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LARIFORMASOCIALE
RI\'ISf A CRITI C4 il I n DI F1NANll

LUIGI EINAUm. Dl ffll",y. _ l' ASltl l,l l.ll J AI>"NACCUI'f)
T.u1g1 Etnaudt
n mio ptann non r. quelle di Keynes
uomini; chot siano un panldosso; tan ti op<!ral edili disoccup;1lti
quando tanlo bisogno \''ho di case; chot il problema llOD su di
-me di \'OIOOtiO di 1a\"Onl'1'; non sia t ....mco, n aicolo,
D comme rcie, n organizzati \'o, bancario. 1Ia sia un
problema dello spirit:o, ..t assomigli an'imbarauo di due abili
oondu.centi di autocarri in potrfetlo stato, i quali, incolltraDdosi
in iimP;O SPU;O, DOtI SI.D potrcl>O" ip:>rando le Jeui
d..1Ia COU&J>O potr non Silpel'1' cl:ti <lebl>. iindue a destra
.. chi il sinistra. Il puadosso economim odiertlO sta aeIla
maneoll.. di COlltatto tra fattori produtti,-; disponibili _ uomini
disoccup;1lt, macchine inoperose, le"", incolte, materie pt'Dt'
inutilimote - e dol'S'idoI'rio o bisogno dei beni chot i fattori
disoccup;1lt prodll!'t't'bbotro, ... fossero OCCUp;1lti.
0Ui il contatto non si Op<!Ul. p<!rcl>O, l'imprendilore DOlI
"P<!1'll profitti . LI maoc:hina otalllO.mc.. I fattori
Il . :Sormalment il cont allo Ira fattori produtti\; e
dMidotriodi b<.ni. posto da imp",nditori in cerca di profitti. Il
me<:canismo economico messo in moto da imprenditori, i
quali, acquistando sul m..rcato fatt ori produtti\; e \' endendo
prodotti, compiono n..na s.ociet odi"rna l'ufficio del padre di
famiglia nelle 50ciet p<ltriareali chiuse, del priore > gua rdiano
nei conventi medienli, del minist ro della produzione ili Una
colletti'istica, Ma l'imprenditore opera, ossia cor",
rischi, quando ,ed.. la possibilit di un profitto, di una
diff"l'1'llZa positiva fra il prezzo ri"",,]to dai prodotti n enduti ed
il costo dei fattori produtti,,j acquistati, Stabilito il ccnt attc ,
messa in moto l'impresa, quotSta. basta a se stessa, potrch. i
fattori produttivi COmumano quanto essi med"Simi producono,
:\">? llliIterialmente gli nessi beni, CM qu"St SOllO dati in
scambio di b<.ni prodotti da altri; llliI in sosl.anl.a gli stessi sotto
mutata specie.
, I :-: o 8- I A.;o
Tho!' .\1....." fa 1'rrJspntty, di John l>b ,}-u.ard M}'IleS
010........
110
" &Dd Co, . S. llarti]l'$ Street, LondoIl. 1<)33, pp. :rJ.
preuo 1 se. nlrt).
Il "saggio" del Ke}'De5, dunque, pu essere riassunto in
proposizioni cosi concatena te:
I. Supponiamo chot la crisi odierna sia do\...ta ad un
difettoso funzionamento dei congopi menlali psicologici, ;
quali OODdDCOl>O allot decisioni ..t atti di \'OIontit degli
n"saggio. dl'l M}'Des. _ Adop<!fO la p;1lro/a "saggio non
i1\'endone tfO\."la altra miglio,.., alluoco tract. dl'l
frolllcese pamphllrt. Ma in l'1'alt "saggio llOll lradul'l' 1Mon. il
CODCe'ttO di ocnttura d'Ottasiolle, nrumenlo di battaglia
politica o HlOllOmica, che c.aratteristica deogli scritli bl'1' \-;
\'e-ementi, n"; quali furono condotte battaglie prati che o
dichiarati principi teorici, La letteratura economica, la grande
letteratura economica ti picam"nte composta di saggi, Chi
facesse un dizionario deD" """p<!rte economiche, con la
citazione delle fonti , in cui prim.am" nte quelle scop<!rte furono
enunciate, cit" ",boo assai pi b l'1' vi saggi che grossi libri, La
parola-meno-"ra un t"mpo usata, assai propriam..nt.., per tal
sorte di scritli b",\,j .. significati ,,j; ma non si pu usar pi, a
causa d..l malo uso fatton..,
Ca pitolo 8 - TI mio pia n o non io quello di
Keynes
K,!\dle 1>1" PC2 In prol itto . lln '<!1
LUIGI EINAUDI
Il mio piano non quello di Keynes
(1933)
, ' . Pare dunque risoh'ere piellall>E'n!e il paradQSSQ
sugo del discol"SO in queste poche parole). Se in,,_ esistono
<el"llm..nte uomini e fattori produtti vi disoccupati, il cont atto
opel"llto m non cagione di danl1050e perturbarioni in ....,no
ad altri gruppi sociali. Sarebbe 00..... se il milion. di disoccupati
pot esse 65E're trasportato in ullisola finol"ll d..... rta ed i<i
pro<'"odesse da s alla propria <i ta. Qual danno $ubinobb.. il
R'Sto deIb coIIetti<-1tio?Anzi ..rebbe due "antaggi: risparmiano
la falcidiil dei rumdi di disoceupaziOlle e disuibuire su di s e
sugli n-disoceupati, inv_ SU di s soltanlo, il eosIo dene
spese (imposle).
Il problema si complicherebbe se esist65E'ro solo operai
diooceupati e llOIl anche fattori maleriali produttivi disponibili;
peI'eMin tal etiO la llUQ\'a domanda da pane dei I O miliilrdi di
m.. di fondo otatalesi fO\-escerebbe suIlIltlUSil fi$SiJ dezIi altri
fattori produtli'i e ne farebbe <:TeSCeI'e il prezzo. Lo SUlo si
metterebbe in roncorrenza con sti imprenditori prin ti,
scmnpisJiandone tutte le basi di eakolo economiro, oon
oonsegull'l1ZO' lIOIl. facilmerlle pI'e\"edibili. fatu, nulla
di tutto ciO: esistoDo uomini.. =bine, n'....;, felTO\-M.,
porti iDoperosi; che llOIl prodlK'OOO, pereh dissociati.
:!olettiamoli a contatto; e roi beni prodotti, sti uomini
diooceupati ..rI.IUlQ se stessi., sen.zilliulla chiede... altrui,
anzi .,...."00 di ric<'\..... da altri ProbabiJm.,nte,
ilnzi, il prodotto totale ereso:er in misurapi che proponio.w..
.al magg;or la<'O..o pre!itato, Che, se, do\.. 9 milioni di uomini
1a<'OnIlOadalim..ntarr>e I O, il prodotto llIlitario 90 milK>ni di
unit, oo.e la.'Onoo tutti IO, per la pi. perfetti .... del
1a<'Oro .. il _&Por al la<'Oro do\"\.to alla in<ilriata
Wcidia d<'II<' imposle. il prodotto llIlitario ari, probilbment e
100 .. J[ milioni di anitil.
'!t 0 e I ltn "'fitt i (Men:llo ,,,tto , rt. Edition
c S, I .. El I x
produtti <i , beni strumentali e uomini, rimangono disoccupati
od ; dl'Sideri deogli uomini t"1>sta1lO insoddisfatti . I fattori
produtti<i occupati devono assoggettarsi a ta gli.. enormi per
lWIntenere in <ita queni disoccupati. O<:COITI! .... la
macchina.
l". Supponiamo lo SUto ottenp a mutuo da
quakuDo che lo possiede (o lo cru) il fondo dei l a miliardi di
lire; suppOlli.lmo che il mutuo sU concesso il lunga scadenza od
a t<'Due (mlndeGdosi lenue, probilbol ..... qUilkuno dei pili
busi SIgi stor'icilmenle OO!lOSciuti) Silgio di Uo:o
utilizz:lti i fi tto'; produttivi, p esistenti e disponibili: telTl! da
boai6eare. spetthi d-acqua da in porti, materi.ali
..dilizi da ridulTl!a case lirtite e uomini diooceupati da applimre
an.. t" ITI!, an.. aeque ed an.. eI.Se. tcee (1'Nto il miraookI d..l.
rimI'tt.. re in !DOtO la ecollOmica, ....,D.U. aumentare i
prezzi dei fattori prodntti<' e dei prodotti. La$pesa. pubb&a si
esalll'imlbe in vali pane Mi CRSCer prezzi o ....n"importare di
pi. daDestero ...., llOIl esist_ro ll1UJini di fattori produtti<i
disoccupati. fii 1L'Vt' link or no rruJ'l111 01 unnnplnynI
7nOUroH, rhA (J 1M1\crNRd 1L'Ollld
IL-asft itMf in Irigltt-rpricn and incrtaMd imports. Riproduco
il 1,"", 0, perch dopo ISSai rompimenlO di capo, ronclusi il
III. Poich, Il disillealllO, IlOn Po\"a il IlOrmal.. moti<'o
PCOOOIJlco del profi tto, fa d'uopo Iro"""" ono spedienle.
"uoIsi dar lavoro I d UIl mi!iQlle di disoccupati? Basta, a 10 .000
lire I 1e5ta, [6W UIl fOlldo di I O miliardi di m... Se gli
impr.ndilori privati llOIl asma, osi lo SUlo. Sui l a miliardi
spesi, lo SIIIO sicuro di ricupenroe, m quel risJ>MtDia in
minori sussidi ai disoccupati e quel ebe lucra per
imposi.. sul cresciUIOreddilo dei alm..110 cinque.
Ilibliot.....
Ce,.",di Kindle per
Vi w.lin. VOi Slru"'."" GU'1If
" Ce..", di per PC2 ln lode de l P.'oIitto Itri ",,,tti (Men:elo Di,itto l ibert' tali, n Ed,tion
eoeooomlCO odi emo manchi solo ull llIleIIo d.lbl ca!ena: i l O
di !in di fOll do lIl'<.'f'SSario aDo Stato per far domamla
sul merc;ltO dei fattori produtti" atti a c,,"", il nl1O\..,
p........
\1. Pare in,''''''' che Ill' paesi a...nuti i pasticci di lep.... si
f..eeaec ora COli i conigli. Ho )'impress>one cio che do. qual che
tempo g!i economisti inglesi siano ass1dui alla nobile fatica di
cercar coni&fi do. 505lituire ..ne lepri. Quando sentono parlare di
risparmio ..n'antica, fanno 5II1Ome. O che non ci sia. J:>solno di
llllIta fatica o di tanta rinUllcia., p" rcbp le disgrazie ilttuali noli
5ODO OO'...te a carestia., terremoti e 1""'"'" e lIl'ppure a diff(lo
di fatt ori produttivi, ma al difettoso operare di una qu.alche
nella testil desii uomini; o che sia dispenta impresi1
indUl'te g!ilKlllIini il rispa.rmia.re, con i redditi tanto falcidiati e
con le impost e cosi aIt.. (incomn are !lO curtailN today ond
tamtio:nt !lO,"udI thal many a1rNdy, m
th.. to lIIQiruam thLir standard 0/ lift. Jatillg /n.s than
sounJ pnsona./ habit$ 5l.a di fatto che molti
economisti da'il.flJUI.f'dia. m-oJgoDO a p....ferenza la loro
attellZOllf al su.nopto di risparmio pRrttoslOche al rispa.nnio
inteso IlO! senso tndizionaJoo. Che """" sia cotal SIIrT01ato di
risparmio non ef..cile spiegare. t un .....rt o che di nebuloso, un
comJ>O'ito di conoeUi vecchi pbusibi!i e di astrazioIli nuove.
La patemill, involontaria. e ad altro scopo indiriui1ta,
risalirebbe ad un economista. di non gnnde fama , apparteOlMlle
alla pll'ade ricardia.na., J ames Pennington, il quale nel 182gL2ll
av bbe dimostrato che le bancbe possono, elltro eerti limiti,
c ar eredito. La teoria. secondo la quale prima il rispa rmiatore
mette da. parte 20 lire (o . 0 miliardi t ra tutti i risparmiatori di
un pa..se insieme), poile reca. aII.a banca e fina!m.. nte la banca I..
d a mutuo all 'impre nditore 0, se questi sia. ti mido, allo Stato
per m<'llere in moto la macchina eeonomica incantata, sa.rebbe
una teoria.antiquata o, p" r lo meno, insuffici.. nte. C'e, accanto il
questa. e nl' paesi moderni parrebbe di ben maggio r portata,
un'altra teoria, la quale direbbe cbe prima la banca apre un fida
al cliellt e (imprenditore Stato), poi il t rae assegni $uIIa
ballca fino a concotTt'lllA del fido rice'"\I to, pc>$Ca il
be....ficiario deO'ilSSoO'gDO se Ile fa acc....mtare l'import o presso
b st essa OUn'all ra banca e cosfinalm..,.re na.scono i dq>Q$iti in
ballca; in media. i d..J>O'iti presso le bancb. lOSSl'Ildo COlISf1U""ti
ed equi.-alenti ..ne ap" rture di credito concesse daDe biinche
lIIl'desime.
o o
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A.iI. III
<]0
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In antiqu.o.ti e do. <'COIlOIIlisti antiqu.o.l, co"'" lo

