was a death squad assassin, Rudolfo Isidro Lopez Sibrian, who implicated in deaths of 2 American labor advisers. Washington Post, 11/15/1992, C1,2 El Salvador, 1980-93. 11/5/1993 release of thousands pages of intelligence reports shows every U.S. diplomat, military officer, and intelligence operative who worked with El Salvador's military and political leaders in 1980s knew most of those involved in organizing death squads. State Department officials lied to Congress. Intelligence reports detailed precise information on murder, kidnapping, and coup plots, and death squad funding, involving people like VP Francisco Merino and current Arena candidate Armando Calderon Sol. At least 63,000 Salvadoran civilians equivalent of 3 million Americans were killed most by government supported by U.S. The Nation, 11/29/1993, p. 645 El Salvador, 1980-93. Approximately 50-page article on the massacres at El Mozote. Article by Mark Danner. New Yorker, 12/6/1993 El Salvador, 1980-93. Article by Jared Toller, "Death Squads Past, Present & Future." discusses recent cases of FMLN members being murdered by resurgent death squads. Only left is calling for full implementation of UN Truth Commission's recommendations purging armed forces, full investigation into death squads, etc. Truth Commission had recommended U.S. make it files available. U.S. Had refused to turn over 1983 FBI report on death squads organization in Miami. Salvadoran government is the death squads. Member of a death squad now imprisoned and seeking amnesty, Lopez Sibrian, explained participation of Arena luminaries in kidnappings, bombings and attacks on National University. He implicated the mayor of San Salvador in various acts. Link between phone service, Antel, and national intelligence police. Antel records calls of left and passes them to police. (The secret anti-communist Army, a former death squad,

were regulars of now-disbanded Treasury Police). Upcoming elections may have generated increase in death squad activity. Z magazine, 1/1994, pp. 14-5 El Salvador, 1980-93. Colman McCarthy comments of UN's Truth Commission report and the Reagan-Abrams "fabulous achievement." Washington Post, 4/6/1993, D22 El Salvador, 1980-93. Letter to editor by Thomas Buergenthal of law school at George Washington U., who was a member of the Truth Commission for El Salvador. He denies news story that there was a chapter in the report that dealt with the structure and finances of the groups was withheld. He bemoans the ability of the commission to thoroughly investigate all aspects. Washington Post, 11/30/1993, A24 El Salvador, 1980-93. Report of UN's Truth Commission re enormous crime of a government that killed upwards of 70,000 civilians between 1980-92. Report refutes official statements made by Reagan and Bush administrations when officials denied leaders of Salvadoran armed forces were using execution, rape and torture to sustain their power reports says they were. We need a truth report on our own government per Rep. Moakley. Truth report adds growing body evidence U.S. Government officials may have participated in perpetuation of atrocities in El Salvador. In 1960s, CIA advisers helped create a nationwide informant net. In 1981, team of military advisers led by Brig. Gen. Frederick Woener sent to determine "rightist terrorism and institutional violence." Salvadorans generally dismissed notion that terror was a bad idea. One of Colonels, Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar, was one covering up rape and murder of four churchwomen. Woener recommended U.S. proceed and give $300-400 million aid. U.S. officials claimed churchwomen had run a roadblock and there was no massacre at El Mozote. Neil Livingstone, a consultant who worked with Oliver North at NSC concluded, "death squads are an extremely effective tool, however odious, in combating terrorism and revolutionary challenges." op-ed by Jefferson Morley, an Outlook editor. Washington Post, 3/28/1993, C1,5 El Salvador, 1980-93. Salvador's ruling party moved to declare amnesty for those named in United Nations.-sponsored Truth Commission. Investigators said 85% of complaints laid to government death squads. Discusses D'Aubuisson's implication in Archbishop Romero's assassination. Washington Post 3/17/1993 a25 El Salvador, 1980. Ten former death squad members were ordered killed in Santiago de Maria on 27 December 1980 by Hector Antonio Regalado, who felt they knew too much. Intelligence Newsletter, 10/4/1988, p. 6 El Salvador, 1981-84. There are two versions of first page of a CIA report, "El Salvador: Dealing With Death Squads," 1/20/1984. CIA released first version in 1987, among congressional debate over aid to El Salvador. Second version, which contradicts first, declassified by CIA in 11/1993. As recently as 10/1992, CIA continued to release censored version in response to FOIA requests. Redacted version implies death squad problem overcome non censored version show this is not true. New York Times, 12/17/1993, A19

El Salvador, 1981-89. Salvadoran atrocity posed agonizing choice for U.S. COL Rene Ponce, chief of staff of Salvador's armed forces, has been accused of ordering murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter at Central American University. Newly available U.S. documents show U.S. knowingly and repeatedly aligned themselves with unsavory characters during 1980s while defending them to U.S. Public. Diplomatic cables found among more than 10,000 recently declassified State, Pentagon and CIA documents, reveal extent U.S. policy makers chose to overlook Ponce's brutality. U.S. officials long labeled Ponce a right-wing extremist tied to death squads. But documents make clear U.S. played down unsavory side of Ponce. Details from correspondence between Ambassador Walker and Baker. In 10/1983, CIA prepared a "briefing paper on right-wing terrorism in El Salvador" that described Ponce as a supporter of death squads. Impact Bush's visit in 1984 to push for human rights was minimal. By 7/1989, CIA reported that Ponce "espouses moderate political views." Ponce refused repeated requests to pursue those responsible for deaths of Jesuits. Washington Post, 4/5/1994, A13 El Salvador, 1981-90. Government operation at El Mozote consisted of Army, National Guard and the Treasury Police in operation rescue. By early 1992, U.S. spent more than 4 billion in civil war lasting 12 years and that left 75,000 dead. New Yorker, 12/6/1993, p. 53 El Salvador, 1981-90. In 1981 over 10,000 political murders committed by Salvadoran military and its death squads. In 1990 there were 108 such murders. Schwarz, B. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, p. 23 El Salvador, 1981-92. Article "Death-Squad Refugees," discusses case of Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, extradited by Bush to El Salvador to face murder charges for being part of a death squad that he claims operated with knowledge of defense minister Ponce and other top officials. FOIA documents show U.S. helping prepare extradition request for Salvadoran government. Truth Commission's report vindicates Joya. Texas Observer (magazine), 3/26/1993, pp. 9-10 El Salvador, 1981-92. Some U.S. special operations soldiers in El Salvador during civil war want Pentagon to admit they more than advisers. They say they also fought. Army memo given Newsweek says, "most personnel serving in an advisory capacity were directly engaged in hostile action." Newsweek, 4/5/1993 El Salvador, 1981-92. Truth Commission report implicates top Salvadoran officials in ordering or covering up murders of four U.S. churchwomen and six Jesuit priests; and Salvadoran troops massacred many hundreds at El Mozote. Four Dutch journalists killed 3/17/1982 were deliberately ambushed by Salvadoran army. Denials by then top U.S. government officials now exposed. U.S. government supported war with $6 billion. The Nation, 4/12/1993, p. 475 El Salvador, 1981-93. 12 years of tortured truth on El Salvador U.S. declarations undercut by United Nations. Commission report. For 12 years, opponents of U.S. policy in Central America accused Reagan and Bush administrations of ignoring widespread

human rights abuses by the Salvadoran government and of systematically deceiving or even lying to Congress and people about the nature of an ally that would receive $6 billion in economic and military aid. A three-man United Nations.-sponsored Truth Commission released a long-awaited report on 12 years of murder, torture and disappearance in El Salvador's civil war. Commission examined 22,000 complaints of atrocities and attributed 85 percent of a representative group of them to Salvadoran security forces or right-wing death squads. It blamed remainder on guerrilla Farabundo Marti National Liberation front (FMLN). In May 1980, for instance, when Carter was still President, security forces seized documents implicating rightist leader D'Aubuisson in the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero. In Fall of 1981, Army Brig. Gen. Fred Woerner supervised preparation of a joint U.S.-Salvadoran internal military "Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team," which noted that "the (Salvadoran) armed forces are reluctant to implement vigorous corrective actions for abuses in the use of force." One reason so many people found it hard to believe U.S. officials could not have known more about rights abuses and acted more aggressively to curb them is that the U.S. was deeply involved in running the war, from intelligence gathering to strategy planning to training of everyone from officers to foot soldiers. By 1982, U.S.. military advisers were assigned to each of the six Salvadoran brigades, as well as each of 10 smaller detachments. The U.S. put tens of millions of dollars into developing the ultramodern national intelligence directorate to coordinate intelligence gathering and dissemination. U.S. military and CIA officials participated in almost every important meeting. Most brigades had a U.S. intelligence officer assigned to them, as well as a U.S. liaison officer. U.S. advisers regularly doled out small amounts of money, usually less than $1,000 at a time, for intelligence work. The U.S. was not informed of arrests or captures Unless they specifically asked. "They never asked unless there was a specific request because someone in Washington was getting telegrams." El Mozote, the report said, was work of U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion, part of a days-long search-and-destroy sweep known as "Operation Rescue." In fact, the report said, the soldiers massacred more than 500 people in six villages. In El Mozote, where the identified victims exceeded 200, "the men were tortured and executed, then women were executed and finally, the children" Washington Post, 3/21/1993 El Salvador, 1981-93. A discussion of the media's treatment of the El Mozote massacres and the U.S. media's treatment of that story. Lies of our Time, 6/1993, pp. 3-4 El Salvador, 1981-93. Thomas Enders, former Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs from 1981-83, writes op-ed defending U.S. officials' testimony re massacre at El Mozote as now confirmed by UN's Truth Commission report. Washington Post, op-ed 3/29/1993, A19 El Salvador, 1981-93. United Nations. Commission on Truth to release report on crimes committed against civilians in Salvador's 12-year civil war. Defense Minister Ponce already resigned. Washington Post Outlook, 3/14/1993, C1,2 El Salvador, 1981-94. Armando Calderon Sol considered shoo-in to win Presidency in impending elections. Calderon began his political career as a member of a seven-man, neo-fascist group under D'Aubuisson's guidance that supported death squad operations.

Calderon has all worst elements of D'Abuisson without any redeeming qualities. When D'Abuisson running death squads out of his office, Calderon was his private secretary and a loyal soldier in a terrorist cell Salvadoran National Movement (MNS). In 1981, D'Abuisson unified MNS into Arena party. Washington Post, Outlook, 4/17/1994, C1,3 El Salvador, 1981. Detailed article on "The Truth of El Mozote," by Mark Danner. New Yorker, 12/6/1993, pages 51 and ending on page 103 El Salvador, 1981. Skeletons verify killing of Salvadoran children of El Mozote, El Salvador. Washington Times, 10/21/1992, A9 and Washington Post, 10/22/1992, A18 El Salvador, 1982-84. Significant political violence associated with Salvadoran security services including National police, National Guard, and Treasury Police. U.S. government agencies maintained official relationships with Salvadoran security establishment appearing to acquiesce in these activities. No evidence U.S. personnel participated in forcible interrogations. U.S. did pass "tactical" information to alert services of action by insurgent forces. Information on persons passed only in highly unusual cases. Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, pp. 11-13. El Salvador, 1982-84. "Recent Political Violence in El Salvador," Report of Senate Intelligence Committee. Committee found ample evidence that U.S. policy was to oppose political violence. U.S. government accorded high priority to gathering intelligence on political violence. President Bush and his demarche in 1983. P8. U.S. government Relationship with Robert D'Aubuisson bio on him. U.S. Government contact with him limited. Roberto Santivanez, director of Ansesal 1978-79. He claimed he himself had engaged in death squad activity and had a relationship with U.S. through CIA and that COL Carranza had ties to CIA. Colonel Nicolas Carranza had extensive ties to Arena and National Conciliation (PCN) parties. He involved in various activities of interest to U.S. in various positions. Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, pp. 1-11 El Salvador, 1983-90. Former Salvadoran army intelligence agent who applied for political asylum in U.S. convicted in court of entering country illegally. Joya-Martinez's request for political asylum still pending. Washington Post, 9/19/1990, A5 El Salvador, 1985. In 2/1985, CIA reported that behind Arena's legitimate exterior lies a terrorist network led by D'Aubuisson using both active-duty and retired military personnel..." main death squad was "the Secret Anti-communist Army," described by CIA as the paramilitary organization of Arena from the National Police and other security organizations. These were funded directly from Washington. Death squads became more active as 1994, election approached. Columbia, possibly leading terrorist state in Latin America, has become leading recipient of U.S. military aid. Since 1986, more than 20,000 people have been killed for political reasons, most by Colombian authorities. More than 1,500 leaders, members and supporters of the Labor Party (UP) have been assassinated since party established in 1985. Pretext for terror operations is war against guerrillas and narcotraffickers. Former a partial truth, latter a myth concocted to replace the "communist threat." Works hand-in-hand with drug lords,

organized crime, and landlords. National Police took over as leading official killers while U.S. aid shifted to them. Targets include community leaders, human rights and health workers, union activists, students, members of religious youth organizations, and young people in shanty towns. Sale of human organs. Case of Guatemala. Shift of 1962, under Kennedy administration from hemispheric defense to "internal security:" war against the internal enemy. Doctrines expounded in counterinsurgency manuals. Internal enemy extends to labor organizations, popular movements, indigenous organizations, opposition political parties, peasant movements, intellectual sectors, religious currents, youth and student groups, neighborhood organizations, etc. From 1984 through 1992, 6,844 Colombian soldiers trained under U.S. International Military Education and Training Program (MET). Z Magazine, 5/1994, 14 pages El Salvador, 1986-87. See article "Death Squad Update, Investigating L.A.'s Salvadoran Connection." Los Angeles Weekly, 8/7/1987 El Salvador, 1986-89. Joya Martinez, former death squad member, who said two U.S. advisers attached to his unit and gave funds of 9500 month. Article names other Salvadoran death squad members. Unclassified, 7/1990 El Salvador, 1986. In 1986, Salvadoran authorities, with help of FBI, cracked a kidnapfor-hire ring in which death squads posing as leftist rebels kidnapped some of nation's wealthiest businessmen. Schwarz, B. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, p. 28 El Salvador, 1987-89. Jesuit labeled ardent communist two years before by Salvadoran, U.S. officials. Religious News Service, 5/9/1990, p. 1 El Salvador, 1987-89. Salvadoran woman defecting to U.S. said she worked for death squad and provided information on six people who killed. Her claims back up those of her supervisor, Cesar Joya Martinez, who linked death squad acts to U.S. funding. Boston Globe, 3/16/1990, in First Principles, 4/1990, p. 10 El Salvador, 1988-89. Joya Martinez, former member intelligence department 1st army Brigade of Salvador's army. Said U.S. advisers funded their activity, but unaware of death squad. Washington Post, 11/19/1989, F2 El Salvador, 1988. Amnesty International report of 26 October 1988 noted "black list" are supplied to Salvadoran media by Salvadoran intelligence services. During first six months of 1988, number of murders by death squads tripled over same period of previous year. Most prominent victim was Judge Jorge Alberto Serrano Panameno who was shot in May 1988. Increase reflects rise to power of 1966 class from national military school. Class members include Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, new chief of staff of armed forces as well as director of Treasury Police. They command five of country's six brigades, five of seven military detachments, three security forces as well as intelligence, personnel and operations posts in high command. Intelligence Newsletter, 11/16/1988, pp. 5,6

El Salvador, 1989-91. According to confidential Salvadoran military sources, decision to murder six Jesuit priests was made at a 15 November 1989 meeting of senior commanders (CO) at the Salvadoran military school. Those allegedly present were: Colonel Benavides, CO of the school; General Juan Rafael Bustillo, then CO of Salvadoran Air Force in 1991 assigned to embassy in Israel; General Emilio Ponce, then chief of staff in 1991 minister of defense; and Colonel Elena Fuentes, CO of 1st brigade. Initiative for murders came from Colonel Bustillo. For a listing of direct and circumstantial evidence supporting allegation, see statement of Rep. Joe Moakley, Task Force on El Salvador, 11/18/1991 El Salvador, 1989. CIA officer visited bodies of dead priests. Officer was senior liaison with (DNI) the national intelligence directorate. U.S. probably knew Salvadoran military behind assassinations but did not say anything for seven weeks. State Department panel did not review actions of CIA or DOD. Washington Post, 7/18/1993, C1,4 El Salvador, 1989. Congressman criticized a 11/ 1987 report in which Latin American and U.S. military leaders accused Rev. Ignacio Ellacuria and several other theologians of supporting objectives of communist revolution. Father Ellacuria, Rector of Jesuit university in San Salvador, was murdered on 11/16/ 1989. Religious News Service, 5/11/1990, p. 1 El Salvador, 1989. Joya Martinez and Jesuit murders. Martinez says his unit which played major role in 12/1989 murder of Jesuit priests had U.S. government advisors. INS trying to deport Martinez. Unclassified, 9/1990, p. 6 El Salvador, 1989. Salvadoran Archbishop Rivera accused U.S. officials of subjecting a witness to the slaying of 6 Jesuit intellectuals to brainwashing and psychological torment. Washington Post, 12/11/1989, A23,24 El Salvador, 1989. U.S. military adviser Benavides told FBI, later recanted, that Salvadoran army chief of staff and others knew of plan to kill six Jesuit priests. Washington Post, 10/29/1990, A17,21 El Salvador, 1990. Amnesty International reported a significant surge in number of killings by army-supported death squads this year. 45 people killed between January and August this year, compared with 40 reported in 1989. Washington Post, 10/24/1990, A14 El Salvador, 1990. Cesar Vielman Joya-Martinez, former member Salvadoran First brigade death squad, sentenced to 6 months in jail for illegally reentering U.S. 6 years after he deported. Washington Post, 12/8/1990, A22 El Salvador, 1991. Salvadoran minister of defense and other top generals attended 1989 meeting where decision was made to murder six Jesuit priests, according to confidential sources. Allegation was made by an attorney working for Rep. Moakley (D-MA), whose task force released a six page statement directly linking Salvadoran high command to slayings. Washington Times, 11/18/1991, A2

El Salvador, 1991. Summary executions continued in El Salvador despite the presence of Onusal, the UN observer mission monitoring human rights violations. In a 1991 report, Onusal noted government made few attempts to investigate slayings. Report also accused FMLN for recruiting fifteen-year-olds. Washington Times, 12/3/1991, A8 El Salvador, 1992. Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, former Salvadoran death squad member, to be deported. Washington Post editorial, 10/23/1992, A20 El Salvador, 1993. Right-wing death squads undermining fragile peace per UN chief in campaign for March 1994 elections. Washington Times, 11/25/1993, A15 El Salvador, Central America, 1981-1993. Salvadoran death squads set up as a consequence of Kennedy administration decisions. Killers were Treasury Police and the military who were trained in intelligence and torture by U.S. U.S. personnel staffed military and intelligence apparatus. Generals selected and trained by U.S. were most notorious killers. 1984 FBI report on death squads never released. For savage expose of School of Americas' killers, see Father Roy Bourgeois's School of the Americas Watch, Box 3330, Columbus Ga. 31903; (706) 682-5369. The Nation, 12/27/1993, p. 791 El Salvador, 1989-1990. Joya Martinez testified role played by U.S. officials in death squad killings carried out by U.S. trained first infantry Brigade's intelligence unit. Two U.S. military advisers controlled intelligence department and paid for unit's operating expenses. His unit performed 74 executions between April and July 1989. Washington Post confirmed U.S. advisers work in liaison with First brigade and CIA pays expenses for intelligence operations in the brigades. Martinez said his first brigade unit attached to U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion, which slaughtered the Jesuit priests. Member of his unit, Oscar Mariano Amaya Grimaldi has confessed to slayings. In These Times, 8/14/1990, p. 17 Europe: Watch List Europe, 1945-92. Operation Gladio. First scandal was discovery of assassination teams in 1952 linked to Bundes Deutscher Jugend a right-wing political organization in Hesse, Germany. They prepared list of German politicians who [might cooperate with Soviets]. BBC (1992). Gladio Timewatch (Transcript of 3 part program), pp. 19-20 Georgia: Watch List Georgia, 1993. Woodruff worked for 2 months as CIA's Tbilisi station chief posing as a State Department regional-affairs officer. He to help Guguladze upgrade Georgian intelligence service and to monitor factional struggle. Newsweek 8/23/1993, p. 18 Germany: Watch List Germany, 1950-54. In about 1950 pacifist ideas to be eradicated. U.S. formed German youth league (Bund Deutscher Jugend (BDJ)) in Frankfurt. Psychological indoctrination given by Paul Luth. BDJ was a militant organization, a counterweight to communist-run

free German youth (FDJ) run from East Berlin to infiltrate W. German youth. BDJ passed letters and brochures through Iron Curtain and pasted slogans on walls. Chancellor Adenauer wanted cold war and wanted to use the BDJ. Otto John told by State official Zinn that it had uncovered neo-Nazi unit BDJ run by Peters, that was organizing secret firing exercises and training for partisan warfare in the Odelwald. BDJ had drawn up a blacklist of left-wing socialists who were to be arrested or even murdered in event of attack from east. [early version of Gladio political and staybehind operation]. John, O. (1969). Twice Through the Lines: the Autobiography of Otto John, pp. 210-15 Germany, 1950-90. Bonn officials said government to disband secret resistance net Operation Gladio. Section consisted of former Nazi SS and Waffen-SS officers as well as members of an extreme right-wing youth group that drew up plans to assassinate leading members of Socialist Democratic Party in event of USSR-invasion. "Statewatch" compilation filed June 1994, p. 11 Germany, 1952-91. CIA's stay-behind program caused scandal in 1952 when West German police discovered CIA working with a 2,000-member fascist youth group led by former Nazis. Group had a black list of people to be liquidated in case of conflict with the USSR. Lembke case. The Nation, 4/6/1992, p. 446 Germany, 1953. (Stay-behind operation Gladio?). In 1953 mass arrests of neo-Nazi militant organization within ranks of German youth fellowship (BDJ) discovered. Group held secret night maneuvers in Odenwald with CIA instructors. They preparing for war with East Germany and prepared lists of communists, left-wing sympathizers and pacifists who were to be arrested in case of emergency. Members encouraged to infiltrate East German youth league (FDJ). Operation exposed in press and scores of youths arrested in East Germany as spies, propagandists or provocateurs, and sentenced to terms of up to nine years of hard labor. Hagan, l. (1969). The Secret War for Europe, p. 78 Germany, 1953. U.S. Intelligence officer told Otto John, head of BFV, one of its agents in East Germany to defect with a list of East German agents in West. 35 Communist spies arrested after Easter. Later it found many of those arrested were innocent. Arrests followed with apologies. Disaster caused by over-zealous U.S. intelligence officer. West German businessmen as consequence afraid to do business with east. This a goal of U.S. Policy was this a deliberate "mistake?" Hagan, l. (1969). The Secret War for Europe, p. 81 Greece: Watch List Greece, 1967. After CIA-backed coup, the army and police seized almost 10,000 prisoners, mostly left-wing militants, though political leaders of all shades taken including prime minister Kanelopoulos and members of his Cabinet, trade union members, journalists, writers, etc. The lists had been provided by the sympathizers in the police and the secret service. Final lists kept up to date by COL George Ladas.

Details of fate of the arrestees. Tompkins, P. (Unpublished manuscript). Strategy of Terror, pp. 13-8 Guatemala: Watch List Guatemala, 1954. Death squads and target lists. Schlesinger, S., & Kinzer, S. (1983). Bitter Fruit 197, pp. 207-8, 221 Guatemala, 1954. Goal of CIA was apprehension of suspected communists and sympathizers. At CIA behest, Castillo Armas created committee and issued decree that established death penalty for crimes including labor union activities. Committee given authority declare anyone communist with no right of defense or appeal. By 11/21/1954 committee had some 72,000 persons on file and aiming to list 200,000. Schlesinger, S., & Kinzer, S. (1983). Bitter Fruit, p. 221 Guatemala, 1954. The U.S. Ambassador, after overthrow of Arbenz government, gave lists of radical opponents to be eliminated to Armas's government. NACLA 2/1983, p 4. The military continued up to at least 1979 to use a list of 72,000 proscribed opponents, drawn up first in 1954. NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 2/1983, p. 13 Guatemala, 1954. After Armas made president, labor code forgotten and worker organizers began disappearing from united fruit plantations. Hersh, B. (1992). The Old Boys, p. 353 Guatemala, 1954. Department of State Secretary Dulles told Ambassador Peurifoy to have the government scour the countryside for communists and to slap them with criminal charges. A few months later the government began to persecute hundreds for vague communist crimes. The Nation, 10/28/1978, p. 444 Guatemala, 1954 U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy, after Arbenz resigned, gave Guatemalan army's chief of staff a list of "communists" to be shot. The chief of staff declined. The Nation 6/5/1995, pp. 792-5 Guatemala, 1981-89. Israeli Knesset member General Peled said in Central America Israel is 'dirty work' contractor for U.S. Helped Guatemala regime when Congress blocked Reagan administration. Israeli firm Tadiran (then partly U.S.-owned) supplied Guatemalan military with computerized intelligence system to track potential subversives. Those on computer list had an excellent chance of being "disappeared." It was "an archive and computer file on journalists, students, leaders, leftists, politicians and so on." Computer system making up death lists. Cockburn, A. & Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 219 Guatemala, 1985-93. CIA collected intelligence re ties between Guatemalan insurgents and Cuba. CIA passed the information to U.S. military, which was assisting Guatemalan army extinguish opposition. Washington Post, 3/30/1995, A1,10

Guatemala, 1988-91. CIA station chief in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991 was a Cuban American. He had about 20 officers with a budget of about $5 million a year and an equal or greater sum for "liaison" with Guatemalan military. His job included placing and keeping senior Guatemalan officers on his payroll. Among them was Alpirez, who recruited for CIA. Alpirez's intelligence unit spied on Guatemalans and is accused by human rights groups of assassinations. CIA also gave Guatemalan army information on guerrillas. New York Times, 4/2/1995, A11 Guatemala: Death Squads Guatemala, 1953-84. For 30 years the CIA has been bankrolling a man reported to be behind right-wing terror in Central America. The CIA's protg, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, former Vice President Of Guatemala, now heads the National Liberation Movement (NLM) founded in 1953 by CIA as a paramilitary force to overthrow Arbenz. By mid-1960s Sandoval emerged as head of the organization. The White Hand or La Mano Blanco with close ties to the NLM was responsible for as many as 8000 deaths in the 1960s plus more in the 1970s. Sandoval a pillar of the World Anti-communist League. The CIA still funds Sandoval. Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 1/30/1984 Guatemala, 1954-76. Effect of CIA coup organized labor all but wiped out. Union membership dropped 100,000 to 27,000 immediately and continued decline thereafter, in part due to death squad activity. Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, p. 21 Guatemala. Police trained by AID public safety program murdered or disappeared 15,000 people. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People, p. 186 Guatemala, 1954-84. See Jack Anderson column "Links Reported Among Latin Death Squads." Washington Post, 1/12/1984, N. VA., p. 15 Guatemala, 1970-72. Under Arana presidency, with Mario Sandoval Alarcon and others involved in right-wing terrorism, Arana unleashed one of the most gruesome slaughters in recent Latin American history (only in Chile, following the coup against Allende was the degree of violence greater). The New York Times reported in June 1971 that at least 2000 Guatemalans were assassinated between 11/1970 and 5/1971; most corpses showed signs of torture. Most of killing attributed to the officially supported terrorist organizations Ojo Por Ojo (an eye for an eye) and Mano Blanca. Jones, S., and Tobis, D. (Eds.). (1974). Guatemala, pp. 202-3 Guatemala, 1970-87. Violence by security forces organized by CIA, trained in torture by advisors from Argentina, Chile. Supported by weapon, computer experts from Israel. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, p. 133 Guatemala. 1960-82. Trained military death squads who used "terror tactics" from killing to indiscriminate napalming of villages. Special Forces almost certainly participated in operations despite Congressional prohibition. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, p. 193

Guatemala, 1954. The U.S. ambassador, after overthrow of Arbenz government, gave lists to Armas of radical opponents to be eliminated. NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 2/1983, p. 4 Guatemala, 1985. The World Anti-communist League's point man, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, remains a League member even after exposed as a death squad patriarch who was on the CIA payroll. Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 8/9/1986 Guatemala, 1989. Climate of terror grips Guatemala. Killers, bombers said to target civilian rule. Washington Post, 9/29/1989, A 45 Guatemala, circa 1968-70. U.S. counterinsurgency program turned area into bloody war zone taking the lives of thousands of peasants. Formed Mano Blanca or White Hand. Plan used through out country in 1970. NACLA (magazine re Latin America), 3/74, p. 19 Guatemala. Article by Gary Bass and Babette Grunow on the Guatemalan counterinsurgency forces. Lies of our Time, 6/1993, pp. 11-13 Guatemala. At least three of recent G-2 chiefs were paid by CIA. Crimes are merely examples of a vast, systematic pattern; [the guilty] are only cogs in a large U.S. government apparatus. Colonel Hooker, former DIA chief for Guatemala, says, "it would be an embarrassing situation if you ever had a roll call of everybody in Guatemalan army who ever collected a CIA paycheck." Hooker says CIA payroll is so large that it encompasses most of Army's top decision-makers. Top commanders paid by CIA include General Roberto Matta Galvez, former army chief of staff, head of presidential General Staff and commander of massacres in El Quiche department; and General Gramajo, defense minister during the armed forces' abduction, rape and torture of Dianna Ortiz, an American nun. Hooker says he once brought Gramajo on a tour of U.S. Three recent Guatemalan heads of state confirm CIA works closely with G-2. Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores (military dictator from 1983 to 1986) how death squads had originated, he said they started "in the 1960s by CIA." General Efrain Rios Montt (dictator from 1982 to 1983 and the current congress president), who ordered main high-land massacres (662 villages destroyed, by army's own count), said CIA had agents in the G-2. CIA death squads by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 4/17/1995 Guatemala. CIA works inside a Guatemalan army unit that maintains a network of torture centers and has killed thousands of Guatemalan civilians. G-2, since at least 60s, has been advised, trained, armed and equipped by U.S. undercover agents. One of American agents who works with G-2, is Randy Capister. He has been involved in similar operations with army of neighboring El Salvador. A weapons expert known as Joe Jacarino, has operated through out Caribbean, and has accompanied G-2 units on missions into rural zones. Jacarino [possibly a CIA officer]. Celerino Castillo, a former agent of DEA who dealt with G-2 and CIA in Guatemala, says he worked with Capister as well as with Jacarino. Colonel Alpirez at La Aurora base in Guatemala Denied involvement in deaths of Bamaca and Devine. He said CIA advises and helps run G-2. He praised CIA for "professionalism" and close rapport with Guatemalan officers. He said that agency operatives often come to Guatemala on temporary duty, and train G-2.

CIA gives sessions at G-2 bases on "contra-subversion" tactics and "how to manage factors of power" to "fortify democracy." During mid-1980s G-2 officers were paid by Jack McCavitt, then CIA station chief. CIA "technical assistance" includes communications gear, computers and special firearms, as well as collaborative use of CIA-owned helicopters that are flown out of piper hangar at La Aurora civilian airport and from a separate U.S. Air facility. Guatemalan army has, since 1978, killed more than 110,000 civilians. G-2 and a smaller, affiliated unit called Archivo have long been openly known in Guatemala as the brain of the terror state. With a contingent of more than 2,000 agents and with sub-units in local army bases, G-2 coordinates torture, assassination and disappearance of dissidents. CIA Death Squads by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 4/17/1995 Guatemala, 1954-95. For at least five years, Colonel Alpirez was also a well-paid agent for CIA and a murderer, a U.S. Congressman says. Alpirez has been linked to the murder of Michael Devine, an American innkeeper who lived and worked in the Guatemalan jungle, and the torture and killing of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, a leftist guerrilla who was the husband of Jennifer Harbury. CIA ties began in 1954, when Alpirez was about five years old. The CIA engineered a coup in Guatemala that overthrew a leftist president and installed a right-wing military regime. CIA's station in Guatemala began recruiting young and promising military officers who would provide information on the left-wing guerrillas, the internal workings of Guatemala's intertwined military and political leadership, union members, opposition politicians and others. Alpirez was sent in 1970 to School of the Americas (SOA), an elite and recently much-criticized U.S. Army academy at Fort Benning, Ga. Human-rights groups and members of congress point out that SOA's graduates include Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of death squads in El Salvador; 19 Salvadoran soldiers named in the 1989 assassination of six Jesuit priests and three soldiers accused of the 1980 rape and murder of four U.S. church workers; Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedars and other leaders of the military junta that ran Haiti from 1991 to 1994; General Hugo Banzer, dictator of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978, and General Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama, now imprisoned in U.S. In 1970s Alpirez was an officer in a counterinsurgency unit known as Kaibiles. Kaibiles became notorious in the early 1980s, known as scorched earth years, when tens of thousands of Indians were killed as military swept across rural Guatemala, systematically destroying villages. Guatemalan government's own count, campaign left 40,000 widows and 150,000 orphans. In late 1980s, Alpirez served as a senior official of an intelligence unit hidden within the general staff and became a paid agent of CIA who paid him tens of thousands of dollars a year. Intelligence unit, known as "Archivo," or archives, stands accused of assassination, infiltration of civilian agencies and spying on Guatemalans in violation of the nation's Constitution. Archivo works like the CIA. "It was also working as a death squad." New York Times, 3/25/1995 Guatemala, 1954-95. U.S. Undercover agents have worked for decades inside a Guatemalan army unit that has tortured and killed thousands of Guatemalan citizens, per the Nation weekly magazine. "working out of the U.S. Embassy and living in safe houses and hotels, agents work through an elite group of Guatemalan officers who are secretly paid by CIA and implicated personally in numerous political crimes and assassinations ''unit known as G-2 and its secret collaboration with CIA were described

by U.S. and Guatemalan operatives and confirmed by three former Guatemalan heads of state. Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, Guatemalan officer implicated in murders of guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez husband of an American lawyer and rancher Michael Devine discussed in an interview how intelligence agency advises and helps run G-2. He said agents came to Central American country often to train G-2 men and he described attending CIA sessions at G-2 bases on "contra-subversion" tactics and "how to manage factors of power" to "fortify democracy" the Nation quoted U.S. and Guatemalan intelligence sources as saying at least three recent G-2 chiefs have been on CIA payroll General Edgar Godoy Gatan, Colonel Otto Perez Molina and General Francisco Ortega Menaldo. `It would be embarrassing if you ever had a roll call of everybody in Guatemalan army who ever collected a CIA paycheck,'' report quoted Colonel George Hooker, U.S. DIA chief in Guatemala from 1985 to 1989, as saying. Human rights group Amnesty International has said Guatemalan army killed more than 110,000 civilians since 1978 with G-2 and another unit called Archivo known as main death squads. Reuters, 3/30/1995 Guatemala, 1960-90. Human rights groups say at least 40,000 Guatemalans "disappeared" in last three decades. Most were poor Indians. Anthropologists, led by Clyde Snow, dug away at a village site. Maria Lopez had a husband and a son in one grave. She said on morning of Valentine's Day 1982, members of anti-guerrilla militia took her husband and others. They had refused to join militias known as civil selfdefense patrols and were killed. Six unknown clandestine graves in San Jose Pacho. Human rights groups blame most disappearances on army-run civil self-defense patrols set up under presidencies of General Lucas Garcia and Brig. Gen. Rios Montt. There are hundreds of clandestine graves filled with victims of the militias, right-wing death squads and brutal counterinsurgency campaigns. Washington Times, 8/5/1992, p. A9 Guatemala, 1970-95. Jennifer Harbury's story. Time, 4/3/1995, p. 48 Guatemala, 1981-95. DIA reports re MLN particularly disturbing, as they raise grave questions about extent of U.S. knowledge of MLN activities in earlier years when MLN leader Mario Sandoval Alarcon was tied to Reagan Administration's efforts to support Contras. Having come to power in 1954 with the CIA-backed overthrow of Colonel Jacobo Arbenze, MLN leader Sandoval was accused in 1980 by Elias Barahona, former press secretary to the Guatemalan Interior Minister, of having worked for CIA. Head of National Congress from 1970 to 1974, at which time he was made vice president, a position he kept until his term expired in 1978, Sandoval is widely regarded as father of Latin America's "death squads." In 1970's, he had a close relationship with Roberto D'Aubuisson, deputy chief of El Salvador's national security agency (Anseal). D'Aubuisson reportedly was behind El Salvador's death squads. Sandoval was so close to Reagan administration that he was one of only two Guatemalans invited to attend Reagan's inauguration. Intelligence a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 4/24/1995, p. 1 Guatemala, 1984-95. Article, "Murder as Policy." Washington was supporting Guatemalan army in a number of ways: green berets trained Kaibul massacre force, the army's self-proclaimed "messengers of death." U.S. openly sold weapons to Guatemala

 used in massacre in Santiago Atitlan. Hundreds of U.S. troops (mostly National Guard) helped civic action and road building in massacre zones. The Nation, 4/24/1995, pp. 547-8 Guatemala, 1985-93. CIA collected intelligence re ties between Guatemalan insurgents and Cuba CIA passed the information to U.S. military, which was assisting Guatemalan army extinguish opposition. Washington Post, 3/30/1995, A1,10 Guatemala, 1985-95. Bombings against military-reformist Christian Democratic Party (DCG) of then President Vinicio Cerezo to topple Cerezo, who perceived as being too soft on rebels. A 10/1988 DIA intelligence report alerted American authorities that MLN, which was involved in "plotting a coup against Cerezo in the past," is "now apparently prepared to use violent tactics to undermine DCG government." MLN "is reportedly planning a bombing campaign directed against members of ruling DCG. MLN intends to use recently obtained explosives to target personal vehicles of DCG Congressional representatives in order to frighten them. After assessing their impact, MLN will consider initiating a second stage of its anti-DCG campaign that will include killing of various individuals. MLN has selected potential targets in Guatemala city. U.S. Army and DIA, getting regular, high-level intelligence from senior Guatemalan army officers and other sources about crimes, notably murder, being committed by Guatemalan army personnel. Source and depth of intelligence raises questions about what U.S. Government actually knew about Guatemalan army complicity in civilian murders in that country throughout the 1980s, including alleged involvement of Guatemalan Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, then a CIA agent, in 1990 and 1992 murders of American innkeeper Michael Devine and guerrilla fighter Efrain Bamaco Velazquez, husband of an American, Jennifer Harbury." Intelligence a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 4/24/1995, p. 1 Guatemala, 1988-91. CIA station chief in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991 was a Cuban American. He had about 20 officers with a budget of about $5 million a year and an equal or greater sum for "liaison" with Guatemalan military. His job included placing and keeping senior Guatemalan officers on his payroll. Among them was Alpirez, who recruited others for CIA. Alpirez's intelligence unit spied on Guatemalans and is accused by human rights groups of assassinations. CIA also gave Guatemalan army information on the guerrillas. New York Times, 4/2/1995, A11 Guatemala, 1989. 25 students in two years killed by squads. Entire university student association has been silenced. U.S. backed governments in virtual genocide have more than 150,000 victims. AI called this genocide a "government program of political murder." The Nation, 3/5/1990, cover, p. 308 Guatemala, 1990-95. Member of House Intelligence Committee, Robert G. Torricelli (DNJ.) said, in letter to President Clinton, that a Guatemalan military officer who ordered killings of an American citizen and a guerrilla leader married to a North American lawyer was a paid agent of CIA. CIA knew of killings, but concealed its knowledge for years. Another member of House Intelligence Committee confirmed Torricelli's claims. Torricelli wrote in letter to President that the "Direct involvement of CIA in the murder

of these individuals leads me to the extraordinary conclusion that the agency is simply out of control and that it contains what can only be labeled a criminal element." Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, Bamaca, and Michael Devine. Tim Weiner, New York Times, 3/23/1995 Guatemala, 1990-95. Article, El Buki's Tale Murder of Michael Devine. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1995, pp. 32-37 Guatemala, 1990-95. Article, The Agency, Off Target. Two Deaths, a Rogue CIA Informant and a Big Pot of Trouble. Re deaths of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez Harbury's husband. CIA paid Colonel Alpirez $43,000 after it learned of cover up of deaths. U.S. News & World Report, 4/10/1995, p. 46 Guatemala, 1990-95. Assassin of Michael Devine and of the husband of Jennifer Harbury, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was on CIA's payroll and had attended School of Americas (SOA) on two separate occasions. In January 1995 when State and NSC pieced together what CIA knew, the ambassador demanded removal of CIA's station chief. CIA fought to stop disclosure of its relationship with the Colonel. Administration officials began to mistrust what CIA was saying about the case. The Colonel first came to U.S. In 1970 as an army cadet at SOA. He returned to SOA in 1989, to take year long Command and General Staff course when he was already on CIA payroll. In 1990, Michael Devine, who ran a hotel, apparently stumbled on a smuggling operation involving Guatemalan military. He was killed. New York Times, 3/24/1995, A3 Guatemala, 1990-95. CIA last month removed its station chief in Guatemala for failing to report promptly information linking a paid CIA informer to the slaying of a Guatemalan guerrilla fighter married to Jennifer Harbury. Guatemalan army Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was paid $44,000 by CIA in 1992 for secretly supplying intelligence on the civil war. At time of payment CIA had evidence linking him to the slaying of U.S. citizen Michael Devine (after he found about a military smuggling operation or because he had a weapon). Washington Post, 3/25/1995, A1,20 Guatemala, 1990-95. Clinton has threatened to fire anyone in CIA who withheld information from him about activities of its informant in Guatemala, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez. What is more likely to be agency's undoing is its failure to tell congress that only six months after he graduated from command-level courses at School of Americas Colonel Alpirez, a member of military intelligence on agency's payroll, ordered murder of a U.S. citizen, William Devine, and then torture-murder of husband of an American woman. White House officials, and President Clinton in particular, were very angry about Guatemalan affair but NSC Anthony lake was arguing that there is no evidence that CIA tried to deceive president. Los Angeles Times reported that late last year State Department found information about Devine murder in its files that appeared to have originated with CIA and had not been passed on to White House. This discovery prompted State Department and White House to ask CIA for more information. State initially asked CIA for information on rebel Commandante Efrain Bamaca Velasquez and received a few modest files. Several weeks later, State again asked CIA for information but this time on "Commandante Everardo," which was Commandante

Bamaca's well-known nom de guerre. Only then did CIA produced incriminating data that it held solely under that name. CIA has tried to ease situation with a rare "leak" about itself to press. On 3/24, Los Angeles Times quoted "CIA sources" as saying Agency was only told after the fact that its Guatemalan informant, Colonel Alpirez, was present at killing in 1990 of Devine, a U.S. citizen who ran a popular tourist resort in Guatemala. CIA insisted to the paper that it cut ties with Colonel at that point, but, significantly, sources did not put a date on rupture. That gave it "wiggle room" to say it didn't find out about Colonel's involvement in March 1992 torture-murder of Bamaca until early this year. CIA gave Colonel Alpirez a "final payment" of $44,000 at about time of Bamaca's murder. Per National public radio commentator Daniel Schorr, CIA station chief in Guatemala has been fired for failing to relay information. But New York Times says he was reassigned to Langley in January, after U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala accused him of withholding information. CIA has assigned its inspector General, Fred Hitz, to investigate. CIA station chief in Switzerland, who held a top position at Department of Operations (DO) Latin American Division from 1990 to 1992, is now being questioned, as is Jack Devine, who headed division from January 1983 until last October. He was appointed Associate Deputy Director of Operations in October after John MacGaffin was removed from that post for secretly giving an award to a senior operative who had just been disciplined in Ames case. Devine's successor is a woman, first to direct a DO division. She is in her 50s, was previously station chief in El Salvador, and is said by officials outside CIA to be very forthcoming about case. Intelligence a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 3/27/1995, p. 30 Guatemala, 1990-95. Guatemalan soldiers killed Michael Devine under orders from Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan, per convicted soldier, Solbal. He killed as the army convinced he had bought a stolen rifle. They tortured him before killing him. Solbal says Colonel Alpirez gave food and shelter to the killers. Washington Times, 5/15/1995, A13 Guatemala, 1990-95. Letter from Congressman Torricelli to President Clinton about involvement of CIA in two murders in Guatemala. 3/22/1995 Guatemala, 1990-95. Rep. Robert Torricelli, D-NJ., who is on the HPSCI, has requested an investigation from the Justice Department on role of the CIA in the murder of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. Request was made in a letter to President Clinton. Guatemalan intelligence officer who ordered the murders, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was a paid agent of the CIA. Torricelli claims that the NSA, CIA, State Department., and NSC covered up the involvement of a paid agent in the murders. Devine, who was killed in 1990, was an American citizen and Velasquez, who was killed in 1992, was married to an U.S. Citizen. CNN Headline News, 3/23/1995 and AP, 3/23/1995 Guatemala, 1990-95. Revelations about a CIA informer linked to two murders (Devine and Bamaca) in Guatemala helped exhume embarrassing relationship between U.S. military and intelligence personnel and a Central American regime notorious for human rights violations. Washington Post, 4/2/1995, A29

Guatemala, 1990-95. Tim Weiner article "A Guatemalan Officer and the CIA." Colonel is recalled as a "good soldier" and a murdering spy. New York Times, 3/26/1995 Guatemala, 1990-95. Two colonels suspended in Guatemala for covering up 1990 killing of Michael Devine. One was a paid CIA informant at time of killing. Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan also suspended. Washington Post, 4/27/1995, A29 Guatemala, 1990-95. Wife of Michael Devine discusses slaying of her husband. New York Times, 3/28/1995, A1,6 Guatemala, 1991-94. State Department reported in 1991, that "military, civil patrols and police continued to commit a majority of major human rights abuses, including extrajuridicial killings torture and disappearances." Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaign devised by U.S. counterinsurgency experts Caesar Sereseres and Colonel George Minas. Former served as a consultant to RAND Corporation and State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Minas served as military attache in Guatemala in early 1980s. Both encouraged population control such as Vietnam-style militarycontrolled strategic hamlets and civilian defense patrols. Today Guatemala is largest warehouse for cocaine transshipments to U.S. Drug trade run by military which tries to blame the leftists. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Spring 1994, pp. 2833 Guatemala, 1991-95. U.S. Had information in 10/1991 linking a paid CIA informer in slaying of a U.S. citizen. Colonel Roberto Alpirez was dropped from CIA's payroll but remained a contact through 7/1992 when he allegedly ordered another killing of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez husband of Jennifer Harbury. Washington Post, 3/24/1995, A1,27 Guatemala, 1992. Rights abuses in Guatemala continue, paramilitary civilian patrols self defense patrols accused of campaign of terror, control rural areas. Patrols answer to military. Washington Post, 10/4/1992, A35 Guatemala, 1995. President Clinton said he would dismiss any CIA official who withheld information on death of Jennifer Harbury's husband. Rep Torricelli said CIA withheld information for years. Washington Times, 3/25/1995, A3 Guatemala, 1970-95. Discussion of Torricelli, Harbury, Devine, Bamaco, etc. The death of husband of Harbury not a rogue operation. This was standard operating procedure in El Salvador and Guatemala and elsewhere around the globe. CIA organized death squads, financed them, equipped them, trained them, etc. That's what the CIA does. Once in a decade the U.S. public hears about this. CIA should be abolished. The CIA mislead Congress about the Devine case. Getting rid of CIA is not enough the CIA did not act alone. The National Security Agency and the Army may have been involved in Guatemala. The Progressive, 5/1995, pp. 8,9 Haiti: Watch List

Haiti, 1986-93. In 1986 the CIA funded the national intelligence service (SIN) under guise of fighting narcotics but SIN never produced drug intelligence and used CIA money for political operations. Sin involved in spying on so-called subversive groups...they doing nothing but political repression...they targeted people who were for change. CIA used distorted data to discredit Aristide. NACLA (Magazine re Latin America), 2/1994, p. 35 Haiti, 1990-94. Emannuel Constant, leader of Haiti's FRAPH hit squad, worked for CIA and U.S. intelligence helped launch FRAPH. Haiti's dreaded attaches paid for by a U.S. Government-funded project that maintains sensitive files on Haiti's poor. The Nation, 10/24/1994, 458 Haiti, 1990-94. U.S. officials involved in refugee policy have backgrounds suggestive of Phoenix-like program activities. Luis Moreno, State Department, has background in counterterrorism. Gunther Wagner, senior intelligence officer at INS's southwest regional office, assigned to investigate repression against repatriated refugees. Wagner had served as public safety adviser to Vietnamese National Special Branch for 5 years and later advised Somoza's National Guard. INS database on all asylum interviews at Guantanamo. INS, on demand, gave State Department unrestricted access to all interview files. U.S. Officers hand Haitian authorities computer print-outs of names of all Haitians being repatriated. CIA funded service intelligence nacionale (SIN), who's de facto primary function was a war against popular movement including torture and assassination a fact admitted by a CIA officer to an official in Aristide's government. U.S. shares "anti-narcotics intelligence" with Haitian military. The Progressive, 4/1994, p. 21 Haiti, 1991-94. Asylum-promoting project gets family information that fed into a computer project that could be used to target for repression. The Progressive, 9/1994, pp. 19-26 Haiti, 1991-94. Seven chief attaches arranged killings and brought victims to houses. Four of the seven worked for Centers for Development and Health (CDS), funded by U.S. AID. One was Gros Sergo, and other was Fritz Joseph who chief FRAPH recruiter in Cite Soleil. Two others are Marc Arthur and Gors Fanfan. CDS files track every family in Cite Soleil. The Nation, 10/24/1994, p. 461 Haiti, 1994. AID programs for Haitian popular groups; Immigration and Naturalization service, with computerized files on 58,000 political-asylum applicants and army intelligence S-2 section of 96th Civil Affairs Battalion assigned to monitor refugees at Guantanamo Bay. Per Capt. James Vick, unit develops networks of informants and works with marine corps counterintelligence in "identifying ringleaders of unrest and in weeding out troublemakers." 96th's files enter military intelligence system. Gunther Wagner, a former Nazi, served with U.S. In Phoenix operation in Vietnam, and in Nicaragua now heads State Department's Cuba-Haiti task force. Pentagon's Atlantic command commissioned Booz, Allen, Hamilton, to devise a computer model of Haitian society. Results of study given. Priority of study to build an "organized information

bank...." no change expected in ruling clique of Haiti. Article by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 10/3/1994, pp. 344-48 Haiti: Death Squads Haiti. CIA officer assigned 1973-75 Coordination with Ton-Ton Macoute, "Baby Doc" Duvalier's private death squad. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 9/1980, p. 16 Haiti, 1985-93. CIA created an intelligence service in Haiti: National Intelligence Service, (SIN) from its initials in French, to fight cocaine trade, but unit became instrument of political terror whose officers engaged in drug traffic, killings and torture. Unit produced little drug intelligence. U.S. cut ties to group after 1991 military coup. New York Times, 11/14/1993 pp. 1,12 Haiti, 1986-93 INS database on all asylum interviews at Guantanamo. INS, on demand, gave State Department unrestricted access to all interview files. U.S. officers hand Haitian authorities computer print-outs of names of all Haitians being repatriated. CIA funded service intelligence nacionale (SIN), who's de facto primary function was a war against popular movement including torture and assassination a fact admitted by a CIA officer to an official in Aristide's government. U.S. shares "anti-narcotics intelligence" with Haitian military. The Progressive, 4/1994, p. 21 Haiti, 1990-94. Clinton administration denied report CIA helped set up Haiti's pro-army Militia FRAPH. Officials refused to comment whether FRAPH leader Emmanuel Constant was a paid CIA informant. "Nation" article said Constant worked for both the CIA and the DIA. Colonel Collins of DIA and Donald Terry of CIA were his contacts. Collins urged Constant to set up FRAPH. Mr. Constant, per Washington Times, was a paid U.S. Informant on Haitian political activities and assisting anti-drug efforts. Relationship broken off early this year. FRAPH has been linked to murders, public beatings and arson. CIA officers in past worked with Haiti's national intelligence service. Washington Times, 10/7/1994, A16 Haiti, 1990-94. Emannuel Constant, leader of Haiti's FRAPH hit squad, worked for CIA and U.S. Intelligence helped launch FRAPH. Haiti's dreaded attaches paid for by a U.S. Government-funded project that maintains sensitive files on Haiti's poor. In 10/3/1994, issue of Nation carried Nairn's article "The Eagle is Landing," he quoted a U.S. official praising Constant as a young republican that U.S. Intelligence had encouraged to form FRAPH. Constant confirmed that account. He first said his handler was Colonel Patrick Collins, DIA attache in Haiti, and later claimed another U. S. official urged him to form FRAPH. Collins first approached Constant while he taught a course at HQs of CIA-run national intelligence service (SIN) and built up a computer data base at Bureau of Information and Coordination. FRAPH originally was called Haitian Resistance League. Constant was working for the CIA at SIN while it attacked the poor. The Nation, 10/24/1994, p. 458

Haiti, 1991-94. Emmanuel Constant (son of a Duvalier general), who had been on the CIA payroll since the mid-'1980s. With U.S. intelligence advice, formed FRAPH, a political front and paramilitary death squad offshoot of the Haitian army, that began to systematically target democratic militants and hold the country hostage with several armed strikes. On 10/11/1993, day U.S.S. Harlan County and U.S. and Canadian soldiers were to land, even though CIA had been tipped off, FRAPH organized a dockside demonstration of several dozen armed thugs. Ship turned around. U.S. asylum processing program hand-picked and exported almost 2,000 grassroots leaders. In three years after coup, 7,000-man army and its paramilitary assistants killed at least 3,000 and probably over 4,000 people, tortured thousands, and created tens of thousands of refugees and 300,000 internally displaced people. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Winter 1994/1995, pp. 7-13 Haiti, 1991-94. Haitian paramilitary chief spied for CIA. Emmanuel "Toto" Constant, head of Haiti's notorious FRAPH, secretly provided information to U.S. intelligence while his group killed people. Constant paid by CIA for giving intelligence officers information about Aristide beginning shortly after Aristide ousted in 9/1991 coup. CIA dropped him last Spring. Constant's organization blamed for killing hundreds of supporters of Aristide and organizing demonstration that drove off U.S. troopcarrying Harlan County last October. In "Nation" article, U.S. Defense Attache, Colonel Patrick Collins, had encouraged Constant to form FRAPH. U.S. intelligence agencies had extensive penetration of Haitian military and paramilitary groups. Using Constant as source may explain why CIA's reporting on Aristide was skewed. FRAPH not formed until 8/1993, 9 months after Collins left Haiti. Washington Post, 10/9/1994, A1,30 Haiti, 1993. Young men kidnapped by armed thugs seldom reappear. Under de facto government, as many as 3000 may have been killed. Aristide negotiating his return with UN. The Nation, 5/3/1993, p. 580 Haiti, 1995. Interview with Allan Nairn, April 1995 "Criminal Habits." Z Magazine 6/1995, pp. 22-9 Honduras: Death Squads Honduras, 1981-87. Florencio Caballero, who served as a torturer and a member of a death squad, said he was trained in Texas by the CIA. He said he was responsible for the torture and slaying of 120 Honduran and other Latin American citizens. The CIA taught him and 24 other people in a army intelligence unit for 6 months in interrogation. psychological methods to study fears and weaknesses of a prisoner, make him stand up, don't let him sleep, keep him naked and isolated, put rats and cockroaches in his cell, give him bad food, throw cold water on him, change the temperature. Washington Post, 6/8/1988, B3 Honduras, circa 1982-87. Army Battalion 3/16, a special counterinsurgency force which many considered a kind of death squad, was formed in 1980. Florencio Caballero, a former battalion member, described a clandestine paramilitary structure for repressing leftists. Caballero, who studied interrogation techniques in Houston, said the CIA was

extensively involved in training squad members. NACLA 2/1988, p. 15, from New York Times, 5/2/1987 Honduras, March 1986. Apart from CIA training of a battalion implicated in death squad activities and torture, Honduran army defector said CIA arranged a fabricated forced "confession" by kidnapped prisoner that he headed a guerrilla front and had planned attacks against U.S. installations. This in operation truth. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, p. 239 Honduras. General G. Alvarez Martinez, CIA-Contra point man in Honduras, had death squad operation run by Ricardo Lau. Alvarez godfather to new CIA Chief of Station's daughter. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, pp. 78-9 Honduras, 1982-86. Zuniga told congressional staffers about the 316 Battalion established with the knowledge and assistance of the U.S. Embassy. By 1984 more than 200 Honduran teachers, students, labor leaders, and opposition politicians had been murdered. The CIA had knowledge of the killings. Zuniga killed in 9/1985. Mother Jones, 4/1987, p. 48 Honduras. Capt. Alexander Hernandez, a graduate of U.S. International Police services training program, has played a central role in Honduran death squad activities and the war in Nicaragua. Early 1986 New York Times reports that CIA was providing "training and advice in intelligence collection" to Hernandez' unit "as part of a program to cut off arms shipments from Nicaragua to leftist rebels in Honduras and El Salvador." New York Times also says that CIA knew of the assassinations but "looked the other way." The Nation, 6/7/1986, p. 793 Honduras, circa 1981-84. Honduran government established a secret unit that seized, interrogated, tortured, and murdered more than 130 people between 1981-84. Unit named Battalion 316. Unit operated with CIA supervision and training and received U.S. instruction in interrogation, surveillance and hostage rescue. Commander of unit in first years was a graduate of International Police Academy. NA, 2/20/1988, pp. 224-5 The clandestine houses and command post of 316 were visited by CIA agents. NA, 1/23/1988, p. 85 Honduras, Nicaragua, 1982. A Contra commander with the FDN admitted he helped organize a death squad in Honduras with the approval and cooperation of the CIA. Honduran government agreed to host the death squad and provide it with cover, since the group would kill Honduran dissidents at the government's request. The commander admitted he participated in assassinations. CIA "Colonel Raymond" congratulated the squad. The Progressive, 8/1986, p. 25 Honduras, Nicaragua, 1984-85. Honduran army investigators report that Contras have been involved in death-squad killings in Honduras. At least 18 Hondurans and an unknown number of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have been killed by the Contras. Washington Post, 1/15/1985, A12

