Consti 2 - UP Law SecC 2014 Case Digests

UP Law SecC 2014 Constitutional Law 2 Digests
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. When the voters of his district elected the him, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. (2) The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. The election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.
People vs Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago One-Liner: Romeo, who was convicted of rape and acts of lasciviousness, wants to discharge his duties as a congressman; SC said this cant be so because it would be a mockery of the penal system. Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to discharge his duties as a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted of a non-bailable offense. His main argument is the "mandate of sovereign will", as the electorate of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. He avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the HR, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail. Issues: (1) Should he be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives? (NO) (2) Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law? (NO) Ratio: (1) Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. This provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
Section 9 Eminent Domain Republic vs Vda De Castellvi

G.R. No. L-20620. August 15, 1974
RATIO DECIDENDIS: The expropriation must be actually commenced in court ; The taking for purposes of determining the jut compensation to be paid must be reckoned from the date the complaint for eminent domain was filed; the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use of which it would bring most in the market; the report of the commissioners of appraisal are not binding but merely advisory in character as far as the court is concerned. NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CoFI on an earlier expropriation proceeding FACTS: Carmen Vda. De Castelvi = administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castelvi She entered into a contract of lease with the Republic, renewable on a year-to-year basis starting on July 1, 1947, of a parcel of land in Barrio San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. On June 30, 1956 the Republic, before the expiration of the contract of lease, sought to renew the same but Carmen refused. When the
UP Law SecC 2014 Constitutional Law 2 Digests

Philippine Air Force refused to vacate the property, Carmen wrote the Chief of Staff of the AFP but to no avail. Carmen then instituted an ejectment case. While said case is pending, the Republic filed this expropriation proceedings for the possession of lands.
The Republic prayed for the pegging of the provisional value of the land at P259,600, which the lower Court granted. Carmen and the other intervenors, such as Toledo-Gozun, filed their separate motion to dismiss alleging that the fair market value is P15.00 per square meter and that the overall price should be approximately P11,389,485. The trial Court appointed 3 commissioners who submitted their recommendation that the lowest price for the lands should be P10.00 per square meter. The Regional Trial Court heeded the advice of the Commissioners and declared that P10.00 per square meter is fair and just; thus this appeal.
Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 | 3

(e) Utilization of property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property Castelvi was not ousted or deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property because she was still the owner and the State still paid her rent. Therefore, the taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947. The Court did not accept the Republics contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time ceases upon the day fixed without a need of a demand (Art 1669, Civil Code) It cannot also be said, as the Republics contention, that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated. The owner of the land has the right to its value for the use of which it would bring most in the market and thus it was appropriate that Castelvi showed that the land was suitable for division into village or town lots (the land was classified as residential and taxes were paid based on such classification, the location is suitable for a residential subdivision, plans to turn it into subdivision)
3)
ISSUES: 1) W/n the trial Court erred in setting the amount of just compensation to P10 per square meter. 2) W/n the trial Court erred in holding that the taking of the properties under the expropriation commenced with the filing of the action. HELD: 1) Yes, the just compensation shouldnt be computed on the basis of the prices in the year 1947 as the taking by the State of the property using the power of eminent domain did not commence in 1947 but only upon the institution of this action. However, the report of the commissioners of appraisal are not binding but merely advisory in character as far as the court is concerned. The Court in this case ruled that P5 per square meter is the just compensation, taking into consideration the recommendation of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal. 2) No, there are 5 essential requisites to constitute taking under the eminent domain, namely: (a) must enter private property - present in the instant case when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, via the AFP, took possession of the property of Castelvi. (b) must be for more than a momentary period wanting in this case as the lease was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year and thus therefore the entry on the property is temporary and considered transitory. The AFP claims that the real intention of the lessee (the Republic) was to occupy the land permanently. The Court held that the intention cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. If the intention of the lessee in 1947 was to really occupy the land permanently, why was the contract of lease entered into on a year-toyear basis? Why also didnt the Republic expropriate the land in 1949 when it expropriated the other lands it occupied? Even if it really was the intention of the Republic to expropriate the land at some future time, mere or implied notice of an intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate t lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court. (c) Under color of legal authority present because the Republic entered the Castelvi property as lessee. (d) Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. present because use by air force of the AFP.
4) 5)
People vs Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago One-Liner: Romeo, who was convicted of rape and acts of lasciviousness, wants to discharge his duties as a congressman; SC said this cant be so because it would be a mockery of the penal system. Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to discharge his duties as a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted of a non-bailable offense. His main argument is the "mandate of sovereign will", as the electorate of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. He avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the HR, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail. Issues: (1) Should he be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives? (NO) (2) Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
4 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014

persons validly confined under law? (NO) Ratio: (1) Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. This provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. When the voters of his district elected the him, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. (2) The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. The election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. other was used as their residence. In 1979, the government filed an expropriation case for the said land, but was dismissed by the SC on the ground that the choice of area was arbitrary. In 1982, the land was auctioned off to the spouses Babiera and spouses Sangalang since the De Knechts failed to pay their real estate taxes. Petitioners failed to pay within one year, so both spouses filed a petition for registration as owners of the land which the court granted. Then both spouses sold the land to Salem Investment Corporation (Salem). On February 17, 1983, BP Blg 340 was passed authorizing the government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay for the EDSA extension, one of which is the assailed property. The Knechts filed a civil case for reconveyance, annulment of tax sale, and titles of the Babieras and Sangalangs. Although the petitioners presented their evidence, they failed to attend the final hearing, and were always requesting for postponement. The court dismissed the court on the ground of lack of interest. The petition became final in February 1990. 3 months later, the government filed for determination of just compensation of lands in BP 340. The trial court issued a writ of possession, and 7 of the De Knechtss houses were demolished. After, the trial court issued an order fixing the compensation of all the lands, but didnt include the improvements. Because of this, the De Knechts filed a motion for recovery of ownership and possession of the property, and also a motion for intervention and to implead additional parties. The trial court dismissed their motion for intervention after learning that they had no legal interest on the property. Issues: 1. WON the Knechts had a right to intervene over the subject property in the civil case. 2. WON the case was an expropriation proceeding and not just a case to determine just compensation. Holding/Ratio: 1. No. The petitioners are assailed that they didnt know the tax delinquency and subsequent proceedings until 1983, thus, they didnt get to redeem the property after 1 year. But, the claim of lack of notice is a factual question which has already been answered by the trial court and the CA. Res judicata has already set in. Since the lower courts dismissed the case for lack of interest, without qualification that it is without prejudice, the dismissal is regarded as an adjudication of merits and is with prejudice. Even if they assail that they are not owners, but were staying in the land, they still dont have a right to intervene. In the absence of procedure in the law, reference is made in the provisions of eminent domain in Rule 67 in the Revised Rules of Court. The power of eminent domain is exercised by every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. The Knechts lost whatever right or title they have over the land after the Court dismissed the reconveyance case. They had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation proceedings were instituted. 2. Yes. It was in the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340 that expropriation proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be expropriated. B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation. The law merely described the specific properties expropriated and declared that just compensation was to be determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways as the administrator in the "prosecution of the project." Note: Section 1 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
De Knecht vs CA
Ponente: Puno, J. Nature: Review on Certiorari Facts: The case is a sequel to several suits started 20 years ago regarding land, owned by petitioners located in Pasay City. They constructed 8 houses, 7 of which were leased, and the

"Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint." RD: In an expropriation case, any person with a legal interest of the land can file a complaint against the government, not only the owners of the land. *December 3, 1983 PWU (only) entered into a contract of lease according to the memorandum agreement. The land to be leased is 10 hectares at 200,000 per annum with an option to renew it for a period not to exceed 20 years. *December 1984 Benitez executed deed of donation in favor of PWU of the land. This means that when PWU entered into the lease agreement, it still had no right to and it was Benitez who owned the land, but this wasnt a factor in the case. *January 1, 1988 Lease expires, negotiations begin for the purchase of the land by PHRDC. *August 21, 1989 Benitez advised PHRDCs general manager to pursue the sale of the 7 hectare property for 70php per square meter. *February 4, 1991 Benitez confirmed the position and willingness of the University to sell the land. *February 4 onwards PHRDC prepared the necessary deed of sale, Benitez as vendor and PHRDC and CMDF as vendees. As of July 1, 1989, PHRDC stopped the payment of rentals because of the ongoing negotiations for purchase. August 15, 1995 Benitez did not sign the deed of sale and on this date sent a letter demanding the payment of rentals and asked that CMDF leave the premises within 30 days. Later, Benitez filed a suit for unlawful detainer. Because of the failure of the negotiations, PHRDC and CMDF instituted a complaint for eminent domain under EO 1035. Following Section 2, Rule 67 of the ROC, they deposited the whole amount (not only 10% as required) in PNB amounting to 708,490. Then they filed for a motion for a writ of possession. The writ was granted and the sheriff was tasked to execute it, but upon motion for reconsideration by Benitez, the same judge overturned the previous issuance of the writ and quashed it. PHRDC and CMDF filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied hence the current case. ISSUE The sole issue is whether the judge, by quashing the writ of possession that he himself allowed, acted in grave abuse of discretion. HELD Yes, it the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. RATIO PHRDC and CMDF were correctly following the procedures for eminent domain and expropriation under EO 1035. When negotiations failed, they filed a complaint for eminent domain and instituted expropriation proceedings. Then they deposited, not only 10%, but the whole amount. Then the proper writ of possession was issued. The judge in quashing the writ, has his basis only on the fact that writ of possessions are issued for those situations where the government agency still does not have possession of the land. Because in this case, CMDF already had possession of the land before the application for the writ, the judge deemed the writ unnecessary and will only be used by
Republic vs Tagle
December 2, 1998 Overview: The current case involves one of eminent domain. It focuses on the correct procedure required under Executive Order No. 1035 specifically on whether an issuance of a writ of possession is proper when the land to be expropriated is already under the control of the government agency seeking to invoke eminent domain. THE FACTS Executive Order No. 1035 The EO was enacted to facilitate government acquisition of private property to be used for infrastructure or other development projects. According to its Section 7, when negotiations between the parties fail, the government agency involved has authority to institute expropriation proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General. The courts shall give priority to these types of cases. The just compensation will be determined by P.D. 1533 and 10% of it shall be deposited. After which, a writ of possession should be executed within 5 days of the deposit. The cause stems from a dispute over 2 parcels of land in Dasmarinas Cavite which is 483,331 square meters owned by Helena Z. Benitez. (also Philippine Womens University I think but the case doesnt explain their connection) In September 1982, the Government through Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC henceforth), under the Ministry of Human Settlements, coordinated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to establish the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project here in the country. One of the main programs, Program III, aimed to establish a Construction Manpower Development Center (now under the DTI). From here, it would be better to narrate the facts in bullets *March 30, 1983 Memorandum of Agreement between Benitez and PHRC is made providing for a 20 year lease or for Benitez to sell a portion (not less than 10 hectares) of the land to PHRDC. *September 22, 1983 Benitez (together with PWU) granted permission to PHRDC to occupy and use the land. CMDF (under PHRDC) then proceeded to possess the property and develop the land.

