Media Presentation Profile of A Fraudster

Profile of a Fraudster 2011
Press Conference, Zurich
June 15, 2011
Agenda
9.00 9.05 Andreas Hammer Head of Public Relations & Public Affairs, KPMG Switzerland Anne van Heerden Head of Risk & Compliance and Head of Forensic, KPMG Switzerland 9.30 How does the typical Fraudster look like? Presentation of the world-wide Study: Profile of a Fraudster 2011
Prof. Dr. Peter Leibfried Geschftsfhrender Direktor des Instituts fr Accounting, Controlling und Auditing (HSG) Mag. rer. soc. oec Alexander Schuchter Institut fr Accounting, Controlling und Auditing (HSG) Forschungsgeschprche mit rechtskrftig verurteilten Wirtschaftsdelinquenten
10.00
John Ederer Head of Corporate Client Forensic Services, KPMG Switzerland Fraud Risk Management Prevention is better than a cure!
10.20 10.30
Q&A End
2011 KPMG AG/SA, a Swiss corporation, is a subsidiary of KPMG Holding AG/SA, which is a subsidiary of KPMG Europe LLP and a member of the KPMG network of independent firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss legal entity. All rights reserved. The KPMG name, logo and cutting through complexity are registered trademarks or trademarks of KPMG International.
Profile of a Fraudster 2011
Anne van Heerden, Partner, Head of Risk and Compliance, Head of Forensic, KPMG Switzerland
Content
Survey Methodology The Fraud Triangle Who is the typical Fraudster Detection of the Fraudster Size of the Crime Warning Signs Emerging Trends
Survey Methodology I
KPMG gathered data and details from fraud investigations (from January 2008 through December 2010), in:
Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMA)

the Americas and Asia Pacific
348 cases from 69 countries
Only white collar crimes with a clear perpetrator
Survey Methodology II
Frauds investigations included in this survey comprise: material misstatement of financial results theft of cash and/or other assets and abuse of expenses
The survey covers: fraudster profiles more common types of fraud conditions that tend to enable fraud typical follow-up actions by organizations impacted by fraud
The Fraud Triangle

What do we understand by the term fraud? All those activities involving dishonesty and deception that can drain value from a business, directly or indirectly, whether or not there is personal benefit to the fraudster.
Rationalisation
Motive
Opportunity
From a theoretical point of view there are three important drivers for committing fraud.
The Elements of the Fraud Triangle
Motive
The offenders impulse to commit fraud.
Financial pressure resulting from excessive lifestyle; Gap between the financial remuneration earned and the responsability held by individual; Pressure to meet financial targets.
Opportunity
The situation that enables fraud to occur.
Weaknesses in the internal controls, Trust / confidence in certain employees, Dominate position.
Rationalization
The mindset of the fraudster that justifies them to commit fraud. The fraudsters convince themselves that they are owed extra remuneration by the employer; Not enough appreciation, regarding the person, or the professional activity.
Who is the typical Fraudster?

Individual Profile Age: Gender: The typical fraudster is aged between 36 and 45 (70%), as per 2011 survey, which is similar to the 2007 results. Men were found to be more likely perpetrators. Women in the Americas and Asia pacific are almost three times more likely to be involved in fraud than in EMA. This might be due to fewer women in senior positions in old Europe and Africa. Function/ Position: Time: Collusion:
Finance function or in a finance-related role, in a senior management position

Employed by the company for more than ten years Works in collusion with another perpetrator

Where the fraudster works
Senior Management
35% 49% 29% 26% 18% 14% 18%
Management
2011 Survey
2007 Survey
Staff
Board Member
11%
Senior Management remain the most likely fraudster. Most people involved in committing fraud work in the finance function.
Where the fraudster works
Finance
CEO Operations / Sales Procurement Board Level Research and development Back Office
8% 9% 7% 2% 1% 3% 1% 5% 0% 2% 26% 11% 25%
32% 36%
32%
2011 Survey 2007 Survey
Legal
10