Honduras, 1980-83. Agents of Battalion 316, a Honduran death squad, received interrogation training in Texas from CIA in 1980. CIA agents maintained contact with unit in early 1980's, visiting detention centers during interrogation and obtaining intelligence gleaned from torture victims. See Americas Watch "Human Rights in Honduras" (May 1987). Dillon, S. (1991). Commandos, p. 101 Honduras, 1980-83. Gustavo Alvarez, formerly head of police, in 1981 a general running entire armed forces. Worked closely with U.S. on Contras. Alvarez had organized military intelligence Battalion 316 first Honduran death squad. Argentines sent 15-20 officers to work with Alvarez on Contras. Senior officer Osvaldo Riveiro. Garvin, G. (1992). Everybody Has His Own Gringo, p. 41 Honduras, 1980-89. CIA and State Department worked with a Honduran military unit called Battalion 316 during the 1980s. Unit was responsible for cracking down on dissidents. AP, 6/12/1995. Honduran special prosecutor for human rights asking the U.S. to turn over classified information on Ambassadors John Negroponte and Chris Arcos and several CIA agents connected to the disappearance of dissidents in the 1980s. AP, 6/13/1995 Honduras, 1980-89. Colonel Gustavo Alvarez Martinez shot to death in 1989. Alvarez spent years networking with fascists and ultra right terrorists who in World Anticommunist League and its sister organization, the Latin American Anti-communist Confederation, or CAL. He most famous for streamlining Honduras's death squads and uniting them under his control. Alvarez gathered together the National Front for the Defense of Democracy, the Honduran Anti-communist Movement (MACHO), and the Anti-communist Combat Army death squads all and combined them with several governmental forces, including the Fuerzas de Seguridad Publica (FUSEP), Departmento Nacional de Investigaciones (DIN), and Tropas Especiales Para Selva y Nocturnas (TESON). With Director of Central Intelligence Casey, Alvarez and Negroponte turned Honduras into a staging ground for Contra incursions into Nicaragua. Honduran Congress issued Decree 33, which declared terrorist anyone who distributed political literature, associated with foreigners, joined groups deemed subversive by the government, damaged property, or destroyed documents. Alvarez's forces murdered upwards of 500 people. He ousted as Honduras's dictator in 1984 and became special consultant to RAND Corporation. Lies of our Time, 3/1994, pp. 3-5 Honduras, 1980-89. Eleven senior officers who are believed to have been involved with Battalion 316 have been convicted on charges of kidnapping, torturing and attempting to murder six students in 1982. Officers include one general, nine colonels, and one captain. AP, 7/25/1995 Honduras, 1980-89. See entry in Liaison from Baltimore Sun, 6/11-18/1995 Honduras, 1980-93. CIA-trained death squad issue in presidential campaign. In early 1980s, Battalion 3-16, of Honduran military whose members instructed by and worked with CIA "disappeared" scores of activists. Both candidates accusing other of connections to Battalion 3-16. In 1980 25-Honduran officers to U.S. for training per

sworn testimony in International Court by Honduran intelligence officer who participated Florencio Caballero. Group trained in interrogation by a team from FBI and CIA. Training continued in Honduras. U.S. Trainers joined by instructors from Argentina and Chile sessions focused on surveillance and rescuing kidnap victims. Battalion 3-16 engaged in a program of systematic disappearances and murder from 1981 to 1984. By March 1984, 100-150 students, teachers, unionists and travelers picked up and secretly executed. Squads, according to Inter-American Court of Human Rights, belonged to 3-16. Squads modus operandi included weeks of surveillance of suspects followed by capture by disguised agents using vehicles with stolen license plates, interrogation, torture in secret jails followed by execution and secret burial. CIA's connection to 3-16 confirmed by General Alvarez, who created and commanded squad from 1980 through 1984. He later became chief of police and then head of the armed forces. Alvarez said CIA "gave good training, lie detectors, phone-tapping devices and electronic equipment to analyze intelligence." CIA men informed when 3-16 abducted suspected leftists. When bodies found, 3-16 put out story they killed by guerrillas. CIA looked other way. Ambassador Negroponte in 1982 denied existence of death squads. State Department was attacking as communist, anti-democratic and a terrorist group, Committee for Defense of Human Rights in Honduras that was exposing 3-16. In a barracks coup, Alvarez forced into exile in Miami and became paid consultant to Pentagon writing study on low-intensity conflict. Members of 3-16 still in positions of power in government. Congressional intelligence committee in 1988 looked into CIA's role with 3-16, but findings never published. Op-ed by Anne Manuel. Washington Post, 11/28/1993, C5 Honduras, 1982-83. Ex-guard Benito "Mack" Bravo reportedly killed dozens of Contra recruits at his La Ladosa training base near El Paraiso. Mack suspected many were Sandinista infiltrators. In one case, FDN ordered four ex-guardsmen executed for insubordination and allegedly selling arms to El Salvador's FMLN. They also had been accused of killing recruits. Honduran military participated in the execution. Dillon, S. (1991). Commandos, pp. 118-124 Honduras, 1988. Director human rights commission in Honduras and associate killed by assassins. The Progressive, 2/1990, p. 46 Honduras, 1988. Honduran human rights leader Ramon Custodio Lopez accused Battalion 3-16 of murdering a politician and a teacher on 14 January 1988. Custodio relied on testimony by former battalion member sergeant Fausto Caballero. In 11/30/1988. Honduras was condemned by Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1988 for disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velazquez. Battalion 3-16, along with DNI (Directorate of National Intelligence), and FUSEP (National Police) were implicated, all of which have received training from CIA. Intelligence Parapolitics, 9/1988, p. 8 Honduras, 1988. Jose Isaias Vilorio, an intelligence officer and former death squad member, was shot dead on 1 January 1988. Isaias was to testify before Inter-American Court on Human Rights (New York Times, 20 January 1988). Human rights leader and legislator Miguel Pavon was killed on 14 January 1988 after testifying before Inter-

American Court. Also killed was Moises Landaverde, a teacher who was riding in Pavon's car at the time of attack. Intelligence Parapolitics, 3/1988, p. 12 Honduras, Argentina, 1980-89. A survivor tells her story: treatment for a leftist kicks and freezing water and electric shocks. In between, a visitor from CIA. CIA worked closely with the Honduran military while the military tortured and killed dissidents during the 1980s, human rights groups said. A government official also said Argentine military advisers, with U.S. support, were brought in to help monitor leftist activism. "At least nine Argentine military (officers), supported by the CIA, trained many Honduran officers to prevent communism from entering Honduras," said Leo Valladares of the government's human rights commission. Bertha Oliva, head of committee of relatives of the disappeared, claimed CIA knew of disappearances by Honduran security forces and that "the U.S. Embassy had absolute power in this country." in the first of a series of four articles, the Baltimore Sun reported Sunday that CIA and the State Department collaborated with a secret Honduran military unit known as Battalion 316 in the 1980s in cracking down on Honduras dissidents. Following a 14-month investigation. In order to keep up public support for Reagan administration's war efforts in Central America, U.S. officials misled congress and the public about Honduran military abuses. Collaboration was revealed in classified documents and in interviews with U.S. and Honduran participants. Among those interviewed by the Sun were three former Battalion 316 torturers who acknowledged their crimes and detailed the battalion's close relationship with CIA. Ramon Custodio, president of non-government human rights commission, said a former member of Battalion 316, Florencio Caballero, disclosed that CIA in early 1980s took 24 soldiers to the U.S. for training in anti-subversive techniques. At the time, Custodio said, "Honduras' policy was oriented to detaining and summarily executing those who did not please the government or the military." Battalion 316 was created in 1984 and its first commander was General Luis Alonso Discua, current armed forces chief. A government report subsequently blamed it in the cases of 184 missing people. Baltimore Sun, 6/15/1995 Honduras, Israel. During Contra war Honduran military intelligence officers on double salary from CIA and Colombian drug cartels, who saw advantage of using Honduran airstrips for transiting cocaine under cover of war effort. Israelis also trained Honduran death squads. Cockburn, A. and Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 225 Honduras, Assassinations, 1980-84. CIA and Contras accused of running Honduran death squads, killing over 200. CIA officials "looked the other way" when people disappeared. Violence tapered off after ouster of CIA backed military commander Alvarez. Ricardo Lau running Contra intelligence, also death squads. Accused arranging assassination Archbishop Romero in El Salvador. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, pp. 132-3 Indonesia: Watch List Indonesia, 1963-65. U.S. trained unionist spies laid groundwork for post 1965 coup gestapu massacre of leftists by gathering intelligence on leftist unionists. Counterspy, Winter 1979, p. 27

Indonesia, 1965-66. "U.S. officials' lists aided Indonesian blood bath in '60s." U.S. officials supplied the names of thousands of members of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to the army that was hunting them down and killing them in a crackdown branded as one of the century's worst massacres, former U.S. Diplomats and CIA officials say. Robert J. Martens, Former member of embassy's political section said, "it really was a big help to the army.... They probably killed a lot of people..." Martens said. He headed an embassy group of state Department and CIA officials that spent two years compiling the lists. He said he delivered them to an army intermediary. The lists were a detailed who's who of the leadership of the PKI that included names of provincial, city and other local PKI members and leaders of mass organizations. Ambassador Marshall Green, his deputy Jack Lydman, and political section chief Edward Masters admitted approving the release of the names. Army intermediary was an aide to Adam Malik. The aide, Tirta Kentjana Adhyatman, confirmed that he had met with Martens and received lists of thousands of names...given to Sukarno's HQs. Information on who captured and killed came to Americans from Suharto's HQs, according to former CIA deputy chief of station Joseph Lazarsky. Lazarsky said "we were getting a good account in Jakarta of who was being picked up,"..."the army had a 'shooting list' of about 4,000 to 5,000 people." Lazarsky said the check-off work was also carried out at CIA's intelligence directorate in D.C. By end of January 1966, "the checked off names were so numerous the CIA analysts in Washington concluded the PKI leadership had been destroyed." Washington Post, 5/21/1990, A5 Indonesia, 1965-66. In response to Kathy Kadane's May 21 article in Washington Post, Robert J. Martens responds "it is true I passed names of PKI leaders and senior cadre system to non-communist forces during the six months of chaos between the so-called coup and the ultimate downfall of Sukarno. The names I gave were based entirely on Indonesian communist press and were available to everyone. This was senior cadre system of the PKI few thousand at most out of the 3.5 millions claimed party members. I categorically deny that I headed an embassy group that spent two years compiling the lists." Washington Post, 6/2/1990, A18 Indonesia, 1985. Indonesia: years of living dangerously. CIA's role in bloody coup in Indonesia in 1965. Utne Reader. 2/1991, p. 38, two pages Indonesia: Death Squads Indonesia, 1965-66 Indonesian generals approached U.S. for equipment "to arm Moslem and nationalist youths for use in central Java against the PKI." Washington responded by supplying covert aid, dispatched as "medicines." Washington Post, 6/13/1990, A 22 Indonesia, 1965-66. Kathy Kadane's story for States News Service disclosed part played by CIA and State Department officials in 1965-66 blood bath in Indonesia. Kadane reported that U.S. officials in Jakarta furnished names of about 5,000 communist activists to the Indonesian army and then checked off the names as the army reported the individuals had been killed or captured. The Nation, 7/9/1990, p. 43

Indonesia, 1965. CIA and State Department officials provided name lists to Indonesian army that killed 250,000. The Progressive, 7/10/1990, p. 9 Indonesia, 1965. Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians. San Francisco Examiner, 5/20/1990 Indonesia, 1965-66. Article by Michael Vatikiotis and Mike Fonte; Rustle of Ghosts. (1965 Indonesian coup). Far Eastern Economic Review, 8/2/1990, 2 pages Indonesia, 1965-85. Death squads roam at will, killing subversives, suspected criminals by thousands. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 221 Iran: Watch List Iran, 1953-54. CIA gave Shah intelligence on Tudeh party facilitate anti-Tudeh Campaign. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security Relations Between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978," p. 150 Iran, 1953-64. CIA station chiefs in regular contact with Shah and working level liaison relationship with SAVAK established by 5-man training team and smaller unit in SAVAK HQs for several years after training team left. CIA and SAVAK exchanged intelligence including information on Tudeh party. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security relations between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978," pp. 255-56 Iran, 1953. CIA prepared an arrest list for the overthrow operation. Copeland, M. (1989). The Game Player, p. 190 Iran, 1953. U.S. Army colonel working for CIA under cover of military attache worked to organize and train intelligence organization for Shah. Trained on domestic security, interrogation. Primary purpose of (Bakhtiar's intelligence unit later to become SAVAK) to eliminate threats to Shah. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security Relations Between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978" p. 150 Iran, 1954. Year after coup American cryptographic experts and CIA agent played important part in rooting out conspiracy army officers linked to Tudeh Party. Kwitny, J. (1984). Endless Enemies, p. 165 Iran. During Shah's reign, thousands people killed. Many killed at Shah's directive. Rafizadeh, M. (1987). Witness, p. 134 Iran, 1983. CIA identifies to Iranian government 200 leftists who were then executed. The Nation, 12/13/1986, p. 660 Iran, 1983. In 1983, when the Tudeh party was closed down, the CIA gave the Khomeni government a list of USSR KGB agents operating in Iran. Two hundred suspects were executed, 18 USSR diplomats expelled and Tudeh party leaders imprisoned. Washington Post, 1/13/1987, A1,8

Iran, 1983. To curry favor with Khomeni, the CIA gave his government a list of USSR KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran. The Khomeni regime then executed 200 suspects and closed down the communist Tudeh party. Khomeni then expelled 18 USSR diplomats, and imprisoned the Tudeh leaders. Washington Post, 11/19/1986, A28 Iraq: Watch List Iraq, 1963. CIA supplied lists of communists to Baath party group that led coup so that communists could be rounded up and eliminated. Cockburn, A. and Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 130 Israel: Death Squads Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir headed a special hit squad during his ten years in Mossad. Shamir headed the assassination unit from 1955-64 that carried out attacks on perceived enemies and suspected Nazi war criminals. Shamir recruited former members of the Stern Gang. Washington Times, 7/4/1992, A8 Israel, 1992. Article, "How Israeli Commandos Are Waging an Undercover War In Occupied Territories." In January 1992, Israeli army launched all-out offensive to end "Red Intifadeh." Undercover units "Arabized" produced a rash of deaths under controversial circumstances leading to claims commando units are death squads. Since Intifadeh began in 1987, 775 Palestinians killed; 680 more slain by their brethren mostly for collaboration. Human-rights organizations contend Sayarot shoot first and ask questions later. Time 8/31/1992, pp. 49-50 Israel, 1992. Israel's assassination squad, Duvdevan or Cherry has killed one of its own by mistake. Intelligence Newsletter, 7/23/1992, p. 5 Israel, 1992. Israeli army had discharged commander of undercover unit for issuing orders to shoot at Palestine activists. Unit code-named Samson has had three commanders fired or placed on trial within three years. More than 30 Palestinians killed this year by undercover troops, who usually dress as Arabs. Washington Post, 8/26/1992, A14 Israel, Honduras, 1981-89. In 1981 Leo Gleser, "co-owner" of International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) a leading Israeli "security" firm (Israeli Foreign Affairs 2/1987, 5/1987, /1987, 2/1988, 3/1989) identified repeatedly as an Israeli entity began building Battalion 316, a unit of Honduran military intelligence which disappeared, tortured, then killed its victims. Honduran General Walter Lopez Reyes who C-I-C Honduran armed forces 1984-86, said "we had Israeli advisers in Special Forces. They seconded to Special Forces by Israeli mod, although they came officially as non-governmental." Their front [was] they [were] training security groups but [they really gave] special operations courses on how take over buildings, planes, hostages...Contras also taking courses... coordination between them and CIA. Israeli Foreign Affairs, 4/1989, p. 1,4

Israel, South Africa, 1986-91. Israel trained members of Inkatha hit squads aimed at African National Congress, a disillusioned former leader of Zulu organization has revealed. Israeli Foreign Affairs, 2/20/1992, p. 3 Israel. Ranks as fifth largest exporter of arms in world, according CIA estimates, and has become essential element global counterinsurgency business. "Hit lists" used by death squads in Guatemala have been computerized with Israeli assistance and Uzi machine guns the standard weapon of death squads. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1988, p. 5 Italy: Watch List Italy, 1950-59. All Italian "SIFAR" counterespionage officers collected biographies on every deputy and senator. List increased to include Ecclesiastics: 45,000 dossiers on them alone, 157,000 altogether, 30,000 dealing with Italians in world of business and industry. Drop copies went to CIA. De Lorenzo's outfit to become a tool for CIA. Tompkins, P. (Unpublished manuscript). Strategy of Terror, pp. 8-12 Italy, 1959-67. Carabinieri drew up plan Piano Solo for paramilitary to intervene in order to restore public order. Secret services had massive program of surveillance of Italian political and business figures. This partly intended to identify left-wing suspects who would be rounded up and imprisoned in concentration camps on Sardinia. Investigation revealed creation of personal intelligence dossiers began in 1959 and 157,000 files amassed. SIFAR (military intelligence) dossiers emphasized unfavorable significance. SIFAR dossiers routinely deposited at CIA HQs. SIFAR planed microphones in Papal apartments and President's Rome residence. Operation ordered by de Lorenzo at request of CIA station chief Colby. Some years earlier Rome CIA station chief Thomas Karamessines had asked General de Lorenzo, then head of SIFAR, for dossiers on [left-leaning] politicians and in particular for Moro's circle of collaborators. Willan, P. (1991). Puppetmasters, pp. 35-7 Italy, 1960-70. General de Lorenzo, whose SIFAR became SID, implemented new Gladio project to neutralize subversive elements. Known as parallel SID, it reached into nearly every institution. Group set up at request of Americans and NATO. Knights of Malta, as well as freemasonry, and its most notorious lodge Propaganda Due, or P-2, far more influential. Licio Gelli, a knight. Joined U.S. Army's CIC. To ferret out dissidents, they prepared watch lists on thousands. 157,000 files found in Ministry of Interior. CIA obtained duplicates. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1994, p. 24 Italy, 1960-70. Operation Solo a planned coup against a leftist government did not occur but it was based on Operation Gladio. Giovanni de Lorenzo, as chief of secret services, compiled dossiers, including tapes and photos, on some 150,000 people priests, politicians and unionists. He drew up plan to arrest many politicians, take over radio and TV, seize offices and newspapers of left-wing parties. De Lorenzo was organizing a duplicate of Operation Gladio in case left gained too much power. "Statewatch" compilation, filed June 1994

Latin America: Death Squads Latin America, labor. AIFLD collected detailed information about Latin American labor leaders under pretext surveys necessary for AID-financed worker's housing projects. AIFLD able obtain personal and political history union members, with address and photos. Given CIA role in Chile, Uruguay and Brazil coups, among others, it probable this information passed to military regimes and their secret police. DL p. 238 from Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People. pp. 212, 220 Liaison, 1960. Target lists maintained by all Western Hemisphere division stations. Maintain in case local government asks for assistance in preventive detention of dangerous persons. Agee, P. (1975). Inside the Company: CIA Diary, p. 114 Latin America. CIA organizes right wing terrorist organizations that attack and assassinate leftist politicians and others without implicating foreign governments. Groups include "La Mano Blanco" and "Ojo Por Ojo" (Guatemala), "La Banda" (Dominican republic), and "Death Squad" (Brazil). Counterspy, 3/1973, p. 4 Latin America. CIA trained assassination groups such as Halcones in Mexico, the Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and the Escuadron de la Muerte in Brazil. NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 8/1974, p. 11 Latin America, 1953-84. The activities of the death squads, formed under CIA sponsorship in 1954 Are loosely controlled by an international organization known as La Mano Blanco (the White Hand). The front group is the CAL, Latin American Anticommunist Federation, the Latin American affiliate of the World Anti-communist League. Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 1/13/1984 Latin America. Terrorist groups created in most countries. Groups such as "La Mano Blanco" attack and assassinate leftist politicians and others feared by military governments, doing so without implicating police or military. CIA implicated in attempts to organize the right into terrorist organizations. Counterspy, __/1973, p. 4 Latin America, 1960-95. Colonel Alpirez accused killer of American innkeeper and guerrilla leader, graduated from School of Americas in 1989. Other notable alumni include: Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos, former Panamanian strongmen; Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of Salvadoran death squads; Roberto Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri, leaders of argentine dirty war; Michael Francois, former Haitian police chief; 19 of 27 Salvadoran officers cited for murder of six Jesuit priests; 10 of 12 Salvadoran officers involved in El Mozote massacre; 105 of 247 Colombian officers cited for human rights violations in 1992; and, former dictators of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Time. 4/10/1995, p. 20 Latin America, 1976. An Argentinean told Scherrer, legal attache (FBI) Santiago, that Operation Condor, a nascent program among military intelligence services of some Latin American countries designed to locate and eliminate one another's fugitive

terrorists and exiled dissidents. Ambitious leader of Chilean DINA trying to institutionalize process. Branch, T. and Proper, E. (1983). Labyrinth, p. 123 Latin America, Operation Condor, Paraguay, 1970-92. 12/1992 a Paraguayan judge in a police station found documentary history of decades of repression and U.S. intelligence cooperation with Paraguay and other regional dictatorships. Archives detail fates of hundreds, possibly thousands, of Latin Americans secretly kidnapped by right-wing regimes of the 1970s. Paper trail revealing elusive conspiracy among security services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay to eliminate foes without regard to borders. Sketchy outlines of Operation Condor, can be partially filled in. Some of documents already disappeared. Finders had unearthed jumbled mountain of papers outlining police and military intelligence activities during recently overthrown Stroessner regime. HQs of Paraguayan technical police revealed more documents. 4 tons records. Data confirmed arrest and killing of politicians and exchange of prisoners with Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Discovered documents a bombshell that led to arrest of some of Stroessner's old regime. Southern Cone repression killed 50,000, disappeared 30,000 the majority in Argentina and 400,000 imprisoned. U.S. gave inspiration, financing and technical assistance for repression. CIA's technical services division (TSD), provided electrical torture equipment. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Fall 1994, pp. 7-13 Latin America, 1993. James Carroll wrote editorial about U.S. Army's School of Americas in Fort Benning. It is "the U.S. school that teaches militaries how to torture." Among renowned alumni are various Latin American strongmen, including dictators in Bolivia, Argentina, El Salvador and Panama. In Peru 6 of army officers charged with recent murders of 9 students were School of Americas alumni. In Honduras, 4 of the high-ranking officers who helped create "Battalion 316" death squad graduated from the school. In Columbia, the list of officers designated by human rights organizations as worst offenders reads like an honor roll from Fort Benning. In El Salvador, 2 of 3 officers cited for the assassination of Archbishop Romero, 3 of 5 convicted of killing 3 Maryknoll nuns and their lay associate, and 19 of the 26 officers implicated by United Nations. "Truth Commission" investigation of murder of Jesuits, were graduates. "For decades alumni of the School of Americas have helped fill morgues and mass graves of an entire continent." Colonel Louis Michel Francois has been most closely linked to Haiti death squads, and he is an alumni of the school just as is General Raoul Cedars one of those CIA agents. Z Magazine, 2/1994, p. 24 Mexico: Death Squads Mexico, 1957-89. The Mexican DFS (Federal Security Directorate) like many Westernhemisphere intelligence organizations was creation of CIA. DFS has state of the art computer and records systems. Through DFS CIA able to keep tabs on all embassies in Mexico City. DFS works closely with U.S. In the suppression of leftists and political parties. In early 1970s, Nazar created the Brigada Blanca, a right-wing death squad that killed hundreds, probably thousands of Mexican students and political activists. Zacaris Osorio Cruz, a member of death squad, testified in Canada that, between 1977-82, he part of team that killed between 60-150 people. Penthouse, 12/1989

Mexico, 1977-89. U.S. looked the other way when Nazar, head of DFS used his infallible (interrogation) techniques on behalf American agencies while he carried out hundreds, perhaps thousands of political executions of Mexican leftists and political dissidents. DFS (Federal Security Directorate) administering drug traffic. Penthouse, 12/1989 Nicaragua: Watch List Joseph Adams, a former Marine intelligence officer, who served as chief of security for Aldolfo Calero, helped maintain a list of civilians marked for assassination when Contra forces entered Nicaragua. The Progressive, 3/1987, p. 24 Nicaragua: Death Squads Nicaragua, 1983-89. Enrique Bermudez, a Contra leader, said in Contra raids on economic targets in northern Nicaragua, particularly coffee plantations and farming cooperatives, any resistance brought brutal retribution. Commandantes in field authorized to select those to die. Bermudez ordered prisoners to have throats cut rather than waste bullets. Terrell, J., and Martz, R. (1992). Disposable Patriot, p. 149 Nicaragua, 1985-89. "Death squad" reports re Sandinistas first circulated by the CIAfunded Puebla Institute in 1991 as coming from the UN and OAS. When checked out, this proved to be not true. Unclassified, 9/1992, p. 14 Nicaragua, circa 1940-79. Under name Anti-Communist League Nicaragua. Conservative estimates say 30,000 died four decades prior 1978-79 civil war. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People. pp. 81, 94 Norway: Watch List Norway, 1947-90. Operation Gladio, formed in 1947, kept track of communists and became part of intelligence service in 1948. Norwegian branch exposed in 1978, when an arms cache discovered. "Statewatch" compilation filed June 1994, p. 12 Panama: Watch List Panama, 1989-90. U.S. says 90 prisoners now held in Panama. Most of those detained had been picked up by U.S. Forces based on wanted lists compiled by U.S. and Panamanian authorities. Washington Post, 1/19/1990, A16 Panama, 1989. Several hundred people on list Endarra government seeks to detain. They arrested by U.S. troops. Most political activists and labor leaders were wanted. The Nation, 1/29/1990, p. 115 Paraguay: Watch List Paraguay, 1972-83. The Paraguayan government expelled an author and released a document supplied by the U.S. Embassy. The document, marked secret, includes the

author among a list of Paraguayans said to have visited the USSR bloc. Washington Post 2/5/1983, A1,21 Philippines: Death Squads Philippines. Article "Death Squads in the Philippines," by Doug Cunningham. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Winter 1988 pp. 22-3 Philippines. Military used hunter killer unit called scout rangers to find enemy and either attack or report back to battalion combat teams. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 28 Philippines. Probable U.S. support for vigilante death squads in the Philippines. Used in coordination with other programs making up a total low intensity conflict profile. National Reporter, Fall 1987, pp. 24-30 Philippines, 1950-54. Military man who helped Lansdale was Charles Bohannan and Lansdale's chief Filipino associate was Colonel Napoleon Valeriano whose "skull squadrons" beheaded suspected Huks. Karnow, S. (1989). In Our Image, p. 350 Philippines, 1969-83. Marcos' land reform failed and he approved creation of "Monkees" a group used to intimidate and even murder Marcos' rivals. Karnow, S. (1989). In Our Image. p.378 Philippines, 1973-83. In Philippines 1,166 persons were killed from 1972-83. Human rights groups say most of victims were opponents of President Marcos. Washington Post, 4/12/1984, A21 Philippines, 1986-87. "Vigilante Terror" a report of CIA-inspired death squads in the Philippines. National Reporter, Fall 1987, pp. 24-31 Philippines, 1986. See chapter "Direct U.S. Role in Counterinsurgency." includes psywar operations, vigilante and death squads. USIA anti-communist campaign of distributing films and written materials. Film "Amerika" shown. Use of Asian-American Free Labor Institute Operations. In 1985, AAFLI spent up to $4 million on organizational efforts, the money coming from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Bello, W. (1987). U.S. Sponsored Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippines Philippines, March 1986. Reagan signs finding increasing CIA involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency operations. New Aquino government is allegedly perpetrating a purge of opposition, carried out by more than 50 death squads. Ramsey Clark, who investigated death squad activity in 1987, wrote in June that "the victims of vigilante violence are overwhelmingly poor farmers, workers, slum dwellers, and others who are pushing for significant land reform, wage increases and protection workers' rights, as well as those who oppose U.S. military bases." Upsurge in death squad activities are coincident with increased CIA aid and was preceded by visit to Philippines by Maj. Gen. John Singlaub. The Nation, 9/19/1987, pp. 259-60

Puerto Rico: Watch List Puerto Rico. FBI has institutionalized repression. It created "subversive" lists with names of more than 150,000 "independentistas" who often find themselves thrown out of work. FBI agents organized and trained death squads within the Puerto Rican police department NACLA (magazine re Latin America), 8/1990, p. 5 Puerto Rico: Death Squads Puerto Rico, 1978. "Puerto Rico's Death Squad Requiem on Cerro Maravilla: the Police Murders in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Government Cover-up." A book by Manuel Suarez reviewed in the Progressive, 12/1988, pp. 40-42 Russia: Watch List Russia, 1994. FBI to open Moscow office with an eye on nuclear trafficking. FBI has about 20 posts abroad at U.S. Embassies with its agents serving as legal attaches. They range in size from one agent to as many as eight, plus support staff. FBI director Freeh said the FBI working to set up joint police/intelligence data base with authorities in Russia and Germany. Washington Times, 5/26/1994, A3 South Africa: Watch List South Africa, 1962. A tip from a paid CIA informant led to 1962 arrest of Nelson Mandela leader of the African National Congress. A CIA officer claimed "we have turned Mandela over to the South African security branch." Washington Post, 6/11/1990, A18 South Africa: Death Squads South Africa. Article, "South African Death Squad Plot: A Missing Piece to a Puzzle the Media Won't Solve," by Jane Hunter. Extra, 11/1992, p. 26 South Africa. See article "South African Death Squads." Covert Action Information bulletin (Quarterly) Summer 1990, pp. 63-66 South Africa, 1980-89. Details of South Africa's death squads by a former police Captain Dirk Coetzee. Group tracked and killed ANC activists in Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. Newsweek, 11/27/1989, p. 56 South Africa, 1980-90. Apartheid's fiercest warriors in 1980s were South Africa's army special forces, police force known as Koevoet (crowbar), and Portuguese-speaking "buffalo" battalion who ran a campaign of assassination and sabotage against the African National Congress. Newsweek, 9/14/1992, p. 45 South Africa, 1991-92. 75 COSATU (labor union) members killed during past two years by security forces. Many other attacks. Briarpatch magazine (Canada), 10/1992, pp. 55-6 South Africa, 1992. Slaughter in South Africa. Newsweek 9/21/1992, p. 57

South America: Watch List South America, 1970-79. U.S. Legal attache Buenos Aires, FBI agent Robert Scherrer, sent cable to D.C. Describing operation. Operation Condor the code-name for collection, exchange and storage intelligence re leftists, communists and Marxists. Established between cooperating intelligence services in South America to eliminate Marxist activities. Operation provided for joint operation against targets in member countries...third and secret phase of operation involves formation of special teams from member countries who travel anywhere in world to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists from member countries. Special team from Operation Condor could be sent to locate and surveil target. When located, a second team would be sent to carry out sanction. 1979 Senate Report, based on CIA files, says "such a phase three operation planned in 1974 and planned on killing 3 European leftists" one Carlos. Plot foiled when CIA discovered it and warned host countries France and Portugal. U.S. military officers sent under auspices of AID oversaw formation of technical police. One folder of archives has correspondence between Paraguayan ministers and U.S. Army Colonel Robert Thierry, who was serving as "public administration adviser," who supervised formation of the technical police. Letters from FBI agent Scherrer advising Paraguayan police re targets. CIA also worked with Paraguayans. Deputy DCI, Vernon Walters, visited country in 1976 who apparently approved abortive effort to get false passports for 2 Chilean DINA agents Armando Fernandez and Michael Townley who en route to U.S. To assassinate Orlando Letelier. The case of Eugenio Berios. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly) 12, 57, 8, 9 South America: Death Squads South America, 1976. Letelier killed by right wing Cuban exiles called "Gusanos" who are paid and trained by CIA and "Chilean Gestapo" DINA. Gusanos regularly engage in terrorism against Cuba and Latin American and Caribbean countries. Tactics include blowing up airplanes, embassies, fishing boats, and kidnappings. Gusanos connected with police of other right wing governments such as Venezuela. Certain gusano operations directed by CIA; Other unilateral operations of DINA. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 10 Syria: Watch List Syria, 1949. Following CIA coup of March 1949 CIA officer reported over "400 Commies" arrested. Middle East Journal 57 Syria, 1949. The Husni Za'im coup of 30 March result of guarantee CIA that once firmly in power, the U.S. would give de facto recognition with de jure to follow in a few days and pointed out targets to be seized. Gave him a list of all politicians who might be able to rally resistance. Copeland, M. (1989). The Game Player, p. 94 Thailand: Death Squads

Thailand, 1965. Death squads. Lobe, T. (1977). United States national security policy and aid to the Thailand police 67-70 Thailand, 1973-76. General Saiyut Koedphon, deputy head of CSOC and close ally of CIA, admitted that CIA was collaborating with a variety of Thai security agencies, including CSOC. Similarly, deputy director of police, Withun Yasawat, said he was receiving CIA advice and reports as late as 1974. American indoctrination of CSOC and border patrol police during 1960's produced U.S. desired objectives. "Nawaophon" created ISOC officers who in turn has close contacts with CIA, employed covert tactics to search out "subversive elements" within the Thai population. Counterspy, Summer 1980, p. 14 Thailand, 1973-76. The Krathin Daeng (Red Guars), were groups of rightist students with police support that had over 100,000 members including government employees, soldiers, policemen, etc. Group received support and assistance from the internal security command (where CIA had a presence) and the Thai Santiban aka Special Branch. The Red Guars implicated in numerous bombings, killings, shooting and harassment of labor leaders, peasant leaders, etc. Indochina Resource Center Study, 1/1977 Thailand, 1976. A high-ranking official of Seni Pramoj government told a foreign visitor few weeks before October 6 coup, both Nawapon and the Red Gaurs were being financed by CIA. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 52 Thailand, 1976. Over 10,000 students, professors, political figures, labor and farm leaders arrested since coup. U.S. military aid increased. New junta used CIA-trained forces to crush student demonstrators during coup. 2 right-wing terrorist squads suspected for assassinations tied directly to CIA operations. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, v9 #3, 9/1977, p. 2 Thailand, 1976. Red Gaurs, an organization of the extreme right, staged provocations against progressive students and assassinations of activists of farmers' federation of Thailand. The number of assassinations by right wingers soared in April 1976 during parliamentary elections. Defense minister Pramarn Adireksan, leader of right wing Thai National party, openly proclaimed the slogan "the right kill the left." Syrokonski. (1983). International Terrorism and the CIA, p. 117-118 Thailand, 1976. Thai border police, element of police most involved in counterinsurgency and which CIA concentrated most of its efforts, carried out an assault by fire against essentially unarmed students, killing at least 100. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 52 Turkey: Watch List Turkey, 1971. Coup carried out by counter-guerrilla, the CIA, the Turkey military and Turkish military intelligence (MIT). CIA solely interested in protecting American interests. CIA assisted MIT in 1960-69 in drafting plans for mass arrests of opposition

figures similar to the pattern followed in Thailand, Indonesia and Greece. In single night generals ordered 4000 professors, students, teachers and retired officers arrested. They tortured. Counterspy, 4/1982, p. 25 Uruguay: Watch List Uruguay. CIA agent associated with death squads. Every CIA station maintained subversive control watch list of most important left wing activists. Gave names families and friends. Frankovich, A. (1980). On Company Business. TV transcript, 5/9/1980, pp. 51-3 Uruguay, liaison, 1964. Biographical data and photos. Uruguay has national voter registration that effective identity card system. From liaison service CIA station gets full name, date and place of birth, parents names, address, place of work, etc. and id photos. Information invaluable for surveillance operations, for subversive control watch list and for a variety of other purposes. CID-361 Uruguay: Death Squads Uruguay, 1970-72. CIA operations officer used cover of AID public safety advisor to help set up Department of Information and Intelligence (DII). DII served as a cover for death squad. Counterspy, 5/1979, p. 10 USSR: Watch List USSR, 1990 KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov said KGB to protect against antiCommunist forces. Said western intelligence exploiting current instability in USSR. Certain radical movements being masterminded by foreign support. Certain groups had written "blacklists" of people who must be neutralized. Washington Post, 12/12/1990, A18,20 USSR, 1990. KGB's Kryuchkov accuses CIA and other western intelligence agencies of gathering information on workers' movements. Washington Post, 12/23/1990, A1,22 USSR, East Germany, 1949-57. League of Free Jurists (UFJ) kept a blacklist of offenders against justice particularly lawyers and police and published their activities. Named were marked men, whether they came to West as refugees or as accredited representatives of East Germans. Hagan, L. (1969). The Secret War for Europe, p. 200 USSR, Iran, 1982. Vladimir Kuzichkin, a senior KGB officer in Tehran, defected to the British. CIA had a sharing agreement with MI6 and became privy to contents of two trunks full of documents. From those documents CIA prepared name lists of more than one hundred people, mostly Iranians, working as secret agents in Iran for the USSR. Casey allowed this list be handed to the Iranians who executed them. Persico, J. (1991). Casey, p. 301 Vietnam: Watch List

Vietnam, 1965-68. U.S./Government of Vietnam create list of active NLF for assassination. After 1968 Tet offensive, names centralized to Phoenix coordinators. Collect names of tens of thousands NLF suspects. Military operations such as My Lai use Phoenix intelligence. By 1973, Phoenix generates 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Counterspy, May 1973, p. 22 Vietnam, 1965-70. Details re Vietnam. From 1965-68 U.S. and Saigon intelligence services maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre marked for assassination. Phoenix program for 1969 called for "neutralizing" 1800 a month. About one third of Viet Cong targeted for arrest had been summarily killed. Security committees established in provincial interrogation centers to determine fate of Viet Cong suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green Berets and Navy Seals most common recruits for Phoenix program. Green Beret Detachment B-57 provided administrative cover for other intelligence units. One was Project Cherry, tasked to assassinate Cambodian officials suspected of collaborating with North Vietnamese, KGB. Another was Project Oak targeted against South Vietnamese suspected collaborators. They controlled by Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, which worked with CIA outside of General Abrams's control. Stein. J. (1992). A Murder In Wartime, pp. 360-1 Vietnam, 1967-73 CIA developed Phoenix program in 1967 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect Viet Cong infrastructure. Viet Cong infrastructure means civilians suspected of supporting Communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by Vietnamese. Due process totally nonexistent. South Vietnamese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 13 Vietnam, 1967-73 District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC). Dien Ban center a model for all of Phoenix. Bldg 10' x 40'. Manned by two U.S. Soldiers, 2 Census Grievance, one Rural Development cadre, and one Special Branch. DIOCC intelligence clearinghouse to review, collate, and disseminate information. Immediate local reaction. Americans kept files of sources, Viet Cong infrastructure and order of battle. Reaction forces 100 police, 1 PRU unit, guides from census grievance. Marines screened civilian detainees using informants and DIOCC's blacklist. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p.126 Vietnam, 1968-69. Until late 1968, Saigon had run a program under which 500,000 ID cards were issued. Viet Cong made fake ones and many stolen. Viet Cong during Tet assigned teams to go door-to-door to collect them. Saigon reissued cards in 10/1968. By 1 May 1969, number of cards issued was 1.5 million. Adams, S. (1994). War of Numbers, p. 181 Vietnam, 1968. Phoenix program quota of 1800 neutralizations per month. Viet Cong Infrastructure System (VCIS) fed 3000 names Viet Cong infrastructure into computer at Combined Intelligence Center political order of battle section. Beginning of computerized blacklist. In Saigon DIA, FBI and CIA used computers. Until 1970 computerized blacklist a unilateral American operation. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 259

Vietnam, 1968. U.S. advisors worked with Government of Vietnam counterparts to establish a list of those who were active with the NLF and who were vulnerable to assassination. Counterspy, 5/1973, p. 21 Vietnam: Death Squads Vietnam. Counterterror teams aka Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). Six or dozen men carried out carefully planned forays, capturing or killing identified communists. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 210-11 Vietnam, 1960-93. Montagnards recruited in early 1960s by Special Forces to fight Viet Cong. Did not surrender until 1992, when they yielded weapons to UN forces in Cambodia and brought to U.S. About 600 live in North Carolina. Paul Campbell, former SF who first American to recruit them. Kay Reibold head of Vietnam highlands assistance project. Montagnards live in small apartments around Raleigh with lowpaying jobs. In 10/1961 Campbell, then a SF Sergeant, sent by CIA to recruit Montagnards. They to form village security, but soon being used for long-range reconnaissance and in highly mobile strike forces that hunted Viet Cong for weeks at a time. "We killed many Vietnamese." Article by W. Booth. Washington Post, 12/27/1993 Vietnam, 1965. CIA station helped create census grievance units. CIA funded, trained and guided counter terror teams who per Chief of Station de Silva, were "to bring danger and death to Viet Cong functionaries." Corn, D. (1994). Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, p. 175 Vietnam, 1966-71. Phoenix operation designed to help U.S. military reach crossover point, where dead and wounded exceeded Viet Cong's ability to field replacements. In April 1967, President Johnson announced formation of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) for pacification. Robert Komer as deputy commander of MACV-CORDS. CORDS budget about $4 billion from 1968-71. CORDS the management structure for pacification programs. Personnel both military and civilian. By 1971, 3000 servicemen, advisers to ARVN, placed under CORDS. 1200 civilians by 1971. U.S. AID responsible for material aid. State and USIA also provided personnel. But CIA played the crucial role. CORDS reinstated civic action teams under name Revolutionary Development cadre. RD program formed teams of 59 South Vietnamese, divided into 3 11-man security squads and 25 civic action cadres. Teams to spend 6 months in a village to fulfill "Eleven criteria and 98 works for pacification." 1. Annihilation of ...cadre; 2. Annihilation of wicked village dignitaries; etc. System placed 40,000 two-way radios in villages. Land reform failed. (Photos of Phoenix propaganda material). Teams helped create Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PFs). Ruff-puffs, suffered high casualties. They represented half of South Vietnamese government forces, they had 55-66% of casualties. They inflicted 30% of Communist casualties. Underground paramilitary effort called Phoenix, which included a "census grievance," stay-behind. He actually a spy. All information fed into intelligence coordination and exploitation program. Vietnamese at Komer's request set up staff that, with CIA, was responsible for coordinating intelligence reports on Viet Cong Infrastructure. Information from census grievance, military, police reports. paramilitary units,

including CIA's Provincial Reconnaissance Units and ruff-puffs. Arrestees those not killed when captured taken to Provincial Interrogation Centers (PIC). Also regional prisons and a national center. All financed by CIA. Problems of coordination and jealousy. Numerical quotas created saying how many VCI to be eliminated each month. Torture used in questioning. Manning, R., (ed), (1988). War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, pp. 55-65 Vietnam, 1966. In 1966 recycled counter terrorists called Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and managed by CIA officer in CORDS RDC/O Office. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 117 Vietnam, 1968. CIA issued two handbooks in June 1968. One "the Viet Cong Key Organization From Central Level Down to Village and Hamlet Levels." Second a manual of procedures from Saigon to DIOCCs. One report said "as DIOCCs and PIOCCs have refined data bases, gained experience, and mounted more operations against targeted individuals, the neutralization rate... over 1000 per month for last 4 months." Gia Dinh "has more than quadrupled monthly rate of killed, captured and rallied." Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 190 Vietnam, 1971. William E. Colby on July 19, 1971, before Senate Subcommittee testified that CIA's Operation Phoenix had killed 21,587 Vietnamese citizens between January 1968 and May 1971. Counterspy, December 1978, p. 6

December 11, 2003 Preemptive Manhunting The CIA's New Assassination Program

Preempitve Manhunting, the CIAs New Assassination Program

by DOUGLAS VALENTINE The major media outlets have ignored the CIAs on-going strategy of mass assassinations as one of the main weapons in Bushs burgeoning global war of terror. This is why it came as something of a shock to highbrows and media elites when Seymour Hersh, in a recent article for The New Yorker, revealed the existence of what he wrongfully referred to as "a new Special Forces operation" that is intended to assassinate the people comprising "the broad middle of the Baathist underground." This is a half-truth at best. To begin with, this is a CIA assassination program, not a Special Forces program; and while Hersh is correct when he says the targets are members of the outlawed Baath Party, he tactfully skirts the fact that this assassination program is illegal because it targets civilians not soldiers. Americans have denied these Iraqui civilians due process

in their own country. Based on the word of a single anonymous informant, Baath Party members who have never harmed a single American can be detained indefinitely, tortured until they rat out some colleagres, or become a double agent, or they can be assassinated along with their family, friends and neighbors. And not just Baath Party members, but anyone who gets their name on the CIAs blacklist of political and ideological enemies. Preemptive Manhunting: The New Phoenix Program The CIA has concocted various euphemisms for its long-standing policy of assassinating civilians whose ideas and political beliefs it hates. In a 24 July 2003 article for CounterPunch titled Nation of Assassins, I listed some of them: "targetted kill" being the most popular, along with neutralize and "executive action". Ive been waiting for the new euphemism with which the media will assuage the public and now we have it from disinformation specialist Seymour Hersh: "Preemptive Manhunting." Preemptive Manhunting is the new name for assassination and, according to Hersh (quoting one of his usual anonymous sources), the rationale for resorting to this immoral and illegal measure is that "The only way we can win is to go unconventional. Were going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. Weve got to scare the Iraqis into submission." This is a textbook description of "selective terrorism" as the ultimate form of psychological warfare, and Hersh is correct in describing Preemptive Manhunting as the rebirth of the CIAs Phoenix Program in South Vietnam. For those who are unaware of it, a typical Phoenix Program operation occurred in February 1968, when former Senator Bob Kerrey (now added to the 9/11 Investigation team) led a sevenmember Navy SEAL team into Thanh Phong village and murdered more than a dozen women and childrena war crime for which Kerry received a Bronze Star. Thats rightKerrey lied when he got back to camp and reported that he and his boys had killed 21 Viet Cong guerrillas. We can expect a lot of this in Iraq, Afghanistan, and any other place Bush sends the CIA to terrorize the civilian populoation into submission. In Vietnam, Kerrey & Company were supposedly after the local Communist Party District Chief. Like the Baath Party in Iraq, the Communist Party was outlawed in South Vietnan, thus providing the CIA with the pretext it needed to kill its members. A Vietnamese informant provioded the intelligence that Kerrey based his mission on, and, in Iraq, the CIAs Phoenix assassination teams will rely on paid, anonymous Iraqi informants to identify which Baath Party members will be murdered along with all their family, friends, and neighbors. And anyone else the CIA wants killed. Thats rightterrorizing the people into submission is the point of Preemptive Manhunting, just as it was the point of the CIAs Phoenix Program. As in Kerreys operation in Thanh Phong, that means killing anyone in any way related to the target. Hundreds of My Lai massacres occurred in

South Vietnam in the name of Phoenix, and starting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the CIA will perpetrate a hundred times that many massacres around the world, in the name of George Bush, Ariel Sharon, and the Judaeo-Christian God. One final note. Hersh mentions that Israel is guiding the CIAs Phoenix Program in Iraq, and as everyone knows, the Israelis are the worlds masters of assassination and terrorizing an entire people into submission. What Hersh doesnt mention is that the blanket of censorship that prevents the American media from criticizing Israel for its war crimes has now been cast over Bush and the CIA, and all the people they use to conquer foreigns nations and assassinate people who never did any American any harmuntil the Americans invaded their country. Compare Americas conquest of Iraq with Israelis conquest of Palestine, and you begin to understand. In each case the stragey is massive war crimes on the one hand, and targetted kills of inspirational leaders on the other. This devastating one-two punch is easier through the complicity of the corporate media. In this respect both Hersh and The New Yorker serve as essential instruments of the Big Lie that makes Preemptive Manhunting popular and thus possible. His story in The New Yorker was no mistake, but merely a part of the psychological warfare campaign being waged by the Bush regime to subdue the resistance of the American public to this awful war. DOUGLAS VALENTINE is the author of The Hotel Tacloban, The Phoenix Program, and TDY. His fourth book, The Strength of the Wolf: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1930-1968, will be published in May 2004. His latest article, "Whose Homeland Security", appeared in the July 2003 issue of Penthouse Magazine. For information about Mr. Valentine, and his books and articles, please visit his web sites at www.DouglasValentine.com and http://members.authorsguild.net/valentine

CIA and Operation Phoenix in Vietnam

by Ralph McGehee, 1996-02-19
Until outlawed in mid 70s CIA directly involved in assassination attempts against Castro of Cuba, and Congolese leader Lumumba. CIA also encouraged plots that resulted in assassination of Dominican Republic President Trujillo, South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in 63 and Chilean Rene Schneider in 73. Most extensive assassination op was Operation Phoenix conducted during latter part of VN war. Twentieth Century Fund. (1992). The Need to Know: Covert Action and American Democracy, 83.

Vietnam, 65-70 details re Vietnam. From 65-68 U.S. and Saigon intel services maintained an active list of VC cadre marked for assassination. Phoenix Program for 69 called for "neutralizing" 1800 a month. About one third of VC targeted for arrest had been summarily killed. Security committees established in provincial interrogation centers to determine fate of VC suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green Berets and navy SEALs most common recruits for Phoenix Program. Green Beret detachment B-57 provided admin cover for other intel units. One was project cherry, tasked to assassinate Cambodian officials suspected of collaborating with NVNese, and kgb. Another was project oak targeted against svnese suspected collaborators. They controlled by special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities, which worked with CIA outside of general abrams control. Stein. J. (1992), A Murder in Wartime, 360-1. Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix op from 1/68 thru 5/71, CORDS reported 20,857 VCI killed. Gvt of VN reported 40,994 from 8/68 thru mid 71. Per cord statistics 12.4% Deaths could be attributed to Phoenix ops. Kenneth osborn of program said Phoenix became a depersonalized murder program. A dept of defense analyst thayer, found that 616 suspected VCI targeted by Phoenix from 1/70 thru 3/71 were killed by Phoenix forces. After war NVNese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach said CIA's assassination program slaughtered far more than the 21,000 officially listed by the U.S. In some parts of south 95% of communist cadre assassinated or compromised by Phoenix. Manning, R., (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, 72. Vietnam, 68-72 Under Phoenix "security committees" in provincial "interrogation centers" would determine fate suspected NLF. Counterspy spring/summer 78, 8. Vietnam, 69 Under Phoenix in July 69 "Vietnam information notes," a state dept publication said target for 69 elimination of 1,800 VCI per month. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978), Uncloaking the CIA, 97. Vietnam, 73 According to Defense Dept official 26,369 South Vietnamese civilians killed under Phoenix while op under direct U.S. control (Jan 68 thru Aug 72 ). By same source, another 33,358 detained without trial. Colby in 73 admitted 20,587 deaths thru end 71 , 28,978 captured, and 17,717 "rallied" to Saigon gvt. Thus approx 30% targeted individuals killed. All Phoenix stats fail to reflect U.S. Activity after "official" U.S. Control of op abandoned. Counterspy spring/summer 75 8. Vietnam, 75 Counter-spy magazine describes Phoenix Program as "the most indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since the nazi death camps of world war two." Counterspy spring/summer 75 6. Vietnam, in 82 Ex-Phoenix operative reveals that sometimes orders were given to kill U.S. military personnel who were considered security risks. He suspects the orders came not from "division", but from a higher authority such as the CIA or the ONI. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) summer 82 52. Vietnam. Phoenix Program to neutralize VCI (tax collectors, supply officers, political cadre, local military officials, etc). Plan to send pru or police teams to get in practice,

death the frequent result of such ops, some times through assassinations pure and simple. Powers, T. (1979), The Man Who Kept the Secret, 181. Vietnam. Phoenix Program took over 20,000 lives, 65-72 U.S. Congress,Church Committee Report. (1976) B 1 27. Vietnam, July 71 Colby inserted chart to Representative Reid showing that some 67,282 persons had been neutralized by Phoenix ops against VC between 68-71 Of these 31 percent had been killed, 26% rallied, and 43% captured or sentenced. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978). Uncloaking the CI, 18. Vietnam, 67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the pru's anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988), A Bright Shining Lie, 732. Vietnam, Phoenix Program, late 60 early 70 took over 20,000 lives in Vietnam. U.S. Congress,Church Committee Report. (1976) B 1 27. Vietnam. Phung Hoang aka Phoenix Program quotas for units set by komer for all 242 districts. One result indiscriminate killing with every body labeled VCI. Powers, T. (1979), The Man Who Kept the Secrets, 181-2. Conflict, li. Law professor at University of Washington, Seattle, Roy L. Prosterman, designed the land reform program the U.S. Government promoted in the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador. In each place the program was accompanied by a rural terror. In Vietnam the Phoenix Program killed 40,000 civilian between August 68 and mid-71; in Philippines, martial law; in El Salvador, a state of siege. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) Winter 90 69 Consequences. Vietnam, 67-70 Phoenix a fiasco, it unmanageable and encouraged outrageous abuses. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 323. Vietnam, 75 according to Frank Snepp's Decent Interval up to thirty thousand special police, CIA and Phoenix related Vietnamese employees were left behind. Saigon CIA station managed to pull out only 537 of its 1900 Vietnamese including close to 1000 high-level Vietnamese who had built close relationships with the agency over the years. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) 6-7/79 4. Vietnam, 68-72 CI Phoenix project run jointly CIA and U.S. Army military intel. Counterspy 5/73 21.