CMDF as a defense against the ejectment suit. The judge is wrong because in issuing a writ, the judge has only a ministerial duty and not a discretionary one. He has the DUTY to issue the writ if the agency already deposited at least 10%. If he were to be followed, the absurd situation would be CMDF would be ejected and then thats when they will be granted the writ of possession because then, they would not already have possession. This would cause unnecessary suits, plus, the expropriation of property does not only mean PHYSICAL occupation but also taking of title and rights. CMDF wanted to possess the land de facto and de jure. The judge also tried to invoke JM Tuason vs. CA and Cuatico vs CA saying that the issuance of a writ possession cannot defeat a case of ejectment. However, these cases are not applicable because they only doctrinized that the government should provide just compensation. They never said that an ejectment suit can defeat the states exercise of eminent domain. meters 400 php/ sq. meter. CA: affirmed the pricing ISSUE: WON the pricing of the lands sought to be expropriated is just HELD NO. RATIO: Parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been re-classified as residential. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner. the value of the land at 400 php/sq. meter, which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision (the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision). The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. DISPOSITION: SC pegged the price at 375 php/ sq. meter- w/c is in accord with Commissioner Atienzas recommendation. ** Just compensation in Art III sec. 9 shall be interpreted to mean as the fair market value of the land based on its nature and character at the time of its taking.
Napocor vs Henson
PONENTE: J. Pardo NATURE: Appeal for certiorari from CAs decision ordering the National Power Corporation (NPC) to pay respondents landowners/claimants just compensation for the taking of their five parcels of land FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) originally instituted with the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint for eminent domain for the taking for public use of five parcels of land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station. petitioner filed an urgent motion to fix the provisional value of the subject parcels of land. respondents filed a motion to dismiss. They did not challenge petitioners right to condemn their property, but declared that the fair market value of their property was from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter. TC: petitioner had a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated. fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 sq. meters to be deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga (w/c petitioner in fact did). TC: issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. the courts deputy sheriff placed petitioner in possession of the subject land. TC: granted the motions of respondents to withdraw the deposit made by petitioner of the provisional value of their property amounting to P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga. trial court issued an order appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the court in the reception of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of the subject property Commissioners recommended that the fair market value of the entire 63,220 square meters property should be: (a) 350 php/sq. meter, according to Commissioner Tiglao (b) 375 php/ sq. meter, according to Commissioner Atienza. (c ) 170 php/sq. meter, according to Commissioner Orocio. TC: fixed the amount of just compensation to be paid by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square
Paranaque vs VM Realty Corporation

July 20, 1998 Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Ponente: Panganiban, J. Facts: September 20, 1993- The (P) Municipality of Paraaque filed a COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION against (R) VM Realty Corporation over 2 parcels of land with a combined area of about 10,000 sq. m. located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title. a. This complaint is pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, s. 1993, authorizing the expropriation for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. b. The (P) municipality also alleged that prior to the filing of the complaint, it tried to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with the (R), but the latter did not accept the offer. January 10, 1994- RTC Makati issued an ORDER giving the complaint due course. February 4, 1994- RTC Makati issued ANOTHER ORDER authorizing (P) municipality to take possession of the properties upon deposit with its clerk of court of an equivalent to 15% of its fair market

value on its current tax declaration. a. February 21, 1994- (R) VM Realty filed its ANSWER containing affirmative defenses and counterclaim, alleging: 1. The complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed on the basis of a resolution and not on an ordinance, as required by RA 7160 or the Local Government Code; 2. The cause of action, if any, was barred by res judicata or prior judgment. Its Answer was then treated as a Motion to Dismiss. b. March 24, 1994- (P) municipality filed an OPPOSITION stressing that the RTC ORDER of FEBRUARY 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160 LGC, and that res judicata does not apply. August 19, 1994- RTC DECISION: Nullified its FEBRUARY 4, 1994 ORDER, and dismissed the expropriation case. (P) municipality appealed to CA, stating the following issues: a. WON the Resolution No. 93-95, s. 1993 of Paraaque Municipal Council is a substantial compliance with the statutory requirement of Section 19 of the LGC in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. b. WON their complaint states no cause of action. c. WON the strict adherence to the literal construction of the LGC resulted in technicality standing in the way of substantial justice (i.e. as it disallows the LGC from exercising of its power of eminent domain). d. WON the principle of res judicata applies. CA DECISION: Affirmed RTC. Dismissed complaint. Also dismissed the MR filed by (P) municipality. Hence the appeal in SC. (P) municipality basically argues that ordinance and resolution are synonymous, such that it may validly expropriate (R) VM Realtys properties with the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, s. 1993. SC says no, as benefit of the poor and the landless REQUISITES BEFORE AN LGU MAY EXERCISE THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, of for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation per Sec 9, Art 3 of the 1987 Constitution. A valid and definite offer has been made previously to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. b. c. No compliance with the 1st requisite of an ordinance. (P) municipality cited the case of Camarines Sur v. CA which states that a Resolution was enough for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. But this was decided under BP 337, the previous LGC, which provided that a resolution was enough. On the other hand, when this present case was instituted, RA 7160, the present LGC was already in effect and such requires an ordinance and not a resolution. RESOLUTION Merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.
ORDINANCE A law.
Possesses a general and permanent character. Requires majority vote of the members of the Sanngunian members.
Temporary in nature.
Issues: 1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect as an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action. 2. WON the principle of res judicata applies when public interest is primarily involved. Held/ Ratio: 1. No, a resolution is different from an ordinance. a. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government, which may delegate its exercise thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and utilities. Therefore, the LGU may only exercise such power subject to the legislatures control, as embodied in the statute it enacted for this purpose, that is, the LGC particularly Sec 19, which specifically states the need for an ordinance. Local Government Code Sec 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
A third reading is necessary.
d. e.
f.
g. h.
If Congress intended a mere resolution to be enough, it could just have adopted the language of the previous law. The power of eminent domain necessarily involves a delegation of a fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly, the change in the legislative language from the previous requirement of a resolution to an ordinance demands strict construction. (P) relied on the IRR which allows for the use of a resolution to exercise the power, but necessarily, the statute, i.e. the LGC itself, prevails over the IRR. By deciding this way, the SC does not diminish the power of the LGUs, but it merely upholds the law as worded in the LGC. The power of eminent domain granted to the

LGUs is in reality inferior as it must conform to the limits imposed by the national legislature. Hence, the complaint states no cause of action as it was based on a mere resolution. The allegation of the (P) municipality that an ordinance was subsequently passed on October 11, 1994 embodying the contents of the resolution was not proven, and such does not cure the defect of the complaint filed earlier on September 3, 1993. 2. 3. Compelling reasons must exist There are heinous crimes involved
i.
*Heinous crimes (as defined in RA 7659): Act or series of acts, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shook the moral self of a people. ISSUES: 1. WON the death penalty was imposed without compelling reasons 2. WON the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment 3. WON the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. HELD: 1. No. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs. However, the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our sociopolitical and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its demission. 2. No. Article III, Section 19 states, "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." The SC in explaining its denial cited a string of American jurisprudence to outline similar cases as the one at bar. It said that in Furman, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries. Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted their death penalty
2.
No, the power of eminent domain is not barred by res judicata. a. The right to exercise the power must be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment. The scope of eminent domain is plenary, and like police power, can reach every form of property which the state might need for public use. b. Principle of res judicata however may apply to specific issued decided in a previous case, such as the issue of WON the power may be exercised on the basis of a resolution.
Judgment: Denied without prejudice to municipalitys right to properly exercise the power over the same property.
Section 19 Cruel and Unusual Punishment People vs Echegaray

February 7, 1997 En Banc Motion for Reconsideration RATIO DECIDENDI: Article III, Section 19, shall be understood as having vested the Congress with the power to re-impose the death penalty subject to a clear showing of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. *in bold are those that are related to the topic FACTS: Leo Echegaray was convicted for having raped his ten year old daughter in 1996 and was thereafter sentenced to death under RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law). He appealed and gave the following reasons. I. Mixed factual and legal matters a. He was already pardoned by the offended party and her mother b. The dates of the commission of crimes was unclear , resulted to inadequate defense c. Guilt not proved beyond reasonable doubt d. He was not the father of the offended party, therefore death was not the proper sentence e. Trial court was biased and unfair II. Incompetent counsel III. RA 7659 is unconstitutional per se: a. Offense did not result to death b. Death penalty is cruel and unusual It was stated in this case that the criteria for death penalty are the following: 1. Congress must provide for the reimposition

statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, Jurek v. Texas, and Profitt v. Florida. 3. No. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". The death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. Short of homicide, it is the ultimate violation of self. and Sen. Pimentels signature. I. Did Court lose jurisdiction over the case since final judgments can no longer be altered? No, the Court is not even changing its final decision. Rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. What the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. Supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. II. Has the Court in effect granted a reprieve which Is an executive function? (Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution) No. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. III. Hasnt Congress made clear its disposition not to review/repeal/modify capital punishment? Yes. The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999 (House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive
Echegaray vs Secretary
19 JANUARY 1999 PUNO, J. EN BANC On 4 Jan 1990, Court issued a TRO restraining execution of Echegaray. Echegaray filed TRO on 28 Dec 1998 on these grounds: (1) his execution has been set on 4 Jan 1990, the first working day of 1999 (2) members of Congress had either sought for executive clemency and/or review or repeal law on capital punishment. The Court had to resolve whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law were mere speculations or not. The Court granted TRO noting that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). Public respondents submitted an urgent MR contending that: 1. Execution of final and executory judgements is under executive authority. TRO trenches on the sphere of executive authority. 2. TRO creates dangerous precedent. Endless litigation because there is always a possibility of a repeal of law by Congress. 3. Congress had already fully debated on death penalty bill. 4. TRO went beyond power of judicial review. 5. Supervening events making death penalty repeal or modification nil: Pres. Estrada announcing he would veto any law imposing death penalty for heinous crimes Resolution of Cong. Golez (with 113 congressmen) that they are against repeal Sen. Rocos resolution to repeal only has his

Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law.") House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose. HELD: COURT GRANTS URGENT MOTION FOR RECON AND LIFTS TRO. SEPARATE OPINIONS: Vitug, J. concurs with the lifting of TRO but urges Congress to review the law until it complies with the standards of Constitution : 1. there must be compelling reasons to justify imposition of death penalty 2. capital offense must involve a heinous crime Panganiban, J. cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, to him, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent.
Part III
Freedom of Expression, Association and Cognate Rights

Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Freedom of Speech, Expression, Assembly Article III, Sec. 4 Article XIV, Secs. 6, 7, 9 Freedom of Religion Article III, Sec. 5 Culture Article XIV, Secs. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 Article XVI, Sec. 12 Article II, Sec. 17 Right to Information Article II, Sec. 28 Article III, Sec. 7 Article XVI, Sec. 10, 11 Participation Article II, Sec. 1 Article V, Sec. 1 Article VI, Sec. 1 Article XIII, Secs. 15, 16 Article XVII, Sec. 1, 2 Article II, Sec. 22 Right to Education Article XIV, Secs. 1, 5 (3) Right to Privacy Article III, Secs. 2, 3 Due Process and Equality Article III, Sec. 1 Article XIII, Sec. 1 Article II, Sec. 9, 10, 14
Purposes
Arrive at truth and debate on public issues
Orfanel vs People Doctrine: Freedom of speech is not absolute. Otherwise it would be an excuse for anyone to implicate individuals, for the attainment of private, selfish and vindictive ends, thereby hampering the operation of the Government with administrative investigations of charges without any semblance of truth, and with no other probable effect than the harrassment of the officer or employee concerned, to the detriment of public service and public order. Facts: Jesus Ballesteros (complainant) is an employee of the Bureau of Printing Godofredo Orfanel (defendant and second cousin of Jesus) wrote a letter to the Director of Bureau of Printing Godofredos letter says that Jesus and two other

employees of the Bureau has, every night, been printing Christmas cards, wedding invitation cards, term papers for college students, etc. using the properties and facilities of the Bureau of Printing and appropriating the money derived from such for personal use; that Jesus has sold wedding cards to one Artemio Holgado; that he (Godofredo) has himself a copy of the cards which will serve as evidence; that with such racket, Jesus was able to bought a lot in Las Pias and a coconut plantation in Quezon, and he now has a fat bank account in a bank in Manila; that he (Godofredo) can furnish more information to assist in the investigation; and that he (Godofredo) wishes to hold these information strictly confidential and his identity be withheld Godofredo has also sent the letter to the Secretary of General Services The office recommended to the Civil Service Commission that the charges against Jesus be dismissed for being groundless Jesus then commenced a criminal action for libel against Godofredo CFI: convicted Godofredo CA: affirmed the conviction Godofredo appears to be actuated by malice in sending the letter by way of revenge to Jesus' mother's filing of a civil action against Godofredos wife for the recovery of a parcel of land Also, he should have named the two other employees involved in the alleged racket and not just Jesus only No Defendant conveyed the impression that he had evidence to substantiate the charges made in the letter To escape criminal responsibility for libel or slander, it is not enough for the party who writes a defamatory communication to another to say that what he (the writer) expresses is no more than his opinion or belief. The communication must be made in the performance of a "legal, moral, or social duty." Godofredo has no such duty to convey his opinion or belief about complainant's moral fiber to the Director of Printing or the Secretary of General Services. Moreover, he has no reasonable ground to have the court believe that Jesus is one of those unfit members of the government. Godofredo has no legal right, much less duty, to gossip, or foster the circulation of rumors, or jump at conclusions, and more so if they are gratuitous or groundless. Otherwise, the freedom of speech, which is guaranteed with a view to strengthening our democratic institutions and promoting the general welfare, would be a convenient excuse for the harrassment of officers or people concerned, to the detriment of public service and public order. Yes He should have known that Holgado's testimony would have been the best proof. His failure, not only to introduce said testimony, but also, to explain why he did not do so, necessarily weakened his defense. Yes Defendant had, likewise, sent a copy to the Secretary of General Services. Moreover, considering that Godofredo had explicitly asked an investigation, it is obvious that the reading of the letter by other persons other than the to whom the letter is originally addressed was precisely what the defendant had envisaged and sought. Even, however, if no other person than the Director of Printing, to whom the letter was addressed, had read it, still such fact is sufficient publication, for purposes of libel, for he is a third person as regards its writer and the person defamed. Indeed, "(a) libel is 'published' not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice of another person" than its author and the offended party. In Re Emil P. Jurado Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) Nature: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Contempt. PONENTE: NARVASA, C.J. DOCTRINE: To resolve the issue raised by these facts, application of fairly elementary and self-evident postulates is all that is needed, these being: (1) that the utterance or publication by a person of falsehood or
3.
Issues: 1. WON the letter is a privileged communication which whould exempt the author thereof from criminal responsibility 2. WON Godofredos conviction is merely based on presumption of malice 3. WON the letter merely contained an opinion or belief for which Godofredo incurred no criminal liabillity 4. WON the failure of the defense to present Artemio Holgado as a witness should be taken against Godofredo 5. WON there really has been publication of the letter was only addressed to no other than the Director of Printing Held and Ratio: 1. No Privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged or conditionally privileged. A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has acted in bad faith. Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith. There is malice when the defamer has been prompted by ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed In this case, the letter is a qualifiedly privileged communication, pursuant to Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown... 2. No Godofredo's testimony about his alleged good faith is untenable: (1) The imputations contained in his letter appear to be absolutely groundless he did not even try to prove his allegations, he did not present Artemio Holgado, any copy of the alleged cards, and he did not substantiate his claims of Jesus buying lot and plantation and having a fat bank account; and (2)
4.
5.

half-truths, or of slanted or distorted versions of facts or accusations which he made no bona fide effort previously to verify, and which he does not or disdains to prove, cannot be justified as a legitimate exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be deemed an activity shielded from sanction by that constitutional guaranty; (2) that such utterance or publication is also violative of "The Philippine Journalist's Code of Ethics" which, inter alia, commands the journalist to "scrupulously report and interpret the news, taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by improper omission or emphasis," and makes it his duty "to air the other side and to correct substantive errors promptly;" (3) that such an utterance or publication, when it is offensive to the dignity and reputation of a Court or of the judge presiding over it or degrades or tends to place the courts in disrepute and disgrace or otherwise to debase the administration of justice, constitutes contempt of court and is punishable as such after due proceedings; and (4) that prescinding from the obvious proposition that any aggrieved party may file a complaint to declare the utterer or writer in contempt, the initiation of appropriate contempt proceedings against the latter by the court is not only its prerogative but indeed its duty, imposed by the overmastering need to preserve and protect its authority and the integrity, independence and dignity of the nation's judicial system. FACTS: Emiliano P. Jurado is a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the Manila Standard. His column is entitled Opinion he describes himself as a columnist who incidentally happens to be a lawyer, insisting that his membership in the law profession does not, in any way, affect his occupation as a newspaperman. Jurado had been writing about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). The Chief Justice issued AO 11-93 Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary o The ad hoc committee is composed of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as chairman, and former Justices Hon. Lorenzo Relova and Hon. Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, as members. o The committee shall seek to ascertain the truth respecting reports and statements as regards corruption in the judiciary, and shall interview at closed-door sessions or otherwise, such persons as may appear to it to have some knowledge of the matter and who may be appealed to share that knowledge with the Court, and otherwise gather such evidence as may be available. o The committee shall submit its report to the Court within 30 days. JURADOS PUBLISHED STATEMENTS (1992-Feb 1993) 1. October 21, 1992 column: he wrote of the Magnificent Seven RTC judges who have become so notorious in their dealings with litigants and lawyers, and that it has come to a point where lawyers and litigants try their darndest to stay away from these judges. 2. Feb 3, 1993 column: about another Magnificent Seven group. When lawyers speak of the Magnificent Seven one has to make sure which group they are referring to. Makatis Magnificent Seven are a bunch of Makati RTC judges who fix drug-related cases. The Magnificent Seven in the SC consists of a group of justices who vote as one. 3. Oct 21, 1992: he dubbed another group as the Dirty Dozen These judges, I am told, are not satisfied with accepting bribes; they actually sell their decisions to the litigants that offer the larger bribe. Each of these judges reportedly has go-betweens who approach the litigants and solicit their bids for what is clearly an auction for the judges decision. According to him, the Dirty Dozen is the most corrupt. Multi-nationals and financing institutions explicitly stipulate in their agreements that litigation in connection with their contracts may be held anywhere in Metro Manila except in Makati; and lawyers confirm that Makati judges are the most corrupt. 4. Nov 9, 1992 column: he wrote about a former appellate justice who holds office at a restaurant near the CA building and is known as the contact man of five CA divisions. Jan 29, 1993 column: he referred to the same CA justice as being known for fixing cases for 5 CA divisions for a fee. And if the price is right, the lawyer of the litigant paying can even write his own decision using a CA justice as a ponente. This ex-justice holds court at the mezzanine of a restaurant owned by the wife of a former Marcos cabinet member, and which has become a meeting place for judges, CA justices, practicing lawyers, prosecutors and even SC justices. The former CA justice also has his own Chinese contact. 5. March 24, 1993 column: he claimed that one can get a TRO from a RTC in Metro Manila by paying the judge anywhere between 30K and 50K. Other columns: a) A police report from the South Capital Command that 8 Makati judges were paid for decisions favoring drugtraffickers and other big-time criminals b) The Equitable Banking Corporation (Ermita branch) had hosted a lunch at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners c) The lady secretary of an RTC Judge in Makati who allegedly makes sure, for a fee of 10K or more, that a case is raffled off to a Judge who will be extremely sympathetic and can arrange to have the Court issue attachments or injunctions for a service fee of 1% over and above the regular premium of the attachment or injunction bond; a Chinese-Filipino businessman who paid this miracle worker 300k on top of the regular premium on the attachment/injunction bond. d) Exec Judge de la Rosa violated the rule that no case may be assigned in multi-sala courts without a raffle. e) The secretary of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), had supposedly gotten that body to nominate him to the CA; and a son and a nephew of JBC members, who were also nominated to the CA, contrary to ethics and delicadeza f) Having a relative in the JBC or SC, or having a powerful politician as sponsor, is a major determinant of promotion; and that nomination of some worthy individuals was blocked because they incurred the ire of the powers that be (Judge Maximiano Asuncion, QC RTC, and Raul Victorino, closely identified with former Senate Pres Salonga