Time at the organization
More than 10 years 6 - 10 years 3 - 5 year 1 -2 year

10% 9% 1%
33% 22% 27% 29%
29%
36%
Less than 1 year
4%
The survey shows an increase in the detection of fraud among longer-term employees. 60% of the fraudster worked at the company for more than five years.
11

Internal Control
Weak internal controls exploited

Reckless dishonesty regardless of controls 15% 36% 11% 15%
74% 49% 2011 Survey 2007 Survey
Collusion to circumvent good controls
Weak internal controls have become more important compared to 2007.
12
The Swiss Fraudster
17 out of the 348 cases were from the Swiss Firm.
As the global average the typical swiss fraudster is: Male, aged between 36 and 55, working in the finance function or in a finance-related role, in a senior management position, employed by the company for more than five years.
13
The Swiss Fraudster

Collusion Acted alone in 60% of the cases, exploiting in 70% of the cases the weak internal controls.
60% 34% 42% 41%
66% 58% 59% 40%
Americas AsiaPac EMA Swiss
Alone
With others
14
The Swiss Fraudster

Motivation Misappropriation of assets is the most important fraud in Switzerland (59%), above the global average of 43%. Globally, fraudulent financial reporting, raises concerns about the pressures placed on management to achieve targets, while in Switzerland personal gain was the most common fraud motivation.
Fraudulent reporting 59% Misappropriation of assets Revenue/assets gain due to fraudulent acts Expenses/Liabilities incured for fraudulent act Other 12% 12% 11% 17% 12% 6% Type of Fraud 65% Meet targets / hide losses Personal Financial Gain Greed unknow
6%
Motivation
15
Detection of the Fraudster
Many frauds continue to be exposed by formal or informal whistleblowing mechanisms, One in seven frauds are discovered by chance. This puts question marks over the effectiveness of controls and management review at detecting and preventing fraud. (In 2007, 8% of frauds were discovered by accident, rising to 13% in 2011), Companies seem to depend increasingly on the good consciences of staff / third parties, or on accidental discovery, to identify fraud. Globally, there are moves to create more formal frameworks to promote whistleblowing In the US the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), in the UK the Public Interest Disclosure Act. In Switzerland there is legislation scheduled to be debated in parlament to protect whistleblowers.
16
Warning signs
Red Flags What do we understand by the term Red Flag? A red flag is an event or set of circumstances that ought to alert an entity to the possible presence of fraud risk
Red Flag identified and resulting actions taken
No prior red flag Prior red flag not acted on Prior red flag acted on
6% 21% 24%
44%
55% 50%
Companies are failing to read and to act quickly on the warning signs. Ignored red flags are a license for perpetrators to carry on operating and a missed opportunity for the business to detect or prevent fraud and to possibly reduce losses and associated costs.
17
Emerging trends I
Switzerland Family office in Switzerland are becoming targets for fraudster. perpetrators tend to be employees and outside agents such as investment advisers rather than family members.
Asia pacific To overcome cultural and language barriers, there is, a tendency to staff subsidiaries with local people rather than with trusted and experienced employees from the home markets. This allows for gaps in controls and means that fraud can go undetected for prolonged periods, leading to high losses.
18
Emerging trends II
India Companies are too focused on the front end [growing the business] rather than the back end [the support functions] so red flags get ignored or treated as one-offs. When frauds blow up, it's typically several years down the line, when the value of the deception has multiplied and all the warning signs have been missed.
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Many multinational companies have tended to transfer trusted expatriate employees from the parent company into key financial positions at their subsidiaries in the region, to provide not only the necessary experience, but also to police the subsidiary from within the finance function. They act as whistleblowers.
19
Emerging trends III