Vietnam, 75 U.S. military provided approx 600 case officers to supplement 40-50 CIA case officers for Phoenix ops. Counterspy spring/summer 75 8. Vietnam. The Phoenix and the identity card programs. Volkman, E., & Baggett, B. (1989), Secret Intelligence, 150. Vietnam, 65-69 CI/pacification efforts initiated by French culminate in Phoenix Program designed to eliminate Viet Cong infrastructure. Made official June 68, Phoenix was intensification of ci ops and involved "mass imprisonment, torture and assassination." For thorough Phoenix description seeCountersp 5/73 20. Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams and pics. Military intel working with mss, ARVN intel and regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and public safety, including field police. Needed to bring altogether under special police. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 99. Vietnam, 66 beginning of Phoenix Program. Lv 218. Phoenix to increase identification VC infrastructure and passing info to military, police, and other elements who were to induce defections, capture them, or attack them in their strongholds. Colby, W. (1989). Lost Victory, 266. Vietnam, 67-73 In 67 CIA proposed all U.S. Intel agencies pool info on VC at district, province and Saigon levels for exploitation. Program first called intel coor and exploitation program (icex). Phoenix the name of program. Assigned quotas for VC to be neutralized. To focus police and intel orgs. Against communist apparatus. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977), The Counterinsurgency Era, 243-8. Vietnam, 67-73 District intel ops coor center (diooc). Dien ban center a model for all of Phoenix. Bldg 10' x 40'. Manned by two U.S. soldiers, 2 census grievance, one rd cadre, and one special branch. Diooc intel clearinghouse to review, collate, and disseminate info. Immediate local reaction. Americans kept files of sources, VCI and order battle. Reaction forces 100 police, 1 PRU unit, guides from census grievance. Marines screened civilian detainees using informants and diooc's blacklist. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 126. Vietnam, 67 12/20/67 Prime Minister signed directive 89-th. T/vp/m legalizing Phung Hoang, VN clone of Phoenix. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 148. Vietnam, 67 Phoenix Program in fledgling stage conceived and implemented by CIA. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 147. Vietnam, 68 Phoenix Program statistics were phony a bust and a fake. DeForest, O., & Chanoff, D. (1990), Slow Burn, 54-55. Vietnam, 69 Program of 69 campaign called for elimination of VCI. Program became known as Phung Hoang or Phoenix. In each province the chief established a province

security committee (PSC). PSC controlled the npff and sp who maintained province interrogation centers (pics). Counterspy 5/73 20. Vietnam, 71 CIA had no intention handling over attack on VCI to national police command. CIA advisers to special police advised to begin forming special intel force units (sifu). 8-Man teams composed of 4 volunteers each from special police and field police. Sifu targeted at high-level VCI, as substitutes for pru. They sign CIA planned manage attack on VCI thru sb, while keeping Phoenix intact as a way of deflecting attention. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program, 391. Vietnam, 71 In revising Phoenix Program (because of all communist penetrations in gvt) first steps to hire southeast asia computer associates (managed by a CIA officer) to advise 200-odd VNese techs to take over MACV and CORDS computers. VNese were folded into big mack and Phung Hoang management info system (phmis). Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 363. Vietnam, 72 In report on Phoenix effectiveness in 9/72 Phung Hoang crossed out and anti-terrorist inserted. The end of Phoenix? Some Phoenix ops in 73. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program 403, 406. Vietnam, 75 U.S. Still involved in Phoenix in 75. Program renamed special police investigative service (spis). U.S. provides data processing facilities for spis thru, Computer Science Services, inc. Which runs intel thru machines to classify and collate them and then turns info over to spis. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 415. Vietnam. Phoenix Program, resources control program, checkpoints, identification card program, paramilitary police called the police field force a 100 man mobile company at least one assigned to each province. Aid helped upgrade police and developed national police academy, improved communications and files, established one two-way radio in every village. Chieu hoi program. Refugee generation programs. Province coordinating committees supervised civic action on bridges, roads, public buildings, agricultural extension work, medical technicians and more. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, 217-8. Vietnam, 67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the PRU's anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988), A Bright Shining Lie, 732. Vietnam, Phoenix. Ranelagh, J. (1986), The Agency 437-441. Vietnam, police. Public safety included Michigan State University program. Resources control, effort to regulate movement resources both human and material. Includes set up checkpoints roads and waterways, mobile checkpoints. Resulted in 560,000 arrests by 1969. National identity registration program. Every VNese 15 or older must register

and carry identification card. Fingerprints obtained. Once completed program to include fingerprints, photos and bio data. Surveillance of suspects role of special police branch. Sp agents penetrate subversive organizations and use intel collection, political data and files from census data to separate good from bad. Pacification or Phoenix Program. Systematic effort at intel collection and exploitation. All intel services and America's CIA and military intel orgs. Pool data from informers and prisoners. With this info police and provincial reconnaissance units make raids in contested areas to seize or eliminate VCI agents. See Klare, M.T. (1972), War Without End, 265 for more death squads. Vietnam, 66-71 Phoenix op designed to help U.S. Military reach crossover point, where dead and wounded exceeded VC's ability to field replacements. In 4/67 Pres Johnson announced formation of civil ops and revolutionary development support (CORDS) for pacification. R. Komer as deputy commander of MACV-CORDS. CORDS budget about $4 billion from 68-71. CORDS the management structure for pacification programs. Personnel both military and civilian. By 71, 3000 servicemen, advisers to ARVN, placed under CORDS. 1200 Civilians by 71. Usaid responsible for material aid. State and USIA also provided personnel. But CIA played the crucial role. CORDS reinstated civic action teams under name revolutionary development cadre. Rd program formed teams of 59 SVNese, divided into 3 11-man security squads and 25 civic action cadres. Teams to spend 6 months in a village to fulfill "eleven criteria and 98 works for pacification." 1. Annihilation of ...Cadre; 2. Annihilation of wicked village dignitaries; etc. System placed 40,000 two-way radios in villages. Land reform failed. (Photos of Phoenix propaganda material). Teams helped create regional and popular forces (rf/pfs). Ruff-puffs, suffered high casualties. They represented half of SVN gvt forces, they had 55-66% of casualties. They inflicted 30% of communist casualties. Underground pm effort called Phoenix which included a "census grievance," stay-behind. He actually a spy. All info fed into intel coordination and exploitation program. VNese at Komer's request set up staff that with CIA was responsible for coordinating intel reports on VC infrastructure. Info from census grievance, military, police reports. PM units - including CIA's provincial reconnaissance units and ruff-puffs. Arrestees - those not killed when captured - taken to provincial interrogation centers (pic). Also regional prisons and a national center all financed by CIA. Problems of coordination and jealousy. Numerical quotas created saying how many VCI to be eliminated each month. Torture used in questioning. Manning, R., (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, 55-65. Vietnam, 71 William E. Colby on july 19, 1971, before Senate subcommittee testified CIA op Phoenix had killed 21,587 Vietnamese citizens between 1/68 and 5/71. In response to a question from mr. Reid "do you state categorically that Phoenix has never perpetrated the premeditated killing of a civilian in a non-combat situation?" Colby replied: "No, I could not say that...I certainly would not say never." Counterspy 12/78 6. Vietnam, 67 First MACV alloted Phoenix 126 officers and ncos. By end 67 one nco assigned to each of 103 dioccs then in existence. All military officers and enlisted men assigned to Phoenix Program took orders from CIA. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 145.

Vietnam, 68-73 Phoenix ci/terror op funded and covered by U.S. Aid, CORDS pacification survey, public employment projects, and other benign agencies. Counterspy may 73 22. Vietnam, 71 1.7 Billion dollars go to CORDS in Phoenix Project. Colby refuses congressional audit Phoenix funds before committee. Counterspy 5/73 24. Vietnam, 71 When questioned concerning unaccounted-for 1.7 Billion dollars which had financed much of covert aspect of Phoenix Program, Ambassador Colby assured house subcommittee on foreign ops and govt info, all main problems has been resolved and Congress could rest assured aberrations of brutality would remain at a minimum. He did not know how many innocent victims the program had killed, maybe 5,000, maybe more. He did not have authority to discuss reasons why Congress could not audit 1.7 billions worth of taxpayers funds which went to CORDS. Counterspy 5/73 24. Vietnam, 69 Colby rendered due process obsolete. VCI target broken into three classes a, for leaders and party members; b, for holders of responsible jobs; c, for rank-and file. Decision c category to be ignored since Phoenix directed at VCI command and control structure. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) explained. Hes guesstimate of VCI in 1/69 was 75,000. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 260. Vietnam, 71 House subcommittee on foreign operations and gvt. Info. investigates Phoenix. Colby insists project "respectable", brutality minimized. Estimates 5000 killed. Congress denied audit of Phoenix funds. Counterspy may 73 24. Vietnam, 67-73 CIA developed Phoenix Program in 67 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by VNese. Due process totally nonexistent. SVNese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 13. Vietnam, 68 Phoenix ci/terror program established by Thieu's presidential decree, literally written by CIA man William Colby. Decree and future authorizations indicated that suspects could be arrested without a warrant or copy of charges and detained on basis of police dossier heresay evidence. Once arrested, suspect could not confront accusers or see dossier, was denied bail legal counsel, and was denied a trial or even a hearing. At best one's case was reviewed by province security committee composed of milt and intel officers. Under Phoenix all rights of due process stripped. Counterspy Winter 78 28. Covert Action Information Bulletin 13:3, 16-17:6-10; 17:48-49; 22:2,4,6,10-24; "from Phoenix associates to civilian-military assistance," 22:18-19; "from the hessians to the contras: mercenaries in the service of imperialism," 22:10-11. 89 An article by Rob Rosenbaum from interviews with General Secord and Ted "Blond Ghost" Shackley. They give their answers to questions about Iran-Contra, secret war in Laos, Phoenix Program in Vietnam, CIA-Mafia plots of the sixties. Shackley discusses

charges of opium smuggling in Laos by elements supported by CIA. Photos of Secord and Shackley. Shackley interview in his risk-assessment consulting firm, Rosslyn-based Research Associates International. Vanity fair, 1/90 72-77, 126-8,130-1 Vietnam 68-73 Evan Parker, Jr., John Mason, and John Tilton all from CIA were men who headed Phoenix Program when it supposedly transferred to military and CORDS. Roger McCarthy said CIA very much involved with Phoenix. Corn, D. (1994), Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 193. Vietnam. John Murray, of WHD, and his wife Delores, former CIA ops officer, sending letters of disclosures re Shackley. He covertly contacted William Miller, staff director of Church Committee, and told how Shackley and Helms in 70 arranged to keep CIA from being implicated in My Lai massacres. (Some evidence suggested massacre related to CIA's Phoenix Program.) Corn, D. (1994), Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 302. Vietnam, 67 50 officers and enlisted men invited to join counter insurgency program. Those who accepted by CIA joined as junior officer trainees. Most assigned to provinces as rdc/p or rdc/o advisers and many as Phoenix coordinators. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 198. Vietnam, 68-69 Robert K. Brown (later editor of Soldier of Fortune magazine) worked with James K. Damron, CIA's project coordinator for the Phoenix Program in Gia Dinh province. Pigeon, R. (1986). The Soldier of Fortune, 44. Vietnam, Orrin DeForest, with U.S. Air Force special investigations early on. Joined CIA in 68 as chief interrogator Hau Nghia province in bien hoa under cover of Office of Special Assistance (OSA). Duties included inspection of pics, training VNese in interrogation. Monitoring intel production. He discovered pics poorly run, Phoenix Program slipshod, and CIA had been unable generate single agent. Using methods learned while working with Japanese national police in identifying, communist agents, disregarding CIA methods, DeForest's efforts produced 80% hard intel in VN. Minnick, W. (1992). Spies and Provacateurs, 50-1. training, 55 Eisenhower establishes public safety program whose goal is to train foreign police units in, among other things, counterinsurgency. 62 Program becomes Office of Public Safety which eventually procures 400 officers in 45 countries and yearly budget 50 million. Much of Phoenix funding and training was thru Office of Public Safety. By 75 ops had distributed 200 million in equipment foreign police, trained 7000+ senior police officials, and trained over 1 million rank and file police officers worldwide. Counterspy Winter 78 29-30. Vietnam, 75 Counter-spy magazine describes Phoenix Program as "the most indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since the nazi death camps of world war two." Counterspy Spring/Summer 75 6. Vietnam. Former Phoenix advisor Wayne Cooper said "Operation Phoenix was a unilateral American program", and Klare confirmed by saying "although most of the

dirty work was performed by indigenous operatives, Phoenix was designed, organized, financed, and administered by U.S. authorities." Counterspy Winter 78 27. Vietnam. "Phoenix demonstrated that the U.S. Government through the CIA will create, impose, and conduct an operation in another country without a semblance of a mandate from a given people or their representatives as long as the operation is considered in interest of U.S. governmental objectives." Counterspy Winter 78 27-8. Vietnam, 59-69 the SEALs and the Phoenix Program. The Intel Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was a joint MACV/CIA op - forerunner of Phoenix. SEALs helped train VNese personnel. SEALs assigned ops detachments. SEALs worked with PRUs. By 68, with prisoner snatches, ambushes, and increasing VC defections, ICEX program neutralizing 800 VCI every month. Phoenix began 7/1/68. Description of the province intel ops coordinating center (piocc) and the district (diocc). Combatting VCI in urban areas responsibility of national police force and police field force. SEALs taught PRUsin mekong delta. Description of prus. They the most effective native troops. By end of 68, the iv corps PRUswere almost entirely advised by seal personnel. Seal advisors accompanied PRUson average of 15 missions a month. Description of ops. Dockery, K. (1991). SEALs in Action, 167-176. Vietnam, 68-73 ttwo small groups wreaked havoc on the VCI. The Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and the Navy's SEALs. PRUs and SEALs often worked together and both killed many VCI and guerrillas -- the enemy had wrapped itself in the population. Together they were fewer than 6000 men. They had access to the best intel often coming directly from CIA. Pru had roots in the counterterror teams of the early 60s. In 66 the ct became prus. Details of the makeup and recruiting source of the prus. PRUsoften killed targets. Military participation in the pru program was to end in 10/70. Pru was the most effective action arm of the Phoenix Program. Details of the SEALs larger-than-life reputation earned in VN. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 171-199. Vietnam, 65-72 During Nixon's first 2 1/2 years, state department officially admits that the CIA-run Phoenix Program murdered or abducted 35,708 VNese civilians, 4,836 more than the pentagon claimed the NLF had assassinated or kidnapped during the same period, and a monthly increase over the 200 killed by the CIA every month under johnson. Senator Gravel edition, (1971), Pentagon Papers v 300. Vietnam, 65-73 Phoenix Program torture tactics include rape, electric shock, water torture, hanging from ceiling, beatings, incarceration and execution. Counterspy 5/73 16. Vietnam, 69-71 K. Barton Osborn, Phoenix agent, testified to Congress "I never knew an individual to be detained as a VC suspect who ever lived through an interrogation in a year and a half. Uc 114. Note says this testimony given before U.S. Congress,Heari. 315321. Vietnam, 73 "The prime difference between the types of intelligence provided to the military units and the Phoenix coordinator was that all information going to Phoenix was of a political nature ... I was following through on a reported (VC) suspect that one of my agents had identified. The man was interrogated at the marine counter-

intelligence complex and I was invited to witness it. As I entered the hooch the man was being taken out, dead. He died from a six inch dowel pushed through his ear and into his brain." Barton Osborn, former Phoenix case officer before Armed Services Committee, 1973. Counterspy Spring/Summer 75 7. Vietnam. Colby supervised est of pics in each of SVN's 44 provinces. Each center constructed with CIA funds. Agency personnel directed each centers op much of which consisted of torture carried out by VN nationals. Coi 207. Colby admitted serious abuses committed under Phoenix. Former intel officers came before Congressional cmttees to describe repeated examples torture. Marchetti, V., & Marks, J.D. (1974), The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 207 see fn. Vietnam, 66-74 CIA analyst, Nelson H. Brickman, on 11/66 produced basic guidelines for [the Phoenix Program] in a memorandum that described the VCI and suggested which parts of it should be targeted. His memo said rank-and-file members were not legitimate targets "because they were most often unwilling participants in the revolution." Brickman called for using all available intelligence services to neutralize the VCI. Robert Komer was so impressed he assigned Brickman to the revolutionary development office. He adopted brickman's suggestion that there was no need to begin a new anti-vci program, only that the existing programs be brought together and managed by a single bureau. He recommended the U.S. Agencies get their houses in order before bringing in the gvn. Brickman "deserved the credit" for the Phoenix Program. A program called intel coordination and exploitation (icex) was the first structure. Evan parker named director of icex but komer had full control. U.S. Military reluctantly participated initially. Icex officially created on 7/9/67, although basic structure had been in place a year. Building of district ops and coordinating centers (doicc) which by late 67 were called district intel and ops coordinating centers (dioccs). MACV directive 381-41 stated: "to coordinate and give impetus to U.S. and gvn operations...Directed toward elimination of the VC infrastructure." Icex placed under cords. South Vietnamese were unwilling to take program seriously. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 58-70. Vietnam, 67-72 K. Barton Osborn's testimony re the Phoenix Program before the house committee on government ops, 8/71. Osborn characterized program as a "sterile, depersonalized murder program." Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, xv-xvi. Vietnam, 67 The Phoenix (Phung Hoang) program was officially born on 12/20/67 when the SVNese premier issued a decree. This differed from ICEX only in official SVNese support for the program. Seal-and-search op in Bui Cui village. LRRP ambush parties. People's self-defense forces (psdf) started after Tet, it was a nationwide system of local militias. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 72-81. Vietnam, 68-70 PIOCCC had extensive dossiers on VCI and the chieu hoi program was the largest producer of Phoenix intel. 132. A criticism of Phoenix was the covert control by CIA. Despite influx of military advisers, CIA controlled chain of command and purse strings. Colby, top man of CORDS in 69 had been with CIA. American directors of Phoenix at national level were all CIA. In 7/69 the system changed. "Management and support facilities for Phoenix were officially transferred from the office of the special

assistant to the ambassador (osa) (cia) to MACV, who assumed full responsibility for providing for or arranging monetary and logistical support through American channels." From July 69 on, CIA made up only a small part of the program. Details of numbers neutralized and differences between CIA and military estimates. The use of diocc VCI target folders, a simple prepared set of biographical, operational, and administrative questions. By the end of 1970 one hundred thousand copies had been distributed. A sophisticated computerized collation program called the Phung Hoang Management Info System (PHMIS) was implemented. The program combined the national police tracking system with VCI info to gear up police for handling both. PHMIS was manned by Vietnamese, using American advisers as trainers. 135-6. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 134. Vietnam, 68 President Thieu with the help of William Colby, Komer's deputy for CORDS, drafted a decree that officially sanctioned Phoenix/Phung Hoang on 7/1/68. Article 3 was of paramount importance -- it defined who was or was not a member of the VCI. Article 3 -- definitions: the Viet Cong infrastructure is all Viet cong, political and administrative organizations established by the communist party which goes under the name people's revolutionary party, from the cities to the countryside. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) is the highest level steering organization...And the front for the liberation of South Vietnam (NLFSVN)....Viet Cong military units, members of mass organizations established by the Viet Cong, citizens forced to perform as laborers, or civilians in areas temporarily controlled by the Viet cong, are not classified as belonging to the Viet Cong infrastructure. Definition adjusted over time. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 84. Vietnam, 94 VN rejects visit of ex-CIA chief Colby, now a Washington lawyer, who had planned to visit as a director of a U.S.-based investment fund. Fund directors had planned to hold a reception Monday. Event canceled, and directors will meet in Bangkok. Colby was CIA's chief in Saigon during war and was associated with Phoenix, an op to root out rural support for communist guerrillas via sweeping arrests, torture and execution of suspects. Critics said most of those killed were innocent peasants. Chicago Tribune 12/3/94 21. Vietnam, accelerated pacification campaign, July 68 Thieu with Colby's help issued decree est Phoenix committees at national, regional and provincial and even district level, "to which all the agencies involved had to furnish representation." Colby, W. (1978). Honorable Men, 267. Vietnam, Australia, Vietnam, 62-73 Australian AATTV teams operated in VN often in CIA Phoenix op. `Black team' commanded by American of australian usually given target figure. He pinpointed and black team would go out, usually dressed in enemy's gear and the assassination then blamed on VC. Toohey, B., & Pinwill, W. (1990), Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service 87-88. Vietnam, icex intel coor and exploitation MACV/cia program to work on VCI with Vietnamese cooperation. Colby helped devise program which became Phoenix. Colby, W. (1978), Honorable Men 267.

Vietnam, National Security study memo, 67-69 said although Phoenix launched in Dec 67, Vietnamese cooperation minimal and only after American prodding, Thieu issued a decree in July 68 directing network to be set up. Program forced on VNese. Pru supervised, controlled and financed by Americans. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978), Uncloaking the CIA, 111-125. Vietnam, Phoenix Program most notorious of counterinsurgency programs. Originated by robert w. Komer, who now headed Civilian Operations Revolutionary Development Staff (CORDS), Phoenix designed to root out secret Vietcong infrastructure in South Vietnam. Miller, N. (1989). Spying for America379. Vietnam, Phoenix, 68-70 In 69 CIA apparently had attack squeamishness and pulled out of CORDS. Concluded Phoenix inappropriate. It believed North had moved away from military engagement to lacing entire gvt with spies -- possibly as many as 30,000 so Thieu's gvt could be easily overthrown. Baritz, L. (1985). Backfire, 269. Vietnam, Phoenix op. Every person who ran program from Saigon assigned to program from CIA. Colby and 20,000 + figure of persons killed under Phoenix, see fn ag 440. Phoenix General Ranelagh, J. (1986), The Agency 436-441. Vietnam, Phoenix Program, beginning circa 66-67 CORDS pacification program. Komer settled on massive intel program on VC who could be neutralized by SVN forces. First called ICEX. Name changed to Phoenix in 69 with SVN version phung hoang. Had interrogation centers in each of SVNs 235 districts and 44 provinces, card files and computerized indexes. Pru's of 50 to 100 men. In Phoenix CIA provided weapons, paid for Saigon computer files, funded and trained PRU's and passed intel to Phoenix. Colby told senate Phoenix killed 20,587 VCI. When questions arose re legality Colby retreated and said 87% killed in regular military actions. Two army lts. Told federal judge they order to maintain kill quota 50 VCI a month. Prados, J. (1986), Presidents' Secret Wars, 307-310. Vietnam, Phoenix Program evaluation. Robert Komer wrote Phung Hoang has been a small, poorly managed, and largely ineffective effort. Clearly Phoenix failed to eliminate the infrastructure that remained after heavy losses of tet. Ce 274-8. Colby continued to see Phoenix as contributing usefully to attack on VC. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977), The Counterinsurgency Era, notes 328. Vietnam, Phoenix Program, july 69 "Vietnam information notes" a State Dept publication says: target for 1969 calls for elimination of 1,800 VCI per month. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978). Uncloaking the CIA, 97. Vietnam, Phoenix Program. Part of total pacification program of gvt VN. Colby testified that in over two and a half years there were 29,000 captured, 17,000 defected and 20,500 killed, of which 87% were killed by regular and paramilitary forces and 12% by police and similar elements. Vast majority killed in military combat, fire fights, or ambushes, and most of remainder were killed in police actions attempting to capture

them. Major stress to encourage capture. Borosage, R.L., & Marks, J. (eds.). (1976), The CIA File, 190. Vietnam, Phoenix Program. Quotas and indiscriminate killing of people. CIA conceived and organized program and regional and provincial officers in charge were all CIA. Colby actually wrote Phoenix directive which Thieu was finally pressured into adopting july 68 Colby conceded Phoenix recorded deaths of 20,587. Powers, T. (1979). The Man Who Kept the Secrets, 181-2. Vietnam, Phoenix Program, 67-75 Targets members VCI. 637 Military intel advisers assigned to Phoenix. Much money given to VNese police to expand detention facilities. Phoenix org: first the district co - ordination center, diocc, that maintained dossiers on suspected VC. Once enough evidence person placed on police green list. Suspect then jailed without right to civilian trail. In cordon and search ops all villagers lined up and walk past police checkpoint. Next level province interrogation center, pic, staffed by SVNese, Americans and CIA. After interrogation, suspect passed on to province security committee, comprised of police chiefs, military and police intel and advisors. Finally suspects could be imprisoned under law for 2 years. This one way to neutralize. Other way via Provincial Reconnaissance Units, PRUs, who would kidnap or assassinate agents targeted by diocc. Had American advisors from SEALs, Green Berets. Official amnesty program called chieu hoi used to convince VC to surrender. VC categorized as a,b, or c. A were key members, c least impt. National police detention center processed 180,000 a year. American money and effort went into national identification card, id, project. All Vietnamese over age 15 jailed if did not carry a card a RAND computer tracked the 15 million suspects also cross-linked to 10 million dossiers and fingerprints. The Dossier issue 6, 11/83 14-5. Vietnam, Phoenix, 72-73 The F-6 program was a defensive measure to bolster Phung Hoang after the Easter Offensive. F-6 sought to increase pressure on the VCI by allowing province chiefs to move against suspected cadre on the strength of a single report rather then the usual three. With the culmination of the F-6 program in early 73, the Phoenix Program came to an end. In the spring of 72 phung hoang was absorbed into the national police. The last American advisers left VN in december 72. Various tables, command structure charts in appendix. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 231-251. Vietnam, 66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA man managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams and pics. Military intel working with mss, arvn intel and regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and public safety, including field police. Needed to bring altogether under special police. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 99. Vietnam, 67-73 CIA developed Phoenix Program in 67 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called phung hoang by VNese. Due process totally nonexistent. SVNese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 13.

Vietnam, 68-72 NLF according to Nixon adm decimated during Tet Offensive, remainder by Phoenix Program. Nvese officer reported Phoenix resulted in loss of thousands of our cadres. Proof in 2 remaining offensives. In 72 and in 75 they did not rely on guerrillas. Baritz, L. (1985), Backfire, 273. Vietnam, 68 Phoenix Program quota of 1800 neutralizations per month. Viet Cong Infrastructure system (vciis) fed 3000 names VCI into computer at combined intel center political order battle section. Beginning of computerized blacklist. In Saigon DIA, FBI and CIA used computers. Until 70 computerized blacklist a unilateral American op. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 259.

The Phoenix Program

a book by Douglas Valentine

Amazon

Extract
The My Lai Massacre and The Tiger Cages

Quotes
As for the American role, according to Muldoon, "you can't have an American there all the time watching these things." "These things" included: rape, gang rape, rape using eels, snakes, or hard objects, and rape followed by murder; electrical shock ("the Bell Telephone Hour") rendered by attaching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body, like the tongue; "the water treatment"; "the airplane," in which a prisoner's arms were tied behind the back and the rope looped over a hook on the ceiling, suspending the prisoner in midair, after which he or she was beaten; beatings with rubber hoses and whips; and the use of police dogs to maul prisoners. All this and more occurred in PICs. p.85 "Now everyone knows about the airborne interrogationtaking three people up in a chopper, taking one guy and saying. Talk,' then throwing him out before he even gets the chance to open his mouth. Well, we wrapped det [detonator] cord around their necks and wired them to the detonator box. And basically what it did was blow their heads off. The interrogator would tell the translator, usually a South Vietnamese intelligence officer, 'Ask him this.' He'd ask him, 'Who gave you the gun?' And the guy would start to answer, or maybe he wouldn'tmaybe he'd resistbut the general idea was to waste the first two. They planned the snatches that way. Pick up this guy because we're pretty sure he's VC cadrethese other two guys just run errands for him. Or maybe they're nobody; Tran, the farmer, and his brother Nguyen. But bring in two. Put them in a row. By the time you get to your man, he's talking so fast you got to pop the weasel

just to shut him up." After a moment's silence he added, "I guess you could say that we wrote the book on terror." Page 63 (hardcover edition) On August 25, 1970, an article appeared in The New York Times hinting that the CIA, through Phoenix, was responsible for My Lai. The story line was advanced on October 14, when defense attorneys for David Mitchell a sergeant accused and later cleared of machine-gunning scores of Vietnamese in a drainage ditch in My Lai citing Phoenix as the CIAs systematic program of assassination, named Evan Parker as the CIA officer who signed documents, certain blacklists, of Vietnamese to be assassinated in My Lai. When we spoke, Parker denied the charge. ......As in any large-scale Phoenix operation, two of Task Force Barkers companies cordoned off the hamlet while a third one Calleys moved in, clearing the way for Kotouc and Special Branch officers who were brought to the field to identify VC from among the detained inhabitants. .....The CIA, via Phoenix, not only perpetrated the My Lai massacre but also concealed the crime. ....As Jeff Stein said, The first thing you learn in the Army is not competence, you learn corruption. And you learn to get along, go along. Unfortunately not everyone learns to get along. On September 3, 1988, Robert TSouvas was apparently shot in the head by his girl friend, after an argument over a bottle of vodka. The two were homeless, living out of a van they had parked under a bridge in Pittsburgh. TSouvas was a Vietnam veteran and a participant in the My Lai massacre. .....TSouvass attorney, George Davis, traveled to Da Nang in 1970 to investigate the massacre and while there was assigned as an aide a Vietnamese colonel who said that the massacre was a Phoenix operation and that the purpose of Phoenix was to terrorize the civilian population into submission. Davis told me: When I told the people in the War Department what I knew and that I would attempt to obtain all records on the program in order to defend my client, they agreed to drop the charges. .....Bart Osborn (whose agent net Stein inherited) is more specific. I never knew in the course of all those operations any detainee to live through his interrogation, Osborn testified before Congress in 1971. They all died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those individuals was, in fact, cooperating with the VC, but they all died and the majority were wither tortured to death or things like thrown out of helicopters. [book extract] The My Lai Massacre and The Tiger Cages by Douglas Valentine But the American establishment and media denied it then, and continue to deny it until today, because Phoenix was a genocidal program -- and the CIA officials, members of the media who were complicit through their silence, and the red-blooded American boys who carried it out, are all war criminals. As Michael Ratner a lawyer at the Center for Constitutional Rights told CounterPunch: "Kerrey should be tried as a war criminal. His actions on the night of February 24-25, 1969 when the seven man Navy Seal unit which he headed killed approximately twenty unarmed Vietnamese civilians, eighteen of whom were women and children was a war crime. Like those who murdered at My Lai, he too should be brought into the dock and tried for his crimes." ......A famous Phoenix operation, known as the My Lai Massacre, was proceeding along smoothly, with a grand total of 504 Vietnamese women and children killed, when a soldier

named Hugh Thompson in a helicopter gunship saw what was happening. Risking his life to preserve that "social contract," Thomson landed his helicopter between the mass murderers and their victims, turned his machine guns on his fellow Americans, and brought the carnage to a halt. .....It was the CIA that forced soldiers like Kerrey into Phoenix operations, and the hidden hand of the CIA lingers over his war crime. Kerrey even uses the same rationale offered by CIA officer DeSilva. According to Kerrey, "the Viet Cong were a thousand per cent more ruthless than" the Seals or U.S. Army. [2001] Bob Kerrey, CIA War Crimes, And The Need For A War Crimes Trial by Douglas Valentine

The My Lai Massacre and The Tiger Cages

Excerpt from The Phoenix Program by Douglas Valentine

The My Lai Massacre

The My Lai massacre was first reported in March 1969, one full year after the event. In April 1969, because of congressional queries, the case was given to the Army inspector general, and in August Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland turned the case over to the Armys Criminal Investigation Division (CID). In November 1969 Seymour Hersh broke the story, telling how 504 Vietnamese civilians were massacred by members of a U.S. infantry company attached to a special battalion called Task Force Barker. Ten days after Hersh broke the story, Westmoreland ordered General William Peers to conduct an official inquiry. Evan Parker contended to me that Peers got the job because he was not a West Point graduate.2 However, Peerss close ties to the CIA may also have been a factor. In World War II, Peers had commanded OSS Detachment 101, in which capacity he had been Evan Parkers boss. In the early 1950s he had been the CIAs chief of training and its station chief in Taiwan, and as SACSA in 1966 Peers had worked with the CIA in formulating pacification policy. Having had several commands in Vietnam, he was well aware of how the war was being conducted. But the most conclusive evidence linking Peers to the CIA is the report he submitted in March 1970, which was not made available to the public until 1974 and which carefully avoided implicating the CIA. The perfunctory trials that followed the Peers inquiry amounted to slaps on the wrist for the defendants and fuelled rumors of a cover-up. Of the thirty people named in the report, charges were brought against sixteen, four were tried, and one was convicted. William Calleys sentence was quickly reduced, and in conservative quarters he was venerated as a hero and scapegoat. Likewise, the men in Calleys platoon were excused as victims of VC terror and good soldiers acting under orders. Of nearly two thousand Americans surveyed by Time magazine, 65 percent denied being upset. Yet, if most Americans were willing to accept the massacre as necessary to ensure their security, why the cover-up? Why was the massacre portrayed as an isolated incident?

On August 25, 1970, an article appeared in The New York Times hinting that the CIA, through Phoenix, was responsible for My Lai. The story line was advanced on October 14, when defense attorneys for David Mitchell a sergeant accused and later cleared of machine-gunning scores of Vietnamese in a drainage ditch in My Lai citing Phoenix as the CIAs systematic program of assassination, named Evan Parker as the CIA officer who signed documents, certain blacklists, of Vietnamese to be assassinated in My Lai.3 When we spoke, Parker denied the charge. A defense request to subpoena Parker was denied, as was a request to view the My Lai blacklist. Outside the courtroom CIA lawyer John Greaney insisted that the agency was absolutely not involved in My Lai. When asked if the CIA had ever operated in My Lai, Greaney replied, I dont know. But as has been established in this book, the CIA had one of its largest contingents in Quang Ngai Province. [See: Map of South Vietnam - pop-up window] Especially active were its Census Grievance cadre, directed by the Son Tinh District RD Cadre intelligence chief, Ho Ngoc Hui, whose VNQDD cadres were in My Lai on the day prior to the massacre. A Catholic from North Vietnam, Hui reportedly called the massacre a small matter. 4 To understand why the massacre occurred, it helps to know that in March 1968 cordon and search operations of the type Task Force Barker conducted in My Lai were how RD Cadre intelligence officers contacted their secret agents. The Peers report does not mention that, or that in March 1968 the forty-one RD teams operating in Quang Ngai were channeling information on VCI through Hui to the CIAs paramilitary adviser, who shared it with the province Phoenix coordinator. The Phoenix coordinator in Quang Ngai Province at the time of the My Lai massacre was Robert B. Ramsdell, a seventeen-year veteran of the Army CID who subsequently worked for ten years as a private investigator in Florida. Ramsdell was hired by the CIA in 1967. He was trained in the United States and sent to Vietnam on February 4, 1968, as the Special Branch adviser in Quang Ngai Province. Ramsdell, who appeared incognito before the Peers panel, told newsmen that he worked for the Agency for International Development. In Cover-up Seymour Hersh tells how in February 1968 Ramsdell began rounding up residents of Quang Ngai City whose names appeared on Phoenix blacklists.5 Explained Ramsdell: After Tet we knew who many of these people were, but we let them continue to function because we were controlling them. They led us to the VC security officer for the district. We wiped them out after Tet and then went ahead and picked up the small fish.6 The people who were wiped out, Hersh explains, were put to death by the Phoenix Special Police. 7 Ramsdell simply eliminated everyone who was on those lists, said Gerald Stout, an Army intelligence officer who fed Ramsdell names. It was recrimination. *8 Recrimination for Tet, at a minimum.
* In August 1966 the CIAs paramilitary adviser in Quang Ngai, Reed Harrison, unwittingly sent USAID employee Dwight Owen into an ambush outside Tu Nghia. The guerillas who killed young Owen were from the Forty-eighth VC Battalion.

Unfortunately, according to Randolph Lane the Quang Ngai Province MACV intelligence adviser Ramsdells victims were not Vietcong.9 This fact is corroborated by Jeffrey Stein, a corporal working undercover for the 525th MIG, running agent nets in Quang Nam and southern Thua Thien provinces. According to Stein, the VNQDD was a Vietnamese militarist party that had a world fascist allegiance and wanted to overthrow the Vietnamese government from the right! The people they were naming as Communists were left-wing Buddhists, and that information was going to the Phoenix program. We were being used to assassinate their political rivals. 10 Through the Son Tinh DIOCC, Phoenix Coordinator Ramsdell passed Census Grievancegenerated intelligence to Task Force Barker, estimating the 48th Battalion at a strength of 450 men. The Peers report, however, said that 40 VC at most were in My Lai on the day prior to March 16 and that they had left before Task Force Barker arrived on the scene. 11 Ramsdell told the Peers panel, Very frankly, anyone that was in that area was considered a VCS [Vietcong suspect], because they couldnt survive in that area unless they were sympathizers. 12 On the basis of Ramsdells information, Task Force Barkers intelligence officer, Captain Kotouc, told Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker that only VC and active VC sympathizers were living [in My Lai and My Khe]. But, Kotouc said, because leaflets were to be dropped, civilians would be out of the hamlets...by 0700 hours. 13 Phoenix Coordinator Ramsdell then provided Kotouc with a blacklist of VCI suspects in My Lai, along with the ludicrous notion that all sympathizers would be gone from the hamlet by early morning, leaving 450 hard-core VC guerillas behind. Yet the link between Ramsdell and the poor intelligence for the 16 March operation was never explored by the Peers Panel. 14 As in any large-scale Phoenix operation, two of Task Force Barkers companies cordoned off the hamlet while a third one Calleys moved in, clearing the way for Kotouc and Special Branch officers who were brought to the field to identify VC from among the detained inhabitants. 15 As Hersh notes parenthetically, Shortly after the My Lai 4 operation, the number of VCI on the Phoenix blacklist was sharply reduced. 16 In an unsigned, undated memo on Phoenix supplied by Jack, the genesis of the blacklist is described as follows: There had been a reluctance to exploit available sources of information in the hamlet, village and district. It was, therefore, suggested that effective Cordon and Search operations must rely on all locally available intelligence in order to deprive the Viet Cong of a sanctuary among the population. It was in this context that carefully prepared blacklists were made available. The blacklists were furnished to assist the Allied operational units in searching for specifically identified people and in screening captives or local personnel held for questioning. The

information for the blacklists was prepared by the Police Special Branch* in conjunction with intelligence collected from the Province Interrogation Centers.
* In June 1988 Quang Ngai Special Branch chief Kieu participated in a Vatican ceremony which elevated Catholics killed in Vietnam to the status of martyrs. Kotouc was charged by the Peers panel with concealing evidence and falsifying reports, with having authorized the killing of at least one VC suspect by members of the National Police, and with having committed the offense of maiming by cutting off the finger of a VC suspect. 17

The CIA, via Phoenix, not only perpetrated the My Lai massacre but also concealed the crime. The Peers panel noted that a Census Grievance Cadreman of Son My Village submitted a written report to the Census Grievance chief, Quang Ngai, on 18 March 1968, indicating that a fierce battle with VC and local guerrillas had resulted in 427 civilian and guerrilla deaths, 27 in My Lai and 400 in the nearby hamlets of Thuan Yen and Binh Dong!18 The appearance of this report coincided with the release by Robert Thompson of a captured document, which had been mislaid for nineteen months, indicating that the Cuc Nghien Cuu had assassinated 2,748 civilians in Hue during Tet. The only person named as having received the Census Grievance report is Lieutenant Colonel William Guinn, who testified in May 1969 that he could not recall who specifically had given it to him. In December 1969 Guinn, when shown a copy of the Census Grievance report, refused further to testify and accordingly, it was not possible to ascertain whether the 18 March Census Grievance report was in fact the one which he recalled having received.19 With that the matter of the Census Grievance report was dropped. The My Lai cover-up was assisted by the Son Thinh District adviser, Major David Gavin, who lost a report written on April 11 by Tran Ngoc Tan, the Son Tinh district chief. Tans report named the 504 people killed at My Lai, and Tan said that he discussed [the report] with Gavin but that Gavin denies this. Shortly thereafter Major Gavin became Lieutenant Colonel Gavin.
20

The Eleventh Brigade commander dismissed Tans charges as baseless propaganda.21 Barkers afteraction report listed no civilian deaths. Civilian deaths in South Vietnam from 1965 until 1973 are estimated at 1.5 million; none is reported in U.S. military afteraction reports. The Peers panel cited evidence that at least at the Quang Ngai Province and Son Tinh District levels, and possibly at 2nd ARVN Division, the Senior U.S. military advisors aided in suppressing information concerning the massacre. 22 Task Force Barker commander Lieutenant Colonel Barker was killed in a helicopter crash on June 13, 1968, while traveling back to My Lai as part of an investigation ordered by the Quang Ngai Province chief, Colonel Khien. Khien is described as a big time crook and a VNQDD politico who had a family in Hue and was afraid the VC were going to make another Hue out of Quang Ngai. Province Chief Khien and the deputy province senior advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Guinn, both believed that the only way to win the war was to kill all Viet Cong and Viet Cong sympathizers. 23

The last piece in the My Lai puzzle concerned Robert Haeberle and Jay Roberts, Army reporters assigned to Task Force Barker. After the massacre Roberts prepared an article for the brigade newspapers which omitted all mention of war crimes he had observed and gave a false and misleading account of the Task Force Barker operation. Roberts was charged by the Peers panel with having made no attempt to stop war crimes he witnessed and for failing to report the killings of noncombatants. Haeberle was cited by the panel for withholding photographic evidence of war crimes and for failing to report war crimes he had witnessed at My Lai. As Jeff Stein said, The first thing you learn in the Army is not competence, you learn corruption. And you learn to get along, go along. 24 Unfortunately not everyone learns to get along. On September 3, 1988, Robert TSouvas was apparently shot in the head by his girl friend, after an argument over a bottle of vodka. The two were homeless, living out of a van they had parked under a bridge in Pittsburgh. TSouvas was a Vietnam veteran and a participant in the My Lai massacre. TSouvass attorney, George Davis, traveled to Da Nang in 1970 to investigate the massacre and while there was assigned as an aide a Vietnamese colonel who said that the massacre was a Phoenix operation and that the purpose of Phoenix was to terrorize the civilian population into submission. Davis told me: When I told the people in the War Department what I knew and that I would attempt to obtain all records on the program in order to defend my client, they agreed to drop the charges. 25 Indeed, the My Lai massacre was a result of Phoenix, the jerry-built counterterror program that provided an outlet for the repressed fears and anger of the psyched-up men of Task Force Barker. Under the aegis of neutralizing the infrastructure, old men, women, and children became the enemy. Phoenix made it as easy to shoot a Vietnamese child as it was to shoot a sparrow in a tree. The ammunition was faulty intelligence provided by secret agents harboring grudges in violation of the agreement that Census Grievance intelligence would not be provided to the police. The trigger was the blacklist. As Ed Murphy said, Phoenix was far worse than the things attributed to it. Indeed, the range of transgressions generated by Phoenix was all-encompassing but was most evident in its postapprehension aspect. According to Jeff Stein, the CIA would direct the PRU teams to go out and take care of a particular target...either capture or assassination, or kidnapping. Kidnapping was a common thing that they liked to do. They really liked the whole John Wayne bit to go in and capture someone at night. ... Theyd put him in one of these garbage collection type bins and the helicopter would pick up the bin and fly him off to a regional interrogation center. I think its common knowledge what goes on at the interrogation center, Stein writes. It was common knowledge that when someone was picked up their lives were about at an end because the Americans most likely felt that, if they were to turn someone like that back into the countryside it would just be like multiplying NLF followers. 26

Bart Osborn (whose agent net Stein inherited) is more specific. I never knew in the course of all those operations any detainee to live through his interrogation, Osborn testified before Congress in 1971. They all died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those individuals was, in fact, cooperating with the VC, but they all died and the majority were wither tortured to death or things like thrown out of helicopters. 27

The Tiger Cages

One of John Harts original ICEX charges was to develop a means of containing within the GVNs judicial system the explosion of civilian detainees. But as Nelson Brickham explained, no one wanted to get the name of the Jailer of Vietnam, and no agency ever accepted responsibility. So another outcome of Phoenix was a prison system filled to overflowing. It was not until April of 1970, when ten Vietnamese students put themselves on display in a room in the Saigon College of Agriculture, that treatment of political prisoners gained the attention of the press. The students had been tried and convicted by a military field court. Some were in shock and being fed intravenously. Some had had bamboo splinters shoved under their fingernails. One was deaf from having had soapy water poured in his ears and his ears pounded. The women students had been raped as well as tortured. The culprits, claims Don Luce in his book Hostages of War, were Saigons First District police, who used false documents and signatures to prove guilt, and used torture and drugs to extract confessions. The case of the students prompted two congressmen to investigate conditions at Con Son Prison in July 1970. Initially, Rod Landreth advised station chief Shackley not to allow the congressmen to visit, but Shackley saw denial as a tacit admission of CIA responsibility. So Landreth passed the buck to Buzz Johnson at the Central Pacification and Development Council. Thinking there was nothing to hide, Johnson got the green from light General Khiem. He then arranged for Congressmen Augustus Hawkins and William Anderson and their aide Tom Harkins to fly to Con Son accompanied by Public Safety Adviser Frank Walton. Acting as interpreter for the delegation was Don Luce, a former director of the International Volunteer Service who had been living in Vietnam since 1959. Prison reform advocate Luce had gained the trust of many Vietnamese nationalists, one of whom told him where the notorious tiger cages (tiny cells reserved for hard-core VCI under supervision of Nguyen Minh Chau, the Reformer) were located at Con Son Prison. Upon arriving at Con Son, Luce and his entourage were greeted by the prison warden, Colonel Nguyen Van Ve. Harkins presented Ve with a list of six prisoners the congressmen wished to visit in Camp Four. While inside this section of the prison, Luce located the door to the tiger cages hidden behind a woodpile at the edge of a vegetable garden. Ve and Walton protested this departure from the guided tour, their exclamations prompting a guard inside the tiger cage section to open the door, revealing its contents. The congressmen entered and saw stone compartments five feet wide, nine feet long, and six feet high. Access to the tiger cages was gained by climbing steps to a catwalk, then looking down between iron grates. From three to five men were shackled to the floor in each cage. All were beaten, some mutilated. Their legs were withered, and they scuttled like crabs across the floor, begging for food, water, and mercy. Some cried. Others told of having lime buckets, which sat ready above each cage, emptied upon them.

Ve denied everything. The lime was for whitewashing the walls, he explained, and the prisoners were evil people who deserved punishment because they would not salute the flag. Despite the fact that Congress funded the GVNs Directorate of Corrections, Walton accused the congressmen of interfering in Vietnamese affairs. Congressman Hawkins expressed the hope that American POWs were being better treated in Hanoi. The extent of the tiger cage flap was a brief article in The New York Times that was repudiated by U.S. authorities. In Saigon the secret police cornered Luces landlady and the U.S. Embassy accused Luce of being a Vietcong agent. Rod Landreth approached Buzz Johnson with the idea of circulating evidence of Luces alleged homosexuality, but Johnson nixed the idea. When Luce began writing articles for Tin Sang, all issues were promptly confiscated and his press card was revoked. Finally, Luce was expelled from Vietnam in May 1971, after his apartment had been ransacked by secret policemen searching for his records. Fortunately Luce had mailed his notes and documents to the United States, and he later compiled them in Hostages of War. Michael Drosnin, in the May 30, 1975 issue of New Times, quotes Phoenix legal adviser Robert Gould as saying, I dont know for sure, but I guess Colby was covering up for Con Son too. Nothing really was changed after all that publicity... the inmates who were taken out of the Tiger Cages were simply transferred to something called cow cages, which were even worse. Those were barbed wire cells in another part of the camp. The inmates were shackled inside them for months and left paralyzed. I saw loads of spidery little guys they couldnt stand and they couldnt walk, but had to move around on little wooden pallets.28 According to Gould, It was a well known smirking secret in certain official circles that with all the publicity about the Tiger Cages, no one ever found out about the cow cages. 29 Added Gould: The responsibility for all this is on the Americans who pushed the program. We finally made some paper reforms, but it didnt make any difference. The Province Security Committees did whatever the hell they wanted and the pressure our neutralization quotas put on them meant they had to sentence so many people a month regardless. And God, if you ever saw those prisons. 30 In Hostages of War Don Luce refers to the GVN as a Prison Regime and calls Phoenix a microcosm of the omnipotent and perverse U.S. influence on Vietnamese society. He blames the program for the deterioration of values that permitted torture, political repression, and assassination. While few Americans are directly involved in the program, Luce writes, Phoenix was created, organized, and funded by the CIA. The district and provincial interrogation centers were constructed with American funds, and provided with American advisers. Quotas were set by Americans. The national system of identifying suspects was devised by Americans and underwritten by the U.S. Informers are paid with US funds. American tax dollars have covered the expansion of the police and paramilitary units who arrest suspects. 31 Thus, Luce writes, the U.S. must share responsibility for the nature of the Saigon government itself. It is a government of limited scope whose very essence is dictated by American policy, not Vietnamese reality.32 But the CIA absolved itself of responsibility, saying that abuses occurred in the absence of U.S. advisers and that oversight was impossible. However, if the CIA had accepted responsibility, it would have nullified the plausible denial it had so carefully cultivated.

Like Phoenix, the prison system was intentionally jerry-built, enabling sadists to fall through the gaping holes in the safety net. Writes Luce: Abuses of justice are not accidental but an integral part of the Phoenix Program. For example, The widespread use of torture during interrogation can be explained by the admissibility of confession as evidence in court...and by the fact that local officials are under pressure from Saigon to sentence a specific number of high level VCI officials each month. He adds that Phoenix was named after the all seeing mythical bird which selectively snatches its prey but the techniques of this operation are anything but selective. For many Vietnamese, the Phung Hoang program is a constant menace to their lives. 33

Notes
1. McCollum interview. 2. Parker interview. 3. Calley Defense Asks Disclosure of Top-Secret Data on Song My, The New York Times, August 25, 1970 4. Wall interview. 5. Seymour Hersh, Cover-Up (New York: Random House, 1972) p. 87. 6. Hersh, p. 88. 7. Hersh, p. 88. 8. Hersh, p. 88. 9. Hersh, p. 88. 10. Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing (New York: Signet, 1984), p. 625. 11. Joseph Goldstein, The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-up (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 256. 12. Hersh, p. 93. 13. Hersh, p. 93. 14. Hersh, p. 95. 15. Goldstein, p. 145. 16. Hersh, p. 95. 17. Goldstein, p. 339 18. Goldstein, p. 270 19. Goldstein, p. 277 20. Goldstein, p. 278 21. Goldstein, p. 288 22. Goldstein, p. 313 23. Hersh, pp. 188-189. 24. MacPherson, p. 625. 25. Interview with George Davis. 26. Jeffrey Stein and Michael T. Klare, From the Ashes: Phoenix, Commonweal, April 20, 1975, p. 159. 27. U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam, p. 53. 28. Michael Drosnin, Phoenix: The CIAs Biggest Assassination Program (New York Times, August 22, 1975), p. 24. 29. Drosnin, p. 24. 30. Drosnin, p. 23.

31. Don Luce, Hostages of War (Indochina Resource Center, 1973) p. 26. 32. Luce, p. 27. 33. Luce, P. 24.

Glossary Agroville (Khu Tru Mat): garrison community into which rural Vietnamese were forcefully relocated in order to isolate them from the Viet Cong. ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam Census Grievance (CG) CIA covert action program designed to obtain information on the VCI through static agents in villages, or mobile agents in armed propaganda teams. [Back] CIO Central Intelligence Organization: formed in 1961 to coordinate South Vietnamese foreign and domestic intelligence operations. DIOCC District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center: office of the Phoenix adviser in each of South Vietnams 250 districts. [Back] Free Fire Zone Area in South Vietnam where U.S. military personnel had the authority to kill anyone they targeted. GVN Government of Vietnam [Back] ICEX Intelligence coordination and exploitation: original name of the Phoenix program, formed in June 1967. [Back] Kuomintang (KMT) Official ruling party of the Republic of China (Taiwan), formed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911. MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: arrived in Saigon in February 1962 as a unified command under the Commander in Chief, Pacific, managing the U.S. military effort in South Vietnam. [Back] NIC National Interrogation Center: CIA facility built in 1964 inside CIO headquarters in the naval shipyard in Saigon. NLF National Liberation Front: formed in 1960 by the various insurgent groups in South Vietnam. [Back] NVA North Vietnamese Army Phung Hoang The mythological Vietnamese bird of conjugal love that appears in times of peace, pictured holding a flute and representing virtue, grace, and harmony. Also the name given to the South Vietnamese version of Phoenix. [Back] Province Security Committee (PSC) nonjudicial body charged with the disposition of captured VCI. [Back] PRU Provincial Reconnaissance Units: mercenary forces under the control of the CIA in

South Vietnam. [Back] RD Revolutionary Development: CIA program to build support for the GVN in provinces of South Vietnam. [Back] RDC Revolutionary Development cadre: South Vietnamese trained by the CIA at Vung Tau to persuade the citizens of South Vietnam so support the central government. RDC/O Revolutionary Development Cadre, Operations: CIA officer in charge of paramilitary operations in a province. RDC/P Revolutionary Development Cadre, Plans: CIA officer in charge of liaison with the Special Branch in a province. SACSA Special assistant (to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities: office within the Joints Chiefs with responsibility for Phoenix policy. [Back] USIS United States Information Service: branch of the U.S. government responsible for conducting psychological operations overseas. VC Viet Cong: Vietnamese Communist VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure: all Communist party members and NLF officers, plus Vietcong and NVA saboteurs and terrorists. [Back]

May 17, 2001 A CounterPunch Special Report

Fragging Bob: Bob Kerrey, CIA War Crimes, And The Need For A War Crimes Trial
by Douglas Valentine By now everybody knows that former Senator Bob Kerrey led a seven-member team of Navy Seals into Thanh Phong village in February 1969, and murdered in cold blood more than a dozen women and children. What hardly anyone knows, and what no one in the press is talking about (although many of them know), is that Kerrey was on a CIA mission, and its specific purpose was to kill those women and children. It was illegal, premeditated mass murder and it was a war crime. And it's time to hold the CIA responsible. It's time for a war crimes tribunal to examine the CIA's illegal activities during and since the Vietnam War.

War Crimes As Policy

War crimes were a central was part of a CIA strategy for fighting the Vietnam War. The strategy was known as Contre Coup, and it was the manifestation of a belief that the war was essentially political, not military, in nature. The CIA theorized that it was being fought by opposing ideological factions, each one amounting to about five percent of the total population, while the remaining ninety percent was uncommitted and wanted the war to go away. According to the CIA's mythology, on one side were communist insurgents, supported by comrades in Hanoi, Moscow and Peking. The communists fought for land reform, to rid Vietnam of foreign intervention, and to unite the north and south. The other faction was composed of capitalists, often Catholics relocated from North Vietnam in 1954 by the CIA. This faction was fighting to keep South Vietnam an independent nation, operating under the direction of quiet Americans. Caught in the crossfire was the silent majority. The object shared by both factions was to win these undecided voters over to its side. Contre Coup was the CIA's response to the realization that the Communists were winning the war for the hearts and minds of the people. It also was a response to the belief that they were winning through the use of psychological warfare, specifically, selective terror the murder and mutilation of specific government officials. In December 1963, Peer DeSilva arrived in Saigon as the CIA's station chief. He claims to have been shocked by what he saw. In his autobiography, SubRosa, DeSilva describes how the VC had "impaled a young boy, a village chief, and his pregnant wife on sharp poles. To make sure this horrible sight would remain with the villagers, one of the terror squad used his machete to disembowel the woman, spilling he fetus onto the ground." "The Vietcong," DeSilva said, "were monstrous in the application of torture and murder to achieve the political and psychological impact they wanted." But the methodology was successful and had tremendous intelligence potential, so DeSilva authorized the creation of small "counter-terror teams," designed "to bring danger and death to the Vietcong functionaries themselves, especially in areas where they felt secure."

How Counter-Terror Worked In Vietnam Thanh Phong village was one of those areas where Vietcong functionaries felt secure. It was located in Kien Hoa Province, along the Mekong Delta. One of Vietnam's most densely populated provinces, Kien Hoa was precariously close to Saigon, and is criss-crossed with waterways and rice paddies. It was an important rice production area for the insurgents as well as the Government of Vietnam, and thus was one of the eight most heavily infiltrated provinces in Vietnam. The estimated 4700 VC functionaries in Kien Hoa accounted for more than five percent of the insurgency's total leadership. Operation Speedy Express, a Ninth Infantry sweep through Kien Hoa in the first six months of 1969, killed an estimated 11,000 civilianssupposedly VC sympathizers.

These functionaries formed what the CIA called the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI). The VCI consisted of members of the People's Revolutionary Party, the National Liberation Front, and other Communist outfits like the Women's and Student's Liberation Associations. Its members were politicians and administrators managing committees for business, communications, security, intelligence, and military affairs. Among their main functions were the collection of taxes, the recruitment of young men and women into the insurgency, and the selective assassination of GVN officials. As the CIA was well aware, Ho Chi Minh boasted that with two cadre in every hamlet, he could win the war, no matter how many soldiers the Americans threw at him. So the CIA adopted the Ho's strategy-but on a grander and bloodier scale. The object of Contre Coup was to identify and terrorize each and every individual VCI and his/her family, friends and fellow villagers. To this end the CIA in 1964 launched a massive intelligence operation called the Provincial Interrogation Center Program. The CIA (employing the US company Pacific Architects and Engineers) built an interrogation center in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces. Staffed by members of the brutal Special Police, who ran extensive informant networks, and advised by CIA officers, the purpose of the PICs was to identify, through the systematic "interrogation" (read torture) of VCI suspects, the membership of the VCI at every level of its organization; from its elusive headquarters somewhere along the Cambodian border, through the region, city, province, district, village and hamlet committees. The "indispensable link" in the VCI was the District Party Secretary the same individual Bob Kerrey's Seal team was out to assassinate in its mission in Thanh Phong.

Frankenstein's Monster Initially the CIA had trouble finding people who were willing to murder and mutilate, so the Agency's original "counter-terror teams" were composed of ex-convicts, VC defectors, Chinese Nungs, Cambodians, Montagnards, and mercenaries. In a February 1970 article written for True Magazine, titled "The CIA's Hired Killers," Georgie-Anne Geyer compared "our boys" to "their boys" with the qualification that, "Their boys did it for faith; our boys did it for money." The other big problem was security. The VC had infiltrated nearly every facet of the GVN-even the CIA's unilateral counter-terror program. So in an attempt to bring greater effectiveness to its secret war, the CIA started employing Navy Seals, US Army Special Forces, Force Recon Marines, and other highly trained Americans who, like Bob Kerrey, were "motivationally indoctrinated" by the military and turned into killing machines with all the social inhibitions and moral compunctions of a Timmy McVeigh. Except they were secure in the knowledge that what they were doing was, if not legal or moral, fraught with Old Testament-style justice, rationalizing that the Viet Cong did it first. Eventually the irrepressible Americans added their own improvements. In his autobiography Soldier, Anthony Herbert describes arriving in Saigon in 1965, reporting to the CIA's Special

Operations Group, and being asked to join a top-secret psywar program. What the CIA wanted Herbert to do, "was to take charge of execution teams that wiped out entire families." By 1967, killing entire families had become an integral facet of the CIA's counter-terror program. Robert Slater was the chief of the CIA's Province Interrogation Center Program from June 1967 through 1969. In a March 1970 thesis for the Defense Intelligence School, titled "The History, Organization and Modus Operandi of the Viet Cong Infrastructure," Slater wrote, "the District Party Secretary usually does not sleep in the same house or even hamlet where his family lived, to preclude any injury to his family during assassination attempts." But, Slater added, "the Allies have frequently found out where the District Party Secretaries live and raided their homes: in an ensuing fire fight the secretary's wife and children have been killed and injured." This is the intellectual context in which the Kerrey atrocity took place. This CIA strategy of committing war crimes for psychological reasons to terrorize the enemy's supporters into submission also is what differentiates Kerrey's atrocity, in legal terms, from other popular methods of mass murdering civilians, such as bombs from the sky, or economic boycotts. Yes, the CIA has a global, illegal strategy of terrorizing people, although in typical CIA lexicon it's called "anti-terrorism." When you're waging illegal warfare, language is every bit as important as weaponry and the will to kill. As George Orwell or Noam Chomsky might explain, when you're deliberately killing innocent women and children, half the court-of-public-opinion battle is making it sound legal. Three Old Vietnam Hands in particular stand out as examples of this incestuous relationship. Neil Sheehan, CIA-nik and author of the aptly titled Bright Shining Lie, recently confessed that in 1966 he saw US soldiers massacre as many as 600 Vietnamese civilians in five fishing villages. He'd been in Vietnam for three years by then, but it didn't occur to him that he had discovered a war crime. Now he realizes that the war crimes issue was always present, but still no mention of his friends in the CIA. Former New York Times reporter and author of The Best and The Brightest, David Halberstam, defended Kerrey on behalf of the media establishment at the New School campus the week after the story broke. CIA flack Halberstam described the region around Thanh Phong as "the purest bandit country," adding that "by 1969 everyone who lived there would have been thirdgeneration Vietcong." Which is CIA revisionism at its sickest. Finally there's New York Times reporter James Lemoyne. Why did he never write any articles linking the CIA to war crimes in Vietnam? Because his brother Charles, a Navy officer, was in charge of the CIA's counter-terror teams in the Delta in 1968.

