THE HINDU REALISM

THE

HINDU RKALISM
BEING

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICS OF THE NYAYA-VAISHESHIKA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

JAGADlSHA CHANDRA CHATTERJI,

VIDYAVARIDHI,

B.A. (CANTAB.),

DIRECTOR OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, KASHMIR STATE.

ALLAHABAD

THE INDIAN PRESS

1912
All rights reserved.]
[Price Rs.

3 or 4

Shillings.

Printed by Apurva Krishna Bose at the Indian Press, Allahabad,

CONTENTS.
PAGE.

Preface

...

List of Authorities

and Sources
abbreviations used
...

...

ix

Alphabetical

list of

...

xvii

Key

to the pronunciation of Sanskrit

words

....

xxi

Introductory
(a)

General

(b)

The Three Standards

...

10

Realism

A.-The Analytic Aspect

The Nine Realities The Paramanus
Akasha
...

...

19-94

...
...
...

19
21

...
...

47

The Five Bh utas

Kala and Dik

53
54
61

Atman Manas
Principles

...

...

Summarised
...

...

...

93

B.-The Synthetic Aspect

1.

95-151
...

No

First Beginning
in

...

95
100 102

2.
3.
4.

Orders and Grades

the Universe

...

Man

his constitution

and achievements
...
...

...

Re-incarnation

...

110
123

5.

Hierarchy of beings

...

...

PA&E.
6.

The moral purpose of the Universe

Alternation of the universal manifestation
Justice in the Universe
"

...

124
125 128

7. 8.
9.

...

...

...

Nothing new under the

of

Sun"

...

...

128

10.

Meaning
History

Progress

and

Philosophy of
13
...

11. 12.

Beginninglessness of
Life
is

knowledge

181

13. 14. 15.

16.

meaning ... Only one way to Peace and Freedom

suffering
its

...
...

132
133 133 137

Necessity of realising truth

Qualifications needed for Realisation

... ...

The method

of Realisation
...

...

...138
15*

Conclusion

Notes

...

...

155
177

Appendices

PREFACE.
have made an attempt to doctrines of two of the present the main metaphysical Hindu Schools of Philosophy, the Vaisheshika and the
In the following pages*
1

called Hindu Realism. Nyaya, constituting what may be made after I have tried, dur The attempt has been residence at Cambridge, to understand and

ing
cal

my

assimilate the

European attitude

in matters philosophi

and the European mode of philosophic thinking. the I have not made any explicit comparison between and Realism, or any other phase, of European thinking but I have always kept the the Realism of the Hindus so as to European ideas and attitude before my mind,
;

make

this presentation of

Hindu Realism

intelligible to

the Western reader.

with insuffi Although written as early as 1824, and of Colebrookej cient material before him, yet the Essay on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika is still perhaps the best work in any European language. But excellent on the
subject
essay
as the
is,

Colebrooke wrote
;

it

more than a philosopher

*

and

doubt very much

1

as a philologist if a
of the Cain-

Being

my

thesis written as an
Its

Advanced Student

as I publication has been greatly delayed bridge University. been wanting to add to it at least two more parts, namely, on have and the Vedanta. But pressure of other duties has the

Sankhya

as yet left

me no time

to accomplish this
1

although, in so far as the

Kashmir SlmivaSankhya is concerned, have done it partially in my ism which is now in the press and will be very shortly published in
the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies edited by myself. in Essays, Vol. II. | Republished in 1873

Western student

of

philosophy can at

all

get from

it

an

intelligent idea of the

Hindu system.

the earliest essay on the subject is not, nor was perhaps intended to be, a rational presentation of
if

And

Nyaya-Vaisheshika system, neither is the latest a reasoned statement of the case. For I am equally doubt ful if, by reading Professor Max Mliller s account of the
the

an idea as

system, a European student of philosophy can form to the reason or reasons why the Hindu

and do hold even now, the metaphysical doctrines which are taught in their system. * As for the translations of original Sanskrit works
Realists held,

on the system, they can hardly be understood by anyone but those Orientalists themselves who are, or must be,
already well acquainted

with the Hindu mode of think

ing and Hindu terminology. | In regard to these translations Dr. Thibaut says :-Indian Philosophy would, in my opinion, be more
"

and widely appreciated than it is at present, if the translators of philosophical works had been some what more concerned to throw their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the Western reader than
readily
literal
be."

renderings from technical Sanskrit must needs (Thibaut s translation of the Shri Bhashya, p. x.)
it

Thus
tion, in a
*

happens that there

is

hardly a single presenta

European language,

of the metaphysics of the

Max

M tiller s Six Systems of

Nyaya
;

Indian Philosophy, 1899.

Reprint

ed

1903.
|

Translations

tracts from the Vritti

German by Roer
Roer.

Sutras, Books I-IV., by Ballantyne, with ex Vaisheshika Sutras in English by Gough, in Tarka Sangraha by Ballantyne, Bhasha-Parieh. by

Nyaya-Vaisheshika which would enable the reader to understand properly the reasoning by which it is support
ed.

This honour

attempt,

which

is

venture to claim for the present made by me not as a philologist, or

an orientalist, but as a student of philosophy. fa) The first claim then in regard to the originality of the following pages is that they contain a
rational presentation, for the
first

time in a
generally.

European language,
(b)

of

Hindu Realism

And

in regard to special points, I venture to think

in an intelligible
(i)

that the following are presented for the first time form to a Western reader
:

The idea
is

of the

Paramanus

an idea which

considered to be the most characteris

the Nyaya-Vaisheshika.

tic of
(ii)
(iii)

The idea of Kala. The ideaofDik.

to these claims to originality,

(c)

In

addition

this
:

presentation of
(i)

Hindu Realism

also includes

A fuller (though
than
is

not exhaustive) statement, to be found in any other work in

a European language, of the arguments given in support of the Atman from the

Nyaya-Vaisheshika point of view,

(ii)

fuller

and more
"

intelligent presentation
"

of the

Synthetic Aspect
to

from the Re

alistic standpoint.
I

have confined myself

the

explanation of the

main doctrines only as taught by Kanada and Gotama, and have left out several of the minor ones, such as that of Samavaya, which is peculiar to the Vaisheshika
*

vi
of

and the Ley

to

its

notion

causality,

i.e.,

the relation
I

between the producing source and the product. also left out entirely all the later ideas hut
;

have have

given some of the recent reasonings which have been advanced on the subject by living and genuinely Hindu thinkers to meet objections based on European thought.
In presenting
in the position
of

Hindu Realism,
a Realist

have placed myself

Kanada and Gotama.

and a genuine follower of To write and speak as though

one fully believed in the doctrines one has to present has been an ancient Hindu attitude. It was in this
attitude

that
all the

the

great

Vachaspati Mishra wrote

on

almost
I

schools of

Hindu Philosophy.
list of

subjoin herewith a
Sanskrit,

the authorities,

mostly in

original
to in
I

which

have consulted and referred

support of

my
out

interpretation of the system.

all
its

have

left

consideration
literature.
;
"

of

the

history

of the system, or

of

European scholars
"

have written on the subject with their own notion of the

but as they have written

philosophy of history

and with pre-conceptions which are peculiar to the West ern mind, the history as conceived by them can be, from
the

Hindu
155).

standpoint, but partial truth (see pp. 130, 131

Still
it

and

serves

all

practical purposes

and

have therefore refrained from touching upon the subject,

But the

list of

the authorities subjoined

is

so arranged as

to give one

some idea

of the history of the

system in so

far as its present literature is concerned.

*

also

For a history, from the Western standpoint, of the system, see Introduction to Tharka-Sangraha, by M. R. IJodas, in the
Series.

Bombay Sanskrit

vii

In this connection

it

may be
is

just noted that the

to

age

of

the existing works

no guide

the

age

and origin of the system itself (see note 5). The Hindus regard the whole of their Smriti literature, to
which the Darshana-Slmstra
as
is

(their philosophy) belongs,

a
of

branch of learning in which the meaning only

(artha-pradhana) and distinguish it or Shruti in which the words or

importance sharply from the

therefore see

"Vedas

sounds are of importance (shabda-pradhana).*

They can

how

it is

possible that the Smriti literature,

while retaining the meanings or ideas, has yet changed

its

form again and again, and how

so far

it is

also possible

that the Shruti, in

as

it

is

tained

its

very words and sounds.

of thoughts

preserved, has re In these circums

tances, they hold that

as

a system

any system of their philosophy and ideas may be much older

it is

than the existing books in which

I

now

contained.
;

have given most of the references in the foot-notes but where a reference has needed some explanation I have given the same in notes at the end.

As

the

notes are often of the nature of textual criti

texts,

cisms or elucidation of

and can be needed

I

to justify

my

statements to Sanskritists only,

have

left

many

word and passage untranslated.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
J. C.

CHATTERJI.

March 1908.
* I got this idea from one of kanta Tarkalankara.

my

teachers,

M. M. Pandit Chandra-

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

AND SOURCES.
Kanada. Pub., For editions used see
of

THE VAISHESHIKA.
1.
i.

The Vaisheshika Sutras

Ben. Sans. Ser.
"below.

subject.

The oldest existing work on the The old commentaries on the

lost, at least

Sutras are
2.
ii.

not found yet.

Prashastapada

Padartha-Dharma-Sanused
see

graha
3.
iii.

for edition
s

below.

Udayanacharya
the

Kiranavali,

Cornm. on

above.

Only
of

part of this

work

(as

far as section

ing

texts

on Dik) with correspond Prashastapada has been

s

published in the Ben. Sans. Ser. with

extracts from

Vardhamaria

Kiranavali-

prakasha. The rest of this work has been consulted in Mss.

4.
iv.

Shridhara

Nyaya-Kandali, another Comm. on Prashastapada, published with the An latter in the Viz. Sans. Ser., Ben.
s

excellent edition.
5.

v.

Lakshanavali by Udayanacharya giving Pub definitions of Vaisheshika terms.

lished (the text only) as an appendix to

No.

3.

(Udayana and Sh ridhara were

very likely contemporaries).

6.
vi.

Saptapadarthi by Shivaditya or
Shivacharya.
If

Vyoma
it

by

latter,

will

precede Udayana

works.

It

may be

and Nyaya
see below.
7.

regarded also as a work on both Vaish. For edition used jointly.

vii.

Upaskara, Comm. on the Vaisheshika Sutras of Kanada by Shankara Mishra

(pub. in Bib. Ind.).

8.

viii.

Vivritiby Jayanarayana, Com. on No. 1. Pub. together with Nos. 7 and 1 in Bib. Ind.

9.

ix.

A Comm.

on No.

1,

with what

is

said to

be the Bharadvaja Vritii (one of the old and now lost commentaries on the
Sutras),

by

Gangadhara

Kaviratna-

It is impossible to distin Kaviraja. in this work the Bharadvaja guish

Vritti

(if

there
is

is

any

of

it

in the work)

by Gangadhara himself. Its reading of the Sutras and their arrangement are
actually

from what

written

widely different from the other commen taries mentioned above. Pub. Berhampore (Murshidabad) Shak. 1790. The copy I have used is in the India Office

Library
10.
x.

(I.

B. L. 13),

London.

Chandrakantiya Bhashya, Comm. on No. 1 by M. M. Chandrakanta Tarkalankara, a

fessor

living
in

author

;*

formerly pro

the

Government Sanskrit

College,

Calcutta (one of

my

teachers).

Pub. Calcutta, 1887.

* Since dead.

THE NYAYA.
11.
i.

Nyaya Sutras work on the

pendix

of

Gotama,
4, of

oldest

existing

subject.

Published as an ap

to Fasc.

No.

in Bib. hid., 1897.

see below.

the Nyaya-Varttika For other editions used

12.

ii.

Nyaya-Bhasl^a by Vatsyayana or Pakshilasvamin. Earliest existing Comin. on No. 11. Published with the Sutras and numerous
extracts from Nos. 13

and

14, in the Viz.

Sans. Ser.
13.
iii.

An

excellent edition.

Nyaya-Varttikaby Udyotakara, supplementary written when to, and elucidation of No. 12

;

Buddhism was greatly flourishing

i.e.,

in India,

the early

centuries

of

the

Christian
the

era.

Published

in 6 parts or fasces in

Bib. hid., 1887-1904.

14.
iv.

Nyaya-Varttika-Tatparya-Tika by Vachaspati Mishra explanatory to Nos. 12 and 13.

;

Pub.
15.
v.

in Viz. Sans. Ser.

;

pub. in Nyaya-Manjari by Jayanta Bhatta Ser. This may be regarded Viz. Sans. almost as an encyclopaedia of the Nyaya
system. Nyaya-Vritti by Vishvanatha
a

10.

vi.

Comm. on
But

No.

11.

Pub.

first in

Calcutta, 1828.
is

the edition used

by me
is

that published
this

by

Jivananda.

It

from

that extracts

were translated by Ballantyne.

17.
vii.

Tarkika-Raksha, by Varadaraja. tion used see below.)

(For edi

Of these works, Nos. 1-5 are

ance on the Vaisheshika.

of the

greatest
are

import
No. 10

Nos.
is

6-8

also of great

weight and authority.

is

No. 9

not

much known.

greatest living Pandit of the Nyaya, Nos. 11 to 14 are of the great Nos. 15 and 16 too are of much weight. est authority.

the

work

of

perhaps the

Bengal.

On

NYAYA-VAISHESHIKA.
18.
i.

Bhasha-Parichchheda
Bib. Ind.

by Vishvanatha.

Ed.

19.

ii.

Siddhanta-Muktavali,

Comm. on

the above

by

Vishvanatha himself.
20.
iii.

Bib. Ind.

Tarka-Sangraha by Annambhatta.
Sans.
Ser.

Ed. Bom. by Y. V. Athalye and M. R.

Bod as. OTHER WORKS ON THE NYAYA AND THE VAISHESHIKA.

21.
i.

Mitabhashini,

Comm. on

No. 6

published
pub. with

with No. 6 in Viz. Sans. Ser.

22.
ii.

Nishkantaka,
same,
first

Comm. on

No. 17

in the Pandit

and then in book

No. 20,
1881.

form by Lazarus
23.
iii.

&

Co., Benares.

Siddhanta-Chandrodaya,

Comm. on

by Shrikrishna Dhurjati,

enares,

(Oblong edition.) Works on the other systems. THE SA1VKHYA-YOGA.

24.
i.

25.
26.

ii.

The Sankhya-Karikas. Gaudapada s Comm. on same.

Vachaspati Mishra s Sankhya-Tattva-Kaumudi, Comm. on No. 24.

iii.

27.

iv.

Sankhya-Chandrika, Comm. on No. 24 by Narayana. Pub. at Benares.

28.

v.
vi.

29.

The Sankhya-Sutras. The Safikhya-Pravachana-Bhashya by Vijnanabhikshu.

Comm. on

No. 28.

30. vii. Vritti

by Aniruddha on

No.

28.

Garbe

edition.
31. viii.

32.

ix.

Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali. Bhashya on the above

Shastri,

Ed. by Rajarama
32.

33.

x.

Bombay. Vyakhya by Vachaspati Mishra on No. (All three pub. by Jivananda.)

;

34.

xi.

Yoga-Varttika by Vijnanabhikshu Comm. on No. 32, pub. in the Pandit by Lazarus.

34a.

xii.

Karma-Mima msa with Bhashya.

THE VEDANTA.

35.

i.

Brahma-Sutras. Shariraka-Bhashya by Shankaracharya on the

above.

36.

ii.

37. 38.

iii.

Ratna-Prabha by Govindananda on No. 36.

iv.

Bhamati by Vachaspati Mishra on No.

together with another gloss
the Nirnaya Sagara Press,

36.

(All these,
Giri,

pub. by

by Ananda Bombay, 1904

an excellent
39.
v.

edition.)

Shri-Bhashya,

Com.

on

No. 35. Pub. with

Shruta-prakashika by Lazarus
nares, in three vols.
40.
vi.

&

Co.,

Be

Vivaranopanyasa by
Ben. Sans. Ser.

Ramananda

Sarasvati.

41. vii.

Advaita-Brahma-Siddhi by Sadananda
Ind.

Bib.

OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS.

42.
i.

Atmatattva-viveka
a refutation
of

by Udayana, containing
the

Buddhistic notions in
Edition used
is

regard to the Atman.

43.

by

Jivananda, Calcutta, 1873.

ii.

Shiva-Sutra-Vimarshini, an ancient work on

the Shaiva philosophy as

taught in Kash

44.

iii.

Edited by myself. mir. Hindu Philosophy in 5 vols., being S.G.V.M.

Fellowship lectures (Calcutta University) by M. M. Chandrakanta Tarkalankara, in

Being the highly Sanskritised Bengali. work of the most learned Pandit of Bengal,
it is

at

once of great authority and full of

information.
45.
iv.

Sankhya-Tattvaloka in Sanskrit and Bengali, by Svamin Hariharananda one of the very few living Safikhya-Sannyasins of great
learning and practical knowledge of Yoga. Travels of Shivadhyana. It is leally a philo sophical work on the Sankhya, written

46.

v.

under

the guise

Sannyasin who

experiences of a travelled all over India

of

the

and sojourned in the Himalayas. It is one of the most remarkable works on the subject
ever written.
thor
It is

in

Bengali.
his

does not disclose

that
it is

The au name but one

of No. 45.

knows
47.
vi.

by the writer
the

Rational Refutation of
sophical

Hindu Philo
Shastri

Systems

by

Nilakantha

Goreh, and trans, by F. Hall.

48. vii. Dialogues

on the Hindu Philosophy by K. M.

s

Banerjea.
49.
50.
viii.

Colebrooke
Six
F.

Essays.

ix.

Systems of Indian Philosophy

by Prof.

Max

Muller.

51.

x.

Die Samkhya-Philosophie, by Prof. R. Garbe.

UPANISHADS, &c.
52.
53.
i.

Mundakopanishat.
Brihadaranyakopanishat,
with
Cora.

ii.

by

Shankaracharya.
54.
iii.

Bhagavad-Gita.

PURANAS,
55.
i.

&C.

Mahabharata with Nilakantha s Comm. (Cal cutta edition, Pub. by the Bangabasi
Press).

56. 57. 58.

ii.

Vishnu Pur ana.

Bhagavata.

iii.

iv.

Manusamhita with Raghavananda tary on it.

BUDDHISTIC.

Commen

59.
60.

i.

Digha-Nikaya.

ii.

Majjhima-Nikaya (both Pub. by the PalrText

Soc.).

GENERAL.
61.
i.

Shabda-Kalpa-Druma (A Sanskrit Dictionary).

Medini Kosha.

62.
63.

ii.
iii.

Prasthana-Bheda
vati.

by Madhusudana Ed. and Pub. by Weber

Sarasin

his

Indische Studien, Vol. I (1S50J.

64.

iv.

Niruktalochana by Satyavrata Samashramin. Pub. in his edition of the Nirukta in Bib.

Ind.

65.

v.

Chatruvarga-Chintamani, Bib. Ind.

TRANSLATIONS.
66.
i.

Vaish.-Sutras with extracts from Comm., by Gough. (Lazarus & Co., Benares).
Ibid,

67.

ii.

by Roer.

xxi, pp.

(German) in Z.D. M. G., Vols. 309-420 xxii, pp. 383-422 Leipzig,

;
;

1867, 1868.
68.
iii.

The Nyaya- Sutras with

Vritti of

extracts

from

the

Vishvanatha by Ballantyne.
Dr.

Books

I-IV only.
69.
iv.

The Vedfmta-Sutras by
Sacred

Thibaut in the
Series.

Books

of

the East

Vols.

xxxiv and xxxviii, containing the transla tion of the Shariraka Bhashya and Vol.
xlviii, that of

the Shribh.ash.ya.

70.
71.

v.
vi.

Bhasha-Parichchheda by Roer in Bib. Ind. The Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali with BhojaVritti by Raja Rajendralala Mitra. Bib. Ind. WESTERN WORKS.
Philosophy of History by Fred,
gel. Eng. Trans,

72.

i.

von Schle-

by

J. B.

Robertson, 1835.

73.

ii.

74.

iii.

75.

iv.

Appearance and Reality by Bradley. Some Dogmas of Religion by Dr. J. E. McTaggart. Multiple Personality by Drs. Sidis and Goodhart.

76.

y.

Evolution of Ethics by Huxley.

Series, 1895.

Eversley

xvii

ABBREVIATIONS USED.
Arranged alphabetically.

The number on the

ceding List of Ad. Br. Sid.
Ani.
...

right

is

that of the work

in

the

pre>

Authorities and Sources, p. ix. = Advaita-Brahma-Siddhi

...

41

=Aniruddha
Sutras...
...

Vritti on the Sarikbya

...
...

30 42
48 57

At. Tat. Viv.

= Atma-Tattva-Viveka
= Benares Sanskrit
=Bhagavata
...

...

Banerjea H. Phil. Ben. Sans. Ser.

Dial.

Dialogues on the Hindu Philo-

sophy

...

...

Series.
...

Bhag
Bhag. Gita. Bhamati
Bhaslia-Par.
Bib. Ind.
...
...
,..

= Bhagavad-Gita = Bhamati on Shar. Bhash. = Bhasha-Parichchheda

...

...

54 38
18

...
...

...

=Bibliotheca Indica.
R.

Bom. Sans.

Ser.

Bradley App.
Brah.
Brili.
Sii.

&
...

= Appearance

.Bombay Sanskrit Series. and Reality

...
...

by
...
...

Bradley = Brahma Sutras

73

35
53 44
10

Up. Cha. Ka.

...
...

... =Brihadaranyakopanishat = Hindu Philosophy by M. M. ... Chandra-Kan ta ...

Chan. Bhash. ... Chatur Va. Ohi. Ma.

Digh. Nik. Dog. Rel.
...

...
...

= Some Dogmas of Religion

Gahgadhara
s

Ohandrakantiya Bhashya Ohaturvarga Chintamani. ... =Digha NikAya

...

...

59
74
9 25

... ...

Ganga. Gaud. Sahkh....

=Gaudapada

Commmeiitary Commentary on
...

Goreh
Kandali
Ki. Va.

...

Sankhya Karika ... =Rational Refutation

ShastriGoreh
...

by

N.
...
...

47

...

=Nyaya-Kandali
=Kiranavali

...

4 3

xviii

Ki.

Va. Pr.

...

= Kiranavali-Prakasha
=Lakslianavali
...
...
...

...

Laksh.

Ma. Bhar.
Majj. Nik.

...
...

Mahabharata

Manu.
Medini.
Mit.

= Majjhima-Nikaya = Manu-Sariihita = Medini Kosha.

=Mitabhashini

55
...

60
53
21

...

...

...
...

... ...

Mund. Up.
N. V. T. T.
... ...

=Mundakopanishat

52
14

=Nyaya-Varttika-Tatparya-Tik4

Nya. Bhash.
Nya. Manj. Nya. Su.
Nyft. Var.

...

...

=Nyaya-Bhashya = Nyaya-Manjan =Nyaya-Sutras =Nyaya-Varttika

...
...

...

12
15

...

...

...
...

n
13

...

Nya. Vrit.
Pra. Blie.

Prashasta

...

... =Nyaya-Vritti ... 16 =Prasthana-Bheda ... ... 63 =Prashastapada s Padartha-Dhar-

ma-Sarigraha

...

...

Rljarama
Ration. Refut.

=Yoga-Sutra, edited by Pandit Rajarama Shastria ... =Rationai Refutation ...

32 47
37 70 24
51

Rat. Pr.

=Ratna-Prabha

...

...

Roer
Saii.

=Roer s

translation

of
...
...

Bhasha...

Parichchheda
K.
Phil.
... ...

=Sarikhya-Karikas

...
...
...

Samkh.
Sari.Su.

Sarikh. T. L.

=Sarhkhya-Philosophie =Sankhya-Tattvaloka ... =Sankhya-Sutras

45 28
6
21

...
...

Saptap.

Saptap. Mit. Sa. Sa.Ni.

...
...

= Sapta-padarthi = Mitabhashim

...

...

=Niruktalochana by Satyavrata Samashramin ... ...

64 72
61

Schlegel. Phil. Hist -Schlegel s Philosophy of History

Sha. Ka.
Shar. Bhash.
Shi.
...

=Shabda-KaIpa-Druma
=Shariraka Bhashya... =Travels of Shiva-Dhyana

...

...
...

35 43

Dh.

Shiv. S.

Vim.

...

=Shiva-Sutra-Vimarshini

..

43 39 23
19

Shri. Bliash.
Sid.

...

Oha.

Sid.

M. V.
Saii.

= SIiri-Bhashya = Siddhanta-Chandrodaya = (Nyaya)-Siddhanta-Muktavali

...

...

...
...

Tark.

^Tarka-Saiigraha

... ...

... ...

20
17

Tar. Rak.

=Tarkika-Raksha

Thibaut

= Thibaut s
Vedanta

translation of

the
...
...

Sutras,

Shariraka

Bhashya and Shri-Bhashy a

Upask.
Vaish. Su.
...

69
7
1

=Upaskara

...
...

= Vaisheshika-Sutras

...

Ved. Din.

Vijnana
Vish. Pur.

=Vedanta-pindima. =Sahkhya-Prav. Bhashya = Vishnu Purana ...

...

...
...
... ...

29

56

Vivaranopa.
Vivr.

= Vivaranopanyasa
=Vivriti
...

...
...

40
8

Viz. Sans. Ser.

=Vizianagram

Sanskrit
...

Series.
...

Yoga

Su.

= Yoga-Sutras.

31

KEY TO THE PRONUNCIATION

OF

SANSKRIT WORDS.
The order
is

that of the Sanskrit alphabet.

Vowels (only those needed for our present purpose). a as in cedar.

<i

as in father.
as in pin.

as in marine.
as in push. as in rude.

u
u
ri

as in merrily.
as in there.

e
ai

as in aisle. as in so. as in

au

Haws (German)

or ou in house.

Consonants (only those needed here and

peculiarities of sound.)

which have

g gh
h
ch

always hard as in give.

as in Bi&g-horn

pronounced quickly.

as ng in sing.

always
as

soft as in church.

chh
fi

as in churc7i-7iall pronounced quickly.

in

bunch.

f.

pronounced with tongue turned up (cere

bral.)

as in ant-hill pronounced quickly.

XX11 (..

pronounced with tongue turned up

bral).

(cere

n
t

cerebral.

as in French.
like th in iftank without

th

any hissing sound.

as in French.

dh ph bh
sh
sh

the above aspirated. as in philosophy.

as in

stab-Mm pronounced quickly.

like the

as s in sure.

pronounced
tip

above but with the

turned

of

the

tongue

upward

(cerebral).

m
h

nasal, not unlike

ng

in song.

aspirate.

THE

HINDU KEALISM.
4

INTRODUCTORY.
(a)

GERERAL.
to

The name Hindu seems only

be a corrupt form
i.e.,

of the Sanskrit Sindhu,

the Indus.

The name
nincui

denned*
theirs

was n a ll probability given by the ancient Persians to those contempora

It
i

ries

of

who inhabited

the

provinces of India
of

bordering on that river.

Whatever the origin

dislike
I
it

the

name, and however

much one may

and
or
I shall

personally
it

owing
here
;

to

its

history

associations,

must use
social
is

and by Hindus

mean
in
is

all

those

people or
polity

peoples

who

accept,

did accept,

that

and religious discipline which as the Varnashrama Dharma and

ings of what
is

Sanskrit

known

based on the teach

these terms being

called the

Veda- both
I

explained later/

By Hindu Philosophy
H
h"

mean
of

that branch of

the

ancient learning

the

Hindus
in

(in the

"

fined

aljove

sense )

which

demonstrates

by

what a

man

regard reasoning propositions to do in order to gain true happiness ought

*Jnjra,
p. 131

to (a)

and

p. 132,

in

states of existence

and under particular circumstances and or (b) what he ought to

;

in

specific

realise by

direct experience in order to

be radically and absolutely

freed from suffering and to be absolutely

independent such propositions being already given, and lines of

reasoning in their support being established, by duly qualified authorities as also explained later on.*
In Sanskrit, Philosophy has been variously named but it is at present chiefly known as
;

Darshana Shastra, which

the science of views,
in
i.e.,

literally

means

correct views,

regard

to
;

either

of

the two

kinds of propositions

named above
shoulol

do

to

namely, those embodying what a man be truly happy in and under particular cir
in specific states,
i.e.,

cumstances and
or

his duties

(Karma
the

Dharma)

or

those

enunciating
free

the

truths of

essential nature of

things (Tattva\ so that a

realising

them may be absolutely

terms meaning the

man by and independent.

Manana-Shastra,

It is also

called Vichara-Shastra or
"

both

these

Science of Rational

Demonstration/
truths (Tattva).f
It

namely,

in regard to either duty

propositions put forward (Karma or Dharma) or essential

of

may be

said

to

that

is,

Europe and America,

correspond to what in the West, is generally understood

by Philosophy, in so far as the latter is only a rational demonstration of what a man should do to truly better
* Sha. Ka.,

Sub voce Darshana Sa. Sa.

;
; ;

Ni.,

Vol.

iv.,

ne. line

1;

Goreh, p. 1, para. 1 See Note 1 Infra, p. 3. Vivr., vi. | Sha. Ka., Sub voce Darshana ha, Ka., Vol. I., p. 102 See Note 2,
; ;

ii.

16

Sa. Sa. Ni.,

Ibid,

himself,
realised

or

of

ultimate

verities
;

which
is

are

already

by experience as facts that is not mere speculation in. regard The full moaning of this duties and verities.
as Philosophy

to say, in so far

to

such

qualifi

cation will be understood as

we go

on.

Two main
sions

diviit is

of Hindu Philosophy.
(1)

.^

From the definition ~ given above obvious that Hindu Philosophy falls twQ brQa(] divisi()nSj n une i y ._
,

that

is

Rational demonstration of propositions of duty, to say, what a man should or should not do in
in

order to realise happiness,

existence.

some

state

of specific

(See pp. 131-133;.

is

This
mimariisn.

called

the

Dharma-mimftmsft
it

or

Karma-

We

shall refer to

as

Dharma-mimamsll.*

Rational demonstration of propositions in regard (2) to those truths about the fundamental nature of things

which a man should realise by direct experience, to be from suffering and absolutely in absolutely freed
dependent. This division
is

may be

called

Tattva-mimarhsa.

It
it

also

termed

Moksha-Darshana.t
Philosophy,

We

shall

call

simply

Metaphysical

and refer
in

to

the

truths discussed therein as Metaphysical Truths.

While thus the two divisions are made

to their special subject-matter, yet the

regard

Dharma-mimariisa

is not, and cannot be, entire!} free from some reasoning about Metaphysical Truths. For the very propositions it has to discuss are based on these truths, one of which,

the fundamental one,

is

discussed
I, p.

at

some length

in

* Cha. Ka., Vol.

t Shi. Dh., p.
1,

105 (implied),

the main text-book of this branch of Hindu Philosophy. Several other Metaphysical Truths are taken for granted. Thus even Dharma-mimamsa has a metaphysical basis,

and a particular metaphysical standpoint, of which we shall see presently.

the

place

As

for Metaphysical Philosophy,

it is

Schools of Metaphysieal Philosophy.

number

of wliat are

call ed

represented by a Tantras or
translated

Nayas, words which

.

may be

as schools, using this

term in a sense
different

which
that

is,

as will be soon seen,

it

somewhat

from

which

usually bears in connection

with Philo

sophy in the West.* There are several

of these schools, but only

five are

regarded as fundamental.
(1)
(2)

Their names are

Vaishe^hika,

Nyaya,
Sankhya,
Yoga, Vedanta.
as,

(3)

(4)

and

(5)

The
to be,

others are regarded

and may be
five

easily

shown

but
is

variations of these five.

As
6

well-known, the fundamental

really represent, in so far as

maln SyS

schools again what may be

terns!

called purely theoretical truths are con

cerned, three systems grouped as follows

(1)

Vaisheshika-Nyaya or Nyaya- Vaisheshika,

(2)

Sankliya-Yoga,

and
*
tfya.
7,

(3)

Vedanta.|
N. V.~T. T,, p. 146, line 15
Br. Sid., p. 2
;

Bhash.
et seq,

I. 1. 4.

Ki. Va,, p, 117.

In/ra, p.

t Cha. Ka., Vol.

I,

p. 113

A<*.

Pra, She,

As

stated before, the

Dharma-mimamsa has

a meta

physical

basis
it

of
is

concerned,

own, and so far as this basis is also reckoned as belonging to the first
its

group, namely, the Nyaya-Vaisheshika.

Thus, in

reality, there

are

systems of the Hindus. considered as mutually contradictory. They are re garded as forming a graduated series in which the
three systems form, as
it

only three metaphysical These systems again are not

were,

three great standards,

different

suited to different types or grades of minds,

intellectual (and only intellectual)

capacities and tem

peraments.

This position follows as an inevitable consequence of tlie very conce P t i n tne Hindus have of Hindu
eoneeption of philoso-

phy;

and eer-

tain preeoneeptions of the Hin-

Philosophy itself. What that conception i T 1S Q as been already hinted at. It might
, 1 ,
-,

>

pe rhaps be made a little clearer, by stating here certain ideas which are uni
all

versally held

by

Hindus.

general preconceptions of the

satisfactory. Without, however, giving any of these reasons here, I shall first just state what, to a Hindu, seem to be the corresponding

are preconceptions for that are, to them, quite full and

They may be considered the Hindu mind. But they which the Hindus have reasons,

preconceptions of the Western mind

the

and then
be

Hindu

ones, so that the latter

it

may

just give seen by op

sets of

position,

as

were,
as

in clear relief.
it

The two

preconceptions are, opposed to each other.

will

be seen,

diametrically

* See Note 3.

It

seems

to a

Hindu

that Western students of his Philo

sophy start generally with the following pre-suppositions, which are apparently assumed as established facts Alan can never know Metaphysical Truths by (1)
:

same way, for instance, as he can know sense objects. And, therefore, Metaphysical Truths can, at best, be but matters of speculation and
direct experience, in the

mere inferences or only based on

(2)

faith.

Even

if

it

be conceded, as a sort of possibility,

these truths

that

men may perhaps know

some day by

direct experience, yet there has been so far no has known them in this fashion.
(3)

man who

matters of pure speculation, the various schools of Hindu philosophy, like any other must be mutually contra speculative systems of the West, be true, the others must dictory, and if any one of them
Therefore, being

be

false.

As against
(1)

these, the

Hindu preconceptions

are

can knoiv Metaphysical Truths, like any other truths, by direct experience, and not merely by

Man

by inference, or by faith. There have been men in the past who have thus (2) known the whole truth of our nature and existence, as
speculation,

well as that of the

Universe as a whole.
this

These men are known as Rishis, which term, in

connection,

may be
it is

translated as

"perfected

seers."t

by knowing Metaphysical Truths by And, (3) direct experience that some of the Rishis have taught them to the Hindus.
* Cha. Ka.,

Ad. Br. |Sce Note 4.

Sid.,

Goreh, &c.

Note

3.