Lo. risposu allo.ci<>nuryl . tro\"Ue i IOmiliMdi?
P"""'"' i risparmi.o.tori. F'1I1O a qualche anno fa, qu.o.ndo
si di risparmio, il pensiero COl'ft'\.. al solito bollUS patn
fu,"ilias , il quaJoo ..n'anI1O al meseo al Pomo .00 e,
spendendo 80, NCJ.; restalIti 20 alla cassa di ris parmio o allo.
banca. Se, a furia di 0'0, lungo un anno si lllI fondo di
. 0 miliardi, ..",.. lo il dn u cereeec ed utM a
menere in molo Lo. maccbin.o. Qualche minore ..!!rito dovr
essere superato: p"rclu' lo Stato possa farsi Illultare l O
miliardi, ocoo"",r probIDibnente cbe il fondo del nuovo
rispamo annuo sU. parecchio sUp"riore ai IOmiliMdi, essendo
incredibile che non esista altresi una domando. privata di
risparmio, non fossallroda. partedi quegli oslli1tiche, pure in
tempo di crisi, continuano ad <=t're afflitti da1ll ntala.ttia. della
pietra o da. quello. del campo bene sist.mato Od..n... bottega in
perfetto ordi ne e si miglianti pazzie anti -eccnc miche, cbe sono
pero la r..gion di ,-ita di tanti pi uomini che non si creda.
All' uomo d..n... st rada ed agli economisti .. ntiquati pare dunque
assurdo tronr.. a prestito IO milia.rdi, se pri ma i IO milia.rdi
non siaac stati messi da parte .. nOn sia.no tuttora disponibili.
seeza la I.. pre 1l01l si faImo pasti cci di lepre.
sin qui Keynes
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.. ( emodi Kir>d l. P"" PC In ki<Ie de l prof itt o sc"tt, (Me"' . lo D" ,tlo li be rt} Ed il ion
\1] . Ecco I fferrata 11 codi coniglio in<fupensabile a
manipolare il pasticcio Bisogna dar modo alle
banche di fare unlpenutll di cl'E'dito di I O miliardi. Se gli
impn>nditori pri\"lti non \"OI!iono SlpeTne di chi ede", cl'E'dito
neppure al 3 per c.nto Oal :I per c.nto, temono di
perde", suDe imprese I d essi consi&\iate, sia concesso il cl'E'dito
allo Stlto, il quale llOIl ba duopo di fare conti di profitti e costi
e puO tro\"are un profitto (mi nori sussidi ai dis<>ccupali,
magior Cetti10 deDe imposle), do'e ai pri,...ti non sarebbe
concesso.
\111. )lI le banche _ possono aprir crediti, sia alla
mam..1'1 antica dopo l ' er m'"1rtO depositi, .... alla mam..n.
nDO,a dooUl prir pl"e\Umente crediti SlpeDdo che SII"J.lIIKI poi
copt'rti dadooposili, se IlOll 05Se' ,..'DO tIhme rez* prodenzialj
dlIb esperienza. Per opi .00 lire di depositi,
OCCOln' ,i sU.oo solo . 00 - Il lire di Ipt'rture di credito, Il
...,."Ddo la rise,...,. in contallti (bialietti) o in a ,'irto.
p""'50 cii istituti di emissioolle che le banchepru<ienzialmente
doo."Ol>O sero.re per essere sempre pronte I far fronte ali..
doma...w. di rimborso dei depositi; che ' -u:>o. quello di fani
rimborsare, comune ai depositlDti fi tti lIlantica ed a quelli
, ...nuti fuori allamoderna. Ecio i depositi e quindi le aperture
di credito 5OtlO lUlI funziolle. Wl multiplo deDe l''isero...
possedute dille bancbe orditwie di credito. Se I"esperienza, a
caPm d'esempio, consi&li lU1I riser\.,. del. I O per cento. le
banche ordinarie possono, tra bl"e\; e 1unP>e. consentire
aperture di credito solofiDo al multi plo di 110'''' , ..HIe le rise,......
possedute. Anche i teorici della "bili"" la quale crea il credito
atlIIlIKlono che 11 potesti! ct'Ntminiziatrice della banca non
sia arbitnria.
IX. A sua \"0111, 11 rise,...1 delle bInche ordinari e.
consistendo in bi&Jietti emessi dacJi istituti ceutrali di emiss.ione
o in depositi I ,isll presso i medesimi istituii, non una
quantit arbi traria. Essa una frazione massa totale di
biglietti emessi in un peese, il resto Iro' l ndosi sparpagliato in
numerosissime piccole ocrosse rise,...e di bi&Jietti, in opi dalo
momento neOe lUCbe o nei eassetti di pri '.,. ti cittadini
o di enti di\"ersi.
X. Lamassa toule deibi&beni circolanti in Wl paese , dal
canto suo, un multiplo deUa rise,...I-oro po5Sedlltll dIIl"istituto
C<' ntnle di emismr>e. Se Iesperienu. O le Iegi, le quali
do".-bbero _re es periena cristaIIizzata, consicliano agli
istituti centrali di emissioolle di tellere 1llI.I rise,...,. ngualeal 4 0
per cento dei biPetli. l"anuoontan. totale dei bi:cDetti. llOIl poi>
essere m.a.gg;ore di d..... ,..HIee mezD1&m1DOntan. deD.a rise,.......
AlIli, po;eh l"es peneQl:l illsepu. elastiche in,''''''
che ,.;pde, Po"1 in tempi penccMosi. crescere 11 pl'OpO.-zKme
della rise n ... ai bipietti.. III tempi 1lOrmal:i., se 11 ... di
IOmiliardi, i bi&beni cirrolanti possono spiqeni I due ' vite e
mezza, ossia I 2S miIi.ardi. III tempi di crisi, quando per far
fronte a rirhies\e di papmenti lIl-estft'O, 11 rise,....,.-oro si
ridotta a 8 miIi.ardi e si in ansia per u1tmori riduzioni,
c.ntrale riduce prudentemente il multi plo I due e la
massa dei emessi1 16miliardi.
XI. Rifacendo, 01'1, il cammino scopriamo
facilmente I"espediente, il rimedio, il dn"a" di Ke."'lleS:
se ad una 1"iseroI-oro di 8 miliardi, corrispolIde. al multiplo 2
una volta, era cos
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.. ( emodi Kir>d l. P"" PC In ki<Ie del profin o se"n, (Me"' . lo D" ,tlo li be rt} Edil io n
allio proporzione del 50 per cento, una massa di biglietti
cirrol.o..ole di 16 miliardi;
... dei 16 miliardi cirrolanti. 4 si tro\'ano neDe casse delle
banche of'dini,rie di credito (casst' di risparmio ed altri
istituti di credito compresi) e costituiscono 10
"",,""a-bi&Jietti deDe blnche medesime;
se UlliO rise,,"ab;cIietti di 4 miIindi delle banche
ordinarie corrispollde wl"attitudine di queste . d .prir
credi to per l"ammoIlllre di 4 X9 " 36 miliardi;
quale c:ondiliooe sufficiellte per nddoppiare quest'1l1tima
.ttitudine, ossia per portlre le aperture di eredito da 36 72-
ciJu.?
Ll rispD$tl 0\"''''': lumentlre sufficientemente le
rise"-e-oro deU"istitutocentrale;
5e q<-,e SOllO c:resriute da 8 a ' 0 , eeec l"istituto nontnle,
pi. tnnquiUo, pronto a spingere 11 lDISSoI di biglietti em<=a
dal ml,1;jplo 2 a quello 205 e la a 25 miliardi;
... dei 25 miIindi c:ircolanti, Wl quarto, <:ome dianzi,
6,25 miIi.udi. eesercece la riser\...--bipietti deDe banche
ordinarie di credito;
... Ie bIncbe ordilwie di credito, forti di UDI riser\-a, tanto
cresciuti, spinsotlo il loro multiplo di enoazione di
di credito da 9 a 12, ecco le aperture di credito ba1zare. 6.25
X 12 " 75 miliardi. Ossia, ecco pi che ngiunto !"effetto
desidenoto.
XII. Quella ora orditwtamente racionat. 10 1l"'l':5 della
proposta ... di Ke)"Iles: si crei una massadi 5 miardi
di dol1ari.gro di biglietti internazionali Id opera di un istituto
centrale mondial e di emissione, la Banca dei regolamenti
intemuionali di 8asiJe., od altra" I bi&!ietti do\Tl'bbero essere
.ccettati allio PMi deD'oro; non do\Tebbero neD.
effetti \"a; sarebbero usati esclusi\'ament e dall e
tesorerie desii Suti panecipanti, da&Ii istituti centrali di
emissione e sarebbero equiparati alla """".. -eee propriamente
detta desii istituti medesimi.
I big\iKti do\Tebbero essere fOl'lliti I mutuo, contro
obbIigazio";..gro di identico ammonllre I sagio bassissimo di
interesse, quei JO\"emi i quU ne faoessero richiesta e si
obbIig_ro abolire qualsilsi restrizione sui ambi esteri e
ogni dazio e oontintente docllle che fosse StIlO introdotto
l>Dn a causa di UlliO <bu politica eeDl>Dmca, llII esclasi'"ImI'nte
per difendert<i contro imporuziooi da paesi esteri I ,ahrta
deprezzati O contro esporuzioni di capitali.
I gD\..mi e p istituti di emisAone potrebbero,
.<Ubof'dini,umente al ritorno aDa bbert dei cambi ed I quflla
degli ..... mbi di merci, &re dei biglietti nee."Ilti l'uso cM
repuU5Mro mipore: papi" debiti esteri ut!"Dti. ridare
equihbrio al 1>0',000, le emissioIIi interue eartKee
suIIaba... della cresciuti riser\... Iurea..
Ogni SUto Tebbe dirino I nee.-ere I prestito UDI ql>Ota
dei cinque miIindi la quale fosse proporzioIIIIe allio massa di
"""n 'a . urea posseduti nel l<p8, fino ad un mlSsimo di 450
milioni di dollari per osnuno di essi. 0JDi 5t1to
re:o; ponsabile, in proponione aDa propria quota, delle perdi te
subite nella gestione della n\lO\"I lIIISSlI monetaria.
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.. ( emodi Kir>d l. P"" PC In ki<Ie del profitt o sc"tt, (Me"' . lo D" ,tlo li bert} Edil io n
XIII . f in qui, i1l'11cionam..nto fila diritto. P..ricolosam..n-
t.. eome sullil di Un rasoio, ma diritto. Ad un tratto, dal
cielo Cild.- un boli d..: oli eonsillio dil'l'ttivo [d..l nuo'.., istituto
c<>ntral.. mondW.. di ..mi55ion..] do'Tl'bb.. far uso d..U.. sue
facol t d5crerionali f5peno aUammontarl' C'Ompll'SS'''' dei
biglimi emessi [al disopra O al disotto dl'i S miliardi di
do&ri-oro] O f5peno al sagio di int..ressl' do caricar1' sulle
obNigarioni-oro rila5ciat.. dagli Stati adl'l'l'Ilti,
aDo 5COJ>O di ....;lafl', pl'l' qua nlo sia po5SIbill', un rialzo nel
livello dl' pruzi-oro dei prodotti fondaml'ntali costituenti il
eoll1m<Orm inl"rnazionaIe al disopn di un Ii,.uo con'..nlllo -
forw q...I\o del ' 930 - po5Io tn i11i,...no pl"l'Sl' nt .... qo..rJo del