Phoenix Comes To Thanh Phong

The CIA launched its Phoenix Program in June 1967, after 13 years of tinkering with several experimental counter-terror and psywar programs, and building its network of secret interrogation centers. The stated policy was to replace the bludgeon of indiscriminate bombings and military search and destroy operations which had alienated the people from the Government of Vietnam with the scalpel of assassinations of selected members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. A typical Phoenix operation began in a Province Interrogation Center where a suspected member of the VCI was brought for questioning. After a few days or weeks or months undergoing various forms of torture, the VCI suspect would die or give the name and location of his VCI comrades and superiors. That information would be sent from the Interrogation Center to the local Phoenix office, which was staffed by Special Branch and Vietnamese military officers under the supervision of CIA officers. Depending on the suspected importance of the targeted VCI, the Phoenix people would then dispatch one of the various action arms available to it, including Seal teams like the one Bob Kerrey led into Thanh Phong. In February 1969, the Phoenix Program was still under CIA control. But because Kien Hoa Province was so important, and because the VCI's District Party Secretary was supposedly in Thanh Phong, the CIA decided to handle this particular assassination and mass murder mission without involving the local Vietnamese. So instead of dispensing the local counter-terror team, the CIA sent Kerrey's Raiders. And that, very simply, is how it happened. Kerrey and crew admittedly went to Thanh Phong to kill the District Party Secretary, and anyone else who got in the way, including his family and all their friends.

Phoenix Comes Home To Roost By 1969 the CIA, through Phoenix, was targeting individual VCI and their families all across Vietnam. Over 20,000 people were assassinated by the end of the year and hundreds of thousands had been tortured in Province Interrogation Centers. On 20 June 1969, the Lower House of the Vietnamese Congress held hearings about abuses in the Phoenix VCI elimination program. Eighty-six Deputies signed a petition calling for its immediate termination. Among the charges: Special Police knowingly arrested innocent people for the purpose of extortion; people were detained for as long as eight months before being tried; torture was commonplace. Noting that it was illegal to do so, several deputies protested instances in which American troops detained or murdered suspects without Vietnamese authority. Others complained that village chiefs were not consulted before raids, such as the one on Thanh Phong. After an investigation in 1970, four Congresspersons concluded that the CIA's Phoenix Program violated international law. "The people of these United States," they jointly stated, "have deliberately imposed upon the Vietnamese people a system of justice which admittedly denies due process of law," and that in doing so, "we appear to have violated the 1949 Geneva Convention for the protection of civilian people."

During the hearings, U.S. Representative Ogden Reid said, "if the Union had had a Phoenix program during the Civil War, its targets would have been civilians like Jefferson Davis or the mayor of Macon, Georgia." But the American establishment and media denied it then, and continue to deny it until today, because Phoenix was a genocidal program -- and the CIA officials, members of the media who were complicit through their silence, and the red-blooded American boys who carried it out, are all war criminals. As Michael Ratner a lawyer at the Center for Constitutional Rights told CounterPunch: "Kerrey should be tried as a war criminal. His actions on the night of February 24-25, 1969 when the seven man Navy Seal unit which he headed killed approximately twenty unarmed Vietnamese civilians, eighteen of whom were women and children was a war crime. Like those who murdered at My Lai, he too should be brought into the dock and tried for his crimes." Phoenix, alas, also was fiendishly effective and became a template for future CIA operations. Developed in Vietnam and perfected with the death squads and media blackout of Afghanistan and El Salvador, it is now employed by the CIA around the world: in Colombia, in Kosovo, in Ireland with the British MI6, and in Israel with its other kindred spirit, the Mossad. The paymasters at the Pentagon will keep cranking out billion dollar missile defense shields and other Bush league boondoggles. But when it comes to making the world safe for international capitalism, the political trick is being more of a homicidal maniac, and more cost effective, than the terrorists. Incredibly, Phoenix has become fashionable, it has adhered a kind of political cachet. Governor Jesse Ventura claims to have been a Navy Seal and to have "hunted man." Fanatical right-wing US Representative Bob Barr, one of the Republican impeachment clique, has introduced legislation to "re-legalize" assassinations. David Hackworth, representing the military establishment, defended Kerrey by saying "there were thousands of such atrocities," and that in 1969 his own unit committed "at least a dozen such horrors." Jack Valenti, representing the business establishment and its financial stake in the issue, defended Kerrey in the LA Times, saying, "all the normalities (sic) of a social contract are abandoned," in war. Bullshit. A famous Phoenix operation, known as the My Lai Massacre, was proceeding along smoothly, with a grand total of 504 Vietnamese women and children killed, when a soldier named Hugh Thompson in a helicopter gunship saw what was happening. Risking his life to preserve that "social contract," Thomson landed his helicopter between the mass murderers and their victims, turned his machine guns on his fellow Americans, and brought the carnage to a halt. Same with screenwriter and journalist Bill Broyles, Vietnam veteran, and author Brothers In Arms, an excellent book about the Vietnam War. Broyles turned in a bunch of his fellow Marines for killing civilians.

If Thompson and Broyles were capable of taking individual responsibility, everyone is. And many did.

Phoenix Reborn
There is no doubt that Bob Kerrey committed a war crime. As he admits, he went to Vietnam with a knife clenched between his teeth and did what he was trained to do kidnap, assassinate and mass murder civilians. But there was no point to his atrocity as he soon learned, no controlling legal authority. He became a conflicted individual. He remembers that they killed women and children. But he thinks they came under fire first, before they panicked and started shooting back. The fog of war clouds his memory But there isn't that much to forget. Thanh Phong was Kerrey's first mission, and on his second mission a grenade blew off his foot, abruptly ending his military career. Plus which there are plenty of other people to remind Kerrey of what happened, if anyone will listen. There's Gerhard Klann, the Seal who disputes Kerrey's account, and two Vietnamese survivors of the raid, Pham Tri Lanh and Bui Thi Luam, both of whom corroborate Klann's account, as does a veteran Viet Cong soldier, Tran Van Rung. As CBS News was careful to point out, the Vietnamese were former VC and thus hostile witnesses and because there were slight inconsistencies in their stories, they could not be believed. Klann became the target of Kerrey's pr machine, which dismissed as an alcoholic with a chip on his shoulder. Then there is John DeCamp. An army captain in Vietnam, DeCamp worked for the organization under CIA executive William Colby that ostensibly managed Phoenix after the CIA let it go in June 1969. DeCamp was elected to the Nebraska State Senate and served until 1990. A Republican, he claims that Kerrey led an anti-war march on the Nebraska state capitol in May 1971. DeCamp claims that Kerrey put a medal, possibly his bronze star, in a mock coffin, and said, "Viet Cong or North Vietnamese troops are angelic compared with the ruthless Americans." Kerrey claims he was in Peru visiting his brother that day. But he definitely accepted his Medal of Honor from Richard Nixon on 14 May 1970, a mere ten days after the Ohio National guard killed four student protestors at Kent State. With that badge of honor pinned on his chest, Kerrey began walking the gilded road to success. Elected Governor of Nebraska in November 1982, he started dating Deborah Winger, became a celebrity hero, was elected to the US Senate, became vice-chair of Senate Committee on Intelligence, and in 1990 staged a run for president. One of the most highly regarded politicians in America, he showered self-righteous criticism on draft dodger Bill Clinton's penchant for lying. Bob Kerrey is a symbol of what it means to be an American, and the patriots have rallied to his defense. And yet Kerrey accepted a bronze star under false pretenses, and as John DeCamp suggests, he may have been fragged by his fellow Seals. For this, he received the Medal of Honor.

John DeCamp calls Bob Kerrey "emotionally disturbed" as a result of his Vietnam experience. And Kerrey's behavior has been pathetic. In order to protect himself and his CIA patrons from being tried as a war criminals, Bob Kerrey has become a pathological liar too. Kerrey says his actions at Than Phong were an atrocity, but not a war crime. He says he feels remorse, but not guilt. In fact, he has continually rehabbed his position on the war itself-moving from an opponent to more recently an enthusiast. In a 1999 column in the Washington Post, for example, Kerrey said he had come to view that Vietnam was a "just war. "Was the war worth the effort and sacrifice, or was it a mistake?" Kerrey wrote. "When I came home in 1969 and for many years afterward, I did not believe it was worth it. Today, with the passage of time and the experience of seeing both the benefits of freedom won by our sacrifice and the human destruction done by dictatorships, I believe the cause was just and the sacrifice not in vain." Then at the Democratic Party Convention in Los Angeles last summer Kerrey lectured the delegates that they shouldn't be ashamed of the war and that they should treat Vietnam veterans as war heroes: "I believe I speak for Max Baucus and every person who has ever served when I say I never felt more free than when I wore the uniform of our country. This country - this party must remember." Free? Free to murder women and children. Is this a consciousness of guilt or immunity? CBS News also participated in constructing a curtain of lies. As does every other official government or media outlet that knows about the CIA's Phoenix Program, which continues to exist and operate worldwide today, but fails to mention it. Why? Because if the name of one targeted Viet Cong cadre can be obtained, then all the names can be obtained, and then a war crimes trial becomes imperative. And that's the last thing the Establishment will allow to happen. Average Americans, however, consider themselves a nation ruled by laws and an ethic of fair play, and with the Kerry confession comes an opportunity for America to redefine itself in more realistic terms. The discrepancies in his story beg investigation. He says he was never briefed on the rules of engagement. But a "pocket card" with the Laws of Land Warfare was given to each member of the US Armed Forces in Vietnam. Does it matter that Kerrey would lie about this? Yes. General Bruce Palmer, commander of the same Ninth Division that devastated Kien Koa Province in 1969, objected to the "involuntary assignment" of American soldiers to Phoenix. He did not believe that "people in uniform, who are pledged to abide by the Geneva Conventions, should be put in the position of having to break those laws of warfare." It was the CIA that forced soldiers like Kerrey into Phoenix operations, and the hidden hand of the CIA lingers over his war crime. Kerrey even uses the same rationale offered by CIA officer DeSilva. According to Kerrey, "the Viet Cong were a thousand per cent more ruthless than" the Seals or U.S. Army.

But the Geneva Conventions, customary international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice all prohibit the killing of noncombatant civilians. The alleged brutality of others is no justification. By saying it is, Kerrey implicates the people who generated that rationale: the CIA. That is why there is a moral imperative to scrutinize the Phoenix Program and the CIA officers who created it, the people who participated in it, and the journalists who covered it up to expose the dark side of our national psyche, the part that allows us to employ terror to assure our world dominance. To accomplish this there must be a war crimes tribunal. This won't be easy. The US government has gone to great lengths to shield itself from such legal scrutiny, at the same it selectively manipulates international institutions, such as the UN, to go after people like Slobodan Milosevic. According to human rights lawyer Michael Ratner the legal avenues for bringing Kerrey and his cohorts to justice are quite limited. A civil suit could be lodged against Kerrey by the families of the victims brought in the United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act. "These are the kinds of cases I did against Gramajo, Pangaitan (Timor)," Ratner told us. "The main problem here is that it is doubtful the Vietnamese would sue a liberal when they are dying to better relations with the US. I would do this case if could get plaintiffs--so far no luck." According to Ratner, there is no statute of limitations problem as it is newly discovered evidence and there is a stron argument particularly in the criminal context that there is no statute of limitations for war crimes. But criminal cases in the US present a difficult, if not impossible, prospect. Now that Kerrey is discharged from the Navy, the military courts, which went after Lt. Calley for the My Lai massacre, has no jurisdiction over him. "As to criminal case in the US--my pretty answer is no," says Ratner. "The US first passed a war crimes statute (18 USC sec. 2441 War Crimes) in 1996-that statute makes what Kerrey did a war crime punishable by death of life imprisonment--but it was passed after the crime and criminal statutes are not retroactive." In 1988, Congress enacted a statute against genocide, which was might apply to Kerrey's actions, but it to can't be applied retroactively. Generally at the time of Kerrey's acts in Vietnam, US criminal law did not extend to what US citizens did overseas unless they were military. [As a senator, Kerrey, it should be noted, voted for the war crimes law, thus opening the opportunity for others to be prosecuted for crimes similar to those he that committed but is shielded from.] The United Nations is a possibility, but a long shot. They could establish an ad hoc tribunal such as it did with the Rwanda ICTR and Yugoslavia ICTY. "This would require action by UN Security council could do it, but what are the chances?" says Ratner. "There is still the prospect for a US veto What that really points out is how those tribunals are bent toward what the US and West want." Prosecution in Vietnam and or another country and extradition is also a possibility. It can be argued that war crimes are crimes over which there is universal jurisdiction--in fact that is obligation of countries-under Geneva Convention of 1948--to seek out and prosecute war

criminals. "Universal jurisdiction does not require the presence of the defendant--he can be indicted and tried in some countries in absentia--or his extradition can be requested", says Ratner. "Some countries may have statutes permitting this. Kerrey should check his travel plans and hire a good lawyer before he gets on a plane. He can use Kissinger's lawyer." CP Douglas Valentine is the author of The Phoenix Program, the only comprehensive account of the CIA's torture and assassination operation in Vietnam, as well as TDY a chilling novel about the CIA and the drug trade.

How the CIA penetrates the Left Check it out at the Lew Rockwell Show "Doug Valentine belongs to that precious remnant of journalists and historians with the wisdom to see our time, the integrity and courage to write about it, and the literary grace to bring it all chillingly alive. This indispensable book may quite well be the best yet in the author's already singular body of work. He takes us again into that dark inner reality of policy and politics that Americans so tragically deny and evade, and gives us back a reflection there is no denying, no escaping. If there is hope for America at this moment of so many reckonings, it is out of pages like these." Roger Morris, author of Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician

Published Works The Hotel Tacloban, a highly praised account of my father's experiences in a Japanese prisoner of war camp in World War II. The Phoenix Program, described by Professor Alfred W. McCoy as "the definitive account" of the CIA's most secret and deadly covert operation of the Vietnam War. TDY, a novel about an Air Force photojournalist who participates in an unusual military mission in 1967. The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America's War on Drugs, recipient of the Choice Academic Excellence Award . The Strength of the Pack: The Politics, Personalities and Espionage Intrigues That Shaped the DEA, described by Peter Dale Scott as "an indispensible resource for those who wish to understand the politics of drug enforcement in America; and for those with any sense of the subjects real importance it is a gripping read as well."

The Hotel Tacloban and The Phoenix Program are available through iUniverse.com as backinprint books under the Authors Guild imprint. TDY is also available through iUniverse.com. See my Books page for ordering information.

My research and interview notes, and tape recorded interviews with numerous CIA officers are available to the public at the National Security Archive The Douglas Valentine Vietnam Collection at the National Security Archive in Washington, DC, has been open and used by researchers since early 2007. The Collection contains the research material, including audio files of interviews with senior CIA and military officers in the Phoenix program, original handwritten interview notes, and government documents obtained from CIA and military officers as well as through FOIA requests, for my book The Phoenix Program. The Collection can only be used in the National Security Archive's Reading Room; it is not available for interlibrary loan and an appointment must be made to use it. The "resguide" link below will help anyone who wants to read the material.

Follow this link to learn how to use the Archive's Reading Room Link to the document the Department of Justice posted online regarding my Privacy Act request from the CIA. This case was heard in federal court Phoenix audio files and documents at Cryptocomb Many of the most important Phoenix documents and the first four taped interviews are up at Cryptocomb. More to follow. The documents show the development of targeted kills, "administrative detention" and "High Value" rewards programs, among other things relevant to the eternal war on terror and Homeland Security. interview with Joyce Powers (6.7MB) Adam Engel reviews Strength of the Pack John Jiggens reviews Strength of the Pack Thomas Wilkinson reviews Strength of the Pack Ron Jacobs Review of Strength of the Pack Click this link to order my new book Strength of the Pack. View the dust jacket too! Article in the Sunday Republican, 11-22-09 Ron Jacobs reviews Strength of the Wolf Carlo Parcelli reviews Strength of the Wolf The Strength of the Wolf has been published online in Russian and is available by clicking this link

Adam Engel (author of Topiary) reviews TDY National Security Archive Index to the Valentine Vietnam Collection (51.5KB) Some documents from the file the CIA keeps on me as a result of my work on The Phoenix Program (654.0KB) interesting link

From Uri Dowbenko < www.conspiracyplanet.com > http://educate-yourself.org/cn/criminalsinaction29jun04.shtml Posted June 29, 2004

Dead Spooks Don't Lie (And Don't Deal Drugs Either) by Uri Dowbenko
War criminal and notorious CIA klller/ drug trafficker Ted Shackley, known as 'The Blond Ghost, died on December 9, 2002. The Ultimate Cold War Apparatchik, Ted Shackley was the notorious Director of 'Operation Phoenix' in Laos and Viet Nam, and thus responsible for a slaughter which claimed the lives of over 40,000 Vietnamese civilians under the guise of neutralizing communist sympathizers. According to many credible reports, Shackley was involved in covert and illicit drug trafficking and weapons sales as late as the notorious Iran-Contra scandal, in which a huge quantity of weapons fell into terrorist hands. He took part in a scandalous affair in which Libyan terrorists under Muammar Quadaffi received weaponry and military training from the US. Behind the scenes, he was one of the most influential members of the CIA from the 1960s through the 1980s, being the Deputy Director to CIA DIrector George Herbert Walker Bush. Shackley was also the author of "The Third Option" (Dell Publishing), a guide for training indigenous homegrown terrorist groups in foreign lands, a failed and flawed policy which can be held responsible for the state of the world today. An excellent analysis of Shackley's role in geo-politics and the rise of American Empire is included in the following excerpt from David Hoffman's "The Oklahoma City Bombing" -Or consider the words of Lt. Col. Bo Gritz, former commander of the Special Forces in Latin America and the most decorated soldier in Vietnam. Gritz made a trip to the Golden Triangle in

1983 to search for American POWs, a mission that was ultimately stonewalled. Gritz believes the POWs are being used as drug mules, and the government doesn't want them returned alive, for fear they would expose the Octopus. As Gritz said: "[They] would not want the American POWs to come home. Because when they do, there will be an investigation as to why they were abandoned. At that time we will uncover this secret organization and its illicit drug money and financing. The Secret Team would then be exposed."[1122] As Gritz later wrote in Called to Serve: If Richard Armitage was, as Khun Sa avowed, a major participant in parallel government drug trafficking, then it explained why our efforts to rescue POWs had been inexplicably foiled, time after time... If it was true, Richard Armitage would be the last man in the world who would desire to see prisoners of war come home alive.[1123] As "Special Consultant to the Pentagon on the MIAs," in Bangkok in 1975, Armitage reportedly spent more time repatriating opium profits then recovering POWs. In 1976, when Khun Sa was still selling heroin to CIA officials, the head of the CIA was none other than George Bush.[1124] Former presidential candidate H. Ross Perot, who was appointed presidential investigator for POW/MIA affairs, came upon the same information, and was warned by former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci to stop pursuing the connections to Armitage. As he sadly explained to a group of POW/MIA families in 1987: "I have been instructed to cease and desist."[1125] Ironically, between 1987 and 1991, Vice-President Bush served as head of the South Florida Drug Task Force, and later as chair of the National Narcotics Interdiction System, both set up to "stem" the flow of drugs into the U.S. While Bush was drug czar, the volume of cocaine smuggled into the U.S. tripled.[1126] Celerino "Cele" Castillo, the DEA's head agent in El Salvador and Guatemala from 1985 to 1991, told reporters and Senate investigators of numerous known drug traffickers who used hangers controlled by Oliver North and the CIA in El Salvador's Ilopango military airbase. When Castillo naively tried to warn Bush at a U.S. embassy party in Guatemala, Bush "just shook my hand, smiled and walked away"[1127] "By the end of 1988," added Castillo, "I realized how hopelessly tangled the DEA, the CIA, and every other U.S. entity in Central America had become with the criminals. The connections boggled my mind."[1128] "The CIA they're making deals with the Devil," adds Mike Levine. "Unfortunately, the Devil is smarter than they are."[1129] Some of those devils, like Monzer al-Kassar "business partner" of Richard Secord and Oliver North would be utilized to do the Octopus's dirty work.

Another name Khun Sa mentioned repeatedly was Ted Shackley.[1130] A long-time CIA player, Theodore G. Shackley (known as "The Blond Ghost") began his Agency career as CIA Station Chief in Miami, where he directed the CIA's JM/WAVE Operation, a post-Bay of Pigs attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro and wreck havoc within that sovereign nation. Utilizing Cuban expatriates, the CIA conducted hundreds of sabotage raids against Cuba in direct violation of the U.S. Neutrality Act. Shackley also worked in close partnership with Mob figures John Roselli, Sam Giancana, and Santos Trafficante.[1131] While the operation was shut down in 1965, due mainly to revelations of organized crime connections and drug smuggling, many of the participants remained in Miami, continuing their illegal activities. Later, as Station Chief of Laos, Shackley directed Major General Richard Secord's air wing in tactical raids against the Communist Pathet Lao, who happened to be General Vang Pao's main competition in the opium trade. By keeping the Pathet Lao busy with the help of the CIA and the American military, Pao's Hmong tribesmen were able to become the region's largest heroin producers.[1132] Of course, Shackley, his deputy Tom Clines (who supervised the air base in Long Tieng), and their colleagues in CIA front companies like Air America were only too happy to help, smuggling heroin to the U.S. in the gutted bodies of dead GIs (with the assistance of their old Mob buddy Santos Trafficante, who had helped form their ZR/RIFLE assassination team, and Vietnamese Air Force General Nguyen Cao Ky), and laundering the profits in the Nugan-Hand bank. As a 1983 Wall Street Journal article stated: Investigations following Mr. Nugan's death and the failure of the bank revealed widespread dealings by Nugan-Hand with international heroin syndicates, and evidence of massive fraud against U.S. and foreign citizens. Many retired high-ranking Pentagon and CIA officials were executives of or consultants to Nugan-Hand.[1133][1134]* Shackley, along with Nugan-Hand's attorney former CIA Director William Colby directed the infamous "Phoenix Program," a largely successful attempt to "neutralize" by torture and murder approximately 40,000 Vietnamese civilians suspected of being Viet Cong sympathizers. One Phoenix operative, testifying before Congress, stated that Phoenix was "a sterile, depersonalized murder program it was completely indiscriminate." The assassinations would continue in Nicaragua under the code-name "Operation Pegasus."[1135][1136] After becoming the head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere operations (Latin American Division) in 1972, Shackley supervised the overthrow of the Chilean government ("Operation Track II") by murdering democratically elected President Salvador Allende. With the backing of the CIA under Shackley, the military led a violent coup by Right-wing General Augusto Pinochet, which resulted in the abolishment of the Constitution, the closing of all newspapers save for two Right-wing dailies, the outlawing of trade unions, the suppression of all political parties, and the arrest, torture, and execution of thousands.[1137]

After a brief stint as Director of the Far East Division, Shackley directed CIA agent Edwin Wilson in training the Shah of Iran's notorious secret police, the Savak, who routinely tortured and murdered the Shah's opponents. Later Shackley would assist more directly in these efforts.[1138] In 1975, Shackley became Associate Director in the Directorate of Operations, which put him in charge of Covert-Operations, Counter-Intelligence, and ironically, Counter-Narcotics, all under the command of George Herbert Walker Bush. These associations naturally led to Shackley playing a role in the formation of the "Secret Team," (to coin a phrase invented by Col. L. Fletcher Prouty) the covert and illegal enterprise that was the driving force behind the Iran-Contra operation. Donald Gregg, one of Shackley's subordinates during his Saigon tenure, would later become Assistant National Security Advisor during Iran-Contra, reporting directly to Vice-President Bush. It was against this backdrop that Shackley served as a "consultant" to players such as Bush, Secord, North, and Casey in their illegal and bloody guns-for-drugs network that resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and the flooding of our streets with tons of drugs. As Wall Street Journal reporter Jonathan Kwitny writes about Ted Shackley in his book, The Crimes of Patriots: Looking at the list of disasters Shackley has presided over during his career, one might even conclude that on the day the CIA hired Shackley it might have done better hiring a KGB agent; a Soviet mole probably could not have done as much damage to the national security of the United States with all his wile as Shackley did with the most patriotic of intentions. Between Shackley's Cuban and Indochinese campaigns, more dope dealers were probably put onto the payroll of the United States Government, and protected and encouraged in their activities, than if the government had simply gone out and hired the Mafia which, in the case of the Cuban campaign, it did. CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner forced Shackley to resign from the Agency in 1979, due to his "unauthorized" dealings with rogue agent Edwin Wilson, who was selling plastic explosives to Libya (with Shackley's approval). Had he not left, Shackley would likely have become head of the Agency.[1139] George Bush, who headed the Agency in 1976, strongly desired to continue in that post. He was not reappointed when Jimmy Carter took office.[1140]* Moreover, Turner, who had little faith in HUMNIT (Human Intelligence) sources, decided to reshape the CIA along more advanced technological lines. As a result of Turner's infamous "Halloween Massacre," the CIA cut its field agents from several thousand to just over 300. As President Jimmy Carter would later state, "We were aware that some of the unqualified and incompetent personnel whom he discharged were deeply resentful."[1141]

The old hands of the Agency, who formerly had at their disposal almost unlimited "Black Budget" funds for covert operations, were suddenly forced into retirement, or forced into lockstep with Turner's new guidelines. Although CIA Director William Casey hired 2,000 new covert operators in 1980, many CIA critics felt Turner's actions had already caused the secret cells of the good-old-boy networks to bury themselves and their illegal activities even deeper. It is this element, birthed in the hysteria of the Cold War, legitimized by the paranoia of the National Security state, and nurtured by the politics of greed, that has buried itself in the core of American politics. As long-time Army Criminal Investigator Gene Wheaton defines it: "An elite, very clandestine, very covert group within the intelligence community. The CIA and DIA is just the lightening rod for the people who really control things." Those who could accept the idea of government foreknowledge of the Oklahoma City bombing would be hard-pressed to accept the notion that certain factions within the government might have orchestrated the bombing itself. Those who have a difficult time accepting this are stymied by what they perceive as "government." As Wheaton explains, "The government is just a bunch of monuments, office buildings, computers, and desks. They don't see the crazies in the government the little conspiratorial cliques within the government."[1142] These little conspiratorial cliques the same players that Shackley intersects with, going back to Cuba, Laos, Afghanistan and Nicaragua have been involved for decades in everything from drug and gun-running, to assassinations, covert warfare, and outright terrorism. It is a terrorism that increasingly has no particular face, no ideological credo, no political goal. It is a terrorism motivated by power and greed.[1143] By no means the lone man behind the curtain, Ted Shackley represents one of the more visible of this lexicon of covert operators upon whom the powers that be depend on for their endless supply of "black ops" and dirty tricks. Perhaps this is how Shackley knows, or seems to know, the complex truth behind Oklahoma City. It is a truth that remains hidden behind a sophisticated labyrinth of covert operatives, all of whom converge at similar times and places. They are, as David Corn writes, "the little faceless gray men we never see and seldom hear about." Those we call the "Shadow Government," the "Parallel Government," the "Enterprise," the "Octopus," or a half-a-dozen other names, are carefully hidden behind an endless roster of official titles and duties, and a plethora of familiar-sounding organizations and institutions. These same faceless little gray men would pop up in the Oklahoma City bombing conspiracy like interminable weeds between the cracks of the pavement. From the Bay of Pigs to Iran-Contra to Oklahoma City, the names, faces, and players would coalesce for a brief moment in time into an indistinguishable menagerie of politicos and spooks, terrorists and assassins to commit their

terrible deed, then fade into the seamless world were little distinction is made between assets and criminals.[1144] Ted Shackley was officially forced to resign from the CIA due to his dealings with friend and renegade agent Edwin Wilson. Wilson and former CIA employee Frank Terpil had smuggled two tons of C-4 to Libya, and at the behest of Shackley, had set up terrorist training camps there utilizing Green Berets led to believe they were working for the Agency. The ostensible purpose of this maneuver was to permit the CIA to gather information on Soviet and Libyan weapons and defense capabilities, and to learn the identities of foreign nationals being trained for guerrilla warfare. Upon obtaining their passports and travel plans, Shackley would alert their home country's secret police, who would then assassinate them upon their return.[1145] While Wilson was sentenced to a long prison term, Terpil fled to Cuba, and has since been involved in numerous dealings with the PLO and other terrorists, supplying them with sophisticated assassination weapons, detonators, and communication systems.[1146] Terpil also supplied torture devices to Ugandan Dictator Idi Amin, who used a bomb supplied by Terpil to assassinate Kenyan cabinet member Bruce McKenzie.[1147]* One month later, Terpil was implicated in the murder of three executives of the IBEX corporation a high-technology company that was doing business with the Savak. John Harper, IBEX's former director of security, said that while in Tripoli, he saw a mock-up of the ambush site at the training facility that Terpil and Wilson had set up.[1148] Readers will recall this is the same Frank Terpil that was seen by Cary Gagan in Mexico City with Omar (Sam Khalid?), six months before the Oklahoma City bombing. "I saw him down in Mexico," recalled Gagan, "in November of '94, in Mexico City with Omar." Gagan said he and Omar met Terpil at the Hotel Maria Isabelle in the Zona Rosa district. Gagan didn't know who Terpil was at the time, but described him as a fat, balding, 60ish fellow, who was "terribly dressed." In other words Frank Terpil. "I heard the name because I knew Wilson's name from the Florence Federal Penitentiary in Colorado." Gagan said that one of his intelligence contacts, a man named Daniel, told him about Terpil. "The conversation came up in reference to the Gander, Newfoundland crash," said Gagan. Was Terpil in Mexico to supply explosives to Omar? While Gagan wasn't privy to the conversation, he believes that was the purpose of the meeting. When Wilson and Terpil were selling arms and explosives to Libya, they were reporting to none other than Ted Shackley. Kwitny notes that Wilson and Terpil were hiring anti-Castro Cubans from Shackley's old JM/WAVE program [and Green Berets] to assassinate President Qaddafi's political opponents abroad:

Some U.S. Army men were literally lured away from the doorway of Fort Bragg, their North Carolina training post. The GIs were given every reason to believe that the operation summoning them was being carried out with the full backing of the CIA.[1149] Readers will also recall that while Timothy McVeigh was still in the Army, he wrote his sister a letter telling her that he had been picked for a Special Forces (Green Beret) Covert Tactical Unit (CTU) that was involved in illegal activities. These illegal activities included "protecting drug shipments, eliminating the [Octopus's drug] competition, and population control." This is exactly what Shackley, Clines, and Secord did in Laos assassinating and bombing Vang Pao's opium competition out of existence. Could this CTU McVeigh claims he was recruited for be a latter-day version of Shackley's assassins? Former federal grand juror Hoppy Heidelberg said McVeigh's letter indicates that he turned them down, while former FBI SAC Ted Gundersen claims McVeigh actually worked for the group for a while, then became disenchanted.[1150] If McVeigh had actually been recruited for such a group, the question arises of what cover-story he was given. As discussed, it is highly likely he was told that he was on an important mission to infiltrate a terrorist organization and prevent a bombing. Considering McVeigh's background and character, it is unlikely he is a terrorist who set out to murder 169 innocent people. Also recall that McVeigh was seen with Hussain al-Hussaini. The Iraqis would provide a convincing and plausible excuse if McVeigh was led to believe he was part of a sting operation: "Son, you were a hero in the Gulf War. Your country needs you now in the fight against terrorism." It is a story a young, impressionable man like McVeigh would fall for. It is also possible that McVeigh was sheep-dipped as disgruntled ex-GI for infiltration into the neo-Nazi community, which would provide a doorway into the bombing conspiracy through places like Elohim City. Or perhaps, as a result of his becoming "disenchanted" and "leaving" the CTU, he became targeted for "termination," and was set up as a fall-guy. Such is standard operating procedure for those who attempt to leave the world of covert operations. Either way, the fact that there appeared to be two "Timothy McVeighs," just as there were two Oswalds, would suggest a sophisticated intelligence operation, one that was designed to put McVeigh in the wrong place at the wrong time. Like Oswald, McVeigh probably believed himself to be a government agent, part of a secret project. Like Oswald, McVeigh was not told what the plan really involved, and was trapped, framed, and made a patsy. This goes a long way towards explaining why an armed McVeigh didn't shoot and kill Officer Charles Hanger when he was stopped on the Interstate after the bombing. Why would a man who had just killed 169 men, women, and children balk at killing a cop (a member of the system that

McVeigh allegedly hated) on a lonely stretch of highway? The only possible answer is that McVeigh believed he was part of a sting operation a government asset and would be protected. Whatever McVeigh's actual purpose and intent, it is curious, to say the least, that Ted Shackley would tell D'Ferdinand Carone that the perpetrator of the bombing was somebody from here. How did he know? Roger Moore, the mysterious gun dealer whom the government claimed McVeigh and Nichols robbed to "finance" the bombing, ran a company next to Bahia Mar Marina in South Florida (a popular hang-out for the Iran-Contra crowd), which manufactured high-speed boats. The boats sold through Intercontinental Industries of Costa Rica (an Ollie North "cut-out") were used to mine Nicaragua's harbors in "Operation Cordova Harbor."[1151] One source I spoke to said Moore had direct contact with Oliver North. "I don't know who his [Moore's] contact was on Iran-Contra beyond Don Aranow. I know he had access and would talk directly to Oliver North. He knew Felix Rodriquez pretty well, he knew Nester Sanchez, Manny Diaz, all those guys around Jeb [Bush] pretty well." This source also claimed that Moore was a "paymaster" for Tom Posey's Civilian Military Assistance (CMA) the covert paramilitary operation that served as the primary nexus for arming the Contras. A retired CIA/DIA agent I spoke to in Arkansas, said "[Moore] was an Agency contractor." Other sources say Moore was an informant for the FBI. He allegedly tried to sell heavy weapons to the Militia of Montana (MOM) as part of an FBI sting operation. A call to MOM indicated that Moore had indeed stopped by for a friendly chat. He told Randy Trochmann, one of MOM's leaders, that he was traveling the country meeting with militia groups in an attempt to verify black helicopter sightings and rumors of UN troop movements. This seems a peculiar pastime for a man who worked for a network of spooks devoted to bypassing and subverting the Constitution.[1152]* What is also peculiar is a letter written by Moore to McVeigh in early 1995. Introduced at the trial of Terry Nichols, the letter, speaks of "a plan to bring the country down and have a few more things happen."[1153] Robert "Bud" McFarlane went on to form his own consulting firm, and joined the board of American Equity Investors (AEI), founded by Prescott Bush. AEI's board of directors reads like a Who's Who of the spook world, including former CIA officials George Clairmont and Howard Hebert, and CIA lawyer Mitch Rogovin, who was George Bush's legal counsel when he was Director of the Agency.[1154] AEI invested in a Tulsa, Oklahoma company: Hawkins Oil and Gas, from 1988 to 1991. McFarlane was a "consultant" for Hawkins and several other companies on the Ech power

project in Pakistan, which required frequent trips to that country.[1155] This was during the tail end of the largest covert operation the U.S. ever conducted the arming of the Mujahadeen, who trained in Pakistan. McFarlane sat on the "208 Committee," who's job it was to procure weapons for the Mujahadeen, and arms contracts for the Pakistani government. Recall that Richard Armitage, who was the contact for Fazoe Haq, governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, also sat on the "208 Committee." As Alfred A. McCoy writes in The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia: It's known that the CIA paid the Afghan guerrillas, who were based in Pakistan, through BCCI. That the Pakistan military were in fact banking their drug profits, moving their drug profits from the consuming country back to Pakistan though BCCI. In fact the boom in the Pakistan drug trade was financed by BCCI. BCCI also served as a conduit for the Iran-Contra operation, largely through Gaith Pharon, former head of Saudi Intelligence, who operated out of Islamabad, Pakistan. The Saudis played a major role in funding the Mujahadeen and [via the request of Secord and McFarlane] the Contras. McFarlane who former Mossad official Ari Ben Menashe claims is a Mossad asset worked with the president of Hawkins' International Division, Mujeeb Rehman Cheema, on the Ech project. Was Hani Kamal's supposed statement that Khalid was connected to the Mossad accurate? A prominent Muslim community leader, Cheema claims he does not know Sam Khalid.[1156] Interestingly, Gagan said that at one point, Terry Nichols rendezvoused with his Middle Eastern friends at the Islamic society of Nevada. Cheema is chairman of the Islamic Society of Tulsa. Is there a connection? And what of Cheema's links to McFarlane? Was McFarlane using Hawkins as a front for CIA activities in Pakistan? It is perhaps prophetic that many of the terrorists implicated in the major bombings of the last decade attended the terrorist conference held in the Northwest Frontier Province town of Konli, Pakistan in July of 1996. As noted, Osama bin Ladin, a Saudi who funded the Mujahadeen and was implicated in the Riyadh and Dhahran bombings, (a close associate of Sheik Abdel Omar Rahman, implicated in the World Trade Center bombing), Ahmed Jibril (who bombed Pan Am 103), and senior representatives of Iranian and Pakistani intelligence, and Hamas, HizbAllah, and other groups attended the conference.[1157] Stephen Jones claimed he had learned through the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service that Iraq had hired seven Pakistani mercenaries Mujahadeen veterans to bomb targets in the U.S., one of which was the Alfred P. Murrah Building.[1158] Just who were these "Pakistani mercenaries," and were they really working for Iraq?

The Deadly "Operation Phoenix"

by Texe Marrs http://www.texemarrs.com/ In Vietnam, in the 60s and 70s, the United States really got its concentration camp program in high gear. The CIA and U.S. Army special units set up a string of torture and death camps throughout South Vietnam. The program was called "Operation Phoenix." Sometimes, entire villages and towns were targeted for extinction. My Lai was one such village, and U.S. Army Lt. William Calley and his soldiers carried out orders and wiped out hundreds of men, women and children at My Lai. Just like in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, the genocidal butchers of the U.S.A. used the best of statistical and high tech methods in their Vietnamese concentration camp program. Death quotas had to be fulfilled by village chiefs, local political bureaucrats and lower-level commanders. As Doug Valentine points out in his powerfully documented book, The Phoenix Program, "neutralization quotas put on them meant they had to sentence so many people a month regardless. And God, if you ever saw those prisons!" In Hostages of War, Don Luce also examines the perverse Phoenix Program, recounting its massive and unjustifiable use of torture, repression, and assassination. Most victims, he notes, were innocent, brought in only after a nosey neighbor, village gossipper, or family enemy falsely reported them to authorities as a potential threat to security. Many were accused of saying something they shouldn't have said, or of "insufficient support" for the political system.
This is the carnage of Jim Jones' Peoples Temple in

Both Valentine and Luce say this demented brainchild system came straight out of The Company (the CIA) in Langley, Virginia. Computers were used by the thugs that ran it, and everyone in authority, from the military officials, to the U.S. Ambassador, the bureaucrats of the State Department, and the occupants of the White House, knew of Phoenix. Butconsider thisthe American people knew little or

Guyana, South America. Independent

investigators now believe this to have been an experimental death, torture, and brainwashing camp clandestinely run by the CIA.To cover up their atrocities, the CIA ordered an assassin team to go in and kill Jones and his followers. The Guyana coroner reported that most died of gunshot wounds, not cyanide poisoning.

nothing about Phoenix. And to this day, over three decades later, the press (CBS, NBC, ABC, Washington Post, etc.) still refuse to report the facts. Those who scoff at the very word, "conspiracy," better rethink things. How often have you heard the faulty rhetoric, "Oh, I don't believe in conspiracies. If that was true, why don't I read about it in the newspaper or see it exposed on the TV news?" Sure, just the way Phoenix was so courageously exposed by our bold journalists, huh? "Everything Must Change" In my video, Gulag USA, you will see just how close we are to that scary night when the jackbooted thugs of America's ruthless new Special Forces Gestapo will begin breaking down doors and hauling Christians and patriots off to the camps. These gulag camps are already built. They are being furnished with the most heinous of torture devices. Some will be equipped with guillotines and crematoria. Thumbscrews, cattle prods, branding irons, skull crushers, tongue clamps, and microchip implantation devices will be used in dark dungeons of torture and death. Bush, Ashcroft, Tenet and the boys are preparing the way, conditioning the mass public, rousing fear and alarm, declaring that cell after cell of domestic and foreign terrorists are out there, "plotting more crimes of infamy." If necessary, Washington, D.C. tells us, the Constitution must be shelved. The need for the peoples' security and safety make the Bill of Rights antiquated and obsolete. Torture, also, must be made acceptable say Jewish lawyers like New York's Alan Dershowitz and associates.

During the French Revolution, as the Masonic/ Illuminist plotters ominously rounded up frightened legions of bewildered men, women, and children targeted for rape, torture, mass drownings, and the guillotine, the revolutionary leaders of the government in Paris, led by Robespierre, Voltaire, and other Illuminists, cried out "Everything now is different. Everything has changed. Liberty requires action. Carpe Diem! (Seize the day!)" Listen closely, my friends, for that same, fatal cry is being loudly cried out, even today, in the U.S.A. And the same devils are behind it.

Investigators found this rail car, equipped with shackles, parked in an isolated area on the train tracks. It appears to be designed to transport prisoners.

Nazi killing of civilians

[back] Phoenix programme

[Hitler and the Nazi's were Satanic, which was where he obtained his power and oration ability from 1. One of it's trademarks is Human Sacrifice, hence the killing and terrorising of civilians--energy and negative emotions---food for reptilians 1.]

The roots of the CIA Phoenix programme--the Nazis:

[2009] Notorious SS unit 'traced' British historian Norman Davies estimates that on just August 5 alone some 35,000 men, women and children were killed in cold blood. Given a free rein by SS commander-in-chief Heinrich Himmler, Dirlewanger's men also participated in gang rape, torture and the practice of bayoneting babies as a way of striking terror into Poles.

CIA Nazi connections

[back] CIA

[The roots of the Nazi's and their eugenic's programme lie in the USA (funded by Rockefeller) as revealed by Edwin Black, you can see the Nazi symbols, Fasces in your face now. Illuminati bankers created them and carried on funding them throughout the war 1. So it was to be expected that the CIA would import their kin from Germany after the war----1500 Nazi doctors and researchers under Operation Paperclip, some of them went into the nuclear industry in Los Alamos, but many of them were placed in key positions in hospitals and in medical research facilities, both in the United States and in Canada, eg Mengele went into MKUltra while Wernher von Braun headed up NASA. Fritz Kraemer for many years was Plans Officer at the Pentagon. Mae Brussell identified him as "Number One" most powerful person in the United States. She suspected that he was the very same Fritz Kraemer who was very high up in Hitler's regime and personally responsible for extremely strategic fascist atrocities in WWII General Reinhard Gehlen was Hitlers Chief of Intelligence against Russia. Upon arriving in Washington D.C. in 1945, Gehlen met extensively with President Truman, General William Wild Bill Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Allen Dulles, who would later become the stalwart head of the CIA. Gehlen returned to West Germany in the summer of 1946 with a mandate to rebuild his espionage organization and resume spying on the East at the behest of American intelligence. So it is no surprise to find the CIA has behaved like the Nazis with 6 million deaths to their name, along with slaughter of civilians, mostly women and children (operation Phoenix), which was what the SS used to do as a matter of course 1, along with heinous mind control 'experiments' that are based on the torture of children.]

See: Nazi connections to Allopathy Nazi killing of civilians Quotes re Hitler Paperclip See: Rudin Mengele Verschuer Goebbels Mengele, Joseph Reinhardt Gehlen Hitler Heinrich
Mller [vid] How the CIA was hijacked by the Nazis and their supporters in Corporate America From the book "America's Nazi Secret"

Deathbed confessions, photos support claims that George H. Scherf(f), Jr., was the 41st U.S. president By Don Nicoloff Berman recounted how Skorzeny was found not guilty at the Nuremburg trials, and then ushered into the CIA. Some 50,000+ S.S. Nazi war criminals, not just rocket scientists, were brought to America after the war.
The CIA's Man: The Chronology of Helmet Streikher

[2001] WORST KEPT SECRETS OF THE BUMBLING BEAR - the CIA/NAZI marriage [2001] The CIA's Worst-Kept Secret. Newly Declassified Files Confirm United States Collaboration with Nazis [1984] The Nazi Connection to the John F. Kennedy Assassination by Mae Brussell Operation Paperclip Mass Graves Of Children Found Near Montreal; Another Duplessis Orphan Tells Of Being Tortured As A Child In CIA Experimentaion Programs Using Nazi Doctor [Media] British nerve gas death tests had Nazi scientists Ford and the Fhrer By Ken Silverstein [Interview with Gregory Douglas] Mller, chief of the Gestapo, was officially listed as killed during the final days of World War II Deathbed confessions, photos support claims that George H. Scherf(f), Jr., was the 41st U.S. president By Don Nicoloff

Book
America's Nazi Secret: An Insider's History by John Loftus

Quotes
I provide hard, documented evidence of the direct involvement of ex-Nazis at the very highest levels of NASA. 2) I provide documented evidence of the direct ties between military intelligence personnel, the Army Intelligence agency, and the Monroe Institute, a New Age sacred cow for many people. 3) I provide documented evidence of the sort of electronic mind control technologies that are now available -- like a patent that permits the direct, electronic transmission of voices into the human auditory cortex via pulsed microwaves. 4) I talk about the kundalini -- the natural, cosmic, supremely powerful spiritual power that is in all human beings. 5) And, I talk about the out-of-body phenomenon. Too 'Conspiratorial' For Strieber! Shunned by Dreamland By Richard Sauder, Ph.D.

My Lai massacre

[back] Vietnam war

[back] Phoenix programme

[A Phoenix operation. The murder of 504 civilians, primarily women and children, including infants, on March 16, 1968. Many of the victims were sexually abused, beaten, tortured, or maimed, and some of the bodies were found mutilated.] Civilian deaths in South Vietnam from 1965 until 1973 are estimated at 1.5 million

Book
The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of Law? : The Peers Commission Report by Joseph Goldstein, William R. Peers, Burke Marshall, Jack Schwartz, United States Department of the Army (Corporate Author)

Quotes
On August 25, 1970, an article appeared in The New York Times hinting that the CIA, through Phoenix, was responsible for My Lai. The story line was advanced on October 14, when defense attorneys for David Mitchell a sergeant accused and later cleared of machine-gunning scores of Vietnamese in a drainage ditch in My Lai citing Phoenix as the CIAs systematic program of assassination, named Evan Parker as the CIA officer who signed documents, certain blacklists, of Vietnamese to be assassinated in My Lai. When we spoke, Parker denied the charge. ......As in any large-scale Phoenix operation, two of Task Force Barkers companies cordoned off the hamlet while a third one Calleys moved in, clearing the way for Kotouc and Special Branch officers who were brought to the field to identify VC from among the detained inhabitants. .....The CIA, via Phoenix, not only perpetrated the My Lai massacre but also concealed the crime. ....As Jeff Stein said, The first thing you learn in the Army is not competence, you learn corruption. And you learn to get along, go along. Unfortunately not everyone learns to get along. On September 3, 1988, Robert TSouvas was apparently shot in the head by his girl friend, after an argument over a bottle of vodka. The two were homeless, living out of a van they had parked under a bridge in Pittsburgh. TSouvas was a Vietnam veteran and a participant in the My Lai massacre. .....TSouvass attorney, George Davis, traveled to Da Nang in 1970 to investigate the massacre and while there was assigned as an aide a Vietnamese colonel who said that the massacre was a Phoenix operation and that the purpose of Phoenix was to terrorize the civilian population into submission. Davis told me: When I told the people in the War Department what I knew and that I would attempt to obtain all records on the program in order to defend my client, they agreed to drop the charges. .....Bart Osborn (whose agent net Stein inherited) is more specific. I never knew in the course of all those operations any detainee to live through his interrogation, Osborn testified before Congress in 1971. They all died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those individuals was, in fact, cooperating with the VC, but they all died and the majority were wither tortured to death or things like thrown out of helicopters. [book extract] The My Lai Massacre and The Tiger Cages by Douglas Valentine But the American establishment and media denied it then, and continue to deny it until today, because Phoenix was a genocidal program -- and the CIA officials, members of the media who were complicit through their silence, and the red-blooded American boys who carried it out, are all war criminals. As Michael Ratner a lawyer at the Center for Constitutional Rights told CounterPunch: "Kerrey should be tried as a war criminal. His actions on the night of February 24-25, 1969 when the seven man Navy Seal unit which he headed killed approximately twenty unarmed Vietnamese civilians, eighteen of whom were women and children was a war crime. Like those who murdered at My Lai, he too should be brought into the dock and tried for his crimes." ......A famous Phoenix operation, known as the My Lai Massacre, was proceeding along smoothly, with a grand total of 504 Vietnamese women and children killed, when a soldier named Hugh Thompson in a helicopter gunship saw what was happening. Risking his life to preserve that "social contract," Thomson landed his helicopter between the mass murderers and

their victims, turned his machine guns on his fellow Americans, and brought the carnage to a halt. .....It was the CIA that forced soldiers like Kerrey into Phoenix operations, and the hidden hand of the CIA lingers over his war crime. Kerrey even uses the same rationale offered by CIA officer DeSilva. According to Kerrey, "the Viet Cong were a thousand per cent more ruthless than" the Seals or U.S. Army. [2001] Bob Kerrey, CIA War Crimes, And The Need For A War Crimes Trial by Douglas Valentine

El Mozote massacre
[back] El Salvador The El Mozote Massacre took place in the village of El Mozote, in Morazn department, El Salvador, on December 11, 1981, when Salvadoran armed forces trained by the United States military killed at least 1000 civilians in an anti-guerrilla campaign. It is reputed to be the worst such atrocity in modern Latin America history. [1982] Massacre Of Hundreds Reported In Salvador Village [2004] Raymond Bonner and the Salvadoran Civil War 1980 to 1983 By John F. Kirch

Book
The Massacre at El Mozote by Mark Danner

External
The Truth of El Mozote by Mark Danner

Quotes
Rufina could not see the children; she could only hear their cries as the soldiers waded into them, slashing some with their machetes, crushing the skulls of others with the butts of their rifles. Many others the youngest children, most below the age of twelve the soldiers herded from the house of Alfredo Mrquez across the street to the sacristy, pushing them, crying and screaming, into the dark tiny room. There the soldiers raised their M16s and emptied their magazines into the roomful of children. When they reached the playing field, there were maybe thirty children, he says. The soldiers were putting ropes on the trees. I was seven years old, and I didnt really understand what was happening until I saw one of the soldiers take a kid he had been carrying the kid was maybe three years old throw him in the air, and stab him with a bayonet. They slit some of the kids throats, and many they hanged from the tree. All of us were crying now, but we were their prisoners there was nothing we could do. The soldiers kept telling us, You are guerrillas and this is justice. This is justice. Finally, there were only three of us left. I watched them hang my brother. He was two years old. I could see I was going to be killed soon, and I thought it would be better to die running, so I ran. I slipped through the soldiers and dived into the bushes. They fired into the bushes, but none of their bullets hit me. .....There was one in particular the soldiers talked about that evening (she is mentioned in the

Tutela Legal report as well): a girl on La Cruz whom they had raped many times during the course of the afternoon, and through it all, while the other women of El Mozote had screamed and cried as if they had never had a man, this girl had sung hymns, strange evangelical songs, and she had kept right on singing, too, even after they had done what had to be done, and shot her in the chest. She had lain there on La Cruz with the blood flowing from her chest, and had kept on singing a bit weaker than before, but still singing. And the soldiers, stupefied, had watched and pointed. Then they had grown tired of the game and shot her again, and she sang still, and their wonder began to turn to fear until finally they had unsheathed their machetes and hacked through her neck, and at last the singing had stopped. The Truth of El Mozote by Mark Danner In some cases, as we saw later, in late 1981 of course there was, what is now fairly well known, the massacre in El Mazote. And this was a case where the first American trained battalion was sent out over Christmas time in 1981 into rebel controlled territory and it swept through this territory and killed everybody, everyone they could find - including the children. When two American reporters, Ray Bonner and Alma Jimapareta (?), went to the scene of this atrocity in January of 1982, they were able to see some of what was left behind and they interviewed witnesses who had survived, and came out with stories describing what they had found. This was of course extremely upsetting to the Reagan administration, which at that time was about to certify that the Salvadoran military was showing respect for human rights, and that was necessary to get further funding and weapons for the Salvadoran military. And I was at those hearings which occurred afterwards, on the hill, and when Tom Enders who was then Assistant Secretary Of State for Inter-American affairs gave his description of how the State Department had investigated this and had found really nothing had happened or that they had found no evidence of any mass killing, and they argued with great cleverness that the last census had not shown even that many people in El Mazote - there were not the 800 or so who were alleged to have been killed - only 200 had lived there to begin with, and many still lived there, he said. Of course it wasn't true, but it was, I guess in their view, necessary - it was necessary to conceal what was going on. And, it became necessary then, to also discredit the journalists, so Raymond Bonner, and Alma and others, who were not accepting this story, had to be made to seem to be liars. They had to be destroyed. And the administration began developing their techniques, which they always were very good at - they were extremely good at public relations, that's what's they had - many of them had come from - the President himself had been an advertising figure for General Electric - and they were very adept at how to present things in the most favorable way for them. [1993] Fooling America. A talk by Robert Parry

The Truth of El Mozote

By Mark Danner

HEADING up into the mountains of Morazn, in the bright, clear air near the Honduran border, you cross the Torola River,
the wooden slats of the one-lane bridge clattering beneath your wheels, and enter what was the fiercest of El Salvadors zonas rojas or red zones, as the military officers knew them during a decade of civil war and after climbing for some time you take leave of the worn blacktop to follow for several miles a bone-jarring dirt track that hugs a mountainside, and soon you will find, among ruined towns and long-abandoned villages that are coming slowly, painfully back to life, a tiny hamlet, by

now little more than a scattering of ruins, that is being rapidly reclaimed by the earth, its broken adobe walls cracking and crumbling and giving way before an onslaught of weeds, which are fuelled by the rain that beats down each afternoon and by the fog that settles heavily at night in the valleys. Nearby, in the long-depopulated villages, you can see stirrings of life: even in Arambala, a mile or so away, with its broad grassy plaza bordered by collapsed buildings and dominated, where once a fine church stood, by a shell-pocked bell tower and a jagged adobe arch looming against the sky even here, a boy leads a brown cow by a rope, a man in a billed cap and bluejeans trudges along bearing lengths of lumber on his shoulder, three little girls stand on tiptoe at a porch railing, waving and giggling at a passing car.
In a remote corner of El Salvador, investigators uncovered the remains of a horrible crime a crime that Washington had long denied. The villagers of El Mozote had the misfortune to find themselves in the path of the Salvadoran Armys antiCommunist crusade. The story of the massacre at El Mozote how it came about, and hy it had to be denied stands as a central parable of the Cold War.

But follow the stony dirt track, which turns and twists through the woodland, and in a few minutes you enter a large clearing, and here all is quiet. No one has returned to El Mozote. Empty as it is, shot through with sunlight, the place remains as a young guerrilla who had patrolled here during the war told me with a shiver espantoso: spooky, scary, dreadful. After a moments gaze, half a dozen battered structures roofless, doorless, windowless, half engulfed by underbrush resolve themselves into a semblance of pattern: four ruins off to the right must have marked the main street, and a fifth the beginning of a side lane, while an open area opposite looks to have been a common, though no church can be seen only a ragged knoll, a sort of earthen platform nearly invisible beneath a great tangle of weeds and brush. Into this quiet clearing, in mid-October last year, a convoy of four-wheel drives and pickup trucks rumbled, disgorging into the center of El Mozote a score of outsiders. Some of these men and women most of them young, and casually dressed in T-shirts and jeans and work pants began dumping out into the dust a glinting clutter of machetes, picks, and hoes. Others gathered around the hillock, consulted clipboards and notebooks and maps, poked around in the man-high brush. Finally, they took up machetes and began to hack at the weeds, being careful not to pull any, lest the movement of the roots disturb what lay beneath. Chopping and hacking in the morning sun, they uncovered, bit by bit, a mass of red-brown soil, and before long they had revealed an earthen mound protruding several feet from the ground, like a lopsided bluff, and barely contained at its base by a low stone wall.