But the Rishis have taught the Metaphysical (4) Truths not as dogmas, to be received merely on faith, but by rational demonstration. That is to say, they have
demonstrated by reasoning* the truths, already realised by them as matters of direct and positive experience.

And

it

is

this

rational demonstration

of,

that

is,

demonstrating by reasoning, the metaphysical truths, which constitutes Philosophy according to the Hindu
point of view.f The function of Philosophy, therefore,
discovery of metaphysical truths,
is

not

the

by reasoning and infer but only the explaining and understanding ration ally of such truths already discovered and realised by
ence
;

experience.^.

These truths, being realised by the Rishis by direct experience, that is, not being conceived by them as matters of mere speculation, inference, or faith, all
(5)

the Rishis have

known them as the same, in much the same way as all who are provided with eyes may know the sun as one and the same thing.
(6)

But, while the metaphysical truths as realised

in every case, the

by

them are the same

this

Rishis have taught

one and the same set of truths, in what may be called three different standards or which are grades,\\
represented by, but not necessarily exactly the same as, the great text-books known as the philosophical Sutras.fl * See No te 57. also note 1. t Ibid
;

| Ibid,
||

and

infra, p. 140.
p. 23;

Cha. Ka., &c.

Pra Bhe.,

At. Tat. Viv., pp. 131-132

Ad. Br. Sid., p. 151, lines 3 et seq. from bottom Vod. Din., 19 ; Cha. Ka., Vol.
;

I,

p.

Rajarama, Intro.; &c. ^ See Note 5.

5

And

they

have thus taught in order

to

suit

different
of

minds, in

much

the same

way

as,

say,

the

grammar
on.

Sanskrit or Greek

may be

taught in different standards,

such as practical,
(7)

historical, philological,

and so

And

it is

these three different standards of teach

ing

and presenting rationally one and the same body of essential truths, already realised by the Rishis ly direct the three fundamental sys experience, which constitute tems of Philosophy mentioned above." They are there to one another, but together form fore not
contradictory

a single and gradually advancing series, in which, it may be pointed out, the order of the three systems may
or

may
(8)

not be one of historical succession.

Not only are not the three

to

different standards of
all

Philosophy contradictory
lead. to the

one another, but they

same practical
to

end.-f

A man may pursue

one of them, according

his intellectual capacity

any and

end as temperament, and yet reach the same practical

others following the other standards.
ble
tion

How

this is possi
illustra

may again be
of the

exemplified

by our previous
T

different

standards of the

grammar

of a

what language like Sanskrit. While and philological standards of the grammar may historical
the language respectively in its give one a knowledge of and in regard to its ultimate historical

have called the

development

sources, they, as well as the first standard,

may

give one

a practical

knowledge enabling one to which may be speak and write the language correctly, third the same. Similarly, while the second and
knowledge,
i.e.,

exactly

Ante

p. 4.
;

| At. Tat. Viv., p. 1

Cha. Ka, Vol.

I,

p. 6.

standards of Philosophy may, and indeed do, give one a good deal more of what may be called theoretical know
well as the

ledge or knowledge of secondary importance, they, as first standard, lead one to the same practical
is

end which

the

realisation of

absolute freedom and

independence.

That the Hindus regard their

forming
entirely

different systems
series
lias

as

a gradually

advancing
It

not been
in a

unknown

in the West.

was known,

more
in

or less confused

manner, even to Fred, von Schlegel.*

Recently the late Prof.

a fashion,
in

Max

M tiller came

to realise

it

so far
all

as he

recognised the one funda

mental basis of

the

schools of

Hindu Philosophy.

He

says
;<

The longer I have studied the various systems, the more have 1 become impressed with the truth of the
view taken by Vijiiana-Bhikshu and others that there is behind the variety of the six systems a common fund of what may be called national or popular philosophy, a
large
far

Manasa lake
in the

away

of philosophical thought and language, distant North, and in the distant Past,
to

from which each thinker was allowed

draw

for his

own

purposes."!

While thus the idea

European
scholars of
F.O

is

not entirely

unknown among
to

Sanskrit, there has been no ade

far

quate attempt made,

as I

know, by any writer

show how

exactly,

if

at all,

the different systems can

constitute a single

how

the

and gradually advancing series, or Hindus can at all justify their position. Yet
*8ehlegel, Phil, of Hist., pp. 202 and 208, Six Systems, p. xvii.

10
it

the

Hindus maintain
is

that

can be

justified,
is

and that
not only

the view

they hold of their Philosophy

correct, but

most essential

to a

proper understanding

of their various systems.

Leaving aside, for future consideration, this claim of the Hindus and taking the position for granted, let us

now

see

what the three standards

(6)

really are.

THE THREE STANDARDS.

for

The Sanskrit word

what

have called a Standard

of Philosophy is Prasthana. Literally translated it means It may also be render a setting forth, or a setting out.

ed as a standpoint or road.
are three

And, as stated above, there

and only three standards or Prasthanas. The first standard is meant either for absolute begin
ners, that
is to

The Creationist
OP

say,

for students with

...
.
.

Realistic

an intelligent, but as yet philosophical

ly unreflecting, or at or for

reflecting,
to

mind

any rate not much those otherwise unable or unwill

study any but the practical truths of metaphysical ing Philosophy.* This standard takes up the Universe as it appears to such a mind, that is to say, as it is found

extended in space and changing in time, with

objects in
it

all

the

as real things
in

and

all

the qualities of these

objects as inherent
jective, existing
It

them and not as something sub

anything of the nature of what

merely in the mind of the percipient.

the

excludes, of course,
called

may be

psycho-dynamism or polyonymismf

of the other

two standards and has certainly nothing to do with idealism. It is naive realism, pure and simple.

As Realism,

this
;

standard has
Roer,
p.

reduced

the

infinite

* Cha. Ka., Vol. I,p. 115

xvi (implied only). } See Appendix B.

11

nine classes of ultimate Realities. complexity of things to The reduction of the infinite variety of existing and these nine classes may be called experienced things to or analytic aspect of the Universe from the
analysis
this standpoint.

Then, what may be called the synthetic aspect of the shows how, out Universe, as taught in this standard,
of

these

nine

classes

of

ultimate Realities,
in

thing

that

we experience

the

Universe

is

every formed.

These things, which are thus formed out

Realities, are considered

of the ultimate

as absolutely

new productions.
ingredients

They

are no doubt produced out of

certain
;

but, before their which have existed from all eternity sort of existence whatever. have no production, they be spoken of as absolute creations, if it were might

They

not for the fact that they are produced, not out of no
thing,

but out

existing.

And
mind
;

things which have been eternally this is a point which should be borne
of

clearly in

for

it is

with reference to this idea, that

the

standard

takes

its

name, which, in Sanskrit,

is

Arambha-vada or Asat-karya-vada. The first of these the doctrine of an two names can be translated as out of pre-existing ingred ients ; absolutely new creation means the doctrine of absolute nonwhile the second
existence
tion.
it

of the

produced
sake
of

before their actual produc

For

the

convenience
or

we

shall

call

the

creationist

standard

standpoint,

bearing

always in

mind,

that creation in this connection means,

but only not the creating of things out of nothing, out of previously existing forming and fashioning them
factors,

12

As suggested

before, there are

three

main and

ori

ginal schools, started by Rishis, which belong to this standard or standpoint.* Of these, the Dhar ma-mi ma mea belongs to it only in so far as it has a metaphysical
basis

and a metaphysical conception

;

of the

origin

of

things
tions

otherwise

it

deals chiefly with certain proposi

laid

down

in regard to
to
it,

men
is,

duties.

The second

school belonging

that

the Nyaya, takes practi

cally for granted several of the

metaphysical doctrines,

standard, and then devotes itself very largely to the discussion of the proper means

which are special

arriving at

to

the

of

truth, in so far as this

means
of
this

consists of

reasoning.^
the

While the third school

deals

Vaisheshika,

doctrines themselves.
schools

standard, with the metaphysical chiefly Thus, while the two first-named

be spoken of as rather practical, the third and as my object here is is, in a sense, more theoretical to deal chiefly with the theoretical doctrines, I shall

may

often refer to
representative,

this standard

by the name

of

its

third

namely, Vaishethika, except when

there

will be occasion specially to

I

mention the other members.

shall also

speak of

it

as Realism, Realistic Standard,

and

so on.

The second standard takes up

The psyeno~aynamie stand,

the analysis
it

of

the
left

Universe at the point where r

was

by the
further.

and carries it Vaisheshika, It reduces the nine ultimate

Realities
final.
It
p. 23.

Realities, or entities of the Realistic System, to only two.

It

does not discard the nine

altogether

but
as

only shows that

they are
;

not
?

accepts them

* Ad. Br, Sid., p. 51 and passim

Pra Bhe.,

| Infra pp. 138-139.

13

facts

but points out that they are not primary but are derived from still simpler principles.* That is to say,
it

does

with the

Realities of

the

first

standard,
in the

very

much what
are said
to

the latest physical

researches

West

be doing with the atoms of matter with which Western chemistry deals. The tendency of these researches has been, as is well-known, to show that the

atoms of chemistry are not ultimate Realities, but that they are derived from sources that are more simple and

But while they are tending in this direction, they have not in any way interfered with the existence of atoms as definite units, albeit they are not

more

universal.

final Realities.

The reduction

of the nine Realities of the first stand

ard to what are regarded as the two ultimate principles may be called the analytic aspect of the Universe, as
held

by the second

standard,

analytic aspect of the former. in all essentials is possesses a synthetic aspect which of the first, only it shows, as exactly the same as that
is

corresponding to the The second standard also

natural,

from the

things are produced not but from the two which it nine Realities
that the derived

Of course, it presents the synthetic fuller form. aspect in greater detail and in a somewhat It shows how one of the two classes of ultimate
considers ultimate.
Realities

and unchanged while out of the other is produced everything which can It shows also how ever form an object of experience.
remains for ever unaffected

out of this Reality are

produced all those things or facts which are regarded as mental or psychical, such
first

* Ani., vi. 13. See Note 6.

14

as

thoughts, ideas, feelings, and so on, and then out of these again everything material.

There has been much confusion

the exact nature of this standard.
terial

in the

West as
the

to

It

derives

ma

from the mental and psychical, that is to say, things which are of the nature of thoughts, But, in spite of this fact, Prof. ideas, and feelings. Garbe, who is perhaps the one scholar in the West

from

a thorough study of the literature of this standard, has yet taken it to be a form of mateso much so, that he has seen no place for rialism
;

who has made

psychology in this standard and has substituted a phy This is indeed strange not only siology in its stead.*
because
of the
it

is

absolutely against the universal tradition

it

Hindus, but also because

is

absurd

to call

system of Philosophy materialistic which derives matter from thoughts and ideas. Prof. Max Milller, however,

who
came

generally had a better insight into things Hindu to form a clearer and more correct conclusion as

to the

nature of the standard.

of idealism ;|

system from things mental can be called idealism, it undoubt But more properly perhaps it may be spoken edly is so. of as a psycho- dynamism, inasmuch as the principles

and

if

For he recognised in it a a system that derives matter

which

it

cal, i.e.,

regards as the origin of things are both psychi of the nature of feelings, thoughts and ideas,
i.e.,

and dynamic,

of the nature of forces or powers.

of

Being a system
creationist notion of

the Vaisheshika,

psycho-dynamism it discards the and shows that

x.

* Garbe, Samkk. Phil., p. 242 et seq.

\

Six Systems, p.

15

as things are not formed out of pre-existing materials, exist absolutely new creations, but that products already

the original psycho-dynamic unroll themselves out from this They simply principle. from the seed. potential state as a tree unrolls itself out That is to say, from this point of view, things are not
in in

a potential form

created but evolved

and what

is

in a potential state. Therefore it This may be translated as the doctrine of evolution

evolved already exists is called Parinama-vada.

;

and

the standard
It is also

may

be called

the evolutionist standard.

called Sat-karya-vada, that is to say, the doctrine of the existence of the product in a potential form prior

to its actual manifestation.

There

are, as

mentioned before, two main schools,

to this

founded by Rishis, belonging

(1)

standard

namely,

Sankhya
and

(2)

Yoga.
chiefly to the exposition of

The Sahkhya devotes

itself

itself

the doctrines of the standard while the

Yoga occupies
practical

mostly with the

consideration

of the

method by which the truths

realised as direct experiences.
to

of the doctrines can

I

be

shall, therefore, refer

this

standard as Sankhya, mentioning Yoga only

necessary.
of

where

it is

The

final

standard

takes

up the analysis

the

mi^Stand^d^

Universe at the point at which it was and left b ^ the evolutionist standard
;

reduces the two Realities of the latter

to

one absolute Reality only. Like the second in

its

dealings

16

with

the

first,

the
the

third

or final standard does not

of

entirely discard

findings

the

second

only

it

shows how one

two Realities recognised by the Sahkhya cannot be absolutely real, but that it is a something which, while it is real from one point
of the

of view,

is

for

ever

non-existent

when looked

at

from

another.

Universe
is

gives as the analytic aspect of the but it presents a synthetic aspect too, which practically the same as that taught in the other
is
;

This

what

it

standards, with such differences only as follow inevitably from the analytic view it presents.

As

the Reality

it

teaches

is

absolutely unchangeable,

this standard

shows how the Universe, with its infinite variety, is and must be but an appearance, namely, of mere names and forms, i.e., concepts as such and
That
is

concepts objectified.
is

to say,

it

shows how

it

thing which, remaining what it is, yet appears as many, under many names and It may, therefore, be called a standard of concepts polyonymism. In Sanskrit it is called Vivarta-vada, that is to say, the doctrine of production in which the originat ing Reality remains what it is and yet brings about the
result.
It is also called Sat-kfirana-vada,* that is to say, the doctrine of the reality of only the originating source or basis of things. shall call it polyonymism,t as

one and the same

We

it is

not exactly idealism in any Western sense of the word that I know of. The manifold of the Universe,

according to this standard, no doubt consists only of ideas as such and ideas objectified of names and
* Ad, Br. Sid., p.
2,

See Appendix

17

forms"

as they are called

up and made

which are, as it were, backed substantial by the one and only Reality ;

but these ideas, while forming, from one point of view, an eternal series, are, under no circumstances, part of the one and absolute ( See, Reality. however, Note 7,
below).
It is

represented, as stated

above, by the Vedanta,

by which name we Of these

Scope and me16

shall refer also to this standard.

three

standards

or

systems
1?or

of

Hindu

Philosophy, the last two only are chiefly

Vn

^ot

knovvn
m,
r

il1

tlie

West
to

tllis
>

we
.

are
,

Hindu Philosophy here made,

greatly indebted

Sanskrit scholars.
,

Ihe

first,

as

it

seems

to

me, has received

less

but scant attention, at any

than
it

rate,

much

attention

perhaps really deserves.

purpose here to make an attempt at explaining the main and original doctrines of this hitherto neglected school of Hindu Realism in such
It is, therefore,

my

a fashion
student.

as

to

make

it

intelligible

to

the

Western

In making this attempt I shall first state the doctrines as clearly as I can and then give some of the reason
ings which are adduced in their support.

REALISM.
A
From
THE ANALYTIC
The Nine
ASPECT.
Realities.

the Creationist standpoint, that which we call the Universe consists, as stated before, of nine classes of ultimate factors, with their various properties and
relations.

may

In Vaisheshika they are called Dravyas. We translate the term by Realities or Entities, but not

by Substances, as has hitherto been done.

of the nine classes of Realities are as follow
(1)
:

The names
things which

Four

classes of

minima

of those

and are perceived by the Enumeration Each or these minima is an senses. o f t h e prineiples eternal and changeless Reality! which has absolutely no magnitude whatever and is called an Ami, a Parimandala, or a Paramanu.t We shall refer to these minima as Paramanus. Paramanus have been translated as atoms, which is most misleading.!! For atoms as conceived by Western
are discrete
*

chemistry are things with some magnitude, while Para manus are absolutely without any magnitude whatever

and

non-spatial.
(2)

An

which may from the Creationist point

* Infra.
J } Infra.

all-pervading Continuum, called Akasha, perhaps be translated as Ether ;^[ although,

of view,
it

does not possess

VII.
20.

Ny&.
23.;

Sfl.,

IV.
ii.

ii.

16.

Vaish.

Sfl.,

V.

i.

13.

i.

NyS.-Bhash.,

IV.

ii.

IV.

14.
Ii

See Note

8.

See Note

8.

^ Infra.

20

exactly the

same properties as the Ether of which modern

:::

Western Science speaks. (3) A Reality, Power or Force," having universal and operation it relates things in regard to their scope
;

movement and change, as well as brings them into existence, urges them on, changes them, and finally As it thus works change in things, it destroys them.
activity,

gives

rise,

in their percipients,

to the
It

notions of past,
is

present, and
in Sanskrit.
(4)

future, of old and new.

called

Kala

Realit}

7
,

Power,

universal scope and

having equally and holding things in operation,

Force,

or

their relative positions even while they are

being driven

on

in Sanskrit, Dik.|
(5)

An

infinite

number

of Realities in general touch,

relation,

and with

possibilities of a special

with every
serves as the

thing in the

Universe.

Each

of these

basis of consciousness and experience in an experiencing In Sanskrit these are called Atmans. being. may

We

perhaps translate the term as Self-Ulti mates (not Souls). (6) An infinite number of Realities, which are all
without any magnitude whatever, and serve as the means by which the Atmans are brought into special relations with what the latter experience in succession. The technical name for one of these is Manas. There is no English word that I know of, which can express the
exact technical meaning of this term. We might perhaps render it by Mind, but it would not be exact. I shall,
*

On

the use of the word Power or Force (Shakti) in this connec

tion, see

Note

9.

| Infra.

J Infra.

Infra.

21

therefore, leave the

word untranslated. What

it

really

and

exactly

means

will

he seen when we come to discuss the

its

arguments

that are advanced in support of

existence.

The
Reasoning- in

Realistic standard

supports the

existence of these Realities

.
.

support of the
principles.

by

line

of reasoning;

which

will

its own now be

explained.

The Paramanus.
First, as

regards the Param&nus.

facts which, as farts, are

There are certain

Reality of the

undisputed.

dispute as to their ultimate but not their existence as facts nature,

People

may

of experience.
of the senses.

Of

these,

we experience some by means

experiences.

These may, therefore, be called sensible Now, as such sensible experiences do

undoubtedly exist, so there are and must be, other than and outside of ourselves as individual experiencers,
call
If we things by which such experiences are produced. sensible world or these things collectively the

them by such a sensible world does and must exist independently, and outside, of us as experienc ing individuals. That such a world seems to exist nobody can doubt for we all perceive it so. Only, some may,
sensible matter, on account of our experiencing

means

of the senses, then

indeed do, imagine that this world as existing outside is a mere seeming. They hold that what really exists are our own ideas and impressions, that is to say, purely only
subjective things and that it is these alone which appear as the sensible world, which, therefore, has no independ
;

ent

existence whatever, as something apart

from and

22

other tlian our

pressions.

own experience This cannot be true.

own

our

own

ideas

There

is,

and im and must be,

a sensible world which exists as something different from,

experiences as individuals, and by which the sensible experiences we have are produced.

and

outside, our

That

this is so

we must admit for the following reasons

outside us as

(a) It exists
it

individuals, because,*

if

life

did not, then the experiences of waking would be of exactly the same nature as

those dreams which are purely subjective.!

For such dreams are experiences which have, outside them, no objects to which they cor
respond and of which they are experiences had by the experiencer. That purely sub
;

jective

dreams are without outside objects know nobody will deny. But how do we

that there are no outside objects correspond

we ing to subjective dreams ? It is obvious we do not perceive them know this because for be again on waking. But if our reason
in subjec lieving that objects experienced tive dreams do not exist apart from our of them, is because they are not

experience

perceived

as

objects

in

waking, then

it

follows that what

is experienced in

waking

We does exist apart from our experiences. not exist, because not can say that A does
perceived as B, only
is
*
f

if

we know

that

what

perceived as
ii.

does exist.

Nya. Su., IV. See Note 10.

33, 34.

Nya. Bhash. and Nya. Var. on above,

23

In other words,
ceived in

we deny

the existence of things per

subjective dreams, because

we

are certain of
is,

the existence of things experienced in waking, that

means

of the senses.

This being

so, it is

absurd

to

by deny

their existence again.

(b)

If

the sensible did not exist, subjective dreams

* themselves would be impossible.

they,
like

Because

memories

and imaginings, are

in various forms, of

nothing but repetitions,

side.
(c)

things already experienced as existing out

Then

again,

if

the sensible things did not exist

apart from our ideas and experiences of them, there is no reason why we should riot
see

them

at will

and continuously, just as

we can have our own ideas at will and for

as long as
things,

we like.| But in regard to sensible we find, that we perceive them only

so long as they remain in relation with us.

This

is

so only because they exist independently

of us.

(d)

Then, there

are, call

in regard to sensible things,

what we
ences

right perceptions and experi

as distinguished ones and hallucinations.^

from

mistaken
not
of a
to

This would be

impossible
exist.

if

the sensible things did

call

For we

that experience

sensible thing right,

*
|

which corresponds

Nya.

Sti.,

IV.

ii.

33 ., with Bhash.

and Var.
ii.

I 7

33.) Nya. Vri., IV. 99, (i.e., Nya. Sfl. with Bhash. ana Var., IV.
ii.

IV.

37, generally,

24

what
that

exists in its true nature as an externally

For

all

wrong and imaginary, which does not so correspond. these reasons, and others which might be
existing tiling, and,

adduced,

there exists a sensible

of,

world, which

is

inde

pendent

and apart from, the

exists, it

subjective

ideas

and

experiences of individual percipients.

And
i.e.,

if it

must be composed
without

of

Paramanus,
magnitude

super-sensible

Realities

any

whatever.

Unlike many,
Difference

if

not most, schools of Realism in the

is
,

West, there
tween

Hindu

be-

. ]

,.

stic

iiTi thought, which has ever held that

,,
,
i

no Hindu system of
i
i

real-

the essential basis of the sensible world

a something or somethings which must have magnitude and extension. This idea, that
is

the essences of the sensible world are extended things, has no doubt found great support, until recently, in the

chemical theory of atoms regarded as

"hard

and

solid"

and absolutely simple

passing away
of

factors.
it

But with the gradual

is

this theory, as

said to be doing in

consequence of the investigations of Prof. J. J. Thomson and others, perhaps there will be, in the West, many more now who will see how it is possible to be a
thorough-going realist and yet maintain, as the Hindu all shades have always maintained, that the ultimate constituents of sensible things are indeed real,
Realists of
self-subsisting,

and independent

of all percipients, but

they are not solid,

however small.
*

hard particles with any magnitude, view, to be classed as Realism, need

&c.,
II. ii,

For instance, Brah. Su, with Shar. Bhash., Shri-Bhash,

28 t

25
it,

perhaps have no more in that the sensible world

than the simple admission should have some real and

eternal basis or bases, producing

and upholding what

we perceive by
Realities,

of the percipient.

and existing independently These bases may be any independent with or without magnitude. They might even
the senses,

be mere stimuli producing the sensible, if the stimuli could be things which existed by themselves, eternally

and independently
thing
else.

of all perceiving
so,

entities or of

any

This being

the

Hindu

Realist maintains,

that the

ultimate bases of the sensible world, and the

the sensible
qualities are neither matter,
like the

originators of

which must have magnitude or extension

as formerly conceived

atoms

by chemistry, nor even stimuli as understood in the West, but Realities things generally that might be as well called real and independently exist
ing Powers or Forces which are without any magnitude * whatever. And he does so for the following reasons
:

What we have
5

called

sensible things or the sensible

world
8 f

may be

divided

into two classes,

th^SensTb !!

the visible an(1 the invisible- the invisi

ble

with whatever

else

it

being the vast aerial atmosphere, may contain in it in an invisible

everything
limited
;

form

and the
all

visible,

else.

Now,

these sensible things, visible or invisible,

are
of

extent,
say,

and,

as

such,

are^iserete!

being of limited extent, they consist of parts which are That the visible things are separable from one another. discrete needs no argument. That the invisible aerial
is to

discrete

that

* See

Note

11.

26
in

atmosphere also
discrete parts,
is

is

limited

extent,

and consists

of

now well-known
established

in the West.

The Hindus
and
if

the fact that there are

so on.*

this idea by pointing to movements in the air, whirlwinds These phenomena would not be possible,

the aerial atmosphere were an all-filling Reality, that is, an absolute Continuum, and were not composed of discrete parts. If a thing be an all-filling Continuum,

no parts of it can possibly move away from their places nor can other parts come in from some other quarter.
have expansion, contraction or undulation or any other form of motion, all of which phenomena
it

Nor can

imply displacement of parts. If, therefore, the atmosphere were an all-filling Continuum, that
say,
if
it

aerial
is

to

were

not composed
it.

of

movable

parts,

there

could be no commotion in

But we know there are

such

commotions

of the

cyclones and so on.

atmosphere, as in storms, Therefore it must also be of limited

of parts.

magnitude and composed

Thus, all sensible things are of limited extent, and as such discrete, that is, consisting of parts. On account
of this fact,
it

may be

laid

down

as a

general principle^

that

Things

of limited extent of

must

consist of parts.
to consider
is,

majnitude are produc

ed,
(a)

How things limited

^ ne

next

Pi nt

that a

discrete thing of limited magnitude can be produced in three different ways :|

By

the addition of things having magnitudes.

* Vaish. SO., II.
t
i.

14.
33.;

Nya. Var.,

III.

i.

Upask., VII.

ii.

9.

27

(I)

By

of expansion or contraction of a thing and finally another magnitude

the

(c)

By

number
but

of things

standing,

not

contigu

ously,

at suitable

distances from

one

another, and then entering into a combina tion of unification, so as to form a single
unit,

which, as a whole, may behave as one individual, and in which the originat ing parts are no longer entirely independent
of the whole.

In this case the originating parts or factors need not have any magni tude whatever.

As
is

for

obvious.

examples of the first two cases, they are quite But in regard to the third, some explanation
of all,

needed.
First

we must admit
difference

that

there

is

a great

Secondary units

between a mere

aggregate,
of

who^fAvaVavins).

Hyand Oxygen, or of a number of drogen living cells put together anyhow, and a unified whole such as the atoms of Hydrogen and Oxygen make when
as

that of a

number

of atoms

combined as water, or a single living organism like some animal body.* The unified wholes, which we may call secondary or produced units or individuals, behave
as a single
in a

thing

but this cannot

be

said

to

be the

mere aggregate of atoms or of cells. The case secondary unit is a new thing, quite other than, and We cannot deny different from, the mere aggregate.
the existence
of

such secondary units or produced in

Bhash., 34-36; Nya. Var., IV.
3-14 (generally).

dividuals (Avayavins).
*

Ny&.

Sfi., II.

L;

Ny.

ii.

28

Secondly,
Porosity of the discrete sen-

we know,

that sensible

things of limited
absolutely solid.*
are

ma g nifcude are never On the contrary, they

;

and must

be,

porous they could not be operated upon by heat, | which, in order to transform a
thing completely as it can do, must enter into every This entire transformation of a part of it. thing would be impossible if there were any parts of the as that
thing,

otherwise

thing,

which were
also

absolutely

solid,

as

such a part

would

resist penetration

by

heat.

We

know

that things can be compressed.

if

This again would be impossible

lutely solid.

they were abso

must, therefore, admit that sensible things are That is to say, they are composed of ultimate porous. parts which are not absolutely contiguous, but have
spaces between them.

We

These

facts,

then,

v the structure of the secondary unit or Avayavin.

e^/ng

m
to
c

St

may be laid down as two of the fundamental principles in regard the composition of sensible things
.,
,
.

magnitude, namely A number of separate things can produce a (1) single unit or a secondary individual which is other than, and different from, a mere aggregate. And
:

ot limited

they

do

by a process different from that

it

of unification
of

which
;

is

and must be

mere combination
particles of

and,

(2)

The ultimate
particles

any thing, so produc

ed, as

of that

thing,

stand, not contiguously,

but apart from one another.

* N. V. T. T., p. 355, lines 3 et seq. | Nya. Manj., p. 438 (lines 6 et seq., from bottom).

of

Applying these principles, we can see how things no magnitude can produce a single thing, i.e., a

secondary unit, of limited magnitude.

First,*

we can
of

see

how

a thing,

which

is

a single

Production
magnitude
mag-nitude.
ber,

by

m} \^ having magnitude, that is to say, some length, breadth and thickness, however
i

which must not be

less

u te, can be produced by a num than three, of other things of

is,

the nature of pure lines, that

having only length. |

Let three *hings of the nature of lines stand, not

contiguously, in which case they will produce only a line, nor in the same plane, but apart from one another,

and on two planes, say as

Then
They
will

let

them combine by the process

produce the single unit,

of unification.

then

A,

that

is to

say, the

prism A, which will be a thing with

of the lines

magnitude. Next we can see how each

prism

producing the

can

itself,

as a single unit, be produced, in the

less

same way, by a number, not

Sea Note
11.

than two, of things of

j

See Note

12.

30

of pure points, that is to say, without any whatever without any length, breadth or magnitude

the nature

thickness.

Let two things of the nature of points stand, not

contiguously, in which case they will point, but apart from one another, as

produce only a

and then As a

let

result

them combine by the process of unification. of this combination we shall get the

single unit

which, as a single unit,

of a

will

be a thing of the nature

pure line. Thus, we find how things of the nature of pure points can produce things of the nature of pure lines and these
;

latter again, things

having magnitude. That is to say, we see how things of no magnitude can produce things

with magnitudes.

And

this is the third

way

of

producing things having

magnitude.

The other two ways, as we have seen, are processes whereby things with magnitude are produced by things
already having magnitude.
Finally, as things of no magnitude,
Thins-s like as the points of si p1est
^

i.e.,

of the nature

P om ^ s are the simplest and cannot be conceived as consisting of any cornponent parts, we must hold that they cannot be prodaced Therefore, if they
;

These are Paramftnus.

factors.
exist,

they must exist eternally for, being unproduced, cannot be destroyed either, destruction meaning they
*

See Note

12.

31

division into component; parts.*

These things are called

Paramanus.

We

have said
.

that,

How Paramanus must exist he d m\ trVo n stituents of the discrete sensible.

must be

they exist, then Paramanus eternal, as they cannot be conif

.

ceived as being produced, and, therefore, The next as capable of destruction.!

nt

we have

to
;

consider

is

that they

do and must exist

are the bases

and that they alone

of
all

and originating ingredients

all

sensible

things which are discrete. For we have seen that

are
discrete

sensible things which

;

and as they are composed of parts, these parts must ultimately be no other than the Paramanus. For there is no reason to
are

composed

of parts

suppose that the ultimate parts must be things of some magnitude, however minute of some length, breadth and thickness. It would indeed be necessary to stop at parts

having some magnitude, however minute, and regard them as ultimate, if we saw no way of things with

magnitude being produced by things without magnitude. But we have shown IIOAV things with magnitude can be
produced from things with no magnitude. We might also stop at the smallest things having magnitude, if the production of these, from things without magnitude,
were in violation of any of the principles which rule the production of other single units. But we have seen, that
not only
is

by

virtue of those

there no violation of such principles, but it is very principles that things without

magnitude can possibly produce things with magni

tude.
* See

Note

13.

&ee Note

13.

32
there

On
ples,
it is

the

contrary,

if

is

any violation

of princi

arbitrariness, even inconsistency, anywhere, be found, not in the idea of Paramanus, but in the view which regards the ultimate constituents of the
to

and

sensible

and

discrete things as particles with magnitude.

Such

particles

are

violation

of

principle,

magnitude, are yet while all considered unbreakable into simpler parts

inasmuch as they, being

of limited

other sensible things having also limited

recognised as produced and capable of * into simpler components. Then, they cannot be considered to be
things, as they consist of surfaces, lines
Finally,
if

magnitude are being broken up

the simplest
points.
of

and

the

ultimate
of

constituents

sensible

things were

composed

solid,

hard

and

extended

then Akasha or particles with magnitude, however small, Ether could not really be all-pervading as we shall see
it

must be.| For all these reasons, we must conclude that the
of

things of sense-per without any ception are of the measure of pure points, breadth magnitude whatever, that is, without any length,
ultimate factors

the

discrete

or thickness.

They

are in other

words Paramanus.

As they
super-sensible.

are without any magnitude whatever, the

Paramanus are

Paramanus, as such, can never be perce i v ed

by the senses.J

They

are, there

fore, super-sensible or

transcendental (Atindriya).

They

are super-sensible, not in the sense that, while

*

they are

how Sap tap. Mit., p. 14, lines 1-3. Ki. Va. on Prithivi, showing Trasareuu cannot be final. See Note 14. Var. IV. ii. 14. $ Nya. Su., Nya, Bhash., Nya. | See Note 15.

Nya. Var.,

II.

i.

33, p. 234, line 3,

&c.

N.

V; T.

T., p. 272, lines 3, 4.

33

too

small to be

with the aid of

invented,

perceived by the unassisted senses, or any instruments which have been so far

had,
in

let

could be perceived by the senses if we us say, ideally perfect instruments to aid us

they
sense-observation.

our

They

are

super-sensible,

rather,

in

by the

sense, that they can never be perceived senses, not even with the aid of the most perfect

the

instruments imaginable.

That

is to

say, they lie

altoge

ther beyond the range of the senses and are transcenden tal. They are beyond the range of the senses in the same

sense as colour
of sight.

beyond the range of hearing, or sound, can be conceived only by the Mind.* They
is

As

Realities without

Paramanus are
non-spatial.

any magnitude, the Paramanus must also be non-spatial. | That is to

gav
^

t} ie

themselves

cannot

occupy

space or localised position (Pradeshatita).

Being super-sensible and non-spatial entities, they distinction from No distinction are incapable of any in Paramanus in e auo ther in regard to size, shape, regard to meaof sure any weight, density or any other torm ot
.

measure.
fled -

They

can,

therefore,

never
of

be classified

with

reference to any

these standards. But they are not incapable of classifica tion. They can be classified with reference to certain
qualities

which they produce

that

in

the different forms of

the

sensible things

are

themselves

products

of

Paramanus.
If
all

sensible

duced by

things of limited magnitude are pro the Paramanus, as they must be, then it
Hue
7 (from
25. (p. 522, line 3)

* N. V. T, T., p. 271,
|

Nya. Var., IV.

ii.

bottom.) Shar. Bluish.,

;

II.

ii.

13.

34

obvious that the properties, which sensible things possess, are also produced by them, and are inherent in
is

the things themselves.

For,
if

external things exist, as they must exist, in-

Qualities inner-

dependency
j

ent in things.
perties do

the percipient,* then it unreasonable to say, that their pro

of
;

not inhere in them but in the percipients or that only some of the properties are inherent in them,
it

while others are purely subjective.! For,

that
of

can be shown

the

very arguments, which

will

prove that some

the properties are objective, will also prove that the rest are equally so. Granting that the external and
sensible world
that
exists,

we cannot

consistently maintain

At best we can say that our perceptions of the properties are mere copies, perhaps very imperfect copies. But copies always imply Therefore, we must admit that if the sensible originals.
any
of its properties are subjective.^:

world exists independently of the percipient,

properties which are inherent in
it.

it

has also

Of these properties, there are some which are never General quali- absent from anyone of the sensible
ties of
It is

matter.

things

impenetrability,

for

instance.

impossible to conceive

any

of the perceptible things

as entirely devoid of these, unless they be hallucinations,

and therefore entirely subjective.

are,

These may be and

indeed,

called the

general

Gunas)

of sensible things.

properties (Samanya One distinguishing feature

* Vaish. Su., II. ii.26.

| Prashasta,
p. 58,

on sound as an objective quality.