T\ltIo llll capi'lolo del sagg;o ..n infatti m to dl'dicato dal
ad iIIw:uafl' i lDOdi di i pfl'zzi. Chl' sia
con..,";"'nt.. &nzi lll'CeS5&M rialzafl' il 1i,..1Io g...... nIe dei
pruzi IlOn llM$5O in dubbio pl'r un istant..
dJlrautofl', il qlUil' llOII n!pUla 1Wpp<I.fl' 1..
ra,;ioni di tale lIll'U. Sir Arthur Salt..r, dicltiarandosi in un
bl'UarticoIosuDo Sptator dt>l 24 lIW"ZO fa..,fl"...l... oggi allo.
propo5l.l del M)'tll'5, osser'l"il., rqionando dal punto di .isto.
dl'D.,. odieml simuionl' di fatto inglese: chl' una l'SJWIS<>n"
crMitiril. oggi oppol'tUtla, perch il mondo si tro>'a al fondo
dl' n... fase d5cendl'nt.. del ciclo l'COtIOmico, chl' p;i.i. sono corni
m anni di resIrizionidi credito, i q..aJi Iwmoridotto i pruzi ed
i costi ed eliminat.. 1.. imprese dubbie .. catti.." chl' non si pu
COIl"'Otire mcorII ai preu:i di aDdII &ili in flecia ad un immenso
OIll're di debiti .. di pesi fissi di og:ai 5P"'cie, cb.. pl' rci qu..lIo
present.. O non pili il _to buono pl'I" don con una
poIitieoo congioH di credito .. di la,..,ri pubblici una
"",<lisciata ai prezzi; chl' agi, I diff..l'l'DDI del 1'J31,
lnghilt..lTiI. pu prendersi il IllSSO di pl't'5titi grandiosi .. di
Lavori pubblici , il bilancio d..llo Stato l'SSl'ndo tOmlto
aD"'luih1>rioed l'SSl'ndo granitico il eredito piibblieo.
XI\. :-;"on discuto il valOfl' del boIid.. in Sl' s!l'SSO; ma
affermo cb.. l'SSO un corpo l'5ttaOeo f5JlE't1o al rag:onaml'llto
proprio del Ke}"tll'$. Il qual.. mov..vl daDa preml'SSll
d..Uesistl'lll.ll di fattori produtti , ; disponibili, cb.. Oon cs.;oo
far mUlI'..... con un l"5pedil'llt.., Sl'tlZiI. 10CCIfl' i11i,...tJo gl'll..n1..
dei preu:i.. Cboo altro ,'all"ano difl' 1.. parole sopn riprodotl..
chl' "'Sl' non ,; fosse m to un maJllll' di riso,.,... dispoml>ili, la
maggio... S"",",,, [dl'gli l'Ilti pubblici Odi pri" I ti, non conta] si
sarebbO' oosaurita &nzi SPfl'C.ltll [ lLou1d /a"9fil1 lL'ClStt itstlfIl>O'1
pro"""arl' allmO'nti di pruzi ed lumenti di importaz>ol>t':"o. E
prima a.....a insistito che la nllO' a spesa [iD la..,ri pubblicil
do''''''a l'SSl'fl' aggiu.nti,.. e llOII lOb1::ituti... della 5pO'Sa che
sarebbO' altrimenti fatti dai pri ,..ti; e che. poor k'O'UIUt' la
disott-upario..... la nUO\'a 5pO'Sa f''01&..rni I fattori
produtti.; disPOIll"bili. es.. ],e risorse del paesoo fosso,.... p;i.i.
int..nment.. util:i.zzate. gli acqui5t:i aggiunti'; [ad <>pO''''- dl'i
1a,..,f pubblici) d.arebbero principalmeute luo&o I pili alti
p...zzi ed a cresciut.. importuionio,
Xl'. Lo. caduta del bobdl' IlOtI ba, si lmmO'tta, importanz.o.
troppo grandl'. Gio>.. Sl'pl1arIa., I 1Dl'ftl'te in ""'" C'OmO' il
sia lIcO'no fra due scopi dellaSUI proposta.: dar modo
agli Stl.ti di p<M..re, t'OII prestiti pubblici, occupar.- i fattori
produtti\; disponibili, Sl'IWI \"Uiare i prezzi, oppurO' don una
spinti. ad una politica di credito, laqua1O' spinp
; pruzi ri<:rl'i i profitti .. perci lo stimolo ad qire pl' r
gli imp.....ditori pri'ati. l nterptl'Wldo nel modo pili conform..
..nzion.. dello 5CfttO"', si pu 1Ochl' rit......re chl' il boIid..
-
"-
.. ( emodi Kir>d l. P"" PC In ki<Ie de l prof itt o sc"tt, (Me"' . lo D" ,tlo li be rt} Ed il ion
non sU. Wl corpo estraneo, ma UIUl Sl'COnda fase del processo
logico" Lio cat ellil compiuti sarebbe in tal CilSO la seguent e:
si C""" la nUO'"11l1ISSI monetln. int emlZionale.
la riser\"a, cos cresciuti, degli istituti di emissione consente
UDI politica creditizil espansi''&;
ne Po\"ano dioppriml lC!i Stlti pH diore, !.'On prestiti e
la\"ori pubblici, la"oro li disoccupati ed utilizzare ; fatt ori
produni'; inerti;
in r;egui10 I quesu primi spinta, .. fidocill rin.tsc-e," prezzi
risaJono, spuntltlO speranze di profitti, !Ii imprenditori si
Lio mKChinlIo ecoDOmCl anugginita. sollecitata
dalI"oIio delJ"OftimiSlDO, si moo'"e pian pLano diopprima e poi
,.... ,.... pi crisi efittili"
Lio ricost:uriorle del pensiero delJ"insigne """'DOmista di
DOn bi per iscopo di facilitare la critico. .Ii
particobri della SIU proposti prinpale" In quanto e=l di.,.-
che "'" punti di I ,"'"&!la.mento della CW"'"& del ciclo
UDI politia di Il.-ori pubblici Id opera dello Stato e
essi riespon.t lIDI teon. classica" Con I..
opportune cautele l'iJIurdo li limiti delb effiac:i.o. dei Il'-ori
pubblici, ed alb necessi di DOn continuare nei IInm
Il CW"'"& del ciclo cblb .-aIle fonda ..:Jip I ris.alin ....,.., il
monte, la teoriI dassica el1lChe pacifica.
" olli, in'"ece, ricostruendo, offrire un _piotipico delb
del Clmminlre diritti sui fili di rasoK>. Tu1:tJ. la
cat"llil pogil, nelli SUI pane principale, oulb ,..,riti delb
proposizione prima, che la crisi presente sii d<n"Utl al difettoso
di qlWche concepo mentale psicologi!.'O
dell"agire umano; e nella sna patt e agiunta (il bolide della
proposizione XIII) che a ric:re;II" profitti e quindi I rida re"dopo
il primo impulso dei la' "ori pubblici statali, incenti,..,
all'operare spontaneo desii imprenditori lio'; il rialzo de]
Ii\"ello general e dei prezzi, Se queste due premesse SOnO'"ere, la
seque"", e \"era. Se il mondo esossopra perch a:Ji uomini
DOn riescono I menersi I contano con le """"
disponibili, elogico che basta I raddrizarlo e farlo mUO\"ere lo
spintone, l' espedi ente, il dn di Ke) "tl es. Sii qualsi,"ogI.1 lo
spedi eote, aperture di credito I spizzioo delle band>. o la
....fIazione aD'inosso con dilu'io interDaZionlJe di carta
stamp.ala, lo spediente puO Po' ..re. Contro una malattia dello
spirito, oontro l'inca.nlesimo, il medioo de'"e farsi strego"e ed
operare con l,I(WI1i m di iDeallto. Tra le stJ'eCOO<'rie 0."...
giustamente , van l\Ioto b bbbrica di calU stampata. Poicbt' ,.
popoli DOn CrMono pil, dopo I"esperienza del dopo-pern,
....lla caru. stampata nuionale, esorrinj"'OU 00" carta
Sla.mp.ata a timbro mtemuiona1e. Se ci PO';a fugar dal loro
oorpo il demonio del "mismoe delJ"inerzia. esorcinjmo"
t per la crisi da,..-ere 1IIIiI malattia dellospirito dIn"Uta a
cotal specie di inca..nto? Ke)'lleS ricceosee, bel. priDcip;o del
sagpo,che la nostri fosse dlnouta aI1a carestia o al
te....mol:O od aI1a prn, I lIDi m'oc'ssetOecse materiali o i
mezzi di produrle, lIDi non potremmo sperare di tnn...... ko
del ritorno alb prosperiti fuon:be nel. duro la,"OrO. nel
risparmio e Dello spirito . AnlrrIette per Wl mom""to
e per ipotesi astratta, solo per !lepre che quelle siano I.. cause
della malatt:ia: _I" realti, le DOStre difficolti SODO notoriamente
di E secue la proposizioM sopra esposta COIl>t'
,-
l o direi che "notoriamente" le Cluse dei llOStri malanni
SODO proprio quelle da lui negate: lalUert1l e le malan;. da essa
-
"-
.. Cemodi Kir>d l. P"" PC In ki<Ie de l prof in o se" n , (Me"' . lo D" ,tlo li be rt} Ed il ion
ino=late P..UO spi rito degli uomini, ossia ingordigia., " ogIia. di
impro....;S; arricchimenti, impi.Zi"11l<I d..1la dura fatica.,
incapacitio i.Ila rinuncia ed al risp.armio, intoU..ranza d..J lungo
a'!P"!W'e il frutto della fl.tica ; spirito di nazionalismo
intoll"""'te, il quale ha chiuso opi popolo in se stesso .. ha
inutiliuato cran part e delle risors.. naturali l>Sistenti,
producendo &1i stessi effetti delle car.stie d"un tempo;
fanatismi reliPosi in RussiIo, in C'ma ed in India. religiosi anche
se in forme puove comunistiche Oxenofobe Ogandhiste, che
fanno preferiTe I.p uomini di su,r senza cibo e seDZll p=ni, pur
di DOli ever OOPhtti pericolosi cee infedeli.
Come si pu pretendere che bo crisi sia un incanto, e che a
mat>O'nn! qUi.kbe commutatore c.artaeeo l'incanto ""anisca,
quando tunodi. anche ad l''ere sIi oochi mediocrement e aperti,
si .t"5timoni deIb ,...ritio del oolltrario? Si OSSl>I'\"aI>O, . "ero,
casi di dist;ruia iIloolpe'w, di imprese sane tn.,'Olte daIla
buf..n.!th qu.anti e quanti esempi di .....ritata Ogni
,..,}t;r,che, adello qU&kbe edificio, si appuraDO i fatti, q.-..ti ci
parlano di .mminisuatori ed impreDditori innlmpetenti, o
..., ...otati, o disoDeSti.. Leimpl'e$<! dirette da gente competente
.. pl'\ldf>pte p;1lSS.JDO I.t!ra''''rso momenti duri. ma resistono.
Gran fri.a.sso di l'O'IW in'"eCe anorno a chi f...,.. in p;rande a
furia di dl>biti, a chi propn eoIossi, dominazioni. controlli e
coosor:ri; I. chi pe r sostenere l'edificio di urta. fabbrim altra.
carta e , -eodette artl a mezzo mondo; a chi, in,"eCedi frustare
per in"enW'e ed IPplicare ternici nllO'i o
metodi perfetti di la,wazioDe e di OtpItinuione
plauso e profitti in,'elltmeio catene di societi, propine ad
ammi nistntori-comp;lll'Se, r1"alutazioni e1eoganti di enti
p;1ltrimonii.li. L'incanto c'. stato e !>OD ancono. rotto; ma
desii scemi, dei fanoootti e dei superbi. A iniettar
carta, sia pure carta intemuionale, in un mondo da cui gli
scemi , ' fara butti ed , superbi non siano aucora stati ca.cciati ,il
se non in parte, non si IlUrisce, no, la malattia; ma la si
alimenta ed incipri&nisce. l'euforia della carta moneta
OCCOrTl>; ma il pentimento, la contrizione e la punizione dei
peccatori, l'applicuione inventiv.. dei sopra'..'issuti. Fuor d..J
ca.t.....h,.mo di santa rotnanl chiesa pop c". salvezza; daDa crisi
non si esce se DOP allontanandosi dal ,izjp e praticando la , -lrt.
Giovasse, i.bneno, la streeoneril della Clrta stampa ta a
""reH profitti ed I ridM perciO impulso aD"Openl desii
imprenditori pri Vl.ti ! AllitM! che anche qui bo CI lena. del