US Detection of fraud involving collusion with outside parties has increased significantly, this can by attributes to anti bribery and corruption initiatives as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and other task forces designed to clamp down on misconduct.
20
Zrich, 15. Juni 2011
Forschungsgesprche mit rechtskrftig verurteilten Wirtschaftsdelinquenten

Prof. Dr. Peter Leibfried, MBA, CPA Mag. Alexander Schuchter, CINA
UNIVERSITT ST. GALLEN (HSG) Institut fr Accounting, Controlling und Auditing Rosenbergstrasse 52, 9000 St. Gallen Tel +41 71 224 74 10, Fax +41 71 224 74 23 peter.leibfried@unisg.ch alexander.schuchter@unisg.ch
Seite 21
Untersuchungsrahmen
Dissertation an der Universitt St. Gallen (HSG) Referent Prof. Dr. Peter Leibfried, MBA, CPA: Geschftsfhrender Direktor Institut fr Accounting, Controlling und Auditing (ACA-HSG) Korreferent Prof. Dr. Urs Jger: Ehem. geschftsfhrender Direktor am Center for Leadership and Values in Society (CLVS-HSG); nun Visiting Professor an der INCAE Business School in Costa Rica Doktorand Mag. Alexander Schuchter, CINA: bungsleiter und Mittelbau-Reprsentant der School of Management (SoM-HSG) Wer knnte zu den tatauslsenden Faktoren und tatverhindernden Massnahmen eine wirklichkeitsnhere Antwort liefern als die Wirtschaftsstraftter selbst?
Zeitlicher Horizont: Seit 2006 Recherchearbeiten, seit Ende 2009 Erhebungsphase, seit Sommer 2010 Abschluss der persnlichen (12) und telefonischen (1) Interviews mit rechtskrftig verurteilten Wirtschaftsstrafttern in der Schweiz (9) und in sterreich (4)
Untersuchung beschrnkt sich auf die Bereiche: Falschbilanzierung, Korruption & Bestechung, Unterschlagung, Veruntreuung & Betrug, vorwiegend qualitativ
peter.leibfried@unisg.ch alexander.schuchter@unisg.ch
Seite 22
Forschungsdesign
Erhebung
Zugang zum Forschungsfeld hat sich als Herausforderung besttigt (Datengewinnung durch Interviews mit verurteilten Wirtschaftsstrafttern mit Deliktsummen im Millionenbereich; strenger Datenschutz, Themenernsthaftigkeit etc.) Befragte: Vom ehemaligen Geschftsfhrer, CEO, Accountant in den oberen Fhrungsebenen und Aufsichtsorgan zum Verurteilten und Insasse einer Haftanstalt Erwhnenswert: berraschend offene Haltung whrend der Gesprche, beraus sympathische und freundliche Personen Aufbereitung
12 der 13 Interviews sind zu verwenden und wurden nach der Tonbandaufnahme (mit Einverstndnis der Befragten) in die hochdeutsche Sprache transkribiert
Gesamtgesprchs- ( 81; 1060 Min.) vs. Aufnahmedauer ( 31; 405 Min.) Auswertung und Interpretation
1. Verfahren: Manifestes: Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse (computergesttztes GABEK) 2. Verfahren: Latentes: Feinstrukturanalyse (hermeneutische Interpretation)
Methoden- und Forschertriangulation Validitt
Quelle: Vgl. Zelger/Oberprantacher (2002), Art. 27. peter.leibfried@unisg.ch alexander.schuchter@unisg.ch
Seite 23
Schlussfolgerungen im Vorfeld I/III