R., pp. 15-17,

But

this

argument

applies to all qualities of matter.

Prashasta, p. 96.
p. 36.

| Bradley, App.

and

together with infra,

35

be perceived all have in common is, that they can more senses than one. Also, in regard to masses by
they
of things,

they
is

differ

only in

degree but not

softer or

in kind.

One mass
easily

more impenetrable than another, more

than another,

ponderable

harder than

another, and so on. They correspond to a certain extent to what are called, in modern European Philosophy, since
the days of Locke, the Primary qualities of matter.
shall refer to

We

them simpty as

general qualities.

As distinguished from
Special
qualities of matter.

these, there are certain other

properties, which can each be perceived j^ a single sense only ;* and they differ,

in masses of things, not in

is to

degree only, but in kind. That

They
to

sny, they are essentially different from one another. form part of those qualities which are called the

special qualities

in

the Vaisheshika, and correspond

some

of the secondary qualities

mentioned in Western
:

Philosophy.

They
(1)

are only four in number, namel}7

Odour,
Flavour,

(2)
(3)

Luminosity (colour), and

(4)
It will

Temperature (Sparsha).|

which
to

is

be noticed that one quality, namely Sound, also perceived by a single and special sense,
left

has been

out of consideration here.

For reasons

a property of
*
f

be explained later,J Sound cannot be regarded as the discrete sensible things. For our
Nya. Bluish.,
III.
i,

56 and 57.
Kiindali on same,

Prashasta, p. 106.

See Note

16,

j Infra.

36

present purpose
there
is

it

will

be quite sufficient

to

say that

no discrete sensible thing from which Sound cannot be entirely eliminated that is to say, which
;

cannot be conceived as absolutely silent. Sound can no doubt be produced by means of every one of the
sensible forms of things,
in
this sense,

and may,
be

for

this
to

be said
is

to

common

at the

same time there

it.

no sensible thing,

reason and them all but which cannot

;

exist without

However this may be, there is one feature wnich common to Sound as well as to the four properties named above, namely, that they are each perceived by
is

a single and special sense only.

They, in this respect, differ from the above-mentioned general or primary and may, as distinguished from the latter, properties,
be,

and indeed they

are, called the

it

special properties
is

of the sensible.

They correspond,
shall refer to

obvious, to the

secondary qualities of Locke

Philosophy.

We

and modern European them as Special Qualities.

belonging now.
to the sensible
at,

Of the

five special qualities

world, Sound, for

the reason just hinted

need not
to

be taken into consideration

remaining
four,
it

In regard

the

obvious that they are all es different from one another. We cannot speak sentially of flavour as being only a higher or lower degree of
is

odour

of

odour as only colour in a different degree

or of temperature as colour in a varying grade.

Nor

will

it

do

to say that these

is,

qualities are purely

subjective,* that

they exist
*

in

the percipient only

Infra.

37

and not

in the things perceived,

and that the primary

For, as stated
If

qualities alone are inherent in matter.

before, this position is untenable,

some are regarded as objective, the rest can also be shown to be exactly on the same footing, and by the same line of reasoning; or if some are thought to be subjective, the rest must
also share the

same

fate for exactly

the

same reasons. 4

This latter position, however, of regarding every pro held perty of the sensible world, as subjective, can be
only by an Idealist Philosopher, because he denies the existence of an external world, independent of, and
apart from,

thoughts and ideas which are regarded as part and parcel of an experiencing subject or subjects. But as, for reasons stated before, this view of an ex

and sensible world not existing independently nf and apart from an experience! or experiences, cannot be accepted as valid, and, as an alternative, we must admit the existence of the sensible, we must also admit
ternal

that the secondary or special qualities are as objective The four qualities, as the primary or general ones.
therefore,

mentioned above must be held as objective,

and inherent in the things perceived. Of these two classes

1

of properties of sensible

things,

the Paramaiius can be

of

classified,

only

th?

Pa^a^na"

ef

4nce to?he
cial

s peproperties of matter.

ties

with reference to the four special qualiwhich difler from one another 11Ot
.

merely in degree but essentially; and .. which, unlike the general qualities, are
everything sensible.
JR.,

not all present in

*

And

the

way

Bradley, App. and

pp. 15-17.

38

to classify the

Paramanus with reference

:

to these quali

ties is as follows
It is

well

known

that there are

ofsensible
matter.

Classification

many things from can never be eliminated

as long as they exist as those things and do not change into some other things
It

which are essentially different*

very essence.
to

belongs to their
quality,
it

While,

as

distinctive
of things,
it

is

inalienable from this class

it is

not essential

many

others,

from which

can be easily eliminated.

might take our example of this class of things indifferently from what are called chemical elements
For from the standpoint of Hindu Philosophy they are all compounds both the chemical elements as well as what are regarded as pro
or from other

We

compounds.

ducts of the
well as other

latter.

For chemical atoms of elements, as

are
of

things,

limited magnitude.

And

nothing that has

any magnitude whatever, excepting Thus while we might infinite magnitude, can be simple. point to anything having inalienable odour as an example
of
this
class, I shall

musk.

simply mention such a thing as This substance can never be imagined as with
it

out odour, as long as

remains

musk,

while the pure

aerial atmosphere, or absolutely

pure water, need not have

any odour

at all.

Then again, there are things from which flavour can never be absolutely eliminated,! (so long as they remain
as those things in regard to
their

essential

formation),
others.

while

it is

not so inalienable in the case of

instance,
p.

many

There

are, for
* Laksh.

many
1.

juicy things which

t

are

on Prithivi,

See Note

17.

39

never without flavour, while the pure air of our previous

example

is flavourless.
it is

Similarly,

inconceivable that the substance of the

sun and the stars can be absolutely without luminosity, unless it undergoes complete change and transformation.
is of the very essence of such sub while there are many other things which have stances, no such inalienable self-luminous property.

Luminosity or colour

Finally, while odour, flavour

inalienable

in

and luminosity are each one or other form of matter, they are

entirely accidental
easily divested of
is,

While pure air can be odour and flavour, and is colourless, that
to

pure

air.

without self-luminosity,

it

is

inconceivable without

temperature.! Temperature belongs to

There

is,

as stated before,

its very essence. no form of sensible matter

is for ever and inalienably present. Sound can no doubt be produced by all forms of sensible matter. But it is not inalienably, and always, present

with which Sound

with

am%

as the four other qualities are.

find that all sensible

Thus we

and compound matter,

can be

with reference to the four inalienable qualities, divided into four great classes.
(1)

That form of sensible and compound matter from

all

which

and

other special qualities, such as odour, flavour colour can be eliminated, but not temperature,
is

which
(2)

essential to

it.

That from which luminosity can never be elimi

it is

nated and to which

(3)

essential.

and

to

That from which flavour cannot be eliminated, which it is essential.

4.

* Laksh. on Tejah, p t

Laksh. on Vayu,

p. 6.

40

(4)

That from which odour can never be eliminated

which
it is

and

to

essential.

does not mean that compounds of succeeding classes do not possess the essential and

Of course,

this

They may, and indeed do, possess them. Thus, for instance, things of the fourth class have always some temperature while they can certainly be visible, i.e., can have colour or
luminosity, and can be tasted under suitable conditions.

inalienable qualities of the preceding

ones.*

What
is,

is

meant by classifying them

is

in the

above fashion

that in each class there

is

only one special quality

class possesses
first),
it,

which

inalienable,

and that the

either as the sole special quality (as in the

or as a

quality which, being inalienable, class (as in the remaining three).

is also

peculiar to the

Of these four
Teehnieal and

classes, the

first is
is

to

be found most
in the atmos-

abundantly, as J

evident,

names
tep.

symbolical

elasge | of sensible mat-

phere of pure air. This class of sensible matter (compound and produced matter, o f course, and not a chemical element)
is

therefore technically and symbolically called Air (Vayu), meaning thereby only a form of matter

other sensible special qualities can be eliminated, but not temperature.

all

from which

The second
fiery

class is

met with most abundantly

stars.
It
is

in the

substance of the sun and

therefore

technically

and symbolically called Fire

(Tejah).

As the when it is

flavour of a really objective thing is had only dissolved into a liquid or watery form, if
Sft., II.

* Vaish.

i.l-4

Nya.

Su., III.

i.

61

and

62,

41

it

is

not already BO,

the third class of sensible matter

called

is

technically

and symbolically

Water (Ap.)
its

Finally, the solid

earth, with all

various flowers,

fruits, vapours and so on, being a great storehouse of things to which odour is both essential and distinctive, the fourth class is technically and symbolically called

Earth

(Prithivi).

We may
for these

four classes of sensible

perhaps retain the original Sanskrit terms matter. But if their

then
they

English equivalents must be used, perhaps be translated as follows

:

may

(1)

Thermal matter

(2)

Self-luminous matter

(3)
(4)

Flavoury matter

and

Odoriferous matter.

As there has been much misunderstanding in the West as to the exact notion which the Misunderstandregard ing in Hindus have in regard to these four
to

Hindu con
matter.

ception of
sible

sen-

classes of extended matter, (the

,
.

misun-

,. derstandmg being greatly due to the the general mistranslation, by the word elements, of name which is given to them, namely, Bhutas), it may

,,

emphasise here that they are all compound and produced forms of matter. The Hindus never looked upon any of these as an indivisible substance,
be well
to

or as

elements

in

the Western
are the

chemical sense of the

only
indivisible ele

word.

The Paramanus

ments, if elements they must be called, by which the four classes of discrete sensible matter, having limited

magnitude, are produced.

42

And, as these are the only forms of sensible matter How Parama- of limited magnitude, and as there are 8 a S St no otners which can be distinguished be o ? fo u r classes. f roni them by any other special and
1
>

essentially
to itself,

out of

different characteristic which is peculiar must be held that the Paramanus themselves, which the four classes of sensible matter are pro
it

duced, are also of four, and only four, classes.*

How

this is so

can perhaps be illustrated as follows

of

Suppose there are only four spectra

let

colours.

Of

us suppose again, the first three, in addition these, to other colours, contain respectively bands of black,

and of blue as their essential and distinctive features, and the fourth contains nothing but yellow. Then suppose, that these four are colours which are
of red

essentially different

be derived from the others

from one another, so that none can and finally, that there are
;

no other kinds

of essentially different colours in

any

of

the four spectra.

ble,

Such a group

of spectra

can be possi

only

if

there are four essentially different classes or

types of factors, (vibrations or stimuli as they

called in
this case),

would be

different colours.

which can originate such essentially Similarly, it must be admitted that the

Paramanus, which produce the four special and essential ly different qualities in sensible matter, are and can be
of four classes only.
(1)

They may be named as follows The Paramanus producing inalienable tempera

:

ture but no other special qualities.

Paramanus producing inalienable colour, or luminosity, (with some temperature, of course, because
(2)

* See

N ote

18.

43

all

luminous things must have some sort of tempera

ture).

Paramanus producing inalienable flavour (with some temperature, and colour, i.e. visibility under
(3)

suitable conditions).

Paramanus producing inalienable odour (with some temperature and colour and flavour, i.e., visibility and tastability under suitable conditions).
(4)

Or,

with reference to the particular classes of sen

sible things themselves, they are

(1)

The Vayu-Paramanus,
of,

spoken of as which enter

in

into the

composition
aerial
(2)

and originate temperature

Vayu

or the

atmosphere.

The Tejah-Paramanus, which

self-luminous things.

originate luminos

ity in all

all

The Ap-Paramanus, which originate flavour in (3) compounds which have only flavour but no odour. The Prithivi-Paramanus, which originate odour (4)
compounds having odour.
These different classes of Paramanus are different
is

in

What

really
t
i

diffe r e

rom one
in
.

another,
.

it

may be J

repeated,

different classes of Paramamis.

not

weight or any other

their capacity to
in

measure,

but only in
qualities
of limited

produce
sensible

the

four

special

those

various

things which are

magnitude and which, as

such, are themselves but

In fact the four classes of

be called

Paramanus in compound forms. Paramanus are even what may Forces, Powers or Stimuli which produce all

things of limited magnitude possessing, among others, the four special properties of temperature, and so on. Only, the Paramanus are things

that affects our senses as

44

which are real because they are self-subsisting and cannot be conceived as originating from something else. They are real and self-subsisting Forces or Stimuli if one

may

call,

them

so.

It

may

also be

repeated

that

while, as

compounds, the Paramanus produce things of limited magnitude and their qualities affecting our senses, they
themselves,
i e.,

as simple

and uncompounded

factors,

are for ever super-sensible, as they must be, of their having no magnitude whatever.
It

on account

might perhaps be said here

868

that, if the

Paramanus
re-

can be divided into four classes with

in^Paramanus
as having
varieties

ference to tn e four special qualities they

originate,"*

they can also be considered

variety
in

much

larger

on account of

the

which there are

qualities themselves.!

each of the four special This would indeed be so, if the

varieties of a special quality

were different
riot.

essentially

from

Indeed, that they are but varieties of one special quality, points to the fact that they must all have a single common basis, just as the varieties
of colour in the solar

one another.

But they are

spectrum have one common source

the sun.

which
the

is

the

light of

Moreover,

we

see that

same temperature,

colour, flavour

and odour

may

appear as a different shade or variety, either to the same person under different conditions, or to different persons

under the same conditions.

its

But a colour can never

lose

character as colour to be perceived as temperature or as flavour. And this is so, because while temperature,
colour, flavour
*
j

and odour are

<p.

different
.

from one another

855, lines 2 et seq Nya. Var., III. i. 4, N. V. T. T., pp. 254, 355 beginning line 3 from bottom of

p. 354.

45

in essence, different shades or varieties of one

and the

same special same kind of

There

quality are but the

results
is,

of one

and the

essential factors, that

Paramanus.

are, therefore, only four classes of

Paramanus

and each
any other
general

of the four classes

variety.

is,

in itself, entirely without

Each

of

them may be

said

to be the

form

of all the varieties of a single class.

There

are, words, no minor divisions or classes in a general class of Paramanus. Finally, each of the four classes of Paiamanus, as the
in other

How
senses.

Pfvram&n-

origin of a special quality perceived

by a
is to
:

correspond ing

single special sense, the particular sense

is

also the origin of

itself.

That

say, the four classes of

(i)
(ii)

Paramfinus prod uce respectively

The Temperature-Sense,!
Sight, Taste,

(iii)

and

(iv)

Smell.

That they do so may be supported by the following

arguments

Each of the special senses reveals to us only a single And it reveals to us only that quality and none other. J
quality which
it

can

itself

produce, that

is to say,

which

it possesses as a capacity and in a pre-eminent degree. That a special sense, revealing a single quality, has that quality as a capacity in abundance, or, which is the

same thing, has the capacity of producing that quality, can be very easily ascertained by exciting the various
sense-organs.
* Vaish.
Sfl.,

Thus, for instance, excitations of the optic

VIII.
ii.
ii.

and
5.

6.

Nyfi. Su.,

I. i.

14

111.

i.

60, 68,

69

and
|

70.

Upask., VIII.
19,

See Note

f tipask., VIII. (II. 5, p. 371, line 5).

46

nerve by artificial means will produce colour, that is to But the capacity to produce a say, a form of luminosity. particular special quality on the part of a thing, simply

means

that the

latter

is
it

made up
is

of

particular

kind.

For

only the

Paramanus Paramanus

of a of a

particular class which alone, as we have seen, constitute the capacity to produce a special quality of a particular kind. Therefore, a special sense, having the capacity

produce a single special quality, and thus revealing exclusively that quality, must be made up of Paramanus
to

which alone constitute such a capacity.

Thus

it is

established that the four senses, namely,

(i)

The Temperature-sense,
Sight,
Taste,

(ii)
(iii)

and

(iv)

Smell,

are

made up

respectively of

Paramanns producing in the

sensible
(i)
(ii)

Temperature,
Luminosity,
Flavour, and

(iii)

(iv)

Odour.

The above argument is given almost in the very words of the old Nyaya and Vaisheshika works. But
It is only this: senses are essentially of the same nature special as the essential ingredients or originators of the qualities
is

the idea

really very simple.

The

themselves.

And

the truth and justice of this idea will

be at once apparent, if we substitute for Paramanus, special kinds of stimuli and regard them as real facts
;

of nature, corresponding to the excitations in ourselves,

47

If it is true

that there

are different kinds of stimuli in

nature for the different sensations produced in us, and that these sensations are so produced by corresponding
excitations of our nervous system, there
is

also truth in

the Nyaya-Vaisheshika idea that the senses in

essentially of the

man

are

or originators

of

same nature as the essential ingredients the qualities which are perceived by

means
P a P a

of them.

Thus, we find, that all objects of limited magnitude m &n us i n the sensible world, with their various produce the dis
crete sensible.
qualities,

as

well

as

the four special

senses

by which we perceive them, are produced by the Paramanus, which are the essential Realities in them. The sense of hearing by which sound is perceived
faculties of

and the

touching and handling and

other
characteristics
of

so on,

which constitute
bodies, have

the
left

living

been

out of consideration here.

What
to the

they are and

according Nyaya-Vaisheshika, will be seen later on. So far, then, with regard to the Paramanus, or the
first

how

they are produced,

four classes

of ultimate Realities,

which are taught

by the Realistic system.

The Akdsha.

The existence of the fifth Reality (Akasha) tained on the following grounds
:

is

main

The Param&nus
A

are like pure points-

We

have seen
,
.

that

medium

of
be-

they
.

,
;

connection

magnitude

limited produce things but they cannot do so if

of
,
.

they actuall y touch one another. For in that case they can only produce
* See- Note 20.

10

48

They produce things by standing away points. from one another and yet being joined. That is to say, And as they unite not contiguously but mediately.
they are joined
together mediately, there
Reality which, being in which are otherwise separate from one another, serves
as a

must be some touch with different Paramanus

medium for their union. * This medium of union must be

or a
;

a non-discrete Reality
is

medium The must be a eontinuum. Akasha.

It
is

Continuum which
.

in touch with

all
,,

discrete things
,.
-

in
. .

other
,

words,
,

is
.

all-pervading.

For

if it

be not such,

it

must ultimately consist of Paramanus like all other dis crete things ;f and these Paramanus must be conceived
only by standing at certain distances But if it be produced in this way, from one another .$
as producing
it

then
that

we
there

shall

be

under the

necessity
thing,

of

assuming
itself,

must be some other

for the

besides
its

which serves as a medium

nus.
In

union of

Parama
all-

that case,

this latter substance will

be the

pervading continuum. That there must be an all-pervad ing continuum, to serve as a medium for the union of
discrete things,

there

is

cannot very well be doubted. And as no proof of the existence of, and no reason to
exists,

any other discrete form of things besides the four we have already named, we must admit that the Reality, which serves as a medium for the
suppose that there
is

union of the Paramanus of the four sensible forms, This all-pervading continuum itself a continuum.
universal

and
*
j

medium

of

union

of

discrete

things
Prashasta,

Nya. Bhash., IV. ii. 21, line 15. Nya. Sii. Nya., Bhash., IV. II. 21 Vaish. Sti.,VIII. Kandali p. 62, line 15, &c p. 58, line 16.
;

i.

22

See Note

21,

49

is

called

Akasha.
it

perhaps translate
the standpoint

as Ether, bearing in

And, as suggested before, we may mind that, from

of Hindu Realism, it does not possess same properties as those ascribed to Ether exactly the by modern Western Science. That Akasha exists, we must admit, says the

Vaisheshika, for another reason also. We have seen, in a general way, that the quality of Sound is not a sound cannot be said to inhere in any of
dfserft^ sens*ble.

tbe

four forms

of

sensible

lnatter vve

have named.*

It is,

no doubt, produced

by the movements of one or other of the four classes of sensible matter, and they may even be needed to

communicate

it

to

The Hindu says

a perceiving being like ourselves. they may be needed for this purpose,

because nobody has ever yet entered a vacuum and tried to find out whether or not sound could be com

municated

to

us without them.t

While thus the move

its

ments

of

the

four forms of matter are necessary for

production, and

perhaps for
to

its

communication, sound
of

cannot be said
quality,

inhere

in
to

any

them

because a

which can be said

inhere in a discrete thing

:

of a particular type, has the following characteristics Characteristics l t endures as long as the thing (a ) of special quali endures in that particular ties inherent in the disc r e t e ( +
sensible.
(b)

form.;

It

the latter undergoes

can never be separated from the thing unless some radical or chemical

change.
* Cha. Ka., Vol. Ibid. t
1
I,

pp. 159
{

and

172-173.
Sfi., II. i

Vaish.

24,

25 and 26 (implied).

rashasta, p. 58, lines 8-10.

50

(c)

It

reappears

in

things, of

the

any combination, with other thing in which it inheres,

such a combination being of the nature in which its different factors can be distinguish ed from one another, as for instance, a mosaic.*

None
These
1

of these conditions

want-

relation mi

to

ing in sound.

Inere

is

holds good of sound in its (a) any sensible matter. ,, in which the sound nothing
.

-,

-,

,-,

lasts as

condition, for all sensible

long as the thing lasts in that things can be conceived as

being perfectly silent, that is, soundless.! (&) There is nothing from which sound cannot be entirely elimi
nated. I
(c)

thing, which

number

of

sound produced by a produced by the combination of a things still distinguishable from one another

And,

finally,

the

is itself

in the combination,

is

never

exactly the

same

as the
is

combined sounds

of the parts of

which the thing

com

posed^ For instance, the sound produced by a violin, is absolutely different (i) from that produced by any of the separate parts of which the violin is a combination and
which are
still

distinguished from one another

;

in their

(ii) from that which may be conceived as the combination of the separate sounds

combination as the violin

or

produced by the separate

For
in
all

parts.
it

these reasons

must be admitted

that

sound

does not inhere like temperature, colour, flavour or odour

any form

of discrete sensible matter.

*
t

Yivr., p. 487, lines et

seq (implied)

Vaish. Bu., II.

i.

24-26.

Prashasta, p. 58, Jines 8-10.

vr., p. 437, lines et seq.

51

Yet

it is

Quality must inhere in reali-

a quality, and as such must inhere in some For, as a quality, it can have Reality.
.

no independent
Thei<e
"

existence ot

.,

its

own.

subject?? 1 inheres in Aka"it

is example whatever of a quaexist ] ity having such an independent and sound cannot be an exception ence,

to this universal

rule.*

Nor can

it

be said that

it

is

purely subjective and inheres in the perceiving entity. For, if it were subjective and inherent in the percipient, then one would feel it to be part and parcel of oneself and an idea. But as, say, pain or pleasure, or a thought

nobody

feels in this

way when

a bell rings and he hears

it is

the sound.

He

does not think or feel that

his sound.

He
bell

rather feels that the sound proceeds

rings.

from where the

to inhere in

Therefore,

it

cannot be said
all

the perceiving being. Moreover, us in our idea that the qualities perceived support

the reasons which

by the

other special senses belong, not to the percipient being, but to things other than the percipient, apply also in the
case
of

sound.

If

those

qualities are not inherent in

In this way, it can be the percipient, neither is sound. shown that there is nothing among the otherwise known

We must, therefore, con things in which sound inheres. in addition to everything else which is known clude that,
otherwise, there

sound inheres
In

Akasha

all

must be some other Reality in which and it is this Reality which is Akasha. discrete things move and as they move

they produce sounds not in themselves, that is, as a pro perty inherent in themselves, but in the medium in which
* Vivr., p. 437, lines
1, 2,

Vaish. SO.,

II.

i.

26

Prashasta,

p. 58,

lines 10-12.

52

they move.*

And

it

is

obvious that this

discrete things.
exists,
it is

medium

is

Akasha which connects

all

Thus we
*

find that

Akasha

and we have

al-

and must be an allAkasha is eternal pervading continuum and being a con it must also be eternal, un produced and indes tinuum,! tructible. For, as mentioned before, production and
ready seen that
;

destruction

of

thing

can

only

mean
and

the bringing

together of parts in a certain way,

or re-arrangement,

their separation
in

things which are both impossible

the case of a continuum.

It is

Therefore

it is

eternal.

also absolutely motionless.!

is

For, being a con-

Akasha
tionless.
it

mo-

tinuum, it cannot be conceived as movn g f rom one p] ace to another, nor can
j

contract and expand, which can

mean only

the bring

ing closer together, or throwing farther apart, of parts or

particles

substances.
in
it,

things which are possible only in discrete Neither is there any undulatory movement

even means displacement of parts, namely, their moving up and down or back and forth.
for that

Finally,

Akasha

is

super-sensible, as

it

neither

is,

nor

can ever be, perceived

by the sen see.

perceived by the

^ or
contrast.

everything that
is so

is

senses

Contrast, again,
isolation,

tion
to

and

perceived by means of some means some sort of distinc neither of which is possible in regard

Being a uniform continuum, (i.e., not being aneka-dravya-vat), there can be no distinction made
Akasha.
* Vaish. Su.,
II.
i.

27

Prashasta, p. 58

lines 13

and

14.

t Vaish, Su., II.

i.

28
21.

| Vaish. Su., V.

ii.

Prashasta, p. 68, lines 17-19. Vaish. Su., IV. i. 6. VIII.

;

i.

and

7.

53

between different parts of itself. Similarly, being allpervading, it can never be isolated from other things so
as to

enable
is,

us to distinguish

it

from them.

Thus

Akfisha

and must

be, super-sensible.

But although
perty, sound,
is

itself

super-sensible,

its

special pro

perceived by means

of a special sense.

This special sense, that is, hearing, therefore, must be essentially of the same nature as
hearing
1

is

only condi

Akfisha

itself

and

this for

the

same

"

reasons which led us to conclude that

the four other special senses are essen

tially of the

same nature as the Paramanus which pro

duce the qualities that the special senses severally reveal to us.* Only, in the case of hearing, we have to admit
that
it is

produced

actually separated such things are impossible in the case of a

off

not by any part of Akasha being for or built into something else,

continuum,

but by

means
ture,

being only conditioned in particular ways, by This struc of the peculiar structure of the ear.
its

being interfered with,

may make

alterations

in

it

the particular conditioning of Akasha, and thus only can be said that hearing is destroyed. So far, then, we find five classes of entities as eternal

The Bhutas OP
Matter.
(1)
(2)
(3j (4) (5)
*

R 6 ^^ 68

an d therefore ultimate consti:

namely Prithivi Paramanus, or odorous minima, A p Paramanus, or flavour producing minima, Tejah Paramanus, or luminous minima, Vayu Paramanus, or thermal minima, and
Akasha, ethereal continuum, or simply Ether.
III.
ii.

tuents of the Universe,

Nya. Var.,
J>

72, p. 400.

Nya. Bhash.,

III.

ii.

78,

rashasta, pp. 58, 59.

54

They
sensible.

are all super-sensible.

Only their products are

only the four forms of

That

is to say, it

is

perceptible matter, with their various qualities, produced by the four classes of Paramanus in their various com
binations,

and the various sounds produced

sensible.

in

Akasha,

which are
These

five classes are collectively called the

Bhutas.*
as

We may

translate the term as Matter,

is,

which,

Para

manus and Akasha, uncompounded.

of

course, absolutely simple and

Kola and Dik.

As

to the

next two Realities, Kala and Dik, as taught by Hindu Realism, there has been much

Misconceptions about Kala and

Dik.

... fusion
is

misconception, owing as 3
.

much

to

con-

in regard to their real

import as

by Substance, of the given as the general name to all the nine classes of Realities. Dravya means a some

to the rendering,

word Dravya, which

thing that
is

independently real and

a Dravya

is

self -subsisting.

Thus a Force even may be

if it

can be shown

to

have an independent existence. x\nd there is no reason why Kala and Dik should not be Dravyas in this sense. f

That Kala

exists as a Reality or as

existing Force,

is
:

an independently maintained by the fol

lowing reasoning

All perceptible things are perceived as moving, ing, coming into existence and passing out of it.J
*
t

chang They

Nya. 80. or Nya. Bhash., See Note 22.

Vaish. SO.,
II, ii.

1.

i.

13.

Prashasta, p. 22.

VII.

i.

25.

Prashasta, p. 25, line

10.

55

and destroyed. There must be some Force or Power which thus brings them into existence and The things themselves cannot do it. moves them oil.
are produced

power of self-origination and self-movement, then, there is no reason why there should be that mutual relation between things which persists even when they are all moving and changing or
If

the discrete things had the

why
is

there should be that orderly

movement which

there

in the

Universe that we perceive. |

in a regular

In the Universe

and orderly fashion; things are all moving they come into existence also in order, and in seasons. There must, therefore, be something which makes this
orderly

movement and seasonable

if it exists, it

origination

and de

struction of things possible.

And
full

must

also be
all

scope and operation over

all

conceived as having discrete things, be

cause

discrete

things

are

Aknsha might have been

in touch

this

moving and changing. Power inasmuch as it is

it

with

all discrete

things; but

cannot be

so,

saw, Akasha is also the basis of a special property, namely, sound, which is produced in it the moment it comes into a special relation with discrete
because, as
things.

we

Things

Now, anything which manifests a special quality can a ^ ect or ^ e affected by, other with
things, only
relation
i

speeialproperty can affect OP be affected by others only

comes into special with them, and not by a merely

it
i

when
*

4.1

through

special relations.

general

relation,

that

is

to

mere
*
|

aggregation

or

even

by by mere
say,

i,

See Note 23.

Kandali, p.
68, lines 10 et seq.

11

56

contact.*

Paramanus,

for

instance,

are

things which

manifest the four special qualities named above. But they cannot do this by merely coining together, that is,

by forming mere aggregates. enter into special relations with

When, however, they

one another and form

units (chemical or i.e., secondary then only do the special qualities appear. biological), But as they can appear only when the Paramanus producing the secondary units affect one another, the

compounded wholes,

appearance of the special

qualities

under the abo\

conditions also means that the Paramanus as the bases

of the special qualities can so affect or

when they

be affected only enter into special relations, one with the other,
aggregation."!

but not by mere

Similarly,

Atmans, which have also special qualities of their own, can never affect or be
shall seej that

we

affected

by

things,

unless they
;

come
is

into special re
in

lations with the latter

fact that,
in touch,

and

this

so

spite of

the

being all-pervading
i.e.,

entities,

they

are

always

in general relation, with all things.

But

the

moment

the

Itmans enter

into special relations with

things and thus affect or are affected by them, there at once arise the special qualities which belong to them.
affect and be by all things. But that is so not because they are in mere touch with all things, but because they have that special and intimate relation with all things
It is

no doubt true that some Atmans can

affected

which other Atmans have only with a few things.

* N. V, T. T., p. 280, line last but one.
t See
Ki. Va., p. 114.

Note

24.

$ Infra.

Infra, pp. 86, 87

and 123

et seq.

and Note

48.

57

Thus we

find,

first,

that there is nothing which has

affect

a special quality and can yet

or

be affected by

other things without entering into special relations with them. Secondly, as soon as things having special quali ties enter into the various special relations with other
at things and thus affect or are affected by them, there once appear, in them, those special qualities which are

their own.

This being so, Akasha, which has a special quality of its own, cannot possibly affect all things equally by mere contact. To do so it must enter into special relations with them, and thereby have at once sound

produced

in

it.

Therefore,

which

affects
it

Akasha were that Power and Reality and thereby moves on everything that is
if

movable,

would have, in the first place, to enter into that special and intimate relation with all things, which has now with one thing and now with another, it in it. according as the one or the other produces sound
relation Secondly, it must have this universally special can be used) with all things, not only (if such a phrase
occasionally,

but

always

for

all

things,

capable of

movement, are moving always. Thirdly, as they move, all movements of theirs would be always producing sound. But this is never the case.
must, therefore, conclude that, that Reality which moves all things by having a general relation with all,
is

We

something other than Akasha. For similar reasons it cannot be identified with any other all-pervading Reality which has special properties
is

thus capable of coming into special relations,

58

We

must,

therefore,

recognise that there must be a

movement, which has only a general relation with every thing that moves, comes into being, changes and passes out of existence. It is this some thing, this Power or Force, which is Kala.
general principle of

As

it

moves and changes

things,

it

gives rise in

the

xi o w ana in what sense Kala

percipient to the notions,

with regard to
;

those things, of past, present and future of old and new. That is to say, it

produces

all

those relations which are termed temporal

and

is

in this sense only Time.

It

must be conceived
to

as a Realityf because

it

cannot

be shown
thing
crete
;

rather

it is

be dependent for its existence upon any upon Kala that all moving and dis
in so far as they have

things depend,

movements

and change. It must be

Universe
that
;

also a Reality
is

which pervades the whole

has relation with
In
fact
all
it

that

to

say,

are

moving and

changing.^

things is a
their

Reality which relates things together in regard

to

and changes, and thus enables a perci as suggested above, to speak of some pient, things as old, and of others as young, with reference to one
another.

movements

The

existence of the next

Reality

as recognised

by

Dik

Realism, namely, Dik or the Power, Force or Principle of relative position,

Vivr.,
II.
ii.

* Vaish. Su., Upask., and N. V. T. T., p. 280, &c. | Vaish. Su.,

II. ii. 7;
i.

6.

Nya. Var.,

II.

i.

36

N. V. T, T., p. 280, last line,

25.

| Vaish. Su., VII.

59
is

which discrete things hold,

ing way*
:

maintained

in

the follow

Things are not only moving and changing, but they

hold
relative

positions,!

that
all

is,

stand at relative dis

of

tances from one another at

are held together in these

moments

time.
is

They
to

positions. f

That

say,

they must be conceived as being acted upon by another Power or Force, which acts in a direction, opposite and thus (viparita) to that in which Kala operates,
acting in opposition to Kala, makes the relative position
of things at

again
their

the

any given moment of time possible. Here things themselves cannot thus maintain
positions.
||

relative

For they are discrete and

;

separated from one another and unless there be some thing else to hold them together, there is no reason

thus retain their respective positions and positional relations to one another, while Nor virtue of Kala. all things are moving on by can Ak&sha, although all-pervading, be the Power which

why

or

how

they should

keeps things
the

in

their

relative
it

positions,

for

exactly

same reasons for which Power. That is to say, it

operating on things

cannot be the all-moving

incapable of affecting or
into

is

without

entering

special

relations, and without thereby having sound produced in it. But the Power that can hold all things to

gether at relative

distances from
time,

given
to

moment
their

of

one another, at any and can thus enable them all

relations,
ii.

retain

mutual positional
25.

must be

* See

Note

t Vaish. Su., II.

10.

J/H/m.
||

Ki. Ya., p. 144.

Kandali,

p. 67, lines

19 et seq.