ragionam..nto pare Spe.u.ilh! Sembno, I sentir taluno, ehe p
aneIIi siano:
sulla base delle cnsc:i ute risel'\'e, le b&ncbe Crese<> DD le
aperture di credito pl'U2O mite;
ilavori pubblicicoodotti mezzo del credito danno la prima
spinta ai prem;
il rialzo dei prezzi ncl'Ni profitti o bo speranza dei profitti;
la l'DDm"lta speranza dei profitti d impulso allo spirito di
intrapresa.pri'I.ta.
la. prop<!'Srione c): il rialzo dn pruzi ricrN i profi1ti
n ra soltanto ""n"ipotesi che i 1a,'Oti pubblici. condotti a mezzo
del .,redito spinpno in $V prec:isameute quei prezzi i quali
deVODO Cfe5Cf're per ristabilire l'equilibrio. la. maDClIDZ.I. di
profitti !>OD PI'O'l"l>De dal Ietto che i prezzi siano bassi, ma dal
fatto ben dinrso che essi sono squilibnoti fra di loro. Se I1Itti i
prezzi fos.wro ribi.swti del SO per ceuto - o, per opi
neIl.. propor:rioni De<:! 5S)rie I tene!' conto delle condizioni. nel.
franempo mutate, di produzione e di domanda - la crisi !>OD
-
"-
.. Cemodi Kir>d l. P"" PC In ki<Ie de l prof itt o se"tt, (Me"' . lo D" ,tlo li be rt} Ed il ion
....bbe; ch si pU vendere in profino a cinquanta com" a
""nl o, se i prezzi dei fanori souo pu... SCl>mati a
cinquanta. La crisi e la mancanza dei profitti nascono dallo
squilibrio dei prezzi, dal fano che taluni p....ui non n1>assarono
Onon furono lasciati ribassa....; e poieh. ; p....ui sono l'l'ddilo
p"r &1i uni e COSIO per &1i altri, molti p"rdono e p"rdono
SOPl'llttutto &1i imp....nditori, Un rialzo dei p....ui che fosse
do\"UIO a la' ori pubblici compiuti per mezzo di inflarione
creditiria lascerebbe sussistere la sproporz:ione fra p...zzo e
pr=, ossiafra costi e m 'i. f orse la Cres<.'l>rebbe.I2:
Se" vere, ad esempio, che wune demale agricole e tal une
materie prime minerarie SODO M"hassate troppo mrebzK>ne a
taluni prodotti industriali, ai prezzi del 1o'"Oro e dei sel'\-m
pobb&i (impost e) ed qli int eltiS dei debiti, sarebbe
-.ano che la oomanda deri'"1.IIt e dai meui di
spende.... offerti daDa c:ruzioDe dellanOO'1I. massa mooetaria si
ri'"Olg_ esclusi,'a.mente verso ; beni ed i sel'\igi
...tati'_le de pl'lUZlti. l'Il Pl"Of;I1l.IDma n>siffatto "
""nordine dene possibilit IImane? EsistODO strumenti di
misun.rione rUfinati abblsuO" per zii squilibri dei
prezzi fra meree e meree? EsistOl>O strumenti adatti a
il nbasso di prezzo Pl'O\...uient" da squilibrio dai
nba.<.si oo\"\.ti a rap:tni temiche: ridtlZioul> di costi. mutazion"
di,u.sti?
P"rcM, se un tempo esiste\1I. equilibrio tnI. diff""""ti bl>ni
(.04., B, C, D) ai prezzi l O, 12, 8, 15 ed on. i pruzi ec>ITl>nti 8, 4-
7, 5 non eeaseatoeo ai produnori di B " di D di 1a\..,l'llI'l>
proficuamenle, cosiccb essi ridUCO!lO for1eml'Dt" la loro
domanda di A e di C, percM iJDma&inare eh" la crisi possa
_ .... liquidata, inietundo carta moneta nel monoo ed
alllnf>l]W1OOdel 50 per celltO; pruzi a 12, 6, 10,50, 7,so?
Lo squilibrio tuttl'; B e D 11011 pot"ndo esse...
prodotti ai prezzi (costi) ....lati,'amente troppo alti di A " di C. t
posstl>ile fan! le iniezioni m (Ilisa da rauiUll&""" IIUO" llID"nt" il
Ii\""no di par!"nu; IO, 12, 8 e 15? Come opera.... il minteolo?
5iamo noi sicuri ehe illi\"eno, ehe era equilibrato alla par!l>DU.,
sia tale ancol'll adesso? Oh!, non me&lio ten"r duro e, come
consiglia il )Iachlup, con sagi di SCOlltOsufficientemente alti,
forzarl> i B ed i D a liquidare, alla pi s\"elta, le rimanenze
ingombranti di maluzU>o, anzi con ulteriori tracolli di pnozzo,
ma con conlempor;me; agiusumenti nelle quantiti. prodotte;
sKrl>t alla fin", il campo dellelll"endulOminal'cioso,
i prezzi ritornino a 6 e ad 8?:SOel frattempo,llDCb.. i prodottori
diA e di C, C05U"eItia pllan! ildeoaro caro, e posti di fron t e ad
att"n""'te riclnesIe di Be di D, a''T&IlIlO00'"11I0al>Chessi eeode...
sui prezzi.. I coll5Om costituiti per resistere a''T&IlIlO abbassat e
le armi .; 5"-l'll.nflO sciohi; ed alla finelIll 1100' ''' fUIbrio .;
potIi formanoai 8.
Alnl>D'''' Iin .llo ,'; torna a profittare ed a lU..Iapa"". La
crisi. finita.
Il scocJio alla bqIDdaz>oue SODO i prezzi fusi p"r
iegg" (tmpost,,) o per contratti a 1u.llp scadooun. (mt,,"""'; di
debiti pubblici e pri\1I.ti) o per con\'fllZioai rit;idl> fra uuppi
sociali (stip"ndi, saI.ari). III fOlldo, i COIlI"Illi iDt1aziomstici
sono ;mmacinati allo scopodi assaltare di fianco con manO\ToI
an'oIz"n'" fonilizi che .; pudica impow"b,1e espup>an' con
assalti frontali. I contribuellti, schiacciati da Wl peso troppo
fom di imposll> (compresi Pi mteressi dei debiti pubblici); eli
indU5l:riali e eli aicoltori, a papre, m temp di
pruzi alanti, imposte, saI.ari ed mteressi m,1l.1'.Iti, SJl"l'lllIO
nella mano,ToI lt1OI>etalV. :SOel tempo l se il noddito nazoDaI"
"l'll 100 "la quot<t di esso assorbita dai pereenori di nodditi fissi
Chi ricordi cl>oo il disordiM soNle del dol'O"l"ern fu
do,-uto DOIl alla pern in s. ma alla infbrion<' monetaria la
quale si accompagn. sebbene DOIl ad
rimane SCOl1l<'llIO dinilnzi alle possibili COllSE'gUenze
sociali di un nUO'o'O sperim<'lllo eamceo a tanta poea distanza
doqu..Do rt'<'ftIle. Sperim<'Ilti cosiffatti si possono. sebbene con
ZU"'issimo pl'lcoIo. ripetere solo 1 dista n'" di l,IlI5O'<'OIo l'uno
dall'altro: IUl'IT1I europea. 1914'1918; assepti francesi.
1:J9D-1796; sistema di taw, 1715-1720. Ogi, rip..te....
potnobbe sipifieare il croDo deIb ",-, ilii
occidental...
e crt"ditori riuscissero a portar b loro quota da 25 a 35; ;
salariati l'd altri semifissi da 30 a 40, sicch. ; n riabili
....stassero COlli rimanenti 25; megliodi ' 0, ma non tanto com..
appa...., poicMi .0 erano sui 65 ed i 25 SOn sui ' 00. I n n abili
inoltre, forse N tti ugualmente alla CUCCJ,gna
o la preferenza andrebbe ai pi s" etti?
S; eoDOSCe la repIiea desii iniI. rioniq; O ri&rionisti,
com<' oggi essi prefO'riscoDo chi amarsi: b refbzion<' SMi
prudent... limita ta al 11ecessuio per ; prezzi ed ;
l'O'dditi DOU da 6S a ' 00, ma. appenil ad 80, cira>ndau do
pranziO' stIO'ttissime. TtItto sommato, ritelllO che ; pe!'N>ttori
dei redditi ,,,,,riabllicornoo minor rischio Ile! fan. boan puoco
J, catti,,,,, fortuna piuttosto che Ile! COn spedi<'nti Lo
spedi<'nte moDl'tlrio, "al cometenunla fortuna J,
Pu J.nd.ar ma po rinoo"are il disordinO' dO'! '9,8-'920.
:X,K' ...; arriechimO'nti Illtttiri e nllO,i impo,-.rimoonti incolpe..oIi
farebbero ridj ,-ampare l'incendio. che ...mbn....
andas5O' dedi odi e deIJ,e in,_ sociali. Como-
... mpl1' acadd.. ...na storia. ; les1:oflllti. ; procacciatori. gli
arriechiti sapnobbooro porsi in SI I\'O peT tempo. Cadrebbero gli
'!t o e I ltn "'fitti (Me",, ' o ,,,tto I rt. Edition
c S, I .. El I x
"'
Ma, oramai l'equilibrio rotto. Chi ci dino si
dNlba ritol"ll.l.re ai rapporti "ecchi di 25 pl'r i redditi fu.si, 4 0
pl'r i ...mifissi e 3S per i redditi n nablli? Quando si stampa
carta, si ba por '..di fu le 0050' con prbo e con giustizia..
Ma arnffa molldi.aJe dei 5 miliardi di
,-inCODOi pi s" ehi; e DOIl mera,i&Jjerebbe affatto cl>oo imposte
(impiegati pubblici, interessi di debiti pubblici ., printi) era 25
e quella ottenuta dai redditi s.emifu.si privati , salari,
canoni di fitto, ecc.) era 40, ili di rt'dditi n riabili
(proprietari diretti conduttori, fittaioli, meuadri, industriali,
commercianti, artigiani. professionisti) rimane,-ano 35. La
oituazione era !TOSSO modo equilibn,[;I.
Se nel lempo 11, essendo i prezzi ridotti del 35 p"r ""nlo,
eppuci il noddilo nazionale sommando a 6;;, la quota
assorbita dai po!'reeonori di nodditi fusi riman....do in" aria ta a 25
qu.u.. ottenuta dai nodditi semi fusi riducendosi forse a 30, ai
pl'rc.nori di redditi variabili, il eoloro com>no il ris"hio del
pi Odel DIe2)(), l'inwl&ono eo.identemflll" solo 10. Essi, cl>e
OODO molti, si Ial1'ano di DOlI pceer pi \"" _.
Se tutti i prezzi fossero fl uidi, tutti si ridurrel>b<.ro di un
t.no cirea: 17, 27 e 21. Poich fluidit si oppongono
kui. eoatroDi, consuetudini, pressioni Dlpoll"nti di , -izorose
foru social:i. i rappresenWlti dei fl!dditi
tra r=diDe desii ODeri fusi e semifusi. i1 111Mte1lo dei prezzi
ea1aDti. Pft'$UU deDa impossibiliti di on_", ridlUioni di
imposte. ronool'lti ' mjcbe\..xi con i cnditori, con.o;ensi
siDd... 1j a riduzioDi di Wri, 00ll ansi.o.lo spe<iiente,
il eouseuta di rWu'" prezzi" nodditi da es a.
100, eoI. minimo attrito e eoI. eont....to K<oYDes
annW>cia aII 'oopo la ricettl da 5 miliardi di doIlari-<>ro
5tl.mpati ad deIJ,e nseo-. J, 1,ll'H.
Ilibliot .....
Ce" ...di Kindl. P'"
" Ce..", di per PC2 - In lode de l P.'oIitto Itri ", ,,tti (Men:elo Di,itto l ibert' tali, n Ed,tion
inno<:'fllti, &li industriali, &li agricoltori, i C'OllUlWrcianti probi e
iWIlSiIti, i quali hanno fin qui noristito aDuno delhl crisi.
S co"'" minor mchio I papre imp<:>sU W ed.
interessi inn riati. '-al meglio ras."t;"lni I reddito,
ed. I tempotallNDWllte la propria quob, a
cuisa di di deI1a pace 5Ociale, ad impiegati
ed opern. AIJa lunga, chi riusriri l &li intel'e$$i pattuiti,
saJ:in. allo proprio crNito, Stlti e pri." ti potranno
COIl....l'tin i propri debiti, appelli. sia 1eplmellle possibile,
daD"8 al 6 ""ilIo, dal 6 al S ""alo, dal S al 4 .d al 3 "
forse al 2 Vz ""ilIo. La rigida O$Hl'\' anza della parola data,
spinta b<!...."co alla soppol'tl1X>ne di quella cJ,. o pari'
inciustizia sostallziale, ,""cono e Siri per un peno la miclior
pranzia di sureesso nella >;udegli indi >..dui e dei popoli.