Der typische Wirtschaftsstraftter ist unauffllig zumeist mnnlich eher extravertiert
noch unbescholten
berdurchschnittlich gebildet risiko- und entscheidungsfreudig stark karriere-, erfolgs- und publicityorientiert
sozial hervorragend in das Unternehmen eingebettet

gesellschaftlich hoch angesehen, geschtzt seit ungefhr einem Jahrzehnt im Unternehmen (!)
Quellen: Vgl. Ragatz/Fremouw (2010), S. 379 ff.; Schuchter (2010), S. 80; Bussmann/Salvenmoser (2006), S. 206 f.; Blickle et al. (2006), S. 220 ff.; Lw (2002), S. 58 ff.; Weisburd/Waring/Chayet (2001), S. 73 ff.; Wheeler (1992), S. 113; Cressey (1953), S. 145 f.
aus welcher Branche?
Seite 24
Schlussfolgerungen im Vorfeld II/III
Tab. 1: Persnlichkeit im Vergleich 1. Hufig kongruente Persnlichkeitsmerkmale
Quellen: Vgl. Blickle et al. (2006), S. 220 ff.; Collins/Schmidt (1993), S. 295 ff.; Ones/Viswesvaran (2001), S. 31 ff.
2. Persnlichkeitseigenschaften entwickeln und verndern sich mit der Zeit 3. Machiavellistische Intelligenz erschwert Untersuchung tatschlicher Persnlichkeit 4. Auch wenn es gelingen sollte, alle Ausprgungen der Persnlichkeit eines Tters bei langjhrigen Unternehmensangestellten oder auch bei Bewerbern fr eine offene Stelle nachzuweisen, ist es dennoch kein Beweis fr ein zuknftiges, deliktisches Handeln
Quelle: Vgl. Schuchter (2010), S. 80.
Seite 25
Schlussfolgerungen im Vorfeld III/III

Viele Unternehmen verletzen Gesetze in bestimmten Gebieten, jedoch nicht in anderen Gebieten, obwohl das Personal dasselbe ist (wenn also allein Persnlichkeitsmerkmale fr das Auftreten von dolosen Handlungen in Unternehmen eine Rolle spielten, dann wre nicht zu erwarten, dass Personen in unterschiedlichen Situationen bestimmte Gesetze unterschiedlich hufig verletzen) und Viele Unternehmen verletzten ber Jahrzehnte Gesetze, obwohl das Personal bereits vollstndig gewechselt hat (wenn die Persnlichkeit von Individuen das Auftreten von dolosen Handlungen erklren knnte, dann wre zu erwarten, dass bei nderung des Personals die Hufigkeit oder Art der Wirtschaftskriminalitt wechselt)
Quellen: Vgl. Sutherland (1949), S. 259 ff.; Sutherland/Cressey (1960), S. 135; Opp (1975), S. 111.
Die These, dass Individuen mit bestimmten Persnlichkeitsmerkmalen eher Wirtschaftsdelikte begehen, wird im Rahmen der Doktorarbeit abgelehnt ANNAHME: Weniger Wirksamkeit: Prvention durch Personalrekrutierung Mehr Wirksamkeit: Profunde Ursachenanalyse, um Prvention zu entwickeln
Seite 26
Theoretischer Bezugsrahmen
Abb. 1: Vom Fraud Triangle zum Fraud Diamond Die Untersuchung sttzt sich auf einen der wohl bekanntesten wissenschaftlichen Erklrungsanstze der Entstehungsgrnde doloser Handlungen von Donald Ray Cressey (Ursprung), einem Pionier der Wirtschaftskriminologie Bentigt es immer alle Fraud Triangle- bzw. Fraud DiamondElemente?
Quellen: Vgl. Cressey (1950), S. 738 ff.; Cressey (1953) S. 90 f.; Wolfe/Hermanson (2004), S. 38 ff.
Seite 27
Boundless-Manager ohne Motiv

He [the offender] did not consider, even while in prison, that his behavior was criminal.
Quelle: Independent Businessmen vgl. Cressey (1953), S. 102.
Abb. 2: Kausalnetzgrafik unbewusst