60

a thing which has only a general relation

with

all,

and

yet,

by virtue

of that relation alone, operates

on

them all, as it must, to keep them in positional order. Nor can Kala be this Reality because, as already said, the Power we are considering is a Power which acts in a way which is exactly contrary to that in which Kala operates and operating in opposition to Kala makes
; ;

relative

position

possible.

We

must, therefore, recog

nise the existence of a separate principle as the upholder of positional relations and order on the part of discrete
things.
is called

This something, this Reality, Power or Force,

Dik.

As

it

upholds relative positions among things,

1

it

notions of

sp^,8

gives rise in their percipients to the notions of far and near in this direc;

but

tion

or
;

in

tliat

clirection

is

of east

and

pro duces relations among things of the nature of what may be called spatial directions. But Dik cannot be called
space
itself, if

west

and

so on.*

That

is to say, it

that

means

place, locality or room.

It is in

This
i.e.,

latter is really

Akasha. |

Akasha

as space,

place or room, and as a Reality, that Dik holds things in

different positions.

The
tween
as

difference
be-

Differenee

Akasha space and

between Akasha as space, or place, and Dik, is much the same as that ben tween, say, a wall on which, and cords
-, -,

-,

^y

w hi cn)
is

pictures

may be hung.
the space,
in

The

wall

or supplies

place or
different

room, and the cords hold the

*

pictures

Bhasha

Par., 45.

| See Notes 20

and

25; Prashasta, p. 22, line 11; Randall, p. 22, line 17,

61

positions

This is a point space so supplied. be clearly borne in mind as otherwise which should there will be, as indeed there has been, much confu
in

the

sion

made

in regard to

the

meanings

of

Akasha and
be

Dik.*

Dik

is

a Reality because

it

cannot be shown

to

dependent on anything conceived as all-pervading, that

all

else for its existence.! It

is,

must be

having relations with

things, inasmuch as

all

discrete things exist in rela

tive positions in the Universe.

KAla and Dik are thus Realities which hold together

Kala
^

and Dik
6

the sensible Universe as, in the infinite

verse in Ak&sha as space.

space of Akasha,
that
its

it

ever moves

on in

well-regulated and seasoned cycles, and

positional order which,
for
ever,

yet

maintains

obtains between

various members. J

The Atman.

The
Atman
systems.

question- of the existence of

recog--

Atman, that

is to say,

tne eighth class

treated

of Realities, has

been

nised by all the

most elaborately.

But as the

Vaisheshika doctrine in this respect has

been

fairly correctly represented in the West, I shall give here only a few of the most characteristic arguments

which are adduced

these not
the other

in

its

support.

And

shall

give

only from the Nyaya- Vaisheshika, but from

systems as well

because while the various

schools have had different teachings as to the nature of

* Trans. Tarkas., p. 133., para. 2
|

Vaish. Su.,

II.

ii.

11; N. V. T. T., p. 280, last line.

t Prashasta, p. 22.

62

the Atman, they all have alike taught

its

existence as an

independent, eternal,
at the

and

infinite Reality, lying, so to say,

background of every experiencing entity. In regard to the nature of the Atman, the Creationist standard shows it to be that Reality in which conscious

ness or experience is only sustained, but of which ex perience is not an essential, an absolutely inalienable
characteristic
;

while the Sankhya reasons out that the

Atman
in

Feeling Intelligence itself, but teaches, in agree ment with the Realistic System, that Atmans are infinite
is

numberis

Finally,

the Vedanta establishes

itself,

that

the

Atman

not only Intelligence

all

but

it

is

one and

the same in

experiencing beings.

For these reasons,

its

arguments
existence

in

support of the Atman, in so far as only

as

an eternal and

infinite,

i.e.,

Reality
ards.

is

concerned, can be adduced from

all

all-reaching the Stand

We
is

which
tr

may, however, begin with the following, perhaps the most characteristic of the Nyaya^ n eac ^ ex P ei enc i n g being there and must be an Atman which is an _ ,. independent Reality and different from the bod 3 because ~
i
.

Vaisheshika arguments.

e\

e^e

(fn-

seiousnessor
as experience property must
111

is

m*

Reality.
(a)

>

Consciousness,

i.e.,

Experience in general,

is

property*

consciousness,

namely, of things,

thoughts and ideas; and so on.

(b)

of feelings, pleasure, pain

As

property
its

it

can have

no independent

existence of
*

own.f

| Prashasta, p. 99, lines 9 et seq.

Nya. Su., Nya. Bhash., Nya. Var., I. i. 10. Kandali on above.

63
is

a property and yet has an independent existence, apart from that of which it is a A property must inhere in and belong to property.

There

is

nothing which

some

Reality.
to

Consciousness, as a property, must also

in

belong

and inhere

some

Reality.
it

(c)

The

materialist says

to the

body.

inheres in and belongs But this, for the reasons to be

mentioned immediately, is impossible. Therefore, there must be some other Reality in

which
is

it

inheres

and that

to

which

it

belongs

the At man.*

If it
If

be held that consciousness

consciousit-

tyfthen^tTis
self the

not a property, and that it is a Reality which has an independent existence, then there is hardly
is
[

Atman.

anv neec

f or

further argument.
of
is

For

in that case the difference

would be one
which

In reality

it

will be the very thing

name only. called Atman

by the Hindu.!
be regarded as a procannot Le the property of SSJertyrfthe b ody. the body, for the following reasons Because, if it were a property of the body, it would
Consciousness
if

But

it

P ert y

tben

ifc

exist

also in

the various

parts

mately in the ingredients, i.e., is composed, even when these were separated from one another and the body divided up. We find in a combined

body and ulti the Bhutas, of which it

of the

whole no property which cannot also be found in the

* See

this section
|

Note 26 for on Atman.

p. 71,

full

references to authorities on the whole of

Kandali,

lines 17 et seq.

Sid. Cha., leaf 12 (seoondside).

12

64

parts and ingredients of which the whole and into which it can be divided. But this
case with

is
is

made np never the

any part

of

the

Bhutas.

And

the body nor with its ingredients, there being no consciousness in the

parts and ingredients of the body, consciousness cannot

be the property of the body.

be pointed out that intoxicating power is produced by combination of ingredients which severally do not possess it, the objec
If,

as

an exception

to this

rule,

it

tion can

be met by saying that this

is

analogy.

For the contention

is

not that there

not quite a proper may not

develop in a

compound

new

or hitherto unobserved pro

but perty which has not been present in the ingredients, that when such a compound and therewith a new property
the newly produced property is always found, in howsoever small a degree, even in the smallest whole. Thus, part, as still a compound, of the compounded
are

produced,

if intoxicating taking the very example of the objector, power is produced in a cask of whisky, not only was such power present, though it might not have been observ

ed, in each of the

fermented grains of which the whisky was made but it is not quite lacking in any portion of the whole quantity of the whisky even when such a por
tion is quite separated

the cask. But

is

and taken away from the whole in consciousness ever found, say, in an arm

of the body, or in the solid or liquid matter

which consti tute the ingredients of the arm, whether before they had been built into or when they are detached from the

body

?*
iii

* Sankh. Su.,

interpreted the Sutras slightly differently believe to be their original import. See also Cha. Ka., Vol. II., p. 139.

20 and 22 with Vijnana and Ani. on them. I have according to what I

65

Nor can
6

it

be maintained

that,

although conscious

cannot
th embody

be^due

Pm

ness may not be the property of the material ingredients of which the body is composed, it is produced by a com

bination of them in a particular way. That is to say, it belongs to, or inheres in, the parti cular form which they produce by their combination. For, consciousness as a property cannot inhere in any

and a form cannot be thing but in some real entity said to be a real entity, inasmuch as it has no independ
;

ent existence of

its

own.

Moreover,

if it

be held that there

is

consciousness

C9nseiousness
propeny or tne individual body, consciou sne s s

in

being

t } ien

the various ingredients of the body, w jn follow that the consciousjt

ness of an individual really

bi nation

would be only
of eoiffe nesses.
i

of

...immense an
as one

is

the com,
,.

number

01

o^us

But nobody separate consciousnesses. f ee j s himself as such, that is to say,

all

as many.
individual.

We

feel ourselves

and the same

feel himself as many, formed one individual but if really many consciousnesses often be either torn consciousness, then the body would

Not only does an individual not

For, it is comparatively to pieces or absolutely inactive. rare thing to find a large number of conscious a

very

entities

acting

together absolutely with

one will and

have different wills and and if the different members and purposes of their own, had each a separate consciousness parts of the body were not subordinate of its own, and at the same time
purpose.

They

generally

to

some other and central consciousness,

it

is

pretty

66

certain

that they would often disagree and try to carry out their different wills and purposes and the result would be a complete disintegration of the body. Or,
;

if

the

body did not

and purposes

disintegrate,

there would be an

absolute
wills

deadlock of activity, inasmuch as the varying

of the

different

parts

of the
this

body
kind

would neutralise one another.

of disintegration

But as neither
is

nor stagnation
it

must conclude that

is

not the

ever observed, we separate conscious

nesses of the different parts of the body which produce the one individual consciousness.

Perhaps

it

agreement, on by the agreement of the majority.

be said, that in the event of dis the functions of the body would be carried

may

This

may

often

happen.
division

But

it

is

also

possible

that sometimes

the

body
case,

is

may be equal and in such circumstances the sure to be divided into two parts. No such
is

however,
it

ever known.

Finally,
If

consciousness
th e

would be equally futile to urge that the wil1 and pm P Se f the difTerent men>
bers of the body, would be controlled and overruled by the will of the body
as a wlwle

were a properthen*
t

h er

ss
of the body as

For on tbe theor y that the

individual consciousness of a
1

a whole.

nesses of parts,

merely an aggregate of the conscious there can be no meaning of the will of the
of the wills of its

PI-

man

is

body as a wlwle, except the aggregate

different constituents.

For,

if it

be held that the body

will,

as a whole can have its

own consciousness and

as

distinguished from, and independent of, the aggregate of the consciousnesses of its various factors, then, such

67

consciousness can
For,
it

be either

essential

or

accidental.

cannot be anything

else,

as there is not a third

alternative.

But

it

it

were essential

to the

be no death at
cannot
sential

body, then there would all, for death is not pos-

^
to

11

6S e s-

sible unless consciousness is

gone from

the

of the hitter.

body body if it were That which is an

t ] ie
;

and

it

could not leave the

an essential property

essential property of a

as, for instance, impene thing cannot possibly leave it as an essential property of matter, can trability, which,
;

never be absent from

it

it.

If it

were essential

to the

body
is

would

be,

say, like

colour which, being essential,

always with the body as long as it is. Colour is never absent from the body, because it is essential to the body but this cannot be said of consciousness. It does not
;

endure as long as the body does. Bodies can be found without consciousness, not only after death, but also in a
trance
or

swoon.

Therefore consciousness cannot be

essential to the

body.

is

Of course, here it may be urged that, although there no absolute want of colour in the body, there is, at
rate,

any

change

of colour.

man, for instance, having

white leprosy, will change his colour altogether. Yet, in spite of this change, colour cannot be said to be the
Similarly, property of anything but the body itself. what we call consciousness and unconsciousness are

merely two properties of the body, one alternating with the other, just as one colour can change into an
other.

This argument would indeed be valid, if it could be proved, that unconsciousness were really a

68

which could be contrasted with con sciousness as one colour can be contrasted with another. But unconsciousness is not such a positive quality. It
positive property,

means only
is to say,

the absolute

want

of consciousness.

That

unconsciousness in a body, as at death, means not the production of a new property, similar in nature, as one colour is similar to another, but the absolute elimination of consciousness. There is no such absolute
elimination
lasts.

of

colour from

the

body

It is
is

true that one colour

may

long as it succeed another.

as

always some colour in the body, as long as the latter is. This cannot be said of conscious
ness.
It is, therefore,

But there

not the essential property of the

body.

But

if it is

not

its essential

property, then
to

it

must be

Consciousness

admitted
for,
,
.

to

be accidental
above,
.

the body,

accidental
to the body.
al, it is

as
,
.

stated

there
,
. .

can be no
.
.

third alternative.

And
is

if

it is

accident

evident that the body alone

not the cause or

There must be something else, some other power or substance, which must come in, so to say, and in some way be related with the body before
basis of consciousness.

consciousness

is

produced in the

latter.

can be done in two ways, as may be illus trated by two examples namely, (a) the reduction, say, and of solid gold or silver into a liquid or molten state

And

this

the lighting up of a room, say, with a candle or some (b In the first example, that is, other source of light.
}

in

the

reduction of solid gold to

is

a liquid

state

the
is

liquidity

produced

the property of the gold itself, although it by means of some other agency, which

is

69

introduced,

so

to

say,

from outside.

In the

second

example, the illumination of the

to

room cannot be said

be the property of the room

to the source

from which

it

the light belonging Now the ques proceeds.

itself,

body, of the nature of the liquidity produced in solid gold, i.e., be longing to the body itself, although produced by means
tion is
:

Is consciousness,

produced

in the

of

some other agency

side agency itself,

the property of the out as the light in the room is of the

;

or, is it

source of light, which

is

other than the

room

itself ?

little

reflection

will

show

that consciousness, pro

duced in the body, cannot be the property of the body For consciousness implies, as ever} one knows, itself. a relation, namely, between that which is conscious
r

and that

which it is conscious. And it must be admitted that, whether they be essentially one or and we shall see that they are different different these two, things are quite distinct from one another at
of

the time
if

when
it

the one
it

is

conscious of the other.

further be

And

this is admitted,
is
it

will
to

conceded that of

the two
or, of

the
is

first

which

a property.

which consciousness belongs, Let us put the matter

a little more concretely. Whether it be absolutely fixed and unchangeable, or ever varying, there is what may be called an "I-ness" in me, and when I am conscious
of something, then

whatever constitutes

my

"

I-ness"

at

the
of

moment
which
I

is,

and must be, distinct from

conscious.
to

this

something
say,

am
"

Further, the consciousness

at that

moment belongs
"

me,
"

that

is

to

what
it

constitutes

my

I-ness
"

at

the time.
in

Therefore,

is

the property of this

I-ness

me, and not of that of

70

which
terms,
that

am

conscious.

This

fact,

expressed in general
of
is

means that consciousness is not the property of which one is conscious, but of that which
In other words,
the latter,
it

conscious.

is

not the property of

is

the object of consciousness.

consciousness
perty.

an object of therefore, cannot be its pro

in

But body

In any case, whether consciousness be produced

Being
aeei-

the bodv
;

dental to the body, consciousness need not necessarily be a

ty

like liquidity in solid & sold, or

.

like light in

a dark

room,

it it

be ad-

-^ nutted, as
is

it

must

be, that consciousness

hepent
body.

in

the

accidental to

tlie

bod

y>

and tbat
>

for

its

production in the body, there

is,

and

must

need of some other agency, then the theory that consciousness is dependent entirely and exclusively
be, the

upon the body

of
it

falls to the

ground.
is

For,

it

has

to

be ad

mitted that consciousness

the body and something else.

is

produced by This being admitted,

the combination

unreasonable to maintain, as the materialist does, that consciousness is the property of the body only, when
equally claimed to be the property of that some other agency, which must come into relation with
it

may be

the body before consciousness can be produced.

As a

matter of
to

fact, for the

be mentioned now,

reasons stated above, and for others it will be found more rational to

hold that consciousness belongs to, and is the property of, this other agency rather than that of the body. Consciousness That consciousness cannot be the and will must to the belong property of the body will be seen from R e bu will etnnoi the following further considerations.
belong
to

the
Jt

^^ ^

adm

i tte(i

tnat a desire

71

or will

caused by consciousness. One cannot desire a thing or have any will to act with reference to a Will, in thing, unless one is conscious of the thing.
is

other words,

is

a phase of consciousness itself.

to the

This

being so, which will belongs. Now, if it will does not belong to the body, sciousness does not belong to it
not belong to the body,
is

consciousness must belong

same thing to can be shown that the

it

will follow that con

either.

That
;

will does

is

clear from the

it

fact that will

different

from that which

moves.

The

will of the

carpenter moves his tools. The will of the warrior moves In his sword. And the will of the boy moves his ball."
:;

other words,

we

all

move material things by our

wills

and

we know we
if

are different from these material things.

And

moved by wills which are must be admitted that the will which moves the body itself, as it does move, must be
other material

things are
it

different

from them,

from the body, because the body That is to say, it must belong material thing.
different

is
to,

also

and be
Hence,

the property of, something else than the body.

as will

and consciousness are inseparable, consciousness must also belong to that something else to which will belongs and not to the body.
Moreover,
if

Consciousness n Pr P e S? fho b o ?y
6

consciousness were a property of the body, it would be perceived by others

e^ved by ot^p
bodies.

than the owner of the body. For proP erties of material tllin S s are perceived by all who are provided with the neces
of

sary senses.

But the consciousness

* Cha. Ka., Vol.
II.,

can never be

p. 152,

13

72;

perceived by B.
of the

Therefore
is

it

cannot be the property

so

body which

Again, we
Consciousness

a material thing. find that all made-up things are

made
is

U P by, and for the use

the
tllin S s

of,

others than

makefus^o fthe
body
-

themselves,
it

A
is

house

and
all

exists for

made-up thing, and the use of a man, that is

itself.

made up by

other than the house

to say, a something This will be found true of

made-up

things.

And

the

body

is

made-up

thing.

Tt

must, therefore, belong

to

that is to say, the consciousness belongs not to the body but to that which uses it for its own purposes.
;

body by which it is used. something that has consciousness

than the something But it can be used only by a

else other

Then

again, there

is

the universal feeling of the

>

be?on!sto Vhat

being a P ossession
plleS a

bethe possessor*
of the body.

P ossessor
a
1

body and a possession imTllis possessor shows

itself in
It
is

general

way every time

it

my body. strongly and clearly when a man has, let us say, a dis eased arm or leg amputated, and he says or feels I, as possessor of the body, have given up a part of it. And
says
:

man

But

shows

itself

most

there is a possessor of the body, it is clear that con sciousness belongs to that possessor and not to the body. Moreover, if consciousness were the property of the
if

There would be
G nS e ess a a il
f

body, there could be no consciousness at

all.

were a property

For the body, like any other material thing, is an object of consciousness. of the body. .* And it consciousness were a property of the body then that would mean that the property of a thing had the thing itself as its object, which would be
.

73

tantamount
is

to

saying that a thing acted on

itself.

This

impossible.

One might

as well say that fire can

burn

as a thing cannot act on itself, that is to say, cannot have the thing itself as the object of its operation,
itself.

And

and as consciousness
its

of the

body must have the body as

be no consciousness

object

of operation, there could

whatever

were a property of the body. Then again, our inability to realise consciousness
if it

Inability to realise

conscious-

ness apart from

apart from the body is hardly conclusive , f c proof of the theory that experience is the
,
, ,
. .

n t nece^ny prove it to be a property of the

body.

P TO P ert y
ness and

of

tlie

b d y-*
. .

We

ca

illdeed

b e certain of the existence of consciousall

implies as long as the body exists in a living state, but we cannot be so cer tain of its complete non-existence when the body does not
it

that

exist.

For

it is

equally as possible that even after the

body in some other

lias died,

the consciousness should continue to exist

state, as that it

may

altogether cease.

And

should consciousness persist, after the death of the body, it cannot surely be the property of the latter. In any case
this very

prevent our accepting as truth the theory that consciousness is a property of the body.
is

doubt

enough

to

Moreover,

if it is

concluded that consciousness

is

a pro-

Body may be a mere auxiliary.

P er ty of the body because it takes place where there ig a bof]y and doeg not take
is
is

place where there

visual perception

none,

we may

as well conclude that

it

a property of light because

light

takes

place where there

light
is

and does not take place where absent. But as we can never accept this second con
is is

clusion as valid there

no reason why we should accept

lihash., III. iii.54.

*SMr.

74

the

first.

For who can say that the body

is to
it

is

not a mere

auxiliary to consciousness as light

Finally,
is

visual perception ?
is

not true that the body

absolutely

Consciousness

can be had without the body.

re^l u ^ re ^ as an auxiliary of consciousness, as we shall see later on.* While thus

, ,
.

the ehiei

argument in favour

or

the

is

is a property of the body not conclusive, that theory cannot be accepted, for rea sons given above, even as a possibility.

contention that consciousness

consciousness cannot be a property of the body as a whole, neither can it be a mere funcConsciousness
if

And

fyTfuneuTof
the brain.

This brain theory of consciousness was never advanced in

tion of the brain. |
;

ancient India

but

it

has been treated by a modern

Hindu philosopher
It

of a genuinely Hindu school and has been shown by him that the brain education.^ theory of consciousness is open to exactly the same objec

tions as the one

which maintains that consciousness

is

Brain may be indeed property of the body as a whole. needed as an instrument for the expression of conscious
ness,

as the
of

body

as a whole

is

needed.

But
is

it is

not a

question
are

an instrument

of

consciousness that
at issue

we
The
is

now

considering.

The point

one of the

basis in

which consciousness inheres as a property.

is

argument that when the brain consciousness, and when it is out

vanishes,

in

order

there

of order consciousness

can only prove that brain is needed for the but not that consciousness expression of consciousness
;

is

inherent in the brain or that

It

it

is

same.

might
|

as well be said
See Note
27.

that vision

property of the is inherent

II,

* Infra, p. 149.

Cha. Ka., Vol.

pp. 174 et

seq.

75

in the eye

because

if

man

he has good vision and if All that such a fact can prove is that the eye badly. not that vision is is merely an instrument of vision, but In the same way the brain may be inherent in the eye. but there is no merely an instrument of consciousness basis in which fact Ivnown which can prove that it is the consciousness is inherent as a property. be the property of Thus, as consciousness cannot it must belong Atman is that the body or brain, ^to eonin which some Reality in something an( j i line re
seiousness heres.
in,
.
-,

Las his eye in good order it is out of order he sees

which

is

other
is

than and independent

of the

body.

This Reality

called

Atman

or the ulti

mate

an experiencing being. such an Atman exists in each experiencing That a consibeing will also be evident by
self of

^an there
of
of

be no memory.

problem of memory. no Atman independent ^ than the body, there could be no memory and other our bodies. the experiences we have had through
eln
deration
of

the

there were

For the body

entity,
is

of a

man,
it is

like

that of

at

no time a mere aggregate

any other living of the parts and

particles of

composed. It is, on the contrary, whole (Safighata* or a secondary unit or an organic different from, and something Avayavin) which is very If the body were a mere a mere

which

other than,

experiences which a aggregate means of, man as an individual has through, and by would be merely an aggregate of the experiences his

aggregate. of particles, then the

body

""TB^lhUMii^

ai^g^th^rs, Vivaranopa.,

pp. 100

to 109.

76

which the

and particles have as separate, and independently conscious entities. But independent this is a position which we have seen cannot be sustained.
different parts

No

one can possibly conceive of himself, it may be re peated, as any but an individual and individually whole
experiencer or conscious entity, and not a mere aggregate
of a

number

of separate ones.
so,

This being
Body
unit.
is

we must regard
that
is
>

the
is,

body as an
a

an orga-

organic whole,

a^seleo^id a

ry

w ^ ic ^

something perhaps more, and certainly

mere aggregate. And if it is an organic whole, and if there be no other individual and no Atman beyond the body, then the impressions and memory of experiences which a
other, than a

man
it

has as an individual must be retained in the body

as a wlwle

and not specially

in

any parts or particles

of

as separate entities. But if it is true that the

gate of particles

body is not a mere aggre but an organic whole, and that ex

periences are had, and impressions thereof retained, in only the body as such a whole, then, in the life of, and

an individual, these impressions cannot possibly be transmitted from the body of infancy to those of youth
as,

and manhood and from the bodies

hood
to that of old age.

of

youth and

man

For these bodies as wholes are not one but entirely different from one another, and impresBody as an or~ whole is sions inherent in one whole cannot game
entirely differ..
.
.

ent at different stages of life.

possibly migrate into some

other and

separate whole .*
* See

Note

28.

77

The point may perhaps be made following way

:

clearer

in

the

be particles of matter which and compose, the body at different stages of life; and let the body in youth be composed of a, b, c, and d. Then, for reasons stated above, the body of youth will be not merely the aggregate of (a + b + c + d), but an organic whole, composed no doubt of these parti cles, but, as an organic whole, a different entity altogether
a, b, c, d, e, f, etc.,

Let

come

into,

and quite distinct from

Let this

the

mere aggregate
a.

of

the

components. Now a, but not the mere aggregate

new

entity be called

(a+b+c+d),

being the body of youth, the impressions of that age are, for reasons given above, inherent not in the mere
aggregate of the components but in the new entity
a.

suppose some of the particles pass out and come in, some to take the places of the particles others that are gone, others to add greater magnitude to the

Now

body that is to say, let the body pass from youth manhood. At this stage let its component factors be
;

to
:

6+1+0+ d+g+h
and and g and h as additional ones. Here again the body, b, as an organic whole, is not the mere aggregate of the components, nor even an entity representing
f

namely, e and

as substitutes for the old particles a

but a totally
for

new

entity

/3.

It

cannot be simply
this

two reasons.
of
in

First, this
is

would mean that

new

body which

manhood
this case

of components would no doubt bo the new particles

a mere aggregate

78

coming in as particles, joined together with a as a whole minus some of its original factors. But we have seen that a body is not, and cannot be, a mere aggregate of
components and therefore
Secondly,
so that as a
a
it it

cannot be merely
exists

when

is

produced there

no

a at all,
3.

could enter into the composition of

For

was an organic whole consisting of certain definite factors and when some of those factors were removed, a as a ceased to exist and what remained behind was These not {a (a + b)}, but merely the particles c and d.
; ;

latter,

produced must be from

together with the other and newly added particles a new organic whole, a new entity 0, which
totally

different

from

a,

as different

as x

is

y, or

a from b.

This being so, there is absolutely no connection between a and 3. Therefore the impressions inherent And as they cannot in a cannot possibly pass on to 0. from the body pass from a to 3 and from 3 to 7, that is,
of

one stage to that of another, there can be no memory

youth in manhood, or of manhood in old age. But such memory exists. We must, therefore, conclude that there must be some other entity above and beyond the in which impressions of experiences inhere and
of

body which does not change with the changing body, but remains with them all, connecting a with and 3 with 7. And because it remains with them all, it carries on the another and thus makes me impressions of one age to is the Atman. mory of different ages possible. This entity as the body does not It has been suggested that, could be retained as the change at once, impressions

70

shape and form is retained in fossils. This argument would be valid if the body were a mere aggregate but we have seen it cannot be so. It not being a mere
;

aggregate,

the

as a wliole, but not bit

organic whole changes every moment, by bit as the dead body of an

fossil.
:

animal or plant changes into a

Finally,
it

may perhaps be argued

that
particles

We know

change

we

also

know

that
is

Dogmatic assertions passed as reasoning-. The

impressions persist and

tact.

memory

We

must, therefore, suppose that

are

tion^onede" nying- Atman.

impressions

somehow
to the

transferred
;

from old particles

new ones

but

we need not suppose

else,

which

is

that they are retained in something other than the particles themselves.

We

might, indeed, argue like this, if

we could

posi
;

tively prove that there realty is nothing

beyond the body

and the argument in those circumstances would be quite valid. But nobody has so far positively proved that
there
is

no Atman.
style of

In the absence of any such proof,

the above

argument

is

only another
it is

name

for

merely dogmatic assertions.

to the existence of

And

the more objec

tionable, because the weight of evidence distinctly points

consciousness
inhere.
If,

is

the property

something beyond the body, of which and in which impressions

in spite of all the evidences in its support

and of their reasonableness, we do not admit the exist ence of the Atman, we are driven to invent explanations

which are either merely dogmatic

veiled as in the line of

assertions, only thinly

argument
it

just referred
difficult

to,

or so

absurd and chimerical that

14

is

to

see

how

people can accept tkem and yet refuse the doctrine of

80

the Atman which, as a matter of fact, is the simplest.* If we admit that an independent Atman exists, we explain things in the simplest way and we see at once how it is possible to remember experiences even when the body
is

completely changed.

That there

is,

in

each
is

sentient

being,

an Atman

proves Ttman.

body, is independent a so evident from the feeling of selfFor not only does a man identity.
^

which

of the

remember the experiences of childhood in manhood, and manhood in old age, but he feels himself really to be one and the same being at these different stages. He never thinks of himself as many in the same way as he does of his bodies. He feels and can say I who saw in my childhood my parents, I, the same being, now in
of
*
:

my

old age,
is

see

my

children and
experience.

my

grandchildren. !
this,
it

This

the

universal

From

must

be concluded, that the entity which feels itself as thus being present and associated with all these everchanging and mutually exclusive bodies, is different

from them
"

all.

For,

it

may be

laid

down
in

as a principle

that,

if

a thing remains the

of

same

the

midst of a
things, then

number

changing

or mutually exclusive

the thing existing with and is different from the changing

things.
of

accompanying them all, and mutually exclusive

For instance, if, in the midst of a large number flowers which are different from one another and
certain

mutually exclusive, we find a thread that runs through

them

and makes a garland possible, then that the thread is different from the flowers.
all
* Cha. Ka., Vol.
II, p.
|

it is

"J

Similar^,
2

Bhamati, Intro.

Bhamati, pp.

and

3.

81

old age are although the body of childhood, youth and them the thread mutually exclusive, there runs through
of that

something which perceives itself as the T, and and therefore, this something must be different from,
bodies.

other than, these different

And because

it

is

different from the different and changing bodies, and because it is with every one of them all the time, while to remember they are changing, it is possible for man

the experiences of his childhood and youth in old age. If it were not so there could be no memory of childhood
or youth in old age.

As

stated before, the theory that consciousness

is

only

function

of

the

brain

was never

Brain-self-

advanced in ancient India.

The above
against the
the

arguments
generally of the body,

are

directed
is

theory that consciousness or experience

property

and that there

"

is

no Atman above

and beyond such a body.

But they can be used equally

theory of Brain-selfhood" against the modern European as it has been called in Sanskrit (Mastishkatmavada).

That there
Psychical pheas men a proofs of Atman.

is

an Atman, in each of
evident,
fleration
if

independent of the body would be still more us,

no

we could
by

take

into consi-

gome

of those

factfl>

which
for

are

now

being

investigated

the
facts

Society

Psychical Research.
yet

But these are

as

which are not

West.

generally recognised labours of the Society for

such in

the

The

Psychical Research may, in The time, prove them to be facts for the scientific West, be facts, and bring Hindus think they know them to
* Cha. Ka., Vol. II, p. 175.

82

them forward

as evidence of the existence of the inde

pendent Atman.

But

in

attitude in regard to these facts,

view of the general Western I shall omit the argu

if

ments which are based on them.*

Further,
it

could be shown that,

tlie

consciousness were
if

Without Atman there can be no moral law.

Pr

P ert y of the
,
.

bod ^ and
,
.

beyond

the body, there existed nothing else, that

.

no Atman, which is not produced or destroyed with the body, then there could be really no moral law in the Universe, and there could be no justice
is,

11

whatever.! If Universe, then

it it

be admitted that there

will
also

is

justice in the

have

to

be admitted, as will

be shown later on, that man s consciousness is not the property of his body, but that there is a something else in him which is different from the body and which has
lasted from all eternity and will last for ever.

But even without any reference

3
"

to the

moral bearing
to

of the question at issue,

Ot
"^

perhaps enough

AtmaV.

]ias

alr eady

been said
is

show

that

consciousness

not the property of the

body, and that there

of the

body and
if

in

is an Atman which is independent which consciousness inheres.

And

consciousness

is

not the

Atman can n b Vi t h t fn^d

senses, vitality or mind.

body, and, therefore, the body

property of the is not the

Atman, neither is consciousness the property of, and one with, those powers and
J
faculties
;
.

of

man which
;

are

known

as

(a)

the powers
that
is,

of

sensation, or

sense-perception,

the senses

*
t

For instances
Nya. Bhash.,

of such
III.
i.

arguments see Bhamati, Introduction,

p. 3.

4 (implied).

83
;

(I)

vitality (Pr a La)

and

(c)

what may be called the Mind (Manas).

therefore none of

And
The

them

is

Atman, the sustainer

of consciousness, in an experiencing entitj7 .

Atman
be
the

in

which consciousness inheres and

,

Why
cannot

Atman
as senses.
it

same
feels

which, therefore, is the real experience! cannot be any ot the senses because a

man

sees

a thing with

,.

-,

his eyes,

and

be hot or cold with his temperature-sense and then he relates the two things together and says It is one and the same thing that I have felt and seen.
to
:

This could not be possible if the experience!* or Atman were not different, both from the eye and from the tem
temperature of have visions. Nor a thing, nor can the temperature-sense I who am seeing now have also felt can the eye say
perature-sense.

The eye cannot

feel the

the temperatures of something, any

more than the tem

perature-sense can
feeling
it

feel

It is

who have both

the

of

temperature as well as vision.

is

Therefore

must be admitted that there

beyond, and different

from, them both a something which relates the expe This some riences that are received by means of both.

thing

is

the

Atman which
we
are

cannot, therefore, be the

same

as the senses.

Then
that
is,

aware of the senses as organs, instruments by means of which things are

again,

But instruments, being used, always imply an agent which uses them, and without which they
experienced.

cannot be used.

Therefore the senses being used as instruments there must be some agent which uses them.

84
;

This agent

is

the

Atman

and, as agent,

it

cannot be the

same as the instruments used. Finally, senses are, as we have

seen, things produced by Paramanus and Akasha and as such belong to matter and matter, as we have also seen, cannot have con
;

sciousness as

its

property.
the

Nor can the Atman be

vitality

same as

vitality.

For,

cannot possibly have any other meaning than merely the special relation
of

an Atman with a certain form of

matter which, by this relation, the Atman organises and builds up, as a means of having experience.* And as long as this special relation
are going on.
Finally,
lasts, all

the processes of

life,

such as breathing and moving, handling and so on,

Atman cannot be the same as the mind. If by mind we mean merely thoughts, ideas and feelin S s ^ obvious Atman
>
>

cannot be any of these.

are continually changing,

For

all

these

and they are known and expe rienced as such changing things in much the same way as the body and its changes are known and experienced. And being so experienced, they can no more be the

Atman than
But
if

which

by and ideas are experienced, as much as the changing body and sensible objects are experienced, then, it is obvious, it must be different from
all

body can. mind is meant by

these

the

a changeless something,

thoughts

the

experiencer

that is to say,

who experiences things by who uses it as an instrument.

* Kandali, p. 263, line 20.

its

means-,

For, being

85

used as an instrument of experience, it can no more be the same as the experience! than the eye or the ear can.

meant that something which knows and experiences thoughts and ideas, as much as it experiences the changes in the body, then, that would
Finally,
if

by mind

is

be merely another name for Atman. For, as their experiencer, it will have to be distinguished, on the one hand,

from the thoughts, ideas and feelings of which it is aware, and, on the other, from any instrument, by means of which it may be aware of them. And if the experiencer
is

so distinguished

from both of these latter classes of

it

things which are generally called mind, then

matters

One may call it mind, if little by what name it is called. But in reality it will be the same thing as the one likes. Atman. Thus it will be a difference of name only. The fact that the experiencer, whether it be called Atman or
be distinguished from thoughts, ideas and feelings, which are commonly called mind in the West, and from any instruments by means of which these be experienced by the experiencer cannot be denied.
Mind, will have
to

may And

if

one prefers to

call

the former
for the

mind he

will

have

to find a different

name
there

two latter classes of

things.