They pounded stakes into the ground and marked off the mound with
bright-yellow tape; they stretched lengths of twine this way and that to divide it into quadrangles; they brought out tape measures and rulers and levels to record its dimensions and map its contours. And then they began to dig. At first, they loosened the earth with hoes, took it up in shovels, dumped it into plastic pails, and poured it onto a screen large enough to require several people to shake it back and forth. As they dug deeper, they exchanged these tools for smaller, more precise ones: hand shovels, trowels, brushes, dustpans, screens. Slowly, painstakingly, they dug and sifted, making their way through the several feet of earth and crumbled adobe remnants of a buildings walls and, by the end of the second day, reaching wood-beam splinters and tile shards, many now blackened by fire, that had formed the buildings roof. Then, late on the afternoon of the third day, as they crouched low over the ground and stroked with tiny brushes to draw away bits of reddish dust, darkened forms began to emerge from the earth, taking shape in the soil like fossils embedded in stone; and soon they knew that they had begun to find, in the northeast corner of the ruined sacristy of the church of Santa Catarina of El Mozote, the skulls of those who had once worshipped there. By the next afternoon, the workers had uncovered twenty-five of them, and all but two were the skulls of children. Later that afternoon, the leaders of the team four young experts from the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Unit, who had gained a worldwide reputation for having exhumed sites of massacres in Guatemala and Bolivia and Panama and Iraq, as well as in their own country piled into their white four-wheel-drive vehicle and followed the bumpy, stony road out of El Mozote (the Thistle). Slowly, they drove through Arambala, waving to the smiling little girls standing on their porch, and out onto the calle negra the black road which traced its way up the spine of the red zone, stretching north from the city of San Francisco Gotera to the mountain town of Perqu?n, not far from the Honduran border. At the black road, the Argentines turned left, as they did each evening, heading down to Gotera, but this time they stopped in front of a small house a hut, really, made of scrap wood and sheet metal and set among banana trees some fifteen yards from the road. Getting out of the car, they climbed through the barbed wire and called out, and soon there appeared at the door a middle-aged woman, heavyset, with high cheekbones, strong features, and a powerful air of dignity. In some excitement, the Argentines told her what they had found that day. The woman listened silently, and when they had finished she paused, then spoke.

No les dije? she asked. (Didnt I tell you?) Si slo se oa aquella gran gritazn. (All you could hear was that enormous screaming.) For eleven years, Rufina Amaya Mrquez had served the world as the most eloquent witness of what had happened at El Mozote, but though she had told her story again and again, much of the world had refused to believe her. In the polarized and brutal world of wartime El Salvador, the newspapers and radio stations simply ignored what Rufina had to say, as they habitually ignored unpalatable accounts of how the government was prosecuting the war against the leftist rebels. In the United States, however, Rufinas account of what had happened at El Mozote appeared on the front pages of the

Washington Post and the New York Times, at the very moment when members of Congress were bitterly debating whether they should cut off aid to a Salvadoran regime so desperate that it had apparently resorted to the most savage methods of war. El Mozote seemed to epitomize those methods, and in Washington the story heralded what became perhaps the classic debate of the late Cold War: between those who argued that, given the geopolitical stakes in Central America, the United States had no choice but to go on supporting a friendly regime, however disreputable it might seem, because the alternative the possibility of another Communist victory in the region was clearly worse, and those who insisted that the country must be willing to wash its hands of what had become a morally corrupting struggle. Rufinas story came to Washington just when the countrys paramount Cold War national-security concerns were clashing as loudly and unambiguously as they ever would during four decades with its professed high-minded respect for human rights. In the United States, the free press was not to be denied: El Mozote was reported; Rufinas story was told; the angry debate in Congress intensified. But then the Republican Administration, burdened as it was with the heavy duties of national security, denied that any credible evidence existed that a massacre had taken place; and the Democratic Congress, after denouncing, yet again, the murderous abuses of the Salvadoran regime, in the end accepted the Administrations certification that its ally was nonetheless making a significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights. The flow of aid went on, and soon increased.

By early 1992, when a peace agreement between the government and the guerrillas was finally signed, Americans had spent
more than four billion dollars funding a civil war that had lasted twelve years and left seventy-five thousand Salvadorans dead. By then, of course, the bitter fight over El Mozote had largely been forgotten; Washington had turned its gaze to other places and other things. For most Americans, El Salvador had long since slipped back into obscurity. But El Mozote may well have been the largest massacre in modern Latin-American history. That in the United States it came to be known, that it was exposed to the light and then allowed to fall back into the dark, makes the story of El Mozote how it came to happen and how it came to be denied a central parable of the Cold War. In the weeks that followed the discovery of the skulls of the children, as each days work at El Mozote yielded up a fresh harvest, the initial numbers came to seem small. But in San Salvador, five hours by road to the west, where President Alfredo Cristiani and the generals and the guerrillas-turned-politicians were struggling with one another about how to put in place, or not put in place, a purge of the officer corps, which was proving to be the most difficult provision of the ten-month-old peace accord struggling, that is, over what kind of reconciliation would come to pass in El Salvador after more than a decade of savage war the first skulls of the children were enough to provoke a poisonous controversy. Those twenty-three skulls, and the nearly one hundred more that were uncovered in the succeeding days, were accommodated by the nascent Salvadoran body politic in two ways. Members of human-rights groups (those members, that is, who had survived the war), along with the politicians of the left (many of whom had been guerrillas shortly before), hailed the discovery as definitive evidence that a matanza a great killing had taken place in Morazn, and that what they had been saying for eleven years had at last been proved true. Members of the government, on the other hand, and various military officers found themselves forced to concede that something had indeed happened in Morazn, but they insisted that the situation was more complicated than it appeared. Dr. Juan Mateu Llort, the director of El Salvadors Institute of Forensic Medicine, declared that the skulls themselves proved nothing, for there were an abundance of armed children in the guerrillas. El Diario de Hoy, an influential right-wing daily, published a reconstruction according to which guerrillas had barricaded themselves in what seemed to have been a religious center and from there opened fire on the troops, making the deaths of children, women and old people possible. President Cristianis government, already under attack for stalling in the dismissal of senior officers, maintained its position that no records existed of any Army operation in Morazn in early December of 1981.

And yet on the ninth day of that month any reader of La Prensa Grfica, one of San Salvadors major dailies, could have learned that all the highways with access to Gotera and the other towns in the Department of Morazn are under strict military control No vehicles or individuals are permitted to enter the zones of conflict in order to avoid accidents or misunderstandings Neither was the entry of journalists or individuals permitted. The Department of Morazn had been sealed off from the rest of the country. Four thousand men, drawn from the security forces the National Guard and the Treasury Police and from regular units of the Salvadoran Army, were hard at work. The area north of the Torola River, the heart of the red zone, was alive with the thud of mortars, the clatter of small-arms fire, and the intermittent roar of helicopters. Two days before, Operaci?n Rescate Operation Rescue had begun. Many of the towns and villages were already empty; during and after Army operations of the previous spring and fall, thousands of peasants had left their homes and begun a long trek over the mountains to the Honduran border and refugee camps beyond. Of those who remained, many made it a practice, at the first sign of any Army approach, to leave their villages and hide in the caves and ravines and gullies that honeycombed the mountainous region. But El Mozote was crowded; in the days before Operation Rescue, people from the outlying areas had flooded into the hamlet. Many people were passing by the house, saying, Come on, lets go to El Mozote, an old peasant named Sebastiano Luna told me as he stood behind the yellow tape, watching the experts bent low over the brown earth of the sacristy of Santa Catarina. Between their feet lay an expanse of dark rubble, a miniature landscape of hills and ridges and valleys in every shade of brown. It took a moment or two to distinguish, among the dirty-brown hillocks, the skulls and parts of skulls, each marked with a bit of red tape and a number; and, beneath the skulls and skull fragments and the earthen rubble, scores of small brown bundles, heaped one on top of another, twisted together, the material so impregnated with blood and soil that it could no longer be recognized as clothing. Amid the rubble in the northeast corner of the tiny room that had been called el convento (though it was really a kind of combined sacristy and parish house, in which an itinerant priest, when he visited the hamlet, would vest himself, and sometimes, perhaps, stay the night), a dark-haired young woman in denim overalls was kneeling. She slowly drew a small bundle toward her it had beenlabelled No. 59 and began, with almost agonizing gentleness, extracting the brown bits and placing them on a sheet of cardboard. Left tibia, fragments only, she sang out in a low monotone. Vertebrae, one, two, three six of them Tibia, left, I think Metacarpals ... Now she disentangled the bits of ruined fabric: Belt of brown leather, metal buckle Pants, light in color, with patches of blue and green color in the posterior part In the pants pocket ah um The strong voice took an odd slide downward and stopped. Over her shoulder, I saw her staring at something in her palm, then heard her swear in a low voice: Hijo de puta! She turned and opened her hand to reveal a tiny figure: a little horse of bright-orange plastic. No. 59 had been a lucky child, had had a family prosperous enough to provide a lucky toy.

After a moment, the anthropologist Mercedes Doretti said, Ordinarily, we could use this for identification. I mean, even
after eleven years, any mother would recognize this as her kids, you know? She looked back at No. 59 and then at the brown rubble. But here, here they killed all the mothers, too. Behind the yellow tape, Sebastiano Luna and his wife, Alba Ignacia del Cid, stood silent amid a knot of peasants, watching. They had walked from their small house, several miles outside El Mozote, where the dirt track joins the black road. Eleven years before, in early December, scores of people were passing by their house, pulling their children along by the hand, laboring under the weight of their belongings. Come with us! they had called out to the old couple. Come with us to El Mozote! The afternoon before, the people of El Mozote had gathered, some fifty yards from the church, in front of the general store of

Marcos Daz, the richest man in town. He had summoned the townspeople, neighbors and customers all, and when they had assembled perhaps a couple of hundred of them, the men in caps and straw hats and the women in bright-colored skirts, holding children in their arms Marcos Daz addressed them from his doorway. He had just come up the mountain from his regular buying trip to San Miguel, he said, and as he was waiting at the checkpoint in Gotera, at the entrance to the red zone, an officer in the town had greeted him Marcos Daz, an important man, had friends among the officers and then pulled him aside for a little talk. Daz would do well to stock up, the officer said, for soon the Army would launch a large operation in Morazn, and nothing and no one would be permitted to enter or leave the zone. But his friend Daz neednt worry, the officer assured him. The people of El Mozote would have no problems provided they stayed where they were. In the street that day, these words of Marcos Dazs set off a debate. Some townspeople wanted to head for the mountains immediately, for the war had lately been coming closer to the hamlet; only the week before, a plane had dropped two bombs near El Mozote, damaging its one-room school, and though no one had been hurt, the people had been terrified. A lot of people wanted to leave there was a lot of fear, Rufina Amaya said when I visited her a year ago. And a few people did leave. My godfather left, with his family. My children were crying. They said, Mama, lets go. But Marcos Daz, a man of influence, had put his prestige on the line, and he insisted that his neighbors would be safe only if they stayed in their homes that if they left the hamlet they and their families risked being caught up in the operation. That was the lie, Rufina Amaya told me. That was the betrayal. Otherwise, people would have left. In the end, Marcos Dazs prestige decided the issue. Though the debate went on that afternoon and into the following morning, most of the people of El Mozote finally accepted his assurances. They had seen soldiers before, after all; soldiers often passed through on patrol and sometimes bought supplies in El Mozote. Only the month before, soldiers had come during an operation and occupied El Chingo and La Cruz, two hills overlooking the town, and though the people of El Mozote could hear mortars and scattered shooting in the distance, the soldiers had not bothered them. In the crazy-quilt map of northern Morazn in 1981, where villages belonged to the government or to the guerrillas or to neither or both, where the officers saw the towns and hamlets in varying shades of pink and red, El Mozote had not been known as a guerrilla town. The Army spent a lot of time around here, Rufina told me. We all sold them food. If the soldiers were looking to find guerrillas, that was fine with us, because we didnt have anything to do with them. And the guerrillas knew about our relations with the Army.

The guerrillas knew, the soldiers knew: northern Morazn during the early eighties was a very small world, in which
identity, or the perception of identity, often meant the difference between living and dying. That El Mozote in late 1981 was

not a guerrilla town is a fact central to Rufinas story and lies at the heart of the mystery of what happened there; and though it is a fact one that almost everyone from the zone affirms it seems to have nonetheless been a slightly more complicated fact than Rufina makes out. As in many other communities in northern Morazn, the people of El Mozote were struggling to keep their balance in the middle of the perilously shifting ground of a brutal war were working hard to remain on friendly terms with the soldiers while fearing to alienate the guerrillas. Joaqu?n Villalobos, who was the leading comandante of the Peoples Revolutionary Army (or E.R.P.), the dominant guerrilla group in Morazn, told me flatly during an interview last year in his headquarters in San Salvador that the people of El Mozote would not support us only to concede twenty minutes later that his fighters had, at least on some occasions, bought supplies in the hamlet. They had the lowest level of relationship with us only the very slightest commercial one, Villalobos said. Licho, a rebel commander who had grown up in Jocoaitique, a few miles from El Mozote, acknowledged to me during an interview in Perqu?n that in the late seventies some from El Mozote had been our supporters, but that long before 1981 these supporters had come along with us, they were with us. He added quickly, The people who were still in El Mozote were afraid of us. But the reason, apparently, was not only their fear the frank terror that many villagers in the zone felt about exposing themselves to Army retribution but their ideology. The guerrillas support in Morazn had grown largely in soil made fertile by the work of Catholic liberation theology, but El Mozote had been uniquely unreceptive to such blandishments, for the hamlet was a stronghold of the Protestant evangelical movement. People had begun to convert as early as the mid-sixties, and by 1980 it is likely that half or more of the people in El Mozote considered themselves born-again Christians; the evangelicals had their own chapel and their own pastor, and they were known as were born-again Christians throughout Central America for their anti-Communism. Everyone knew there were many evangelicals in El Mozote, and these people wouldnt support us, Licho told me. Sometimes they sold us things, yes, but they didnt want anything to do with us. So, unlike many other hamlets of Morazn, El Mozote was a place where the guerrillas had learned not to look for recruits; instead, a delicate coexistence had been forged an unstated agreement by both parties to look the other way. The guerrillas passed by El Mozote only at night, and when they did, Rufina says, the people would hear the dogs barking and theyd be afraid. She remembers seeing guerrillas only once in daylight: a few ragged young people, unarmed and wearing civilian clothes, had come into the hamlet and tried to hold a meeting in the tiny church of Santa Catarina. Rufina didnt attend, nor did most of the other townspeople. I remember people saying, Dont get involved. Lets just live and work and not get involved. People just didnt want anything to do with it. I had four children to look after. Youre worrying about feeding your family, and you try not to pay attention to these other things. And so when Marcos Daz brought his news from Gotera, when he conveyed the strong words of the officer and presented the choice as one of leaving the town and risking getting involved in the operation or of staying put and remaining safe, there was never much doubt about what the people of El Mozote would in the end decide. That very afternoon, at Marcos Dazs urging, people began fanning out from the hamlet into the outlying districts to spread the word that one and all should come to El Mozote, and quickly, for only there would they be protected. Marcos Daz helped matters along by letting it be known that he would offer on credit as much food and other supplies as the newcomers needed. Peasants poured into the hamlet, occupying every bit of space. All the rooms in Marcos Dazs house were filled with people, Rufina recalls. Every house had people staying there from outside. Even the common in front of the church was crowded with people, for the few houses could not accommodate them all. Come to El Mozote thats what everyone was saying, the old peasant Sebastiano Luna told me. He and Alba Ignacia del Cid had stood in front of their house, had watched the people pass. But they had decided not to go. I had half an idea something bad might happen, Sebastiano said. So I told her nodding to his wife You, you go if you want to. Im staying. And I, said Alba, I said, No, no, I wont go without you, because theyll ask me where my husband is. Theyll say hes not here because hes a guerrilla and then theyll kill me. Either we both go or we both stay. So Sebastiano and Alba hid in the mountains above their house. They saw soldiers pass by, and saw a helicopter hover and descend. And later they saw thick columns of smoke rising from El Mozote, and smelled the odor of what seemed like tons of roasting meat. Four miles south of El Mozote, outside the hamlet of La Guacamaya, the guerrillas of the Peoples Revolutionary Army also awaited the soldiers. From their agents in the capital, they knew that large shipments of American munitions had been arriving at Ilopango Airport, and that truckloads of troops had begun moving along the Pan-American Highway toward Morazn. On December 1st, Jons, the most powerful comandante in the zone, had pulled aside Santiago, the director of the

E.R.P.s clandestine Radio Venceremos, and informed him that an operation of great breadth, named Yunque y Martillo Hammer and Anvil was being planned. Santiago recalls that intelligence sources within the Army itself had passed on a report of a key meeting at the High Command. According to the sources reconstruction, the Minister of Defense, Colonel Jos Guillermo Garca, declared to his officers that Operation Rescue must wrest the offensive from the F.M.L.N. the guerrilla umbrella group, of which the E.R.P. was one of five members. His Vice-Minister, Colonel Francisco Adolfo Castillo, added that the troops must advance no matter what the cost until we reach the command post and Radio Venceremos. Then Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa Barrios, the dynamic commander of the lite Atlacatl Battalion, broke in, agreeing wholeheartedly that so long as we dont finish off this Radio Venceremos, well always have a scorpion up our ass. Colonel Monterrosa, who at the time was the most celebrated field commander in the Salvadoran Army, was well known to have an obsession with Radio Venceremos. He was not alone: the station, which specialized in ideological propaganda, acerbic commentary, and pointed ridicule of the government, infuriated most officers, for its every broadcast reminded the world of the Armys impotence in much of Morazn. Even worse, the radio managed to be funny. They actually acted out this daytime serial, like a soap opera, with Ambassador Hinton in it, a United States defense attach of the time recalls. Theyd call the Ambassador this gringo who is marrying a Salvadoran woman Deane Hinton was about to marry a woman from one of the countrys wealthy families and at the end theyd say, Tune in again tomorrow. And you couldnt do anything about it. Most people at the Embassy, including the Ambassador, wanted to hear it. The mortified Salvadoran officers maintained that the broadcasts originated in Nicaragua or Honduras. Colonel Monterrosa was mortified by Radio Venceremos as well, but, unlike his colleagues, he had determined, in his rage and frustration, to do something about it. For Monterrosa, as American military advisers had come to realize, was a very different kind of Salvadoran officer. By late 1981, with Congress and the American public having shown themselves resolutely opposed to dispatching American combat forces to Central America, it had become quite clear that the only way to prevent another Nicaragua was somehow to reform the Salvadoran Army. We were on our last legs, an American military adviser who was in the country at the time told me. We had to reform or we were going to lose. And it wasnt because the guerrillas were so good; it was because the Army was so bad. Salvadoran troops were sent into the field virtually untrained, soldiers rarely left the barracks after five oclock in the afternoon, and officers rarely left the barracks at all. The institution simply did not support people being good commanders, this adviser said. I mean, who ever got relieved? You could surrender with eighty-five men and nothing at all would happen to you. As the Americans soon realized, however, reform meant remaking an officer corps that had developed its own, very special criteria for advancement and reward. These had to do not with military competence but with politics: with showing unstinting loyalty to the institution and, above all, to ones military-academy class ones tanda, as it was called. A hundred teen-age boys might enter the Gerardo Barrios Military Academy, and from their number perhaps twenty toughened, hardened men would emerge four years later; throughout the next quarter century, these men would be promoted together, would become rich together, and would gradually gain power together. If among them there proved to be embarrassing incompetents, not to mention murderers and rapists and thieves, then these men were shielded by their classmates, and defended ferociously. Finally, perhaps two decades after graduation, one or two from the tanda those who had stood out early on as presidenciables, as destined to become leaders of the country would lobby within the officer corps to become the President of El Salvador. Monterrosa had graduated in 1963, and though the records show him fourth in his class of nineteen, it is a testament to the respect he inspired that many officers now remember him as first. In the academy, he was a magnetic figure, charismatic from the start. Short, with the simple face and large nose of a Salvadoran peasant, he walked with the peasants long, loping stride, which made his distinctly nonmartial figure recognizable from far off. General Adolfo Blandn, a former chief of staff, who was in his last year in the academy when Monterrosa was in his first, recalls that the young man established himself immediately as the best in his class the top rank in studies, physical conditioning, knowledge of the concepts of war. Normally, of course, such prestige, such respect from his colleagues, would brand him presidenciable. But, unlike his fellows, Monterrosa was, as Blandn puts it, that rare thing: a pure, one- hundred-per-cent soldier, a natural leader, a born military man with the rare quality of being able to instill loyalty in his men.

In the years after his graduation, Monterrosa taught at the academy, took courses from the Americans in Panama, travelled to Taiwan to study anti-Communist counter-insurgency tactics, and served in the paratroops as part of El Salvadors first free-fall team. After the controversial elections of 1972, in which a hard-line faction of the military stole the ballot from what looked to be a winning Christian Democratic ticket, led by San Salvadors Mayor Jos Napolen Duarte, Monterrosa grew close to the new military President, Colonel Arturo Molina. In the Army at this time, the key focus was on politics, and the struggle over El Salvadors stunted political development increasingly split the country, and the officer corps. By the late seventies, after Molina had given place to General Carlos Humberto Romero, in another dubious election, the situation had become even more polarized. On the far left, several tiny guerrilla groups were kidnapping businessmen, robbing banks, and, on occasion, assassinating prominent rightist leaders. Activists on the moderate left, having been denied an electoral path to the Presidential Palace by the Armys habitual ballot tampering, joined populist forces in organizing vast demonstrations, and managed to bring hundreds of thousands of people into the streets. The security forces generally responded to these demonstrations with unflinching violence, shooting down scores, and sometimes hundreds, of Salvadorans. Within the Salvadoran officer corps, the countrys political crisis had reopened a political fault line that had spread apart periodically throughout the century. Back in 1960, a faction of progressive officers had staged a coup, but it had been quickly reversed by a conservative counter-coup; in 1972, when Duartes victory was stolen by conservative officers, the progressives attempted another, with the same result. Finally, in October of 1979, with at least tacit American support, a group of young reformists who called themselves the juventud militar the military youth overthrew General Romero and set in his place a progressive junta, which included politicians of the left. As had happened two decades before, however, the conservatives in the Army almost immediately regained the upper hand, and now, under cover of a more internationally acceptable reformist government, they felt free to combat the Communist agitation in their own particular way by intensifying the dirty war against the left. The most visible signs of the dirty war were mutilated corpses that each morning littered the streets of El Salvadors cities. Sometimes the bodies were headless, or faceless, their features having been obliterated with a shotgun blast or an application of battery acid; sometimes limbs were missing, or hands or feet chopped off, or eyes gouged out; womens genitals were torn and bloody, bespeaking repeated rape; mens were often found severed and stuffed into their mouths. And cut into the flesh of a corpses back or chest was likely to be the signature of one or another of the death squads that had done the work, the most notorious of which were the Union of White Warriors and the Maximiliano Hernndez Martnez Brigade. The latter was named for a general who had taken over the country in 1931, during a time of rising leftist agitation among the peasantry, and had responded the following year with a campaign of repression so ferocious that it came to be known simply as La Matanza. Throughout the western part of the country, where an abortive rebellion had been centered, members of the National Guard, along with civilian irregulars, lined peasants up against a wall and shot them. Before the purge was over, they had murdered well over ten thousand people. Now rightist officers who proudly counted themselves heirs of Martnez determined to root out this new leftist infection with equal thoroughness. Drawing on money from wealthy businessmen who had moved to Miami to avoid kidnapping or assassination, and benefitting from the theoretical guidance of ideological compatriots in neighboring Guatemala, the officers organized and unleashed an efficient campaign of terror in the cities. The campaign intensified dramatically after the progressive coup of October, 1979. By the end of the year, monthly estimates of the dead ranged as high as eight hundred. Against the urban infrastructure of the left the network of political organizers, labor leaders, human-rights workers, teachers, and activists of all progressive stripes which had put together the enormous demonstrations of the late seventies this technique proved devastating. These people werent organized militarily, which is what made them so easy to kill, William Stanley, a professor of political science at the University of New Mexico, told me in an interview in San Salvador. As the repression went on, month after month, it became less and less discriminating. By the end, the killing basically outran the intelligence capability of the Army and the security services, and they began killing according to very crude profiles, Stanley said. I remember, for example, hearing that a big pile of corpses was discovered one morning, and almost all of them turned out to be young women wearing jeans and tennis shoes. Apparently, one of the intelligence people had decided that

this profile you know, young women who dressed in that way made it easy to separate out leftists, and so that became one of the profiles that they used to round up so-called subversives. Some civilians were certainly involved, particularly on the funding end, but there can be no doubt that the dirty war was basically organized and directed by Salvadoran Army officers and no doubt, either, that the American Embassy was well aware of it. There was no secret about who was doing the killing, Howard Lane, the public-affairs officer in the Embassy from 1980 to 1982, told me in an interview. I mean, you formed that view within forty-eight hours after arriving in the country, and there was no secret at all about it except, maybe, in the White House. In public, the fiction was resolutely maintained that the identity of the killers was a mystery that the corpses were the work of rightist vigilantes. This campaign of lies was designed in part to accommodate the squeamishness of the Administration in Washington, which had to deal with growing concern in Congress about human-rights violations, particularly after several notorious cases, including the murder, in March of 1980, of Archbishop Oscar Romero while he said Mass; the rape and murder, the following December, of four American churchwomen; and the assassination, in January of 1981, of the head of the Salvadoran landreform agency and two of his American advisers. On the evening of December 1, 1981, Santiago, the director of Radio Venceremos, after learning from Jons, the comandante, about the coming operation, set out on foot from the guerrilla base at La Guacamaya, four miles south of El Mozote. As darkness fell, Santiago hiked east over the hills and through the gullies, crossed the Ro Sapo, and climbed down into a heavily forested ravine at El Zapotal. Here, dug into a rock niche half a dozen feet underground, was the studio of Radio Venceremos, which consisted of a small transmitter, an unwieldy gasoline generator, assorted tape recorders, microphones, and other paraphernalia, and a flexible antenna that snaked its way up through a forest of brush. Santiago gathered his handful of young staff members, and soon news of the coming operation was broadcast throughout the zone. Back in La Guacamaya, in a rough encampment in the open air, perhaps two hundred young men and women, outfitted in a motley combination of peasant clothing and camouflage garb, were making preparations. Some cleaned their weapons mostly old M1s and Mausers, along with a few captured American M16s. Many of the women bent over smooth flat stones, grinding corn, making the meal that would serve as the companys fuel during the days ahead for, confronted with the arrival of thousands of troops, the guerrillas of the E.R.P. were preparing not to fight but to flee. Mobility and quickness had always been central to the guerrillas strength, along with their familiarity with the mountain terrain. Like El Salvadors other radical groups, the Peoples Revolutionary Army had been the brainchild of young urban intellectuals, who had founded the organization in Mexico City in 1972, funded it during the mid-seventies largely by robbing banks and by seizing and ransoming wealthy businessmen, and battled among themselves for its leadership, using hightoned abstract arguments of the left (which more than once deteriorated into violent schism). The revolutionary process started in Morazn around 1977 or 78 with the consciousness-raising of Christian base communities led by radical priests, said Licho, the rebel commander, whose parents were campesinos living on the other side of the black road from El Mozote. We young people would get together and read the Bible and apply it to our own situation, and gradually we became more politically aware. When the young men came of age, the guerrilla leaders often urged them to join the Army they had urged Licho to do so in order to receive military training and gain firsthand knowledge of the enemy while providing useful intelligence until they could return to their home provinces to take up arms. By 1980, small groups of young guerrillas were operating throughout northern Morazn, drawing food and support from sympathetic peasants, and launching raids from time to time against the National Guard posts in the towns. They would attack suddenly, kill a few Guardsmen and capture their weapons, then fade back into the bush. After the posts had been reinforced, the Guardsmen responded, as they had done for years, by beating or killing peasants they suspected of having been infected with Communist sympathies. This quickened the flow of able-bodied men and women into the mountains. Soon some villages were inhabited almost entirely by old people and mothers and their children. The Guardsmen abandoned some towns completely in effect, ceding them to the control of the guerrillas. And the people abandoned other towns, either fleeing to the refugee camps beyond the Honduran border or joining the guerrillas, and thus forming, as time went on, a quasi-permanent baggage train of masas, or civilian supporters. The people who supported us moved around as our rear guard, providing food and other help, Licho told me. In some areas, our supporters were in the majority, in others not.

The distinction between combatants and noncombatants, never very clear in this guerrilla war, was growing cloudier still. The Salvadoran High Command had become increasingly alarmed by the situation in Morazn. The military view the situation in the countryside as critical, the United States Ambassador, Frank Devine, wrote in a 1980 cable. Many feel there are liberated areas where they dare not operate due to the concentration of leftist-terrorist strength. In January of 1981, the F.M.L.N. proclaimed a final offensive the badly equipped guerrillas hoped to provoke a popular insurrection, as the Sandinistas had done in Nicaragua eighteen months before, and to do it in the days just before Ronald Reagan took power in Washington but the people did not rise up, and the offensive ended in a costly defeat. After the collapse, hundreds of fighters streamed out of the cities and headed for the mountains. Having failed to overthrow the government, and having seen many of their civilian sympathizers liquidated in the past months by death squads, the guerrillas decided to focus their forces on a full-scale rural insurgency rooted in the northern mountains. By November, General Fred F. Woerner, whom a worried Pentagon had sent to assess the Salvadoran war, was concluding in a secret report that the situation on the ground had so deteriorated that a primary aim of the Salvadoran Army had now become to prevent the establishment of an insurgent liberated zone in the Department of Morazn, which could lead to international recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent force. (Three months before, France and Mexico had recognized the F.M.L.N. as a representative political force.) If the guerrillas were not dislodged from Morazn, the Salvadoran officers feared, they would risk seeing their country split in two. On December 1, 1981, after Radio Venceremos broadcast word that the Army was coming, people throughout northern Morazn began talking among themselves, arguing, and coming to decisions about what to do next. Hundreds of people assembled outside the guerrilla camp at La Guacamaya, having packed up what tortillas and beans they had, and gathered their children, ready for the hard trek ahead. On Monday, December 7th, the young men and women of Radio Venceremos began doing what they had practiced many times: rapidly dismantling the components, loading the generator aboard a mule, and hoisting the transmitter, the antenna, and the other equipment on one anothers backs. Then they hiked off to join the fighters at La Guacamaya. Around this time, according to Joaqun Villalobos, representatives of the guerrillas approached El Mozote and attempted to warn the campesinos there. We always had rear-guard people, political people, behind the lines, he says. So when the fighting was beginning in the south they advised people in the north to leave the zone. But the people in El Mozote had already made their decision. Because they had little relation to us, and because they were evangelical, they decided they had little to fear from the Army, Villalobos says. More likely, they had decided, after listening to the words of Marcos Daz, that the danger would be greater outside the hamlet than within. We told them what might happen, Licho says. But they didnt believe that the Army would do anything to them. Perhaps they regarded the guerrillas warnings those who heard them, that is (Rufina, for one, heard nothing) as attempts at recruitment. As the people of El Mozote well knew, in the view of the Salvadoran Army, to go with the guerrillas was to be a guerrilla. By Tuesday morning, December 8th, the guerrillas at La Guacamaya could hear the sounds of battle, of mortars and smallarms fire, coming, it seemed, from all directions; they knew by now that perhaps four thousand soldiers had entered the zone, that troops had crossed the Torola and were moving toward them from the south, that others were approaching the Sapo from the east. The only way clear had seemed to be to the north, toward the Honduran border; but, even as the Radio Venceremos announcers were putting out their last broadcast, urging the people of the zone to join the guerrilla columns, the guerrillas heard the helicopters approach and saw them pass overhead, carrying the troops of Domingo Monterrosas Atlacatl Battalion northward, to the mountain town of Perqun. To reach Perqun from El Mozote, you turn right on the black road and begin to climb. Soon the grade grows steeper, the tropical brush gives place to mountain pine, and the air lightens and grows fresh. Here and there, a bit of sorghum or corn or

maguey pokes out from among the trees, but, increasingly, from the red soil of the mountainside only great white rocks grow. The overpowering fragrance of freshly cut pine announces the hamlet of La Tejera and its sawmill, a low building of unstripped logs surrounded by stacks of new planks. Finally, a sign announces Perqun; the road tilts sharply upward and becomes a street of large cobblestones; and, after a few moments jolting, the traveller comes upon a dramatically uneven town square, which, despite blasted buildings and damaged streets, remains an oddly beautiful, vaguely otherworldly place. At its heart is a bizarre park, which accommodates many wildly slanting levels of green grass, like lopsided terraces on a cultivated but dilapidated hillside. Bordering the park are a yellow-painted clinic, a rough-hewn little hut, and a remarkable church crowned by a bulbous steeple. When Colonel Monterrosa set his helicopter down here in December of 1981, he found a town in government hands, but barely. Only four months earlier, in mid-August, the guerrillas had swept out of the surrounding hills and overwhelmed the local National Guard post, killing four men and capturing five. There were many young ones, but some really old ones, too, children in Perqun told Alma Guillermoprieto, then a stringer for the Washington Post. There were eight women. Some of them were in uniforms, but most of them wore raggedy clothes, like us. We knew some of them; they were from this town. The guerrillas had spent a week and a half digging defensive trenches, buying corn from the local coperative, and marching about the streets shouting Pueblo libre! and other slogans. When the Air Force began bombing the city, ten days later, the guerrillas swiftly vanished, fading into the mountains and ravines they knew so well, and leaving behind the four dead men, buried in a bomb crater, and also the civilians who had been there all along the civilians who, after playing host to the guerrillas for ten days, now gazed with all innocence into the faces of the National Guardsmen who had taken the places of their dead comrades. Colonel Monterrosa had thought long and hard about civilians and guerrilla war, about the necessity of counterinsurgency, about the frustrations of the odd and bloody conflict that the overextended Salvadoran Army had been fighting and losing. When the men of his Atlacatl Battalion touched down in Perqun that Tuesday morning in December, storming from helicopters in a crouch, gripping their helmets tightly against the backwash from the rotors, the officers had in their pockets lists of names to hand to the National Guardsmen. While the Atlacatl captains mustered their troops, the Guardsmen marched off through the town and pounded on doors. They were big men, well fed, and they looked even bigger than they were, outfitted in high black boots and uniforms of heavy greenish-brown cloth, with automatic rifles on their backs, and razor-sharp machetes hanging at their belts. In those days, if they came to your house to ask you to come with them to do something, youd end up dead, a Perqun man whom the Guardsmen visited that morning told me. When he heard the pounding and pulled open the door to find the Guardsmen there glowering down at him they always glowered, for their business was, and had been since the early days of the century, to induce fear in the countryside and to stamp out rebellion from the moment it revealed itself as a lessening of fear in a campesinos eyes this man could only try to control his terror as the Guardsmen stared for a moment, then barked, Hey, we have work to do! Come with us and help us do it! The man came outside, watched as one of the Guardsmen ran his finger down the list that Monterrosas men had handed him, then looked up, exchanged glances with his partner, and murmured, Ya vamos dndole. (Now lets get started.) The Perqun man knew what that meant the killing was to begin and, in a panic, he began to protest, digging an identification card out of his pocket and begging the Guardsmen to look at it carefully. Finally, after a terrible few minutes, he succeeded in convincing these impassive men that the name on the list was not his that one of the surnames was different. Nonetheless, the Guardsmen hustled him along the streets with them, and as they moved through town they pounded on other doors and collected other frightened men. Those men numbered ten by the time they reached a field in front of the clinic, which was a blur of unaccustomed activity: helicopters landing and hovering and departing, and, amid the blast and the roar from the rotors, hundreds of men in green moving about, checking weapons, cinching the straps on their packs, and talking among themselves as officers marched back and forth shouting orders. By then, several hundred of the Atlacatl soldiers had stormed off the helicopters, most of them in olive green, and a few in camouflage garb above black jungle boots. On the shoulders of their uniforms they bore, in white or yellow, the figure of an Indian and the word Atlacatl (the name of a legendary Indian warrior who had led the fight against the conquistadores). To a practiced eye, they seemed a somewhat different breed from most Salvadoran soldiers more businesslike, grimmer even and their equipment was better: they had the latest American M16s, plenty of M60 machine guns, 90-mm. recoilless rifles, and 60- and 81-mm. mortars.

But it wasnt their equipment that made them the lite, American-trained Atlacatl Battalion (as press accounts invariably identified them). It was their aggressiveness, their willingness to do the job: a willingness that the rest of the badly led and badly trained Army generally lacked. In part, perhaps, this aggressiveness was instilled by American trainers Special Forces personnel, who, beginning in March, had been coming over from Southern Command, in Panama, to show the Salvadoran recruits how to shoot and how to seize positions. Mostly, though, it came from Monterrosa. Among senior field commanders who in many cases, as one lieutenant put it to me, dont even own fatigues, Monterrosa seemed a soldier of the classic type: aggressive, charismatic, a man who liked nothing better than to get out in the field and fight alongside his troops. The Salvadoran grunts mostly unlettered peasant boys, many of whom had been pulled from buses or off country roads and pressed into service, having received little training and less regard from their officers loved Monterrosa for his willingness to get down in the dirt with them and fight. The press loved him, too: not only was he a natural story but he was only too happy to invite reporters to come along with him in his helicopter. And, of course, the Americans loved him as well: Colonel John Cash, a United States military attach, speaks of a hot-shot strategist like Monterrosa, whom Id put up against any American hot shot. As the war moved decisively to the countryside, the American government was no longer able to deny that it had a major problem on its hands. The Salvadoran officers were showing themselves utterly incapable of fighting a war of rural counterinsurgency. Not only was the Army, with a total of thirteen thousand men facing perhaps a third that many guerrillas, terribly overstretched, but its officer corps was burdened by a byzantine political structure and a perverse system of anti-incentives. The most important commands from the military point of view were from the point of view of most Salvadoran officers the least desirable, and the result was that those posts tended to be assigned to the politically least powerful, and often least talented, members of the officer corps. The guys in the real combat commands tended to be the total incompetents, Todd Greentree, who was a junior reporting officer in the United States Embassy at the time, told me. These guys would be sent out there to the end of the line, and theyd spend their days drinking in the cuartel. Embassy officials recommended, cajoled, and finally urged reassignments, but changes, when they came at all, came only after enormous effort. The explanation was not just the superior political and economic power of the right wing of the officer corps but the fact that the tanda system, in which classmates, no matter what their failings, were fiercely protected, appeared nearly impervious to outside pressure including pressure from the Americans, who were now pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into the country. As the officers understood only too quickly, the ultimate sanction that the Americans could brandish turning off the aid spigot threatened to hurt the Americans themselves as much as it would hurt the Salvadorans, since the American fear of a Communist El Salvador taking its place alongside Sandinista Nicaragua had become overriding. Even during the final months of the Carter Administration, this underlying reality became embarrassingly evident, when President Carter, after cutting off aid in response to the murder of the American churchwomen, rushed to restore it only a few weeks later, in the face of the rebels final offensive. Ronald Reagan did not suffer from the same ambivalence. By the fall of 1981, Reagan had removed the outspoken American Ambassador, Robert White; had vowed, through Secretary of State Alexander Haig, to draw the line in El Salvador against Communist subversion in the hemisphere; had almost doubled economic aid for El Salvador, to a hundred and forty-four million dollars, and increased military aid, from twenty-six million dollars to more than thirty-five million; and, in November, had begun funding the Nicaraguan Contra fighters as a proxy force against the Sandinista government. By late 1981, the priorities of American policy in El Salvador had become unmistakable. The Americans had stepped forward to fund the war, but they were unwilling to fight it; it would be left to the Salvadorans to defeat the guerrillas. The guerrilla always carries his masas into battle with him was a famous Army saying of the era, a piece of received wisdom from that darkest period of the Salvadoran civil war, and its author was Colonel Monterrosa himself. It was intended not only as a statement of fact but as a general affirmation of principle: in this bloody war, in the red zones, there was really no such thing as a civilian. A large professional Army would have reoccupied territory and sent out aggressive patrols, all the while doing political work in the countryside to regain the loyalty of the people. Indeed, that was part of the rationale behind the search-anddestroy operations. There are a lot of different names for counter-guerrilla fighting, Colonel Castillo, then the Vice-Minister of Defense, told me in an interview. Whether they call it Hammer and Anvil, or the Piston, or something else, its all the

same idea to try to expel the guerrillas from the zone. After we managed to expel them, they would lose the support of all the people they had indoctrinated. But in those days, Castillo conceded, the Army didnt have enough equipment or forces to maintain operations there for a long enough time. The result was that the Army would enter a zone in force; the guerrillas, after a few minor engagements, would flee; and the soldiers, after killing a number of supposed subversives (civilians who may or may not have been guerrilla supporters but hadnt been quick enough, or smart enough, to get out of the way), would evacuate the zone, leaving a token force behind which the guerrillas, when they flowed back in a few days later, would maul and expel. The Armys tactic was not effective, and it made for great frustration. When I arrived here, in June of 1982, the Salvadoran officers used to brag to me that they didnt take prisoners, Colonel Cash, the military attach, said. They said, We dont want to dignify them by taking prisoners. They wouldnt even call them prisoners, or guerrillas. They called them terroristas delincuentes terroristas. (General Blandn, the former chief of staff, told me, Before 1983, we never took prisoners of war.) As the guerrillas were reduced to the status of terrorist delinquents, all civilians in certain zones were reduced to the status of masas, guerrilla supporters, and thus became legitimate targets. North of the Torola, for example, it was believed that the civilians and the guerrillas were all mixed together, and were indistinguishable. By late 1980, the Army had begun the tactic that William Stanley, the political-science professor, refers to as killing by zone. One of the first such operations took place in October, and began with a staff meeting in Perqun. Colonel Castillo explained that it was necessary to stop the Communist revolution that it was necessary to make an example of this place, so we wouldnt have the same problems in other parts of the country, an officer who had been present at the meeting told me. He said we must take into account that the great majority of the people here are guerrillas. So the idea was to surround them all, to create this hammer and anvil thing, push all the people down to Villa El Rosario, where a huge artillery barrage would be unleashed. The city would be totally destroyed. We were going to make an example of these people. The brutality of this operation provoked the first major exodus from Morazn, as entire populations fled their villages for the refugee camps in Gotera, or for the camps over the border in Honduras. Despite the Armys success in taking away the water, however, the fish continued to multiply and grow stronger. In November of 1980, a month after the Villa El Rosario operation, the guerrillas began to receive the first of a number of shipments of small arms from the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua a mixture of fals, M16s, and Uzis, according to Stanley. After the collapse of the final offensive, in January, the guerrillas also benefitted from a fresh infusion of manpower, including not only the fighters who had fled the cities but a number of important deserters from the Army. In front of the Perqun health clinic that Tuesday in early December, amid the backwash from the helicopters, the men of the Atlacatl mustered and made ready. The National Guardsmen, who by this time had collected the ten villagers, pushed their reluctant charges forward through the troops until they reached a tall, green-eyed officer in combat fatigues, who was striding about amid the commotion, pointing here and there and issuing orders. One of the Perqun men, who had served in the Army several years before, recognized the officer as Major Natividad de Jess Cceres Cabrera, a legendary figure: sixth in his academy class, a born-again Christian, a fanatical anti-Communist, and now the executive officer of the Atlacatl Battalion. (Later, his legend grew: as a colonel in command of Chalatenango in 1986, he forced all the residents of that substantial city to express their desire for peace ... their purity, their soul, and also their cleanliness by painting the entire city white; and in 1989, on a Salvadoran highway, Cceres ordered his men to block the convoy of the American Ambassador, William Walker, and, when the Ambassador refused to emerge and offer proof of his identity, threatened to blow up his limousine with antitank weapons.) On that Tuesday, Major Cceres looked over the ten men and gestured to five captains who were organizing the companies under their command. He put two of us with each company, one of the Perqun men told me, and he said, We want you to come with us, to show us the area. They had been brought there to serve as guides for the Atlacatl. Major Cceres gathered the captains together, gave them pseudonyms to be used over the radio during the operation he himself would be known as Charlie and issued a few orders. Then the five companies of the Atlacatl moved out, down the mountainside. Everywhere, above the roar of the helicopters, could be heard the thud of mortars and the booming of

artillery. It was a huge operation, the guide from Perqun told me. There were helicopters and planes and heavy equipment and troops all through the mountains, and they even had animals to cart along some of the guns and ammunition. As the Atlacatl men set off south from Perqun, hundreds of other soldiers were moving steadily north. Having been deployed as a blocking force along the Torola and Sapo Rivers, to the south and east, and along the black road, to the west, they were now tightening the circle. These units, the hammer of the operation, were meant to push all the guerrillas in the zone up toward the anvil of the Atlacatl and crush them against the best troops the Army had to offer. But, as a lieutenant involved in the operation remarked to me, you take troops from all over the country and move them up to Morazn in about ninety truckloads, right along the Pan-American Highway I mean, you think somebody might notice? As Monterrosas men circled the hills below Perqun, the guerrillas of the Peoples Revolutionary Army, far to the south, at La Guacamaya, completed their preparations. Confronted with a heavy force blocking the river to the south, and the Atlacatl moving down from the north, the guerrillas would break straight west, punching their way through the militarys lines at the black road. That night, some of their train started the trek: long columns of peasants, their belongings, food, and young children bundled on their backs, trudged single file through the mountains, flowing in a vast nocturnal exodus that would carry them over the mountains to the Honduran border. On the morning of Wednesday, December 9th, while thick mist still carpeted the valleys, the men of the Third Company of the Atlacatl rose in their encampment on a hill called El Gigante, broke camp, and circled back toward the black road. In the hamlet of La Tejera that afternoon, they seized three civilians, two youths and an old man of eighty or more, hustled them along to a field not far from the sawmill, and began interrogating them very strongly, very brutally, according to the guide from Perqun. The officers accused the men of being guerrillas, demanded to be given the names of their comrades, to be told where they had hidden their weapons. When the men denied the charges, Major Cceres declared that they would be executed; the killing, he said, would begin here. But then a farmer from the area came forward. The two youths worked for him, he told the Major, and he protested vigorously that they had nothing to do with the guerrillas. One of the guides vouched for them as well, and after a prolonged dispute the men were spared. This argument over identity, over who was a guerrilla and who wasnt and what constituted evidence one way or the other, would recur during the next two days. Already in La Tejera, officers disagreed about whether the men should have been spared; according to the guide, Captain Walter Oswaldo Salazar, the company commander, reacted angrily when he was told of a comment from another officer that the local people should be treated with respect unless there was evidence that they were guerrillas. Salazar said, No, these are all guerrillas, the guide said. He said the soldiers could go ahead and kill any of them, or all of them. Later that day, according to the guide, Captain Salazar let slip his suspicion that the other officer was in fact a guerrilla himself, and vowed to assassinate him. This wasnt simply paranoia. We had tremendous infiltration in the Army at that time, the lieutenant involved in the operation told me. We knew that certain sales of arms were going to these people, that information was being leaked all our operations, all our movements, were being leaked. The overwhelming suspicion that this engendered, together with the growing panic among the officers about the deterioration in the government position, gave the hardest-line officers a decisive upper hand. The hard-core guys there really did believe that it was a virus, an infection, Todd Greentree said. Theyd always say a cancer you know, Communism is a cancer. And so if youre a guerrilla they dont just kill you, they kill your cousin, you know, everybody in the family, to make sure the cancer is cut out. These officers, of course, had Salvadoran history on their side. They had a kill the seed mentality, Professor Stanley told me. After all, what happened in 1932? To this day, when someone wants to make a threat here, why do they invoke the name of Martnez? the author of the Matanza. Because he is an icon, thats why. The idea of going out to the zones and killing everyone is not a new idea. Its a proved idea.

Putting that proved idea into practice would become the mission of the Atlacatl Battalion. Hoping to insure that at least one unit of the Salvadoran Army was adequately prepared to fight, the Americans sent Special Forces instructors in early 1981 to train the first recruits of the new Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalion (biri). Yet, as the American advisers well knew, the epithet of lite, American-trained that was hung on the Atlacatl by the press was a bit of a joke. They had no specialized training, one of the original Special Forces trainers told me. They had basic individualized training you know, basic shooting, marksmanship, squad tactics. I mean, the difference was that the Salvadorans basically had no trained units in the country, so this was going to be a unit that would be trained. Some officials in the Embassy and the Pentagon had wanted the entire unit to be trained in the United States and, indeed, later in the year recruits for the second of the biris, the Belloso, would be flown en masse to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. But the Atlacatl had something the Belloso didnt: it had Monterrosa. That the battalion wasnt sent to the United States but was trained by Monterrosa here was in large part a testament to his authority, a contemporary of Monterrosas told me. The High Command had been preparing him, grooming him. He had taken all the courses the Americans offered, including those for the paratroopers and the commandos. His ambition became very concrete around the time the Americans decided to direct a major counter-insurgency effort here. When the Atlacatl came along, he jumped at it. From the beginning, Monterrosa worked to give his new force a mstica a mystique. They shot animals and smeared the blood all over their faces, they slit open the animals bellies and drank the blood, a lieutenant in another unit told me. They were a hell of a raunchy unit. They had no discipline of fire, none at all. I mean, they saw something moving out there, they shot it deer, pigs, whatever. Youd be out there in the field trying to sleep, and all night those assholes would keep shooting at things. According to one reporter, the men of the Atlacatl celebrated their graduation by collecting all the dead animals they could find off the roads dogs, vultures, anything boiling them together into a bloody soup, and chugging it down. Then they stood at rigid attention and sang, full-throated, the units theme song, Somos Guerreros> We are warriors! Warriors all! We are going forth to kill A mountain of terrorists! By the fall of 1981, the Atlacatl was well on its way to building that mountain. The pattern of its operations had become well known: units of the regular Army and the security forces would move into place along the border of one of the red zones, walling it off, with the help, very often, of a natural barrier, like a river or a mountain range. Then a blocking force would invade the zone, pushing before it everyone and everything living. Finally, the helicopters would sweep in, and the men of the Atlacatl would storm out, bombard all whom the trap had snared with artillery and mortar fire, and then with small arms. It was the strategy of draining the sea, or, as Monterrosa was heard to describe it on occasion, of La Limpieza the Cleanup. Those parts of El Salvador infected by Communism were being ruthlessly scrubbed; the cancer would be cut out, even if healthy flesh had to be lost, too. El Mozote was in a place, in a zone, that was one hundred per cent controlled by the guerrillas, one of the original American advisers with the Atlacatl told me. You try to dry those areas up. You know youre not going to be able to work with the civilian population up there, youre never going to get a permanent base there. So you just decide to kill everybody. Thatll scare everybody else out of the zone. Its done more out of frustration than anything else. Joaqun Villalobos, the E.R.P. comandante, freely conceded to me in an interview that in a number of the most notorious operations, both before and after El Mozote, many of the civilians killed were in fact sympathetic to the guerrillas. In San Vicente in 1982, for example, the massacre at El Calabozo that involved more than two hundred people, he said. This was a situation where the Army was stronger, where our guerrilla force was too weak to protect our followers. We simply werent able to provide those people sufficient military protection. It was the same in 1980 at the Sumpul River in Chalatenango, where a group of our sympathizers were fleeing, trying to cross the river. The guerrillas, benefitting from very good intelligence and excellent mobility, generally managed to escape from the zones ahead of the Army; it was their supporters, and any other civilians who happened to be there, who took the punishment. In the case of many of the massacres during the early eighties, then, the Salvadoran Army was managing to do what it set out

to do: killing Salvadorans who were sympathetic to the insurgents. However blatantly this behavior violated the rules of war however infamous it was to murder men, women, and children en masse, without trial or investigation, simply because of the political sympathies of some of their number the strategy did at least have some rationale. Even against this grim background, El Mozote stands out. El Mozote was a town that was not militant, Villalobos said. Thats why what happened at El Mozote was special. Sometime during the incident at La Tejera that Wednesday afternoon, word came over the radio that the First Company of the Atlacatl had engaged the guerrillas. There was an exchange of fire, an armed confrontation, the guide says. But, like so much else in this story, the battle its intensity, even its precise location has become a matter of fierce dispute. From the start, the Salvadoran military claimed that the fighting took place at El Mozote itself. On December 17th, a C.I.A. officer cabled from San Salvador that the heaviest fighting had occurred at El Mozote where 30 to 35 insurgents and four Salvadoran soldiers were killed. It is impossible to know for sure, but from the context of the cable it seems very probable that the C.I.A. mans information came, one way or another, from the Salvadoran Army. The guide, on the other hand, who was a few miles away and heard the report on the fighting as it came over the Atlacatl radio, places it around Arambala. It was a little skirmish, he told me, and it happened at El Portilln, near Arambala a little over a mile from El Mozote. Villalobos, who appears to remember the operation in great detail, also insists that the fighting took place at Arambala, which was in effect our rear guard, he said. Although most of the serious fighting took place south of us, along the Torola, there was a minor level of fighting, including maybe a little mortar fire, near Arambala. He went on to say, Its normal when you displace a large force to leave small units to protect the retreat and keep up resistance. Guerrilla squads around Arambala, north of La Guacamaya, were in a perfect position to protect the flank of the main guerrilla force as it retreated west. Santiago, who was still in La Guacamaya, readying his Radio Venceremos crew for that nights retreat, describes how the pressure of the enemy was growing in his north-south advance. On that day, he writes in his memoirs, the comrades of the Fourth Section took by assault a position of the Atlacatl Battalion and captured two rifles a plausible number in view of the four dead that the Salvadoran Army apparently acknowledged. But Santiago makes no mention of the 30 to 35 insurgents killed that are claimed in the C.I.A. cable, and neither, so far as I know, does any other guerrilla memoir. This would have been a very large number of dead; the fact that no one mentions them, and the fact that, in the wake of this fighting, the guerrillas did indeed manage, as Santiago recounts, to maintain the lines of fire and organize the movement to break the circle and make a joke of Monterrosas hammer blow these two facts lead one to wonder whether the officers, in providing their reports to their own superiors (and possibly to the C.I.A.), had created a victory at El Mozote from what was in fact a defeat at Arambala. The officers would have been especially reluctant to admit a defeat at the hands of the Fourth Section. An lite guerrilla unit, it had been trained, in large part, by Captain Francisco Emilio Mena Sandoval, an Army officer who had deserted to the guerrillas the previous January. Salvadoran officers had developed a deep hatred for Mena Sandoval, regarding him and others like him as much more despicable forms of life than, say, Villalobos: in their eyes, the latter was merely a delinquent terrorist, whereas officers like Mena Sandoval were traitors. And, as it happened, the officers and men of the Atlacatl had a special reason not only to hate Mena Sandoval but to remember with the greatest distaste the town of Arambala and also the hamlet of El Mozote, just down the road. It was near Arambala, eight months earlier, that the first unit of the brash new Atlacatl had ventured forth to show the guerrillas, and the rest of the Army, what it was made of; and it was there that, to the embarrassment of its officers and men, the highly touted new unit suffered a humiliating defeat in large part because Captain Mena Sandoval had had the foresight to steal an Army radio when he came over to the guerrillas. Thanks to the radio and Mena Sandovals knowledge of the enemys codes, the rebels were able to keep one crucial step ahead of their opponents. We defended one line on the outskirts of El Mozote, which the enemy was unable to take for many days, Mena Sandoval writes in his memoirs. Their cost in casualties kept growing, as did our morale. It had been twelve days of combat and we had almost no casualties. Finally, after twenty-two days of intense fighting, the guerrillas slipped away across the black road under cover of night. As

for the Atlacatl, news of its poor performance spread quickly through the Army. Soon officers and soldiers began passing on a little joke. The Atlacatls designation as a biri, they said, stood not for Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalion, as everyone had thought, but for Immediate Retreat Infantry Battalion. This kind of needling would likely have assured that, eight months later, many officers and soldiers in the Atlacatl would have retained vivid memories of Arambala and El Mozote. Now, after the initial engagement on Wednesday, according to the guide, we heard by radio that the other company killed people there. Under the gaze of Major Cceres, who was then with the First Company, the troops entered the town of Arambala, brought out the people who had remained there, and assembled them in the plaza. They led the women and children to the church and locked them inside. Then the troops ordered the men to lie face down on the ground, whereupon they bound them, blindfolded them, and began to beat them, demanding information about the guerrillas. A number of men the guide believes as many as twenty (and his estimate agrees with the figure given in a detailed analysis of the operation in and around El Mozote by Tutela Legal, the San Salvador Archbishoprics human-rights office, in November, 1991), though other estimates range as low as three were taken from the assembly, led away, and executed. In Arambala, the officers still relied on their lists to select who would die. However, by the following afternoon, Thursday, the lists had run out, and at some point perhaps that day, perhaps late the day before the officers made a decision about the direction the operation was to take. For, despite Rufina Amayas bitter conviction that there had been a betrayal, that the officer who had spoken to Marcos Daz as he left Gotera had taken part in a nefarious plot to make sure that the people of El Mozote stayed in their homes to await the fate that had been planned for them, an equally likely explanation and, in a way, a more horrible one is that the officer was in fact trying to do his friend Daz and the people of the hamlet a favor, for at that point nothing whatever may have been planned for them. Whenever the officers made the decision, it is clear that by the time they reached El Mozote they had ordered a change in tactics. They had lists from Perqun south to Arambala, the guide told me. But farther down, there were no lists. Farther down, they killed everything down to the ground. Farther down was scorched earth. Just after midnight on Wednesday, as the men of the Atlacatl settled down to sleep, a long column wound its way out of La Guacamaya and snaked slowly through the ravines and gullies, heading west toward the black road. The guerrillas and their entourage travelled quietly: the only sound in the tense darkness was that of hundreds of moving feet. The fighters came first, lugging their rifles and ammunition and whatever other supplies they could manage. Then came the civilian followers, loaded down with their bundles of clothing and sacks of tortillas and coffee, and nervously hushing their children. And at the rear came the men and women of Radio Venceremos, bent under the weight of the transmitter and the generator and the other equipment that formed the stations heart. In the end, it was these burdens which betrayed them: the weight slowed them, so that, as they finally came within sight of the black road, struggling along in increasing panic, the darkness thinned and faded, dawn broke behind them, and they could see, as they gazed upward from their hiding place a ravine full of prickly maguey the men of the Atlacatl rising and stretching there on the highway. One soldier was swirling his poncho around him to free it of moisture, and the first rays of sunlight glinted off the droplets. The guerrillas had been caught, but turning back was out of the question; there was nothing for it but to run. Advance! Jons ordered. No one moved. Advance, I say! A handful of guerrillas broke from their cover, zigzagging in a wild, desperate sprint toward the road, staggering under the weight of their equipment. A moment passed before they heard the shouts of the soldiers, and a moment more before the bullets started to come. They took cover and returned fire, then again ran, took cover, and fired; but they were badly exposed, and by the time they had managed to cross a hundred and fifty yards of open country three men had been hit. One of them, Toni, had been carrying the transmitter, and as he collapsed his precious burden slipped from his back and tumbled down, end over end, into another ravine. His comrades gathered around him. Toni was dying; the bullets kept coming; there could be no question of retrieving the transmitter. Monterrosa would have his war prize.