Anreiz_keinen
Transkribierter Interviewtext
Ombudsstelle_extern
Auslser
unbewusst
Nein, es gab keinen Druck und nein, eine innere Stimme hat es auch nicht gegeben, weil ich mir eigentlich eines wirklichen Unrechts in der Zeitspanne nicht bewusst war. Der Anreiz des Vorfalls war nicht gegeben, da gab es keinen. Es war nie beabsichtigt, dass wir die Leute betrgen []. Die Absicht einer Tat war nicht da, deshalb waren es keine der genannten Auslser.
Innere_Stimme_keine
Druck_keinen
Quelle: Auswertung der eigenen Untersuchung.
Gew issen_rein
FAZIT: Einzig die Gelegenheit ist eine conditio sine qua non
Seite 28
Tatauslsende Faktoren
Sogwirkung der Motivation, aus welchem eine selbstndige Befreiung aus Sicht der Respondenten kaum mehr mglich scheint
Sog des Drucks

Die Angst, dass das jemand entdeckt. Ich wollte die Sache wieder regeln. Das war ein enormer Druck. Wenn man dann in so einem Kreis drinnen ist, dann ist es auch noch schwierig auszubrechen. Dann haben Sie pro Jahr zwei Wochen Herzklopfen, starkes, wenn die Revisionsgesellschaft da ist und dann geht es wieder weiter, das ist schon so. Ich setzte mir hohe Ziele [] Ein enormer Druck wird ausgebt. Es geht nur um Zahlen und Zielerreichung. Wie man sie macht, spielt keine Rolle. Es war nur aus einer Drucksituation entstanden, weil das damalige Arbeitsklima wirklich sehr gehssig war []. Anreiz als Fahrwasser Es ist immer getrieben von einer gewissen Gier. [] Der Anreiz ist immer materiell, also in meinem Fall war es materialistisch. Ich habe dann auch ein bisschen die Relation verloren. Anreiz, ja, ber dem zu leben, wie man eigentlich leben konnte in meiner Stellung als solches. Dann wurde es zu einem sportlichen Ereignis. Gelingt es mir, oder kommen die jetzt drauf oder nicht.
peter.leibfried@unisg.ch alexander.schuchter@unisg.ch Seite 29
Buch (erscheint voraussichtlich Anfang 2012): Titel: Perspektiven verurteilter Wirtschaftsstraftter Erklrungsansatz der Entstehungsgrnde von Wirtschaftskriminalitt und deren Prvention in Unternehmen
Bitte um Fragen und Anmerkungen

Prof. Dr. Peter Leibfried, MBA, CPA Mag. Alexander Schuchter, CINA
UNIVERSITT ST. GALLEN (HSG) Institut fr Accounting, Controlling und Auditing Rosenbergstrasse 52, 9000 St. Gallen Tel +41 71 224 74 10, Fax +41 71 224 74 23 peter.leibfried@unisg.ch alexander.schuchter@unisg.ch
Seite 30
Fraud Risk Management Prevention is better than a cure!
John Ederer Head Corporate Clients, Forensic Services KPMG Switzerland
The size of the problem
What do we understand by the term fraud?
All those activities involving dishonesty and deception that can drain value from a
business, directly or indirectly, whether or not there is personal benefit to the fraudster.
In numbers
In Switzerland fraud losses are estimated at 2-4% of GNP that would be at least
CHF 8 billion.
32
The guiding message
The guiding message.

