Robert R.

Wadholm

W.V. Quines On What There IsKnock, Knock?

Robert R. Wadholm, Missouri University August 30, 2012
The ontological problem, according to W.V. Quine, is simply contained in the question What is there? Quine posits that the answer is Everything, and further, that everyone will accept this answer as true. Thus begins a lengthy exposition about how the ontological problem has been framed and answered historically, with particular focus (strangely, to me) on what is not (nonbeing). What may and what may not be counted in our answer Everything, and how may we judge our dialogue about existence and nonexistence (and through what conceptual schema)? In Quines words, there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over cases. Simple question, simple answer, just disagreement over cases and methodologies. Here I will argue that Quines framing of ontology glosses over the complexity of the fundamental first (or at least earlier) question(s) of ontology, and provides an answer that is at first blush self-evident, but upon further investigation may be lacking in universal acceptance. I hope that this attempt is not merely argument or squabble over words just for the sake of argument (or a letter grade), but is a simplification of what for me is meaningful about the quest for existence. How we frame the quest, and the basic building blocks of that quest need attention. While for Quine this discussion is a mere appetizer to the meat of an argument about Platos unkempt beard (the problem of nonbeing), I find it hard to get past the question and answer:

The Question: What is there? The Answer: Everything.

Robert R. Wadholm Im interested first in the composition of the question. Forgive me if I take the words out of order as I explicate it seems somehow easier for me to understand. If Quine means by there What is there?, rather than here, his question doesnt include the existence of the perceiver/questioner, perhaps creating a subject/object duality in ontology (a problem, since then Everything would not seem to include the questioner, who is here). Given his answer, I doubt that he means there in that way. If Quine is using there as in the title of the piece (On What There Is), as merely the beginning of a clause (as in There is what?), then we must look at his usage of the word is, because that is where the meaning in the question seems to lie (and we could perhaps dispose of the word there as an extra syllable). Use of is rather than are seems to assume that reality is singular rather than plural, and thus that we should speak of it that way. If we were to assume that reality is plural (realities instead of reality, or things instead of a thing), we could ask There are what (realities/things)? rather than There is what (reality/thing)? Better yet, could we not ask What are/is there? to be fair? We could further simplify, since there seems to be used superfluously as the mere beginning of a clause, and ask What is/are? or even What exist(s)? What could perhaps be substituted for another question word with equal substantiveness. We could ask Why exist(s)? or When exist(s)? or How exist(s)? or Where exist(s)? But these questions do not seem to be as central to the problem of ontology (and Why is more teleological than ontological). But what about Who exist(s)? This is a question that is very central to ontology. Some philosophers have said that it is the only important question, and the only way to truly get at what exist(s). For myself, it is the starting point of ontology (and a basis for epistemology), and perhaps a bigger problem of ontology than What is there?

Robert R. Wadholm Here we see that the simple question of ontology as Quine has framed it is not simple, and is not universally agreed upon. If we cannot see eye to eye on the question, we may not be able to agree upon an answer (if there is one). Further, the problematic question What is there? is a question about existence. If we hold a question about existence as the container of the ontological problem (or problem of ontology, or problem of the study/knowledge of being/existence(s)), we seem to assume that the problem of ontology would not exist if there where no one around to question existence. Is the problem that something exists that asks What exist(s)? Or is the problem ontology itself (i.e., that we ask, or study, or presume to know anything about What exists?)? Is the problem the questioner, the question, or the act of questioning What exist(s)? It seems from a simple reading, Quine means the question itself, as he points to the problem as being identified/identical with What is there? In this case, where/whom did the question come from, and upon what is it based/constructed? Also, is the question of the existence of the question of existence (i.e., the existence of the question What exist(s)?) under the purview of ontology? From Quines answer, we can assume that it is. That doesnt sound simple to me. Leaving the seething complexity of the question itself, what can be said of Quines universally acknowledged answer Everything? Is there no one who has ever answered Nothing (whether they were wrong or right or whether we can even judge their wrongness or rightness)? Is there no one who has ever answered Someone (as in There is no everything, only a person or persons)? Is there no one who has ever answered Everything other than nothing or Everything other than nonexistent things (as he later discusses). Is there no one who has ever answered Some one thing (perhaps in contrast to Everything). Or has no one ever turned the question into the answer (What is there? What there is. What exist(s)? What

Robert R. Wadholm exist(s).) as Quine himself does later in the same paragraph? Is What there is identical with Everything in every way? This brings us, I think, to some of the complexity of ontology: questioning existence, question(s) about existence, and questioner(s) of existence. Does questioning existence (ontology) exist? Of what does questioning existence exist? Does at least one question of existence exist? Of what does the question of existence exist? Does at least one questioner of existence exist? Of what does the one questioner of existence exist? Of what (or whom) are we questioning, and how? For me it doesnt seem to be a simple three syllable question or one word self-evident answer. The questions of ontology remaining to be answered satisfactorily are more complex than What is nonbeing? (as important and worthwhile as that is). And perhaps the fundamental question is not as simple as What is there? and maybe the answer could be a personal question turned into an answer: Whos there. This makes knock knock jokes central to the complexity of the ontological problem.