EVENTS DIRECTLY GIVING RISE TO THE PROCEEDING AT BAR The seed of the proceeding at bar: the so-called controversial case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). The vote was 9 to 4 in favor of PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote the opinion of the majority, In connection with the case, the Philippine Daily Inquirer along with 2 other newspapers published a report of the affidavit of a linguistics expert, Mr. Davild Miles Yerkes. He has been commissioned by the ETPI to examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay to ascertain if the decision had been written by the latter. Yerkes concluded that the Gutierrez decision looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDTs counsel. The Yerkes revelations spawned more public discussion and comment about the judiciary and the SC. There were calls for impeachment and resignation. There were derogatory statements about the judiciary. The term Hoodlums in Robes was coined. At about this time and under these circumstances, Jurado wrote in his column on Feb 8, 1993, Who will judge the Justices? referring among other things to a report that six justices, their spouses, children, and grandchildren (36 total) spent a vacation in Hong Kong some time last year and that all their expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm, this gave rise to the proceeding at bar On February 10, 1993, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, First Vice President of the PLDT, addressed a letter to the Chief Justice, submitting his sworn statement in confutation of the item in the column of Mr. Emil Jurado of the Manila Standard on a vacation trip supposedly taken by six Justices with their families last year, and requesting that the Court take appropriate actions. o PLDT declares that it is not the public utility firm referred to in the Jurado column. It has never paid for the Hong Kong trip, hotel or other accommodations for any justice of the SC or his family during their vacation. It is not even aware that any of the justices or their families have made the trip referred to in the Jurado column. o Neither Atty Emil Jurado nor any one in his behalf has ever spoken to any responsible officer of PLDT about the matter. o PLDT denies that it had ever talked to or made arrangements with any travel agency or any person or entity in connection with any such alleged trip of the Justices and their families to HongKong, much less paid anything therefore to such agencies, fully or in part, in the year 1992. o The travel agencies which PLDT patronizes are Philway Travel Corporation and CitiWorld Travel Mart Corp. No records from these travel agencies bear out the fact that arrangements were made by them at the instance of the PDLT for the trip referred to in the Jurado column. Atty. William Veto, the in-house counsel of Equitable Banking Corporation since 1958, deposed that on Jan 5, 1993 he had hosted a lunch party at the Officers Lounge, 7th Floor of the Equitable Banking Corporation Building, Ermita Branch upon prior permission obtained; that the expenses paid for said party were exclusively from his personal funds and the food was prepared in his house by his wife and served by his house help and 4 waiters hired from the nearby Barrio Fiesta restaurant; that among the invited guests were members of the SC and CA who were his friends of 40 years since their law school days; and that the party was held in the lounge of the bank because his birthday happened to fall on a working day and his friends from the bank suggested that the party be held there. This was reported in Jurados column (Manila Standard Jan 12 and 28, 1993 issues) as having been hosted (by the Equitable Bank) at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners. The Court also received info from the Ad Hoc Committee o The Chairman of the committee extended an invitation to Emil to definitely and accurately determine the facts as regards the published rumors and reports of corruption in the judiciary Emil failed to appear. Instead, Jurado stated in his column Feb 4, 1993 that he was told he was being summoned by the Ad hoc committee but there is really no need to summon me. The committee can go by the many things I have written in my column about corruption in the judiciary. Many of these column items have been borne out by subsequent events. o Another letter was sent by the Chairman to Jurado dated Feb 5, 1993, reiterating the Committees invitation. The ad hoc committee is a fact-finding body and its function is to gather evidence. It is not an adjudicative body in the sense that it will pronounce persons guilty or innocent, or impose sanctions, on the basis of such proofs as may be presented to it. At the conclusion of its evidence-gathering mission, the committee will submit its report and recommendations to the Court which will then take such action as it deems appropriate. The hearings were scheduled on Feb 11 and 12, 1993. Jurado still failed to appear. Jurado explained that he had not snubbed the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee. According to him, the first invitation was routed to his desk at the Manila Standard office on the day of the hearing itself, when it was already impossible to cancel previous professional and business appointments; and the second invitation was never routed to him. He averred that his columns are self-explanatory and reflect his beliefs and there was no need to elaborate further on what he had written. Jurado invokes RA 53, as amended by RA 1477, exempting the publisher, editor or reporter of any publication from revealing the source of published

news or information obtained in confidence, and points out that none of the matters subject of his columns has any bearing on the security of the state. Mr. Ermin Garcia, Jr. (Pres Citi-World Travel Mart Corporation) and Mrs. Marissa de la Paz (General Manager of Philway Travel Corporation) denied ever having made any travel arrangements for any of the Justices of the SC or their families to HongKong. Jurado alleged that the sworn statements of Mr. Garcia, Jr. and Mrs. De la Paz are affirmations of their own personal knowledge; that Jurado had no specific knowledge of the contents of these, let alone their veracity. Jurado also sought clarification on two pointsas to the capacity in which he is being cited in these administrative proceedingswhether as full time journalist or as a member of the bar and why he is being singled out from the other media who had also written about the wrongdoings in the judiciary. The Court informed Jurado that its Resolutions had been addressed to him in his capacity as a full-time journalist who coincidentally happens to be a member of the bar at the same time. Jurado moved for the termination of the proceeding on the ff premises: o The court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist. o The present administrative matter is not a citation for (a) direct contempt as there is no pending cases or proceeding out of which a direct contempt charged against him may arise, or (b) indirect contempt as no formal charge for the same has been laid before the court in accordance with Section 3 (Rule 71) of the Rules of Court. o His comments would be more relevant and helpful to the Court if taken together with other evidence and reports of other journalists gathered before the Ad Hoc Committee. He perceives no reason why his comments should be singled out and taken up in a separate administrative proceeding. the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justiceFor the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. Every person exercising the constitutional right of freedom of expression, as the Civil Code stresses, obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.1 It may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truthsthis would not be to observe honesty and good faith; it may not be used to insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disreputethis would not be to act with justice or give everyone his due. Judges are commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having thereby forfeited any right whatsoever to private honor and reputation. The protection of the right of individual persons to private reputations is also a matter of public interest and must be reckoned with as a factor in identifying and laying down the norms concerning the exercise of press freedom and free speech. The point of adjustment between the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges in the maintenance of private honor and reputation is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. This norm represents the generally accepted point of balance or adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the Philippines. Failure to present the other side is reprehensible, being what in law amounts to a denial of due process. The record does not show that before Jurado published his story, he ever got in touch with Veto or anyone in Equitable Bank, Ermita branch, to determine the accuracy of what he would later report. If he did, he would quickly have learned that his sources, whoever or whatever they are, were not to be relied upon. If he did not, he was gravely at fault at the very least for disregarding the Journalists Code of Ethicsin failing to exert bonda fide efforts to verify the accuracy of his information. Jurados publication of the misleading and false report
Art. 19 CC: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado is liable for published statements demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of the courts and individual judges HELD: YES RATIO: Zaldivar v. Gonzales: the Court underscored the importance both of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the reality that there are fundamental and equally important public interests which need on occasion to be balanced against and accommodated with one and the other. The Court stressed the importance of the public interest in the maintenance of the integrity and the orderly functioning of the administration of justice. o freedom of speech and of expression like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these public interests is the maintenance of

is censurable. His proffered explanation: that the justices having confirmed their presence at the luncheon, thus corroborating what he had written in vital details and making further substantiation unnecessary, and that his report constituted fair comment on the public conduct of public officers, obviously does not at all explain why a party given by Atty. Veto was reported by him as one tendered by Equitable Bank. Paraphrasing the Code of Ethics, he failed to scrupulously report and interpret the news; on the contrary, his failure or refusal to verify such essential facts as who really hosted and tendered the luncheon and spent for it, and his playing up of the Banks supposed role as such host have resulted in an improper suppression of those facts and a gross distortion of the truth about them. Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a pending case. Philippine jurisprudence parallels a respectable array of English decisions holding contumacious scurrilous attacks against the courts calculated to bring them into disrepute, even when made after the trial stage or after the end of the proceedings. The original doctrine laid down in People vs. Alarcon, --that there is no contempt if there is no pending casehas been abandoned in subsequent rulings of this Court. Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated differently than his other colleagues in media who were only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee. The answer is that upon all that has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation, which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance of its functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been singled out. Under RA 53, a newsman has a right to keep his sources confidential; that he cannot be compelled by the courts to disclose them, unless the security of the State demands such revelation. But it does hold that he cannot invoke such right as a shield against liability for printing stories that are untrue and derogatory of the courts, or others. The ruling, in other words, is that when called to account for publications denounced as inaccurate and misleading, the journalist has the option (a) to demonstrate their truthfulness or accuracy even if in the process he discloses his sources, or (b) to refuse, on the ground that to do so would require such disclosure. In the latter event, however, he must be ready to accept the consequences of publishing false or misleading stories the truth and accuracy of which he is unwilling or made no bona fide effort to prove. RA 53, as amended, is quite unequivocal that the right of refusal to disclose sources is without prejudice toliability under civil and criminal laws. RA 53 confers no immunity from prosecution for libel or for other sanction under the law. All it does is give the journalist the right to refuse (or not to be compelled) to reveal the source of any news report published by him which was revealed to him in confidence. False reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech in the Constitution. The US SC, while asserting that under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea, and that however pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas,2 nonetheless made the firm pronouncement that there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact, and the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances societys interest in unhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. They belong to the category of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest, in order and morality. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection. Jurados actuations demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the Golden Rule and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.
JUDGMENT: The Court declares Atty. Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and in accordance with Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. DISSENTING OPINION MELO, J. In making a choice between the preservation of liberties and freedom, on one hand, and attainment of a better-ordered society, on the other, men have not stopped debating. The balance, the point of the weighing scale, has moved hither and thither depending on the needs of the times and on the kind of government involved. In democratic democratic governments, there must at all times be due regard for the preservation of constitutional rights even to the extent of seemingly sacrificing, as in the case at hand, accurate and truthful media comment. PUNO, J. RA 1477 approved on June 15, 1956 prohibits revelation of the source of any news-report on information related in confidence unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such
Passage from the first Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson

revelation is demanded by the security of the State. RA 1477 amended RA 53 by changing the phrase interest of the State to security of State. The change limited the right of the State to share with newsmen their confidential sources of information. The protection of RA 53, as amended by RA 1477 to newsmen, provides but one ground which can force a newsman to reveal the source of his confidential informationwhen demanded by the security of the State. In re: Angel J. Parazo: the Court adjudged newsman Parazo in contempt of court for refusing to divulge the source of his story regarding leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Exam. Parazo contends that under RA 53, he could only be compelled to reveal the source of his information when the revelation is demanded by the interest of the State. The Court rejected his argument as it held that the 2 terms are not synonymous, the first being broader than the second. It then ruled that the maintenance of high standard of the legal profession qualifies as an interest of the State the promotion of which is a good ground to compel newsmen to break the confidentiality of their sources of news. The Court ruling did not sit well with Congress June 15, 1956: RA 1477 was enacted changing the phrase interest of the State to security of State. Evidence on record failed to prove clear and present danger to the administration of justice, hence, there is no need to task respondent to reveal the sources of his information in order to prove that his reports about judicial corruption are not patent falsehoods. The Court should always adopt an approach that is less destructive of freedom of speech and of the press. The sanctity of a newsmans source of information is not only intended to protect a newsman but also the source of his information. When a person transmits confidential information to a newsman, he is exercising his freedom of speech on condition of anonymity. Talley v. California: it was held that identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly foisted a falsehood to degrade administration of justice, Court should be slow in citing him for contempt. As agent of the people, the most important function of the press is to inform and it cannot do so if it is uninformed. We should be wary when the independent sources of information of the press dry up, for then the press will end up printing praise releases and that is no way for the people to know the truth. The majority opinion will weaken the press as an informed and informative source of information of the sovereign people. The protection we give to the sanctity of the sources of information of the press is for the benefit of the people. It is designed to benefit us all, to keep us above the cloud of ignorance. In re Amado Macasaet In re Columns of Amado Macasaet, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC (August 8, 2008) Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 (A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC) Date: August 8, 2008 Ponente: Reyes Facts: Amado Macasaet writes a daily column in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation. In the September 18-21, 2007 issues of the newspaper, Macasaet published articles containing statements and innuendos about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court. The bribery was allegedly committed on separate occasions in the second week of September 2010, wherein 5 boxes were delivered to the Court and were received by a certain Cecilia who as a staff of one lady Justice for whom the boxed were for. Because the Justice was then absent and believing that the gift might be perishable, Cecilia opened one of the boxes and saw an estimated P10 million cash. Cecilia informed the Justice about it, after which the Justice fired her. The gift was allegedly in connection with a decision rendered by the Justice acquitting a FilipinoChinese businessman from charges of corruption. The articles contained statements saying that the courts are dirty, that the reputation of the Court is now soiled and sagging, that the lady Justice shamed her Court and that she should be impeached. Also, on September 20, 2007, Marites Vitug, EIC of Newsbreak, faxed a letter to SC Associate Justice YnaresSantiago asking her to 1)explain the reversal of her decision in the graft case against Go 2)comment on the allegations that she received a cash gift of P10 million after issuing the decision re: Go and 3) confirm the removal of her secretary after opening the box. Ynares-Santiago called for Assistant Court Administrator Midas Marques to tell Vitug that she had been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she never received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for opening a box of cash. Despite that, however, Newsbreak, proceeded to publish an on-line article on September 24 with regards to the allegations of bribery against Ynares-Santiago. On September 24, Cecilia Munoz Delis, who was previously identified by Macasaet as the Cecilia who opened the box of cash and got terminated gave Ynares-Santiago copies of the letter and the affidavit she executed wherein she described Macasaets reports as baseless. She also clarified that she was not a secretary but a Juridical Staff Officer; that she resigned and was not fired; and that as a matter of procedure she would not have been tasked to receive boxes, as such was a duty assigned to their utility personnel. She also said that she executed the affidavit to allow Justice YnaresSantiago to defend her honor, and to correct the erroneous information published by Macasaet. On September 25, the Court issued a Resolution stating that it appears that certain statements and innuendos (in the columns) tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, and ordering Macasaet to explain why no sanction should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court. An Investigating Committee composed of retired Supreme Court Justices was created to receive the evidence from all parties concerned. The Committee concluded that Macasaets bribery story in his September 18-21 columns were unbelievable. They observed that Macasaets story is full of holes, inconsistencies, and contradictions, and that he did not exercise due diligence in checking the veracity of the information before publishing them. The Committee believed there exist valid grounds for the Court to cite Macasaet for indirect contempt. Issue: WON Amado Macasaet was guilty of indirect contempt of court Held: Yes

Ratio: Justice Reyes started with a long exposition on the nature and history of press freedom, the role of the media, the judiciary and judicial independence and a detailed survey of Philippine jurisprudence on the matter. He put so much emphasis on the need for the co-existence of an independent judiciary and a free press in a democratic state, and the balance between these conflicting interests. The Court recognizes that it has no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in their decisions, judicial reasoning, or how they run their public offices, but the Court is of the opinion that the articles of Macasaet crossed this line. The Court opines that Macasaets articles do nothing but damage the integrity of the Court undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten judicial independence. The Court relied on the falsity and negligence test it used in In Re Jurado in finding Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court.Macasaet published highly speculative articles based on specious information, without any regard for the injury it will cause to the reputation of the juidiciary and the effective administration of justice. The terms he used such as thieves and basket of rotten apples directly undermine the integrity of the justices. Purely resorting to speculations and as admitted by him, by doing a fishing expedition in the hope of actually creating a story, Macasaet committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice. The Court also relied on Macasaets failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism in holding him guilty of indirect contempt of Court. He failed to confirm the accuracy of his story and in fact admitted that he wrote his articles to fish out the Lady Justice involved in an alleged bribery fed to him by his source, disregarding the idea that bribery may or may not have existed at all. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Carpio assailed the Commitee proceedings which recommended that Macasaet was guilty of contempt of Court because the Commitee monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying Macasaet of his right to due process. He said that Macasaet was reduced to a passive participant, unable to subject the testimonies of adverse witnesses to rigorous probing under cross-examination. The majority opinion disagrees with Carpio saying that 1) the proceedings are presumed to be regular and the burden to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet; 2) that Macasaet was never able to crossexamine his witnesses does not necessarily mean denial of due process of law, in fact Macasaet never asserted said right; and 3) the Court is bereft of power to cross-examine. Finally, the Court believes that by disproportionately informing the public about specific court processes, or by spreading unsubstantiated allegations about corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct, the press dramatically undermines the publics faith in the courts and threatens the very foundation of our democratic government. Furthermore, the Court said that they should sanction those who obstruct or impede the judicial processes, and that effective administration of justice may only be realized with the strong faith and confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the judiciary, free from political and popular pressure. The cardinal condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Dissenting Opinion (Carpio): Procedural: The Committee Proceedings were fatally defective, so the testimonies should have been inadmissible. It cannot be said that Macasaer waived his right to conduct cross-examination for failure to assert such right. From the outset the Committee was a fact-finding one, making Macasaet believe that there would be a separate occasion for a cross-examination. The testimonies should have been inadmissible as evidence. Substantive: The majority opinion made use ofthe Jurado test in holding Macasaet in contempt: 1) whether the story was false and 2) whether Macasaet could have prevented the publication of the false story by exercising diligence in verifying its veracity. Carpio believes that instead, the Court should have used two theoretical formulas adopted long before the Jurado test to serve as judicial scales upon which the competing interests are weighed: 1) the clear and present danger rule and 2) the dangerous tendency rule. The clear and present danger rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice. The dangerous tendency rule means that if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. The clear and present danger rule is most protective of free speech and of free press -- basic rights which are necessary for the exercise of almost every other fundamental right. The falsity and negligence test which the majority opinion used in holding Macasaet in contempt does not consider seriousness or imminence of the substantive eveil ought to be prevented. In such test, any unflattering publication to a judge or court becomes punishable. If viewed in the light of clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rules, Macasaet cannot be held in contempt. It appears that what the substantive evil caused by Macasaets publications are 1)disrespect for the Court and 2) unfair administration of justice. a. On the question of disrespect. The Report of the Investigating Commitee which the majority of the Court relied on seemed to have selected words and separated them from context to arrive at its conclusion. Taken in context, the words that the majority found to be contumacious are not. b. On the question of unfair administration of justice. It was never claimed that the matter of these contempt proceedings will affect the disposition of the court in the case of Go which was still pending (MR was filed; pending resolution). The Reports conclusion that Macasaets publications generated public distrust in the administration of justice are rooted on assumptions bereft of factual basis, considering that Ynares-Santiago was not asked to inhibit from the case. The government still had confidence in her impartiality. Articles: September 18, 2007 Bribery in the Court A lady justice (I have not been told whether she is from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals) did not report for a day last week. Her secretary received a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen milk cans. Believing that the "gift" might be something perishable, she

opened the box. Indeed, it was a gift estimated at P10 million. Posthaste, the secretary informed the magistrate about the gift. She thought she was doing her job. The lady justice fired her instead. She would not have anybody catch her accepting a bribe. But she practically did. The stupidity here is that the bribe-giver what else would we call him or her did not check whether the lady justice was in the office or not. Better still he or she could have the box full of money delivered to her home. But then her family would get to know about and ask who was the kind soul that was so liberal with money a boxful of it. The Supreme Court cannot let this pass. A full investigation should be conducted. The magistrate who was sent the bribe should be impeached. The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court. The court is like a basket of apples. There a few which are rotten that makes the whole basket rotten. The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicions they are thieves. Heres the clue The Court employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece of another lady justice who earlier retired. The worker was inherited by the incumbent lady justice. My problem with this report is that while my source is definite about the employee opening a gift-wrapped box that contained at least P10 million, he wont confide to me the identity of the jurist. Unless the employee who was fired talks against her boss and she should as a matter of duty we will never know who this justice really is. The members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan are all called justices. The head of the Office of Government Corporate Counsel is also honored by being addressed as such. So is the head of the Court of Tax Appeals. Since the employee was fired for opening the box which she thought contained perishable goods but turned out there was an estimated P10 million in it, she should be loyal to her duty of telling the truth. That way, she would have rendered a great service to the justice system. Without her talking, every lady with the title of Justice is suspect. There are more than a dozen of them in different courts but only one was caught red-handed taking a bribe. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery. Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers? September 19, 2007 The Bribe Giver I learned from some lawyers that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged. It is funny that the delivery of five boxes of money (I said only one earlier) coincided on the day the lady justice, obviously acting as ponente, acquitted the prospect. The secretary of the lady justice who took the bribe made five trips to the guardhouse to pick up the boxes. Incidentally, this secretary is a namesake of her aunt, a deceased associate justice of the Supreme Court. I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court. The late justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma is the only lady justice I know who retired and died at a ripe old age and left behind a reputation of decency and integrity. We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored. September 20, 2007 Cecilia, please save the court I have established the lady justices secretary who opened one of the five milk boxes containing bribe money is a niece of the late, respected and honorable Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma from Batangas. The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake. Cecilia, you have a duty to honor the memory of your aunt, who, during her stay in the court, was known for having balls. More important than that, you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court. Cecilia, you must tell the Court en banc everything you know about the money that was sent in five boxes to your boss. Not in retaliation for your dismissal, but for no other reason than as a duty to your country and, I must again say, to honor the memory of your late illustrious aunt, a legal luminary and staunch defender of the Constitution. The other reason you must spill the beans is that if you do not, other lady justices are suspects. That is not fair to them. September 21, 2007 Wrong date, same facts On verification, I discovered that the secretary of a lady justice of the Supreme Court who was said to have accepted five milk boxes of money, was fired as early as March. Not last week as I mistakenly reported. It turns out that Cecilia Muoz-Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March. She never opened the first four boxes which she picked up from the guardhouse of the Court. She opened the last and saw the money because the lady justice was absent on that day. Forthwith, she was fired. Cecilia, who is from Bicol, never opened any of the first four boxes delivered on various dates (I have not been told when). She picked up all of them from the Supreme Court guardhouse and left them with the lady justice. She wouldnt dare open the first four because the lady justice was in her office. She opened the fifth one because the lady justice did not report for work on that day. Cecilia thought that the gift-wrapped box contained some perishables like food. What she found was money instead. She was fired. Whenever a gift for lady justice comes, she would order Cecilia to pick it up from the guardhouse. So the fifth she picked up was one of those errands. Where is Cecilia? I cannot get any information on the present whereabouts of Cecilia. However, if the Supreme Court has intentions to investigate what I have been saying, maybe the Chief Justice himself should find out where she could be sent an invitation to appear before an investigation group in the Court. Better still, as I said, yesterday, Cecilia should disclose everything she knows regarding the box before the Court en banc. Farthest thing from my mind is to embarrass the lady justice whose identity I do not know up to now. It is my conviction that the Court should investigate reports of wrongdoing by any of its peers. Justice is served that way. The Chief Justice and the rest of the justices should not have a problem finding out who she is. It is a simple job of asking a clerk to go to personnel department of the Court and find out who Cecilia worked for.1
Preserve Public Institutions