If it seems too good to be true,
it usually is!
33
Rule of Thumb
According to the 20:20:60 Rule of Thumb
20% of all employees are honest
20% 20%
No special measures / actions necessary 20% of all employees are dishonest Pre-employment-screening Fraud risk management (effective controls) 60% of all employees are as honest as the circumstances allow fraudulent activities and misconduct or not
80%
60%
Fraud risk management Ethics and integrity management (code of conduct, whistle blowing hotline, management as role model, tone of the top) Know your employees
34
Fraud Risk factors
Misuse of merger reserves Manipulation of transfer pricing Manipulation of joint ventures Improver valuation of other assets Misuse of inter company and suspense accounts False cash entries Hidden pledges of cash deposits Teeming and lading or lapping
False sales and customers Advancing or delaying revenue Manipulation of rebates and discounts Misrepresentation of credit status
Other
Revenue Expenses
Under or over provision for bad debts Under or over accruals Delaying or advancing expenses
Cash Inventory
Standard costs manipulation False ownership status False quality
Manipulation of rebates and discounts False valuation False quantity Misrecording of capital items Hidden contract terms
This graphic contains illustrative examples and should not be considered as a complete list of fraud risk factors and not all of these examples are necessarily applicable in all circumstances. Professional judgment is required in response to the specific circumstances.
35
Managing Fraud I
Effective control starts with..
Prevention:
A Code of Conduct with a section on Fraud Risk Management must be implemented and considered effective, with regular training held by most of the company, and dedicated IT security measures ought to be implemented. Fraud risk assessments should also be conducted on an annual basis. Detection: Management review and basic Internal control mechanisms are rated as the most effective means for detection. The role of whistle blowing is significant, but unevenly spread across different regions and cultures. Response: The majority of large companies have incident assessment and escalation procedures, but few have a dedicated fraud response team.
36
Managing Fraud II
Essential components
Effective anti-fraud strategy Tasking key people to take ownership for fraud management Open minded - on specific fraud risks: not It wont happen here!, rather
Why couldnt it happen?
Know your fraud risks

Be aware of key fraud indicators Increase awareness on what to do and actions to take Code of conduct, that is lived
37
Dos and donts I

Dos
Immediately ask for experienced professional assistance Keep it confidential to a small number of essential individuals Block electronic and physical access of suspects Withdraw powers of attorney of involved persons
Preserve evidence and put it into a safe place

Anticipate publicity and establish internal and external communication. One voice
only.
38
Dos and donts II

Donts
Do not touch, save, back up nor shut down any PC/Laptop that may contain
evidence.
Do not alert the suspect Do not let involved targeted employees touch the PC/Laptop anymore, not even
for just shutting it down properly
Do not search for evidence yourself Do not fire the suspect before taking legal and tactical advice.
39
Quick Wins
Check the fundamentals reconciliations are carried out independently & appropriately signatures are completed limits are applied segregation of duties is obeyed assets are appropriately valued & control
Trust and check but also have a healthy measure of mistrust!
40
Red Flags
Examples of Red Flags Refusing to take a holiday (especially more than a few days ) Persistent anomalies in behavior or attitude, e.g. a dominating style, not tolerating questions Excessive generosity towards other staff / auditors
Taking particular interest in certain elements of the organization's business

Habitual gambling / expensive life style Conflicts of interest
Missing files or incomplete documentation

Complaints from suppliers, customers, staff or auditors
41
And the Future? I

Will fraudulent actions increase? 66% of the questioned companies assumed that they will not fall victim to white collar crime But: 73% informed us that they had already suffered from white-collar-crime in the last three years!
The number of the cases may be constant, but more and more are coming to light due to Increased consciousness Increased willingness to report fraud and misconduct More rigorous laws and guidelines Control & fraud risk systems
42
And the Future? II

Based on the Survey results. There seems to be an increased failure to respond to Red Flags Due to the recession & consequent cost cutting there appears to be a reduction in the effectiveness of internal controls (despite tightening legislation) In developing growth economies the front office sales are growing faster than the back office infrastructure and this probably effects Swiss international companies just as much as others We may be facing a growth in fraud discoveries in 2011/ 2012 if the Surveys three year delay in ties back to the recession of 2008
43
Q&A's
Additional Information
Red Flags I
Some Red Flags to look for:
Does this describe an area of your business?

There are difficult relationships and a possible lack of trust between the business and the internal/external auditor. Excessive secrecy about a function, its operations and its financial results. When questions are asked, answers and supporting information are often stalled or withheld. Some practices within a function do not appear straight-forward, and may even be illegal or unethical.
Yes
No
Senior managers receive large bonuses linked to meeting targets.