That

is all.

Thus we

find that

exists the

Atman which

is

independent of and as such constitutes the eighth vitality and mind,

standard. Reality taught by the Realistic This Atman exists in each conscious

and

different

from the body, senses,

being, and

is,

Atman
nal.

is

eter-

anc^ must be,

either be

eternal.

For

it

cannot
It
it

produced or destroyed.

be held that

it is

a thing produced, then we must be told

86
it

how

it

is

produced, what
If it

is

that occasions
is

its

pro
it

duction, or

what the material

out of which

is

be said that it is produced with the produced. body, then that will involve all those objections which

have been urged against the theory that consciousness is one with the body. And if it is not produced with the body, it cannot be shown to be produced in any
other

way

either.

And,
it

if

a thing

is

such that
it

its

origin

cannot be shown, then

sists for ever.

must be held that

as
it

That

is to say,

per cannot be shown that

else, it

also

Atman
that

is

produced from something

eternal.
eternal,
it

must be held

it is

Being

Atman
n.te,

is infi-

is to say, or in touch with all things. all-pervading

must
it

also be infinite, that

i.e.,
1

all,

pervading OP in

For,

cannot be like a mathematical

touch with
point

point without any magnitude.

And

thing to be eternal, must either be a without magnitude, or must be all-pervading. *

Anything between these two, that is to say, anything of measurable magnitude, must consist of parts. And con sisting of parts, it must be divisible being divisible it cannot be eternal. Therefore, the Atman, being eternal,
;

cannot be conceived as of measurable magnitude. | Nor, as just said, can it be like a point without magnitude.
If it

were,

the

Atman would

not feel

itself,

as

most

people do, one with the whole body which is extended. Therefore the Atman is infinite, that is, all-pervading.

We

shall see

later

on, that the

whole universe

is

moulded into shape by the acts of Atmans. This would be impossible, if they were not in touch with all
*
Kaiidali, p. 92, lines 20

and

2i.

Sid Cha., leaf 12 (1st side).

87

things.

We

shall also see that while the different parts

of the Universe constitute spheres of

different

Atmans, which has the Universe as a whole

there

must

at least

experience for the be one Atman

its

for

sphere of ex
is

This because that Atman is all-pervading, possible only And if one Atman is alli.e., in touch with all things.
things.")"

This means, that this Atman perience.* relation with, and has control over, all

in intimate

is

pervading, all other Atmans must also be the same. For, there is no reason to suppose that in essence they are in

any way different from one another. which there can be between the
that while they are all in general

The only difference different Atmans is,

all things,

touch with
relations

they have
different,

intimate

and special
is

which

are

i.e.,

more or

less extensive, in different cases.

Then

again, there

An infinite number of At-

Atmans, as many as there are or can be living and conscious entities.!}: It there were not,
.

an

infinite

number

of

everybody would be conscious and thoughts of everybody else. feelings

Finally,

of

the

the

Atman
Reality in
}
r>

in

each

is

undoubtedly the
consciousness in-

which
,

all

Atman only
sustains

eon"

But consciousness or experience is not its essential characteristic^ These are produced, and inhere, in it, in the
heres.
is

same way

produced, and inheres, in Akasha. How they are produced will be seen when we come to deal with what I have called the Synthetic aspect.
as

sound

Kandali, p. 88, lines It et seq.

15

| Infra, p. 123, et seq.

t See Note 29.

Sec Note

20.

88

The Manas.

The

existence of the next and final class of Realities,

namely, Manas, is supported in the following way.* We have seen that the Atman is the basis of conEvid e n e e
of

sciousuess and experience.

that

It is in that,

Manas

consciousness

inheres.

But

the

Atman

is

all-pervading, and therefore

sent everywhere,

always in contact

The senses again

sense-objects,

come

into

it is always pre with every sense. special relations with

which are then perceived by the Atman.

Atman does not always perceive an external object, even when the latter is in relation with a sense, or senses, by which it is The Atman perceived. is there, because it is present everywhere, and always
it is

But

observed that the

and the object may also be there, and its relation to the sense, by means of which it is perceived, may be there too and still the perception does not take place. This
;

is deeply absorbed ii? one thing to the exclusion of others, but under ordinary conditions. What is the reason of this ? The only way in which it can be explained is this For the percep
:

happens not only when one

tion of things the

Atman

requires not only the senses, but

something
lation

else as well,

which being absent, the object

in question cannot be

perceived, even when it is in re with the senses by means of which the Atman
it.

can perceive
is

When

this

something, the missing link,

supplied between, so to say, the

Atman and

the senses,

and thereby a special relation is established between the Atman and the object, then at once perception takes It must be there, otherwise there is no reason place.
*

For

full

reference on this section, see Note

30.

89

why

there should not be

any knowledge and any per

are in
is

ception, even
sense-objects.

when

the senses

relation with the

This something
that

called Manas.

That the Manas

Succession
in

exists, is also

seen

from the fact

,

we can know things in succession, experience.,,,/; 1 he Atman being present always and proves Manas.
,
.

everywhere,

no reason why things should be known in succession. This succession of knowledge can
there
is

be explained by the fact that knowledge is got by the movement of Manas, which now connects with this
thing,
to

and now with that

and

this

enables the

Atman
is

know things one after the other. Then again it is observed that
the the
Ollly

the
>

Atman, which
is

Manas is needed as an organ for experien c i n g

thoughts,
ing-s

ex P eriencer

conscious
f

of

sensible objects,

such as

colour,

and

feelso on.

odour, and so on, by

organs.

means

of the sense-

We

never

without

the use
of

of

an organ.

a sense-object But these are not the

know

is It is conscious. only objects conscious of such things as pleasure and pain, that is to And, if in say, of the objects of the nature of feeling.

which the Atman

the

case of every
to

has

use an organ,
it

one of the sense-objects, the Atman an instrument, by means of which

its

alone,

can perceive
is

object,

it is

only reasonable to

infer that, in the case of the objects of other classes also, of

which the Atman

conscious,

it

has to use an organ.

Then

there are those objects of consciousness

of

which the

Reeoileetion

te^afso^rov^s Manas.
disappear,
to

Atman knows as thoughts and ideas, and wu cn are sometimes present as actual
i

objects of consciousness,

and sometimes
the occasion

be remembered again

when

90

or need arises.
time,
of

Both for the knowledge,

for the first

these thoughts and ideas, as well as for calling

to

them back

memory, when they are

for the time

being

forgotten, or at any rate, are not prominently before the

Atman
Organ
fng-

as conscious objects, an organ

it

is

needed.

Nor can
is

be

said,

that while the organs are certain-

needed

ly

XP

and

th Q u gifts feeling s.

needed for the perception of the sensebJ ects no such instrument is required
>

f or

the

a\vareness

of

pleasure,

pain,

thoughts, ideas, and

jective or internal.

so on, because they are purely sub

For, the fact that thoughts

and ideas

are sometimes known, and sometimes forgotten, shows

that there

must be an instrument which makes such a

phenomenon possible. It cannot be said that the ideas that are now forgotten, but can be remembered with some
effort,

are absolutely absent

from the Atman.

They

are

How is it then that they are in the Atman. remembered? The only explanation is that not always there must be some organ, without the use of which the Atman cannot be aware of things, which are retained even
somewhere
in itself
;

and that

in order to be

aware

of, i.e., to

remem

ber, any one of them, the Atman has to direct this organ towards that thing or object, when it rises up, so to say,

in consciousness again

that

is

to

say,

is

remembered.

And

this

to this

or that object of

something which may be directed by the Atman thought or idea, which may
is

have been forgotten, but

remembered now,

is

Manas.

This Manas, in each sentient being,

Manas

is only one, not many, as indicated by the fact that we can be conscious of things in suc

cession,

If

there

were more than one

91

Manas
tion

of

For,

would be simultaneous percep even when succession was desired. many objects there is no reason why, when a man fixed one
in

a man, there

one thing, the other Manases should not be bringing about perception in regard to other things. It might perhaps be said here that although there

Manas

to

may

not be

more than one Manas,

as

there are

more
if

senses than one, for the perception of variety of objects,

yet there

may

be a plurality of mental organs.

the

For,

the perception of sense-objects requires the sense-organs

as well as the

Manas,
the

should require

Manas

awareness of mental objects This plus something else.

would undoubtedly be the case, if the mental objects were, even when in relation with the Manas, sometimes

known and sometimes unknown, as even when they are in relation with
is

the sense-objects are the senses.

But that

is, therefore, no need to suppose some other organ behind the Manas. that there may be There is, therefore, only one Manas in each, not many.

not the case.

There

Manas
Manas
nal.
is

is

also eternal.

For

it

cannot be conceived as

eter-

f actors

being produced, as there are no simpler or parts out of which it could be

produced.

And

if it

is

not produced,

it

must be indestructible and therefore

Being eternal,
Manas
has
it is

eternal.

no

said

without any magnitude. For, as before, an eternal Reality must

-

magnitude
whatever.

.. i . vi \ either be of infinite magnitude, like tlie

without any magnitude.* All others, being of limited or measurable magnitude,

Atman,

or

are

divisible

into
*

component parts
p. 92, lines 20

or
21.

factors,

and

Kandali

and

92

therefore perishable.
infinite
it

whatever.
if it

magnitude, It cannot be of

But as eternal Manas cannot be of must be without any magnitude

infinite

magnitude, because

were, there could

not be any succession of percep

and calling back to memory. For, special and specific qualities of its own, such as odour, flavour, luminosity, temperature, or sound
tion or forgetfulness

Manas has no

or consciousness

therefore

it

cannot be considered as

having any special relation with anything. Being with out special qualities, and therefore without special
also of infinite magnitude like would be equally and generally related with everything at the same time and, as a conse there would be an equal and simultaneous quence,
relations,
if

Manas were
it

Kala and Dik,

knowledge
Manas.
at onca.

of everything

fact, in that case,

there
itself
is

on the part of the Atman. In would be no necessity for a

Atman by

would experience
wanted
to

all

things

all

But Manas

enable the

Atman

to

have experience, not simultaneously

but in succession.

of all things at

once

must, therefore, regard Manas as And not being of infinite not of infinite magnitude.

We

magnitude and yet being

magnitude whatever.

eternal,

it

must be without any

Being without magnitude,

Manas
moves
thing
wllich

it

must be conceived as a
ca P able
of

extremely quick movement. For, otherwise, there could not be those perceptions of things seem simultaneous. which

is

extremely

Such a Manas,
Manas and man.
At-

it

is

obvious,

tae

^ fcrnan

O f infinite

is quite different from which must be conceived as magnitude and as the basis of

93

experience, whereas the

Manas

is

only an instrument of

experience.
Finally, there

must be an
there

infinite

number
infinite

of Manases,

An

infinite

num-

as

are

an

number

of

ber of Manases.

At mans, one in each experiencing

entity.

The Principles Summarised.

These, then,
are the
Realities

which are found

is

to

constitute the world,

when

the

same

examined from
is

the Creationist or Realistic standpoint.

else
say,

There

nothing

which can be called absolutely real, that is to self-subsisting and all the infinite variety of things
;

in the Universe, all facts of experience,

can be explained

by these

factors,

and

their attributes.

And

the recogni

tion of these factors of

suggested

before,

the

Universe may be called, as analytic aspect of the Universe

the
of

from the Creationist standpoint. Before we pass on to an exposition

called

what may be synthetic aspect of the Universe from the same standpoint, and see how all phenomena can be
the
let

explained by means of these factors, sake of convenience, recapitulate the

us

first,

for the

principles.

These are
(1-4)

Paramanus, which are without but are self-subsisting and super-sensible any magnitude,
classes of
Realities.

Four

They

are the forces, stimuli or things,

which

produce the
colour,

objects having temperature, and odour, as their special qualities, besides others which constitute their general qualities;
flavour
Akfisha, Ether or Ethereal Space, which is an all-pervading Reality of infinite magnitude. It provides the expanse, room or space in which all discrete things
(5)

perceptible

The

94

move and
discrete

serves as the

medium

of

connection between

and separated things. It is also the background which sound as an intangible and ethereal quality in
inheres
(6)
;

Kala, or the principle or force of universal

;

move

ment, which urges things onward

them

into existence,

changing and
the

and by bringing finally carrying them

notions,
in the per
;

out of existence, gives rise to

cipient, of past, present arid future, of old

(7) Dik, or the principle or force

and new

which holds things

together in their various relative positions even while they are being driven on by Kala and thus gives rise,
;

in the percipient, to the notions of

here and there,

or

near and far

(8)

The Atmans, which

are the bases of consciousness

and experience
and

in all experiencing entities

and are eternal

infinite. Being of infinite magnitude, they are, every one of them, in general touch with everything, bat they come into special relation with one or other object as its

experience!

by means

of the

Manas and senses

is

and

only one in each (9) The Manases, experiencing entity. This Manas in each is the force or power, which is the direct instrument of knowledge and
of

which there

Manas is without any magnitude whatever experience. and therefore non-spatial.

Of
these, the four classes of

Paramanus and Manases

are without any magnitude whatever and are discrete and infinite in number, and Akasha, Ktila and Dik are each a single reality having universal scope and opera
tion
;

while the

Atmans

are Realities

which have each

number.

but equally universal scope,

are infinite in

R
So far
1

THE SYNTHETIC ASPECT.

have dealt with what
I

have called the

analytic aspect of the Universe from

the Creationist or

Realist standpoint.
outline of
it,

In order to give a complete general shall now present the main doctrines which

constitute the Synthetic aspect as taught in this Realistic But, as stated before, the Synthetic aspect, in system.

broad outlines, is exactly the same in all the three standards and is not peculiar to the first. Being common, the main Synthetic doctrines of the Realistic system have been treated by writers on the Sahkhya and the Vedanta.
its

Moreover they follow almost as inevitable conclusions from what has been said before. 1 shall, therefore, just

mention them now, giving an occasional argument here and there when it may seem necessary.
doctrines constituting the Synthetic aspect be stated as follows
:

The
1.

may

There

is

no creation

of a univeise,

that

is to say,

No

first

begin-

ning of things.
creation.

an orderly arrangement of things into a which is absolutely the first system,

of a universe

The beginning

means

the be

ginning of a system only, which under no circumstances On the contrary, it is is the first and only one created.
merely one
* Vaish. Su.,

of

beginningless series.*

Thus

if

the

present universe, as
V.
;

we

find

it

to-day,

had a beginning,
;

(implied) Nya. tihash., I. i. 19, 111. i. 27 (towunls (Midi At. Tat. Viv. Prashasta, pp. 48 and 49 with Ki. Va. and Kandali on the same Saptap. Mit., p. 8, line 14 Vivp., IX. ii, 7 ; Shar. Bhash., II. i. 34-36 ; see Note 31,
i.

13.

10

96

was another before it and if that one came into existence at some point of time, there had been another which had preceded it, and so on. This beginningless
there
series of universes is called
;

Samsara*

(lit.

the constant

moving on or being born and dying repeatedly.) That Samsara is beginningless can be supported as
follows
:

Meaning: of a fipst beginnfng of Samsara.

(i)

An

absolutely

first

the universal process can

mean

beginning of only one

Qr ofcher of the fo n owing alternatives :-

moulding or fashioning, of their own accord, as a Universe, of the ingredients which were already existent, and had been existing for ever
it

That

was a

first

without a beginning. That such eternally existing ingredients were (ii) moulded into the Universe by an intelligent being (or,

which
(iii)

is

same thing, beings). That it was created by an intelligent being out

the
first

of

nothing. In the
for ever
;

alternative,

the stuff

must have existed

in the second, not only the stuff, but the being,

it into the Universe, must have existed for and in the third alternative, it is the being that ever; must have existed from all eternity. In any case it must be admitted that something had existed from eternity and prior to the creation of the

who moulded

Universe.

Now
nity.

the age of the Universe, however long,

limited,
_
.

is

yet
.

Age of the Universe and Eter-

and must have begun, on the _

_

theory of a
*

first

creation,

at

definite

On

the meaning of Samsara, see Note

32.

97

point
age,

of

time in the past, however remote.

is

And

this

however long,

surely

insignificantly small

as

compared with the beginningless, that is, the eternal duration of the stuff or of the being, that is, God, as
such a being would be called. In view of this fact, it will be seen that on none of
the

three

alternatives can a

first

beginning
the
stuff

of the

Uni

verse be maintained.

On
The
is
first,

the

first

theory,
itself

namely,
its
}

fashioning

mean1

of

own accord
to

into the

UniJ

ing of an absolute beginning

,

jave
,

as ].

^ ^jg
that
.

stu ff

impossible,

No self-movement of inert
will not

something

intelligent,
.

is,
.

can
.

start
f
,

movements by

itseli,

or

it

it is

ol the

nature of inert matter.

it

In the

first case,

be very different from the being of the second In the second theory, which we shall deal with directly. how can an inert something start a new movement case,

movements and as nothing can be shown to have come, so to say, from outside, to operate on the inert stuff and thus produce movement, it must be concluded that there have been always movements in this stuff,
by
itself ?

No

inert matter can possibly start

of its

own

accord,

and therefore there has always been a

ing of the Universe.*

creation, a

mould

On

the second and third theories, namely, of a being,

that
is,

God, having moulded the Uni-

tivity be essen-

() f

tialtoGod.

verse out of eternally existing stuff, or creating the Universe out of nothing,

we have
* Shar. Bhash., II.

to

ask

Is

tins

moulding or
33.

creative activity essential to

ii. 2.

God

or merely accidental ?
See Note

(implied).

98

has existed eternally with God for nothing that is essential to a thing can be conceived as being ever absent from it.* And if the moulding or
it
;

If essential,

then

creative activity has always been with God, then a Uni verse also has always existed as a result of this activity.

Nor

will

it

do

to

say,
it

that

while activity
all

is

no doubt
as a

essential

to

God,
;

had existed from

at

eternity

potentiality

and that only

a certain

point in the

remote past, it began showing itself as an actual process. For, even then it will have to be explained how a some thing which had existed from all eternity as a potentiality,
could suddenly manifest itself as an actuality. And as this cannot very well be explained, we must maintain
that the creative or
sential
to

moulding

activity, if

it

is

at all

es

God, has always existed as an actuality and

it

not as a potentiality.
If,

however,

Creation impossible if activity 6

tial TT

be held that the activity is not essen to God, but only accidental, then
it

ne must have come by

at

the

time

moulding But how, whence, and in what way did He come by it ?| There is hardly any reasonable way of showing how a being that had remain ed perfectly satisfied without activity from all eternity,
the

wlien

HG

beg

or creating

Universe.

could suddenly start creating a Universe. Even if we grant that God, not being unintelligent matter cou \d make such a sudden
first be inHingis morally
>

resolve,

our
i

difficulties
,
.

are not solved.

,

indefensible.

v Jbor,
II.
i.

unless

in

the beginning

all

nl we dogmatically assume that were created alike, we cannot

* Shar. Bhash.,

33.

with Rat. Pr.

See Note 34.

Kee Note 35.

99

maintain, without contradiction, that God,

created a world so

who

is

con

ceived as a moral and just being, could possibly ever have

full of partiality

and

suffering-*

Nor
created
will
;

is

the contradiction

all

removed by saying that God beings equal and endowed them with free
free choice

and that they by their

be

made themselves

happy
will

or miserable, good or bad.f For then the question

:

Why

did

He

give free-will to created beings

and thus make them behave one way or another so as God to bring suffering and wickedness into the world ?
is

regarded as omniscient and

He must

therefore have

known

the disastrous consequences which His gift of

free-will

produce in the world. As a matter of fact, however, God cannot possibly

to

was going

be conceived as having created these suffering or en joying beings, or, as they would be called, souls, if

For nothing that is they are regarded as everlasting. created or produced can possibly last for ever.} There
no known example of it. Nor can the souls themselves be brought forward as examples of such produced but
is

everlasting

things.

For that

is

just
;

what

will

be

disputed and will have to be proved and a thing which has to be proved cannot be brought forward as an in stance of ascertained truth. Moreover, we have seen that
the real experiencers, that
is

to say,

the Atmans,

must

be eternal,

uncreate and immortal.

But even granting, for the sake of argument, that they are created by God and endowed with free-will,
*
J

Shar. Bha.sh.

II.

i.

34 and 35.
;

Rat. Pr.,

II.

i.

34 (end

implied).

A common Hindu
Up.,
I. ii. 12.

notion

Comp., Nastyakritah Kritena, MunJ. Cha. Ka., Vol. I, p. 143.

100

our difficulties are not removed.

not hold
if

For even then we can

and
free

God

to

be

just, impartial
if

from cruelty,

not positively merciful,

we maintain
first

that

He

created
it,

or

moulded

this

Universe for the

time,

and made

without any reason, full of suffering and partiality. All such objections and contradictions are removed
eontradietipns in a begin-

No

entirely,
,,
.

as
,,

we
,

shall see,

if

we accept
.

the

view that the universal manifesto*

it

Sam-

mnjrless

ti(m neyer beg ^^ but that

for ever

^^
it is

been

and

that, in

short,

cs

existences.

manifestation, or series of Universes, is called, as said before, Samsara. e n 1V e 2 The next doct e is that the istso f v aHous grades of Samsara consists of various orders of

an eternal process which has gone on for ever and ever. This beginningless process of universal

sensible
beings.

The and

woTlTs^nd
is

experiencing beings, inhabiting what ma -v be called various worlds or modes

o f specific existence.*

In regard to the worlds, the existence of the sensible obvious to all.

But we have seen that the originating sources

sensible
are themselves
to

of the

in addition

And super-sensible realities. these there are the Atmans with tliek

things to be explain There are also the Manases which serve as the direct instruments of experience on the part of the Atinans.t There is no reason why these in themselves as

various Sariiskaras and Adrishtas

ed presently.

*Vaish.

Sfi.,

IV.

ii.

5-11;

Nya. Bhash., IV.

Shar. Bhash., IV.
44.

i.

55

N. V. T.

T.,

p. 441, line 14 (over.)

frashasta, pp. 49 and 280

iii

46-52 with Vijn.

and Ani.

Sankh. Ra,,

and

53,

Sahkh. Su., III. with ccmms. See

;

Note

36.

super-sensible Realities should not constitute another order other worlds or spheres, of things, besides the sensible

which we may call the transcendental or super-sensible. Not only is there no reason why they should not constitute
such super-sensible worlds, but there
tal entities
is

every reason to

believe that these worlds, constituted by the transcenden

as transcendental, exist.

For, as

we

shall see,

a world or sphere of existence is nothing but a condition of the experience on the part of experiencing beings
;

and therefore there must be as many varieties

In regard to these beings, they form themselves into a

of worlds

as there are fundamentally different types of beings.

we

find that there are, in

the sensible world, a great variety of them, and that

number

of orders

and grades.

These grades, we also find, form a series, one extremity of which lies in that order of beings, whose experiences
are the most limited.*

we come up towards man, we

Beginning from this grade, as find what may be called

an ascending series, each successive order in which is found having experiences which are wider in range than
those of the beings of the preceding order.

In this way finally we come to man,

who undoubted

But there is no ly stands at the head of this series. reason to suppose that man is absolutely the highest On the contrary, seeing that man is limited order.
and that he
his
is often frustrated or unexpectedly helped in endeavours by unseen powers, we must admit there are beings who are higher and more powerful than men,

and who

exist in

unseen forms. t
30, p. 180
I.

If

what

is

super-sensible

* Shar. Bliash.,
]

I. iii.

Based on Brih. Up.,

iv.

M. 10, with Shankara Bhashya on

it.

102

in

man can
And
if

exist in

other beings

who
these

an unseen form after death, why not habitually exist in such forms ?
beings
exist

in

unseen,

i.e.,

super
or

sensible forms, then there are also states of existence

worlds which are also super- sensible. In this way we find that there are in the Samsfira
different orders of things,
i.e.,

different

worlds sensible
of

and

super-sensible,

as

there

are

different orders

Man belongs to one of them. experiencing beings. And a consideration of the nature of man leads 3.
iis

to the
-

next doctrine of the Vaisheis

>

helS
eonstituteI.

? bika

li

as already implied in the

analytic part, that

(i)

man

consists of*:

A body

and

the four classes of

(ii)

which are produced out of and conditioned Akasha. Paramanus

senses,

Manas, by the operation of which the awareness of the different things and memory are, on the part
of the

Atmans, made possible.

is

It is eternal,

but without

any magnitude whatever. The Atman which (iii)

Of these
three,
it

eternal

and

infinite.
is

is

the

Atman which

the real

Atman
is

in

man

the

expert-

and the Atman gains its of the world by means of experience the body, not immediately, but through
experiencer
;

the
it

intermediate link of the Manas

without the Manas

it

can have no experience whatever, as without can be no awareness of things.

there

And, as the

real experiencer, the

Atman must

also

Atman
agent.

as

be the agent of
* See Note,37,

activities

which are

a t least voluntarily performed.

103
a

o-foid reT suits of Atman s activities.

(i)

As
and
init ._

result

of these

experiences

activities the

7 Atman has produced

Certain tendencies, faculties or character (SamsCertain potentialities of relation or moral worth

the
in

knra).*
(ii)

(Adrishta).*

And

way
]

which Sarhskaras,
are

i.e.,

faculties

and

Samskaras
how produced.

character,

iaps

b est

produced can be perillustrated by an example

like the following.

Let us suppose a boy studies mathematics, say, Euclid, to be more definite, and becomes very proficient

he takes up, let us suppose, some profession or trade where he has absolutely no use for Euclid as such, and as a consequence forgets, say, in 20 or 30 years time, all that he learnt as a
in
it.

Then, later on in

life,

youth of

He may even forget Euclidean Geometry. But he can never shake off the very first definition. the mathematical bent which his mind has received.

This will follow him at every step, and guide and deter mine his mode of thinking. This bent, tendency or
capacity,
is

what a Hindu would

in
of

call

Samskara

a
bis

mathematical Samskara
study
of

this case,

produced by
details

mathematics,
is this
it

which the

may be

entirely forgotten.

But what
onmSK

...
tl

r a

IS

Samskara in reality? It is obvious can be nothing else but a general

that
is

general

memo-

impression,

to

say,

memory
*

of

activities
38.

or

general experience as

See Note

17

104

distinguished from their details, which, as in our illus tration, may be entirely forgotten. But while the
detailed

memory,

or

memory

of the details of experience

is

may

disappear, the

Samskara as general memory

not

gone.
of

And, as in the case of the mathematical, so in that all other Samskaras or tendencies and capacities,

they are produced by experiences and activities of other sorts and are the general memory of them as distinguished from their details, which may be equally
forgotten.*

So far then with regard

results of activities.

to

Samskaras as one
this

of the

But before we leave

question

we must
things.

take into consideration a few more incidental

We
Details

have seen that when the Samskaras are produced, ^le details may be forgotten. We are of ex-

gotten but

Kilyl
experience

^tting
day.
It

Details

of

experience every

not

often requires a great effort of

memory to recall minute details of which a man had only yesterday. Thus while

we

are forgetting details always, this forgetfulness in some cases may be so complete that hardly a trace is

left.

That

this is
is

so in regard to details of experiences

had as infants
complete

obvious.

As an

illustration

of

such

forgetfulness of

the experiences
case, as given

of adult life

take the remarkable

Hanna
"

by Drs. Sidis
In this

and Goodbart
existence

in their

Multiple

Personality."

case every trace of

memory
lost
*

of his

was entirely

by Mr.

Hanna

twenty-four years after an accident

See Note

38.

105

past existence previous to the accident was brought back, and the two Han nas as the two separate groups of experi ences may be called were united into one whole.*

again as a new-born baby does, but with tendencies and aptitudes which were those of Mr. Hanna, as he was previous to the accident. And it was with the greatest difficulty that memory of the
lie

and

had

to start life

But that the memory of the past could be brought back shows that, though entirely forgotten, it was not
absolutely
lost.

Although there are not perhaps many cases recorded by European psychologists of such complete forgetfulness of the whole of the past, and its eventual recovery,
examples are not wanting of complete forgetfulness of part of the past experiences, and their calling up to

memory.
hypnotism.

Several such cases are

known

to

students of

While these are examples from the West, there are

many
(i)

in the East.

All these

show

that

The Samskfiras

are produced by experience

and

activity; and incidentally,

(ii)

(iii)

They are only general memory of the experiences The details of these experiences may be
had
in infancy
lost

entirely
;

forgotten, like the details of experiences

(iv)

(v)
(vi)

But because they are forgotten they are not They can be brought back to memory
;

Forgetfulness of the past experience, even complete, does not prove its non-existence in the

when
past
;

and

finally,
*

Multiple Pers., pp.

83320.

106

(vii)

as

They they must

are retained in
be, for reasons

experiencing Atman, given in the analytic part.

of experiences

the

So far then with regard to those results which are called Samskaras.

As

for potential worth or desert (Adrishta),

that

is,

Adrishta s
how produced.

the second

class of results
]

exper i ence)
about.

et lls see

how

that too

produced by comes

a body of a particular kind, and in a certain situation and environ ment. What birth can really mean and why he finds
a
is

When

man

born he finds himself

in

particular body situation, but not in another, will

himself in

that

and that

particular
later.

be considered

That he

is
is

Now, body

it

born in a particular situation is obvious. observed that, being born in a particular

in a particular situation, a
his

man

can, within limits,

make

body and situation either better or worse. he can make them more or less conducive That For to his happiness by acting one way or another. on disease, and instance, he drinks, and thereby brings
is to say,

thus makes his body a source of misery for himself or, he observes strictly the laws of health and keeps
;

the body in good condition so as to

it.

derive nothing but

to

his situation, he Or, regard happiness from behaves in such a way that he makes all his relations, and those who surround him, most unfriendly to him
in
;

or,

he renders services

helpful and grateful to

his

them and makes them all him. While thus he can change
to

body and

situation one

way

or another,

if

he chooses

to do so, by behaving differently, the behaviour which would improve them and make them more conducive

107

better for him, together happiness and therefore which will lead with the thoughts, ideas and feelings the right behaviour to such behaviour, may be called and situation, or conduct for him in that particular body and and one which he should follow in that body
to his

of his situation; while that conduct

and those thoughts make his body and feelings leading to it which would be called and environment worse for him, may similarly refrain pur the wrong conduct, which he should frorn^ be ascertained which is the In this way it can suing. for a man in a particular body and right conduct and definite rules can be situation, and which is wrong down so as to be able to say that such and such
;

laid

conduct, being right, would other conduct being wrong would pro happiness, while

be conducive to his true

duce suffering for him.*

While
conduct

this

is

possible,

and while there are cases

or wrong where we may know absolutely which the right a man following it does not yet find that one way or another imme change his body or situation sometimes meet with results of his
is,

we

diately.

He may

he has to wait for them. conduct immediately, but often on indulging in all Thus, for instance, a man may go the conse kinds of excesses and yet may long escape but acts of Again, although doing nothing quences. find himself surrounded by kindness, a man may yet to be ungrateful to him, and make people who continue lie has waited for some life miserable, until, when
his

time, he finds a

change

in the situation.

Again, a

man

who
*

is

constantly cheating others,

may

yet for long find

see Ap. A, p. 177.

standard For the Nya.-Vaish, idea of the Moral

108

these very victims of his, his friends, until one day he is caught and sent to prison. Why the results of conduct
for

some time are thus postponed

to

will

appear later on,

is

but that they do have

It is

wait for manifestation

in

a fact.
in one

happening every day

but in
all,

our

life,

not

only

direction,

wrong, waiting for

appear, they alter a
situation.

the results of conduct, right or fulfilment. But when the results

s relation

man
to

with his
the

body and
potential

They may,

therefore, be called

bodily conditions and situations, as distinguished from his actual relation to the

relations of the

man

certain

body and situation which he possesses at the moment. This actual relation again may be said to represent what

may be

called his cash-value or worth,

as,

for instance,

has such a fine or miserable body, such good or bad circumstances, so many friends or
say
:

when we

man

enemies, so

much wealth

or so

much

poverty, and so on.

is

And

if

the actual relation to a

body and situation

his

worth in cash, the potential relations of a man may be called his worth in possibilities or, simply, his potential
worth.

And

it is

this potential

worth which

is

called

Adrishta in Sanskrit and constitutes the second group of results of experience.*

Thus
ences
(i)
:

man

is

constantly producing by his expeii-

Samskaras, or tendencies, faculties, or simply character, on the one hand and

;

(ii)

Adrishta, or potential worth, on the other.

use of the

On the

word
see

Potential

in

this

connection, and in

Nyaya-Vaish. generally,

Note

39,

109

These results are had, as said above, really by the Atman. For it is the Atman that acts and has experi
ences and thereby produces Saihsk&ras and Adrishta,

But of course the Atman acquires them, just as it has Meaning of the experiences, when in relation with a
birth,
life.

death and

produced and
relation

But as any particular body is body. has a beginning, it is obvious, that the
it,

with

of the eternal

Atman, (by means Atman, by means

of the

Manas), also begins.*

When

this

relation of the

of the

Manas, with a body begins, the Atman may be said to be And while it is really the body, which is incarnate.
born, that
the
is to say, is

produced in a particular way, yet

a figurative
relation
of its

Atman may

also be said to be born in

sense,

meaning thereby the beginning

with that body. a figurative sense, be spoken of as the death

its

Similarly, the death of the body may, in

of

the

At

man, meaning simply The Atman being eternal can have no real birth and death, if by these terms are meant the production and
destruction
of

dissociation from

that body.

thing of which

The Atman can only come

dissociated from a body.

into relation with

they are predicated. and be

While thus the birth and death

an Atman conies
spoken
of

of a body,

with which
figuratively

into

relation,

may

be

as

the

birth and death of the

Atman

itself,

the period during which the body lasts may be called an incarnation of the Atman, and the latter spoken of as
living during this period.
* Vaish. Su., Upask., V,
ii.

17

Vivr., VI,

ii.

15

Nya. Var.,

III.

i.

IU.

HO

Using the words

senses
:

birth,

death and

life in

the above

(i)

The

eternal

Atman

of a

man, together with

is its

Atman
iS

primary immediate instrument of gaining &in SL nd Doctrine of Reexperience, is born and dies not once incarnation,but countless times. T has It gone on clearly stated
in

man

tne

eternal Manas, which

b Fn

ancl

ft*

implies

doin g

tllis

for ever

and

ever, without a

explained.

beginning, in an equally beginningless

series of universes.*
(iij

As

it

does

so,

each successive birth or incarna

are determined absolutely

tion

and

its possibilities

and

in every respect by the Adrishta and Samskara acquired Adrishta and in the previous incarnation or incarnations which the Atman has never been, Samskara, without

because

its

series

of

incarnations never began. t

it

It

reaps exactly according as

has

sown."