US vs Bustos G.R. No. L-12593 March 8, 1918 Ponente: Justice Malcolm Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens petitioned to the Executive Secretary through the Cross field and O Brien law office charging Roman Punsalan, Justice of Peace of Macabebe and Masanto, Pampanga with Malfeasance in Office. First information: Francisca Polintan desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, was told by the judge to give P5 then P3 afterwards and she also served as maid for 4 days in the judges house and took from her two chickens and twelve gandus Second information: Valentin Sunga was told to give him (judge) P50 if he want to win his case. Sunga gave nothing, a few days later he was informed that he lost his case. The justice again told him that he could still win on appeal if he would pay P50. Third information: Leoncio Quiambao filed for a complaint for assault against 4 persons, on the trial date, the justice called him over to his house where he secretly game Quiambao P30; the complaint thereafter was shelved. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of the first instance of the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper, action, and report. The Judge of first instance acquitted Punsalan. Thereafter, a Criminal action against the petitioners, now defendants was instituted, for the reason of writing and publishing a statement which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous. The information filed omitted the paragraphs of the petition mentioning that the investigation was forwarded to the Executive Secretary. Honorable Percy M. Mior found all defendants except 4 individuals guilty and sentenced each to pay P10 and 1/32 of the cost and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. ISSUE: Are the defendants guilty of libel for criticizing Roman Punsalan, a justice of peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. HELD: No. Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Island before 1900 (e.g. Rizal, La Solidaridad wanted liberty in press and association). When the Americans came, the constitution of the US guaranteed the right of freedom of speech and the right of assembly and petition. McKinleys Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission laid the inviolable rule: That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. If the people cannot criticize a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Qualified Privilege (Communication): a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words but privilege communication destroys that presumption. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of peach, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. The defendants are entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. Disposition: Defendants are acquitted. Costs de officio. Separate Opinion Justice Carson: The doctrine in the former US v. Bustos Case has long since been abandoned by this court. That case is identical to the present case. US vs Perfecto G.R. No. 17493 Johnson, J.: Oct 11 1920 An Assistant prosecuting attorney of Manila filed a complaint in CFI Manila charging the defendants with the crime of sedition in violation of Section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1692. The defendants demurred, contending that (a) the complaint was illegal and unconstitutional for the reason that it had been presented by a political entity without authority, and that the same had not been formulated in accordance with the essential requisites required by the law; (b) the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a crime and that, even though they came under the provisions of Act No. 292 as reformed by Act No. 1592, said laws were null because they violated certain provisions of the organic law of the Philippine Island; (c) as a result of the first two grounds of the demurrer, CFI Manila was without jurisdiction of the person of the defendants nor over the facts alleged. After a consideration of the demurrer the same was over- ruled and the defendants were required to plead not guilty and were duly brought to trial. At the close of the trial the Honorable Imperial, judge, concluded that: a. Maximo Mendoza - insufficient evidence - not guilty b. Gregorio Perfecto - guilty - fine: P500; if insolvent, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. -Perfecto appealed directly to SC ISSUES: Q of law: (a) LC erred in overruling the demurer; (b) LC erred in not declaring the complaint illegal and unconstitutional, in that it was entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands" instead of in the name o the "United States of America;" (c) In not declaring illegal, unconstitutional, and null, Act Nos. 2667 and 2886 of the Philippine Legislature; (d) In not declaring that Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692, is null, illegal, and unconstitutional; and (e) In not declaring that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try and decide the cause presented in the complaint. Q of facts: the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause does not show that he is guilty of the crime charged. HELD: SC avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the questioned laws by ruling on the insufficiency of evidence. RATIO: +Even granting, without deciding, that the various laws, the constitutionality and legality of which a re questioned by the appellant, are illegal, unconstitutional, and null, the evidence adduced does not show that the defendant willfully, maliciously,

and unlawfully violated neither section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1692, nor any other provisions of said Act No. 292. +SC held that his acts was not supposed to incite rebellion, go against government officials, or to disturb peace in the community. To hold otherwise, based on the evidence, would be to abridge the freedom of the press in the Philippine Islands, which abridgment would be in direct contravention of the provisions of of the Jones Law, par. 13, sec. 3 +U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731. - It is not only a right but a duty for a citizen of a state to present their grievances against the gov't. - The free press is the best avenue for that purpose. -Commenting on the gov't is essential for a civilized society and a good government. It is also a necessary consequence of republican and democratic institution, and the complement of the right of free speech. +The freedom of the press consists in the right to publish the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, although said publication may be offensive to the Government, to the courts, or to individuals. + Chief Justice Marshall of the US SC: "Among those principles which are held most sacred by the people of America, there is none more deeply rooted in the public mind than that of the liberty of the press." + Mr. Daniel Webster: "It is important to safeguard to the utmost the right to free speech and the free press." It is as essential as breathing and life itself." Giving up the right of free speech is like saying "Good-bye" to liberties forever. Under such circumstances free government may still be maintained, [but] their life, their soul, and their essentials will be gone. Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson: It is also a form of spreading knowledge and if prohibited, would make the state barbarous. DISPO: Complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. Espuelas vs People 17 December 1951 Topic: Purposes Preserve public institutions Ponente: Bengzon, J. Facts: This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Court of Appeals decision. Somewhere from June 9 24, 1947, in the town of Tagbilaran, Espuelas had his picture taken which showed him hanging lifeless from a rope tied to a limb of a tree, when in fact he was standing on a barrel and pretending to be lifeless. He then sent copies of the photograph to newspapers of general publication all over the Philippines and abroad, causing its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang, and other local publications. He included a suicide note which said that he was Alberto Reveniera and that the letter was for his wife. The letter said that he killed himself because he was very displeased with the Roxas administration, and that she should write to Pres. Truman and Churchill to tell them that the government was full of Hitlers and Mussolinis. He said that she should teach their children to burn pictures of Roxas. He also stated that he killed himself because he had no power to put the Roxas administration under Juez de Cuchillo. Espuelas admitted to all of these facts. Espuelas was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bohol with the crime of inciting to sedition (RPC Art. 142). He was found guilty in the Court of First Instance which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Law: RP Art. 142 - Inciting to sedition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government (of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth) of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187). Issue: Whether or not Espuelas is guilty of inciting to sedition? Held & Ratio: Espuelas is guilty of libel for the following reasons: 1. It is scurrilous libel because it calls the government crooks and dictators, pointing out the reference to the Hitler and Mussolini. 2. The communication was made to produce dissatisfaction or arouses the urge to be disloyal to the government. These kinds of writings are against public peace because not only do they undermine the security of the government or weakens the confidence of the citizens in the government, but they may also lead to the destruction of the government. 3. The government and its branched (legislative, executive, judicial) must be respected and recognized that they hold important functions. Any criticism against them must be made on with a certain standard of decorum. These criticisms must be made on some basis of respect and deference. Sedition is another restriction to free speech and writing. The US has punished sedition in the act of July 14, 1978, with analogous provisions in the Espionage Act and seditious libel amendment. It can be argued that these statutes are vulnerable to being used as a constraint to free speech, but the safeguard of requiring intent on the part of the accused balances this out. Freedom of speech in the Constitution does not mean an absolute freedom. Every citizen has the freedom to criticize the government, but this criticism must be specific and constructive. IT must be reasoned and tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the government. What Espuelas did clearly does not fall under constructive criticism. His attacks on the government, as seen in his suicide note, were indiscriminate. He did not specify acts or omissions of the administration that caused his dissatisfaction. Clearly, his acts and infuriating language were

intended to create disturbance and not merely to persuade the audience, all the more because he added the drama of a fake suicide. It is argued that article 142 refers to libelous acts against the government only and what the accused did was specifically against the Roxas administration therefore he cannot be convicted cannot be upheld. Article 142s language clearly includes or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof. Furthermore, the substance of sedition is that it induces people to resort to illegal methods to express discontent in the government. Clearly, Espuelas is guilty of this. His whole letter reflects the idea of violence. He glorifies the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law, which shows that these unlawful acts may be justified in comparison to the dirty government run by the Roxas administration. Also, he uses the term Juez de Cuchillo which, in laymans terms, is the Law of the Knife and refers to a summary and arbitrary execution by the knife. Therefore, he suggests that his reason for killing himself is because he could not execute the Roxas administration, and therefore his countrymen should resort to bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to overthrow the administration. Precedent used: Isaac Perez of Sorgogon, in 1922, said in a speech that Filipinos must use bolos to cut off Woods head (referring to then Governor-General Leonard Wood). Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition. Dissenting: Tuason, J. Article 142 refers to the government. What the accused did was against the administration only. Government and administration must be distinguished. He did not use Hitler and Mussolini as comparisons to the government officials, per se. He used them only to say that the system of government is no longer faithful to democracy and is now ruled with tyranny. He also cited the rebel situation in some provinces to be examples of results from the graft and corruption of the Roxas administration, but he did not mean that these should be justified or followed. When the intent of the accused is doubtful, he should be given the benefit of the doubt and acquitted. Tuason believes that the letter was merely a proclamation of devotion to the welfare of the country and its institutions. Planas vs Gil LAUREL ORIGINAL ACTION FOR PROHIBITION Ratio: The constitutional grant to the President of the power to exercise general supervision over all local govts and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner, a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila. Facts: Planas is a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila She made a statement which was published in La Vanguardia criticizing the acts of certain govt officials in connection w/ the recently held general election for Assemblymen o She said that govt officials like Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez and even the then Pres. Manuel Quezon were campaigning and were using govt machineries to flatten the opposition and ensure the victory of their party, the Nacionalista Party The day after the publication, Planas received a letter from Jose Vargas, Sec to the Pres, who, under the authority of the Pres, directed her to appear before Gil, Commissioner of Civil Service, to prove her statements and that failure to do so would be sufficient cause for her suspension/removal from office Planas appeared before Gil and raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and asked Gil to desist from investigating her Before the jurisdictional issue was resolved by Gil, this case was brought to SC During the pendency of this case, Gil resolved that he had jurisdiction and ordered Planas to appear before him and adduce evidence to support her charges o
Issues: Several issues were raised by both parties, but the following are the ones resolved by the Court: 1. WON the court has jurisdiction over the case under the separation of powers doctrine; if yes, can the writ of prohibition issue YES, YES The SC is entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation (Sec 2 (1), Art VIII of 1935 Consti) o In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary provides the corollaries of the system of checks and balances of the govt The Pres is immune from suit but it does not follow that his subordinate who is acting under his orders shall also be deemed as granted immunity Generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions o But Sec 516 and 226 of Code of Civil Procedure provides that it may issue to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, whose acts are without or in excess of jurisdiction The terms judicial and ministerial are comprehensive enough to include the challenged investigation 2. WON the Pres has authority to order the investigation YES Art VII, Sec 1 of the 1935 Consti grants the Pres executive power and the duty to see that laws are faithfully executed Art VII, Sec 11 (first clause) provides that the Pres shall have control of all the executive depts., bureaus, and offices and (2nd clause) shall exercise general supervision over all local govts as may be provided by