o
<].
A.iI. III

:
Capitolo 9 - Tema per gli storici
dell'economia: dell'anacoeetismo
economico
I . Gio\" ritornan, propo...... DOIl. soluzioni b<!n.s:i
sopl'& al 1epme fra XI.... h"berale e h"beralismo
..e<lDOmico, che l"KO'lll emelll e" ba
dichial'&lOcoll tinlell!e, .din Ilessun tooeo forse meeJio che COIl
.. parole secuenti:
L'idell liberile pvO un legame contingent e eUinsitoro, Illi
non Iti nessull lepme neressario e perpetuo, COlI li proprim,
pri u U delli Ifrri e delle industrie: essasi oppone primamente e
direttamente all 'opp..-ione e falsificazione delli ."iU moral e, da
qUilullque PUIf si _rriti, da assolutisti o da democ ratici, da
Cilpilalisti o da proletari, da <Zar o da bolsee"iet, e SO!tO
qUilunque finzione mitiCil, sia quella delli rilm artena, sii
1iI1tri della filee e lIUr!ello; e il promm'imenlOdelli libertio il
criterio con cui misura istituti politici e ordinamenti economici,
in rapporto i111e nrie ,ituaziolli 'toriche, a volta il "Ollil
ae<:ettandoll o respillgendoli, """'lido che quegli lstltutl lfrbino o
smantscano efficirn p'" il suo fine, L'ideale liberale ha natura
religiosa, e la Itom della libert storia religiosache di cont inuo
gludlCil clomilla la nom "c' momica non gi Sloria
eoonomiu. che della religione si ...rn di masc:llera, come
immagilla>'i )lan, [...] Solo lnO...ndo dalla libem come
esigfflZoil morale daUl intnl'!"l' tare >IOri.a. Dflla qwole q\lfSUo
esigfflZoil si affemwUo e <!"l'alo di volta in volu le propn..
istitunoal, -00che di volGi in volti era possibile Dflle \'i ne
opoc:!le: COllW IllOIWrde feudal i e come repubblidlf romullolli,
tomf _rClUe iWIIute e come _ rcbie Olltituziollali. e ..l
Kir>dl. per
fil , Vim. lina vai Slrum, nti Guiclo
.. C I " I A& [E] I :.:
(!I2J Tl'llduco I modo mio in lire itl1il ne i calcoli de) Keynes.
seDZ.a entrlre nei particolari dimostl'l ti' i . A......rt o che. anche
sorto I1tri il mio Un t'lSSunto, che non pretendo
lett erale, del Sluio del Ke)"tles. TI'ISCUrO una parte note'..,}.,
deDe 5ue lflomentlZi oni, che I me, sebbene forse non I lui,
paiono UtTI"lptlti rispetto Il punt o essenziale; e riespongo
quest 'ultimo come lo riC05tnw:i nella mia mente, con qu.che
amplifieuione , inutil e per &Ii iniziIti, neC'eSSlri.l I chi ' 'DOle
rit_ re la ClteDI del l'Ilcionamento ll tutti i ouoi anelli. Pu
<!ani che, riducendo ed I mplifiClndo, io . bbia mut l to. Resta
llteso che arilSsunto e le critiche si riferiscono non Il saggio
originale Ke)'1le5, mi .n. mia rico5truzione.
I21l 1ll una IlOtI COlllUIlic.iti lO 1boow Toob e do questi
pubbliati mlOppeodke ilio KtirtoA Lnkt IO Ltm1Cmn:iIII' fI!Io
E/frcn A.Jo'lbtd IO rIIt RM<1Il,l:Q)fI ofC4M DII rIIt l<ufo of
rIIt C\o1l'ncJ. LOIldon, JohIl l,JUITllY, , 829,
UUiSi su questo pI1Dto ed mI_nle ...ua politic.il.
del credito un 5igi6, che _ esito I dichiara...
=...ndo ...r dusin foru e dirittul'l. di nzlon.;l.mento. di Fritl:
lbchlup, "ZW' f l'l.l e der .-\ll.kurbelnlll durch
BmcII\' , Heft 3. pp. 39 8 104. La.
\murI di qlleSto e cii litri Slgi pubblic.iti dilli riri>tl. ...."""'" mi
fa ",l1loIre che CUi 11 del1I ecceIJenu. !TI. le t'lfelDl'ridi
......."".,idw. che ...r quiIcbe lDIlO dopo il .890 pal"<e .-mu da
KamI ed l'rISi poi tns1eriUI Loadn ed I Clmbridge CL ) sia Ol'l.
dispu.uu., coa esito iIlcerto, da nmlll. pn!ZZll dell ape conln> Lo
diffu'I opnio!le, del1I quale si fa eco anche il J:eyues.. un
dtcioo ribIwo del SIgio dello ICOllto YllltiUi<*> I!JlliqllicWioDe e
Il Sl.lP"rllDl'll to del1I cri5i, riprodurre Lo Lopjdo.rio sente=l del
lachIup: _La poliw del SlWO dello ICOllto dezIi istituti di
ba indubbiatnetlte UIII &J'I1lde import llw, I nc he nelIl
W. deIIl discesa. Soado hlpillone dei pi. nmport llw, .....
_.
m un 1I1oggernellto o lenimentc delll crW Irtrl'-erso II
riduzi one ripida e deciSI del SlUio dello sconto. Secondo II mil
opinione l 'imporu.nu sti m un differimento delli liquidazione delll
crisi, m un prolunp mento delll situulone dfpress;'-I precisamente
do" uti ;o]]e b cilititrici ridlllOn del SlUiO dello sconto. Se "ero
che il ......r l mento delll crisi consiste in un ristllbilimento
dell"'l.ui!ibrio fra costi e prezzi, il qu.e renda Iluon mente possibil e
l1IlI produrione II qu.e copr i l costi e lasd UII prolirto; se
inol tre che l "'I.ui!ibrio nei l'mzi si rlgiunl e tinto pi l'l.pidamenlO
qllilllto pi presto si liqui dano le rimanenze di merci mnnc!ute e
qllilllto pi rlpidamente si spinl ODO ;o]]',n&iii , costi dei fart ori
produtti,.; e del1I Ioni di se fllll!mmt. che un
cresci uto saggiodi KIlIlto acceleT'11o s.. llOtllmeDtodei 1Do1l,il:l:ini ed
il lnCOIloo dei pmzi, la r ipida riduzioDe del SlWO dello !ICOI1to
ridenl'lDl' nl' un mem> Irto I prolullp re 1.1 crisi. lJisericorcIiose
ridUlioni del SlWO dell'Interesse ftCIlO lIOllie'1l. Esse spin,ODO I
lIlIlIl . ....... 1epositioni al rialzo, le qu.11!Jl fi de_""............
lbiw>dorl.ale: ...... reIldooo possibile 1.1 tempon. p..-:nzior>e di
prod urioni le qlllli da ultimo de.... .........: ......
comoentnoo cii Slgi di mlll1 nzione. che si
dimostrer lDllO infine imopporu.bili: iD esse DD
differimento nella Iiquidarjwwdel1Icrisi, LeDilheDlO del1Icrisi vuoi.
dire prolung=>entll del pl'OCe$llll cii CUI'l. del1I crisi _. n lIachlt:p
giunge ...rtiiI iIIe wguentl p.oposiZloitI eleplltemellt. pir>5Slli:
u.nriaIzIl pl'ftlllt\lnl del SlWOdello ICOllto donnte Lo fase
dft rido oo lOl " ico aaortiI il riaIzIl (e quiDlti IttenUl Lo
crisi DD ribIwo dft SII&iO deIJo KO<Ito
nella W. discmdente pu 11 cJer..r ' .... un
riaIzIl troppo del SIgio cii ICOllto lungo 11 fase ascendente
prolungl il riiIlo (e quillcli crisi <:oaMfUeIIte), il riu.rdo
nel ribawl del SII&iO di scoato durante Lo fase disooIdente pu
abb... Lo
1UJ. Ho cercato, per lltllil. di m_te Lo
guelTll, dei miIi sociIli che Lo sesuirooo e di le lui e le Unse
del lfuordine pCI5t--bellico nel LG COIldotfa
NOTE








THE MEANS TO PROSPERITY


BY
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE




MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1933














THE MEANS TO PROSPERITY


BY
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE




MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1933










This pamphlet is an enlarged version of four
articles printed in The Times in March 1933.


PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, EDINBURGH



















CONTENTS
CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER II

INTERNAL EXPANSION

CHAPTER III

THE RAISING OF PRICES

CHAPTER IV

A PROPOSAL FOR THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

CHAPTER V

THE INTERNATIONAL NOTE ISSUE AND THE GOLD STANDARD

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION











CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
If our poverty were due to famine or earthquake or warif we lacked material
things and the resources to produce them, we could not expect to find the Means to
Prosperity except in hard work, abstinence, and invention. In fact, our predicament is
notoriously of another kind. It comes from some failure in the immaterial devices of
the mind, in the working of the motives which should lead to the decisions and acts
of will, necessary to put in movement the resources and technical means we already
have. It is as though two motor-drivers, meeting in the middle of a highway, were
unable to pass one another because neither knows the rule of the road. Their own
muscles are no use; a motor engineer cannot help them; a better road would not
serve. Nothing is required and nothing will avail, except a little, a very little, clear
thinking.
So, too, our problem is not a human problem of muscles and endurance. It is not
an engineering problem or an agricultural problem. It is not even a business problem,
if we mean by business those calculations and dispositions and organising acts by
which individual entrepreneurs can better themselves. Nor is it a banking problem, if
we mean by banking those principles and methods of shrewd judgement by which
lasting connections are fostered and unfortunate commitments avoided. On the
contrary, it is, in the strictest sense, an economic problem, or, to express it better,
as suggesting a blend of economic theory with the art of statesmanship, a problem
of Political Economy.
I call attention to the nature of the problem, because it points us to the nature of
the remedy. It is appropriate to the case that the remedy should be found in
something which can fairly be called a device. Yet there are many who are
suspicious of devices, and instinctively doubt their efficacy. There are still people
who believe that the way out can only be found by hard work, endurance, frugality,
improved business methods, more cautious banking, and, above all, the avoidance of
devices. But the lorries of these people will never, I fear, get by. They may stay up
all night, engage more sober chauffeurs, install new engines, and widen the road; yet
they will never get by, unless they stop to think and work out with the driver
opposite a small device by which each moves simultaneously a little to his left.
It is the existing situation which we should find paradoxical. There is nothing
paradoxical in the suggestion that some immaterial adjustmentsome change, so to
speak, on papershould be capable of working wonders.