The Adrishta and Samskara determine

(a)

The

and time, environment, circum stances, possible associations and so on of and in the new birth.
locality

(6)

The family and parentage, with which, on the one hand, the Atman is linked by Adrishta; and which, on the other, can offer it at least some affinity of Samskara, i.e., of character and tendencies both of body and
Vivr-.,

* Vaish. sa., Upask.,

V.

ii.

17

VI.

ii.

15; Prashasta, pp. 280

to 28 1,308
t

and
27.

309.
I. i.

Nyfi. Su., Nya. Bhash.,

19

Nya. Var., IV.

i.

10; III.

i.

19, 22,

25, 26,

and

See Note

40.

111

mind, so that the latter in there-incarnating Atman can find some scope, however small,
of

manifestation,
in

deserts

the direction

and thereby can get its of what may be

called his subjective being, as distinguished

from his objective situation, possessions and circumstances that is to say, all that is

meant by
(c)

heredity.

The

possible period
i.e.,

during which that incarna

possible longevity.

tion can last,

(iii)

The Samskaras
differ

also

show themselves

as

the

innate tendencies, capacities and possibilities of character

in

which children
(iv)

from one another.

But the Adrishta and Sarhskara determining a

of the child,

fresh incarnation, or Sarhskara

ter

and capacities
is

showing as innate charac need not necessarily be,

life.

and, as

obvious, often cannot be, exactly those acquired

in the immediately preceding

Owing
Postponed
rishta

to

our varied kinds of activities

.

we

are

daily

Ad-

how pos-

acquiring worths and tendencies which are often so incompatible with one an
other that

they

cannot

possibly

be

Thus, for instance, a man may ac worths one of which, when actualised, will make him, let us say, poor and miserable from birth, while another will give him a most comfortable and
actualised together. f

quire two

sets of

luxurious situation, also from birth. J It is obvious these two sets of worths cannot actualise themselves together.
*Vivr., VI.
see
ii.

15.

|
p.

Nya. Bhash., IV.

i.

64.
ii.

JPrashasta, p.

281; Randall

53, line 13;

Upask., VI.

1C;

Note
18

41.

112

operating the other must wait till it finds an opportunity just as seeds sown in the ground, and then covered with snow, must wait till the snow

When

one set

is

This is also they can germinate. the reason, why, in our daily life, many of our acts do In fact, not bring about their consequences at once. it is by virtue of this principle that any potential worths
melts away before
are at all produced. Otherwise, all activities bringing about their results at once, all worths would be only

cash-values.

And what

is

true of Adrishta,

is

also

true of

Sams

We cannot simultaneously be both sentimental karas. and cool and calculating or, at the same time both
;

sickly

and robust.

Thus Adrishtas and Samskaras often being incom patible with one another, some will have to wait (and And it wait even for long), when others are operating.
out of this waiting Adribhtas and Samskaras (which may be of many lives of the past, and even of a very remote past), that a certain portion may determine the
is

while the Adri^hfca and Samskara which are being acquired now, may have to wait long That is how it may happen that the next for their turn.

next birth of a

man

incarnation of a

man may be

very different from what

one could possibly expect from his present conduct and

character.

bright and keenly intellectual man may be re-born, as a sentimental fellow, and a saintly man may

re-appear with many an evil tendency in his nature. Or, one, who has tried all his life to help others, may yet
find

himself in very

undesirable and unfriendly sur

roundings.

113

of Bat, of course, none of the Samskfiras or Adribhtas a man are lost. They wait, as it were, 8 S u*b - Umlnai behind him, and form a sort of reserve
in the

background.
is

It is

perhaps this

reserve which,
in the

it

would seem,
sub-liminal

now being recognised

of a

West

as the that

self

man.
is,

However
or

may

note be, the point to

that not all

the tendencies

showing

in

and capacities which we are now forming our lives, nor all the worths which we are

may show themselves in our next incar Some of them may re-appear in the next birth, nation. or they may all sink down, for a time, into some deep strata of our being, while others may crop up.
now
acquiring,

In every case,

however, any capacities and tenden which may show themselves as cies,
inborn in a child,
or any circumstan

ces in
in

which

it

the past and

may be born, are only things acquired are not gifts as they are often called.!
called

The above ideas together constitute what are

the

doctrines

of

Re-incarnation

and
moral

Karma (lit, activity, meaning due to activities which in their turn produce causation Adribhtas and Samskaras).J But in reality they form in the Nyaya is called simply only one doctrine, which We shall refer to the two doctrines
Pretyabhava.
to
1

together as

Re-incarnation,

except

when Karma

will

have

be specially mentioned.
* Ibid.
|

Kandali, p. 53, line

1.

See Note

42.

Supra.

114
^ r

in

^S

ar g umeilts

lu

support of
says
:

incarnation.

He-incarnation the

Nyaya simply
established

That the Atman re-incarnates

is

by the
it

very fact that it is eternal.* This statement of the ancient Nyaya, in so far as
relates to the

existence of
finds

the

Atman previous
in

to

its

birth

in

a body,
writer, T

a strange paiallel

a
:

most

modern
"

mean

Dr.

Me
will

Taggart, who

says

Any

evidence which
"t

prove immortality will

if

also prove pre-existence.

existence of

The Hindus, however, are of Atmans is admitted,

opinion,

that,

pre-

then, from that very

admission, will follow, as an inevitable consequence, the doctrine of Re-incarnation also. Hence they have

been

satisfied
is

chiefly

Atman

a perishable

with refuting the idea that the And this notion being thing.

recognised as refuted, by every body in India, the truth of Re-incarnation was never questioned.

That

is

perhaps how Re-incarnation has been so

in India.

commonly accepted
sally accepted idea

And

it

being a univer

among Hindus
of
its

of all shades, as well

as by Buddhists
as to

and

others, although they

have differed

the

exact

mode

operation,

none of these

people have troubled themselves very much to establish its truth, as a fact, by argument. Still there are many arguments which can be adduced in its support. Of
these the following is one J:

have seen that an Atman, during life, is always And Adrishta acquiring Adrishfta or Potential Worth.
always means possible
*

We

relation
|

to

new
J

situation.
43.

Nya.

Sti.,

IV.

i.

10.

Dog. ReL, p. 113.

See Note

115

But much of this Adrishta must relate to situations of the same kind in which it is acquired inasmuch as much
of

by which Adrishta is acquired, affect and beings existing in that same kind of situa things tion or state. That is to say, some of the Adrishta
the activities,

acquired
the

human state must relate to a human state, which may, still as a human state, be higher or lower than
in a

some

one in which Adrishta was acquired. Similarly, of the Adrishta acquired by a superhuman being
in

existing

the super-sensible
state,

world must relate

to

superhuman
of Adrishta,

and so

on.

We may

call

this

kind
state,

the Adrishta

of the

same or similar
as distinguished

or

simply

similar

Adrishta,

from

Adrishta which
or state of a

may produce

relations with a situation

it

kind other than the one in which

is

acquired.

Now
life,

is

there is no man who, at any moment of his without some Adrishta of the same state. For,

by our

actions,

we

are always affecting others

state,

existing

with us in the same

and always having the conse

quences of some of these acts at any rate postponed. This being so, when a man dies, the Atman must still

have in

it

some Adrishta

of

the

same

state.

This
a

means

that the

Atman has
same kind

potential

relations with

situation of the

Adrishta.

If

the

man

in which it acquired the does not die at the time when

we
to

are
live

till

supposing him dying, and, if he contiuues the Adrishta of the same state, which he

would otherwise carry with him at death, becomes an actual relation to an actual situation, then, it is obvious,
that the situation that

would be produced as the

result

116

of that Adrishta
it

would be one

of a similar

kind in which

was acquired, that is to say, a human situation on And if on his continuing to live, the Adrihhta would actualise itself into a situation on this
this earth.

earth,

there

is

no reason
that

to

suppose

that,

simply be

cause he

dies,

situation

when

actualised

would

change completely and be something other than human and earthly. And if an Adrishta of the same state,
during earthly life, can produce a situation, to which the Atman is bound, only on this earth, then that the Atman, dying with any Adrishta it is certain,
acquired
of the

same

state,

must be re-born

in the state in

which

the Adrishta was acquired.

And

as most

men have some

it is

Adrishta of the same state when they die, they must all be re-born on earth.
Further a r g u*R e-fncarnation,
"o^of

obvious

born again and again will be evident also from a conis

That the Atman

sideration of the folloing points*:

of a man has a beginning as surely as it but the Atman, as we have seen, is eternal and being eternal, we cannot think that it has been to say, from all eternity, without an lying naked, so embodiment of some sort. If it could lie naked all

The body
;

has an end

these

countless reons,
? It

why

should

it

suddenly come

to

be born

makes
case,

a resolve

cannot be said that an Atman suddenly to be born and is born. For, in that
first

we have

to
;

show the antecedents which can

lead to

which

such a resolve because we know of no resolves are made without antecedents consisting of
Secondly,
if

thoughts, ideas and perceptions.

* See

an Atman

Note

44.

117
its

by making a sudden resolve, it would be born only under conditions which could make it happy. But there are millions of
choice,

came

to

be born out of

own

men
in

that are

situations

or bodies

anything but happy in regard to their and it is unlikely that the Atnians
;

them would have corne

Nor can
it

to be

born out of anything

born, once and
is

like choice.

be said that

it is

all of

sudden, entirely by chance.

is

For, there

a rigid law

which guides and governs the body in which the Atman born, (that is to say, with which it is related) and the surroundings in which the body is found. This body and surroundings form one term of the relation, while
the
it is

Atman forms
hardly

the

other.

In these circumstances

reasonable to assume that, of the two terms of a relation, while one is guided by law, the other is merely a thing of chance.

be held that it is God who associates Atman with a body, and He does so only once, then such a God would be open to the charge of injustice and involved in contradictions.* He would be unjust and malicious, inasmuch as He associates one Atman, without any reason, with a body where a man cannot
Finally,
if it

the

but be happy and have pleasant surroundings, while He associates another with a body which can be only

and surroundings which can only But nobody thinks of God as being unjust or whimsical, and therefore the theory that God asso ciates an Atman with a body, only once, without any reason, must be abandoned.
a source
foster
of misery,
vice.

*Brah.SO., 11.84-36, &c.

118

And

if

God cannot
for

associate

the

body only once and

create the Atrnan.

no reason,
first

For, in the

Atman with the much less can He place, we have seen

;

that the

even

and secondly, would be involved in just the same inconsistencies, and would be open to the same charge of injustice and whimsical conduct as in
is
if it

Atman

uncreate and eternal

were created, God

the

case of his associating an

;

eternal

Atman with
:

body once and for no reason for we have to ask why does he create and place some souls (as Atmans in those
circumstances would be called), in pleasant, and others
in unpleasant or vice-breeding surroundings ?

Nor

is

it

of

any avail

to

say that

all

this

can be

Re-incarnation explained by what is called heredity.* and heredity, j? or ^he q ues tion, raised here, is not how offsprings resemble their ancestors and parents in bodily characteristics or tendencies, or how they inherit
:

circumstances from them.

For that

is

hardly a prob

lem

it is

a fact which anyone can see.

to

But

it is

why

we come
particular

be born of particular parents, inheriting

other
inferior nature,

bodies and surroundings, and not of

parents of a superior or
different bodies

and inheriting
is

and situations
the

of a different character ?
is
:

In other words,

question

why

a particular

Atman connected with one body rather than another ? And finally, how it comes to have a body at all ? It is a
fact,

or

us say, that a man inherits a miserable body surroundings, because his parents have miserable
let

bodies and surroundings

does this

and the question is why man or Atman come to be born in a family or

;
:

* &ee

Note

45.

119

surroundings where everything is miserable, everything is conducive only to vice, and not where he can have
everything in perfection
?

Of coin so,
like

if

the existence of independent Realities

an Atman be denied, as the Materialist may deny, But we have seen then such a problem does not arise.

account for consciousness, the existence of Atman as an independent Reality must be admitted. And, if this is admitted, then mere heredity will not
that, in order to

and cannot explain the problem.

then be
herit a
:

For, to repeat,

it

will

of these Atmans come to in and surroundings rather than particular body

why does one

another

inadequate the idea of heredity as an explana tion of this problem is, can be perhaps best illustrated by the following example. Suppose a man renders service
in the shape of us assume, from money, one of the State Treasuries or Banks with which the
to a State,

How

and thereby deserves a reward

some money.
State has

He

gets this

let

business.

treasuries of this

There may be several banks or and the kind all over the country
;

nearness of his residence, cr out of some other consideration, gives the man an order
State, in view, say, of the

part of He goes to this bank, cashes his order and the country. the amount. Afterwards, as he comes out of the bank gets
to receive

the

money from

bank

in a certain

with his cash, a crowd of people sees him do so. Then, man s suppose, these people as an explanation of our

because getting suddenly wealthy, say he got wealthy he got the money from the bank. It is obvious, this can never be the real explanation. That will have to
:

19

120

be sought in the fact that the

man

deserved the wealth

by

his service.

In the same way, the explanation of the fact that we get different kinds of bodies and surroundings is not

we get them, or, which them from our parents, but

that

is

the

same

that
of

we

thing, inherit deserve to inherit

them.

And

this deserving

ours again can be but

the result of our past thoughts and deeds, retained as Of course, potential worths or Adrishtas in the Atmans.

bad body and

such as a good body or a so on, only in families where these can be had, as the money in our illustration can be had only from a bank or a treasury but not from a beggar s hut.
deserve,

we can

get what

we

the difficulties which beset the theory of a first and only birth of a man on earth are at once and one removed by the doctrine of Re-incarnation namely, that
;

Thus

the

ceaselessly repeating its births in a beginseries of lives in a beginningless series of Uni ningless
is

Atman

verses (Samsarasj and that, of these births of the Atman,

the successive ones are determined, entirely and absolute

ly,

in regard to their nature, heredity

and environment,
activities of the

and even possible longevity, by the

Atman

in the

preceding ones,

the

Atman

suffering or
:

enjoying exactly as it has acted exactly as it has sown.

in the past

it

reaps

While Re-incarnation thus solves a number

Re-i
tion:

of difficul

near na memory of
-

ties,

the

only objection which can be

it,

the past.
will

seriously raised against

namelv, that
existences,

we do
to

not

remember our past

be seen
it is

be based on erroneous notions.

To begin

with,

not true that

we

forget entirely everything of

our past

experience

for a

man
as

does possess a

memory
it,

of the past, a general

memory,

we have

called

in the
is

shape of tendencies, faculties

say, as Samskaras.

and character; that

to

What

is

termed conscience in the

West may
of the
details
if

also be interpreted as only a

vague memory

experiences of the past.

details

Secondly, it is only the of experience that are not remembered. But

of

the

experiences can

be forgotten by an

accident, as they were in the case of Mr.

Hanna, surely must be forgotten when the old body in which the experiences were had goes to pieces, and a new body
they
is

formed.

Moreover, we

ences which

we had

all forget the details of experi as infants and yet we do not doubt

our infancy.

But, as a matter of

fact,

even the

details,

as stated before, are not entirely lost. by suitable means, they can be, and the

As we Hindus
is

shall see,
say,

have

often been, recovered.*

The question

of

memory,

therefore,

hardly a real

objection against Re-incarnation. Before leaving this question of memory, it may be noted here in passing that one of the features which
characterise a

man

of

high type, such as a Rishi or a

Buddha, is, according to the Hindus, this very fact that he does remember all his past lives and every experience
in them.

By

virtue of this principle of Re-incarnation the At-

Re-birth as sub-

man may

be reborn (for every birth

is

sXe-hu
beings,

ma n

ou] y a re-birth) not only, as a

man
;

but,

according to Adrihhfca, in any of the lower forms of beings which are below man or it may
*

Upask., V.

ii.

18; VI.

ii. 16.

Yoga

Su.,11. 39,

with Bhash. and Vrit.

122

re-appear, by other Adrishtas, as one of the higher order of beings in the super-sensible world which, as we have
seen, exists.*

This

is
is

How
sible

this
-

pos-

possible by so behaving during life, as to acquire Adrishtas not of the same state,

but other Adrishtas productive of a dis

state
;

similar

(which we may call simply dissimilar and by deserving thereby a situation of a Adrishta) An Atman can sub-human or a super-human order. |
acquire dissimilar

Adrishtas by
it is

its

conduct,

because

being all-pervading,

at every

relation not only with

the world of

moment of its life, in human beings biit

its

with various others.

it

Being in relation with these worlds

its

can

affect

them by

conduct, (by
it

deeds, thoughts,

and

feelings) as

much

as

can

affect the

And

just as in consequence of affecting the

human world. human world

in one

way

or another,

it

deserves in the same world a

it

situation of this or that sort, so does

deserve different
its

situations
affecting

in

them

the other worlds, in consequence of in various ways.

it

In this

way
"

happens, that Atmans that were born

AH

as

human beings

often appear,
all

accord-

ing being s are Atmans born in states various

ing to their Adrishta, in * In grades ot existence.

the varying
the various

fact,

experiencing beings, forming the dif

and

ferent grades of the universe, sensible super-sensible, are nothing but Atmans born in these
It is

grades. J
encers, as
*

we

alone which are the real experihave seen. And the Atmans are constantly
f Ibid.

Atmans

| Prashasta,

Prashasta, pp. 280-281. p. 39 (bottom).

See Note

43.

See Note

46.

123

changing

their situations for others of a similar or dis

similar character, according as, in any given situation, they behave one way or another, that is to say, according as they acquire Adrishta of one kind or another.
5.

But

as Adri^hta always
r

Hierarchy of beings created by Adrishta

or
worth."

higher \eu\\ng to a higher or lower situation, is nothing but a ,. T , ,. m relation ot a higher or lower order. This
lower

means

relation, a

*^*>

again can only mean a relation either of

controlling or of being controlled. And as birth in any grade or order
sult of Adrishta of

is

one kind or another,

to

merely the re be born in a

higher or lower grade, really means either to have con trol over, or be controlled by, others just as in human life to be placed in a higher or lower position means to
;

have power over, or be controlled by, others.

And

so

it

happens

that,

owing

to the

working

of

Adrishta, all the experiencing beings, in a system or Universe, are brought into direct or indirect relation

with

one another and are arranged in a hierarchical order in which the higher orders control the lower. In
this hierarchy of beings,
it is

obvious, the highest

it

is

that

which has control overall; and

as
is

can get

to that position,

Adrishta, while the other beings their respective places accord occupy

also obvious, as a result of its

own

ing to theirs.

This gives unity

Hierarchy produees system

variet y of

and infinite and of the things beings, under their control and all things are under the control of, and serve as means
to
*

the multiplicity

See Note

47.

124

some being or beings. And as it gives unity to the multiplicity, it makes of the latter a single system and an organic whole. 6. But if in this system and hierarchy, to be born in
of experience for,

The
is

Universe created ana

a particular situation, and to have a particular measure of control and influence

exists fora moral purpose.

over others, means merely the actualisation

more or
it

less partial

or

ones po

tential

worth (Adrishta),

follows that the various situa

tions and spheres of influences are themselves nothing but the direct results of the worths themselves. That is
to say, they are created

their

own

activities (Karrna).

by the Atmans themselves by That a situation, which

acts,

follows immediately a certain act or acts done by a man,

is

created

by that act or

nobody doubts.

But,

if

cular act or acts, there

an immediate consequence can be the creation of a parti is no reason why we should not

regard deferred consequences of acts also as such. And as actualisation of Adrishtas is nothing but the realisation
results of acts performed in the past, all and spheres of influence in which beings are situations born or continue to exist by virtue of actualised Adrish
tas, are as

of the deferred

much

the creations of their

own

acts of

body
acts

or

mind

as those

which follow immediately other

they may perform. grade of existence and sphere of influence in the Universe is only the actualisation of the Adrishta of some experienc

which

And

as every situation or

ing entity,
tion, or
is

it

follows that the whole Universe

acts of experiencing
;

is

a crea

a result of the
line
19

beings.*

* Prashasta, p. 48,

Sankh.

Sft.,

VI. 41

Ani., III. 51

(bhoga-bhutaye) Upask., VII. i. 1; Shar. Bhash., II. i. 34, &c., &c.

;

125

That

is to say,

supplying tuations and spheres of influence, according

for the experiencing beings,

the Universe exists for a moral purpose, their various si

to their

each situation or sphere of influence worths, serving as a means on the part of a its share of being getting experience, its meed of joy or of sorrow and suffering ac

cording as

it

deserves.

But

if

the Universe

is

merely an

actualisation of the potential worths of beings created by the acts, and for the experience, of
it

and

is

Itmans,

is

so created, (that

is

to say,

moulded

into shape) of

course, out of the ingredients, and with the assistance of the various powers or forces, which have existed eternally.
7.

Then

again,

less
ses,
safi

A beginningand endless
all

if the Universe, as it exists to-day, has been created as the result of moral

worth on

ethe

linked Ca U

must
1?CU

"

h essences of the

Atmans, it also come to an end some day. tlie ^inverse as a whole exists for
part
,

the

of

the

Universe alternate between

S

the experience of the highest being, (that 8

.

ha

and Cosmos

orahma, not Brahman, as such a being occupying this position is called in Sanskrit), and as such it is merely the
ls
worth."*

T,

actualisation of his

But worth, being acquired,

is

must come
unlimited.

to

an end some day, for nothing that

ac

quired as the direct result of activities can possibly be

come
exists

to

an end

The worth of Brahma, and when it ends,

;

therefore,

must

also

the Universe, which

also

merely as the actualisation come to an end.

of this worth, will

But

if

the present Universe ends, there

its

w ill
r

arise

an
this

other Universe in

place and out of the ruins of

* See

Note

48.

126

For beings are acquiring worth in this Universe as well and some one of them stands, in the universal
one.

hierarchy, next to the present

Brahma.
of this

And when
is

the
to

present Universe perishes,

much

worth

bound

remain

still

unactualised, just as, in the case of an indivi

dual man,

he

dies.

much of his worth remains still potential when And the potential and unrealised worth of the

present Universe as a whole, as well as of the being standing next to the present Brahma, or, of the present

Brahma
to

himself,

occupy that
the
it is

new worth would still permit him position, must be actual ised some day
if

his

when when

proper time and opportunity occurs. actual ised, another Universe will follow.
this

And

Universe will be succeeded by another as a result of the worths acquired in it, it must be conclud

But

if

ed that the present Universe

itself

only as a successor of a past one,

worths.
Similarly, the predecessor
of

in

came into existence which the present

their respective

Brahma, and other beings, had acquired

the
;

present Universe

must have been preceded by another

a beginning.

and so on without

Nor need we think that this series of Universes will come to an end. For there is no reason to suppose And if they are not that the number of Atmans is finite.
ever
finite,

that

is to

say,

if

they are infinite in

number, then

the flow of the Universes will go on for ever, even though

of them may and even actually do, as we shall cease to have Adrishtas and therewith the necessity see, of having experience and existence in specific forms.

some

* At. Tat.Viv.

12?

Thus

the series of Universes

must be

infinite,

begin-

ningless and endless. In this infinite series, the successive Universes being the inevitable results of worths acquired in preceding
ones,
it

also follows, that the series is

held together

by

an inexorable law of cause and sequence. Following this sure and certain law of cause and
effect,

a Universe or orderly arrangement of

things,

i.e.,

a cosmos,
called

comes
into

into

existence,

out of what

may be

dissolved
to

formless ingredients, and is again same chaotic and formless state, only be succeeded by a new cosmic form. Or, as it may
chaotic and
the
stated
:

be

the

ingredients are

eternally

alternating

between the phases of a Chaos and a Cosmos. And if for ingredients we substitute Energy, and for chaotic

and formless

state, a potential phase,

and

for

Cosmos a

phase of explication, then this ancient Hindu teaching finds a strange corroboration in the words of Huxley,

who

says

"The

faith

which

is

born of knowledge finds

in

its

object

in

an eternal order, bringing forth

ceaseless
;

time, change, manifestations of cosmic energy alternating

through endless

endless space

the

between
It

phases of potentiality

and phases

of explication.

may

be that, as Kant suggests, every cosmic magma predes tined to evolve into a new world, has been the no less
predestined end of a vanished
predecessor."*

In this process of alternation

versal

Energy or ingredients,
that
of
* Evolution,

on the part of the uni a complete period of ex

the

plication, together with

following potential
and
9.

and

Ethics, pp. 8

20

128

phase, is technically called a Kalpa (lit. Imagining or thinking), and its two phases Srislifci and Prftlaya,
i.e.,

Creation and Dissolution, respectively.* And these periods succeed one another by virtue of Kala, as seasons follow one after the other as men
;

and are born again as they wake up and and as heavenly bodies whirl around in orbits, sleep and occupy the same postions in the all-pervading Akasha again and again and in ceaseless succession.]"
are born, die
; ;

Finally it is Dik which, when things are created, holds them in their relative positions as Kala urges

them

on.

In this

way

the Universe goes on and on, and for

ever and ever,

its

essence alternating eternally between

phases of explication
8.

and

phases of potentiality.
beings,
i.e.,

And

as this alternation goes on, the

Justice in Universe.

the

eternal

Atmans

in successive

Universes

rea p exac tly as they

have sown in the

preceding ones- Thus there is absolute justice in the Universe and nothing is undeserved. J This cannot possibly be said of the Universe if a God is thought to

have created
9
(i)
1

it

for the first

and only time.

are eternal, and
all

Further,

as the

Atmans

Nothing

new
and
all

ideas and impressions are retained in t *lem an d are even remembered, in their

beings present

always
therefore
progress.
*
I.
iii.

by Eishis and in part or as general memories or Samskciras by otners and as it is these Atmans with
entirety
>

p ast experiences which really build up

| Shar. Bhash.,
p. 53.

Comp. Yathapurvam akalpcujat. See Note 49. Ma. Bhar., I. 1. 38-40. 30 J Randall,
;

129
it

new Universe,
very much
like

follows that a

new

crea
It

tion proceeds along the lines of the old.*

is

the building up,

by men

an old country, of a new colony wherein things are done naturally on the lines of
of

the

old.

That

is

to

say, there

is

behind a

new Universe always

and experiences middling and low,
being
so, it

the

ideas, impressions,

of

various

grades,

high,

of a past Universe.
:

This

The past and old always follows themselves in the present and new. reproduce
There
is,

therefore,

nothing which

is

really

and absolutely new. All appearances are but ? appearances and there is nothing new under
the sun.
(ii)

There

is

no time in the

life of

the Universe
is

when any phase

of

of thought

and experience
all

wanting, although Atmans having

types

thought and experience may not always be found incarnated on earth, or even in the
sensible Universe as a whole.
(iii)

Therefore, there

is

no such thing in the Uni

verse as an absolute progress of all things, all

same time from the lowest stage and then gradually advancing to higher and higher ones. Progress and evolution from a
starting at the

lower stage to a higher one

is

always with
of

reference to individuals or groups

indivi

duals, but never of the entirety of beings all

starting at the

same time horn the lowest

Note
50.

level.

* See

130

10.

This being
of
.

so,

even the progress and evolution

,
,

Progress and
evolution never

any particular individual or group of 1, individuals, from a low stage, is never

-,.

a reall y

blind and

absolutely unaided

groping.*
the Universe,

For there being always in

necessarily
in

though not

the sensible

world, higher types of beings side by side with the lower ones, and the higher ones being, as they must be owing to Adrishta, in touch and relation with the lower, the

former cannot but help and guide or at least influence These the lower, with their own ideas and thoughts.

may be communicated
exist in the

sensible

physically if the higher beings world. Otherwise such thoughts

to

and ideas can be communicated and as

"

us

"

as

inspiration,"

sudden flashes," such mode of communication being possible on account of the fact that Atmans in ex
periencing beings are always in touch with one another, whether incarnate in physical bodies or discarnate.

The History
History of progross and philo-

of

progress,
.

therefore,

must always be
education
,

like that of

progress in
,

made

sophy of history.

by a child. y The child does indeed pro, gress and evolve from a lower stage to a

higher one.

made by
in the
truth.

But if, in writing the history of progress the child, one recorded only the different stages growth of the child, it would be only half the

The

history,

to

be really true and complete,

must take
teachers,

into account the fact that the child has

had

who have helped him and put before him which they indeed knew by experience though
pupil did not.
* See Note 51.
f See

ideas
their

Note

52,

131

things generally progress and as the history of progress means merely the history of assimila tion, on the part of the lower, of the already existing

As

this is

how

thoughts, ideas and achievements of the higher beings, the history of any science or philosophy, which embodies

knowledge

of true

facts

and principles and not mere

speculations, must also take into account the fact that such knowledge had already existed before in higher beings, and was merely learned and assimilated by

lower ones from them

4

knowledge being received either through sensible means or as inspirations and sudden flashes or as super-sensible experiences of a very precise and exact kind, such as ecstatic hearings,
visions,
11.

the

and so on.

Thus

it

ning

No peal beginof know-

ledge.

The

happens that there is no real beginning o f any Science or Philosophy which has in it any true knowledge of facts and laws

m
(not

re ar( l to the nature of things or of

principles of conduct.

That

is to

mere speculation)
at
all.

of things

say, real knowledge and principles has no

(a) of

beginning

This beginningless knowledge

things as they really are, and (b) of prin ciples of proper conduct, has always been had by some being or beings in this beginningless series of Universes.*
the nature of

And

it is

this

two-fold knowledge or wisdom, direct

and immediate, vast as the Universe and without a beginning, which is the Veda.t
It

has always been directly

in its entirety

known and

realised

by

some beings

and by

others in part.

* Cha. Ka., Vol. V, p. 124 et seq.

f

For the Vaish. idea of the Eternity of the Veda, see Note 53,

132

These beings are Brahma and the Rishis, human and superhuman, of various grades. Of the Rishis again
those alone are perfect
tion.

who have

the

Wisdom

in perfec

And

they, as a class, as well as inferior beings, as

other classes,

of Perfect Rishis

have existed eternally. And as the class have existed eternally, some of them

have taught men that aspect of the Veda which consists of the principles and rules of conduct, following which

men may rise from a lower human and superhuman.*

This

to a

higher state of existence,

communicated
principles
vious,

knowledge
of

of

the rules

and

Varnashrama Dharma.

must

conduct which, as is obbe different in different

cases according to the various natures and circumstances

of the persons taught, or simply Dharma.t
is

called

Varnashrama Dharma

This Dharma

men may

follow or not, either from

If

choice or from imperfect understanding.

it,

they follow
If

they do not practise

rise

gradually in
the

the scale of beings.

they

Dharma and do what can but lower

beings of imperfect knowledge and are liable to make mistakes in

their

worth (Adrishta), they go down.

12.

And
rise in

as all

Constant

wisdom
as

and

fall

states.
specific

How
in
is

regard to the practice of Dharma. and

compulsory
existence
forms
suffering.

some
,

of

them
.<

violate

Dharma through
.,
.

weakness,
a

it

dicing
i.

happens there is always U p an d down of beings in

the hierarchy of the universe.}

Nya. Bhash., IV. Upask., IX. ii. 6.
-j-

62

Prashasta, p. 258 (top), with Kandall

Kandali. p. 281,

Prashasta,

p.

272

see

Note

54.

:f

See A ote

55,

133

even those rising constantly cannot have their For the latter are for ever. superior places secured And as worth can never be gained only by worth. unlimited and must come to an end, sooner or later,

And

with the vanishing of worth, the position which is gained In any case, to main as a result of it must also be lost.

one must superior position in the hierarchy, his Dharina not being done always be on the watch lest Therefore properly he may be outdistanced by others.
tain

he can never have real and abiding Peace and Bliss. Thus existence in any one of these rungs of the
universal ladder
is

wanting always
sufferring.

in

and

Bilss

and

is,

in this sense at least,

permanent Peace if in no other, full

of misery, sorrow
13.

and

There

is

Only way out of

this suffering is to be freed from the necessity to n SP e 0r
ci fle

only one way out of this ceaseless anxiet y and constant possibility of falldown and suffering, if not actual i ns

sorrow and torment.

to

And
the

that

way
any
is

is

?op existence.

of

free

oneself from

necessity

of of
to
to

having any form

of existence in at all

the grades of the universal hierarchy

say, to

that

be absolutely free and really independent*

attain
14.

Moksha

or Mukti, as

it is

technically called.

And

this

This free d o

gained only by realisation of

truth,
i.e.,

freedom or Moksha can be had only if tne Atman i s ^ ree(1 ^ rom activity V karma) O f the kind which leads to worth and
.

true

by dfrect^xperience.
* Yaisli
|

thereby to some specific lorm o existence as existence as a member in the

universal hierarchy

may be

called.!

Yaish

VI.

ii. i.

with Upask. (opening line). 1 i-nshastf., 281 Nya. Sfl. 1. i. 2 (Introduction), &c., &c.
Su.,

V.

ii.

1*.

su.,

I. i.

Nya. Bhash.,

134

But how
activity?

is

man going

to

free

himself

from

Not surely by being

idle.

For that would

mean simply not doing the duties of his position and will lead him in the end, not to freedom but to a specific
existence of a very undesirable sort and perhaps to a stone like state. He may not, without disastrous conse

quences, shirk the duties of a position, once he has found himself in it. For, no living creature can live and yet

be absolutely
this rule.*

lutely idle,

and man can be no exception to And if a man, while living, cannot be abso that is to say, if he must be doing something,
idle,

and yet

if

he does not do his duties, he cannot but

produce some Adrishtas by those activities of his which he would be performing as a matter of necessity. These Adrishtas are bound to be of a lower nature and there
fore drag

him down.

Such

activities are

bound

to

pro

duce a lower Adrishta because they will be done only with a view to self-gratification of some sort or other
without any redeeming
therefore,

feature

in

them.

He must,
;

and, at

the

do what really are his duties in the situation same time, he must seek Wisdom, that is,
that
is to

true and direct knowledge of the nature of things as they

really are
:

say,

he must

realise that aspect of

the

Veda which

consists of
that
is,

such Wisdom.f

For

it

is

only by knowing,

realising

by

direct experience,

the truth of things as they really are, that

he can make

himself absolutely free from activity that will produce Adrishta and therefore existence in a specific form.

That nothing but

free
in
*

realisation of truth

can make one

this

way
iii.

will
5.

be evident from the following

t See

Bhag. Gita,

Note

56.

135

considerations.

It is

activity with a motive to

improve

our body and situation, i.e., to gain advantage to oneself or even one s race or country, as opposed to other indivi
duals, races or countries, and their interests, that leads to worth and specific existence. * But such activity is possi ble only so long as men feel and think of things as their

own
to all,

special

possessions,

and not as belonging generally

interests

and think
is

of their special

as opposed to

the interests of others.

feeling again

And
to

this

mode

of thinking

and

due only

ignorance

ignorance of the

true nature of things.

For one thing, it is ignorance of the true nature of things and beings in so far as the perceptible forms of
these
are

cencerned.

These

compounded and organic

things and beings, as wholes, look so pretty and

beautiful or so hideous and repulsive. f

Appearing thus,

they give rise in our nature to likes and dislikes; to

desires to possess them,

or

to aversion.