law Absent any statutory provision authorizing the Pres to conduct an investigation and in view of the nature and character of the executive authority of the Pres, the constitutional grant to the President of the power to exercise general supervision over all local govts and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner, a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila. o It implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective As to the contention that supervision and control are different, this is correct but this distinction is not important as far as the power of the Pres to order an investigation is concerned o Besides, the supervisory power of the Pres was a compromise during the ConCon resulting from the historical view which recognizes the right of local self-govt and the legal theory which sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local govts o The result was the recognition of the power of supervision and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium in imperio (The right or power of a state to enforce the law) to the detriment of a strong natl govt Aside from the Consti, Sec 64 of Administrative Code of 1917 states: o In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Gov-Gen (Pres) shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter. Among such special powers and duties shall be: c. To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Govt service, and in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted. o SC said this provision does not violate the Consti nor was it abrogated by the National Assembly Assuming the Pres has power to order the investigation, petitioner can be proceeded against administratively only on the grounds stated in law disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, or maladministration in office and that as an elective official, she is responsible for her political acts to her constituents alone NO Under Sec 64 of the Admin Code, an investigation may be ordered if the interest of public service requires such and if Planas charges be found true, appropriate action may be taken against the guilty parties; otherwise, the petition can be proceeded against under Sec 22140 in connection with Sec 2078 of the Revised Admin Code Besides, investigation would still be under the authority vested in the Pres to take care that laws be faithfully executed WON petitioner has abused her right to free speech NOT AT ISSUE Planas contends that if she did abuse her right to speech, then a criminal action should be filed against her by the aggrieved party and not by the govt Court said that official conduct and the policies of public officials can be criticized and such criticism cannot be suppressed or prevented unless they incite rebellion and civil war o And Planas is not denied that right nor is she being investigated for exercising such right o But she cannot impute violations of law and commission of frauds then refuse to face an investigation meant to elicit the truth or falsity of the charges she made Santiago vs Far Eastern Broadcasting November 8, 1941 Ponente: Ozatea, J. Topic: Preserve Public Institutions; Type of Expression Forms; Forum Media/Political Campaigns Facts: Petitioner Geronimo Santiago is the campaign manger of the political party Popular Front Sumulong. Respondent Far Eastern Broadcasting is an owner/operator of radio stations that required Santiago, upon purchasing airtime, to submit a manuscript of the speech to be given. Santiago did not submit a script and instead petitioned to the Supreme Court for mandamus, that he be allowed to broadcast without previous censorship. Far Eastern contends that its actions in requiring submission of the manuscript were for the benefit of safeguarding public morality so as not to prejudice public interest. Santiago however, says that the speech (which was in fact delivered, albeit not on air) was heard by many at the Opera House and printed in newspapers, without causing any danger. Act 8130. Franchise for Far Eastern; radio to be open to the general public but subject to regulations Comm. Act 98. Sec. of Interior and/or the Radio Board is empowered to censor what is considered neither moral, educational or entertaining, and prejudicial to public interest. The Board can forfeit the license of a broadcasting station. Sec. of the Interior, Dept. Order 13. Requires submission of daily reports to Sec. of Interior/Radio Board re: programs before airing. For speeches, a manuscript or short gist must be submitted.
4.
3.
Issue/s: Decision: Whether or not Far Eastern has the right to require manuscript Yes, Far Eastern can require the submission of a manuscript. Laws and regulations grant him this

privilege. Mandamus does not lie. Held 1. SC does not uphold claim that Far Eastern had no right to require the submission of the manuscript Ratio It is a duty of Far Eastern to require the submission of a manuscript as a requirement in broadcasting speeches. Besides, laws (see box above) provide for such actions. construed as synonymous with "[suppress]" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103)." Such abhorred abuse of authority in conferring this prerogative to the whims and caprice of a single man would be tantamount to "unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented." The Court said that the constitutional right to free speech and peaceful assembly was a fundamental right of the people and may not be suppressed unless there was the probability of serious injury to the state, and quoted US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Whitney vs. California: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Disposition: Petition granted. Notes/Obiter Dictum: (Technical issue given a page's worth of attention) The Court speaks of the settled maxim that the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority," the only exception to this rule is for some specific powers of local government and within this ambit of empowerment is police regulation which is "conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal corporation." In this light, "the police power to regulate the use of streets and other public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by the Municipal Board." And extending the inference of the unconstitutionality of relegating Legislative power to another body or person; "Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter" it will coevally be null and void for the same reasons cited. -Jimenez, 06-12828 03.13.11 Gonzales vs COMELEC L-27833, April 18, 1969 Date: April 18, 1969 Nature: In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of RA 4880 Counsel for Petitioners: Atty. F. Reyes Cabigao Counsel for Respondents: Atty. Ramon Barrios Amicus Curiae: Senator Lorenzo M. Taada (Main), Philippine Bar Association, Civil Liberties Union, UP Law Center, UP Women Lawyers Circle Ponente: Fernando Facts: RA 4880 (Taada-Singson Law), an act amending certain portions of the Revised Election Code, was approved and took effect on June 16, 1967. It (1) prohibited the too early nomination of candidates and (2) limited the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. o SEC. 50-A. Prohibition of too early nomination of Candidates. It shall be unlawful for any political party, Political
2.
Santiago has right to contest
no
He did not even submit a draft of the speech. Would have been a different case if he did in fact submit and was arbitrarily denied of airing it.
Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1943) Purposes Preserve Public Institutions Primicias v. Fugoso 80 Phil. 71 (1943) Nature: Petition for mandamus. Ponente: Feria, J. Doctrine: (1) The delegation of the power to grant or refuse the issuance of a permit to the whim of men in authority, is arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of our free institution violated; and may only operate as a discretion to specify where the parade may pass or where the meeting may be held. And (2) the mere apprehension that trouble may arise during a rally was not a ponderous reason to curtail the fundamental right of the people to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances. Facts: In November 1947, Valeriano E. Fugoso, the mayor of Manila refused to grant a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The reason cited: "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." The 1119th section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, as writ by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila required a mayors permit to hold a parade or procession, or, by analogy, a public meeting or assembly. Cipriano P. Primicias (campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties) filed a prayer to compel the mayor to acquiesce to his request for a permit. Issue: Does mandamus lie to compel the mayor to grant the permit? Held: (Yes.) Ratio: The Court ordered the mayor to grant the permit, tempering the ordinance to mean that the Mayor did not have the power to grant or refuse the permit, only the discretion to specify where the parade may pass or where the meeting may be held. Such a construction of "'regulate,' as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be

Committee, or Political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for a large earlier than one hundred and fifty days (150) immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days (90) immediately preceding an election. SEC 50-B. Limitation upon the period of Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity. It is unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the period of one hundred twenty days (120) immediately preceding an election for any public office. "Candidate" - any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate. "Election Campaign" or "Partisan Political Activity" - acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office which shall include: (a) Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) Holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; (c) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office; (d) Publishing or distribution campaign literature or materials; (e) Directly or indirectly soliciting vote and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; (f) Giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly. Provisos: Provided, (1) That simple expressions or opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an election campaign. Provided, further, (2) That nothing herein stated shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he supports. June 22, 1967 - Petitioners challenged the validity of the two new sections abovementioned. They said that the enforcement of RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights such as their freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; and therefore, said act is unconstitutional. They further assert that there is nothing in the spirit or intention of the law that would legally justify its passage and enforcement whether for reasons of public policy, public order or morality. Moreover, the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period for election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate and curtail among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding of agreement. Finally, the limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. o Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for ViceMayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967. o Petitioner Gonzales is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. Respondent COMELEC, on its answer filed on August 1, 1967, denied the allegations as to the validity of the act for being mere conclusions of law and erroneous at that. It set forth special affirmative defenses, procedural and substantive in character; and, would have this Court dismiss the petition filed. o Here, the Philippine Government argued that the purpose of the law is to curtail excessive and extravagant partisan political activities during election year: (1) Prolonged exposure by both candidates and the people to political tension leads to bitter rivalries precipitating violence and even death (i.e. election-related violence); (2) Huge election expenditures make poor yet deserving candidates chances of winning slim (i.e. dominion of rich in political arena); and, (3) Prolonged election campaigns also lead to corruption of the electorate. as a response to a serious substantive (and existing) evil affecting the electoral process August 3, 1967 Case was set for hearing. SC passed a resolution giving the petitioners and the respondent a period of 4 days from this date within which to submit their respective memorandum in lieu of oral argument. August 9, 1967 SC passed another resolution declaring that they would defer final voting on the issue until after the return of the Justices now on official leave. o There was a divergence of among the 8 Justices present as to the constitutionality of section 50-B, pars. (c), (d) and (e) of the

Revised Election Code. o Sec. 10, Art VII: "No treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the (Supreme) Court. Senator Taada: He justified RA 4880s enactment under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. Limitation on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity suffers from the fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness and may be stricken down. o Where the statutory provision then operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedom affirmatively protected by the Constitution, the imputation of vagueness sufficient to invalidate the statute is inescapable. o The majority of the Court is thus of the belief that the solicitation or undertaking of any campaign or propaganda whether directly or indirectly, by an individual, the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interview for or against the election for any party or candidate for public office, or the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, suffer from the corrosion of invalidity. It lacks however one more affirmative vote to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality. o It only indicates that for the majority, the prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command. To that extent, the challenged statute prohibits what under the Constitution cannot by any law be abridged. More specifically, in terms of the permissible scope of legislation that otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger doctrine, it is the consideration opinion of the majority, though lacking the necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. o Overbroad: The statutory provisions in question are unconstitutional on their face inasmuch as they appear to range too widely and indiscriminately across the fundamental liberties associated with freedom of the mind.
Procedural Issues: 1. WON the petition should be dismissed on the ground that respondent COMELEC is not being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act so that the suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion 2. WON the petition should be dismissed on the ground that the parties do not have legal standing Substantive Issues: 3. WON prohibition in RA 4880 of the too early nomination of candidates and the limitation found therein on the period of election campaign or partisan political activities is unconstitutional on the ground that it offend against the rights of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association? Held/ Ratio: 1. No. Under the circumstances, the petition could still be rightfully treated as one for prohibition. SC said: It is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter. The exceptional character of the situation, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections being barely six months away. In the first part of the decision, the SC also said: The question confronting this Court is one of transcendental significance. 2. No. In this jurisdiction, the rule has been sufficiently relaxed to allow a taxpayer to bring an action to restrain the expenditure of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional legislative measure. 3. It is the judgment of the Court that RA 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional. The necessary two-third vote, not being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to annul statues to come into play. Petition is dismissed. Writ prayed for denied. Prohibition of too early nomination of candidates is valid. (We sustain its validity. We do so unanimously.) o Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose.
Voting: UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Dizon, Zaldivar, Capistrano, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Barredo and Fernando (Ponente). (7 votes) CONSTITUTIONAL (Concurs in the Result): Concepcion C.J., Reyes J.B.L., Makalintal, and Teehankee. (4 votes) Ratio Decidendi (?): Sec. 4 of Art. III (1987 Constitution), No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, should NOT be interpreted as a right NOT susceptible of any limitation. In any case, the law in question would be subjected to certain tests clear and present danger