The paradox is to be found in 250,000 building operatives out of work, when
more houses are our greatest material need. It is the man who tells us that there is no
means, consistent with sound finance and political wisdom, of getting the one to
work at the other, whose judgement we should instinctively doubt. The calculations
which we ought to suspect are those of the statesman, who, being already burdened
with the support of the unemployed, tells us that it would involve him in heavy
liabilities, present and to come, which the country cannot afford, if he were to set the
men to build the houses; and the sanity to be ques]tioned is his, who thinks it more
economical and better calculated to increase the national wealth to maintain
unemployed shipbuilders, than to spend a fraction of what their maintenance is
costing him, in setting them to build one of the greatest works of man.
When, on the contrary, I show, a little elaborately, as in the ensuing chapter, that
to create wealth will increase the national income and that a large proportion of any
increase in the national income will accrue to an Exchequer, amongst whose largest
outgoings is the payment of incomes to those who are unemployed and whose
receipts are a proportion of the incomes of those who are occupied, I hope the reader
will feel, whether or not he thinks himself competent to criticise the argument in
detail, that the answer is just what he would expect,that it agrees with the
instinctive promptings of his commonsense.
Nor should the argument seem strange that taxation may be so high as to defeat its
object, and that, given sufficient time to gather the fruits, a reduction of taxation will
run a better chance, than an increase, of balancing the Budget. For to take the
opposite view to-day is to resemble a manufacturer who, running at a loss, decides to
raise his price, and when his declining sales increase the loss, wrapping himself in
the rectitude of plain arithmetic, decides that prudence requires him to raise the price
still more;and who, when at last his account is balanced with nought on both sides,
is still found righteously declaring that it would have been the act of a gambler to
reduce the price when you were already making a loss.
At any rate, the time seems ripe for reconsidering the possibilities of action. In
this belief I here reexamine the advantages of an active policy, beginning with our
own domestic affairs and proceeding to the opportunities of the World Conference.
This Conference may be well-timed in spite of its delay. For it will come at a season
when bitter experience makes the assembled nations readier to consider a plan. The
world is less and less disposed to wait for the miracleto believe that things will
right themselves without action on our part.







CHAPTER II

INTERNAL EXPANSION
The reluctance to support schemes of capital development at home as a means to
restore prosperity is generally based on two groundsthe meagreness of the
employment created by the expenditure of a given sum, and the strain on national
and local budgets of the subsidies which such schemes usually require. These are
quantitative questions not easily answered with precision. But I will endeavour to
give reasons for the belief that the answers to both of them are much more
favourable than is commonly supposed.
It is often said that it costs 500 capital expenditure on public works to give one
man employment for a year. This is based on the amount of labour directly
employed on the spot. But it is easy to see that the materials used and the transport
required also give employment. If we allow for this, as we should, the capital
expenditure per man-year of additional employment is usually estimated, in the case
of building for example, at 200.
But if the new expenditure is additional and not merely in substitution for other
expenditure, the increase of employment does not stop there. The additional wages
and other incomes paid out are spent on additional purchases, which in turn lead to
further employment. If the resources of the country were already fully employed,
these additional purchases would be mainly reflected in higher prices and increased
imports.
But in present circumstances this would be true of only a small proportion of the
additional consumption, since the greater part of it could be provided without much
change of price by home resources which are at present unemployed. Moreover, in
so far as the increased demand for food, resulting from the increased purchasing
power of the working classes, served either to raise the prices or to increase the sales
of the output of primary producers at home and abroad, we should to-day positively
welcome it. It would be much better to raise the price of farm products by increasing
the demand for them than by artificially restricting their supply.
Nor have we yet reached the end. The newly employed who supply the increased
purchases of those employed on the new capital works will, in their turn, spend
more, thus adding to the employment of others; and so on.





Some enthusiasts, perceiving the fact of these repercussions, have greatly
exaggerated the total result, and have even supposed that the amount of new
employment thus created is only limited by the necessary intervals between the
receipt of expenditure of income, in other words by the velocity of circulation of
money. Unfortunately it is not quite as good as that. For at each stage there is, so to
speak, a certain proportion of leakage. At each stage a certain proportion of the
increased income is not passed on in increased employment. Some part will be saved
by the recipients; some part raises prices and so diminishes consumption elsewhere,
except in so far as producers spend their increased profits; some part will be spent on
imports; some part is merely a substitution for expenditure previously made out of
the dole or private charity or personal savings; and some part may reach the
Exchequer without relieving the taxpayer to an equal extent. Thus in order to sum
the net effect on employment of the series of repercussions, it is necessary to make
reasonable assumptions as to the proportion lost in each of these ways. I would refer
those who are interested in the technique of such summations to an article by Mr. R.
F. Kahn published in The Economic Journal, June 1931.
It is obvious that the appropriate assumptions vary greatly according to
circumstances. If there were little or no margin of unemployed resources, then, as I
have said above, the increased expenditure would largely waste itself in higher
prices and increased imports (which is, indeed, a regular feature of the later stages of
a boom in new construction). If the dole was as great as a man's earnings when in
work and was paid for by borrowing, there would be scarcely any repercussions at
all. On the other hand, now that the dole is paid for by taxes and not by borrowing
(so that a reduction in the dole may be expected to increase the spending power of
the taxpayer), we no longer have to make so large a deduction on this head.
My own estimate, taking very conservative figures in the light of present
circumstances, makes the multiplier to be at least 2. It follows that the loan-
expenditure per man-year of employment is, not the figure of 500 with which we
began, but 100. Since, however, I am anxious not to overstate what will be a
sufficiently striking conclusion anyhow, let us take it at 1, i.e. that two men
employed by loan-expenditure lead indirectly to the employment, not of two further
men, which represents my own belief, but of one further man. I do not think that
anyone who goes through the detailed calculation can bring it out at less than this;
which means that additional loan-expenditure of 200 on[Pg 12] materials, transport,


and direct employment puts, not one man to work for a year, buttaking account
of the whole series of repercussionsone and a half men. This gives us a figure of
133 as the amount of additional loan-expenditure required to-day to stimulate a
man-year of employment.
But let us, in order to give ourselves a further margin of safety, base our
argument on the figure of 150. This answers, most conservatively, the first of our
two questions.
Next consider the magnitude of the relief to the Budget. For purposes of broad
calculation, the average cost of a man on the dole is usually taken, I think, at 50 a
year. Since, on the basis of the above calculation, a loan-expenditure of 3,000,000
will employ at least 20,000 men for a year directly or indirectly, it follows that it will
save the dole 1,000,000. Here is one-third of the expenditure already accounted for.
But there is a further benefit to the Budget. The yield of the taxes rises and falls
more or less in proportion to the national income. Our budgetary difficulties to-day
are mainly due to the decline in the national income. Now for the nation as a whole,
leaving on one side transactions with foreigners, its income is exactly equal to its
expenditure (including in expenditure both consumption-expenditure and new
capital-expenditure, but excluding intermediate exchanges from one hand to
another);the two being simply different names for the same thing, my expenditure
being your income. Thus new capital-expenditure of 3,000,000, paid for by an
additional loan and not by reducing consumption-expenditure or existing capital-
expenditure, increases the national income by more than 3,000,000 if we allow for
repercussions. The calculation to obtain the appropriate multiplier is much the same
as in the case of employment; except that it is somewhat greater, since to obtain the
national money-income we do not have to make the same deduction for a rise in
prices. However, to be on the safe side, let us, as before, take the multiplier as being
1.
It follows that our capital expenditure of 3,000,000 will increase the national
income, subject to taxation, by 4,500,000. Now on the average about 20 per cent of
the national income is paid to the Exchequer in taxes. The exact proportion depends
on how the new income is distributed between the higher ranges of income subject to
direct taxation, and the lower ranges which are touched by indirect taxes; also the
yield of some taxes is not closely correlated with changes in national income. To
allow for these doubts, let us take the proportion of the new income accruing to the
Exchequer at 10 per cent, i.e. 450,000. There will, it is true, be some time-lag in the
collection of this, but we need not trouble about that; though it is a powerful
argument in favour of proposals for modifying the rigidity of our annual Budget and
for making our estimates, on this occasion, cover a longer period than one year.
Owing to the time-lag in the effect of increased taxation in reducing the national
income our existing budgetary procedure is open to the serious objection that the


measures which will balance this Budget are calculated to unbalance the next one;
and vice versa.
Thus the total benefit to the Exchequer of an additional loan-expenditure of
3,000,000 is at least 1,000,000 plus 450,000; or, in round figures,
1,500,000, i.e. a half of the loan-expenditure; or two-thirds of it, if we were to take
the multiplier as 2. We need see nothing paradoxical in this. We have reached a
point where a considerable proportion of every further decline in the national income
is visited on the Exchequer through the agency of the dole and the decline in the
yield of the taxes. It is natural, therefore, that the benefit of measures to increase the
national income should largely accrue to the Exchequer.
If we apply this reasoning to the projects for loan-expenditure which are receiving
support to-day in responsible quarters, we see that it is a complete mistake to believe
that there is a dilemma between schemes for increasing employment and schemes for
balancing the Budget,that we must go slowly and cautiously with the former for
fear of injuring the latter. Quite the contrary. There is no possibility of balancing the
Budget except by increasing the national income, which is much the same thing as
increasing employment.
Take, for example, the proposal to spend 7,000,000 on the new Cunarder. I say
that this will benefit the Exchequer by at least a half of this sum, i.e. by 3,500,000,
which vastly exceeds the maximum aid which is being asked from the Exchequer.
Or take the expenditure of 100,000,000 on housing, whether for rebuilding slums
or under the auspices of a National Housing Board, this would benefit the Budget by
the vast total of some 50,000,000a sum far exceeding any needful subsidy. If the
mind of the reader boggles at this and he feels that it must be too good to be true, let
him recur carefully to the argument which has led up to it. And if he distrusts his
own judgement, let him wait and see if any competent person has been able to
confound the bases of the argument, where I first offered it coram publico in the
forum of The Times.
Substantially the same argument also applies to a relief of taxation by suspending
the Sinking Fund and by returning to the practice of financing by loans those
services which can properly be so financed, such as the cost of new roads charged on
the Road Fund and that part of the cost of the dole which can be averaged out against
the better days for which we must hope. For the increased spending power of the
taxpayer will have precisely the same favourable repercussions as increased
spending power due to loan-expenditure; and in some ways this method of
increasing expenditure is healthier and better spread throughout the community. If
the Chancellor of the Exchequer will reduce taxation by 50,000,000 through
suspending the Sinking Fund and borrowing in those cases where formerly we
thought it reasonable to borrow, the half of what he remits will in fact return to him
from the saving on the dole and the higher yield of a given level of taxation;

though, as I have pointed out above, it will not necessarily return to him in the
same Budget. I strongly support, therefore, the suggestion which has been made that
the next Budget should be divided into two parts, one of which shall include those
items of expenditure which it would be proper to treat as loan-expenditure in present
circumstances.
I should add that this particular argument does not apply to a relief of taxation
balanced by an equal reduction of Government expenditure (by reducing school
teachers' salaries, for example); for this represents a redistribution, not a net increase,
of national spending power. It is applicable to all additional expenditure made, not
in substitution for other expenditure, but out of savings or out of borrowed money,
either by private persons or by public authorities, whether for
capital purposes or for consumption made possible by a relief of taxation or in some
other way.
It is often pointed out that, when loan-expenditure was on a larger scale as a result
of official encouragement, this did not prevent an increase of unemployment. But at
that time it was offsetting incompletely an even more rapid deterioration in our
foreign balance. The effects of an increase or decrease of 100,000,000 in our loan-
expenditure are, broadly speaking, equal to the effects of an increase or decrease of
100,000,000 in our foreign balance. Formerly we had no visible benefit from our
loan-expenditure, because it was being offset by a deterioration in our foreign
balance. Recently we have had no visible benefit from the improvement in our
foreign balance, because it has been offset by the reduction in our loan-expenditure.
To-day for the first time it is open to us, if we choose, to have both factors
favourable at once.
If these conclusions cannot be refuted, is it not advisable to act upon them? The
contrary policy of endeavouring to balance the Budget by impositions, restrictions,
and precautions will surely fail, because it must have the effect of diminishing the
national spending power, and hence the national income.











CHAPTER III
THE RAISING OF PRICES
It is the declared policy of the Government, and also of the representatives of the
Empire assembled at Ottawa, to raise prices. How are we to do it?
To judge from some utterances of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he has been
attracted to the idea of raising the prices of commodities by restricting their supply.
Now, it may well benefit the producers of a particular article to combine to restrict
its output. Equally it may benefit a particular country, though at the expense of the
rest of the world, to restrict the supply of a commodity which it is in a position to
control. It may even, very occasionally, benefit the world as a whole to organise the
restriction of output of a particular commodity, the supply of which is seriously out
of balance with the supply of other things. But as an all-round remedy restriction is
worse than useless. For the community as a whole it reduces demand, by destroying
the income of the retrenched producers, just as much as it reduces supply. So far
from being a means to diminish unemployment, it is, rather, a method of distributing
more evenly what unemployment there is, at the cost of somewhat increasing it.
How, then, are we to raise prices? It may help us to think clearly, if I proceed by
means of a series of very simple, but fundamental propositions.
(1) For commodities as a whole there can be no possible means of raising their
prices except by in]creasing expenditure upon them more rapidly than their supply
comes upon the market.
(2) Expenditure can only be increased if the public spend a larger proportion of
the incomes they already have, or if their aggregate spending power is increased in
some other way.
(3) There are narrow limits to increasing expenditure out of existing incomes,
whether by saving less or by increased personal expenditure of a capital nature.
Incomes are so curtailed to-day and taxation so much increased, that many people
are already, in the effort to maintain their standard of life, saving less than sound
personal habits require. Anyone who can afford to spend more should be encouraged
to do so, particularly if he has opportunities to spend on new capital or semi-capital
objects. But it is an evasion of the magnitude of the problem to believe that we can
solve it in this way. It follows, therefore, that we must aim at increasing aggregate
spending power. If we can achieve this, it will partly serve to raise prices and partly
to increase employment.