And

these in

their turn lead to activities with

a view to gain some

realise

advantage.

But

if

we

really

know,
as

i.e.,

by direct expe
conviction
these, they

rience (and

not merely

an

intellectual

produced by reasoning), the true nature of

no longer have such powers over us. For then we realise them to be but shapeless and formless Paramanus,
all alike,

and therefore incapable

again,
it is

of distinction as hide

ous or attractive.

Then

the ignorance in regard to the true

nature of the Atman.

*
ii.

This ignorance, for one thing,

f
1

Prashasta, pp. 280-281.

;

N y-

Sfl.,

Nya. BhSeh., Nya. V3r., IV.

1-3

Nyu. Bhash., IV.

ii.

(introduction).

21

136

makes a being regard, of the particular body or form with which the Atman happens to be related, as itself
or
it clings to it, longs to breaks up and the Atman perpetuate is reborn in some other form, it clings to that form again and thus it goes on for ever and ever. And as it clings
it.

himself.

With

this feeling
it

And when

to

these forms or embodiments, and thinks of one of

at a time as itself,
it is

them
to

led to activities with a view

securing advantages to that particular embodiment

in opposition to the interests

and advantages

of other

beings in other embodiments.

But
a

if

the true nature of the

Atman

is realised,

and

man

the

can feel by direct experience that he himself is Atman, then there can be no clinging to any form
fear that the

and no

form being destroyed, the Atman

has realised himself as not

will perish.

A man who
any
is

the embodiments but the Atman, can never work with a view
to

advantage
only

whatsoever to himself
the

in

opposition to others.
belong,
it

Such advantages or disadvantages

to

obvious,

specific

forms of

existence which are different from one another but not

to

the

Atmans

as such.

For the Atmans are

all alike.

Nor can he work with a- view to gaining advantage for one particular race or people as opposed to other peoples and races. For no race is his, or rather all races are
his.

He
race.

is

the
It

Atman and
is

any
race.

the

body

as such does not belong to that belongs to a particular

Thus

realising the true nature of the

to

Atman,

all

motive for working with a view

gaining for himself

any advantage in any form, as opposed to the interests and advantages of others, that is, other individuals and

137

races, altogether ceases.

activities

And

the motive ceasing, such

this
;

cease

and

activities of

character being

and when there is produced no potential worth there can be no birth into any specific form of existence.
absent, no potential worth
is

Thus with
to

the ceasing of ignorance, both with regard

the essential character of things

and

in

regard to

the
all

Atman, and with the

realisation of their true nature,

causes of births in specific forms are removed and

the

Atman is really free. Wisdom therefore, that

experience of the

is to

say,

the realisation
is

by
the

direct

true nature of things,

only means of getting out of all specific forms of exist ence and of realising true freedom. 15. But a man seeks this wisdom only when he is
really tired of
specific

forms of existence

the
as

feeling

of this tiredness

being realised not so much

clear

fact of experience in his surface consciousness

but as a

deeply rooted Samskara. Such a man, thus tired of being compelled to be ^ orn * n specific forms of life, is also Qualification
truly
fit

for

Wisclom
.

And
,
.
.

knowledge
Its

OP

wisdom. Teachers of wisdom,

transmission.

candidates for Wisdom, like other types

.
-.

of

beings, have existed always in

.

the

Universe

For>

as

we have

geeil|

no

types of

And
to

if

being can ever be really wanting in the Universe. they have existed for ever, they have never had

they groped But this long enough they might have hit upon it. has never been necessary. For if candidates for Wisdom
*

grope after

Wisdom

in the dark.*

If

Kandali, p. 282, &c., &c.

338

have existed always, there have also always been per fected Rishis, who have realised this Wisdom already

by direct experience. These Rishis have taught the worthy candidates who in their turn have learned and realised the truths and then, themselves becoming Rishis and teachers, have taught others. And like the
thus,

Eternal Veda

itself,

the

line"

of teachers

and pupils has

continued

till

this day.

The method of
d

MWdring Wis dom.

steps.
(i)

^. And the pupils have always learned and Ballsed the truths by following a definite method.
.

Three

This method con-

namely: Receiving the truths as statements, or proposi

tions

sists 01 three distinct steps,

enunciating

the

truths

technically

called
(ii)

Hearing

(Shravana);

Understanding
reasoning,
i.e.,

by by weighing arguments both against and for teachnically called Consider

ation,

of the truths, thus received,

or

rational demonstration

(Manana)

and
(iii)

Realisation of the truths by direct experience.*

Taking
First Step.

the

first

step,

the
that

Hearing
is

can be
the

ac-

The
S

com P lisli ed,

to

say,

truths

how e nune iat eI

received, as is obvious, only from teachers who have already realised them as they are. What,
therefore,

* S statements

can

be

they say to enunciate the truths are the words of the

*Nya. Sil, Nya.Bhash., Nya. Var., IV ii 47 Prashasta, pp. and 282 Kandali, p. 282 Upask., Vivr. IV. ii. 16
; ; ;

281

Saptap. and

Mit., p. 32, &c., &c.

130

Veda. Hearing Veda. *

is,

therefore, clone

hi the

Words

of

the

These truths which, following this first step, are thus heard have been mentioned before namely, The five Bhutas are Kala and Dik exist
;

Atmans are They are born again and again

;

and so

on.
first

Hindu method of acquiring not be improperly compared to philosophic truths may enunciation of a proposition, of the first step, i.e.,
This
step of
the

Euclid
Second

in the

When

matter of acquiring a geometrical truth. heard in the words of the the truths are

Rati on al Be rn on stration

step

Veda, then must the pupil, taking the second step, ponder over them and try
to

JESSES
truths.

only rational demons tr a t i on of

understand them and have them deto

monstrated

him by J
.

reasoning. For, to
.
.

be

satisfied

merely with bearing, would

mean nothing more than vague beliefs. That his beliefs may be transformed into rational and logical convictions,
he

must consider
the

all

the arguments,

first

against,

and

then

weighing both, for, must come to rational conclusions about them. But here again, if he were to do this by himself unaided, the chances are he would go astray and would probably never be able to come to a right conclusion at
all.

statements.

And

then

So the Rishis, ever desirous to help man, again come forward and show the line of reasoning which may be pursued. Thus did the Rishis, K ana da and Gotama,
*

Nya.

Su., Bhfish.,

Nya. Var., IV
;

ii

47

Prashasta, pp. 281 and 282

ii.

Kandali, p. 282 p. 32, &e., &c.

Upask., Vivr. IV.

16

Saptap. and Mit.,

140

They pointed out to, and established for, deserving pupils the lines of reasoning which show how the statements ot the truths must be true, that is to
say,

teach.

how they can be demonstrated.* And it is these lines of reasoning, as founded by Kanada and Gotama, which constitute philosophy,
i.e.,

the Vaisheshika and the Nyaya.f

Thus philosophy
J
reasoning-

is

not

reasoning and speculation

to
is

with a

view
it

discover

metaphysical

and

reasoning with a view to lo g icallv demonstrate and understand

tru ths, but

facts of

these truths which are already given as experience, and as propositions enunciated in
of the

the

Words

Veda. J
i.e.,

Reasoning and speculation about transcendental,

S

and

Speeul aU?n.

metaphysical truths, not already given as experienced facts, can never do more than lead us to a probability. But as

often they mislead us.

Then
of

again, there

is

no certainty

in reasoning as
truths.

means
clever

discovering transcendental
to-day establishes as true

What one

man

by mere reasoning, another cleverer man demolishes to morrow as devoid of foundation. Mere reasoning, there
fore,

cannot lead us to certainty about transcendental

of

and metaphysical truths. understanding them.

Reasoning

is

And

because

it is

merely a means this kind of

reasoning which, as stated before, constitutes philosophy, (as the Hindus understand it ) the latter is also only a

means
V.

of understanding, not discovering, truths.

4.

* Ki. Va,, p.
ii.

Upask., Intro., pp. 2 and 3

J See Note 57.

Vivr., Intro., p. 2

and

16. (Intro).

See Note

58.

141

This being
1

so,

the object of philosophy

as under

PhUO

"

sophy

is

stood by the ancient teachers of India wot the mere solution of an intellec
tual

problem for

its

own sake

not the

mere performance

of intellectual gymnastics,

with no

better result than just the sharpening of the reasoning On faculties, and as often the perverting of them,*

the contrary, the object of philosophy ing man to understand truth which is
so that,
it
;

by understanding it, he may and by the realisation of truth may become free and Thus philosophy thus end his sorrows and sufferings. is one of the most practical of all practical things, inasmuch as it is a means to the gaining of an end

aid suffer before him, put afterwards realise

is

to

which

is

the highest that

man can

conceive.
is

For

this

end, on the road to

which philosophy

a step,

is

no

Philo other than true freedom, absolute independence. sophy is the middle step to the gaining of this end.

This middle or second step of the Hindu in acquir that step of ing philosophic truths may be compared to

Euclid which

is

called

demonstration

in

regard

to

geometrical truths.

The

third and

final

step

is

Realisation
is

by

direct

Third Step. Rea 1 i s a t i o n of

experience.

It

technically J

called

Samadln, or
it

more generally, Yoga. And

last

SuthsbyVir^ct

is

bY
first

fllis

ste
P>

that

truth
s

is

experience
the
* t

really acquired

and made one

it

own.f

The
of faith,

gives
it

merely as

a matter

second turns
59.

into a rational

conviction,

Sec Note

Nya.

Sft.,

I\7

ii.

38

IV.

ii.

46.

Supra.

See Note 60.

142

but

the

third

alone

gives

the

truth

by experience.

Neither merely hearsay knowledge, rather information, about truth, nor merely intellectual and inferential
conviction in regard to
it,

can possibly make us free and

end our sufferings.

Such information
in a
theoretical.

and inference
knowledge no merely
realisation

are knowledge only which is indirect and

theoretical
as

secondary sense

And
the

knowledge can possibly end so actual a thing

is.

human

suffering

It

is,

therefore,

of truth

by

direct experience

which

is

the only the only

radical

remedy

of the ills of specific existences

way

to

freedom.

And,

to repeat, it is this realisation

which the

third step, Yoga, secures.

But with Yoga we pass beyond the limits of philosophy proper philosophy which is, Yog-a and philosophy proper.
f

rom

the

Hindu point

of view, only

the

monstration, by transcendental or metaphysical truths.

reasoning, of propositions

enunciating

To explain
A few of the main principles

fully

what Yoga

really is

and how

it

can

lead to direct experience of the meta-

physical truths would

detreatise

touch upon a few of

its

by itself. main principles.

of things

mean a separate Here we can just

by directing our

We
minds,

find that

we are aware

by paying attention, to them. The greater the attention the moreMs our awareness of things. On the other hand, if we can withdraw our minds and
that
is,

at all,

attention altogether from a thing, it is even if it be before us all the time.

not perceived
all

That

this is true in
less

regard to things physical we

more or

know.

But that

it

is

true in regard to

143

Yet many things mental also, is not perhaps so obvious. of us know that by concentrating our minds on any
problem or puzzle, as much as on a physical thing, we can often have it solved as though in a flash. That
such acquisition of knowledge by concentrating our minds on things mental is possible, all discoverers and
inventors will probably bear testimony
to.

Experiences of this
that
if

kind would seem

to

indicate,

we could concentrate our minds on anything to I say perfection, we might perhaps know all about it. we might perhaps know all about a thing. The Hindus maintain that we can certainly know everything by this means. For, it is after all the mind (Manas) which is
the direct and immediate instrument of
all

experience
it

and awareness.
But

The senses merely

this

assist

in
is

its

operation. It is indeed indispensable as absolutely indispensable. as the mind is not able to work, as it were, on long
its

assistance

of

the

senses

not

own

account.

But once

it is

able to do this,

it

can

bring about knowledge and experience of things without

the help of the senses.

Such
not
the

possibilities of the

human mind would

vast

certainly

be admitted by the But even scientific West.

to

majority of people in

men
is

in

the

West are

beginning
practically

turn their attention to the

as

study of such

phenomena
some
ever,

hypnotism* by everybody as a

which
fact,

now recognised
These,

and telepathy which

at least regard as

proved

to

be true.

how

the opinion of the are phenomena which, Hindus, are only of a most elementary character and
in

just the indications of

22

what the human mind

is

capable

144

of doing.

With

further studies along

these

lines,
its

say

and

opinion not only in a few abnormal cases and with in narrow limits can the mind of man bring knowledge
see, that

the Hindus, the

West may perhaps change

can do so habitually and in ail things. But before the mind can do this, say they, one must learn to concentrate it on anything to perfection.
it

and experience senses, but that

of things without the intervention of the

Whatever the West may think about it, practically Hindu thought, including Buddhism, has had any influence, is of one opinion in
the whole of the East, where

Both the Hindus and Buddhists, who have devoted themselves to the cultivation of it from early times, maintain that concentration of the mind can be
this matter.*

practised to absolute perfection, and that, when perfect ed, by its means alone everything can be known and
realised as direct experience.

YogaopSamadhi is perfected concentration.

And h
.

is

tllis

P erfected power

of

concentration, enabling a
...

man
.

to realise
,
.

, ^ everything by direct experience, which they call Yoga (or Samadhi.) But when concentration is perfect, say these people,
,

then the mind becomes absolutely

8

still,

binaUon of absolute calmness

like a flame in a place

.

where there

is

and most penetratingr

no t even the gentlest breath

of wind.*

keen-

The
tion

simile o
is

the flame in this connec

It

significant.

means

that the

mind, when thus concentrated and

sleepy, but fully alive
* See
t

stilled is

not dull and

and most keenly penetrating.f

61.

Note

See Note

62.

Bhag. Gita,

vi. 19.

145
lias

Only, in this
in
it.

state, the
it is

Thus

not the slightest flicker a combination of keenness and stillness

state of a stone.

mind

and not the dead dull

Being a combination of these two apparently contraYoga is

idleness.

no

dictory aspects,

it

is

obvious that the

concentration desired cannot be gained by idleness or by anything that would throw the mind * into a dull state.
It can be achieved only by combining in one s life and character those two things which can, on the one hand, sharpen the mental faculties and, on the other, It is obvious that the sharpening and quiet the heart.

developing of the faculties of the

only
if

mind

is

possible

we

exercise
if

again, only

and we can exercise them, we bring them into activity by doing

them

something that requires thought or by thinking out some problem, that is to say, by conducting ourselves
so as to develop thoughtful ness in us.

But
Yoga
sible

this conduct, leading to thoughtfulness

and deve
motive

is impos by leading

lopment
followed

of

mental

faculties, is Generally

with

some

personal

and personal

interest, as distinguished

from, and considered as opposed to, the interests of others. That is to say, it is followed with what may be called a
selfish motive,

with Ahankara, as

it is

called in Sanskrit.

But as long

motive of con any duct, that conduct can never give us the stillness and quiet which must be combined with keenness. By following such a conduct with selfish motives, one can no doubt
as
selfish Interest is the

develop keenness.

But together with keenness there

*

See Note

63.

146

be disturbance in the mind, because the man, following such a coarse, will always have thoughts and feelings like oh, this is mine I must have this;
will always
"

somebody will perhaps get in my way I must fight and so on. All these thoughts and ideas breed him," passions in our hearts and when the passions rage, no
;

stillness is ever possible.

To

have, therefore, both absolute calmness and keen

How the wouldbe Yogin should

ness of the

mind, a
life

man must
all

so con-

duct himself in
to

as to do

he can

mental faculties and develop keenness, but with a motive which is absolutely imper
his

accomplish this is to do faithfully and thoughtfully all that is really a man s duty in life, and to do these duties as duties simply,
without permitting oneself to think of what advantage can be personally gained by the doing of them. Nor should a man permit himself to be so entangled in

sonal or selfless.*

The only way

to

thought and care about the duty that he can never put it off his mind and that it intrudes itself upon him even

when

the day s
else.

work
all

is

done and he wants

of

to

think of

something
spirit will

The doing
one
;

one

real duties in this

bring play and exercise thus develop them and as they develop, the mind and one of the requisites of concen will grow in keenness
s faculties into

tration.
all
it

Such living

will also* eliminate

from the heart

cause of disturbance, by gradually expunging from all notions and feelings of personal and selfish inter
all

ests,

thought of
to
you.
*

and
yours*
64.

me
or

and
he

opposed

and

mine and

as
his.

See Note

147

These thoughts and feelings will never find any nourish ment in a man if he keeps himself busy witli duty

which
of

is

done simply as duty and without any thought

personal gain or advantage.

all

And when

thoughts

and feelings
with

removed, the heart is calm the free from passions and therefore full of second requisite of concentration.
is

personal cause of disturbance

of

interests are

gone and there

Thus by doing
entangled
self

duty, as

duty,

and without getting

gradually develop in him the two indispensable and yet apparently contra
in
it,

man can

dictory

There is no requirements of concentration. other way by which this can be done, for all other
will

ways

develop

either
I,

keenness,

with
;

selfishness
or, stillness

with the thought

me and
is

mine

without keenness, which

only dulness and stupidity.

selfish

This mode of living or conduct without any

interest

and entanglement in
It

it

is

technically

called

Karma- Yoga.
those cannot

may

be practised in various ways, but

be very well explained here. All that we need to understand, for our present purpose, is simply
the principle that, in

and
and

stillness
life,

order to develop both keenness together, a man must begin by living, not

an idle
all

but an active
is

that

life, doing all that is needful but only as duty with an absolutely duty,

unselfish

any entanglement in it. he must aim at being well-nigh perfect in moral character. For, if a man can eliminate from
motive,

and

witTiout

That

is

to say,

his nature all

thought of personal interest as opposed

thought of

to the interests of others, and, therefore, all

personal gratification which

may

lead

to

the

harming

148

any living being or to the feeding of any passions in himself, he cannot but be morally perfect. This is the one indispensable pre-requisite, and the
The foundation ofYoga perfeein moral tion
very foundation of
,.

of

Yoga which
ol

leads

to

direct

experience

truthg
until

It ig

^ gQod
this
is

metaphysical

talking of
at

Yo ga

this

is

practised,

any
to

rate to

a great extent.* extent, a man is

And when
fit

done

a large

for

practical concentration,

which

then becomes comparatively easy. And to practise concentration

when

the preliminary
the

Secondary
helps in Yoga.

qualification

is

gained,
of
;

man may

aids.f

take advantage Of these there are several

certain secondary but perhaps only two

:

need be mentioned here.

(i)

These are

The regulation
in

of diet so as to
it

keep the body

such a state that

may

feelings of dulness, stupidity

not produce any or heaviness on

restlessness on
it

the one

hand,
that

or
it

too

much
be, as

the other;
delicate

may

were, a most
in per

and sensitive instrument, and

if

fect health, if possible.

(ii)

Seclusion, occasional

not permanent, from

the hurry and bustle of life, in a pleasant spot, such as a quiet river bank with beautiful
scenery, or a mountain, forest
on.
dale,

and

so

In such a spot, seating himself in a position which

will

be easy and comfortable, so that the body

or
distract
the.

may
II, 42,

not

disturb

mind by
j

its

discomfort on the
Sft.,

* See Note 65.

Nya.

IV.

149

one hand, nor send it to sleep on the other, the man should try to fix his thought on any object of which he wants to know the truth.

When
Some Y a
-

he succeeds
^

in fixing his

thought absolutely,

results of

w ^ know all that there is to know about it, He will, for instance, come
ie

to realise*
(a)

That the things consist

of

Paramanus

he

will

(6)

by becoming actually aware of the Pa ram an us by means of his mind. That Akasha and the other Realities exist.
this

know

These he

will

realise

by similarly becoming

aware
(c)

of them.

That the Atman

is not the same as the body. This will be realised by separating his mind

from the body, and thereby withdrawing his whole being from it as the soft blade is

drawn out of a grass drawn from its sheath,

itself

or

as

sword

is

or as

a snake draws

out from

its skin.

When he can do this he knows how experience can be had without the body. (d) That man is born and dies again and again. This will be realised by remembering all his
past lives and
fact

by being actually aware

life

of the

that

when a man

dies in one place, that

in the
else.

which constituted his inner

that
is

body
re

dead re-appears somewhere

the truth of Re-incarnation

By realising membering all

and by
all

his

past lives he also realises

* See

the

Note

66.

150

Adrishta which
other births.*

lies

behind him and may lead him

as

to

And

he knows these Adrishtas he

meets and counteracts them in a way, which, the Hindus hold, there is, and which gives everyone his due, so
that all justice
is

done.

It is

in this

way

that all the

waiting Adrishtas are exhausted.

(e)

That there are worlds and beings which are

never perceived by the senses.
is

This, again,
of them.

realised

by being actually aware

realise
all

In this

way he may

the facts
is,

and prin
the super
is to say,

ciples pertaining to the transcendental, that

sensible,

and may

finally

realise himself, that

the

Atman,
else.
is

as separate from,

thing

When

this is

and independent of, every done he no longer feels that

he

the body or the mind.

With

this realisation, all

and desire with any form of existence ceases and the man is free. specific This then ia briefly Yoga, which constitutes the third step in the method of acquiring and realising
identification of himself in thought

philosophical truths. Unlike the first two,

this third step in

the

Hindu

method

of acquiring metaphysical truths, has

no actual

parallel in

Euclidean geometry. But if to the two steps already named, i.e., Enunciation and Demonstration, a third could be added, namely, Verification of the truth
the propositions established
to

of

by reasoning, then the

that is to say, to

same might be said

of
this

correspond to the third step

Hindu metaphysical method,

i.

Yoga.
*

Nya. Bhash., IV.

ii.

64

Prashasta, p. 281 (bottom);

Upask., V.

ii.

18

VI.

16.

151
if

Thus,

for

instance,

the

proposition,

that

three

angles of a triangle are equal to enunciation, corresponds to the

two right angles, as an

first

step

of the

Hindu
of
this

metaphysical

method, and

the

demonstration
to the

second step, proposition by reasoning corresponds or philosophy proper as understood by the Hindus, then there might be added a third step corresponding to the

Yoga
the

of the

Hindus.

This step

would be something

like the following.

proposition,

or having
of

Suppose, that after demonstrating it demonstrated to him, a

man

takes a piece
;

paper and cuts

it

into a triangular

shape and measuring the angles, he finds that they make exactly 180 degrees. Such a procedure in regard
to a

geometrical truth, giving him

of
said,

realisation

knowledge or what was already learnt by reasoning,

direct

might be
in

the

in a way only,* to correspond to Yoga matter of transcendental truths.

realises the truths

When, following Yoga, the learner

The

DU

il

becomes
teacher.

the

experience, he himself becomes a Rishi, a freed man and a teacher

7

direct

in Ins turn.

Conclusion.

Such then
to those not

is

the Realism

which the Hindus teach

capable of understanding by reasoning the

psycho-dynamic or polyonymic presentation of the true nature of things. But even a candidate, not intellec
tually qualified or temperamentally

inclined

to

follow

the presentations

of the other Standards,

can reach the

same goal
23

as any

others,

when, by practice, he comes

Appendix C.

* See Note 67 and

152

to realise

the
said

truths as
so
often,

goal,

as

This presented by Realism. is the absolute freedom and

;

independence of the Heal in man it is freedom from all sorrow and suffering, and, above all, from every necessity

and compulsion, and is gained by freeing oneself from the one and only prolific source of all other necessities,
the necessity

and compulsion

to

be born in a

specific

form

of existence.

And he can

reach this goal even

without realising what may be called the secondary things, such as the ultimate nature of the Paramanus,

Akasha and so on that is to say, whether they be really eternal and everlasting or are derived things, or whether
;

there be really

many Atmans

or only one.f

is,

indicated, to realise the goal, that absolute freedom, all that he needs is that he should no longer be prompted to with a view
activity

For, as already

gain some advantage to himself as opposed to others, and, to this end, to be absolutely free from likes and dis
to
likes,

special

attachment for some things

and aver

these latter cease, a man no longer hankers after some things as specially desired or
for others.

sion

When

seeks to avoid others as undesirable.

And

this object is

gained the moment it is realised that all the diverse forms of things, which hitherto appeared as
beautiful or hideous,
as attractive

variously or repulsive, are but

groups of Paramanus that ar*e all alike. could, by an extraordinary power akin

Suppose a man
to,

say,

that of

the ideally perfect microscope, see things so magnified that they appeared to him as nothing but a mass

swirling

of particles
* See

which were

all

alike,

it

is

obvious he could
j-

Note 68

See Note

69,

153

not be specially drawn by any one of them

to

and ceasing be drawn by any of them, he would not be repelled

;

either

by

experience, and
that
all

Similarly, when a man realises by not merely convinced by reasoning, perceptible things are but Paramanus which are
others.
is

he cannot possibly have any likes or dislikes for any of them. Once this is realised, it matters little whether he knows them further as eternally existing
all alike,

or as derived things.

Then again

in regard

to

the Atraan, the

moment

by experience, and not merely as an intellectual conviction, he ceases to have special at tachment for any specific form of embodiment, human or superhuman. And ceasing to have special attachment
for

man

realises this as himself

Thus he

any particular forms, he is not repelled by others. is again free from likes and dislikes and all that
This freedom from likes and dislikes by the

they imply.

Atman is further strengthen ed by this other experience in regard to the forms of em bodiments themselves, the experience, namely, that they are, like all other discrete things, themselves but masses
realisation of himself as the
of

Paramanus, which are

all alike.

Thus, by just realising oneself as the Atman, one can end without further enquiring whether the Atman which is himself is the only one in the Uni
realise the desired

verse or whether there are others.

Nor
is

will this

any limitation

to the

Atman which

himself, or

mean make

any practical difference. For the Atman, being infinite in nature, and without any distinguishing features which

may

differentiate

it

from other Atmans (supposing there

itself,

are such), will realise

as a matter of fact, as one with

154

them

all,

in

their character as pure

Atman,

i.e.,

as not

associated with particular Adribhtas and embodiments.

character of the

Thus, without enquiring further into the ultimate Paramanus, Akcasha, Kala and Dik,
question of the oneness or plurality of Atmans,

and Manases as eternal Realities or derived things or

intothe

and by just realising the truths as presented by Realism, the Realist can reach the same goal as the others. When the goal is realised, the Realist may or may not
care to

know what

have called secondary things.

of Realities as taught

If

he
his

does, after the nine classes

by

own Standard are realised as existing facts, he may per haps also know them as the other Standards teach them
to be.

But

if

he does not care

to

pursue his enquiries

hold these as eter

further in this direction, he

nal verities.

may

still

But

in

any case, as far as the ultimate goal

and main object

is concerned, he gains it by following the path of Realism, just as much as those whose intel lectual reasoning even did not stop at that point of the

analysis of things

where the nine Realities

facts.

of

Realism

were discovered as

Thus Realism,

like the other

systems, serves the same purpose, and it has, like them, ever been studied in India as a means, an intermediate

means, to the gaining of the one supreme end, namely, Absolute Freedom, i.e., Moksha or Mukti. Realism,
therefore, like

Hindus,

the other metaphysical systems of the has a most practical aim and object in view.

NOTES.
That the philosophy of the Hindus, i.e., the of rational de original Darshana Shastra, consists only in the Vedas is monstration of propositions laid down
1

(p. 2).

clear

from the following extracts (a) Shastran tu shad-vidham

:

Mimaiiisa-Sankhya
tattva-jrianartham

Patanjala
-

Vaisheshika-Nyayarupam. Etani
vicharya

Vedan

Kanada-

Gotama-Jaimini-Kapila Patanjali- Vedavyasakhyair muni-shatkaih kritani (Sha. ka., sub

voce Darshana).
(6)

Veda-vishaya-nirnayayaiva utpannam sumahat Darshana-Shastram. (Sa. Sa. Ni., Vol. IV,

p. ne, line 1).

That the notion

of

the

Hindus

in regard to their

own philosophy

is

as

embodied in the above extracts has

been admitted even by Mr. N. Shastri Goreh. And his admission is very significant as he was, being a Chris He says tian convert an opponent of the Hindus.
:

Darshanas) the staple is argument. But they profess to derive their views from the Veda
"

Of these

(i.e.,

and other sacred books.

those views they disci aim.

Independent authority as

to

Goreh, Ration.
2
use,
(p. 2).

Refut., p.

1.

The name Darshana, which is now in common seems originally to have meant not so much a com

view or doctrine plete system of views as any particular And in this sense it is often replaced by Drishti, which

156

means the same

ii,

35

IV.

i.

14

See Nya. Bhash., Nya. Var., IV. i. 14, &c.

thing.

I. i.

23

III.

Both these words occur in their Pali forms in the same senses in the Buddhist Suttas, i.e., "Discourses of
the
I.

Buddha."

v. 1.,

See Saleyyaka-Sutta (41)., Maj. p. 288 of Vol. I, Pali Text. Soc. s edition.

Nik.,

two other current names, Manana Shastra and Vichara Shastra, see Cha. Ka., Vol. I, p. 102 Vivr.,
for the
;

As
ii.

VI.

16.

While these three names, Darshana-, Manana-, and Vichara-Shastra, will be recognised by everybody as being used in these days, the more ancient names seem to have been some of those words which are now used in specific and restrictive senses, i.e., not meaning phi
losophy generally.

These are

Mimamsa

or Mimamsa-Shastra, Tarka or Tarka-Shastra,

Anvikshiki,

and
Nyaya-Vidya.

Commentary by Raghavananda on Manu, XII. 106, where both the words Mimamsa and Tarka have been used in the sense of general philoso
phy and not
in

See, for instance, the

the

special senses in

which they are

the

now
of

used.

See also the

Viveka on
ICt)

Tantraloka
see

Abhinava

Gupta

(i.

As

for Anvikshiki,
it

Shabdakalpadruma, sub voce, where

Adhyatma-vidya.
Finally, Nyaya, although
ly as a

is

explained as
exclusive

now used almost

system founded by Gotama, original does not seem to mean anything more than mere ly
of the

name

157

reasoning,

as for instance, in Nynya-Varttika, IV.

i.

14.

That

it

Gotama

meant general reasoning, and not specifically Philosophy, is also clear from the fact that in
only, namely,

the Nyaya-Suchi by Vachaspati Mishra, the section on

syllogism
of as

Sutras,

I. 1,

32-39,

is

spoken

Nyaya-Prakarana. See Nyaya-Suchi, published in the Bib. Inch as an Appendix to Fas. IV. of NyayaVarttika.

evident also from the fact that

That Nyaya meant Philosophy generally is it is used as part of the

name
is

of such works as the Nyayamala-Vistara, which work not on the Nyaya-Darshana, as it is now understood, but on the Karma-Mimamsa.

p. 6).

The pre-conceptions

of the

Hindus given here

are not mentioned in so cular place.

many words in any one parti But they can be easily gathered from their
See, for instance, Cha. Ka., Vol.1, p. 6.

various writings.

and Vol. V, pp. 32-181. Also Goreh, p. 1, para. 2. 4 (p. 6). A Rishi need not necessarily be a perfected
seer,
i.e.,

Freed

Man
seers

be Rishis who are

perfect and
Bliash.,
I.
iii.

(Mukta-Pnrusha). There may not only of lower things but

strive after

of a transcendental nature.
final

Such Rishis may wisdom and then be freed.

But
of course the Rishis

See Shar.
are the

26.

who

founders of the Darshana must be regarded as "perfect ed seers," because they are all Mukta-Purushas.
5 (p. 7). The existing Sutras may be much later than the Rishis themselves. What is meant by saying that the

Rishis are the founders

of the systems is that

they are

the founders of the lines of arguments and the standards, not necessarily the writers of the current works. In

corroboration of the statement that the systems

may be

158

much

older than the existing Sutras the following

:

may

be quoted
"It

is

necessary, however, to state that in appealing

I

to the

Safikhya,

appeal
is

to the

doctrine and not to the

abundant evidence, both in Hindu and Buddhist works of unquestionable antiquity and
text-books.

There

Safikhya and Yoga systems having been current before the time of Buddha."
authenticity, of the
"

Preface to

Aphor.

of

Patanjali,"

being Trans,

of

Yoga Sutras
6
(p. 13).

(p. xvi)

by Raja Rajendralal Alitra. That the Paramanus of the Vaisliesbika

Sankhya but are accepted as derived things under the name of Tanmatras will be seen from Gaud. Safikh. 22. See however Bhashya on Yoga Sutra, III. 43, with Vyakhya of Vachaspati and Yoga
are not rejected by the

Varttika of Vijnana-Bhikshu on it. As for the other principles of Realism,

it

is

well

known they
not as

are

finalities,

recognised by the Safikhya, but The Atmans even except the Atmans.
all

are conceived differently.

See further Note 37.

7 (p. 17). In connection

"

with the remark that the

has to be noticed

ideas (nama-rftpa)

are under no circumstances part

Reality,"

of the one

and absolute
is

it

that there

an interpretation

of

the

Vedanta,

i.e.,

the

Upanishads, which does consider these as part of the This interpretation is now Real, that is, Brahman. represented by Ramanuja and his School though it

was not originated by him.

who

is

inclined to
of

meaning

the

Dr. Thibaut, think that Rarnanuja interprets the Brahma-Sutras more faithfully than
it is

But even

Shankara, cannot but admit the fact that

the latter

159

who has
original

a greater claim,
of

than Ramanuja, to being the

right interpreter

Vedanta.

the Upauishacls, i.e., the real and See Preface to his translation of the

Shar. Bhash. in the

the
seq.
title

Sacred Books of the

East,"

under
et

Vedanta Sutras, Vol. I, pp. cxxii, See specially lines 13, &c., on p. cxxiv.
of the
it is

And
It
is

according

to

Shankani

s
is

interpretation of

the Vedanta that the above statement

made.

a very difficult and extensive subject and can not possibly be fully treated here.

In regard to the Paramanus, the NyayaVaisheshika holds the following ideas

(p. 19).
:

A Paramanu
sure
of

is

(a) absolutely
is

without any magnitude. Its mea anu, which is not the lowest degree

magnitude, i.e., a measure consisting of length, breadth and thickness, however minute, but is of a totally opposite character. See

Vaish.

Su,

VII.

i.

10.

(The reading of this

*

Mahato viparitam anu, the other reading being Ato vipari., etc.
is
)

Sutra in Ganga.
Va.

Ki.

note on

quoted in Ki. Va, p. 52 Roer, Bhaslia Par. 14 (but marked 15)

Pr.,
;

also Intro., pp.

x-xi

Banerjea,
IV.

Dial. Phil.,

158-159, &c,
(6)
(c)

non-spatial.

NyafVar,

ii.

25, p. 522, line 3,

has no inside or outside.

(d)

Nya. Su., IV. ii. 20, with Bhash. and Var, is super-sensible and can be conceived only by the mind. Nya. Var., p. 233, &c. N. V. T.
;

T,

p. 271, line 7
24

from bottom, &c.

160

(e)

The measure

of the Paramanus, being added up, cannot produce any magnitude or any other measure because they are absolutely without

any magnitude. Upask., VII. Sid. Mu. Va. on 14.

In these circumstances
it is

ii.

9, &c.,

&c.