There is excessive pressure on employees to tamper with results to meet analysts' high expectations for the business. Elsewhere in the industry, companies are struggling and sales and/or profits are declining. Your business appears to buck the trend.
Complex/unusual payment methods; agreements between the business and certain suppliers/customers. These may be set up in a deliberately opaque manner to hide their true nature.
46
Red Flags II
Some Red Flags to look for (cont.):
Does this describe an area of your business?

There are multiple banking arrangements rather than one clear provider a possible attempt to reduce transparency over the businesss finances. High staff turnover within a function. Employees may be more likely to commit fraud in a business with low morale and inconsistent oversight. Where matters of financial judgment/accounting treatment are involved, the business consistently pushes the limits/boundaries.
Yes
No
A division or department of the business is perceived as complex or unusually profitable, thereby diverts the attention of management and the audit functions.
Increases in profitability fail to lead to increased cash flows. A remote operation not effectively monitored by the head office.
47
Size of the crime
Sub Region Asia and Middle East North America Australia and New Zeland Europe Africa South America India
Average total losses per fraud US$m 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7
In some fast growing economies where there is a culture of not loosing face or speaking up they tend to have higher average losses, Increased commercial pressures to recover funds,
Direct correlation between the size of the crime and attempts to recover the loss.
48

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Profile of a Fraudster 2011

Press Conference, Zurich

June 15, 2011

Profile of a Fraudster 2011

Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMA)

348 cases from 69 countries

Only white collar crimes with a clear perpetrator

The Fraud Triangle

The Elements of the Fraud Triangle

Who is the typical Fraudster?

Finance function or in a finance-related role, in a senior management position

Who is the typical Fraudster?

35% 49% 29% 26% 18% 14% 18%

Where the fraudster works

2011 Survey 2007 Survey

Who is the typical Fraudster?

More than 10 years 6 - 10 years 3 - 5 year 1 -2 year

33% 22% 27% 29%

2011 Survey 2007 Survey

Less than 1 year

Who is the typical Fraudster?

Weak internal controls exploited

74% 49% 2011 Survey 2007 Survey

Collusion to circumvent good controls

Weak internal controls have become more important compared to 2007.

The Swiss Fraudster

17 out of the 348 cases were from the Swiss Firm.

The Swiss Fraudster

60% 34% 42% 41%

66% 58% 59% 40%

Americas AsiaPac EMA Swiss

The Swiss Fraudster

Detection of the Fraudster

2011 Survey 2007 Survey

Emerging trends III

Zrich, 15. Juni 2011

Forschungsgesprche mit rechtskrftig verurteilten Wirtschaftsdelinquenten

Schlussfolgerungen im Vorfeld I/III

sozial hervorragend in das Unternehmen eingebettet

aus welcher Branche?

Schlussfolgerungen im Vorfeld II/III

Tab. 1: Persnlichkeit im Vergleich 1. Hufig kongruente Persnlichkeitsmerkmale

Schlussfolgerungen im Vorfeld III/III

Boundless-Manager ohne Motiv

Abb. 2: Kausalnetzgrafik unbewusst

Quelle: Auswertung der eigenen Untersuchung.

Sog des Drucks

Bitte um Fragen und Anmerkungen

Fraud Risk Management Prevention is better than a cure!

John Ederer Head Corporate Clients, Forensic Services KPMG Switzerland

The size of the problem

What do we understand by the term fraud?

The guiding message

The guiding message.

Fraud Risk factors

Standard costs manipulation False ownership status False quality

Know your fraud risks

Dos and donts I

Preserve evidence and put it into a safe place

Dos and donts II

Trust and check but also have a healthy measure of mistrust!

Taking particular interest in certain elements of the organization's business

Missing files or incomplete documentation