Late that Thursday afternoon, the men of the Atlacatl trudged into El Mozote. They found the streets deserted. For the last two days, the thud of the mortars, the firecracker staccato of the small arms, and the roar of the aircraft had been coming steadily closer, and that morning helicopters and planes of the Salvadoran Air Force had strafed and bombed the area around the hamlet, terrifying the inhabitants. Everything was closer every day, louder every day, Rufina Amaya told me, and finally, by that day, the people were hiding in their houses. The strafing ceased not long before the men of the Atlacatl entered the hamlet, dragging with them civilians they had found hiding along the way. Tired and impatient, the soldiers swarmed about the houses of El Mozote and pounded on the doors with the butts of their M16s. Salgan! they shouted angrily. Get out here! Get out here now! Hesitantly, the people came out into the twilight, frightened, bewildered, unsure of what was happening. The soldiers, cursing and yelling, pulled them forward, hustled them along with the butts of their rifles, herded everyone into the center of the street. Rufina and her husband, Domingo Claros, emerged with their four children: he was carrying three-year-old Marta Lilin and leading Cristino, nine years old, while Rufina had five-year-old Mara Dolores by the hand and carried at her breast Mara Isabel, eight months old. They told us all to lie down in the street, boca abajo literally, mouth down and they began pushing some of us down, Rufina says. As my husband was setting the little girl down, a soldier pushed him to the ground. The girl started to cry. By then, all the children were crying. The entire town lay like that, perhaps four hundred people face down in the dirt, as darkness fell. Between the wailing of at least a hundred children and the shouting of the soldiers hundreds had entered the hamlet by now the din must have been unbearable. The soldiers marched up and down the lines of people, kicking one here and there, striking another with a rifle butt, and all the while keeping up a steady rain of shouted insults and demands. As Rufina tells it, a soldier would stop next to a man or a woman, kick the prone body, and bark out a question: Who were the guerrillas? Where were they? Where did they hide their guns? The men and women of El Mozote insisted that there were no guerrillas there, that they knew nothing of guerrillas or weapons. If you want to find guerrillas, one woman shouted tearfully, raising her head from the ground, go out there she waved toward the hills outside town. But here, here were not guerrillas. This only made the soldiers angrier. All you sons of bitches are collaborators, an officer said. Youre going to have to pay for those bastards. At one point, as Rufina tells it, the wealthy and influential Marcos Daz, lying in the street beside his wife and their sons and daughters, raised his head. Wait! he pleaded. They promised me nothing would happen to the people here. The officer told me so. At that, the Atlacatl officer laughed and said, No, motherfucker, you all have to pay. Now, get your face back in the ground. And he raised his black boot and pushed Marcos Dazs head down into the dirt. They were very abusive, Rufina says. We couldnt do anything. They had all these guns. We had to obey. Some of the soldiers took down names as others went along the lines demanding to see peoples hands and pulling from their fingers any rings they saw, then ordering them to turn over their jewelry and crucifixes and anything else that might have some value. The people of El Mozote lay there in the street, their faces in the dust, the children sobbing, for a long time. The soldiers yelled, strode back and forth, aimed their weapons at them. We thought that they were going to kill us all that we were sentenced to die right there, Rufina says. But finally the soldiers ordered them to get up. As the people of El Mozote climbed unsteadily to their feet, the soldiers barked out an order: they were to go back into their houses, the soldiers said, and not let even so much as their noses poke out the door. The people, terrified, grateful to be alive, hurried into their houses crowded into them, for virtually every room in the hamlet held extra people. Now the wailing of children made the houses seem smaller still. No one slept. Outside, the men of

the Atlacatl shouted and laughed and sang songs, punctuating the hilarity with celebratory bursts of gunfire. Rufina and her husband, packed into a house with two other families, struggled to calm their children. They were hungry, and we had no food to give them, she says. We were going to kill a chicken to feed them, but as soon as we lit a candle the soldiers yelled at us from the street to put out the light. Our children were scared, and hungry, and the littlest ones were messing all over themselves, and we couldnt even take them outside to clean them. So they huddled inside in the darkness, listening anxiously to the laughter, starting up each time it was cut by a burst of automatic fire, and all the while trying to soothe the children. The saddest thing was that the children were crying and we could do nothing for them, Rufina says. Soon everything would be all right, their parents assured them soon they would be safe. Perhaps the parents began to believe it themselves. After the terror of that evening, after feeling the earth against their faces and the gun muzzles at their necks, Rufina and her husband prayed that they had seen the worst, that the soldiers would leave the next day. We were thinking that because they hadnt killed us yet, maybe they wouldnt, Rufina says. After all, no one had really been harmed, and, even if the promises of Marcos Dazs officer friend had been worthless well, the people here had never had trouble with the Army. The people knew that they werent guerrillas, and the soldiers, despite their angry shouting, must know it, too. As the people of El Mozote huddled in their dark houses, down at Osicala, the base camp of the operation, south of the Torola River, the officers were taking stock. The first stage of the operation the convergence of the Atlacatl companies on El Mozote, the capture of the hamlet and its people had gone well. The first phase was over, an officer involved in the operation told me. All the unit commanders came to Osicala to talk it over. I was heading for the mess hall, and I bumped into he named a major who at that time was a key figure in military intelligence and he said to me, Look, we might need you tomorrow. Be ready. Then the major gave the younger officer a rundown of the situation. He said, You know, the first phase is over, the units have gone through and done what theyve had to do, and now its just a question of going in there and interrogating those people you know, like P.O.W.s. I asked him if there had been any guerrillas there, and he said, No, theyre gone. But we might need you. We have people to interrogate. We have maybe six hundred people altogether. That was a lot of people to interrogate. If I had gone in there, the officer told me, I would have expected to spend two or three days, considering all the people they had. The two men stood there for four or five minutes while the major briefed the younger man on the sort of information they wanted to get out of the prisoners. Basically, we were looking for the guerrillas means of support how they were getting their food, and so on. Wed stopped a lot of their communications, but we wanted to know their logistics, how they were getting their supplies, what their routes were, and so on. Especially, we wanted to know who it was theyd infiltrated into the Army itself and who was selling them arms. We had evidence that there was considerable selling of arms from the Army at that time I mean, you could ask three and four times what a weapon was worth, and these people would pay it, and many of the soldiers couldnt resist that. There was selling of information as well. All our operations were being leaked. Everyone wanted to make a buck that was the game. Other officers passed by as the two men talked. That the first phase had been completed, that the Atlacatl had seized El Mozote and now held its population prisoner that much was widely known among the officers at Osicala that night. My impression was that the plan was to spend the next day interrogating these people, the officer told me. And apparently that was the majors impression as well. But the next day he never called me. And by that night everyone knew that something had happened. While it was still dark, the soldiers came to Rufinas door and began pounding on it with the butts of their rifles. Salgan!

they shouted once again. Get out here! The families were hustled outside. We wanted to give our children food, Rufina says, but they said, No, get out to the plaza. All around, the people were emerging from the houses; the soldiers pushed them along roughly, and in the darkness they stumbled over the ground and bumped against one another. Form lines! the soldiers shouted. Men and older boys over here! Women and children over there! Soon all the people of El Mozote were lined up in the plaza. The soldiers ordered them not to move. They stood for hours. The children, having had no food and no rest, sobbed and fussed; the mothers tried to quiet them. The soldiers, unlike the evening before, said little. They just marched up and down the lines looking real mean and ugly, not saying anything, Rufina says. And so the sun rose on the people of El Mozote that Friday. Around seven, they heard the sound of a helicopter approaching. As it hovered overhead, the soldiers began herding the people from the plaza. The men were ordered into the church, a small whitewashed building adjacent to the even smaller sacristy; the women and children were crowded into the house of Alfredo Mrquez, a small building on the main street a few feet from the larger house of Marcos Daz and directly opposite the church and the sacristy. Looking out a window of the tightly crowded house well over a hundred women and children had been forced into a space meant for perhaps a dozen Rufina saw the helicopter touch down in the plaza and half a dozen officers climb out. She saw several of them, accompanied by soldiers of the Atlacatl, stride to the church, where the men were being held. The others came marching to the house where she was, and pushed through the door into the packed, noisy room. They had bayonets on their guns, and they used them to push the women back, Rufina says. They said we were collaborators. They were angry. They kept asking us where our pistols were, where the men had hidden our guns, and when we kept saying, again and again, that we didnt have any, theyd push at us with the bayonets. Then theyd say, Shut up, old woman, what are you crying about? They said theyd kill us if we didnt tell them. After only a few minutes, the officers strode out, leaving soldiers to guard the door. Around this time, the helicopter lifted off, taking at least some of the officers along. Now the women began to hear shouting from the church. We could hear them yelling the men, Rufina says. They were screaming, No! No! Dont do this to us! Dont kill us! When she heard the screams, Rufina, who together with her children had been sitting on a bench with her back to the front wall of the house the wall facing the church climbed up on the bench so that she could look out a small window high up in that wall. Through the window she saw soldiers leading groups of men from the little whitewashed church blindfolded men whose hands were bound behind them. Each pair of soldiers led five or six men past the house of Alfredo Mrquez and took them out of the hamlet in various directions. After a time, she saw her husband in one group, and as she watched, along with young Cristino, who had climbed up next to her, eager to see what was happening, they both saw him Domingo Claros, twenty-nine-year-old woodcutter, husband of Rufina and father of Cristino, Mara Dolores, Marta Lilin, and Mara Isabel bolt forward, together with another man, in a desperate effort to escape the soldiers. But there was nowhere to run. The men of the Atlacatl levelled their M16s and brought both men down with short bursts of fire. Then the soldiers strode forward to where the men lay gasping on the ground, and, unsheathing their machetes, they bent over them, grasped their hair, jerked their heads back sharply, and beheaded them with strong blows to the backs of their necks. I got down from the bench and I hugged my children to me, Rufina says. My son was crying and saying over and over, They killed my father. I was crying. I knew then that they were all being taken away to be killed. I just hugged my children to me and cried. While the officers had been questioning the women, other officers and soldiers were interrogating the men in the church. Many of the men were bound, blindfolded, and forced to lie face down on the ground while they were interrogated,

according to the Tutela Legal report (which was evidently compiled with the coperation of at least one soldier who had been present). The soldiers would step on their backs and pull their heads back by their hair until they screamed in pain. For all their brutality, however, the interrogations of the men appear to have been almost as perfunctory as those of the women. The officers devoted scarcely an hour to questioning the hundreds of supposed collaborators, which makes it difficult to believe that they really expected to acquire useful intelligence from the people of El Mozote. At about eight oclock, various of the men who had been gathered in the church were lifted off the ground and decapitated with machetes by soldiers, according to the Tutela report. The soldiers dragged the bodies and the heads of the decapitated victims to the convent of the church, where they were piled together. It must have been at this point that the women in the house across the street began to hear the men screaming. Decapitation is tiring work, and slow, and more than a hundred men were crammed into that small building. After the initial beheadings it is unclear how many died inside the church the soldiers began bringing the men out in groups, and it was from one of the first of the groups that Domingo Claros had attempted to escape. While Rufina huddled with her children in the crowded house, mourning her husband, other women climbed up on the bench beside her and peered out the small window. From here, they, too, saw the soldiers taking groups of men from the church and marching them off in different directions. Outside the hamlet, on a hill known as El Pinalito, the guides from Perqun waited in the company of several corporals the officers had ordered them to stay there, lest they become confused with the townspeople during the operation and throughout the morning the guides watched the soldiers pass. I saw them marching along groups of maybe ten each, one guide told me. They were all blindfolded, and they had their hands tied behind their backs. Then we would hear the shots, the bursts from the rifles. Out in the forest, the soldiers forced the men to the ground and ordered them to lie flat, with their faces against the earth, as they had lain, with their families, the evening before. Then the soldiers lowered their M16s and fired bursts into each mans brain. All morning, you could hear the shots, the crying and the screaming, Rufina says. In the house of Alfredo Mrquez, some of the children had become hysterical, and no one knew how to calm them. Cristino begged his mother tearfully to take them out of the house, lest they be killed, as he had seen his father killed. Rufina could do nothing but point helplessly to the guards and try to calm him. None of the women had any idea what would happen next. We just cried and hugged one another. Around midday, a group of soldiers came into the house. Now its your turn, women, one of the soldiers said. They were going to take the women out now in groups, the soldier explained, and then, he said, the women would be free to go to their homes, or down to Gotera, or wherever they liked. With that, the soldiers began picking out, one by one, the younger women and the girls, and pulling them toward the door. The girls would hang on to their mothers, and the soldiers would come in and just grab them from their mothers, Rufina says. There was a lot of screaming and shouting. Everyone was screaming, No! No! Dont do this! But the soldiers would hit the mothers with the butts of their rifles, and they would reach behind and grab the girls and pull them along with them. From the house of Alfredo Mrquez, the soldiers marched the group of young women and girls some of them as young as ten years old out of the hamlet and up onto the hills known as El Chingo and La Cruz. Before long, the women in the house could hear screams coming from the hills. The guides, on El Pinalito, nearby, also heard the screaming. We could hear the women being raped on the hills, the Perqun man told me. And then, you know, the soldiers would pass by, coming from there, and theyd talk about it. You know, they were talking and joking, saying how much they liked the twelve-year-olds. In the midst of this, one or perhaps two helicopters accounts differ, as they do about many details of the story touched

down in the plaza in front of the church, and a number of officers climbed out. From his vantage point on the hill, the guide says, he recognized the distinctive figure of an officer he had seen several times before: Colonel Jaime Ernesto Flores Grijalba, the commander of the Third Brigade, in San Miguel, who was widely known as El Gordo (the Fat Man). Among the officers accompanying Colonel Flores was one famous figure, a small but charismatic man whom the soldiers of the Atlacatl proudly pointed out to the guide: Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa, their beloved commander. The officers, having been received at their helicopter by Major Cceres and the company captains, were escorted to a house not far from the church, and disappeared inside. After some time, during which the killings went on around El Mozote and also in the adjacent hamlet of Tierra Colorada, where patrolling Atlacatl troops had begun shooting people they found hiding in the houses the officers strolled out onto the common, climbed back into their helicopter, and lifted off from El Mozote. Around this time, the soldiers returned to the house of Alfredo Mrquez. I was still sitting on the bench with my kids, Rufina says. When they came back, they began separating the women from their kids. They pulled the mothers away, leaving the children there crying. They took one group of women and then in a while they came back and took another. That was the saddest thing little by little, the mothers disappeared, and the house became filled mostly with crying children. Rufina found herself in one of the last groups. It must have been five oclock. There were maybe twenty of us. I was crying and struggling with the soldiers, because I had my baby on my chest. It took two soldiers to pull the baby from me. So when I came outside into the street, I was the last in the group. I was crying and miserable, and begging God to help me. The soldiers marched the women down the main street. They passed the house of Marcos Daz on the right and, on the left, that of Ambrosiano Claros, where Rufina and her family had spent the previous night. Ambrosiano Claross house was in flames. I saw other houses burning, and I saw blood on the ground. We turned the corner and walked toward the house of Israel Mrquez. Then the woman at the head of the line we were in single file began to scream. She had looked through the door and seen the people in the house. What the woman had seen was thick pools of blood covering the floor and, farther inside, piles of bloody corpses the bodies of the women who only minutes before had been sitting in the house with them, waiting. The first woman screamed, There are dead people! Theyre killing people! and everyone began screaming. All down the line, the women began resisting, hugging one another, begging the soldiers not to kill them. The soldiers were struggling with them, trying to push the first women into the house. One soldier said, Dont cry, women. Here comes the Devil to take you. Rufina, still at the end of the line, fell to her knees. I was crying and begging God to forgive my sins, she says. Though I was almost at the feet of the soldiers, I wasnt begging them I was begging God. Where I was kneeling, I was between a crab-apple and a pine tree. Maybe that was what saved me. In all the yelling and commotion, they didnt see me there. The soldier behind me had gone up front to help with the first women. They didnt see me when I crawled between the trees. The crab-apple tree which still stands, next to the ruin of Israel Mrquezs house, as gnarled and twisted an old crab apple as one can imagine was within about fifteen feet of the house. I couldnt move, couldnt even cry, Rufina says. I had to remain absolutely still and silent. The whole group was still outside the house the women grabbing one another and hugging one another and trying to resist. Soon, though, the soldiers pushed some of them into the house. I couldnt see inside, but I started hearing shots and screams. Finally, when the screams and the gunfire had stopped, some of the soldiers went off. A few minutes later, they returned, pushing along the last group of women, and now Rufina heard the sequence the cries of terror, the screaming, the begging, and the shooting all over again. After a time, those sounds ceased. In the sudden silence, scattered shooting and fainter screams could be heard echoing from the hills. A few feet from where Rufina lay hidden behind the tree, nine or ten soldiers laid down their guns and collapsed wearily to the ground. Well, all these old bastards are dead, one said to somebody farther off. Go ahead and burn the house.

It was growing dark, and soon flames were rising from the house of Israel Mrquez, highlighting the soldiers faces and the trunk of the tree. It grew so hot that Rufina began to fear that the tree would catch and she would be forced to run. She had remained perfectly still, hardly daring to breathe, and her legs had begun to fall asleep. And the soldiers, still close enough to touch, remained where they were, smoking cigarettes and watching the fire. Well just stay here and wait for the witches of Mozote to come out of that fire, one said. The soldiers watched the fire and talked, and Rufina, frozen in her terror a few feet away, listened. Well, weve killed all the old men and women, one said. But theres still a lot of kids down there. You know, a lot of those kids are really goodlooking, really cute. I wouldnt want to kill all of them. Maybe we can keep some of them, you know take them with us. What are you talking about? another soldier answered roughly. We have to finish everyone, you know that. Thats the colonels order. This is an operativo de tierra arrasada here a scorched-earth operation and we have to kill the kids as well, or well get it ourselves. Listen, I dont want to kill kids, the first soldier said. Look, another said. We have orders to finish everyone and we have to complete our orders. Thats it. At about this time, up on the hill known as El Pinalito, Captain Salazar was shrugging off a guides timid plea for the childrens lives. If we dont kill them now, he said angrily, theyll just grow up to be guerrillas. We have to take care of the job now. Meanwhile, the soldiers sat and gazed at the burning house. Finally, one stood up. Well, no witches came out, he said. There are no witches. Lets go see what kind of food they have in that store. With that, the other men got to their feet, picked up their rifles, and trudged off. A few minutes later, Rufina could hear, from the store of Marcos Daz, bottles clinking you know, as if they were drinking sodas. The fire was still burning furiously, but the big crab-apple tree, which some miracle had kept from igniting, shielded Rufina from the heat. Over the crackling of the fire she could still hear, coming from the hill called La Cruz, the screams of the girls. Now and again, she heard a burst of gunfire. After a time, when the soldiers seemed to have finished drinking their sodas, Rufina heard crying and screaming begin from the house of Alfredo Mrquez: the screaming of the children. They were crying, Mommy! Mommy! Theyre hurting us! Help us! Theyre cutting us! Theyre choking us! Help us! Then I heard one of my children crying. My son, Cristino, was crying, Mama Rufina, help me! Theyre killing me! They killed my sister! Theyre killing me! Help me! I didnt know what to do. They were killing my children. I knew that if I went back there to help my children I would be cut to pieces. But I couldnt stand to hear it, I couldnt bear it. I was afraid that I would cry out, that I would scream, that I would go crazy. I couldnt stand it, and I prayed to God to help me. I promised God that if He helped me I would tell the world what happened here. Then I tied my hair up and tied my skirt between my legs and I crawled on my belly out from behind the tree. There were animals there, cows and a dog, and they saw me, and I was afraid they would make a noise, but God made them stay quiet as I crawled among them. I crawled across the road and under the barbed wire and into the maguey on the other side. I crawled a little farther through the thorns, and I dug a little hole with my hands and put my face in the hole so I could cry without anyone hearing. I could hear the children screaming still, and I lay there with my face against the earth and cried. Rufina could not see the children; she could only hear their cries as the soldiers waded into them, slashing some with their machetes, crushing the skulls of others with the butts of their rifles. Many others the youngest children, most below the

age of twelve the soldiers herded from the house of Alfredo Mrquez across the street to the sacristy, pushing them, crying and screaming, into the dark tiny room. There the soldiers raised their M16s and emptied their magazines into the roomful of children. Not all the children of El Mozote died at the sacristy. A young man now known as Chepe Mozote told me that when the townspeople were forced to assemble on the plaza that evening he and his little brother had been left behind in their house, on the outskirts of the hamlet, near the school. By the next morning, Chepe had heard plenty of shooting; his mother had not returned. About six oclock, around ten soldiers in camouflage uniforms came to the house, Chepe says. They asked me where my mother was. I told them she had gone to the plaza the night before. I asked them if I could see my mother, and they said I couldnt but I should come with them to the playing field near the school. They said when we got there they would explain where my mother was. Carrying his little brother, Chepe went with the soldiers and walked along with them as they searched house to house. We found maybe fifteen kids, he says, and then they took us all to the playing field. On the way, I heard shooting and I saw some dead bodies, maybe five old people. When they reached the playing field, there were maybe thirty children, he says. The soldiers were putting ropes on the trees. I was seven years old, and I didnt really understand what was happening until I saw one of the soldiers take a kid he had been carrying the kid was maybe three years old throw him in the air, and stab him with a bayonet. They slit some of the kids throats, and many they hanged from the tree. All of us were crying now, but we were their prisoners there was nothing we could do. The soldiers kept telling us, You are guerrillas and this is justice. This is justice. Finally, there were only three of us left. I watched them hang my brother. He was two years old. I could see I was going to be killed soon, and I thought it would be better to die running, so I ran. I slipped through the soldiers and dived into the bushes. They fired into the bushes, but none of their bullets hit me. Lying amid the maguey that night, Rufina Amaya heard the chorus of screams dwindle to a few voices, and those grew weaker and weaker and finally ceased. She heard the officers order that fire be put to the house of Alfredo Mrquez and the church and the sacristy, and from the maguey she saw the flames rise and then she heard faint cries start up again inside the buildings and the short bursts of gunfire finishing off a few wounded, who had been forced by the flames to reveal that they were still alive. Soon the only sounds were those which trickled down from the hills laughter, intermittent screams, a few shots. On La Cruz, soldiers were raping the young girls who were left. On El Chingo and El Pinalito, other soldiers busied themselves making camp. Down in the hamlet, a few troops walked about here and there, patrolling. Not far from the still burning house of Israel Mrquez, two soldiers halted suddenly, and one of them pointed to the patch of maguey. He lowered his rifle and fired, and after a moment his companion fired, too. In the patch of brush, the stream of bullets sent a dark-green rain of maguey shreds fluttering to the earth. Then the soldiers charged forward and began poking among the weeds. She was right here, one said, pulling at some maguey. I saw her, I know it. Up on the hills, the soldiers listened to the shots, exchanged glances, and waited. Then they went on with what they had been doing: watching the flames rise from the burning houses and talking quietly among themselves, telling tales of the days work. They spoke wonderingly about the evangelicals, those people whose faith seemed to grant them a strange power. They said maybe some of the people believed in God so strongly that they just delivered themselves up, they didnt resist, the guide told me. They said some of the people were singing even as they were killed. There was one in particular the soldiers talked about that evening (she is mentioned in the Tutela Legal report as well): a girl on La Cruz whom they had raped many times during the course of the afternoon, and through it all, while the other women of

El Mozote had screamed and cried as if they had never had a man, this girl had sung hymns, strange evangelical songs, and she had kept right on singing, too, even after they had done what had to be done, and shot her in the chest. She had lain there on La Cruz with the blood flowing from her chest, and had kept on singing a bit weaker than before, but still singing. And the soldiers, stupefied, had watched and pointed. Then they had grown tired of the game and shot her again, and she sang still, and their wonder began to turn to fear until finally they had unsheathed their machetes and hacked through her neck, and at last the singing had stopped. Now the soldiers argued about this. Some declared that the girls strange power proved that God existed. And that brought them back to the killing of the children. There were a lot of differences among the soldiers about whether this had been a good thing or whether they shouldnt have done it, the guide told me. As the soldiers related it now, the guide said, there had been a disagreement outside the schoolhouse, where a number of children were being held. Some of the men had hesitated, saying they didnt want to kill the children, and the others had ridiculed them. According to one account, a soldier had called the commanding officer. Hey, Major! he had shouted. Someone says he wont kill children! Which son of a bitch says that? the Major had shouted back angrily, striding over. The Major had not hesitated to do what an officer does in such situations: show leadership. Hed pushed into the group of children, seized a little boy, thrown him in the air, and impaled him as he fell. That had put an end to the discussion. Now, up on the hills, the soldiers talked and argued and watched the burning houses, while the two men down below still searched among the maguey, cursing at the sharp thorns. I know she was here, the first soldier said. I saw her. She was right here. No, no, his companion finally said. Theres no one here. Youre just seeing the dead. Youre seeing ghosts. The ghosts of the people you killed are frightening you. With that, the soldiers looked at each other, then turned and trotted back to the center of the hamlet. Amid the maguey, Rufina Amaya closed her eyes, remained motionless. After a time, she reached out a hand and began groping about in the weeds, slowly pulling the thorny strips to her, gathering them into a pile and heaping them over her body. She lay there still when the stars began to disappear from the lightening sky. She heard sounds of movement from the hills, rising voices as the men woke, urinated, ate, prepared their equipment. Shots echoed here and there, interspersed with the barking and howling of dogs and the lowing of cows as the soldiers killed the animals one by one. From up on La Cruz came a burst of high-pitched screaming and begging, followed by a prolonged chorus of gunfire, and, at last, silence. And then the men of the Atlacatl, having completed the operation in El Mozote, moved out. Hours earlier, when the chill of the night came on, Rufina Amaya had shivered, for the maguey had badly ripped her blouse and skirt. The thorns had torn the flesh of her arms and legs, but at the time she hadnt noticed. Now she could feel the cuts, swelling and throbbing, and the blood, dried and prickly, on her limbs. And as she lay sobbing amid the thorns, listening to the soldiers pass, her breasts ached with the milk that had gathered there to feed her youngest child. Marching past the church, which was burning still, past the carcasses of cows and dogs, and out of El Mozote, the men of the Atlacatl did not see the dark shape in the maguey patch, the heap of dark-green leaves. Their minds were on their work, which on that Saturday morning in December lay ahead in the hamlet of Los Toriles. In Los Toriles, the soldiers pulled people from their houses and hustled them into the square, the guide told me, and went down the line taking money and anything of value out of peoples pockets. Then they just lined the people up against a wall and shot them with machine guns. The people fell like trees falling.

Even so, the killing in Los Toriles took much of the day. Some of the residents, having seen the columns of smoke rising the afternoon before from El Mozote, had fled their homes and hidden in caves above the hamlet. But most had stayed, wanting to protect their homes: they remembered that on a previous operation soldiers had set fire to houses they found empty, claiming that they belonged to guerrillas. By afternoon, the streets of Los Toriles were filled with corpses. It was so terrible that we had to jump over the dead so as not to step on them, the guide told me. There were dogs and cows and other animals, and people of all ages, from newborn to very old. I saw them shoot an old woman, and they had to hold her up to shoot her. I was filled with pity. I wished we had gone out and fought guerrillas, because to see all those dead children filled me with sadness. As night fell, the soldiers walked through the town setting fire to the houses. It was dark by the time they left Los Toriles, to march south toward the guerrilla stronghold of La Guacamaya. They made camp in open country, rose at dawn, and, as they prepared to move out again, Captain Salazar motioned them over. The men of the Atlacatl gathered in a circle, sitting crosslegged on the ground as he stood and addressed them. Seores! the Captain said angrily. What we did yesterday, and the day before, this is called war. This is what war is. War is hell. And, goddammit, if I order you to kill your mother, that is just what youre going to do. Now, I dont want to hear that, afterward, while youre out drinking and bullshitting among yourselves, youre whining and complaining about this, about how terrible it was. I dont want to hear that. Because what we did yesterday, what weve been doing on this operation this is war, gentlemen. This is what war is. And for perhaps half an hour the Captain went on speaking in his angry voice, and the men shifted uneasily. There had been a lot of talk about whether it was right, the guide said, and this had clearly got back to the Captain. Finally, the tirade over, the men got to their feet. Soon they were marching south again. Late that afternoon, they reached La Guacamaya. They found nothing there but dead animals; the guerrillas had long since departed. The soldiers spent two nights there, resting and cleaning their equipment. Helicopters landed, bringing Colonel Flores and other top officers, who met with the Atlacatl officers for evaluation and cordination. The operation was now winding down. It was a walk-through by then, a joke, an officer in another unit told me. The guerrillas were long gone, and everybody knew it. On the second morning, the men of the Atlacatl marched west, heading for the black road. On their way, they passed the hamlet of La Joya. Everything was dead there animals and people all mixed together, the guide said. Vultures were everywhere. You couldnt stand to be there, because of the stink. Above the hamlet, in the caves and ravines and wooded gullies, those who had managed to escape the troops shivered and waited, and tried to keep their children still. Some had left their homes before the soldiers came; others had managed to flee when men from the Atlacatl, on the day some of their comrades were cleansing El Mozote, stormed La Joya. Suddenly, there was shooting and explosions all over, Andrea Mrquez, who had been twenty years old at the time, said. We didnt even see the soldiers at first. There were bullets flying everywhere. I grabbed my little girl she was one and a half and put her on my back, and we started crawling through the brush with bullets flying and explosions all around. She showed me an ugly scar from a shrapnel wound on her knee. We crawled and then we ran and ran, and after a while my baby made sounds as if she were thirsty, and I pulled her around and then I saw there was a wound in her head, and I realized I was covered with blood. No one else was around the people had scattered at the soldiers assault and Andrea Mrquez was too terrified to go back toward La Joya. Holding her child in her arms, she climbed higher into the mountains, found a cave, and tried to care for her daughters wound with leaves and with water from a stream. Eight days later, she found a stick and dug a hole and buried her little girl. Then, delirious with grief and shock and terror, she wandered high into the northern mountains.

Months later, the surviving villagers, those few who remained in Morazn, began to murmur fearfully to one another that a witch had come to haunt the mountains a savage woman, who could be glimpsed from time to time late at night by moonlight, naked but for her waist-length hair, as she crouched by a stream and stripped the flesh from a wriggling fish with long, sharp fingernails. The villagers were frightened of her, for they knew that it was after the matanza, the great killing of El Mozote, that the witch had come to haunt the mountains. As the tide of soldiers ebbed from northern Morazn, the guer- rillas flowed back in. We knew there would be killing, but we never expected what we found, said Licho, who was with one of the first units to return. It was desolation, total desolation not a person alive, not an animal alive, not a house that hadnt been burned. There were bodies in the houses, bodies in the fields, bodies in the wells. The guerrillas immediately sent reports of the killing to their commanders; but there was a problem. The comandancia didnt believe us they didnt believe the numbers, Licho said. So we began to count. We sent units all over looking for bodies. A lot of them were not in the houses they were lying out in the grass, in the fields, in the woods. We sent three reports up to the comandancia, and finally they sent other people down to the zone, because they still couldnt believe the numbers. Survivors were straggling back from the caves and mountain gullies to find the plazas of their ruined villages so thick with vultures that, in the words of one man I talked with, they seemed covered by a moving black carpet. People wept, mourned, and, when they could, buried their dead. Pedro Chicas, who had hidden in a cave above La Joya, returned to the hamlet to find everything burned, everything dead corpses everywhere in the street, he said. Everything was dead cows, horses, chickens, pigs. We couldnt do anything with the badly charred people, but the others we buried. As the survivors returned to the hamlets around El Mozote, people from the zone were making contact with representatives of Socorro Jurdico (which was then the human-rights organization of the Archbishopric of San Salvador). Roberto Cuellar, a Socorro Jurdico official at the time, remembers hearing from members of church groups, and just people there, you know, neighbors. Within days it is unclear how many days: limited and sometimes conflicting memories make this sequence particularly difficult to reconstruct Cuellar telephoned the Reverend William L. Wipfler, who was the director of the human-rights office of the National Council of Churches, in New York. Cuellar said the Atlacatl Brigade had committed a massacre in a town called El Mozote and in another called La Joya, and that he thought there might be hundreds killed, and nothing had been cleaned up yet, Wipfler says. Socorro had an eyewitness account it had got two people into El Mozote. Wipfler immediately sent a telegram to Ambassador Hinton, asking confirmation or otherwise of reliable reports received here [that] indicate that between December 10 and 13 joint military and security forces operation took place in Morazn Department which resulted in over 900 civilian deaths. He also telephoned officials at Amnesty International and other leading human-rights agencies in New York and Washington, and left a message for Raymond Bonner, at the New York Times bureau in Mexico City. As Wipfler remembers it, Cuellars call came no later than December 20th and probably earlier. (The telegram to Hinton, sent under the name of the Reverend Eugene Stockwell, Wipflers boss, has been dated December 15th, only four days after the massacre, but there is a possibility that it was actually sent a few days later.) On December 17th, an exhausted Santiago staggered into a guerrilla camp at Jucuarn a town fifty miles south of La Guacamaya along with the other Venceremos people, and there, he says, he found waiting for him a radio message from Morazn: The Atlacatl Battalion massacred a thousand peasants in various hamlets and villages. If Santiagos memory of the date is accurate, then this number, arrived at less than a week after the killing, could only have been a very rough estimate; soldiers still occupied La Guacamaya and the area of El Mozote, and the guerrillas could have made no precise count. But after days of counting in some of the stinking hamlets, and the compilation, with the help of survivors, of partial lists of names, the comandantes had finally been forced to believe that many hundreds had died, and they had apparently settled on the round number of a thousand. And now they wanted Santiago and the others back, with a new transmitter that had been awaiting them in Jucuarn, so they could begin to make the world believe as well. After five days of all-night marches, the small Venceremos crew trudged into the ravine at El Zapotal. It was noon on December 24th. On Christmas Eve, according to his memoirs, Santiago was able to take to the airwaves and tell the world

that Radio Venceremos had been reborn and to announce that during its two weeks of silence a great killing had taken place in northern Morazn. It was the inauguration of an ambitious propaganda campaign, which gathered steam steadily through December and January, and into February. The propaganda was based on truth, which is supposedly the most effective kind, but the Salvadoran government and, later, the American government would skillfully use the fact that it was propaganda and particularly the fact that the number of dead seemed to increase with each broadcast to undermine its truth. On December 29th, the guerrillas stormed the Army detachments that had been left to occupy some of the hamlets in the zone, including at La Guacamaya and at or near El Mozote itself. The attack on La Guacamaya became a major bloodbath, Villalobos, the guerrilla comandante, told me. The lieutenant in charge knew he was in a hopeless position, but he refused to surrender probably because he knew what had happened at El Mozote, and feared reprisals. We annihilated his position, and he died in combat. We buried him in his uniform to honor him. The guerrillas took seven prisoners in the operation, and two of them were made use of a few days later in what Santiago calls the information battle to denounce the genocide. Each prisoner described what he had seen in Cerro Pando, a village three miles south of El Mozote. I expected to see dead, because we had talked to troops who had already been out and they said they had killed many guerrillas, a sergeant said. Then we looked in the houses and I realized that it wasnt the way they said, because I saw dead children, and the mother was hugging one of her children I think it was her youngest son. Santiago himself now visited El Mozote with his mobile unit, and broadcast a description of the devastation, saying that it looks as if a cyclone had passed through; that from the ruins of the sacristy came a penetrating odor that indicated that beneath were to be found who knows how many cadavers of the people of El Mozote; and that in the shattered building he could see macabre scenes, hunks of human hair, and fingers amid the rubble. Late in December, the F.M.L.N. got in touch with Raymond Bonner, of the Times, and informed him that his long-standing request to visit guerrilla-held territory would be approved; he would be welcome to come to Morazn in early January. Also around that time, a guerrilla patrol stumbled upon some campesinos cowering in a ravine, and discovered among them a near-hysterical woman of thirty-eight, whose legs and arms and face were scored with cuts. The peasants said that they had come upon her near a river found her crouched there nearly naked, her limbs and body smeared with blood and covered with thorns. I could hardly speak, Rufina Amaya recalls. I talked and cried, talked and cried couldnt eat, couldnt drink, just babbled and cried and talked to God. Now the guerrillas had found her, and they rejoiced when they realized who she was. They were all happy that there was at least one survivor, Rufina says. They all came up around me and hugged me. I didnt know what was going on, who they were, what they wanted. She was taken to El Zapotal and interviewed, and before long the voice of Rufina Amaya, telling in careful detail the story of what had happened in El Mozote, was broadcast throughout El Salvador. On December 31st, the General Command of the Morazn front of the F.M.L.N. issued a call to the International Red Cross, the O.A.S. Human Rights Commission, and the international press to verify the genocide of more than nine hundred Salvadorans in El Mozote and the surrounding hamlets. We ask these organizations to be the eyes of the worlds conscience, the comandantes said. That night, at the same time that Radio Venceremos was broadcasting a Mass in memory of the thousand massacred, El Salvadors provisional President, Jos Napolen Duarte, felt obliged to take to the airwaves and deny the accusations personally. The entire massacre story, he said, was a guerrilla trick meant to smear his government at the very moment when the United States Congress was considering aid to El Salvador. Duarte was right in at least one respect: though the El Mozote controversy appeared to center on what had happened in a handful of hamlets in a remote region of El Salvador, the real point of focus had shifted to Washington and, in particular, to Congress, which was perceived as the weak spot in the armor of the Salvadoran government. It was Congress that voted the money that paid for the American guns and helicopters and military advisers; and in recent years, as the atrocities had

grown ever more frequent, Congress had done so with increasing reluctance. Two days before Duartes speech, Reagan had signed Congresss amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which required the President to certify that the Salvadoran government is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights and is achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed forces, so as to bring to an end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens by these forces. If such a certification was not delivered to Congress by January 29th, and convincingly defended, all funds and assistance for El Salvador would be immediately suspended. Now all sides prepared for the debate over certification, which would provide concerned congressmen, church leaders, heads of human-rights groups, and others with a new opportunity to document the abuses committed by the Salvadoran government in prosecuting the war. Administration officials, meanwhile, both in Washington and in the Embassy in San Salvador, prepared to defend the government and demonstrate that, despite appearances, the Salvadorans were improving in their respect for human rights. Many of these officials viewed the certification requirement with singular contempt. If Congress felt so strongly about human-rights abuses, it could have simply cut off aid, Elliott Abrams, who had just been sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, told me. But Congress didnt cut off aid, because it didnt want to risk being blamed, if the guerrillas won as a result, for losing El Salvador. Instead, they required certification which is to say, they agreed to fund the war while reserving the right to call us Fascists. Deane Hinton, the United States Ambassador at the time, later told an interviewer that he viewed certification as a way for the Congress to be for and against something at the same time. He went on to say that congressmen didnt want to take the responsibility to deny resources to the government of El Salvador and on the other hand they didnt want to endorse it, so they created a certification procedure and made the rest of us jump through the hoop, and the President had to certify it, and added, It is a political cop-out by a lot of congressmen. At the root of this political cop-out, in the unspoken view of many Administration officials, was a simple truth: that when it came down to either supporting the Salvadoran government, however unseemly its methods, or allowing a victory by the guerrillas the choice was clear and the only difference between the people in the Administration and the hypocrites in Congress was that the Reagan officials were not afraid to say it straight out. Abrams told me, I used to say to people, I mean, I can see arguing for an F.M.L.N. victory on political grounds or economic grounds but on human-rights grounds? I mean, thats crazy. Abrams stood the human-rights argument on its head, contending that to argue for an aid cutoff was, in effect, to argue for a guerrilla victory, and that at the end of the day, however badly the Salvadoran government behaved, those collective atrocities could never approach the general disaster for human rights that an F.M.L.N. victory would represent. Abrams was not alone in taking this line of argument, which appears to have been aimed at persuading those conservative Democrats most prominently who, however much they deplored human-rights abuses in El Salvador, nonetheless worried about taking the blame for any advance of Communism in the hemisphere. The day after the certification was delivered to Congress, the State Department sent out a cable, over Secretary of State Haigs name, urging American diplomats to describe the El Salvador policy as a grit-your-teeth policy: to support a reformist junta, with a lot of bad eggs in and around it, in order to avoid a Somoza-Sandinista choice. For critics to narrow their focus to the teeth-gritting without considering the policys larger aims is shallow and unfair. For those who cant take the current Salvadoran government, Haig wrote, the honest response is not to say the junta is surprise beset and flawed, but rather to make the case that its acceptable to the United States if El Salvador goes the Cuban way. It was against this background that Ambassador Hinton and the State Department began receiving reports about a massacre in Morazn. Coming on top of everything else, El Mozote, if true, might have destroyed the entire effort, Thomas O. Enders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, told me. Who knows? I certainly thought that when I first heard about it. The Embassy began a counterattack, following a pattern that it held to throughout: undermining the reports not by investigating the facts but by casting doubt on their source. In response to the request from the Reverend Wipfler, of the National Council of Churches, Hinton cabled back, on January 8th, that he did not know what your sources are but the only sources that I have seen alleging something like this are clandestine Radio Venceremos reports. The Ambassador then

quoted in full a heavy-handed Venceremos text from January 2nd, in which El Mozote was compared repeatedly to My Lai; added that he found it interesting that a guerrilla communiqu two days earlier had not mentioned El Mozote at all; and concluded that he did not consider Radio Venceremos to be a reliable source. Hinton who declined to be interviewed for this account must have known that the National Council of Churches could not have got its information from Radio Venceremos. (Among other things, Wipflers cable was sent before the station had resumed broadcasting.) He himself had probably already received reports from sources of his own that something had happened in Morazn; after all, no fewer than ten American advisers were working with the Atlacatl at the time. According to one of them, members of the Milgroup the Military Advisory Group at the Embassy had telephoned the Atlacatl base in La Libertad within a few days of the massacre. They called up and talked to the Special Forces people and told them they wanted Monterrosa to come in they wanted to talk to him about something that had happened during the operation, this adviser told me. But Monterrosa just climbed into his helicopter and said, If they want to talk to me, Ill be out with my troops. He wasnt going to go in and talk to those guys. He said, If I go in and let them talk to me about this thing, Ill never be able to get anyone to go out there and fight for me again. And then he got into his helicopter and took off heading back to Morazn. How had the Milgroup officers heard so quickly that something had happened in Morazn? Although the adviser believes it was the guerrillas who got word to the Embassy, a number of highly placed Salvadorans, including one prominent politician of the time who had many friends among senior officers, claim that two American advisers were actually observing the operation from the base camp at Osicala. On its face, the charge is not entirely implausible American advisers had been known to violate the prohibition against accompanying their charges into the field but it is impossible to confirm. Colonel Moody Hayes, who was then the Milgroup commander, refused to discuss El Mozote with me, explaining that he didnt know what might still be classified, while officers from the defense attachs office and from Milgroup who were willing to talk generally dismissed the charge as unfounded. State Department officials, however, were clearly worried about the possibility. Certainly, one of the issues I remember raising between us and the Embassy was, Were there any American advisers on this sortie? Enders said. The Embassy made a great effort to talk to advisers who were with the Atlacatl to try to find out the truth. Of course, had the truth been that Americans were at Osicala, it would have been a very hard truth to make public or, for that matter, to confide to a superior. The officers involved would surely have known, as Enders conceded, that admitting such an unfortunate misjudgment would have ruined those guys careers they would have been cashiered. So no ones going to volunteer, Hey, I was up there. By the same token, Embassy officials would have been acutely aware of the effect such a revelation would have had on the entire American effort in El Salvador. It would have been devastating, Enders said. American advisers with a unit that committed an atrocity? Devastating. Can you imagine anything more corrosive of the entire military effort? Coming at such a time, it might well have made the Salvadoran war, in Enders expression, unfundable. Enders insists, however, that given the small numbers of advisers involved, if theyd been there we would have known about it. Sometime in mid-December of 1981, contacts of great confidence on the left approached Todd Greentree, the junior reporting officer, and told him that a massacre had taken place in Morazn. Greentree knew of Opera- tion Rescue from the defense attachs reports but knew nothing about a massacre. I first heard about it from the left, Greentree, who is now the Nicaragua desk officer at the State Department, says. The most important thing was that they offered me a special safeconduct to go up there and see it for myself. Obviously, a decision had been taken very high up in the F.M.L.N. to do this for propaganda purposes. I knew the guerrillas would never have masqueraded something like this, would never have fabricated it, if they were offering safe-conduct. I was convinced that something had gone on, and that it was bad. I mean, it was pretty clear, if they were going to do this, that something must have happened. Greentree conveyed this message from the left to Ambassador Hinton. A meeting was held. His response was No, you cant do this under guerrilla escort, Greentree says. That would be too risky, and you would just be playing into their hands. I mean, I should emphasize that I never got the feeling that they just wanted this to go away. But there were political and military constraints that we were operating under.

Kenneth Bleakley, who was the deputy chief of mission, told me Todd was a very courageous young officer, but it was just too much of a risk to send somebody out there. The decision was clearly the Ambassadors to make. Peter Romero, who was an El Salvador specialist at the State Department, says, However much we might have wanted more information, no one in State was going to make that call. It was clearly the Ambassadors call. And at the time, basically, the Embassy staff down there were targets they were targeted by the F.M.L.N. Greentree was unable to accept the guerrillas offer to visit El Mozote and have a look for himself. But, as he soon learned, two other Americans were about to do just that. Late on the evening of January 3rd, in the mountains near the Salvadoran border, a dusty car pulled to a stop and disgorged into the barren Honduran landscape two Americans in hiking boots. They slung their backpacks on the ground, stretched, and after a few moments of searching found a boy who had been waiting for them their F.M.L.N. contact. The boy led them into the quiet darkness, heading down a rocky trail to the bank of a river. In the moonlight, the three stripped and, holding their clothing and their packs above their heads, picked their way unsteadily through the rushing cold water until they reached the far shore and the border of the guerrilla-held Department of Morazn. I was scared, Raymond Bonner said. All I could think was, The military, what if the military ambushes us? It was not an idle fear; Bonner, of the New York Times, and the photographer Susan Meiselas together with Alma Guillermoprieto, of the Washington Post, who followed them into Morazn ten days later would be the first members of the American establishment press to report on the Salvadoran war from the guerrilla side. Bonner and Guillermoprieto had both been working hard for months to arrange a trip in, lobbying through F.M.L.N. contacts in Mexico and New York as well as in El Salvador. In early December, they had finally seen their trips confirmed, only to have them cancelled after the start of Operation Rescue. Later that month, Bonners contacts had informed him that the trip was on again. To the charge that the guerrillas took us in to report on the massacre, Id say now, Youre damn right they did, he said. But at the time I didnt really know about the massacre. Bonner telephoned Meiselas, who was in New York, and, in a magnanimous gesture, before flying to Tegucigalpa also put in a call to Guillermoprieto, in Mexico City, who immediately resumed her own desperate, intense, round-the-clock phone lobbying with her F.M.L.N. contacts. Ten days later, after rendezvousing with a guerrilla contact in the Tegucigalpa market, she found herself being deposited under a bush in the middle of the night near the Honduran border, along with a pile of supplies. Bonner and Meiselas, and Guillermoprieto, describe the trip in the same way: hiking all night through the moonlit mountains, and at dawn coming upon the first guerrilla camp a scattering of tents, under pine trees, that held twenty-five or thirty people. By dawn on the third day January 6th Bonner and Meiselas had reached the area of El Mozote. There were bodies and parts of bodies, Meiselas said. We saw about twenty-five houses destroyed around Arambala and El Mozote. My strongest memory was this grouping of evangelicals, fourteen of them, who had come together thinking their faith would protect them. They were strewn across the earth next to a cornfield, and you could see on their faces the horror of what had happened to them. At a burial near El Zapotal, they were introduced to Rufina Amaya, and Bonner interviewed her at length. A few days later, the guerrillas gave him a handwritten list, which they said contained the names of those who had died at El Mozote and in the surrounding hamlets. I did the tally, came up with the number seven hundred, tried to get the number of men, women, and children, got a sample of names, Bonner said. A few days later, Bonner and Meiselas began the hike back to Honduras. At the middle camp, they met a battered Guillermoprieto, one of whose legs was swollen from an accident involving a rock and a mule. At just about the time Bonner

reached Mexico City and began to file his stories, Guillermoprieto was nearing El Mozote. We started smelling it from Arambala, she said. These kids started leading me down paths and pointing to houses and saying again and again, Aqu hay muertos, aqu hay muertos. The most traumatizing thing was looking at these little houses where whole families had been blown away these recognizable human beings, in their little dresses, just lying there mummifying in the sun. We kept walking, got to El Mozote. We walked down these charming and beautiful roads, then to the center of town, where there was this kind of rubbly place the sacristy and, in it, a stupefying number of bones. There was a charred wooden beam lying on top of the bodies, and there were bones sticking up, and pieces of flesh. You could see vertebrae and femurs sticking out. No attempt had been made to bury the bodies. In some shock, she was led to La Guacamaya. Everyone there had lost someone in his family everyone and everyone was in a state of controlled hysteria. The great exodus that had begun with the offensive in mid-December was still under way. It was that massacre, the most horrible, that really caused the glass of water to overflow, Licho told me. People flowed out of the zone, either toward Honduras or south toward Gotera or into the guerrillas. A lot of people joined us as combatants then. At the urging of Jons, the guerrilla commander, Guillermoprieto saw Rufina the next day. Later, she spoke to two young men who had seen their families murdered in La Joya. Then, thinking of Bonner and his head start, she scribbled her story in her notebook, folded up the pages, and hid them in a plastic film cannister. She found a guerrilla courier and persuaded him, with some difficulty, to carry the precious cargo to Tegucigalpa and deliver it to a colleague, who could telephone the story in to the Post. On January 26th, the day Guillermoprieto got back to Tegucigalpa, the Times ran Bonners first story from Morazn, headlined with salvadors rebels in combat zone. Guillermoprieto had already been on the telephone to the Posts foreign editor, and they managed to get her El Mozote story, along with a Meiselas photograph of the rubble of the sacristy, onto the front page of the first edition of the next days paper eighteen hundred words, headlined salvadoran peasants describe mass killing; woman tells of childrens death. Editors in the Times Washington bureau, seeing the piece in the Posts early edition, telephoned New York, where Bonners El Mozote story had been awaiting editing at the foreign desk. Craig Whitney, then the deputy foreign editor, and the deskmen managed to rush Bonners slightly shorter article, headlined massacre of hundreds reported in salvador village, into the papers late edition. Six weeks after the massacre, El Mozote had made it onto the front pages of Americas two most important newspapers. The following day, Ronald Reagan sent to Congress the Administrations certification that the government of El Salvador was making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights. Two days later, on January 30th, Todd Greentree drove out to Ilopango Airport, climbed into a Salvadoran Army Alouette helicopter, and in a few minutes was sweeping over green volcanic landscape toward the mountains of Morazn. At his side was Major John McKay, of the defense attachs office. A one-eyed marine (he had been wounded in Vietnam), McKay was known to have the best contacts among the Salvadoran officers of any American in the country. The two men were headed for El Mozote to have a look for themselves. It was not the most propitious time. The Army was tense; three days before, guerrilla commandos had stormed Ilopango in a daring raid and had succeeded in destroying a large part of El Salvadors Air Force as it sat on the tarmac. The raid which the guerrillas named Operation Martyrs of Heroic Morazn, in honor of those killed in December would not look good in Washington. The congressional debate loomed large in the minds of those in the United States Embassy. It was in the middle of a phenomenally packed, intense period down there, Greentree recently told me by telephone. We had the investigation of the murders of the nuns, we had the Constituent Assembly elections coming up, and, of course, we had the certification which only intensified the pressure from the political microscope in the States, as Greentree called it. The primary policy objective at the time was to get the certification through, he said, and the spectacular reports of the massacre threatened the certification. From the Embassys point of view, the guerrillas were trying to make us look as bad as possible.