(4) Putting on one side the special case of people who can earn their incomes by
actually producing gold, it is broadly true to say that aggregate spending power
within a country can only be raised either (i.) by increasing the loan-expenditure of
the community; or (ii.) by improving the foreign balance so that a larger proportion
of current expenditure again becomes income in the hands of home producers. By
means of public works the Labour Governmentthough rather half-heartedly and in
adverse attendant circumstancesattempted the first. The National Government has
successfully attempted the second. We have not yet tried both at once.
(5) But there is a great difference between the two methods, inasmuch as only the
first is valid for the world as a whole. The second method merely means that one
country is withdrawing employment and spending power from the rest of the world.
For when one country improves its foreign balance, it follows that the foreign
balance of some other country is diminished. Thus we cannot increase total output in
this way or raise world prices, unless, as a by-product, it serves to increase loan-
expenditure by strengthening confidence in a financial centre such as Great Britain
and so making it a more ready lender both at home and abroad.
Currency depreciation and tariffs were weapons which this country had in hand
until recently as a means of self-protection. A moment came when we were
compelled to use them, and they have served us well. But competitive currency
depreciations and competitive tariffs, and more artificial means of improving an
individual country's foreign balance such as exchange restrictions, import
prohibitions, and quotas, help no one and injure each, if they are applied all round.
We are left, therefore, with the broad conclusion that there is no effective means
of raising world prices except by increasing loan-expenditure throughout the world.
It was, indeed, the collapse of expenditure financed out of loans advanced by the
United States, for use both at home and abroad, which was the chief agency in
starting the slump.
A number of popular remedies are rightly popular because they tend to facilitate
loan-expenditure. But there are several stages in the task of increasing loan-
expenditure; and, if there is a breakdown at any one of them, we shall fail to attain
our object. I must ask the reader, therefore, to be patient with a further attempt at
orderly analysis.
(1) The first necessity is that bank-credit should be cheap and abundant. This is
only possible if each Central Bank is freed from anxiety by feeling itself to possess
adequate reserves of international money. The loss of confidence in bank balances
held in leading financial centres as constituting international money for this purpose,
has greatly aggravated the shortage of reserves.


So has the accumulation of a large proportion of the world's gold in a few Central
Banks. On the other hand, we all welcome an increased output of the gold mines or a
reduction in India's sterile hoards, because the quantity of reserve money is thus
increased. The devaluation of national currencies in terms of gold is another remedy
belonging to this category. Or, again, the abandonment of rigid gold parities may
help the case, since a Central Bank which can, if necessary, relieve a strain by
allowing the foreign exchanges to move against it, will be satisfied with a smaller
reserve of international money. The abatement of the legal proportion of
international money, which a bank must hold against its note issue, might also help
on a minor scale.
But this is only the first stage. In the early phase of recovery there is not much
loan-expenditure which can be safely financed by short-term bank-credit. The rle of
bank-credit is to finance the restoration of working capital after business recovery
has definitely set in. In ordinary times we were able to rely on the first stage leading
automatically to the subsequent stages. But not in the conditions of to-day.
(2) The second stage, therefore, must be reached, at which the long-term rate of
interest is low for all reasonably sound borrowers. This requires a combination of
manuvres by the Government and the Central Bank in the shape of open-market
operations by the Bank, of well-judged Conversion Schemes by the Treasury, and of
a restoration of financial confidence by a Budget policy approved by public opinion
and in other ways. It is at this stage that a certain dilemma exists; since it may be
true, for psychological reasons, that a temporary reduction of loan-expenditure plays
a necessary part in effecting the transition to a lower long-term rate of interest.
Since, however, the whole object of the policy is to promote loan-expenditure, we
must obviously be careful not to continue its temporary curtailment a day longer
than we need.
A few countries have reached the first stage. But we alone have reached the
second stage. It is a great achievement of the Treasury and the Bank of England to
have effected so successfully a transition which France and the United States, for
whom the task was, until recently, much easier, have bungled so badly.
(3) But there remains a third stage. For even when we have reached the second
stage, it is unlikely that private enterprise will, on its own initiative, undertake new
loan-expenditure on a sufficient scale. Business enterprise will not seek to expand
until after profits have begun to recover. Increased working capital will not be
required until after output is increasing. Moreover, in modern communities a very
large proportion of our normal programmes of loan-expenditure are undertaken by
public and semi-public bodies. The new loan-expenditure which trade and industry
require in a year is comparatively small even in good times. Building, transport, and
public utilities are responsible[Pg 22] at all times for a very large proportion of current
loan-expenditure.


Thus the first step has to be taken on the initiative of public authority; and it
probably has to be on a large scale and organised with determination, if it is to be
sufficient to break the vicious circle and to stem the progressive deterioration, as
firm after firm throws up the sponge and ceases to produce at a loss in the seemingly
vain hope that perseverance will be rewarded.
Some cynics, who have followed the argument thus far, conclude that nothing
except a war can bring a major slump to its conclusion. For hitherto war has been the
only object of governmental loan-expenditure on a large scale which governments
have considered respectable. In all the issues of peace they are timid, over-cautious,
half-hearted, without perseverance or determination, thinking of a loan as a liability
and not as a link in the transformation of the community's surplus resources, which
will otherwise be wasted, into useful capital assets.
I hope that our Government will show that this country can be energetic even in
the tasks of peace. It should not be difficult to perceive that 100,000 houses are a
national asset and 1,000,000 unemployed men a national liability.
(4) Yet if we are to raise world prices, which is our theme, there is yet a fourth
stage. Loan-expenditure must spread its beneficent influence round the world. How
to assist that will be the subject of the next chapter.

















CHAPTER IV
A PROPOSAL FOR THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
We have reached the conclusion that there is no means of raising world prices
except by an increase of loan-expenditure throughout the world. How to achieve this
should, I suggest, be the central theme of the World Economic Conference. There
are, I think, three, and only three, possible lines along which we can lend assistance.
(1) The first, and perhaps the most obvious, means is that of direct foreign loans,
in the style to which we have been accustomed in the past, from the strong financial
countries, which have a favourable foreign balance or excessive reserves of gold, to
the weaker, debtor countries.
The time may be coming for a return to this traditional policy, as opportunity
offers. But it would be chimerical to suppose that such foreign loans can play a large
part to-day in bringing about recovery. Those countries which are best able to make
them are least likely to do so. Nor is it reasonable to expect private investors to
assume new risks of this kind, when those which they have already assumed are
turning out so badly.
(2) The second, and more promising, means is for the stronger financial countries
to increase loan-expenditure at home, on the lines recommended in Chapter II above.
For such expenditure will be twice blessed. In so far as it sets up a stream of
expenditure on
home-produced goods, the favourable repercussions of the initial loan-expenditure
on employment will be multiplied. In so far as it leads to expenditure on imported
goods, it will set up similar favourable repercussions abroad, and will strengthen the
position of the countries from which we buy, both to make reciprocal purchases and
also to augment their own loan-expenditure. It will have set the ball rolling.
It may be better, therefore, to use our available resources to finance the additional
imports, to which a bold policy of loan-expenditure at home is likely to lead, than to
make foreign loans. This will be just as beneficial to the outside world, and
decidedly more healthy than further additions to international indebtedness.
(3) Yet, once again, it seems obvious that we are discussing, so far, remedies of
which the quantitative effect is hopelessly disproportionate to the problem of raising
world prices. I see no reliable prospect of a sufficient rise in world prices within a
reasonable time, except as the result of a substantial, and more or less simultaneous,
relief of taxation and increase of loan-expenditure in many different countries. We
should attach great importance to the simultaneity of the movement towards
increased expenditure.



For the pressure on its foreign balance, which each country fears as the result of
increasing its own loan-expenditure, will cancel out if other countries are pursuing
the same policy at the same time. Isolated action may be imprudent. General action
has no dangers whatever.
We are now advanced a stage further in our argument. We have reached the point
where combined international action is of the essence of policy. We have reached,
that is to say, the field and scope of the World Economic Conference. The task of
this Conference, as I[Pg 25] see it, is to devise some sort of joint action of a kind to
allay the anxieties of Central Banks and to relieve the tension on their reserves, or
the fear and expectation of tension. This would enable many more countries to reach
the first of the stages which I distinguished in Chapter IIIthe stage at which bank-
credit is cheap and abundant. We cannot, by international action, make the horses
drink. That is their domestic affair. But we can provide them with water. To revive
the parched world by releasing a million rivulets of spending power is the primary
task of the World Conference.
For the Conference to occupy itself with pious resolutions concerning the
abatement of tariffs, quotas, and exchange restrictions will be a waste of time. In so
far as these things are not the expression of deliberate national or imperial policies,
they have been adopted reluctantly as a means of self-protection, and are symptoms,
not causes, of the tension on the foreign exchanges. It is dear to the heart of
Conferences to pass pious resolutions deploring symptoms, whilst leaving the
disease untouched. It should be the rle of the British Government to make a reality
of this forthcoming Conference by concrete proposals which would go to the root of
the disease.
There are certain preliminaries which must be accomplished before positive
remedies will have a fair chance. We all agree that the settlement of War Debts and
of Reparations are, first of all, indispensable. For these are of primary importance in
creating fear of acute tension on the foreign exchanges. But have we a positive
scheme of action wherewith to seize the opportunity which the settlement of these
issues would create?
No remedies can be quickly efficacious which do not allay the anxieties of
Treasuries and Central Banks throughout the world by supplying them with more
adequate reserves of international money. There is a considerable variety of schemes
which can be devised with this end in view, having a close family resemblance to
one another. After much private discussion and borrowing the ideas of others, I am





convinced that the following scheme is the best one. If other variants command
more support, that would be a reason for preferring them.
There are certain conditions which any scheme for increasing the reserves of
international money should satisfy. In the first place, the additional reserves should
be based on gold. For whilst gold is rapidly ceasing to be national money, it is
becoming, even more exclusively than before, the international money most
commonly held in reserve and used to meet a foreign drain. In the second place, it
should not be of an eleemosynary character, but should be available, not only to the
exceptionally needy, but to all participating countries in accordance with a general
formula. Indeed there are few, if any, countries left to-day which are so entirely
without anxiety that they would not welcome some strengthening of their position.
In the third place, there should be an elasticity in the quantity of the additional
reserves outstanding, so that they would operate, not as a net permanent addition to
the world's monetary supply, but as a balancing factor to be released when prices are
abnormally low as at present, and to be withdrawn again if prices were to be rising
too much. These conditions can be satisfied as follows:[Pg 27]
(i) There should be set up an international authority for the issue of
gold-notes, of which the face value would be expressed in terms of the gold
content of the U. S. dollar.
(ii) These notes would be issuable up to a maximum of $5,000,000,000,
and would be obtainable by the participating countries against an equal face
value of the gold-bonds of their governments, up to a maximum quota for each
country.
(iii) The proportionate quota of each country would be based on some
such formula as the amount of gold which it held in reserve at some recent
normal date, e.g., at the end of 1928, provided that no individual quota should
exceed $450,000,000, and with power to the governing board to modify the
rigidity of this formula where special reasons could be given for not adhering
to it strictly. (Some provision, for example, would be required for silver-using
countries.) The effect of this formula would be that the quota of each country
would add to its reserves an amount approximately equal to the gold which it
held in 1928, subject to the above maximum proviso. The detailed allocation
for each country is given in an Appendix to this chapter.
(iv) Each participating government would undertake to pass legislation
providing that these gold-notes would be acceptable as the equivalent of gold,
except that they should not enter into the active circulation but would be held
only by Treasuries, Central Banks, or in the reserves against domestic note-
issues.