Paramanus
rendering of

atoms

very misleading to call as has hitherto been done. This

is

Paramanus

responsible in no small degree

for the almost

contemptuous attitude with which some

is

European scholars have looked upon the Vaisheshika.

What
the

the Vaisheshika has emphasised

of the

not so

much

uncutability
is

Paramanus
of

as

their

measure,

which
their
*

the very opposite

magnitude.

Arm means
the

measure, whereas

whoever invented

name

atom had probably the idea of its indivisibility more than anything else in his mind. The Paramanus are not unlike the qualitative atoms
of

Herbart and his School, in so far as these

latter are

But it is perhaps the bases of things material. better to leave the Sanskrit word untranslated.
9
(p. 20). is

much

of Shakti

The word Power or Force as a translation meant to convey the idea of an independent

Reality and not that of the capacity of a thing, such as Shakti in the latter sense the capacity of fire to burn,
is

Vaisheshika.

never regarded as an independent Reality by the But that Shaku can be used in the former

sense will be seen from Cha. Ka., Vol. II, p. 151, where Atman is spoken of as a sort of Shakti. (Shaktivishesha.)

10 (p. 22). I use the phrase purely subjective dream* as a translation of Svapna to distinguish it from

161

\vliat is

called SvapnAntika.

This latter word

is

used by

some
the

to

prophetic.

denote those dreams which are something like The existence of such dreams is regarded by
as a fact.

Hindus

See Vaish. Su., IX.

ii.

and

8,

with Upask. and Vivr11 (p. 25-27).

is

The

line of

argument followed here

based, as will be

seen from the references, on autho

ritative

Nor need it be Nyaya-Vaisheshika Texts. influenced by Herbart and supposed that I have been For I knew nothing of Herbart and Lotze when Lctze.
I

argument must stop somewhere, otherwise there is no reason why Mount Meru and a mustard seed should be so different be as well as certain other arguments, seem to in
size,

learned the interpretation given here. based on the idea that divisibility The

of

hardly any trace of them in which has the Sutras or even in Prashastapada s work been regarded as the mine (Akara) of information on the Vaisheshika by all subsequent writers on the subject. Shridhara in his Kandali does not allude to it either.
later

origin.

There

is

12

(p. 29).

The idea which

have had in

my mind

when speaking
of a

dvyanuka,

of a thing of the nature of a line is that hitherto translated by binary, in agree

ment with the translation of Paramanus by atoms. But I have stated before my objection to this latter A dvyanukaf produced by two Paramanus, translation.
which are
like

mathematical points, can be only a thing

the shortest the

of the nature of a line

possible

line.

It is
is

distinctly

stated

that

measure a dvyanuka has

of
it

or duality produced by the dvitva That is to say, perceived as dual

two PanimAnus
is

produced by

162

two Paramanus which must be so placed that they can be recognised as two
asya karanatvam
the
;

(dvhvasya...apeksha-buddhi-J3iny-

i. This perception 10). two Paramanus, producing a dvyanuka, as two entities would be impossible if were not they

Upask., VII.

of

placed apart
like

from one another.

Arid

if

two Paramanus which are

mathematical points produce a thing by being placed thus, it is obvious the produced thing can be a
only

thing of the nature of a

line.

A dvyanuka is regarded as a thing which by itself can never be perceived by the senses, which is quite natural. For a line by itself is
certainly imperceptible.

Three of these dvyanukas again produce the tryanuka or trasarenu which is a thing with magnitude. But it is not maintained that three of the
only

dvyanukas can combine together. Kandali says clearly that any other number can certainly combine and produce various other forms. But no magnitude, i.e., breadth and thickness, can be length, produced by a less number of dvyanukas than three. (See
Kandali,
p. 32,

lines 6 et seq.)

This, too,

is

quite obvious, for never can

a magnitude having length, breadth and thickness be produced by a less number of lines than three. As for the idea that a tryanuka or trasarenu is like
a mote in the
find
if it

sunbeam, it is a later one. do not either in the Sutras or hi other early works. Even this were a notion held by the founders of the
system,
difference
in their position!

We

it

would hardly make any

This position is, it may be repeated, that Paramanus are things without magnitude, non-spatial and so on that they first relate themselves together in twos that these
;

163
not

latter

combine

in

numbers

less

than three, and that,

magnitude is produced. one possible objection against my rendering Perhaps of dvyanuka as a thing of the nature of the shortest
possible line would be that the measure of a
also

when they

so combine,

dvyanuka

is

spoken of as ami, though it is regarded as a pro duced measure. But we must remember that, in the
first

place, this application of

is

the

term arm

to the

mea

sure of a

dvyanuka Secondly, ami in this sense means only a measure which is not mahat, i.e., magnitude, and is yet super-sensible in the same sense
as a

a later one.

Paramanu

is

super-sensible (see ante, p. 54).

of

That

this is the
to

meaning dvyanuka is quite

i.

anutva

(i.e.,

clear

from

anu-ness) as applied both Upask. and

Vivr. on VII.

10.

Thirdly, there
the anutva of a

distinction made between and that of a Paramiinu. The dvyanuka

is

clear

is parimandulya, i.e., without any whatever, whereas the measure of a dvyanuka elongation is never parimandalya. (Prashasta, p. 130, last two

anutva of a Paramanu

lines).
is

This

is

significant.

For

it

implies that a dvyanuka

not a parimandala but a something

a line.

which has elonga

in

tion, i.e., is

the following two paragraphs are only the applications of cer

(p. 31).

13

The arguments given here and

tain general principles recognised

by Nyaya-Vaish. They
;

are based on Vaish. Su.,

II.

i.

13

Nyaya-Bhabh., IV.

ii.

22

(latter part)

Nya, Manj.,
is

p. 502, line 5 (from bottom),

and so on.
based on those arguments of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika whereby it is shown how even a
(p. 32).

14

This

164

Truti,
final.

i.e.,

a thing of the smallest

magnitude, cannot be
II.
i.

See, for instance,

T.,

Nya. Var.,
it
;

33, p. 234, line 3,

with N. V. T.

on

the

passage in Nya. Manj.

referred to in Note 13

and so

on.

This argument is based on Nya. Su., IV. ii. 19, where it is given as a Purva-Paksha, i.e., an objection which can be valid only if the ultimate par
15
(p. 32).

ticles are

regarded as things with magnitude.

16
here as

(p. 35).

The Sanskrit word which

is

have rendered

translated as

temperature touch

Sparsha.

It

has been hitherto

to the great
is

Realism.

Sparsha as a quality
It is also

disadvantage of Hindu distinctly stated to be

cold,

only of three kinds, namely, hot,

nor-cold.

added that
of

and neither-hothardness, softness and

the like are not forms

tact

Sparsha but are forms of con In these circumstances it is (Samyoga-visheshah).

misleading to translate Sparsha by touch. See Prashasta, Kandall on it. Nya. Bhash., III. i. 56 p. 102, with

and 57; N. V. T.
Tarkasahgraha,
17
(p.

T.,
;

p.

150, line

3 (from bottom);

p.

16

&c., &c.

definition given here of Apah is ones of the three other Bhutas. The based on similar
38).

The

Lakshanavali gives
18
(p.

it

differently.

42).

The
the
is

Nyaya-Vaisheshika
tile

regards

the
here.
is

Paramanus
But
of

as

constituting
ivay in

four classes given

course

which the

classification

explained here

means

for calling the sense by which Sparsha is perceived, the temperatureIf sense, are the same as those mentioned in Note 16.

19

(p. 45).

my My reasons

own.

of

165

Sparsha

is

which temperature, then the sense by

is

it

is

perceived

also the temperature-sense.

60).

20 (pp. 47 and

In

all

the later works on Nyaya-

Vaish., the existence of Akftsha is supported exclusively on the ground of its being the basis of sound. The open

ing Sutra of Kanada of the section on Akasha (Vaish. Su., III. i. 20) is now regarded as expressing a view which is

This Sutra says that we must admit the existence of Akasha because there must be a medium
that of the Sankhyas.

supply room for the discrete sensible things to move about (saiichara, according to both Upask. and Vivr. This The Sutra itself says coming out and going in.
to
)

reason, however, say the

is set

two commentaries named

above,

aside

by Kanada

in the next Sutra.

tation

seems doubtful and may Shankara Mishra wrote the Upask. author of Upask. relying only on the Sutras as he himself tells us (intro
ductory verse
3);
is

This interpre have originated with the

and

it is

not unlikely that

much

of his

interpretation pretation of the section

only his

own invention. That his inter on Akasha is his own there is rea
is

son to

suspect.

Tarkika-Raksha, which
to take

an older

work than Upask., seems

embodying not
Vaishebhika
in

the opening Sutra as the view of the Sahkhya but of the

(Tar. Rak., p. 123). takes the same

itself.

Chan ra-Kanta
view.

( Chan. Bhashya Bhash.onll. i. 20 et seq.)* The only serious objection to the interpretation of Tar. Rak. and Chan. Bha^h. being correct is that NyaVar. also maintains that the existence of Akasha can be

his

also

maintained only on the ground of

sound.

its

being the basis of

Nya. Var.,

III.

i.

72, p. 400.

166

other hand Nyaya-Vaish., like the other systems, refers constantly to Akasha as the room and locality, one of the supports (adliara), if not the only sup
the
port,
of
all

On

discrete

things
;

Ki. Va., p. 35

Kandali,

Prashasta speaks of all the (line 10 from bottom) p. other Bhutas as existing in Akasha (pp. 48 last line to

22

p. 49, line 7).

Thus

it

would seem that Tar. Rak. and Chan. Bhash.

i.

are quite right in taking the Sutra, II. forth the view of the Vaisheshika itself.

20, as setting

This conclusion would be greatly strengthened if we could rely on the reading of the Sutras as given by

Gangadhara
the Sutra,

in his edition of the Vaisheshika.

i.

He

reads

II.

5,

as

Ta akashe

vidyante,

instead of
it

Ta akashe na
as follows
:

vidyante.

And he seems

to interpret

Those objective things (Te vishayah)

(Ganga,, p. 42).

exist

in Akasha.

For

all

these reasons I have given two lines of argu

ment

in

support of Akasha instead of only the usual

or

Shabdadharatva
ingness) of

most

of the later

Shabdashrayatva (sound-supportVaisheshika works.

In any case the arguments given in here are quite in harmony with and based on authoritative texts.

21

(p. 48).

The

all-pervasiveness of

Akasha

is

often

supported on other grounds. The arguments given here are based on what is called Dharmigrahaka-pramana,
i.e.,

an argument which proves at once both the existence and characteristic of a thing, like the one proving the
existence of

Manas

or of Kala, as well as
is

their

nature.

Part of the argument

i.e.,

also

what

that of the simplest theory,

called laghava, See Nya. Vrit. on IV,

is

167

i.

28,

where eternity

of Akf.sha

is

said to DC so establish

ed (dharmigrahaka-manena laghava-sahakritena). 22 (p. 54). Jfiana, i.e., consciousness or even ex If consciousness can is spoken of as dravya.
perience,

be called substance, then dravya

Bha^h.,
11.
ii.

is

substance.

See Shri-

27, p. 1573.

23
so

(p. 55).

One

of the reasons

why

there has been

much misunderstanding
That Kala
is is

in regard to
in the

Kala

is

that

it

has been taken to be Time

word.

Western sense of the

for

the great power which whirls things

notion.
See,

round
24
It is

common Hindu
I.
i.

instance,

Vish. Pur.,

Udayana
Acharya.

be a very old argument. 280. given by Vrchaspati Mishra in N. V. T. T., p. also quotes it in Ki. Va. and attributes it to an
(p. 56).

This seems

to

This Acharya, we are told by Vardharnana,

(Ki. Va., p. 114).

is

Vyoma-Shiva
tive as stated

Udayana thinks

it

defec

by Vyoma-Shiva. But he does not seem to discard it altogether. For he says that Kala, Dik and Manas must be conceived as without any special quali
*

ties

dharmigrahaka-pramana (Ki. Va., p. He could not possibly have urged this as a reason 110). him to if he discarded the old argument attributed by

by virtue

of

Vyoma-Shiva.

argument stated in to any any but the curtest form* almost unintelligible but those taught orally by the Hindus themselves. The

Nowhere

that

know

of

is

this

common form

simply Vishebhagunavattvat. 25 (pp. 59-60). Like Kala, Dik has been much mis That Dik is a power which holds things in understood. This power is a common Hindu idea. various
it is

of

positions

25

168

spoken of as the Elephants of the quarters that hold up the world in space, or as divine maids that
is

often

uphold creation. It is also spoken of as the arms that support and uphold things. See Nilakanfcha on Ma. Bhar.,
38; Ma. Bhar. 111. cc. xx. 39 Sha. Ka., Sub xoce
I.

Ixiv.

(i.e.

cc

= 200)

15; Bhag., V.

Cliatur Va. Chi.

Ma.,

I.

233. 7, &c.

Dik

is

not

Space,

if

by that

is

extension

or room.

Space in this sense,

all

meant an expanse, and if con

absolute Nothing,

ceived as a Reality not as a mere and

is

Akasha

in

which

(Prashasta, pp. 88-89).

as in a locality things See Ballantyne s translation of

exist
IV., p.

Nya. Su. with extracts, Book.

26

(top).

The Vaish.

Sutra,

II. ii. 10,

beginning the section on

"

Dik, simply says that the characteristic of Dik is that it is from or on account of it that there arises the fact that
this thing is here or there
It is clear

from

this other

thing."

things

is

only relative position of alluded to and not their extent or expanse or

that in this Sutra

their occupation of space, each by itself.

That this is so will be seen also from Bha. Par. 45. Dik would not be unlike gravitation if the latter could
be regarded as an independent Reality and not a mere
property of things.

26

(p. 63).

The arguments on
III.
i.

this
:

section

(Atman)

are based on the following authorities

Vaish. SO.,
Nya. Su. Nya. Bhash.

1-6

III.

ii.

4, 5,

19-21

with Upask.,

Vivr.
^
T.

and Chan. Bhash. on them.

i.

10.
i.

Nya Var.
N. V. T. T. Nya Vrit.

III.
ii.

10,

16-26, 35-42.

19(Vrit, only).

169

Prasliasta, pp.

09 and 100, with Randal! on

(in Mss).
11).

it.

Ki. Va. on

same

Saptap., with Mit., pp. 18 and

Nya. Manj., pp. 437 et seqsmd 467 Sankh. Su. with Vijnan, and Ani,
or 130.

et

seqq.

111.

20-22; V. 129

Shar. Bhash.,

111. iii.

54.

Bhamati, Intro., ph. 2

and

3,

and on

III. iii.

54.

Vivaranop., pp., 108 and 109. Cha. Ka Vol. 1L, pp. 132-201
,

Vol. V., pp. 2

to

et seq.

All that
texts,

is

said in this section

is

be found in these

27
brain,
life.

but of coarse arranged and expressed differently. In India it is the heart, rather than the (p. 74^.

which has been thought to be the direct organ of See, besides numerous Upaninshad passages, Nya.
(p.

Manj., p. 469.

28

76 \

The arguments given here

II.,

are based on
is

Cha. Ka., Vol.

the

pp.

168-172,
is

where

it

shown how
i.e.,

body

of

one stage

not,

as a body,

as

an

organic whole, the upadanas or ingredients of the body at the next stage, but that some of the upadanas only of

one body are the upadanas of another.

29
Vaish.
(p. 87).

These are the special doctrines of NyAya-

30

(p. 88).
:

The arguments
Ill- ii

in

support of Manas are

based on

Vaish. Su.,

1-3; VII.

i.

23; with Upask., Yivr.,

and Chan.
Nya,
Sti.
I

Bluish, on same.
:

Nya. Van m rp jy -y

A ya. Bhash.

10
ii -,0 62 II. Dl -Oit

iii

170

Prashasta, with Kandali, pp. 89-93. Ki. Va. on same (MSS).

Nya.
31

Mafrj., p. 498, lines 3-16.

(p. 95).

The beginninglessness

of
in

Samsara

is

taken

for granted

and admitted repeatedly

Vaish., as will be seen from the references

it is

works on NyayaBut given.

not reasoned out as in Brah. Su., Shar. Bhash, and

other texts.

32
Shar.
4

(p. 96).

On
II.

the use of Samsara in this sense

i.

see

Bhash.,

36, towards the end, beginning with

Smritavapi.

argument showing how achetana-pradha ,na cannot possibly move

of itself.

33

(p. 97).

This

is

based on Shankara

Based on Shar. Bhash., II. i. 33, begin ning with Na cha svabhava, etc., with Rat. Pr. on it. 35. (p, 98) This is a general question asked by all Hindus.
(p. 98).

34

36
as
of

(p. .100).

The Worlds here

are spoken of broadly

super-sensible.

two orders, sensible and

The

Hindus divide them

into several sub-orders.

Part of the arguments in this respect is based on Brih. Up., I. IV. 10, with Shafrkara s commentary on it.

37
the

(p. 102).

This

is

only the Nyaya-Vaish. division,

Sankhya and the Vedanta analyse the Manas further

and recognise several sub-dlVisions in it. They also eliminate certain features from the Atman as conceived

by the Nyaya-Vaish., and relegate them

of Mind.

to the

region

38

(pp.

103 and
in

104).

have
it

used

the

word

Samskara here

the

sense

which

generally bears.

171

Nya. Bhash. uses

it

as

almost synonymous with dhari.

madharma,
a distinction

i.e.,

Adrishta (IV.
in

47).

But

in Vaish.,
Adrislita.

is

made between Samskara and

Samskara,
the Vaisheshika
is

This kind

of

sense,

is

called BhAvanA,

NyA. VAr. says Ariubandha

(III.
i.

another

name

for

Samskara
is

19 \

Adri^hta

common
IV.
i.

postponed Karma and is a name for Dbarma and Adharma. See Nya. Su.,
merely

44-47.
(p. 108).

39

The

potential in this connection should

not be understood in the Sankhya sense but in the sense in which the fruit of a tree is said to be potential in

Nya. Su. and Nya. Bhash., IV. Su. and Bhash., IV. i. 50.

i.

47.

See also

Nya,

40

(p.

110).

Practically
it

the

full
is

doctrine of

Re
ideas

incarnation with all that

(loc. cit.).

implies

given in Prashasta
the

have

only

arranged
of

implied

differently.

41

(p. 111).

The doctrine

specially taught in

postponed Adrishta is the Vedanta which calls it Sanchita

etc., also

Karma.
of
it

But Nya, Bhas.h., Prashasta, as Purva-Karma.

(p. 113).

speak

42

The

idea of

special

gift

to a

believer

in Re-incarnation
is

and Karma and

This is*based on

justice in the universe

a great anomaly.

43

(p.

114)

common Hindu

ideas

like those contained in the Smriti passage

which VijilAna

Bhikshu quotes in his Bhashya on Sahkli. Su. III. 3. 44 (p. 116). The argument that an embodiment cannot come about all of a sudden and without any
reason
is

based on the section on Animittata in NyA.

172

Su., IV.

i,

22-24, with

Bhash. and Vart. on the same

p. 470, lines 5 et seq.

and

also

on Nya. Manj.,
(p. 118).

45

advanced

only

in

The arguments against heredity are modern times by living Hindus.

arguments in
of

There could be
idea.

no occasion for such

the past as the ancient

Hindus never heard

all

any such

46

(p. 122).

On

the idea that

are in reality Atmans, see

experiencing beings Prasbasta on Creation and

of all

beings, high and low (uchchavacha), as being created according to their But Ashaya is a thing which various Karma or Ashaya.

Destruction.

There he speaks

belongs to Atmans only. 47 (p. 123). The idea of a hierarchy

is

most common.
of as Devaraja.

That

is

how India,

for instance, is
125).

spoken

Prashasta says that Brahma was ordered to create the universal order of things. This

48 (pp. 56 and
to

would seem

mean

that the universe

was not due

to

Brahma

Adrishta.

But he

also speaks of the Universe

coming to an end when the time comes for Brahma s Freedom (Apavarga). This can only mean that during
his

the existence of the Universe, Brahma is not And if he has Adrishta, Free, namely from Adrishta.
life, i.e.,

is produced by it. In any case it is a common Hindu idea that one can rise to be a Brahma (i.e., gain BAiLmatva) by his Karma. See Nilakantha on Ma. Bhar., I. 64. 43.

then

it is

obvious that the Universe

49

(p. 128).

a Kalpa.

The period of Srisbti alone is also called name is significant inasmuch as it implies The
is

that the Universe

due

to the

imagination of Brahman.

See Ki. Va. on Srishti-Samhara.

173

50

(p. 129).
ii.

On
Shar

Nothing new under the sun,

Bluish.,
I.

see

Vivr., JX.

7;

iii.

30.

It is

common
It
is

Hindu
51

idea.
(p. 130).

This too

is

common

idea.

the

Rishis and other great beings who appear first and help and guide others. Many of the texts already referred to
will support
this.

For instance, Prashasta on

Srishti-

Samhara (towards end.)

52
(p. 130).

This follows as an inevitable conclusion

from what has gone before.

Eternity of the Veda from the NyayaVaish. point of view does not mean that the words But the Veda as wis (shabda) of the Veda are eternal.

53

(p. 131).

dom is eternal inasmuch as it has always existed and come down from age to age and from teacher to pupil.
See Nya, Bhash.,
It will
II.
i.

G8

(last Sutra),
I

towards end.
to the

be noticed that
is

have not alluded

i.e.,

idea

that the

Veda

Ishvara-vakya,

the

word

of the Deity.

This

is

not to be found in the original

Sutras.

For an

explanation, without any reference to Ishvara, of Vaish., I. i. 3, on which that idea is generally based, see Chan. Bhash on the same.

54

(p. 132).

The

idea of

Varnashrama-Dharma

is

the

very root and foundation of Hindu Society.

It constitutes

what may be called the HJhdu Sociology. What is trans lated as caste is its embodiment. But it is a question which can scarcely be discussed here at length
not maintained by the Hindus that there is no happiness or enjoyment in the world, but that nil happiness, however great, is ever tinged with suffering

55

(p. 132).

It is

174

and

at best perishable. See

with Bhash and Vart. on

on this Nya. Su., IV. tlie same.

is

i.

55-58,

purify the heart* (chitta-shuddhi) and this activity consists in doing one s
(p. 134).

56

Activity

needed

to

duty (avashya-karaniya karma Kandali, p. 282, line 10). 57 (p. 140). Philosophy is only Manana Shastra. See
;

Vivr., V.

ii.

16.

58
not be

(p.

140).

ascertained

Transcendental (Atindriya) truths can by reasoning, Nya. Var., II. i. 28 (as

counted there, p. 214); Sliar. Bhash., II. i. 11; ShriBhash on the same sutras, &c. Kapila also taught the Sankhya, not by knowing it as a matter of speculation,

but by direct experience. He was a Siddha (Bhag. Gita, X. 26 Tattvasamasa Tika, opening part). And candidates following the Sankhaya standard also realise truth by
;

experience.

See Sankh. Su.

All

I.

59

XI. 3
start

VI. 28, 29, &c.

59

(p. 141).

Hindu systems

with the idea of

to understand practices or truths so that, by following the former or realising the latter, he may either gain happiness in some specific state of existence or be

helping

man

absolutely free.

Thus

their object

is

practical.

See the

beginnings of all standard

works on the Darshanas.

"

The

Sa hi (dharmah) Bhashya on Karma-Mimamsa says u sham saihyunaktiti pratijanimahe." nihshreyasena pur Of course, Nihshreyasa here means exist I. i. 1. (end).
:

ence in a high state in the universal hierarchy. Cha. Ka, Vol. L, pp. 105 and 6 on this.

See

60
i.e.,

(p.

141).

For an

illustration of

how

theoretical,

merely inferential knowledge, or mere faith cannot /emove suffering, see Ki. Va., p. 11, with Ki. Va. Pr. on

it.

The example

is of

what

is

called

di&rnoha,

Hindus on

61 (144). That Buddhists also are at one with the this point will be seen, for instance, from
(2)

Digh. Nik., Sam.-Phala-Sutta

or

Maj.

Nik.,

Malm-

Assapura-Sutta
til*

(30),

and numerous other

that

places.

(p.

144).

The idea
to

Yoga means a

dull state

is

due perhaps
it.

the

misunderstanding
all

of Patafijali s

definition of

63

(p. 145).

Of course

by Karma- Yoga, which means at realising Samadhi by sitting

Yoga must be preceded Even attempts activity.

still

do not imply

idle

ness but involve intense effort on the part of the aspirant. Comp. the Buddhist practice of Sammavayamo.

64

(p. 146).

The mere preliminaries which

30 and 31.

are abso

lutely indispensable include the highest of moral virtues.

See

Yoga
65

Su.,

II.

Yogin means one who

II- V,

practises, or has mastered,

(p. 148).

Yoga.
Bhag. Gita
,

On

this see the

Chaps.
i.e.,

where the preliminaries

in Chap. VI.

of practising

Samadhi,

per

fect concentration, are discussed.

The Samadhi

is

taught

the realisation of the Paramanus, Akasha, &c., see Nya. Bhash., IV. ii. 2. There is a remarkable work on the subject by a living Sannyasin of
(p.

66

149).

On

great learning and

of the

saintliness of character.

The name

Sankhya-tattvaloka and of the author, Hariharananda Aranya (Samryasin name). 67 (p. ]51). I say that the supposed Euclidean step
is

work

Yoga only in a way, be cause such a step would give one a direct^Jcnowledge, by experience, not of a general proposition, as such
correspond
to
*

may be

said

to

as, for instance,

three angles of any triangle are

equal

26

176

but only in regard to a particular case or a number of cases which may be examined experi ac mentally. Yoga, on the contrary, enables one to
to

180 degrees

quire a direct experience of

propositions. only by a full
ral

even general How this is possible can be made clear consideration of the true nature of gene
the truth of

truths or

crete

from con general ideas as distinguished facts and by showing how the former ideas and
independently of the
latter.

also exist as facts

this

Indeed

would mean

a full consideration of the Vaisheshika

doctrines of the

Samanya and Vishesha

which

(i.e.,

Generality
of

and Particularity)
Sainavaya,

together with

that

the

absolutely inseparable i.e., or absolute concomitance have been left out in Relation See ante. Preface, p. v, last para. See also this essay.

and

intimate

Appendix
68

0.

(p. 151).

On

the sameness of goal of

p.
1.

all

the sys

tems, see At. T.

"Viv.,

necessity or otherwise T. L., of the realisation of secondary truths, see Sankli. and Shi. Dh., pp. 58-61. just referred to,

69

(p.

152). In regard to

the

THE END.

APPENDIX
My
ley,
ful for

A.
Keightgrate

very dear and philosophic friend, Mr.

to

1>.

M.A. (Cantab.), Bar-at-Iaw,

whom am
I

ni-.si

going through the proofs of this volume as well as for several suggestions and much valuable criticism,
has written as follows
"

to

The Adrishfca or Moral merit and demerit attaching the Atmans imply necessarily some standard or de
and scale
in

finite criterion

of

morality.

Now

it

is

uni

versally accepted

the West, that morality

arise in a

modern philosophic discussion in can only (of. any kind or order)

of

society

conscious interacting beings,

it

being held and granted by all that morality is through and through a social thing. The only possible alter
native (now abandoned

being that morality is determined by the Will of a personal God. Now as Atmans are everlasting and Adri : f,a
mostly)
"

attaches to

them per

se
:

and not as the

fiat of a personal

God

How
the

does the

result of any moral element

come

in

and what

is

moral standard, the moral

criterion ?

can there be any such in respect of Atmans which (in Hindu Realism) do not apparent as such, nor are they spoken ly possess self-consciousuess
of as ultimately
"

And how

forming a society

At

least

the point raised

briefly."

ought

to be noticed,

think,

however

It is

not only this oae

left

also which have been

question but several others out of consideration in this

178
to

essay which

is

intended

be but a short introduction

Still as

to

only the metaphysics of the system.

the

point

has been raised,

it

may

just briefly be touched upon as

suggested by my friend. Of course, anything like a full discussion of the question is quite impossible here, as it touches upon the whole subject of Ethical
philosophy

from the Hindu point of view. Briefly, then, the Hindu ideas in this respect may be stated as follows
:

(a)

The Hindu philosopher would be disposed

to agree

with the Western thinker in saying that morality is and through a social thing, but with an through impor
tant reservation, viz.
:

That while morality is a social thing, moral conduct (including both action and thoughts and feelings) has, from the Hindu point of view, for its real objective
not

others

but oneself

whom

it is

intended to benefit

from such conduct to others being only secondary and incidental, even though inevitable because, from the Hindu point of view, no conduct can be for the real and true and absolute
primarily, any
benefit accruing
benefit of

oneself unless
to

it

is

also

beneficial

at

any

rate harmless

others.
is

The idea
life solely for

that one

leading a
others
is,

moral

or virtuous

the benfit of

from the Hindu

their

point of view,

a pure delusion.

From
or

standpoint
solely

no conduct
others
is

is

moral

or

virtuous
If

which has

as
it

its

objective.

when such conduct

If

possible,

ceases to be moral.

anything,

it

then

a has reached a stage in his existence wherein he being can be himself affected neither by the doing of a moral
possible

becomes super-moral.

For

it is

only when

179

act (whether an actual performance or merely in thought and feeling) nor by its omission that is to say, when lie
;

final Freedom and Inde pendence (see ante, pp. 133 et scq.\ Short of that stage, moral conduct is essential and absolutely iiw.wii-y for an

has realised Mokslia or true and

experiencing being necessary, because if he does not follow it he will harm himself by degrading his nature and by bringing about his fall from the moral height

where he may have reached, further advancement. It is

if

not

by checking his
this

really with

thought,
s

however secretly and sub-consciously cherished in one heart, of avoiding the risk of degradation on one

own

not of positively retarding one s moral and part, spiritual status, that all beings below the Moksha stage
if

endeavour
one

to lead a

moral
of

life.

The real objective s own self.

(b)

moral conduct

therefore,

is

This being the nature of

of view,

moral conduct
i.e.,

from

the

Hindu point
(as

morality,

Dharma, may
is

be defined

has been hinted above,

p.

107 and as

indeed done by the Vaisheshika) as the conduct, includ ing both outward actions and thinking and feeling,

an experiencing entity in the scale of existence in specific forms, or which ultimately leads to (or series as an intermediate moans
for the
of
i.e., Moksha (Yato bhyudharmah Vaish. Su., I. daya-nihsbreyasasiddhihsa i\) Under these circumstances, the moral element (c)

which makes

advancement

of realising) absolute

Freedom,

i.

comes

may

in the fact that an experiencing being may Minot follow such a line of conduct as would make

for its progress

upward

in the scale of beings,

or would

180

conduce
one
to

to the acquisition of that

direct

the truth of

the real

nature
If

of
lie

realise

Freedom.

things does not follow such

experience of which enables

conduct then there

is degradation and suffering for him, and suffering which are, on the one degradation hand, brought about, in virtue of Samavaya, as the inevitable consequences (either immediately or when

opportunity
the Dharma,

offers,

the

consequences

abiding
of
at

in

the

meantime as Adrishta or potential worth)

i.e.,

violating

the rules of moral conduct

;

any given

teach the exporienstage and occasion and, on the other, cer the necessity of not violating the Dharma again, the lessons thus taught being noted down and retained as
pp. 103 to 100), not so much in the surface consciousness as in the innermost depths
indelible Samskaras (ante,
of

the

Soul

(in

the subliminal or subconscious Self, in

the language of
(d)

modern Western thought).

Standard
of
is

And

the Moral

furnished
retained

by the
as

Universal

Experience

the

past,

the

Universal
beings
in

Wisdom
the
i.e.,

or

the

Veda

by
the
past,

higher

and

highest

being or specific forms

the

of existence,

by Brahma and
lay

Rishis
can,

who,
as a

from their own experiences in the

matter of fact do,

and

down

the

rules of

Moral

Conduct, teaching experiencing behave if they want to progress higher and higher in the scale of specific forms of existence or to realise Freedom teaching them how they should
they should

Dharma or beings how

avoid harming others (though for their own sakes), how they should not tell lies, i.e., misrepresent facts

and

real intentions

and thus mislead

others

and so

OQ.

181

(Comp. Tad-vachanat Amnfiyasya pramfinyam

Vaisli.

Su,

I.

i.

3 or

4).

(e)

Finally,

the

a hierarchy of the
It is

Atmans do form a Society, indeed Universe, as shown above (p. 12:

.

only

when they
realising,

cease finally to have

embodi

ments,

i.e.,

die the last of deaths after they

have attained

Moksha by

by direct experience, the truth,

and thus cease to have of the essential nature of things, that they cease also to be social bein.i^

any Adri^htas,

have no necessity of forming Hut then, when thus Univeral vSociety. part of the also cease to be under any moral obligation
in the sense that they then

Freed, they
t ] ie

Till then as said before. y become Super-moral of and experience specific things and they are conscious Souls, whether incarnate a Society of constitute

or discarnate in physical bodies forms limited beings in specific

"be

but

still

existing

as

even though these

may

super-physical.

APPENDIX
Mr. Keightley suggested
^

B.

also

that

should avoid

using the

words

names
so
if

of the third Standard,

it

Polyonymism and
late.
is

were not too

Polyonymic as would have done But the sense in which I

I

and

have used the terms

is

quite clear,

said
so, it

on

p.

16 ante.

1 think, from what In case, however, this may not

be

may be
is

Polyonymism

explained here that, what I mean by the doctrine which holds that what is

experienced as the Universe is essentially a single, uniform Reality of the nature of pure Intelligence or Experiencing Principle, without there being in it or as

anything of the nature of the experienced, this Single Reality appearing under what is but a multiplicity of names, i.e., ideas as such and ideas objectified (called
it

part of

name and Rupa or Form). The be called Idealism, if these names, which constitute the Universe when substantiated by the Reality underlying them, formed any part of the Real. This, however, is not regarded to be the case
respectively
or

Nama

doctrine could

not regarded by the typical school representing the third Standard, viz., the Vedanta, even though there
i.e.,

other schools belonging to this Standard which do Name (or Names and Forms ) as part regard the of the Real.
are

Besides,

the

second

Stanc^rd also

is

form of
(i.e.,

Idealism, inasmuch as the material or the

physical

the sensible)

regarded by it as derived from what are really of the nature of thoughts and feelings and it would not therefore do to call the third Standard also
is
;

idealism.

APPENDIX
The
qualification,

C.

way
its

only"

on

p.

in a by the phrase 151 and explained in Note 67, owes

hinted at

"

origin

to

Dr. J. E.
to

McTaggart,

College,
for

Cambridge,

whom

am

Fellow of Trinity deeply indebted

much valuable help. In the present instance, it was he who first pointed out to me how the statement
as originally
defective.

made

in the

paragraph under reference was

was then only that the qualifying phrase was introduced and the note on it written.
It

BINDING SECT.

MAY 2 8

1975

PLEASE

DO NOT REMOVE
FROM
THIS

CARDS OR

SLIPS

POCKET

UNIVERSITY

OF TORONTO

LIBRARY

B 132 N8J3

Jagadisa-Chandra Chattopadhyaya The Hindu realism