They wanted to shut the whole thing down. The Americans landed at the brigade command in San Miguel to refuel and to receive their first briefing. The brigade commander was expecting us, Greentree said. In San Miguel, that was Flores Colonel Jaime Ernesto Flores Grijalba, the over-all commander of Operation Rescue. Also present, Greentree believes he is not absolutely certain was Domingo Monterrosa. The officers gave the Americans a sort of after-action report, saying which units were where, Greentree said. As I recall, the Atlacatl was the main combat unit, and they talked about this hammer-and-anvil nonsense. We were dismayed, because the Atlacatl was supposed to have developed new tactics, but now they were back to the same old shit you know, insert a blocking force and then carry out a sweep. The message about El Mozote the version that the Salvadoran Army had presumably already provided the defense attachs office was, in effect, that the Army had fought hard to dislodge a large company of guerrillas from the town, and though perhaps a few civilians had been killed in the crossfire, soldiers certainly had not carried out a massacre. Colonel Flores was not particularly happy to see the Americans, and it was clear that his attitude was shared by the other officers they encountered that day. As McKay who is now a colonel attached to nato headquarters in Brussels, and was given permission to speak publicly about the events at El Mozote by the Defense Department told me, In general, we had very little coperation when we went to Morazn. They left San Miguel and flew over the Torola toward El Mozote. You could see there had been a combat sweep through the area, Greentree said. You could tell El Mozote had been pretty much destroyed. Roofs were collapsed, buildings were destroyed, and the place was pretty much abandoned. As they flew over El Mozote, Greentree went on, he could see signs of battle. There was an escarpment close to the town, an obvious line of defense, and you could see trench lines there. There were definitely fortifications in the vicinity. When I pressed him for details, he said that the fortifications might have been closer to Arambala, a mile or so away. They made several passes at a couple of hundred feet, then circled around for a better look. As we lost altitude and got within range, we got shot at, Greentree said. That was pretty standard stuff out there. It was definitely not a landing situation. They headed to Gotera, touched down at the barracks, and received another briefing. The purpose of the briefing was to impress on us that this was a war zone out there, said Bleakley, the deputy chief of mission, who had come to Gotera on another helicopter and met Greentree and McKay there. The officers point was that not only were they not out there killing civilians but they were fighting for their lives in that very dangerous war zone to protect the civilians from guerrilla atrocities. The Americans said theyd like to have a look, talk to some people in and around the town. It was extremely tense, McKay told me. The Army was clearly not happy with our presence there. Accompanied by a squad of soldiers, McKay, Greentree, and Bleakley set off for the refugee camp outside Gotera. We literally went up and down the streets, saying, Hey, do you know anyone from El Mozote? Bleakley said. The impression you got from people was that this was a conflict zone, that the people still up there were camp followers, you know, involved in the conflict. And yet, as McKay acknowledged, the presence of the soldiers made the task of conducting what would, in any case, have been difficult interviews almost impossible. You had a bunch of very intimidated, scared people, and now the Army presence further intimidated them, McKay said. I mean, the Atlacatl had supposedly done something horrible, and now these gringos show up under this pretense of investigating it, but in the presence of these soldiers. It was probably the worst thing you could do. I mean, you didnt have to be a rocket scientist to know what the Army people were there for. Greentree managed to speak to a number of people including a mayor from one of the towns near El Mozote and several

peasants who had lived near the hamlet out of the soldiers hearing. McKay would work the military and keep them distracted while I went out and around and talked to people, Greentree said. The three Americans agreed that the information they gathered in the refugee camp was not explicit. As Greentree put it, I did not get any direct eyewitness accounts of what had taken place, of the type that Ray Bonner and Alma Guillermoprieto reported. It was more sort of the way people were talking and the way the kids around were still looking as if theyd been through hell, and people saying, Yes, my wife was killed that sort of thing. Sometime during these interviews, he and McKay became convinced that something had happened in El Mozote. You could observe and feel this tremendous fear, McKay said. I was in Vietnam, and I recognized the ambience. The fear was overriding, and we sensed it. People were freaked out and pretty scared about talking, and stuff, Greentree said. Nonetheless, the interviews in the refugee camp convinced me that there probably had been a massacre, that they had lined people up and shot them. Bleakley, however (who, as deputy chief of mission, was the senior officer of the three), told me that though it was clear people had been killed, some of them civilians, what we couldnt answer was the fundamental question you know, the difference between subduing a town and pulling out the civilians, My Lai style, and massacring them. Still, Greentree said, each person I talked to confirmed the impression that something bad had happened, but nobody was willing to go ahead and give the exact story. He drew this conclusion from things they said, their general manner and their general unwillingness to talk. And that includes the soldiers as well. I mean, you talk to a soldier who thinks hes taken part in some heroic operation and a Latin soldier, I mean you cant get him to shut up. But these soldiers would say nothing. There was something there. Travelling with the squad of soldiers, McKay and Greentree left the refugee camp (Bleakley, who had business in the camp, stayed at Gotera), climbed into a military jeep, and headed up the black road. We went to five villages, McKay said, including Jocoaitique, within a few miles of El Mozote. We talked to a priest who gave us oblique information that something horrible had happened, and that it was committed by the Army. Now the two men, accompanied by the soldiers, set out for El Mozote to see for themselves. Between five and seven clicks south of Jocoaitique, we were going to turn off the road toward the hamlet and head there cross-country, McKay said. But the soldiers had begun to grow quiet. There began to be complaints. They were already sensitive about the civilian with me. Now they were getting more and more sullen. You know, theyd look at the ground, mumble something about being out of radio contact. Finally, the group reached the place where theyd have to leave the black road for El Mozote. At that point, the soldiers just stopped. The sergeant said, Were not going any farther, were not going to help you. It was made very clear that we would get no more coperation. They had come very close to El Mozote. In less than an hour, they could have seen for themselves the burned buildings, the ruined sacristy, and the bodies. But, with the soldiers refusal to go on, the Americans faced the choice of heading on across open country guerrilla-controlled country without protection or turning back. You want to know what made me decide? McKay said. Well, Id been on that helicopter over there, and wed received fire, and, the month before, the guerrillas had wiped out a whole company up there. What made me decide me, the big tough marine? I was scared shitless. The choice was clear. The Americans, with their soldier escort, turned around and trooped back to Gotera, and from there the helicopter carried them back to the capital. The investigation was over. At the Embassy, Greentree sat down and began to write, and by the following day, after consultations with Bleakley and review by others in the Embassy, including Ambassador Hinton, a lengthy cable, over the Ambassadors name, was dispatched to Washington a cable that provided the basis for what Assistant Secretary of State Enders told Congress two

days later. This cable, which was originally obtained in 1983 by a Washington research group called the National Security Archives under a Freedom of Information Act request, is a remarkable document. Its opening paragraph the all-important summary that heads diplomatic cables reads (with emphasis added) as follows: Embassy investigation of reported massacre at El Mozote including visit to the area by assistant [defense attach] and [Embassy officer] concludes following: Although it is not possible to prove or disprove excesses of violence against the civilian population of El Mozote by Government troops, it is certain that the guerrilla forces who established defensive positions in El Mozote did nothing to remove them from the path of battle which they were aware was coming and had prepared for, nor is there any evidence that those who remained attempted to leave. Civilians did die during Operacin Rescate but no evidence could be found to confirm that Government forces systematically massacred civilians in the operation zone, nor that the number of civilians killed even remotely approached number being cited in other reports circulating internationally. We are still pursuing question as to which Army units were present in El Mozote. End Summary. In the entire summary, only one point is considered solid enough to be dubbed certain that the guerrilla forces who established defensive positions in El Mozote did nothing to remove [civilians] from the path of battle. And yet, as Greentree conceded in our conversation, the descriptions of fighting in El Mozote, and of the defensive positions there, came largely, if not exclusively, from the Army briefings. The information that we had presented to us as concrete was, of course, from the Army side, about the conduct of the combat operation, he said. The slender version of what happened in El Mozote seems to be a mixture of Army briefings and, at best, inferences by Greentree and Bleakley. How could the investigators be certain that the guerrillas did nothing to remove civilians from the path of battle? The day before the trip to Morazn, another junior reporting officer had sent Bleakley a memorandum passing along the report of a source the name is effaced in the version released by the government this fall who, while skeptical of the reported numbers of dead, said that the military did undertake a sweep (limpieza) of the area, that residents of the area were given time to leave it, that most did and that among the unknown number of victims of the operation were some (unspecified) evangelicals who unwisely chose to stay behind. (Bleakley does not recall the document, but he did say that it conforms with my memory of the time that there were people who were part of this new evangelical movement in El Salvador who would live in guerrilla areas and manage to stay above the conflict.) It may be that some of the odd language of the summary (nor is there any evidence that those who remained attempted to leave) was influenced by this memorandum. In any event, the assertion that guerrillas did nothing to remove civilians is actually contradicted later in the cable, when the authors describe an aged couple who said that guerrillas told them to leave in early December. According to the cable, this aged couple returned to El Mozote after the fighting had ended and soldiers were in control. What did they find? They claimed they saw dozens of bodies. This claim is simply quoted, without comment, as is the remark, in the next paragraph, by a man who knew of violent fighting in El Mozote and other nearby cantons but was unwilling to discuss comportment of government forces saying This is something one should talk about in another time, in another country. These quotations, together with the flat statements to me from Greentree and McKay that it was clear to them at the time that something horrible had happened at El Mozote, that there probably had been a massacre, make the cables summary puzzling, to say the least. Read now, the circumspect locutions that dominate the summary take on the aspect of shields judicious phrases by which the investigators deflected the burden of explicitly recounting what they strongly suspected had happened. What is curious is how, instead of building on their observations, inferences, and conclusions to present the best version possible of what probably happened, they emphasize the gap between what could be definitively proved to have happened which, of course, wasnt much, given the reticence of the people and the constraints on the investigators movements and what the newspapers and the guerrillas were claiming had happened. It is a peculiar way of reasoning, built, as it is, on the assumption that in the absence of definitive proof nothing at all can really be said to be known. In effect, officials made active use of the obstacles to finding out the truth and formidable obstacles certainly existed in El Salvador in 1982 to avoid saying clearly and honestly what they knew and what they suspected. McKay, at least, seems to have been troubled by this at the time. We could not have said, My God, theres been a massacre, he told me. But, truth be known, the ambiguity of the cable that went out in my own conscience I began to question it. And then when I saw the New York Times piece, and the picture, that really got me to thinking. Bonner and I had gone to

Quantico together, went to Vietnam together. McKay finally sent off another cable through my own channels, presumably a military or an intelligence circuit and though I cant say categorically that I actually wrote something horrible happened, what I said was to the effect that something had occurred, because of the fear we had detected from the people there. McKay, of course, had reviewed the State Department cable before it was sent, but he was not its author; Greentree was. Though he was only twenty-eight years old, Greentree had already earned the respect of his Foreign Service colleagues and what was much rarer in El Salvador was considered a competent, trustworthy official by many in the press corps. Indeed, even a decade later, in his understanding of what had happened in El Salvador he seemed to me the most perceptive of the American officials I interviewed. It was Greentree who embodied the United States government in the closest contact it would make to the massacre at El Mozote, and yet it was Greentree who provided the reporting that would enable the government to deny that the massacre had happened. It is tempting to conclude that he simply suppressed what was inconvenient, but the truth of what happened in the writing of the cable, like most of the United States dealings with the issue of human rights in El Salvador, is rather more interesting than that. Greentrees recollection, during a series of telephone interviews, of the writing of the cable and of its contents followed a fascinating progression. As I recall, he told me, I gave the military account the benefit of the doubt, but I probably put in the summary more ambiguity about what I felt. He went on to say, There were probably a few lines in there that emphasized that, hey, we infer from some of the information we picked up that something happened, and so on. When he was told no such ambiguity could be found in the summary that, in effect, the only ambiguity in the cable was the conflict, wholly unacknowledged, between its conclusions and some of the observations in the body he said he imagined that in the clearing process that got taken out. The clearing process, in which the cable made the rounds of officials in the Embassy for review, centered on Kenneth Bleakley, and his recollection of the trip, alone among the recollections of the three, coincides with the conclusions drawn in the cable. Nonetheless, Greentree insisted to me that he did not feel that what went out distorted beyond acceptability what he had written. In a later comment, he stated emphatically, At no time during my tour in El Salvador was a report that I had anything to do with ever distorted by the Embassy. Because those are the standards that Hinton set. Like many in the Embassy, and throughout the Foreign Service, Greentree had great respect for Hinton. He describes Hinton as a totally credible person and, in writing what he wrote, he clearly felt the pressure to conform to the older mans standards. Yet it is hard not to suspect that Greentrees strong belief that the cable contained more ambiguity than in fact it did reflects a lingering unease with the final product a conflict that persists, even after twelve years, between what he wrote and what he felt he should have written. I had been in the Foreign Service for only a couple of years at that time, Greentree told me, and we had a very strong Ambassador, and our instructions were to be clear and clean to not distort. You write it down, and then that becomes the eyes and ears of the United States government. And this was especially important because the journalists reporting in El Salvador were thought to be biased. So if I had said everyone was crying, and everything well, that wouldnt have had any credibility, either. We reported what we saw, and the main requirement was to distinguish between what you saw and what other people said, and, even more than the standards of journalism, to keep your slant out of what you were reporting. Had he not been operating under the constraints of politics in Washington, what would he have written differently? Well, I would have put in more strongly the impression that abuses against the civilian population probably took place in El Mozote and the surrounding areas during that operation. But he repeated, It was just an impression. There was no direct corroborating evidence. Yet this was his strongest impression, and since the limitations caused it to be omitted, didnt they feel rather artificial, at the least? Thats right, he said. But thats where, I guess, political judgment came into it. And it was not the judgment that you would

think that, you know, the Ambassadors got to make sure that the information is politically correct. It was that, for the rest of the report to have credibility among people who were far away and whose priorities were you know, were talking about people like Tom Enders whose priorities were definitely not necessarily about getting at exactly what happened: in order for the report to have credibility, all those things have to be kept to a minimum. At that point, one begins to understand the pressures on the Embassy, and the effect that the great game of politics being played in Washington had on those who were supposedly acting, within El Salvador, as the eyes and ears of the United States government. Ambassador Hinton was the guy who sets the standards, Greentree said. So, of course, since I was a junior officer, my eyes were not on the policy. They were being very affected by the things I was seeing and encountering out there. From the Ambassadors perspective, he had to keep his eye on where we were supposed to be going in the country, and he had to put where the truth was in the context of that. In other words, the possibility that the guerrillas were making a major propaganda ploy over a massacre that might or might not have occurred in El Mozote, and were doing so for the purpose of derailing U.S. policy well, what the Embassy had to say about that event had to be very, very carefully phrased and controlled, to get as close as possible to what happened and as far away as possible from propaganda on either side, regardless of what might then happen to it once the report got to Washington and was one way or another translated into testimony before Congress. In reality, then, the admonition to be clear and clean, to be professional and not distort, served as an excuse to exclude from the cable the very things that had most impressed the men who actually ventured into the war zone. The emphasis on clean reporting permitted the blinding and deafening of the government, and served to remove from its field of perception what might have proved to be, in the Washington of early 1982, a very inconvenient fact. In place of McKays clear impression that something horrible happened, and of Greentrees conviction that there probably had been a massacre, that they had lined people up and shot them, the cable supplied to officials in the State Department a number of arguments that they might find useful in impeaching the press accounts of El Mozote deeply misleading arguments that would form the basis of the governments effort to discredit the reports of the massacre. After citing the numbers of dead that had appeared in the Times and the Washington Post, the cable noted, It is estimated that no more than 300 people were in the entire canton prior to December 1981 ignoring the fact that both newspapers had made it quite clear that the massacre took place in El Mozote and in a number of hamlets around it. As for the names of the dead subsequently reported in the U.S. press, the cable suggested that those may well have been extracts in whole or part from the civil registries stolen from Jocoaitique by subversives, though it offered no evidence whatever for this assertion. I dont recall thinking it was what happened, Greentree said when he was asked about the Jocoaitique claim, but I thought it was a possibility. And yet he might have learned from Bonner (with whom Greentree was in frequent contact) that the guerrillas had shown the reporter the list several days before they attacked and captured Jocoaitique, so the possibility that the names were actually drawn from captured civil registries from Jocoaitique a charge that an Assistant Secretary of State would soon be repeating to the Congress of the United States was not a possibility at all. El Mozote is in the heart of guerrilla territory, one reads on page 2 of the cable, and its inhabitants have spent most of the past three years willingly or unwillingly cooperating with insurgents an odd locution, particularly since the next sentence notes the fact that Government forces were last posted in El Mozote in August of 1981, just four months before Operation Rescue. The observation about willingly or unwillingly cooperating with the insurgents echoes the attitude of the Salvadoran Army, in which anyone living north of the Torola must be, a priori, a guerrilla follower and was thus, in the officers view, fair game. And yet Greentree clearly understood that the reality was more complex. Most of these people didnt want anything to do with any of this stuff, he told me. They just wanted people to leave them alone ... They were victims of this whole thing ... If they could get away by giving guerrillas some corn and chickens, and still live on their farms, thats what they would do. At the same time, if the people had to get by by giving corn and chickens to the half a dozen Guardia Nacional who were living in their town, then they would do that whatever it took to enable them to live. It is an eloquent and concise statement of what the civil war had done to many of the people of Morazn by 1981, but, unfortunately, nothing near such depth of understanding is allowed to come through in the cable.

The cable concludes by noting that the defense attachs office is attempting to determine which Army units were present in El Mozote during and after the operation. Of course, if the Embassy wanted to discover what had happened in Morazn this should have been the other path of inquiry: putting the question directly to the American-funded and American-trained Army. And yet six weeks after the events were alleged to have taken place the Embassy reported that it had not managed to discover which units were in El Mozote this although at least ten American advisers were assigned to the Atlacatl, the unit accused in all the press reports. As several recently released cables confirm, however, matters were a bit more complicated. On the day Greentree and McKay made their trip to Morazn, Ambassador Hinton had a discussion with Salvadoran Defense Minister Garca on margin of dinner, as he puts it in his cable about El Mozote. The General (Garca had been promoted on January 2nd) was about to make a trip to Washington to attend a Congressional prayer breakfast, and the Ambassador warned him that he should be ready to respond to Morazn massacre story. General Garca, Hinton writes, was his usual cocky self. Ill deny it and prove it fabricated. I wished him well and added he would have to explain away details provided by correspondents. It might be possible we were investigating and were grateful for his help but he should bear in mind that something had gone wrong. Who did it, when, and in what circumstances was something else. Two days later, on the afternoon of February 1st, an American officer from the defense attachs office travelled out to the Atlacatl headquarters and met with, among others, Major Cceres, Major Jos Armando Azmitia Melara, and Lieutenant Colonel Monterrosa. The officers mission was to specifically determine if the battalion, or elements thereof, were involved in the fighting around and in El Mozote. After greetings and pleasantries were exchanged, the American put his question to the Colonel. Monterrosa remained distantly courteous, but he firmly told RO [Reporting Officer] that he was not in a position to discuss these specific subjects, and that RO had better obtain permission from the General Staff of the Armed Forces before he came with such inquiries to his (LTC Monterrosas) Battalion. Things had begun badly, the American reports: Quite frankly, [I] felt that the interview, albeit short, was thus to be terminated. The American hastened to make the obligatory apologies for what the Colonel may have interpreted as impertinence. RO also pointed out that candid answers to the questions posed would facilitate countering recent press releases which were less than complimentary to the Armed Forces of El Salvador. Major Azmitia now spoke in what can only be described as a parable, explaining that the unit that had fought at El Mozote had had a tough time of it and that because of the intensity and duration of the battle there were undoubtedly casualties among non-combatants. Monterrosa put in that the unit involved had had to fight through fixed enemy positions, then, once in the town, fire was received from the houses in the town. Here, according to the American officer, Monterrosa now utilized the first person: I do not have X-ray vision, and I cannot see inside the house from which someone is shooting at me; nor in those type of circumstances am I very disposed to waste time trying to find out who else might be in the house. ... At this point LTC Monterrosa said he was only speaking in general, not specific, terms about what had occurred at El Mozote. The Salvadorans, it seems clear, are giving the American a conspiratorial wink; but the American doesnt seem to get it, and he ventures to ask Monterrosa if any prisoners had been taken. At this, the Colonel again assumed an adamant demeanor, and suggested that RO consult with the general staff, or get permission from the general staff to ask him such questions. Major Azmitia, as he escorted the American officer to his vehicle, acted apologetic about the fact that they could not provide more facts about El Mozote, but he was sure that RO understood what LTC Monterrosa had been talking about. In his summary the American notes that the two hours spent with these officers was interesting, to say the least. The nuances, subtleties and indirect comparisons used by LTC Monterrosa and Maj Azmitia were intriguing. Yet the central questions remain without definitive answers. Here the officer ventures a personal opinion that the Atlacatl battalion or elements thereof participated in the attack on El Mozote, but he adds that precluding permission from General Garca definitive answers may never be forthcoming. Ambassador Hinton, clearly a bit frustrated, now asked his Milgroup commander if it were possible High Command did not know where and when their field forces operated. No, it was not, he told me. The Ambassador sent this officer to see the Salvadoran chief of staff, who informed the American that the Defense Minister wanted no one other than himself to deal

with that question. Hinton, having been rebuffed on his subordinates level, now paid a personal visit to General Garca. We joshed a bit as is our wont, reports Hinton, describing how the General complimented him on my Washington Post interview which he said put things exactly right. Hinton reminds the General that Tom [Enders] had today gone to Congress to defend the additional 55 million in military assistance and that in this connection reports published in the Washington Post and the New York Times about alleged Morazn massacre ... caused great concern. Garca replied, according to Hinton, that the Morazn business was a novela, pure Marxist propaganda devoid of foundation. I said it was clearly propaganda that its timing had been carefully calculated but there were so many details that it was difficult to deal with the stories. The Ambassador now asks the General about some of those details, including the identity, among others, of Major Cceres. The General replies that Cceres is a straightforward, honorable soldier who would never have killed women and children as described in the story. After some discussion, General Garca acknowledges that the Atlacatl Battalion had been at El Mozote during the December sweep, but then he reiterated that the story was a pack of lies. Garca does promise the Ambassador that he will look into the matter further. He asked me to leave with him the stories and I did so adding as a sweetener the Washington Post editorial of January 29 supporting our common policies. One gets a vivid sense from these cables of the frustrating position the Americans had placed themselves in in their dealings with the Salvadoran military. The Salvadorans behave with an arrogance that bespeaks their awareness of their own power. Washington was behind them and they knew it: Why should they comply with these local officials, except in those cases where they absolutely had to? In the case of El Mozote, it was already clear that they didnt have to. Greentree remembers thinking as he sat in the helicopter on the way back to the capital from Morazn, If were really going to get to the bottom of this, theres going to have to be a decision to put a tremendous amount of energy into it, to carry out a more formal investigation, like the ones conducted for the Americans the four churchwomen. I remember feeling frustrated and dissatisfied with what we came back with. But, if wed wanted to go any further with it, it would have taken a decision to expend a tremendous amount of effort. No such decision was ever made. Two days after Greentrees cable arrived at the State Department, Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders went up to Capitol Hill. Sitting before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, he set out to defend the Presidents certification that the Salvadoran government was making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights. Secretary Enders told Congress that he would make a coherent attempt to answer the question that you have raised are we getting some results. Results he would interpret to mean improvement. Thus he would be arguing, in essence, that, however horrendous the human-rights situation might now be in El Salvador, the last year had in fact been less horrendous than the year before. The effect of this argument was to shift the ground of the debate. Previously, it had been We think this human-rights thing is important and you dont think its that important, Aryeh Neier, then the director of Americas Watch, told me. What the Reagan Administration did was embrace the principle of human rights and then conduct warfare over the facts. The fight over El Mozote exemplified this. The human-rights groups had geared up to fight this new war; Americas Watch, for example, which had been founded only the summer before, issued a book-length study, Report on Human Rights in El Salvador, on January 26th, two days before the certification was sent up to Congress. For the human-rights groups and for leading Democratic congressmen, as well as for the Administration officials, the fight would center on information and how it was gathered. Accurate information, Secretary Enders began. I think we all have found out that is very hard to establish. The responsibility for the overwhelming number of deaths is never legally determined nor usually accounted for by clear or coherent evidence. Seventy per cent of the political murders known to our Embassy were committed by unknown assailants. As in the cable, the fact that the killers identities could not be definitively known, though in most cases few doubted who the killers were, was used as a shield an excuse to ignore what was known. In the absence of conclusive, undeniable proof, the government would feel free to assert that all was darkness.

We sent two Embassy officers down to investigate the reports of the massacre in Mozote, the Secretary went on. It is clear from the report that they gave that there has been a confrontation between the guerrillas occupying Mozote and attacking government forces last December. There is no evidence to confirm that government forces systematically massacred civilians in the operations zone, or that the number of civilians remotely approached the seven hundred and thirty-three or nine hundred and twenty-six victims cited in the press. Echoing the strategy suggested in Greentrees cable, Enders went on, I note they asked how many people there were in that canton and were told probably not more than three hundred in December, and there are many survivors including refugees, now. So we have to be very careful about trying to adduce evidence to the certification. We try, our Embassy tries, to investigate every report we receive. Six days later, Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, remarked to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the El Mozote case is a very interesting one in a sense, because we found, for example, that the numbers, first of all, were not credible, because as Secretary Enders notes, our information was that there were only three hundred people in the canton. The argument about numbers is, of course, deeply misleading no one who read the Times and the Post articles could have missed the fact that the killing had taken place in several hamlets; two of the three survivors Guillermoprieto quoted, for example, were from La Joya, not El Mozote. But the argument exemplifies a pattern. Claiming to have investigated the facts and to have found no evidence of a massacre, American officials then seized on aspects of the charges that, they said, reveal them to be propaganda. We find that it is an event that happened in mid-December [but it] is then publicized when the certification comes forward to the committee, Abrams told the Senate. So, it appears to be an incident which is at least being significantly misused, at the very best, by the guerrillas. In an interview more than a decade later, Abrams made the same argument. He pointed out that the massacre had supposedly taken place in December, and asked, If it had really been a massacre and not a firefight, why didnt we hear right off from the F.M.L.N.? I mean, we didnt start hearing about it until a month later. As has been noted, the guerrillas first publicized the massacre about two weeks after the event as soon as they had got Radio Venceremos back on the air. All the same, it is indisputable that the volume of reporting about El Mozote from Venceremos, from human-rights groups, and from the international press grew steadily throughout January, and reached a crescendo the day before Reagans certification, with the front-page stories in the Post and the Times. Certainly a significant part of this publicity it is impossible to say how much was owing, directly and indirectly, to the efforts of those, beginning with the guerrillas and their international propaganda apparatus, who had a strong interest in derailing the Administrations policy in El Salvador. But Administration officials focussed obsessively on this unsurprising reality, as if the very fact that the El Mozote story was being used as propaganda that it was, as Abrams put it, significantly misused by the guerrillas in itself constituted proof that the massacre hadnt taken place. To many in the Administration, the importance of the massacre was that it had such propaganda value, and that the propaganda, coming at a crucial time, posed a threat to American aid. Preserving the Salvadoran government and helping it win the war were paramount; improving human rights naturally took a back seat since, as the Administration liked to put it, by far the worst disaster that could befall human rights in El Salvador was a Communist victory. This attitude was no mystery to the Salvadoran leaders; despite the periodic brouhahas over certain atrocities, they could see the bottom line quite clearly, which was, as Abrams phrased it, that whatever you think of us from a human-rights point of view, what you think of us from a security point of view is determinative. To say the least, this attitude did not encourage anyone in the State Department to make any additional effort to find out what had happened at El Mozote. As far as the Department officials were concerned, Greentrees cable was the end of the matter. The cable had come from Hintons Embassy, and Hinton had a great deal of prestige in the Department. By now, however, Hinton himself had taken a rather different view. I would be grateful if Department would use extreme care in describing my views on alleged massacre, he cabled on February 1st. Apparently, Washington had sent out cables saying that the Ambassador, in his reply to the National Council of Churches, had denied the massacre had taken place. My letter did not deny incident: it reported that at that time I had no confirmation and had no reason to believe Venceremos reports. I still dont believe Venceremos version but additional evidence strongly suggests that something happened that should not have happened and that it is quite possible Salvadoran military did commit excesses.

Not only McKay and Greentree but now Hinton himself had come to the conclusion that something happened at El Mozote and Hinton had now told the State Department so. To this, he added a frank appraisal of the Salvadoran officers credibility. I find Garcas assertion we have absolutely no information on military actions in El Mozote to be stonewalling without credibility. I have tried to warn him re need to face up to problem, but my impression is he thinks categoric denial is way to handle question. Department officers may wish to discuss matter with him before U.S. press gets to him. As it happened, however, Department officers seem to have agreed with General Garca. They had the Greentree cable, and they would make use of it. After all, the question would come down to as Abrams put it to me Do you believe the Embassy, an agency of the United States government, or Americas Watch? Americas Watch and other human-rights organizations, Abrams said, did not have a great deal of credibility with us, for, in his view, they had ranged themselves on the side of those who argued, in effect, for an F.M.L.N. victory, and thus they served as willing tools of the hypocrites in Congress who now forced Administration officials to undergo a meaningless certification exercise. Certification was this political game they were playing, Howard Lane, the Embassy press officer, told me. I mean, everybody knew, Congress knew, what they the Salvadoran government were doing down there. By then, they had to know, unless they refused to see it. So they beat their breasts, and tore their hair, and yelled about human rights, and made us jump through this hoop called certification. If any Ambassador wanted to keep his job, he had to jump, which meant essentially saying the half-empty glass was really half full. It was a game. I mean, improvement whats improvement, anyway? You kill eight hundred and it goes down to two hundred, thats improvement. The whole thing was an exercise in the absurd. Ever the good soldier, Enders on Capitol Hill attacked the numbers from the human-rights groups, put forward the Administrations numbers, explained how, despite all appearances, the Salvadoran government was making progress. He testified, The results are slow in coming. I would agree with you on that. But they are coming The figures show it. We have September, October, November, December figures for 1980, which show something on the order of eight hundred, seven hundred and seventy-nine, five hundred and seventy-five, and six hundred and sixty-five political murders. That is for 1980. We have the same figures for this year which show September, a hundred and seventy-one, October, a hundred and sixtyone, November, three hundred and two. It shows December, two hundred. Our returns are showing markedly different numbers on the same methodology. That methodology, as anyone who had looked into it knew, was very obviously flawed. The Administrations numbers, drawn from the Embassys weekly grim gram, were based on reports in the Salvadoran newspapers, all of which not only ranged from conservative to unabashedly right-wing but weighted their reporting toward the cities. In 1981, fewer people were being killed in the cities, because fewer activists were there to be killed; most of those who had not been liquidated in late 1979 or 1980 had moved to the mountains. And the killings in the mountains, in the isolated hamlets and villages, rarely reached the pages of newspapers in the capital. Let me be clear this is not a complete report, Enders told Congress. Nobody has a complete report But, nonetheless, it is a coherent attempt to answer the question that you have raised are we getting some results. This is the indication that I submit to you that we are. To this statement a number of congressmen responded with outraged eloquence. Gerry Studds, Democrat of Massachusetts, told Enders, If there is anything left of the English language in this city it is gone now, because the President has just certified that up is down and in is out and black is white. I anticipate him telling us that war is peace at any moment. It was an irresistible quote, and it made for great television. But it didnt make any difference. Enders had supplied a coherent attempt to answer the question that Congress had posed, and though Democratic congressmen would not spare their voices, or their sarcasm, in noting the Orwellian tones of this certification, as Steven Solarz, Democrat of New York, put it though congressmen attacked the numbers and the methodology, and the hearings became contentious and angry it was clear that, come what may, there would not be the votes to cut off aid to El Salvador, for that, as everybody knew, would mean losing the country to the Communists. At root, nearly everyone tacitly agreed (the Democrats whose purported loss of China three decades before was still a painful Party memory no less than the Republican Administration and its allies) that that eventuality was too intolerable even to contemplate, and that in the end the Salvadoran government, by whatever means, had to win the war, or the countrys security would be unacceptably threatened. And so, because of this

underlying agreement, the entire debate, loud and angry as it appeared at first glance, was not a debate. It was an exercise for the cameras. As for El Mozote, since the Salvadoran newspapers said nothing about it, those who had died there merited no place in the numbers Secretary Enders brought to Congress. Had the massacre somehow been proved to the State Departments satisfaction had it been, somehow, impossible for the Administration to deny El Mozote would have had an ugly effect on the Administrations numbers: political murders would have shown an increase in December from six hundred and sixtyfive to well over a thousand, rather than the sharp decline he claimed. Would this have led Congress to reject the certification and cut off aid? Reading the record now, feeling once again the fear in Washington of an F.M.L.N. victory and of the blame such a victory might impose on American politicians, the question seems, sadly, difficult to answer. Aid might have been reduced, true, but, at most, Congress might have managed to cut off aid temporarily, only to restore it again in a panic as Carter had done at the first new guerrilla onslaught. But this is speculation. In the event, the dead of El Mozote did not really come into the discussion at all. On February 10th, the Wall Street Journal published a lengthy editorial headed The Medias War, in which it noted that the publics perceptions are badly confused on the war in El Salvador, and attributed much of that confusion to the way the struggle is being covered by the U.S. press. Most notable were several paragraphs that took up the question of El Mozote: Take the recent controversy over charges of a massacre by an elite battalion of the El Salvadoran army. On January 27, Raymond Bonner of the New York Times and Alma Guillermoprieto of the Washington Post simultaneously reported on a visit to rebel territory, repeating interviews in which they were told that hundreds of civilians were killed in the village of Mozote in December. Thomas O. Enders, assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, later cast doubt on the reports. There had been a military operation but no systematic killing of civilians, he said, and anyway the population of the village was only 300 before the attack in which 926 people supposedly died. When a correspondent is offered a chance to tour rebel territory, he certainly ought to accept, and to report what he sees and hears. But there is such a thing as being overly credulous. Mr. Bonner reported it is clear the massacre happened, while Miss Guillermoprieto took pains to say that reporters had been taken to tour the site by guerrillas with the purpose of showing their control and providing evidence of the massacre. In other words, whatever the mixture of truth or fabrication, this was a propaganda exercise. Realistically, neither the press nor the State Department has the power to establish conclusively what happened at Mozote in December, and were sure the sophisticated editors of the Times recognize as much. Yet as an institution, their paper has closed ranks behind a reporter out on a limb, waging a little campaign to bolster his position by impugning his critics. A news analysis charged the government of sowing confusion by questioning press reports without presenting detailed evidence to support its position. The analysis posed the question of how American diplomats gather information abroad, but not the same question about American reporters. Oddly missing from these paragraphs, and from the rest of that very long editorial, was any acknowledgment that the two reporters had actually seen corpses in Guillermoprietos case, at least, dozens of corpses and that Meiselas had taken photographs of those corpses. Instead, the editorial said that the two journalists repeat interviews in which they were told that hundreds of civilians were killed in the village of Mozote, and then said immediately afterward that Enders later cast doubt on the reports as if Enders, or his representatives, had actually made it to the village, as if the kind of evidence he was purveying were no different from what were, after all, two eyewitness accounts, if not of the events themselves, then of their aftermath. The reporting done by the journalists and by the Embassy officials is repeatedly yoked together, as if the two parties had visited the same sites, seen the same evidence, talked to the same people, and merely drawn different conclusions. Neither party, the editorial declared, has the power to establish conclusively what happened at Mozote the implication being, as the Administration itself had argued repeatedly in its defense of its Salvadoran allies, that, since there is no conclusive account, nothing can be truly known. The idea that much of a journalists business consists of a studied sifting of what is said and what is observed, of a careful wrestling with gradations of evidence, and a continual judgment of the credibility of witnesses this notion is nowhere present in the sixteen paragraphs of the Journals editorial.

Seven days after the Journals attack on the Times overly credulous reporter, the State Department received a cable over the name of the Ambassador to Honduras, John Negroponte, reporting on a visit by an Embassy official and a House Foreign Affairs Committee staff member to the refugee camp at Colomoncagua, to which many of the refugees from Morazn had fled two months before. According to the cable, the refugees described to the American diplomat a military sweep in Morazn December 7 to 17 which they claim resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties and physical destruction, leading to their exodus. The cable went on to say that names of villages cited coincide with New York Times article of January 28 same subject. The reporting officer added that the refugees decision to flee at this time when in the past they had remained during sweeps lends credibility to reportedly greater magnitude and intensity of military operations in Northern Morazn. This information was not made public. Six months after the Journals attack on him, Raymond Bonner was gone from Central America. Since the El Mozote story and the controversy surrounding it, Bonner had been under great pressure, enduring a steady fusillade of criticism from the Embassy and the State Department, as well as from various right-wing American publications for whom Bonner had come to symbolize the supposed leftward tilt of reporting in Central America. In August, 1982, Bonner received a telephone call in his Managua hotel room informing him that he should report to the Metro desk in New York. The Times decision to remove a correspondent who had been the focus of an aggressive campaign of Administration criticism no doubt had a significant effect on reporting from El Salvador. The New York Times editors appeared to have caved to government pressure, and the Administration seemed to have succeeded in its campaign to have a troublesome reporter the most dogged and influential in El Salvador pulled off the beat. The public position of A. M. Rosenthal, then the executive editor of the Times, has always been, as he told me by telephone, that at no time did anybody in the United States government suggest to me, directly or indirectly, that I remove Mr. Bonner, and, further, that anyone who would approach the New York Times and suggest to me that I remove or punish a correspondent would have to be an idiot. To imply that a man who devoted himself to journalism would remove a reporter because of the U.S. government or the C.I.A., or whatever, is ridiculous, nave, cruel, and slanderous. According to Rosenthal, Bonner was removed because he had never been fully trained in the Times particular methods. Bonner, he said, didnt know the techniques of weaving a story together I brought him back because it seemed terribly unfair to leave him there without training. Bonner had been trained as a lawyer, had been an assistant district attorney and a Naders Raider, and had joined the Times as a stringer in Central America. Seymour Topping, then the managing editor, told me that because we were considerably pressed at the time in getting people into the field in Salvador, we short-circuited what would be our normal process of training people on Metro to learn the style and methods of the Times. Bonner, Topping went on, had done a first-class job of investigative journalism, and there was never any question that he had come up with the facts that his stories were true. But, if he had been more experienced, the way he had written his stories qualified them, etc. would have left him much less open to criticism. But training was not the only issue for that matter, as Bonner pointed out to me, he had spent a good part of 1981 on the Metro desk and, at least in Rosenthals case, the question of Bonners journalistic technique seems to have been inextricably bound up with what the executive editor came to perceive as the reporters left-wing sympathies. If anybody ever asked me to withdraw him, hed still be there, Rosenthal told me, and certainly the idea that the government simply pressured the Times into withdrawing Bonner is wrong. Rosenthal suggests that others have promoted this version of the story because I was an agent of change in the Times, and a lot of people didnt like my politics; but conversations with a number of Times reporters and editors, former and current, persuaded me that the campaign against Bonner was more effective than it might have been because of Rosenthals own politics. Several people told me that Rosenthal had made no secret that he was unhappy with Bonner, because the reporter, as one characterized the editors view, was too willing to accept the Communist side of the story. He was very vocal that Bonner was sympathetic to the Communist side in Central America. The criticism from the right led by the Wall Street Journal editorial on El Mozote resonated with Abe, because it reinforced his own suspicions about Bonner. There seemed to be a growing audience out there that agreed with Abe. Several current and former Times employees (none of whom would speak for attribution) pointed to a scene in a Georgetown restaurant a few weeks after the El Mozote story ran it was the evening of the annual Gridiron dinner in which Rosenthal criticized Bonner and angrily described the sufferings that Communist regimes inflict on their people.

(Bonner finally left the Times in 1984; in 1987, he began writing for The New Yorker as did, two years later, Alma Guillermoprieto. He left the magazine in 1992; he is now writing special assignments for the Times.) El Mozote represented the climax of the era of the great massacres. It was not the last of them most notably, in August of 1982 the Atlacatl, in an operation similar to that in El Mozote, killed some two hundred people at El Calabozo, in the Department of San Vicente but after El Mozote the Army relied less and less on search-and-destroy operations that entailed large-scale killing of civilians. It may be that the guerrillas use of El Mozote for propaganda and the controversy that followed in the United States led senior officers to begin to realize the potential cost of such slaughter. It may be that the highly visible denunciations in Congress finally lent the Embassys habitual scoldings a bit more credibility. (Even someone as firmly contemptuous of congressional pressure as Elliott Abrams acknowledges that the good-cop, bad-cop routine with Congress was very effective and that there was some positive impact there in reducing the killing.) It may be that the officers realized that lesser massacres of forty people or fewer, say could accomplish as much without attracting so much attention. More important, the key Salvadoran officers no doubt realized that El Mozote had accomplished its purpose. It was not only that in much of north- ern Morazn the civilians had fled beyond the border that in several key areas the water had been taken from the fish. It was what El Mozote had meant what it had said to those who remained. For El Mozote was, above all, a statement. By doing what it did in El Mozote, the Army had proclaimed loudly and unmistakably to the people of Morazn, and to the peasants in surrounding areas as well, a simple message: Whatever the circumstances, the guerrillas cant protect you, and we, the officers and the soldiers, are willing to do absolutely anything to avoid losing this war we are willing to do whatever it takes. By late 1982, the tide had begun to turn in Morazn, which is to say not that the Army had begun to win but that it had become less than certain that it would lose. The preceding March, the elections for the Constituent Assembly, on which the Reagan Administration had set much store, had been a huge political success for Administration policy, with a much higher turnout than had been expected. By exerting enormous pressure, the Administration had succeeded in blocking Roberto dAubuisson, the best known of the ultra-rightists, from becoming provisional President. Instead, the officers and party leaders and the Americans had agreed upon Alvaro Magaa Borja, a wealthy aristocrat and international banker with many old friends in the officer corps, as a compromise. The successful elections and the consequent emergence of the highly presentable, English-speaking Magaa helped the Administration placate Congress. (By the July certification report, the Administration had altered its language from no evidence to confirm to no evidence to support allegations of large-scale massacres allegedly committed by government forces in direct contradiction of what Hinton, and even Greentree, had reported.) Congress more than doubled military aid, from thirty-five million dollars to eighty-two million, and increased economic aid to more than twice that. Not only were the Americans sending new, top-of-the-line equipment and plenty of ammunition but they were expanding the Army training hundreds of officers and soldiers in the States. Most important, Colonel Jaime Flores, apparently because of rather too blatant irregularities in his payroll in San Miguel, incurred the wrath of Magaa, and was consequently promoted from command of the all-important Third Brigade to command of the less important First Brigade, and, finally, to that of San Salvadors Fire Department. To replace Flores in San Miguel, Magaa drew on the obvious the inevitable choice: Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa. Monterrosa thus became the military commander of the entire eastern zone of El Salvador, and entered upon the period of his greatest renown. Very often, the Army publicity people or the American press people steered reporters straight to the dynamic colonel. He was a phenomenon, Lucia Annunziata, who travelled frequently with Monterrosa as a correspondent for La Repubblica, told me. The Americans were always telling us that here he was, here was the new breed of officer they were always promising. He had embraced completely the anti-Communist ideology of the Americans. By then, he talked not like some kind of butcher but like an American. He was completely full of this idea of conquering hearts and minds. In 1978, Monterrosa had attended the Political Warfare Cadres Academy, in Peitou, Taiwan, and had been trained there in what he described to an interviewer as war of the masses and Communism of this side. Hed returned to El Salvador very enthusiastic about the skills he had learned how to project ourselves to the civilian population and win them over but

found to his dismay that senior officers werent very interested. Now he began to apply what hed learned. He was always tactically very good, Licho, the rebel commander, told me. Then he began using much more intelligent methods. You know, whenever he would take a village he would come in personally and do political work himself. His soldiers, usually helicopter-borne, would storm a town, flushing out the armed guerrillas, and then Monterrosa would arrive and gather the people together. He would make a speech there in the plaza, Annunziata said. He would ask, Who is sick? Who needs help? Then he would say, Do you know these people? that is, the guerrillas. And, of course, no one would answer. And he would say, in this soft voice, Are you sure? Are you sure you dont have a cousin with them? By this time, people all over the countryside recognized the famous figure of Monterrosa. He was short stooped, even with a slight paunch. He was completely nonmartial, Annunziata said. He always wore this tattered, sweat-stained camouflage-green bandanna on his head, and he had a real Indian face big nose, receding chin. With that bandanna, he looked like an old aunt. He was a bit of a fop, a bit dandified. He had this young boy always with him, a beautiful young boy of ten or twelve, who took care of his things. He was always touching his soldiers very physical, you know. At night, he would get in his red hammock and put on blue gloves and cover his face with a blue towel. He was a real dandy. It was late in the afternoon, and we were outside the town of Carolina, on a hill above it. Monterrosa was sitting on a low stone wall, with his feet dangling over the side. He got on the radiophone and he called, Charlie, Charlie that was his code name to Orange, and he gave the cordinates, and the planes came and bombed and all the while he was directing the planes with the radio. We looked down, and we could see another Army unit entering the town and then the guerrillas leaving from the other side. The next morning, the people came out of the town in a long column. You could see them winding their way up the hill in a long line, moving up to where Monterrosa was sitting on the same wall, leaning back, looking halfway between a king and a hero. And, one by one, the peasants passed in front of him, and each of them had an offering. One of them would give him an egg, another some tortillas, another would push forward a young boy to sign up. And Monterrosa would motion to an aide, as he reclined there like a Roman emperor. I remember a father carrying a little boy who had his head covered with a white handkerchief, and then when he came in front of Monterrosa the father unveiled the kids head and you could see he had this big growth on his face. And Monterrosa nodded to an aide. The aide grabbed the radio and called in the helicopter to take the kid to the hospital in the city. By 1983, Monterrosas new tactics had begun to show some success. He changed the way he related to the local population, and he was less arrogant in his military stance toward us, Villalobos, the E.R.P. comandante, told me. There was this first stage, I think, in which he executed the massacres not only because it formed part of his military training and it was tactically approved by the High Command but also because he didnt think it would become a political problem. Then, later, he realized that this sort of tactic didnt work. It did not produce a quick military victory. Annunziata agreed. He was not bloodthirsty, but he was so neurotically driven he wanted at all costs to win the war, she said. The point was to create a turning point, a watershed, to turn the tide, and to do it by scaring the hell out of the enemy. It was a deliberate demonstration of cruelty to show them that the guerrillas couldnt protect them. And he understood that you do this as cruelly, as brutally as possible; you rape, impale, whatever, to show them the cost. To most of the reporters who covered him now few of whom had been in the country in 1981 El Mozote was just a distant rumor, a dark echo from the past. He was the press-corps officer, you know, very personable, Jon Lee Anderson, who was reporting for Time magazine, said, but there was always this buzz that he was responsible for El Mozote, and, of course, he always denied it. By this time, Monterrosa had a mistress in the press corps a beautiful young Salvadoran woman who worked for an American television network. Annunziata recalls, He would helicopter in to the Camino Real the San Salvador hotel favored by the international press to visit her, and he would burst through the door of the press offices in his combat fatigues and come over and look over your shoulder at what you were writing and say, Have you written about me today? Monterrosas girlfriend let her colleagues know speaking in all confidence, of course that there had been a problem with the El Mozote operation, and although, for understandable reasons, she wasnt free to go into details, all one had to know was that on that particular day the Colonel had unfortunately lost radio contact with his men with

regrettable consequences. The guerrillas did not find this story very convincing. He was well known to all the guerrillas as the man who had ordered the massacre, Licho said. Everybody wanted to kill him in combat. Now, however, their adversary had begun doing what they themselves knew was the most effective thing to do in order to win the war: political work in the countryside. He started learning; he began to play football with the people, help their families. We realized that for someone as militarily talented as he was to start to do real political work could be very dangerous. I think it was at the beginning of 1983 that we started making plans to kill him. Villalobos and Monterrosa were obsessed with each others psychology, Annunziata said. For Monterrosa, it was like looking in a mirror. He had this obsession with the guerrillas with knowing them, understanding them. He had studied all the different groups, and claimed he could always tell which one had staged an operation. He felt he was the alter ego of the guerrillas. Every night, out in the field, he would listen to the radio, first to the BBC and then to Radio Venceremos, listening to what they said hed done that day. Every night, you could hear, coming from his hammock, the Internationale playing over Radio Venceremos. As it happened, Monterrosas fascination with Radio Venceremos his capture of the transmitter, after all, had been the high point of Operation Rescue had not escaped the notice of his alter ego. A basic principle of warfare is to study the psychology of the enemy commanders, Villalobos said. Monterrosa was obsessed with war trophies. He got personally involved in combat situations when his men captured something to such an extent that at times he lost the ability to cordinate troop movements. Once, he arrived personally to take charge of video records that they had captured from us. Another time, it was a scale model that we had used to plan an attack. Each time, he came himself. And he was desperate to stop Radio Venceremos. I mean, any cassette or tape recorder he found was turned into a great victory. Increasingly, in late 1983 and on into 1984, Monterrosa had victories to celebrate. His beans and bullets campaign was making progress in Morazn. The area under F.M.L.N. control was gradually shrinking, and so, even more critically, was the guerrillas manpower base. By the summer of 1984, reports had begun circulating that the guerrillas were reduced to conscripting civilians into their ranks. That September, the Americans gave the Army ten new Huey helicopters. When I saw that news about the helicopters, I told a friend, Monterrosa will be coming after us, Villalobos said. He will use those helicopters to attack the command post. The delivery of the helicopters, not coincidentally, came at the time of a major diplomatic initiative by the Salvadoran government. On October 15th, President Jos Napolen Duarte he had won an election earlier that year, and replaced Magaa joined Minister of Defense Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova and other government representatives in a meeting with guerrilla leaders (among them Guillermo Ungo, who had been Duartes Vice-Presidential running mate in the stolen elections of 1972), in La Palma, about eighty miles west of Morazn. Three days after the meeting, Monterrosa launched a major offensive in Morazn, a six-thousand-man sweep called Torola IV. The war goes on, he told James LeMoyne, of the New York Times, as they stood at the base at Osicala, watching the men of the Atlacatl board the new Huey helicopters and lift off into the northern sky. There are times when you have to make war to gain peace. Villalobos would be cordinating the response to Torola IV, a campaign that, in its broad outline, appeared much like Operation Rescue, three years before: soldiers from regular Army units were storming north across the Torola, and the helicopter-borne men of the Atlacatl were moving down from Perqun and other mountain towns. This time, however, the guerrillas response would be somewhat different. Villalobos and his staff were hard at work planning an ambush for the town of Joateca, a few miles east of El Mozote. It was a well-planned ambush they had devoted many hours to its preparation but an unusual one: the guerrillas were planning to have the Army ambush them and thus capture a prize that they very much wanted Monterrosa to claim.

On October 22nd, Monterrosa helicoptered in to Joateca. With him was, among others, Jon Lee Anderson, of Time. It was real air-mobile ops, Anderson told me in an interview. Flying around from one place to another, inserting troops, choppering around, moving several times a day. In Joateca, he said, an advance platoon had flushed out the guerrillas the day before. Now the people were gathered there, waiting for Monterrosa. It was this turfy plaza in this ramshackle old hamlet you know, cobblestones, shaded front porches and he gathered the townspeople around and gave them this hearts-and-minds sort of speech. He was sitting at a table with a microphone in his hand, and he had a woman social worker and a civilian psychologist there beside him. Anderson quotes Monterrosa as telling the peasants, We are your true brothers. Were not the caretakers of the rich. Do you see any rich among us? We give our blood to the soil, but its up to you to make it fertile. Around that time, not far from the plaza where Monterrosa was speaking, his men had pounced on a group of hapless guerrillas. We sent a column of our fighters to fall into an ambush, Villalobos said, and then they were supposed to leave the transmitter, as if, you know, theyd had to abandon it as theyd had to do three years before. But it didnt work out that way. We werent able to get the transmitter up to where the combat took place. We were upset we thought we had blown the operation. I mean, they should have been suspicious. The rebels had left the transmitter near a graveyard on the outskirts of Joateca. Not far away, Villalobos and his men were waiting tensely, listening intently to their radios. Suddenly, they heard soldiers begin to talk excitedly to one another. As soon as they found the transmitter, there was a big celebration, Villalobos said. We could hear them talking about all the prizes they would get, and so on. The soldiers began to congratulate one another, speculating on how happy the Colonel would be when his men brought him this priceless treasure. There was not a hint of suspicion. Just as vanity blinded Monterrosa, it blinded his soldiers as well, Villalobos said. We just had to wait for his personal psychology to play itself out. Late in the afternoon, Jon Lee Anderson sat down to interview the Colonel. He disappeared for a while, and then he came back very excited, Anderson said. He sat down next to me on the stoop of this old peasant house, and he confided to me that he thought hed found the transmitter. It was in this graveyard, in a cemetery at the edge of this little hamlet. This was somewhat far from where things were happening, its true, but the town had definitely been theirs I mean, there were graffiti everywhere. Anderson seized that moment to ask Monterrosa about the rumors that still clung to him about what had happened at El Mozote. It was late, and we were sitting there, just the two of us, and I said, Colonel, qu pas en El Mozote? And there was this long pause, and he looked away, and finally he said, No es como dicen Its not like they say. Monterrosa would say no more, but Anderson took his answer as a tacit confirmation that Monterrosa had been involved in the massacre. Shortly before, James LeMoyne had asked Monterrosa the same question, and, according to LeMoyne, the Colonel, in the aftermath of a long and exhausting day of combat, had answered more bluntly. He shrugged and said, Yeah, we did it. We carried out a limpieza there. We killed everyone, LeMoyne told me. He said, In those days, I thought that was what we had to do to win the war. And I was wrong. Late that evening, Anderson and his photographer left, somewhat regretfully, for the capital. They needed to file their stories, but they intended to rejoin Monterrosa in his chopper the following day. The next day, three senior officers and a three-man Army television crew arrived in Joateca. Along with a local priest and sacristan, they planned to accompany the victorious Colonel as he carried his prize back to the capital. It was to be a triumphal entrance. The capture of the transmitter was an enormous propaganda victory, and Monterrosa wanted to film it, record it, publicize it to milk it for all it was worth. The men climbed aboard the helicopter and took their seats, and as the rotors roared overhead soldiers began loading the equipment aboard. Sitting in the place of honor beside Monterrosa, as it happened, was Todd Greentree, of the United States Embassy. We were sitting together, Greentree said. He was buckling in, and people were stowing aboard all these duffelbags that belonged to different soldiers you know, Take this back to my wife in San Salvador. The transmitter must

have been in one of those. Then a soldier came over to Monterrosa to tell him he had a radio call, and he got off to take it. Greentree was in a great hurry to get back to the capital he has long since forgotten why. I saw that another helicopter was getting ready to take off, and I was in such a hurry to get back that I got off and climbed aboard. On a hill northwest of the town, the guerrillas of the E.R.P. watched excitedly as the Huey slowly rose above the tree line. They waited until it had reached its apogee, pointed a remote-control device in a direct line of sight, and pressed the button. Nothing happened. We didnt know what had gone wrong, Villalobos said. We thought we had a malfunction. Then we heard his press conference Monterrosa was apparently being interviewed by radio, announcing his destruction of Radio Venceremos and we realized that it was the wrong helicopter. They sat tensely on the hill deep into the afternoon, until at last, after what must have seemed an interminable wait, a second helicopter climbed above the treetops and lofted into space. The big aircraft rose high over Joateca, turned, and began to head west, toward the Sapo River toward the tiny hamlet of El Mozote. Poised high in the blue sky, it caught the sun. Far below, a man from Perqun gazed upward, squinted, and then saw the machine of war he had seen such machines so many times over Morazn suddenly blossom into a great orange-and-black fireball; and then he was deafened by the explosion. The man, who had been forced to guide Monterrosas men on their limpieza three years before, said, I remember thinking, If only he had gone a few minutes more, his blood would have been mixed with the soil of El Mozote. Monterrosa was five years dead before the exiles returned to Morazn. Crowded into the trucks and buses that came over the mountains from the Honduran refugee camps, they flooded back into the deserted villages and hamlets of the red zone. The Salvadoran government could do nothing to stop them, for it was November, 1989, and across the country the guerrillas had unleashed a general offensive that, in the political shock it provoked, would turn out to be the Salvadoran equivalent of Tet: it would put an end to the long civil war. The fighting was especially brutal in San Salvador, where guerrillas dug themselves in in the crowded slums, and the military managed to extract them only by bombing and strafing civilian neighborhoods. But the turning point of the offensive, and of the war itself, came during the early hours of November 16th, when commandos scaled the back wall of the shady campus of the University of Central America, roused five Jesuit priests from sleep, ordered them to lie with their faces against the ground, and emptied automatic weapons into their brains. Before they departed, the soldiers killed a sixth priest, the Jesuits cook, and her fifteen-year-old daughter. The scene they left behind the obliterated skulls of the priests, the green lawn soaked in blood and brains, the fantastically redundant number of spent cartridges was one of spectacular carnage. And though the soldiers made a halfhearted attempt to scrawl a few leftist slogans, it would very shortly become clear that those who had done this work were the men of the Atlacatl. It was an enormous political blunder, for it said to the world, and especially to the Americans in Congress, that after the billions and billions of dollars and all the fine words about training and reform, at bottom the Salvadoran Army remained what it had been at El Mozote. But by now Ronald Reagan had gone, and so had the ideological threat he had so feared. The time had come to bring the war to an end. In the mountains of Morazn, in what was still the red zone, the refugees rebuilt their community. In the Honduran camps, they had made friends among the international aid workers, and now, with help from the European Community and other agencies, they raised up new buildings of straight brown planks: a shoe factory, a handicraft shop, a nursery to hold the children during the day when the people went to work. And they named their community Segundo Montes, after one of the fallen Jesuits. On October 26, 1990, Pedro Chicas Romero, of La Joya, who had hidden in a cave above the hamlet as the soldiers killed his relatives and his neighbors, went down to San Francisco Gotera and filed a criminal complaint with the Court of the First Instance, accusing the Atlacatl Battalion of responsibility for the killings in El Mozote and the villages around it, and asking that Judge Federico Ernesto Portillo Campos investigate and punish those responsible. Among the first witnesses to give

testimony in the case was Rufina Amaya Mrquez. The investigation proceeded haltingly, and although Tutela Legal, among other human-rights organizations, tried to push the Judge forward by publishing, in November, 1991, the first full investigation of the El Mozote massacre, including the names of seven hundred and ninety-four dead it is hard to know what might have come of it had not the government of President Alfredo Cristiani and the comandantes of the F.M.L.N. come together, in Mexico City in January, 1992, and signed an agreement to end the twelve-year-old war. Among other things, the agreement provided that the Army be purged of known human rights violators and reduced by half; that the guerrillas disarm and some of their number join a new civilian police force; and that the Atlacatl and the other rapid-reaction battalions be disbanded. The agreement also provided for a Truth Commission that would take on the task of investigating serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth. The experts from the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Unit entered the country in February, and although the investigation was repeatedly stalled, the people of Morazn helped it along (among other things, by staging a boisterous demonstration in front of the Gotera courthouse in April), and so did the three Truth Commissioners when they arrived, in June. Finally, in October, the experts began to dig. And there, on the third day, in the silence of the ruined hamlet of El Mozote, all the words and claims and counterclaims that had been loudly made for nearly eleven years abruptly gave way before the mute force of material fact. The bones were there, the cartridges were there; the sleeping reality of El Mozote had finally been awoken. They dug and sifted and charted for thirty-five days, and soon the cartridges and the clothing and the bones and bone fragments, all labelled and packed away in bright manila envelopes and fresh new cartons, would depart El Mozote and travel by car to a laboratory in San Salvador, where the experts worked away into December. The following March, when the United Nations made public the Truth Commissions report, entitled From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador, the analysis of the evidence was there, laid out for the reader in clear, precise language, each successive sentence demolishing one or another of the myths put forward during the previous twelve years. Of the hundred and forty-three skulls found, all were deposited during the same temporal event, which is unlikely to have occurred later than 1981. El Mozote could not have been a guerrilla graveyard, as some had claimed, especially since all but twelve of the one hundred and forty-three remains identified turned out to be those of children under twelve years of age, including at least one fetus, found between the pelvic bones of one of the adults. The cartridges recovered in the sacristy showed that at least twenty-four people participated in the shooting, and the distribution of the shells indicated that they fired from within the house, from the doorway, and probably through a window to the right of the door. Finally, of the two hundred and forty-five cartridge cases that were studied all but one from American M16 rifles 184 had discernible headstamps, identifying the ammunition as having been manufactured for the United States Government at Lake City, Missouri. From this evidence and from a wealth of testimony, the Truth Commission would conclude that more than 500 identified victims perished at El Mozote and in the other villages. Many other victims have not been identified. To identify them would likely require more exhumations at other sites in El Mozote, as well as in La Joya and in the other hamlets where the killing took place. But the Truth Commission has finished its report, and, five days after the report was published, the Salvadoran legislature pushed through a blanket amnesty that would bar from prosecution those responsible for El Mozote and other atrocities of the civil war. In view of this, Judge Portillo, after allowing two American anthropologists to work in the hamlet for several weeks with inconclusive results, in effect closed down his investigation. The other victims of El Mozote will continue to lie undisturbed in the soil of Morazn. Last July, the Secretary of States Panel on El Salvador, created in the wake of the Truth Commission report, concluded that the Departments handling of the massacre investigation undermined the Departments credibility with its critics and probably with the Salvadorans in a serious way that has not healed. The panel concluded its review by noting that a massacre had indeed occurred and the U.S. statements on the case were wrong. On December 11, 1992, two Embassy officers went to El Mozote to attend a ceremony honoring those who had died in the massacre. Only the Wall Street Journal

remained more circumspect; in February, in a report from El Mozote on its editorial page, entitled The Wars Over, but El Salvador Still Fights Propaganda Battle, the Journal conceded that while it appears that a massacre of some kind took place, questions remain, including, the Journal said, Who were the true perpetrators of this awful crime? If you drive out from San Salvador today, along the highway toward Morazn, passing the barracks of the Domingo Monterrosa Third Brigade, and crossing the narrow bridge on the Torola, its wooden planks clattering beneath your wheels, you will find, amid the sorghum and the corn and the tufts of maguey, the clean new buildings of Segundo Montes, housing the boot factory and the handicraft shop and the other factories brought back from the refugee camps. In one of the buildings, you will find the woman who fled La Joya in 1981, was forced to bury her wounded child in the mountains, went mad, and became the witch of El Mozote that the villagers came to fear. Andrea Mrquez works in the nursery, caring for the children of Segundo Montes. Farther up the black road, if you step through the barbed wire you will find Rufina Amaya living in a small house with her little girl, Marta, who is now four years old. And if you head up the black road to Perqun, with its battered central square and its mural of the slain Archbishop Romero, you will come to Radio Venceremos, which has graduated from its various holes in the ground to an actual building on a nearby hill; concrete, single story, and small, it is a museum now, a gallery to exhibit pictures of the stations former subterranean quarters. Out in front, beside a well-preserved bomb crater with a carefully tended stone-and-flower border, and behind a brass plaque, you will find a dramatically twisted and burned torso of steel. As the people there will tell you, it is what remains of a helicopter that was blown from the sky one fine day, and it happens to be the most cherished monument in all Morazn. Tags: Central America, Latin America, El Salvador

Fooling America
http://www.foodline.com/cgi-bin/listStatesWithLocations.cgiA talk by Robert Parry given in Santa Monica on March 28, 1993 http://www.realhistoryarchives.com/collections/conspiracies/parryspeech.htm A transcription of a talk given on March 28, 1993, by Robert Parry, former AP and Newsweek and now independent journalist. Parry was one of the first reporters to break the story of IranContra, and one of the first to report on the drug angle in Iran-Contra. Parry later pursued the strong evidence that Reagan and Bush made an all-out effort to sabotage Jimmy Carter's efforts to win the release of the Iranian-held hostages before the November election, the episode known as the October Surprise. Parry is the author of several books, including Fooling America and Trick or Treason, both published by Sheridan Square Press. Currently, he publishes The Consortium, a newsletter that reports on current events by showing the historical backdrop to the events and players. He also publishes i.F. Magazine, named in tribute to both I. F. Stone and George Seldes' newsletter In Fact. Well, thank you for coming out tonight. I do want to first thank FAIR (Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting) for inviting me. It's always a pleasure to leave Washington and come to the West Coast. It's a fascinating aspect of how Washington and Los Angeles interrelate these days. I'm not sure which city is more used to producing fantasy than the other, but I always think that LA's fantasy is often more entertaining.