(v) The governing board of the institution would be elected by the
participating governments, who would be free to delegate their powers to their
Central Banks, each having a voting power in proportion to its quota.
(vi) The gold-bonds would carry a rate of interest, nominal or very low
in the first instance, which could be changed from time to time by the
governing board subject to (viii) below. They would be repayable at any time
by the government responsible for them, or on notice given by the governing
board subject to (viii) below.
(vii) The interest, after meeting expenses, would be retained in gold as a
guarantee fund. In addition, each participating government would guarantee
any ultimate loss, arising through a default, in proportion to the amount of its
maximum quota.
(viii) The governing board would be directed to use their discretion to
modify the volume of the note-issue or the rate of interest on the bonds, solely
with a view to avoiding, so far as possible, a rise in the gold price-level of
primary products entering into international trade above some agreed norm
between the present level and that of 1928perhaps the level of 1930.















APPENDIX
Under the formula for distributing the $5,000,000,000 gold-notes in proportion to
the gold held in reserve by each country at the end of 1928 subject to a maximum of
$450,000,000 to any one country, the allocation would work out as follows:
Seven countries (Great Britain, United States, France, }
Germany, Spain, Argentine, and Japan) would } $450,000,000 each
qualify for the maximum }



$

$
Italy 266,000,000

Poland 70,000,000
Holland 175,000,000

Uruguay 68,000,000
Brazil 149,000,000

Java 68,000,000
Belgium 126,000,000

Sweden 63,000,000
India 124,000,000

Denmark 46,000,000
Canada 114,000,000

Norway 39,000,000
Australia 108,000,000

South
Africa
39,000,000
Switzerland 103,000,000

New
Zealand
35,000,000



$

$
Hungary 35,000,000

Bulgaria 10,000,000
Czecho-
Slovakia
34,000,000

Portugal 9,000,000
Roumania 30,000,000

Finland 8,000,000
Austria 24,000,000

Greece 7,000,000
Colombia 24,000,000

Chile 7,000,000
Peru 20,000,000

Latvia 5,000,000
Jugoslavia 18,000,000

Lithuania 3,000,000
Egypt 18,000,000

Esthonia 2,000,000



No country would have injustice done to it by this particular choice of date except
Chile, whose case might deserve special consideration, and, to a lesser extent,
Greece and Canada. If we were to take the highest figure held at the end of any year
from 1925 to 1928, the following would be the only changes in the above total:
1928.
Highest of 1925 to
1928.
$ $
Denmark 46,000,000 56,000,000
Greece 7,000,000 10,000,000
Holland 175,000,000 178,000,000
Canada 114,000,000 158,000,000
Chile 7,000,000 34,000,000
New Zealand 35,000,000 38,000,000
Java 68,000,000 79,000,000
South Africa 39,000,000 44,000,000































CHAPTER V

THE INTERNATIONAL NOTE ISSUE AND THE GOLD STANDARD
In the last chapter I have proposed the creation of an International Note Issue
designed to relieve the anxieties of the world's Central Banks, so as to free their
hands to promote loan-expenditure and thus raise prices and restore employment.
The necessity of this policy is a consequence of the conclusion, which I reiterate
with emphasis, that there is no means of raising world prices except by increasing
loan-expenditure. But it is desirable that I should attempt to fill in some further
details in this far-reaching proposal.
Its adoption would afford a good opportunity, if sufficient agreement could be
obtained, to secure promises that the assistance thus given would be used, in the first
instance, to abate certain unsound international practices which have become
common under stress of hard circumstances. Exchange restrictions should be
abolished. Standstill agreements and the immobilisation of foreign balances should
be replaced by definitive schemes for gradual liquidation. Tariffs and quotas
imposed to protect the foreign balance, and not in pursuance of permanent national
policies, should be removed. The stronger financial centres should re-open their
money markets to foreign loans. Defaults on public debts held abroad should be
terminated, with the aid of the postponement of sinking funds and some writing[Pg
31] down of interest or principal, perhaps based on an index number of prices, where
incapacity, even in the new circumstances, is proved to the satisfaction of an
independent expert body. For my own part, I should withhold participation in the
scheme from any country which was acting in defiance of its international
agreements and obligations.
Subject to these external conditions, it would be advisable to leave to each
participant an unfettered discretion as to the best means of utilising its quota. For
there is great variety in the needs of different countries. Some would discharge
pressing foreign obligations; some would restore budgetary equilibrium; some would
re-establish commercial credit; some would prepare for conversion schemes; some
would organise schemes of national development; and so on. But all uses alike
would tend in the desired direction.
There remains, however, one essential condition, upon which I have not yet
touched. The notes would be gold-notes, and the participants would agree to accept




them as the equivalent of gold. This implies that the national currencies of each
participant would stand in some defined relationship to gold. It involves, that is to
say, a qualified return to the gold standard.
It may seem odd that I, who have lately described gold as a barbarous relic,
should be discovered as an advocate of such a policy, at a time when the orthodox
authorities of this country are laying down conditions for our return to gold which
they must know to be impossible of fulfilment. It may be that, never having loved
gold, I am not so subject to disillusion. But, mainly, it is because I believe that gold
has received such a gruelling that conditions might now be laid down for its future
management, which would not have been[Pg 32] acceptable otherwise. At any rate my
advocacy is subject to the qualifications which follow.
It would be a necessary condition for the adoption of the proposed International
Note Issue that each participating country should adopt a de facto parity between
gold and its national currency, with buying and selling points for gold separated by
not more than 5 per cent. With the increased supply of gold and its equivalent
brought into existence by the new Note Issue, such a commitment by this country
would be, in my judgement, both safe and advisable. The de facto parity should be
alterable, if necessary, from time to time if circumstances were to require, just like
bank-rate,though by small degrees one would hope. An unchangeable parity
would be unwise until we know much more about the future course of international
prices, and the success of the board of the new international authority in influencing
it; and it would, moreover, be desirable to maintain permanently some power of
gradual adjustment between national and international conditions. In addition, the
governing board should have some discretionary power to deal with emergencies
and exceptional cases. The margin of 5 per cent between the gold points would be
essential, in the light of recent experience, as a deterrent and a protection against the
wild movements of liquid funds from one international centre to another, and to
allow a reasonable independence of bank-rate and credit policy to suit differing
national circumstances,though there would be nothing to prevent a Central Bank
from maintaining the gold equivalent of its national money within narrower limits in
normal practice.
With these precautionary safeguards there would be much to gain and little to lose
from the greater stab[Pg 33]ility of the foreign exchanges which would ensue. There
can be no object in exchange fluctuations except to offset undesired changes in the
international price level, or, occasionally, to make an adjustment, with the minimum
of friction, to special national conditions, temporary or permanent; and they should
not be allowed to occur for any other reason.



It can be claimed, I think, as a considerable incidental advantage of the plan here
set forth, that it would enable the condition to be satisfied which our authorities have
laid down for even a qualified return to gold on the part of this country, namely, that
there must be a more equal distribution of the world's gold reserves. Indeed I can
imagine no other way by which this condition could be satisfied within a reasonable
time. For if it means that the Bank of France and the Federal Reserve System of the
United States are to share out their gold reserves with the impecunious countries of
the world, it is clearly quite remoteto-day more than everfrom anything which
can possibly happen. Equally if it means that these countries are to lend abroad sums
so much greater than their foreign balance as to lead to a heavy outward drain of
gold, this also is what no reasonable person would expect. Moreover, in the
conditions of to-day, with the employment of foreign balances as reserve money
completely at an end, and after the experiences by the world's strongest financial
centres of the scale on which balances can seek to move, it is not merely a question
of the maldistribution of gold. We need a much greater absolute amount of reserve
money to support a given level of world-prices, than was necessary before the recent
shocks to international credit. This may not be a permanent requirement. But it exists
to-day, and it must be satisfied[Pg 34] before we can expect that ease of mind and
absence of anxiety on the part of Central Banks which is a condition of their freely
encouraging the increased loan-expenditure without which world prices cannot rise.
Some such plan, therefore, as that which I have proposed has become an
indispensable condition of world recovery. It is useless to do lip-service to the need
of raising world prices if we neglect the only measures which can have that result.
The alternative, sometimes suggested, of a simultaneous devaluation of all
national currencies in terms of gold, whilst offering some advantages, has the great
defect that it would only strengthen the position of those countries which already
hold large reserves of gold and are, therefore, relatively strong.












CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
I have endeavoured to cover a wide field in a few words. But my theme has been
essentially simple, and I am hopeful, therefore, that I have been able to convey it to
the reader.
Many proposals now current are substantially similar in intention to the proposals
of this pamphlet. Some deal with one part of the field; some with another. We shall
have need of more than one, if our action is to be adequate to the problem. After
making all due allowances for the factors which will cause a larger number of men
to appear in the unemployment returns even in good times, we have the task of
putting at least 1,000,000 men back to work. On the figure of 150 primary
expenditure to put one man to work for a year, which I have adopted above as my
working hypothesis, we should need an increased loan-expenditure plus an increased
foreign balance amounting altogether to 150,000,000. If we take the more
optimistic figure of 100 per man, which I am myself disposed to favour, the
primary expenditure required will be 100,000,000 per annum. We cannot rely on
much further assistance towards this total from the foreign balance, until after world
recovery has set in. Thus it would be prudent to assume that we have urgent need of
the addition of at least 100,000,000 to our annual primary expenditure from
increased loan-expenditure at home.
This is a formidable, but not an impossible, figure to[Pg 36] attain. At least 50,000,000
might reasonably come from a relief of taxation as a result of suspending the sinking
fund and borrowing for appropriate purposes; though this would not lead to increased
primary expenditure of so much as 50,000,000. On this basis an additional loan-
expenditure of (say) 60,000,000 by private enterprise, assisted and unassisted, local
authorities, public boards, and the Central Government, would be a substantial step
towards re-establishing employment.
We are, I think, too much discouraged as to the potentialities of fruitful action
along these lines, because the effect of previous efforts has been masked by
offsetting influences. It is most important to understand that the effects of loan-
expenditure and of the foreign balance are in pari materia. Thus it was the rapid
decline of the foreign balance by 75,000,000 in 1930 and by 207,000,000 in 1931
as compared with 1929,
[1]
which defeated the attempt of the Labour Government to



increase employment by loan-expenditure; the additional loan-expenditure for
which they were responsible being on a much smaller scale than this. But, again, the
improvement of the foreign balance in 1932 by 74,000,000 as compared with 1931
has brought no increase in employment, because it has been offset by the drastic
measures of the National Government to reduce loan-expenditure. Heaven knows to
what plight a combination of the policy of the Labour Government in doing nothing
to protect the foreign balance, with the policy of the National Government to curtail
loan-[Pg 37]expenditure might not have brought us! Business losses would have risen
to a figure comparable with those in the United States,
[2]
bankrupting our railways
and bringing the industry of the country virtually to a standstill. On the other hand,
we have the other combination still untriedthe policy of protecting the foreign
balance and at the same time doing all in our power to stimulate loan-expenditure.
I plead, therefore, for a trial of this untried combination in our domestic policy;
and for the World Economic Conference an advocacy by our representatives of an
expansion of international reserve money on the general lines proposed above.
For we have reached a critical point. In a sense, it is true that the mists are lifting.
We can, at least, see clearly the gulf to which our present path is leading. Few of us
doubt that we must, without much more delay, find an effective means to raise world
prices; or we must expect the progressive breakdown of the existing structure of
contract and instruments of indebtedness, accompanied by the utter discredit of
orthodox leadership in finance and government, with what ultimate outcome we
cannot predict.
The authorities in power have pronounced in favour of raising world prices. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon them to have some positive policy directed to that end. If
they have one, we do not know what it is. I have tried to indicate some of the
fundamental conditions which their policy must satisfy if it is to be successful, and
to suggest the kind of plan which might be capable of realising these conditions.













: FOOTNOTES
[1]These figures are the estimates of the Board of Trade, except that the American debt
payment in 1932, which was paid for in gold, has been omitted. I believe myself that in all
these years the absolute figures may have been some 25,000,000 better than the Board of
Trade allows. But this would not affect the comparative figures given above.
[2]I should attribute the extremity of the plight of the United States largely to the combined
effect of their having no dole financed out of loans, as there was in this country prior to 1932,
and no means of improving the foreign balance such as we employed after September 1931.