But there is this tremendous sense of both envy and concern between Washington and LA, but Washington will often look down at Los Angeles as a place that produces movies, sometimes like JFK, movies that were very upsetting to the Washington establishment because they suggested that there was a cover-up of the murder of the President back in the 1960s. But you also find that people in Washington are incredibly attuned to what's happening out here. I was talking to a journalist friend of mine the other day who was saying that there was, for Spike Lee's latest movie, she saw Vice President Quayle in the line waiting to get into the movie, but he thought it was a Roman spectacular, Malcolm 10. And then someone else said they saw Clarence Thomas waiting to get in, but he thought it was an X-rated film. So Washington is a place that does keep track of what is happening out here. Of course, I'm not sure that Los Angeles could produce entertaining shows like the McLaughlin Group, but it does do it's best. Tonight I'd like to talk about what I was doing in the 1980's. I was a reporter for the Associated Press. I started with the AP back in 1974, and worked briefly in Baltimore and then in Providence, Rhode Island, where I covered some of the problems of the Democratic power structure there - Freddy St. Germaine was of course involved with the banks in a very unsavory way. And eventually I was brought to Washington for the AP back in 1977 and covered the Carter administration. And I was examining some of their, what seem like today rather minor scandals, things like the General Services Administration, the waste and fraud that was going on there. And in 1980, after the election, I was assigned to go work on the Special Assignment team for the Associated Press which was there investigative unit. In history, AP's investigative team was actually quite impressive. Sy Hersh had been there, a number of important stories had been broken out of that investigative unit, which at one time was ten, fifteen, twenty people. By the time I was there it had shrunk to about four. I was assigned to do investigations. Other people were doing things like columns about the State Department or about politics, and I was really the only investigative reporter so designated at the AP's Washington Bureau at that time. But no one told me what to work on. And it struck me one day, as I was sitting around, that this administration had a thing about Central America. At the time there had been a number of atrocities that were occurring, and the four American churchwomen had been killed. And the explanations coming from this transition team were quite remarkable. If you remember, Jean Kirkpatrick suggested in one interview that these weren't really nuns, they were more political activists, which always struck me as an amazing suggestion that it's okay to kill political activists. Anyway, it seemed like a very important area to them, one that might end up driving much of what they did, at least in terms of foreign policy and national security issues. So I began working on it. And that experience, in a way, shaped what I did for the rest of my time at the AP. And it was also striking to me that that experience was beyond anything I could have imagine, as an American citizen, watching. It was a case of wide- spread killing - political killing - of dissidents, torture, in the case of women often rape was involved; and this government was not just supporting it, not just providing the weapons and the military support, but trying to excuse it, rationalize it and essentially hide it.

Which is where I sort of came in and I think many people in the American press corps in Washington came in, and the press corp in Central America. At the time the press corps was still the Watergate press corp, if you will. We were fairly aggressive, we were not inclined to believe what we heard from the government, and sometimes we were probably obnoxious. But we were doing our jobs as I think, more or less, as they were supposed to be done. That is - to act, when necessary, in an adversarial way. So when we began covering this topic in early 1981, we had some very brave people in the field in El Salvador particularly and throughout Central America, and some of them risked their lives to cover that story. And those of us back in Washington who obviously were not facing that kind of risk, were trying to get at things. Initially, and maybe we all sort of forget this, but I remember one of my first stories about this had to do with how the State Department was counting up the dead in El Salvador and who they were blaming. At that time the position was that the guerrillas were killing more than half of the people dying in the political violence and that the government was less responsible. So I went over to the State Department to review their methodology, and what I found was that the way they got their figures was that they took the total number of people who had presumably died within a period of a month or so, and then each time the guerrillas would claim on a radio broadcast that they had killed some soldiers, if there was a battle going on and they said "We killed ten soldiers" and then the battle kept going on and it was twenty, and then it was fifty, and then another one of their stations would say fifty, what the State Department did was they added up all the numbers. And so they were able to create these false figures to suggest that the government that the Unites States was supporting was not as culpable as the human rights groups and particularly the Catholic church in ES were saying. It began a pattern of deception from the very beginning. Even when there was something horrible happening in those countries. Even when hundreds, thousands of human beings were being taken out and killed, the role of the US. government became to hide it, to rationalize it, to pretend it wasn't that serious, and to try to discredit anyone who said otherwise. And the main targets of that were the reporters in the field, the human rights groups, and to a degree, those of us in Washington who were trying to examine the policies to figure out what was really happening and what was behind this. I remember again after the new administration came in and of course Secretary Haig made the remarkable comment that the four churchwomen were perhaps running a road block, which is how they'd gotten killed. And even people in the State Department who at that time were investigating this fairly honestly - they had not yet been purged - were shocked that the Secretary would say such a thing because they knew what the circumstances were even then. They knew that they'd been stopped, they knew that they'd been sexually assaulted, and shot at close range. None of that, of course, fit the image of running a road block, and exchange of fire. But the reality became the greatest threat, even at that stage, to what the new administration wanted to accomplish, and what they wanted to accomplish was I think something they felt strongly about ideologically which was their view that the communists were on the march, that the Soviets were an expanding power, that you had to stop every left wing movement in its tracks and reverse it. And they were following of course the theory that Jean Kirkpatrick had devised

that the totalitarian states never reverse and change into democratic states, only authoritarian ones do, which as we know now is perhaps one of the most inaccurate political theories. It's best if you're having a political theory, not to have it disproven so quickly, you know it might be best if you would, maybe fifty years from now you wouldn't really know as much. But Jean Kirkpatricks's was disproven very quickly but it was still the driving force behind the administration's approach to a number of these conflicts, and their justifications for going ahead and trying to conduct what became known later as the Reagan Doctrine which was to sponsor revolutionary operations or what am I saying, counterrevolutionary operations in many cases in various parts of the world and in the Third World in particular. In ES of course, which was my first focus and the first focus of this policy, it was to protect a very brutal government which was at that time killing literally from a thousand to two thousand people a month. These were political murders; they were done in the most offensive fashion. I think any American, any average American, would have been shocked and would have opposed what his government was doing. So it became very important to keep that secret, or to minimize it, or rationalize it or somehow sanitize it. So what we saw, even at that early stage, was the combat that was developing and the combat in terms of the domestic situation in Washington was how do you stop the press from telling that story. And much of what the Reagan administration developed were techniques to keep those kinds of stories out of the news media. In some cases, as we saw later, in late 1981 of course there was, what is now fairly well known, the massacre in El Mazote. And this was a case where the first American trained battalion was sent out over Christmas time in 1981 into rebel controlled territory and it swept through this territory and killed everybody, everyone they could find - including the children. When two American reporters, Ray Bonner and Alma Jimapareta (?), went to the scene of this atrocity in January of 1982, they were able to see some of what was left behind and they interviewed witnesses who had survived, and came out with stories describing what they had found. This was of course extremely upsetting to the Reagan administration, which at that time was about to certify that the Salvadoran military was showing respect for human rights, and that was necessary to get further funding and weapons for the Salvadoran military. And I was at those hearings which occurred afterwards, on the hill, and when Tom Enders who was then Assistant Secretary Of State for Inter-American affairs gave his description of how the State Department had investigated this and had found really nothing had happened or that they had found no evidence of any mass killing, and they argued with great cleverness that the last census had not shown even that many people in El Mazote - there were not the 800 or so who were alleged to have been killed - only 200 had lived there to begin with, and many still lived there, he said. Of course it wasn't true, but it was, I guess in their view, necessary - it was necessary to conceal what was going on. And, it became necessary then, to also discredit the journalists, so Raymond Bonner, and Alma and others, who were not accepting this story, had to be made to seem to be liars. They had to be destroyed. And the administration began developing their techniques, which they always were very good at - they were extremely good at public relations, that's what's they had - many of them had come from - the President himself had been

an advertising figure for General Electric - and they were very adept at how to present things in the most favorable way for them. But what we began to see was something that was unusual I think even for Washington certainly it was unusual in my experience - a very nasty, often ad hominem attack on the journalists who were not playing along. And the case of Bonner was important because he worked for the New York Times, and the New York Times was one of those bastions of American journalism - this was not some small paper, it was not some insignificant news figure. So there began an effort to discredit him and the Wall Street editorial page was brought into play, Accuracy In Media was brought into play, he was attacked routinely by the State Department and White House spokespeople, there were efforts to paint him as some kind of a communist sympathizer, the charge would go around that he was worth a full division for the FMLN - the Salvadoran guerrillas - he was treated as an enemy - someone who was anti-American, in effect. And sadly, it worked. I was in ES in October of '82, I was down there to interview Roberto Dobesan, who was head of the death squads, and I was with a conservative activist, and after that interview we had lunch with the head of the political-military affairs office at the Embassy and the officer was then head of the military group, and on the way back to the hotel, they were boasting about how they had "gotten" Ray Bonner. "We finally got that Son-of-a-Bitch," they said, and at that time his removal had not yet been announced, so it was very interesting to hear that they knew what was about to happen, and he was, in fact, removed by early 1983, and then he was sort of shunted aside at the New York Times and eventually left. So the message was quite clearly made apparent to those of us working on this topic that when you tried to tell the American people what was happening, you put your career at risk, which may not seem like a lot to some people, but you know, reporters are like everybody else I guess they have mortgages and families and so forth and they don't really want to lose their jobs - I mean it's not something they aspire to. And the idea of success is to keep one of these jobs and there are a lot of interesting perks that go with it, a certain amount of esteem, you know, as well as you get paid pretty well. Those jobs in Washington - you can often be making six figures at some of the major publications, so it's not something you readily or easily throw away, from that working level. But what happened in and around that same time frame, was the development, secretly, of another part of the Central America story, which was, of course, the covert war in Nicaragua. And William Casey and Ronald Reagan began putting this operation together, and it involved building up this paramilitary group called the contras, and they were supposed to be seen as an indigenous fighting force, the American role was supposed to be minimized or hidden, again, and that was how it was going to be sold to the American people. It was a classic covert operation, and then it was a legal one at that time - it had been authorized under the finding provisions of the National Security Act. But there were problems with this war from very early on, and one of the problems was that the Contra's weren't very good at fighting - they would go into some villages in Northern Nicaragua and commit atrocities, which began filtering back also to Washington. Congress began hearing about them lining up people in villages and killing them. But it wasn't a very effective group in terms of like taking territory.

And there was one story which I did later but goes back to this time, when the CIA, in 1982, prepared a plan - it was written by the head of military operations, named Rudy Enders, and Mr. Enders had this timetable, and it talked about how the Contras were going to grow at a certain rate and where they'd be at a certain date and they had them marching into Managua by the end of 1983 - and so this was the plan. The plan was to, well, officially even to Congress the White House was saying we have no intention of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua - we're simply trying to interdict weapons going to El Salvador. In their own files at CIA, the policy file for the Contra war contained this timetable to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. So this was their plan - except that it wasn't working. And so by early '83, it became clear even to people at CIA that the Contras weren't what they hoped they'd be cracked up to be, and they ended up looking at this and saying we're going to have to do some different things. Part of this problem though was still that, the longer this thing dragged out, the harder it was to keep all these secrets - plus the Contras were still going out and killing people left and right. So Bill Casey was stuck with a bit of a problem. And he approached it - as he was a very - Bill Casey is often, I think, misperceived - he was a very smart man, and he was extremely committed ideologically to what he was doing, and he was a person who believed in making things happen - whatever the rules might be, or whatever the red tape might be. And so he sat down and developed some strategies in 1983 on what to do. One thing is they would need more time to train the Contras - they weren't going to work the way they were going. Secondly, they had to create the impression the Contras were better than they were, so people wouldn't get tired of supporting them in Congress. So they decided the CIA would have to start sending in its own people, its own specially-trained Latino assets to begin doing attacks which the Contras could then claim credit for, like blowing up Corinto where they blew up this oil depot in the little town of Corinto on the coast, they sabotaged some oil pipeline in Porto San Dino, and these were all being done now by the CIA except that after they'd be done the agency guys would call up the Contra spokesmen, in this case often Edgar Chimorro, and they'd get them out of bed and say, "Now you're going to put a news release out saying that you guys have done this." Now the reason of course for that was to create the impression in the United States, to fool the American public and the Congress, to make the American public think the Contras were really quite effective - that they were now running sea assaults on Nicaragua - pretty sophisticated stuff for a paramilitary force. And Casey had some other ideas. He also began to put together what became known later as the Psychological Operations Manual or the Assassination Manual, and he authorized that in the Summer of 1983, to be prepared - plus they prepared another little booklet on how if you're a Nicaraguan how you sabotage your own government - it was a delightful comic book which I later wrote about at AP - and it showed how you'd start off with, you know, calling in sick was one of the strategies to sabotage, and you'd build up to putting sponges in the toilet to make them back up, as if any of these things work in Nicaragua to begin with, and then they taught you how to make your own malatov cocktails, it was sort of - you graduated - you moved up in your sabotage - and they'd take these little comic books and the Contras were supposed to leave them behind wherever they'd go, so the people could then start calling in sick. So that was one of his ideas. The other one was to do this book - this very sophisticated book in many ways. It made reference to ancient scholars, and how you gave speeches, but the most

interesting part was that there was a section about how the Contras should use 'selective use of violence' to 'neutralize civilian targets' that is civilian officials, judges, people of that sort. And the idea was, apparently, that you would kill these people or at least, you know, incapacitate them somehow, but what was the most remarkable thing about that point was that, when this was finally uncovered when I did a piece on this a year later or so, the CIA then argued, "Well, you don't understand. We were trying to get the contras to be selective in their violence against civilians, not indiscriminate." And that became actually the defense that was used by the CIA to explain why they were running this booklet. But anyway, these things were things that Casey put together in the summer of '83 but he had other plans, which is one section - one of the sections of my book deals with this most remarkable operation that he came up with at that time which is called the Public Diplomacy Apparatus. And what the Public Diplomacy Apparatus did was to make more systematic, to better staff, better finance this campaign to shape the reality that the American public would see. They had a phrase for it inside the administration. It was called 'perception management' and, with US. taxpayers dollars, they then went out and set up offices, mostly at the State Department - there was this Office of Public Diplomacy' for Latin America - but secretly it was being run out of the National Security Council staff. And the person who was overseeing it was a man named Walter Raymond. And Mr. Raymond had been a thirty- year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency and was the top propaganda expert for the agency in the world. He shipped it over to essentially run similar programs aimed at the American public. And overseeing all of this was the Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey. The documentation on this now is extremely strong and clear, that even on matters of personnel, as well as on matters of general strategy, Casey would be given reports, asked to provide assistance, he would help or his people would help arrange bringing in people to staff this office. They even turned to psychological warfare experts from Fort Bragg, who were brought up to handle the cable traffic coming in from Central America. And, as they say in their own documents, the purpose of these psychological warfare specialists was to identify exploitable themes that could be used against - with the American public - to excite the American public to be more and more angry about what was happening in Central America. The documentation is also clear that the idea was to find our 'hot buttons' and to see what - how they could turn, twist, spin certain information to appeal to various special groups. They'd reached the point, and this was really being directed by the CIA, of breaking down the American people into subgroups, and there were people that they thought might be, for instance the press they developed the themes relating to freedom of the press in La Prensa, which was the newspaper in Nicaragua, which was opposed to the Sandinistas. They targeted Jewish Americans - they had a special program to attack the Sandinistas or to paint them as anti- Semitic, which of course is one of the most, to my view, one of the most heinous things a person or any group could be. But, the idea in Nicaragua was to create this image, and then use it to build support among Jewish Americans for the Contras. They did run into a bit of a problem with this, when they first devised it, which was that, they had not yet purged the US. Embassy of honest foreign service officers, so when they were

preparing this, the Embassy, Ambassador Cranton (?? couldn't hear the name), sent up a cable couple of cables - they were classified and I was later able to get ahold of them - which said it isn't true! That the Sandinistas are a matter of many things that are nasty and bad, but they're not anti-Semitic, and he said there was no verifiable ground upon which to make this charge. So what the White House did was they kept that classified and went ahead with the charge anyway. It was just too good a theme. They also developed this - what they called the 'feet people' theme. This was one that was based on Richard Worthlund's polling data. Richard Worthlund who was this sort of legendary, conservative polling strategist did polling of the American people - they had special groups of people to sample these things with, and they'd found out that most of the themes about the communist menace in Central America left people cold. They didn't really take it that seriously it just didn't hit the hot buttons right. But they found that one hot button that really, they could really use, was this idea of the Hispanic immigrants flooding into the United States. So they developed, what they called, the 'feet people' argument, which was that unless we stopped the communists in Nicaragua and San Salvador, 10% - they came up with that figure somewhere 10% of all the people in Central America and Mexico will flood the United States. Now, I suppose at this point already - and this was about '83-84 - we were sort of losing any touch with reality in Washington after we had been undergoing this stuff, but, if anyone had sat down and really said 'okay, now does this make any sense?', you were probably left with this opinion I think, which is that the massive flows of immigrants at that time were coming from El Salvador and Guatemala and of course, from Mexico - which was mostly economic - and in Guatemala and El Salvador it was that there were conservative governments in place, and at that time the flow from Nicaragua wasn't very great at all, and there was no 10% of the Nicaraguan people having fled, so that wasn't happening. There had been some flow of the wealthier Nicaraguans immediately after the revolution around 1979, but, it was not until later - much later actually - '85-85, actually '87-88, when the flow of Nicaraguans increased because as part of our strategy we were trying to destroy their economy. And after we destroyed their economy, people being people, they left - or a lot of them left. But still, the feet people argument was considered very good because it played to the xenophobia of America, and it gave some political clout to Reagan in making this case, and he was able to use it with particular effect with border state congressmen and senators who felt politically vulnerable if their had been a sudden surge of refugees across the border. So we had in place by this '83-84 timeframe, this Public Diplomacy office. And what it did was escalate the pressure on the journalists who were left, who were still trying to look at this in a fairly honest way and tell the American people what they could find out. You had cases, for instance at National Public Radio, where, in sort of a classic example of this, the Public Diplomacy team from State began harassing National Public Radio for what they considered reporting that was not supportive of the American position enough. And finally, NPR agreed to have a sit-down with Otto Reich - who was head of that office - and one of his deputies, and they were particularly irate about a story that NPR had run about a massacre of some coffee pickers in Nicaragua - and the story was more about their funeral, and how this had really destroyed this little village in Nicaragua, having lost a number of the men in the town - and the contras had

done it so it didn't look to good, and Otto Reich was furious and he said 'We are monitoring NPR. We have a special consultant that measures how much time is spent on things that are proContra and anti-Contra and we find you too anti-Contra and you'd better change.' Now, the kind of effect that has is often subtle. In the case of NPR, one thing that happened was that the foreign editor, named Paul Allen, saw his next evaluation be marked down, and the use of this story was cited as one of the reasons for his being marked down and he felt that he had no choice but to leave NPR and he left journalism altogether. These were the kind of prices that people were starting to pay, all across Washington. The message was quite clear both in the region and in Washington that you were not going to do any career advancement if you insisted on pushing these stories. The White House is going to make it very, very painful for your editors by harassing them and yelling at them; having letters sent; going to your news executives - going way above even your bureau chiefs sometimes - to put the pressure on, to make sure if these stories were done they were done only in the most tepid ways. And there also was, in an underreported side of this, there were these independent organizations, who were acting as sort of the Wurlitzer organ effect for the White House attacks. Probably the most effective one from their side was Accuracy In Media, which we find out, from looking at their internal documents the White House internal documents, was actually being funded out of the White House. There was - in one case we have because we have the records, the White House organized wealthy businessmen, particularly those from the news media, from the conservative news media, to come into the White House to the situation room where Charlie Wick, who was then head of USIA, pitched them to contribute a total of $200,000 to be used for public diplomacy and the money is then directed to Accuracy In Media and to Freedom House and a couple of other organizations which then support the White House in its positions, and make the argument that the White House is doing the right thing and that these reporters who are getting in the way must be Sandinista sympathizers or must not be very patriotic or whatever we were supposed to be at the time. So you had this effect of what seemed to be independent organizations raising their voice, but, the more we kept finding out, the more we found at that these weren't independent organizations at all. These were adjuncts of a White House/CIA program that had at its very heart the idea of how we reported the news in Washington and how the American people perceived what was going on in Central America. I'm not sure this has ever happened before - I can't think of it, but it was a remarkable change in the way that the government, as I guess Ross Perot might say, was coming "at" the people rather than, you know, being "of" the people. The overall effect as this continued over time was cumulative. Those of us in the press who continued - who were not smart enough to seek cover, found our work more and more being discredited, and us personally being attacked, because the game really became how do you destroy the investigator. And whether it be America's watch, which was finding that the Contras were engaged in human rights violations as well as the Sandinistas (I should say), or if it were the Catholic Church in El Salvador reporting upon the atrocities there, or it was some journalist finding out about the deceptions in Washington, the best way to deal with that was to discredit the people who were doing the investigation. If you made them look like they were unpatriotic, wrongheaded, somehow subversive, the overall effect was to, first of all make it harder for them

to do their job, and secondly when they did their job, people would tend not to believe it. So it worked, basically. So, as we get into the mid-80's, we're now in a situation where it's getting touchier and touchier to do these stories, but Congress, because of the mining problems and because of the bad publicity that followed, the disclosure that the CIA was actually doing many of these things which the Contras had been claiming credit for, when that was exposed in 1984 - accidentally exposed by Barry Goldwater on the floor of the Senate - what happened on that case was that Goldwater had gotten drunk and had gone down to the Senate and started talking about how the US. was mining the harbors of Nicaragua. And Rob Simmons, who was then staff director for the Senate Intelligence Committee rushed onto the floor to grab this slightly drunken Senator and tell him that he wasn't supposed to say that and they - it was literally expunged from the Congressional Record, even though - this was before C- Span so you couldn't record it - it was expunged from the Congressional Record but a very diligent reporter, David Rodgers for the Wall Street Journal, happened to be in the press gallery and wrote it down so it ran in the Wall Street Journal and it got sort of out, and that contributed mightily to the problems that they had in continuing the war. So Congress stopped the funding for the Contras. Immediately, and actually even before because they knew there was going to be a problem, the White House had this backup plan, and it was, of course, to have Ollie North become the point man. So North becomes, secretly, the point man. He is also being secretly supported by the CIA, and by the NSA, and by other US. intelligence services. That comes out much later. But Ollie North is now the man who is supposedly running everything but that's all secret too, at least from the American people. And he's arranging to get weapons and raise money, and they're doing their various things they did with Saudi Arabia and so forth, to get the money, and so we end up with a lot of us in Washington really sort of knowing about this. This isn't like, all that secret, you know. I'd met Ollie North in '83 and he was actually a source for many journalists because he would, as part of the deal he would tell you some sexy stuff about the Achilles Laurel or something, but you protect your source, so you wouldn't really write about him. But I was writing about him. And by the summer of 85 - by June of 85, I did the first story about Oliver North. And it was a very tepid story, I must say, looking back at it. I had gone to the White House with it and they had flatly denied it. They said it was completely wrong, completely opposite from the truth - and I at that point had still not caught on to how dishonest these people had gotten. So I sort of softened it, but I still put it out - we had this story out for AP about Ollie North, and how he was running this Contra support operation, and how the White House was saying it wasn't happening, and that led eventually over that summer to a few other stories appearing, and of course it was all denied and the pressure on the journalists was so intense that the other news organizations backed away - the New York Times backed away, the Washington Post backed away, and it was left strangely to the AP and to the Miami Herald which was also following it with Al Charty's work to pursue this story - and really the story of the decade, but no one wanted it. It was an amazing story - it was a story about a really remarkable character, with a remarkable support cast, I mean, you know it was better than Watergate in that sense - I mean, you had Fawn Hall as opposed to Martha Mitchell, I mean this was a much better story! You had this secret war being fought, you had the government lying through its teeth every time it turned around, but no one wanted the story. The price had gotten too high.

So as much as I would like to say, like I was really some sort of journalistic genius who'd figured this all out, it didn't require that much. It just required sort of following the leads. They were all over the place. But we'd learned to sort of shield our eyes from the leads in Washington. And as we're doing this - I was now working with Brian Barger who we had brought on at AP - to help on this story, and we did the Contra-drug story in December of 1985, which was really well received around town [he said sarcastically], and we then proceeded to follow the North network into early '86 and we wrote the first story that there'd actually been a federal investigation in Miami, of what we knew as the North network. It had been suppressed because you weren't supposed to investigate this because it wasn't happening anyway, and the US. attorney who make the mistake of trying to investigate this, or the assistant US. attorney ended up in Thailand, working on some heroin case, and the investigation went literally nowhere. So this was what was happening by the Summer of '86, when Barger and I finally did a story we had 24 sources by this point - it was getting silly, you know? You know, it wasn't like two sources, or three sources, we were up to 24, and some of them named, and we did this story in June of '86 where we laid a lot of it out - we didn't have all of it, I'll grant - we didn't know about Secord's flights, but we had Rob Owen, and we had Jack Singlaub, and we had how the intermediaries were moving the weapons and so forth. So we get to this point, and we put this story out, and finally Congress - which had been very afraid of touching this - the democrats were extremely timid - finally Lee Hamilton, who was then Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee takes our little story with the rest of the Intelligence Committee over to the White House and they sit down with Ollie North and they say, "Colonel North - we have this story that says you're doing these things which are kind of illegal, uh, what about it?" He said, "It's not true," they said "Thank you," and they went back to Capitol Hill. And I get a call from one of Hamilton's aides, and he told me, he said - I'll never forget this, because it was probably my worst moment in the whole Iran Contra Scandal - I get this call from a Democratic aide who tells me that Lee Hamilton has looked into my story, and he had a choice between believing these honorable men at the White House or my sources and it wasn't a close call. And so, at that point, we were, sort of, done. They could have - as Ross Perot might say - they could have stuck a fork in us. Barger was stuck on the overnight at AP and was sort of pushed out of the company - he left. I was basically told, more or less, well, you know, take your medicine like a man, you got it wrong, you know, and we were wrapping up our investigation - it was over. During that summer we tried to get a longer version of this into any publication, virtually none would take it. None would take it - I mean, we even went to Rolling Stone and they turned us down. So that's where we were. This phony, dishonest, false reality had won out. And the reality had lost out, and anyone who was crazy enough to actually believe in the reality was a real loser in Washington. And then, as it all looked like it was pretty much over, one of the last planes of Ollie North's little rag-tag air force, was chugging along over Nicaragua on October 5th, 1986, and just because history is like this - history is kind of, you know, it's quirky sometimes - there was this teenager, draftee, never filed a SAM missile in his life, didn't even know how to fire it exactly, but he described after the fact how he sort of aimed it at this plane that was sort of lumbering

along through the sky, and it went off! The SAM missile went off, and it went right at the plane, which really amazed this kid. They say it was Soviet made - I mean, what would you have thought? So the missile goes right at the plane and hits it right under one of the wings and the plane starts spiralling out of control. And another little quirk of history is that - most of the guys were kind of macho on board, and they didn't wear parachutes, but Eugene Hasenfus had just gotten a parachute sent to him by one of his relatives, and because he had the door open to start kicking out these weapons to the Contras, even though the plane spiraled out of control he could crawl to the door and pushed himself away from the plane and parachuted down through the Sandinistas. And so, there was literally a smoking fuselage on the ground in Nicaragua, and the press corps in Washington suddenly said, 'oh gee! Maybe we had missed something after all.' But even then the White House initially - this was - it was an interesting meeting. October 7th, at the NSC - they were in kind of a panic. Ollie was out of the country working on the Iran project, so Elliot Abrams was chairing this meeting, and they were trying to figure out what to do - what was their story going to be. Later on I talked to one of the participants at this meeting and I said, "Gee, what did you guys think you were up to? Did you think you shouldn't just maybe fess up at this point?" He said "No. We had been so successful in managing the information, we, you know, just thought we could just do anything!" So the anything they did was that they just started lying again! And they put out - and it wasn't just from the State Department anymore, it was from the President of the United States, the Vice President of the United States, and virtually every senior official in the position to do anything about this, came out and said there is no US. government connection to this flight. And Elliot even sort of came up with this neat idea [sound lost for a moment] - I know Singlaub pretty well and I happened to put a call in, and he hadn't been told he was supposed to take the fall - they hadn't gotten around to telling him that. So when he flies back from Asia he lands, and he comes down off the plane and all these reporters are up to him saying, The New York Times has just run this story based on a senior official saying it was your plane and he said, "I had nothing to do with that plane!" So later on he told me that he have taken the fall if he'd only known that he was supposed to take the fall, but they hadn't told him he was supposed to take the fall, so, crazy enough, he told the truth. So they were still looking for someone to take the blame on this, and then a very enterprising freelancer, an American journalist, went into the Salvadoran telephone office, and since everything's for sale down there, he bought the phone records for the safe house. They hadn't thought to, you know, take care of the phone records. And so he buys these phone records and, my goodness, there are all these calls to the White House, and to Ollie North's personal line, as well as by the way to the Vice President's office because Felix Rodriguez who was running the drops was calling virtually daily - well maybe, certainly weekly - the Vice President's office to talk to then George Bush's national security advisor Donald Greg. So they had to come up with some new stories again. And these stories kept shifting. But what was incredible about the whole thing was the arrogance that pervaded the White House at this point. They really thought they could control how everybody in this country understood the facts. They could create the reality, and the press would go along with it, and through the press the American people would either be deceived or so confused that they wouldn't be able to do anything about it anyway. The perception management wasn't going to give up.

But that began to cause problems when the next shoe falls, which is the disclosure of the Iran initiative in early November of '86, and that is also a problem legally, because what they know inside the White House which we don't know yet, is that, in 1985 the President had authorized the first shipment of missiles to Iran through Israel without proper authorization. He had not signed a finding; he was in violation of a felony which is called the Arms Export Control Act. So they had to cover that up. And what we saw was the next remarkable stage of this. And probably this is what changed a lot of how I saw journalism. Obviously I'd not been really too thrilled by what I was seeing up to this point, but the next phase was even more unbelievable. And the next phase is the scandal was broken - there are three parts to it basically: there's the illegal shipments of weapons to the Contras in defiance of the law, the Boland Amendment; there is the problem of the Arms Export Control Act, which President Reagan was violating back in '85; and of course there's what became the focus - the crossover - the use of residuals from the arms sales in Iran for the Contras - the so-called 'diversion' which many people feel was indeed a diversion of the public at least. So you had these three elements. The White House chose to make a stand on the latter one - the diversion, and they proceeded to lie about the other two. They put out false chronologies on Iran to show that the President did not know about the '85 shipment. They insisted - even as Vice President Bush insisted until December of '86 that he had no idea there was a Contra operation going on - even though it had been much of the press, he just hadn't bothered to read it. So you had this decision to sort of deny straightforwardly, possibly accurately that the President did or did not know about the diversion - they said he didn't. And that became the focus for the press and for the congress as the investigation gears up, which is very bad enough because these other questions are very important. Was the President involved in a felony under the Arms Export Control Act? Was he involved possibly in another type of crime by defying a law which he signed into law - the Boland Amendment? Can the President just unilaterally conduct war using third country funding? All of these are very important questions to our democracy. But the focus was on the diversion. And on that they felt they could contain it as long as John Poindexter said the buck stopped here, which of course he would do. However, what we began to see very quickly in Washington was almost a collaboration at this point to contain the scandal. Obviously the White House and the Republicans had a very strong interest in containing this scandal; they were politically in hot water. But the Democrats, and the press, were also inclined to contain the scandal. As the phrase went - nobody wanted another Watergate. The people may have wanted another Watergate - but that was the view in Washington - nobody wants other Watergate. And at this point, my last story for AP - AP and I had really had some struggles because although they were in a way happy with my work, but in a way I put them in some very tough spots, and they had not always been the best, but I must say they did put out most of our stories, eventually, and they did the most, of any news organization, but - my last story for them in February of '87 was - we jumped at one of the last firebreaks. We brought the story into the CIA. And I reported that the CIA had assisted North's operation, despite their denials; that North was using National Security Agency highly-sensitive secret cryptology equipment and had been passing it out like candy to all the people who were working with him - they all had these KL43's as they were called which could send these secret messages back and forth, and so we'd broken that barrier. We'd broken into the CIA.

And then I went to Newsweek. Maybe a mistake, I guess, in retrospect, but I went to Newsweek. And I thought - I always think of Newsweek as what it used to be - sort of a gutsy magazine that had changed. So anyway I get to Newsweek and the first week I'm there, some stories about these phony chronologies are circulating and I call a friend of mine on the National Security Council staff and I say, "What are you doing now? You're doing false chronologies on how the Iran sales happened?" and he said, "Bob, you don't understand," he said "These were orders from the Oval Office. Don Regan sent down word that we were to protect the President and write him out of these events." And so, I tell my new Bureau Chief at Newsweek Evan Thomas, and he's real excited by this 'cause he gets excited, and he goes in and Tommy DeFrank, who was the assistant Bureau Chief, calls another source - well known person whose name I can't mention I guess, from the NSC, and this person said yes, that's exactly right, we were told to do it. So Newsweek ran this - I have one copy of this because Newsweek sort of threw it away afterwards - but we ran a cover story called "Cover-up" and we recount how, to protect the President, the NSC staffers were ordered to put these phony chronologies out. And what we didn't realize at the time was we had just broken through the last firebreak. We were in the Oval Office with this story. And the reaction was incredible. Many of my colleagues in the press attacked us. The Wall Street Journal, not just in its editorial pages but its news columns attacked us; Newsweek - of course, Don Regan, who was one of the people of course named here attacked us; and Newsweek decided that they wanted to retract the story. And they sent me back to my source, several times over the next period of time, to get him to take it back and he wouldn't. He said, I told you what I knew, and what do you want me to say, and I said well, we want to retract the story is what we want to do. Anyway, so one of my friends went around - because this was such an embarrassment to Newsweek - that he told me he went around Newsweek and got all the copies he could find and threw them away, so people wouldn't know - so there wouldn't be a reminder it was sort of a 'nice thing' he was doing - so there wouldn't be a reminder of my big mistake. And I found out fairly recently - as recently as a year ago, Newsweek was going to Judge Walsh's office and asking him to give them information so they could retract this story - in their view - to fix the historical record. But of course Judge Walsh wouldn't help them on it. So anyway, here we are, and the problem is - and, uh, it's hard to understand if you haven't lived in Washington it may not make a lot of sense, but I'll explain it anyway - there were three choices at this point: Choice "A" was to tell the truth, to say that the President had violated a variety of laws, committed felonies, and violated our constitutional safeguards about the way we carry out wars in our country, and impeach him. Option A. Then there was Option "B" - to tell the truth and have congress sort of say well, it's okay with us, which creates a dangerous precedent for the future, that is, that now President's would say well hey, look at the Reagan example, you know, if he can wage war privately, why can't I? So that was Option "B."

And then there was Option "C" - to pretend it didn't happen, or to pretend that, say, some Lieutenant Colonel had done it all. So Washington, I guess understandably, settled on Option "C." And it didn't hit me until one evening in March of '87, the Tower board had just come out with its report, which basically said that the President was a little bit asleep at the switch, but hey, you know, it was really these crazy nuts who did it, and we had one of these Newsweek dinners they're fancy affairs - and it was at the Bureau Chief's house, and they're catered, and there's a tuxedoed waiter, and he pours the wine, there's nice food, and I was new - I came out of AP which is kind of a working class/working man's kind of news organization so I wasn't used to this. And we had as our guest that evening Brent Scowcroft, who had been on the Tower Board, and Dick Cheney, who was then - who was going to be the ranking minority figure on the house Iran-Contra Committee, and we're going through this little delightful dinner, and at one point Brent Scowcroft says, he says "Well, I probably shouldn't be saying this, but if I were advising Admirable Poindexter, and he had told the President about the diversion, I'd advise him to say that he hadn't." And being new to this whole, sort of game, I stopped eating, and looked across the table and said "General! You're not suggesting that the Admiral should commit perjury, are you?" And there was kind of like an embarrassed little silence at the table, and the editor of Newsweek, who was sitting next to me, says - I hope partly jokingly but I don't know - he says, "Sometimes we have to do what's good for the country." So that became - I somehow realized I was in a different place than I thought I'd been in you know? So what happened then was that played out. It played out. And it played out almost predictably, almost sort of with a sadness. And even when Oliver North finally told the truth, which was that he was ordered to do all this stuff, and that there was a cover-up going on - you see, he even told them there was a fall guy planned - it was the first cover-up that had been announced probably in front of 100 million Americans and still it was believed by Congress! So Lee Hamilton again, the same guy who had accepted North's word and other guys' back in August of '86, he decides, as Chairman of the Iran-Contra Committee, that we all should sort of say that it was just these 'men of zeal' - there'd been a coup d'etat in the White House, we'd find out - there'd been a junta of a Lt. Col and maybe an Admiral here and there you know who were running this policy and that somehow the CIA had missed it, the White House had missed it, NSA had missed it - it wasn't like the Russians were doing this, it was like, being done, like, under their nose! But, you know, okay - it's not very believable - a lot of Americans didn't believe it, to tell you the truth - but in Washington we believed it. We all believed it. Not all of us, but we pretty much had to believe it. And at Newsweek and elsewhere we were told in the press this was not a story anymore, this was not to be pursued, I guess because this wouldn't be good for the country to pursue it. And again, history being kind of quirky, there was this other element of the story, which was that these three Republican judges who picked independent counsel, picked Lawrence Walsh to be the independent counsel on this investigation, and Lawrence Walsh was sort of this non-descript sort of fellow - he's not a really sharp legal mind? But he's very honest - and maybe they thought they could manage him. But he just kept pursuing the leads, and despite all the lies and the cover-ups that went on, there were other breaks because he kept pursuing the leads, that you then had of course, with the North trial and the Poindexter trial, these guys - basically North saying - here's more and more evidence that these guys were

running this thing, and then in the Poindexter trial Reagan comes out and makes a complete fool of himself and is just all over the place with his story. But then another event happens that we really don't know much about - and that event is that this guy named Craig Gillan is hired to do a sort of clean-up operation at the Independent Counsel's office - just to get the loose ends together so they can wrap up the investigation and end this thing - it's 1990. And Craig Gillan finds out that there are a lot of document requests that had been sent out in the early days and some hadn't been answered! One was from Charlie Hill, who was an aide to George Schultz, and who was - last time I knew he was at Hoover up at Stanford and so they write to Charlie and they say Charlie - you didn't give us your notes. And Charlie finally sends his notes, and in it they find this strange reference to Casper Weinberger taking all these notes! But of course Casper Weinberger told them that he had no notes. Then as they follow those leads they find that in fact there had been an Oval Office cover-up, and that what we had seen, and what remarkably the White House had been able to successfully maintain, in the defiance of all the logic and reason that should have been brought to bear - they were able to maintain for *six years* what amounted to a felony obstruction of justice out of the White House. And they did it under the nose of the Congress, under the nose of the Washington press corp, and the way they were able to do it was essentially this acceptance in Washington of an absolutely phony reality, one which is accepted in sort of a consensus way - what you'll hear if you listen to the McLaughlin Group or these other shows is a general consensus - there may be disagreements on some points - but there is a general consensus of the world that is brought to bear, and often it is in absolute contradiction to the real world. It is a false reality - it's a Washington reality. And what we have seen at the end of these twelve years, and what I guess the challenge of the moment becomes is how that gets changed. How do the American people really get back control of this - not just their government, but of their history - because it's really their history that has been taken away from them. And it's really what the Washington Press Corps and the Democrats in Congress as well as the Republicans are culpable of, was this failure to tell the American people their history. And the reason they didn't was because they knew, or feared, that if the American people knew their real history - whether it goes back to the days of slaughters going on in El Salvador - if they had known about El Mazote - if they had known about the little children that were put in the house and shot to death and garroted - that they wouldn't have gone along with that. And if they had known that there were felony obstructions of justice being carried out of the Oval Office they wouldn't have gone along with that either, and there would have been a real problem - there would have been a political problem to contain I guess, but - it is not the role of the Washington press corp - maybe this is sounds like an understatement, but it's not the role of the Washington press corps to take part in that. Our job was supposed to be, I thought, to kind of tell people what we could find out! We go in, we act nice, we ask a lot of questions, find some things and run out and tell you! We're sort of like spies for the people, you know, and instead, we sort of got in there - and I guess it was real nice, we felt like we were insiders, we felt like these were all nice, respectable men - they dressed well - Casper Weinberger went to every single one of these press/government functions - the Grid Iron Club, the White House Correspondents' dinners, the Congressional correspondents' dinners - you'd always find Casper Weinberger there. And so when he finally gets indicted the Washington press corps comes out and says that's a terrible thing to do, 'cause Casper Weinberger's a good man! He went to all our parties! How

could you think badly of him? And there was even a column by liberal columnist Richard Cohen in the Washington Post who said, it's a terrible thing to indict Casper Weinberger because we shop at the same store in Georgetown! He said Casper Weinberger even pushed his own shopping cart! And before Thanksgiving one year, Richard Cohen saw Casper Weinberger buying his own turkey. And so how could you think about indicting a guy for a felony obstruction of justice when he pushes his own shopping cart? This may seem funny out here but in Washington it's not! This is very serious stuff! I know I'm taking too long, but one other thing I wanted to talk about was - well, you know life being what it is, and history being quirky as it is - so I left Newsweek in 1990 - I was not on the best of terms with them - because I wouldn't go along with this. I mean, I wouldn't - I kept saying first of all George Bush knew it and we should have told the people about it in 1988 when he was running for president - we knew what he knew, we knew that his stories were absolutely the most implausible, idiotic, embarrassing cover stories imaginable and they should not have been treated with the kind of respect they were treated with and we should definitely have pursued that. We also knew that there was a a cover-up going on - which I kept insisting on even though Newsweek kept trying to retract it, and so I left. And I was going to do this book, and this book was going to be about how Washington sort of works or doesn't, and about how the press behaved sort of cowardly, and then I get this phone call one day, in August of 1990, from PBS Frontline, and they asked me if I would do some investigative work on this project called the October Surprise. And I'd been through a lot, and I really didn't want to go through any more. And of all the taboos - obviously for a long time the North network was just a 'crazy conspiracy theory', and then the idea that Bush was involved was a 'crazy conspiracy theory', and the idea that there was a cover-up was a 'crazy conspiracy theory', and I'd seen all these conspiracy theories actually turn out to be true, so I really didn't want to discount anything without having looked at it carefully, I thought, and anyway I thought it would be kind of wimpy, you know, unprofessional and wimpy to say no. This was a reputable outfit - PBS Frontline wanted me to look at something and, as much as I had my doubts about it I thought, okay. So, I went off on this little strange adventure. I had a producer named Robert Ross who's a wonderful guy who speaks Persian and has lived in the Middle East. We took our little camera our little high eight camera - and we went around as cheaply as possible, and we went to Europe, we went to the West Coast - we interviewed some arms dealer over in Santa Monica - and we went around and put together whatever we could. And we found, to our surprise I think, that there was more there than we thought. We had doubts about a lot of it still, and we did not in our - when we finally decided to go with the program we wanted we were very I think skeptical that we didn't feel it was proven, but that there was enough there that merited further attention, I guess that's a fair way to say where we ended up. So we did this program, and it aired in April of '91. Gary Sick the day before - Gary Sick was interviewed on our show - he was a former national security man under Carter and a very respected historian, and it was partly his decision to think that this had happened that influenced us to some degree, because it wasn't just crazy arms dealers and intelligence guys - it was also this fairly respectable guy, and the day before our show aired he did a piece in the New York Times describing his angst and how he came to this conclusion. And so this story that had sort of lived on the fringes for some time but which the government itself had brought in on the public record in a perjury trial in the Spring of 1990, and lost, this now moved into the mainstream much more, and it drew - even by the comparisons to

the other stuff - this one was attacked, and continues to be attacked. Frontline commissioned a second program - an update, which we tried to do in just a very straightforward, honest way because at that point the debunkers - The New Republic and Newsweek actually leading the way - we felt were wrong on a number of points. But we also felt that we didn't think it was anywhere near proven and we did a show saying basically that, and trying to track Casey's whereabouts and all the rest of the stuff we did. Anyway, so after the second show, there was this Congressional investigation, which the Republicans fought, which George Bush personally strategized to stop, and it was stopped in the Senate with a filibuster, but the House approved an investigation - the Senate did a little one in one of the subcommittees, and it just has to be that Lee Hamilton was of course assigned to head the investigation. It wouldn't have been fair otherwise - see, Lee Hamilton was a very honorable man, in many ways, I think, except he doesn't believe anyone else can lie, I guess. He was chairman of the Middle East subcommittee when the Iran stuff was happening - the Iran arms stuff and he missed it. He was then chairman of the intelligence committee when North was going full board - missed that. He was then rewarded by being made head of the Iran-Contra investigation and he kind of missed that. And so, because of his sterling record they made him head of the House Task Force on the October Surprise! And of course then the House Task Force found that it was just fantasy, and they put out their report - and I must say I've read a lot of reports and I think it's the worst one I've ever read - but it was well-received in Washington but I'm going to tell you one little - I mean when people talk about fantasy in Washington - there is this section in this report, and this I think is emblematic of it, where the House wants to put Casey somewhere, and they decide that on August 2nd, 1980, Bill Casey was on Long Island. And you look for why they think that - this becomes important to the story and I'll make it brief. When you look back at this, what they have is that, on August 2nd, Richard Allen - who was then a foreign policy advisor to candidate Reagan, wrote Casey's Long Island phone number on the bottom of a sheet of paper. It was Bill Casey, 516, you know, whatever, and there's no notation of a call or conversation, and Allen when he testified he said I think I called the number, he said, but I don't recall talking to Casey or even if the call was answered. And there's no phone bill showing a call. So what normally people would say, even my four year probably would say, is that doesn't prove anything. That proves, like, zero! If someone calls my number in 703 in Arlington hey, I'm not there! And it doesn't matter that they call my number, or write it down. Yet this becomes conclusive proof to the task force that Bill Casey was on Long Island. Now the reason that's important is because Bill Casey was really at the Bohemian Grove in upstate California. And what we had, was - he actually purchased their annual play book on August 1st at the Grove, according to the Grove. We had a contemporaneous diary entry from one of the people at the Grove that was in the same cottage Casey was in, Matthew McGowan, who describes meeting with Casey that weekend, and they throw out that evidence, because Richard Allen wrote Casey's phone number down and it was a Long Island number! And you go to them and you say how - Larry Burcello was the counsel here - I've had these arguments and I've said Larry, this doesn't prove anything, and they say, it does as far as we're concerned. They put Bill Casey - they wanted him to be there actually the week earlier, the last week of July, because if you put him there that weekend, which they do, that disproves one of the allegations about him meeting with Iranians in Spain that weekend. So by putting him there the weekend earlier, when he was actually there the first weekend in August, you disprove an important

allegation, and that means that one of these guys was just a liar and a fabricator, and we can all go home and feel happy about it. Anyway, that's a bit of a long way to explain that my last adventure was on this October Surprise thing, and I have written a second book, which recounts that little adventure, and it's called Trick or Treason, and it should be out, I guess later this year. This first book is more - basically I talk about how the "conventional wisdom" works, and I use that to sort string along a lot of great little stories about how - my investigative stuff and things that we found out along the way. The second book is really like a first person kind of magical mystery tour through strange people. What I think is the bottom line of both books is that we are in great danger of losing our grasp of reality as a nation. Our history has been taken away from us in key ways. We've been lied to so often. And important things have been blocked from us. It was important to know that those little children were killed in El Mazote. I have four kids, and I know what they mean to me, and it's always been a part of my journalism that I don't want - that if any of my sons will ever be taken off to war someplace, I want it to be done for a real reason - not because somebody made something up. But I also feel for people who lose their kids anywhere. And I think that the idea that our government would be complicit, not just in the killing, but in this very cynical effort to lie about it, and hide about it, and pretend it didn't happen, and attack those who find out that it did happen, is in many ways almost worse. It is something that, as a democracy, we can't really allow to happen. The main problem, at this point, is that we have a set of establishments in Washington that have failed us, as a people. Obviously the executive branch did it because it had its goals, and agendas, and it wanted to do these things, and maybe in some cases they were right. But they shouldn't have lied to us. They shouldn't have tried to create a false reality to trick us into this. Congress failed because it didn't have the courage to stand up and do oversight and perform its constitutional responsibilities. But what is perhaps most shocking to Americans is that the press failed. The press is what people sort of expect to be there as the watchdog, the final group to sort of warn us of danger. And the press joined it. And the press saw itself - in the Washington press corp I'm talking about - saw itself at the elite levels as part of the insider community. And as that evolved and then grew in the 1980's, the press stopped performing its oversight responsibilities. And I think we have to figure out some way, as a people, to change that. There've been actually more changes I think in the political structure - whatever anyone thinks of Mr. Clinton, at least there's a change there. And he has different priorities. And in Congress there's even been some change. But the press has gone from being when I got there '77 as a Watergate press corp, with its faults, with being maybe a little too overly zealous in pursuing some minor infraction, but still - it was there as the watchdog. What we have now, and its continuing into this new era, is the ReaganBush press corp. It's the press corp that they helped create - that they created partly by purging those, or encouraging the purging of those who were not going along, but it was ultimately the editors and the news executives that did the purging. It wasn't the White House or the State Department or the Embassy in El Salvador that drove Ray Bonner out of the New York Times; it was the New York Times executives who did it. And throughout that whole era it wasn't the State

Department or the White House that ruined Paul Allen's career at NPR, it was NPR executives. And this was the case all the way around Washington. The people who succeeded and did well were those who didn't stand up, who didn't write the big stories, who looked the other way when history was happening in front of them, and went along either consciously or just by cowardice with the deception of the American people. And I think that's what we all have to sort of look at to see what we can do to change it. I think it will take a tremendous commitment by the American people to insist on both more honest journalism, more straightforward journalism, but also maybe even new journalism. There has to be some other way - some other outlets. In a way, I've grown to despair at the possibility of reforming some of these organizations. Maybe it can happen, but I think ultimately, we're going to have to see a new kind of media to replace this old one. End of talk. There followed a question and answer session - one of which was to the point of this newsgroup. He was asked for his opinion on the Kennedy assassination. Parry: He's asking what I might think about the assassination of President Kennedy. And I guess my answer about that would be I don't know. One of the great tragedies of losing our history which is what's been happening throughout our lifetimes, has been that, because of this sort of 'conventional wisdom' or 'conventional reality' that exists, certain things are not explored. I guess in '63 the conventional wisdom was of course that it was a lone gun acting by himself - a crazy man. And so the Warren Commission, like many other government investigations since, basically just reinforced - ratified that belief. They may have been right - I mean, I don't know. [Man interjects "there've been over 600 books on the subject written ] -I know! I've read some of them. But - all I'm saying is that if investigations aren't done properly within a certain period of time it's very hard to do them. I had a friend who was at Time/LIFE during that period and he was following up on the connections to New Orleans. But Time/LIFE was so angry about anyone even thinking that there might be another part of this story, that he used to have to put down different stories on his expense accounts - like if he would to go to New Orleans to interview some of these guys that might have information he'd have to say he was there for the Mardi Gras or something. He couldn't say he was there for the assassination of President Kennedy because he would have been considered some kind of a nut! And in answer to a question about maybe the people don't really want to know the truth or take responsibility to pressure the powers that be to tell the truth: Parry: I think probably a lot of people don't want to know. I agree with that. I think, because, it's hard to know. And I would hear that a lot. That would be an argument that would be used a great deal in the 80's after Iran-Contra was going along - it would be that people were bored, they were tired, they didn't want to hear about it anymore. My feeling though is that it was the responsibility of the reporter to tell the people what he could about important events as fairly and as completely as possible. And it was less my responsibility to decide what they should know or shouldn't know, or even wanted to know, but to make an honest judgment about what was historically of importance and tell them what I could. And even if it's 10% of the public that wants to know, they deserve to know. I don't think you should do polls to find out what people want to hear and then tell them what they want to hear. I think to some degree the press needs to inform the public about stuff that's important.

In answer to "do the people know they're being lied to": Parry: Well basically, the American people I think, from the polls, believe - first of all they were interested in Iran-Contra, much more so than the press wanted to think. I remember once at Newsweek a poll showed 1/3 of the people following the story closely, 1/3 following them a little bit, and a 1/3 of them not following them at all, and they said - well, you see 2/3 of the people aren't following them very much at all, so therefore, you know - there were arguments that were kind of turned and twisted to make it appear that the public didn't really want to know. I think the public did want to know. Ollie North's book was a bestseller - a number have been bestsellers that shows that they're interested. Plus, I think, they have a tremendous distrust of how the government's functioned and they want to know when they've been lied to. It may not be that they care as much about all the details, but they sure care if a man who is running for President has lied to them in a major way, and expect the press to try to make a good-faith effort to discover that, and not to sort of go along and say gee, it would be too disruptive if people knew that.

The Santa Cruz Massacre November 12, 1991

[back] Indonesian genocide

On November 12, 1991, Indonesian troops fired upon a peaceful memorial procession to a cemetery in Dili, East Timor that had turned into a pro-independence demonstration. More than 271 East Timorese were killed that day at the Santa Cruz cemetery or in hospitals soon after. An equal number were disappeared and are believed dead. This massacre, unlike many others which occurred during the course of Indonesia's U.S.-backed occupation, was filmed and photographed by international journalists. Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn, two U.S. reporters, were beaten during the massacre.

The Santa Cruz Massacre November 12, 1991

"When film footage of the massacre at Santa Cruz*. was broadcast to audiences around the world it provoked a significant international outcry against the practices of the Indonesian military in Timor-Leste.... However, ... even in the face of strong international demands to bring those who had killed unarmed demonstrators to account, the institutional practices of ABRI/TNI provided the majority of perpetrators who were most responsible with effective impunity." -- Chega! Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR)

On 20th Anniversary of Timor Massacre, Rights Network Urges Justice, ETAN Says U.S. and UN Must Act (November 12, 2011)

On November 12, 1991, Indonesian troops fired upon a peaceful memorial proession to a cemetery in Dili, East Timor that had turned into a pro-independence demonstration. More than 271 East Timorese were killed that day at the Santa Cruz cemetery or in hospitals soon after. An equal number were disappeared and are believed dead. This massacre, unlike many others which occurred during the course of Indonesia's U.S.-backed occupation, was filmed and photographed by international journalists. Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn, two U.S. reporters, were beaten during the massacre. The Santa Cruz Massacre sparked the international solidarity movement for East Timor, including the founding of the East Timor Action Network, and was the catalyst for congressional action to stem the flow of U.S. weapons and other military assistance for Indonesias brutal security forces. Ali Alatas, former foreign minister of Indonesia, called the massacre a "turning point," which set in motion the events leading to East Timor's coming independence. The people of East Timor now have their freedom and are an independent nation, but they have yet to see justice for decades human rights crimes inflicted on their people and country by the Indonesian military.
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