rule and void for vagueness. Concepts: Freedom of Expression o At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. o The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of assuring participation by the people in social including political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. o Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. Criterion for Permissible Restriction (Cabansag v. Fernandez): o Clear and Present Danger Rule Evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented. o Dangerous Tendency Rule If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. . It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. o The test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil a substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable. o The clear and present danger doctrine rightly viewed requires that not only should there be an occasion for the imposition of such restrictions but also that they be limited in scope. Freedom of Assembly o Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. o As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. Freedom of Association o With or without a constitutional provision of this character, it may be assumed that the freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or society exists. With this explicit provision, whatever doubts there may be on the matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantee which are mostly American in origin, this particular freedom has an indigenous cast. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution. o How should the limitation "for purposes not contrary to law" be interpreted? It is submitted that it is another way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for unless an association or society could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for abridging the right to form association societies. Overbreadth Doctrine o A governmental purpose constitutionally subject to control or prevent activities state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. o It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governmental purposes be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an area so closely related to our most precious freedoms.
Sanchez (Concurring and Dissenting): RA 8440 is a police power legislation. It was enacted by virtue of the inherent power of Congress to legislate on matters affecting public interest and welfare. Section 50-A is valid. We may not tag as unconstitutional 50-B, and its subsections (a), (b) and (f). We fear no serious evil with their enforcement. They do not offend the constitutionally protected speech and press freedoms, and rights of peaceable assembly and association. The latter must yield. The proscriptions set forth in all of them are clear-cut, not open to reasonable doubt, nor easily susceptible to unreasonable interpretation. Public interest and welfare authorize their incorporation into the statute books. Subsections (c), (d) and (e) of Section 50-B are problematic. As we analyze the import of the law, we come to the conclusion that said subsections of

Section 50-B inserted into the Revised Election Code by Republic Act 4880 run against the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. o No one can draw an indisputable dividing line between lawful (See: Provisos) and unlawful discussion. The peculiarity of discussion, be it oral or printed, is that it carries with it varying degrees of "enthusiasm and inclination to persuade", depending upon the listener or reader. It falls short of a partisan political activity when it is devoid of partisan interest in the sense that it is not made in the interest of a candidate or party. This is the only criterion for validity. But who is to decide this? And how? The law does not even require that there be an operation or a series of operations in order to measure up to an election campaign as it is commonly understood. In this way, the law may well become an instrument of harassment. Worse, it could lull the potential had defendant into a false sense of security. It then becomes a dragnet that may trap anyone who attempts to express a simple opinion on political issues. o Because of the indefiniteness created in subsections (c), (d) and (e) of Section 50-B, they readily lend themselves to harsh application. Vagueness of the law enforcers. Arbitrary enforcement of the letter of the law by an expansive definition of election campaign or partisan political activity, should not be branded as improbable. To forego the question of constitutionality for now and take risks may not be the wiser move. freedoms of speech, of the press, of peaceful assembly and of lawful association. o Sec. 50-A The process of nomination must yield to the requirements of reasonable regulations imposed by law. While the act of nomination a candidate has speech and assembly aspects, the restrictive effect of this section would appear negligible. The reach of this section is limited: applies only to political parties, political committees or political groups. The thrust is also limited: it does not prohibit political parties from holding nominating conventions or from doing any other lawful thing during such conventions; what it controls is the scheduling of nominating conventions. Moreover, periods specified do not appear to be unreasonably short. Finally, the interest of the community in limiting the period of election campaigns, on balance, far outweighs the social value of the kind of speech and assembly that is involved in the formal nomination of candidates for public office. o Sec. 50-B Applies to any person and any group of persons; The effect of the law is to impose a comprehensive and prolonged prohibition of speech of a particular content except during the 120 or 80 days respectively, immediately preceding an election. The interest of the state in regulating partisan political activity, which is sought to be secured by Sec 50-B no less than by Sec 50-A, is a legitimate one and its protection a proper aim for reasonable exercise of the public power. However, that that interest does not offset the restrictions which Sec 50-B imposes with indiscriminate sweep upon the even more fundamental community interests embodied in the constitutional guarantees of speech, assembly and association. Barredo (Concurring and Dissenting): This case should have been dismissed outright. Procedural grounds: (1) Petition for relief is definitely outside the original jurisdiction of this Court; (2) No actual controversy No allegations of specific acts of COMELEC or even only threatened to be committed by it; (3) Case is academic Petitioners have no more interest in the proceeding; (4) Conversion motu proprio into a taxpayers suit is not proper no specific expenditure of public funds is involved Re: Constitutional Problems o In the light of the recent political experience of the strong of heart and idealists amongst us, this measure appears to me as a perfect or, at least, a near-perfect scheme for the perpetuation of the status quo and the entrenchment of the presently existing political parties, particularly, the two major ones, whether or not we share the cynical reference to them by the discerning as nothing but twin peas in the same pod. o Paragraph 6, Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution which ordains: The right to form associations or societies for
Castro (Dissenting): Sections 50-A and 50-B are not wholly consistent with each other and that practical difficulties may be expected by those who would comply with the requirements of both (i.e. with respect to number of days). The very broadness of prohibitions contained in Section 50-B has the effect of reducing, as a practical matter, the time period specified in Section 50-A for nomination of candidates for national offices from 150 to 120 days before an election. Balancing-of-Interests Test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. o Dangerous Tendency and Clear and Present Danger Criteria are not appropriate in this case because this kind of constitutional testing would involve both speculation and prophecy of sort which this Court is not in any special competence to do. Applying the balancing-of-interests tests, I am persuaded that Congress did not exceed constitutional limits in enacting Sec. 50-A. However, I reach a different conclusion with respect to Sec. 50-B for it constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of the

purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. For purposes not contrary to law the phrase was inserted just to show that the right of association guaranteed in the Constitution was subject to the dominating police power of the state. As a matter of fact, I dare say police power would be inexistent unless the political parties that give life to the government which exercises police power are allowed to exist. That is not to say that political parties are above the state. All that I mean is that without political parties, a democratic state cannot exist; what we will have instead is a police state. Lest I be misunderstood, however, as being an ultra-activist, it should be clear at the outset that in holding that the above prohibitions contained in the statute in question are violative of the Constitution, my stand is limited to my fundamental conviction that the freedoms of speech, of the press and of peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are absolute when they are being exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed. In view of the abbreviated period of campaign fixed in this law, necessarily the candidates have to redouble their efforts, try to cover more area in less time, see more people every moment, distribute more propaganda, etc., etc., and all these mean money, more money and more money. In this set up, so neatly produced by this law, it is regretably evident that the poor candidates have no chance. Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan February 1, 1989, 170 SCRA 1 Ponente: Per Curiam. EN BANC. Nature: Motion for Reconsideration FACTS: This is an MR filed by counsel of Raul Gonzalez (this attorney, claiming to be and acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution, is the subject of this case) in an Oct. 7, 1988 case. (there are NO facts, just a statement of issues raised by petitioner and the SCs respective ruling) ISSUES: 1. Was Gonzalez guilty of indirect or direct contempt? 2. Should Gonzalez be charged under Rule 139(b) or Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court (ROC)? 3. Which is applicable, the visible tendency rule or the clear and present danger rule? 4. Is intent relevant in charges of misconduct? 5. Can the court punish Gonzalez for contempt of court for out of court publications? 6. Is indefinite suspension from the practice of law a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? HELD and RATIO 1. GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and gross misconduct The SC used the term in facie curiae which literally meant direct contempt/contempt in the face of the courts. But what the SC meant was, the acts of Gonzalez (in his pleadings and in his media statements) and his misconduct were serious in nature and it was like a frontal attack to the integrity of the Court and to the entire judicial system itself. Anyway, Gonzalez was given a lot of chances to defend himself. Had it been direct contempt, he would have been punished summarily under ROC Rule 71 Sec 1. RULE 139 APPLICABLE Rule 139 is on Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys (SC will act on it). 139-B is on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys (IBP will investigate first before SC acts). The SC only mentioned 139-B because Gonzalez wanted to refer the case to the Solicitor General or to the IBP. SC said there was no need to refer to another body because the facts are already presented and there is no dispute, and that they already found a cause of action there; thus, only issues of law are needed to be addressed by the SC already. Cited case of Green vs. US, concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter: the power of the court to punish for contempt without need for jury has never been doubted. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER rule APPLICABLE SC did not make a new visible tendency doctrine (NOT defined in the case) but only paraphrased ROC Rule 71 Sec 3(d) (grounds for indirect contempt: :any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice). Cited Lagunzad vs. Vda de Gonzales for definitions o Freedom of expression has limitations: Clear and present danger rule (this is NOT THE ONLY TEST) Balancing of interests test (court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation) SC said under either of these 2 tests, Gonzalez statements went beyond the permissible limits of free speech. The SUBSTANTIVE EVIL that the Court seeks to prevent (and has authority to do so) is the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. o It may be less palpable than threat of public disorder, rioting, or overt violence but its more far reaching. YES. INTENT TO BE DEDUCED FROM ACTS. Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack the Court. SC said you cant hide by using intent. We derive intent by examining acts or statements. Here, it is clear that Gonzalez acts showed intent to attack the Court.
2. -
3. -
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5. 6. YES. Gonzalez used UK and US trends on contempt for his defense SC said those are not binding or persuasive in this jurisdiction. NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN! The indefiniteness actually is to let Gonzalez repent his acts and prove himself again worthy of the legal profession in his OWN GOOD TIME. from the legislative body. The members may nevertheless be questioned in Congress itself. 2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power. 3. Resolution was unanimously approved by the House. Such approval amounted to an amendment of the House Rules, which, according to standard practice, may be done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural. The House has exclusive power over them and the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere (separation of powers). Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension. 4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. Petition was dismissed. Dissenting: Reyes, J. B. L. The special committee empowered to investigate and recommend proper action over Osmenas disorderly conduct was created 15 DAYS after Osmena delivered his speech. He was subjected to a punishment to which he was formerly not amenable. This violated the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation. The right of the House to amend its Rules doesnt carry with it the right to retroactively deprive the petitioner of the immunity he has already acquired. Whatever liability Osmena has incurred was already extinguished when the House decided to consider other business. This extinction is a SUBSTANTIVE right that cant be taken away. The purpose of this immunity is to protect the members freedom of expression and to relieve them from fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a result of political convenience. The Court possesses no power to direct the Legislative to act in a specified manner but this should not stop it from recognizing the unconstitutionality of the questioned resolutions. Labrador, J. The House can amends its rules any time but they may not do so in utter disregard of the fundamental principles of law, to the extent of punishing an offense after the time to punish it had elapsed. The limitation of the time to which a House may take action against an offending member is a substantive rule, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be ignored when invoked. Ayer vs Capulong Borjal vs CA
G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999
Right as a public political figure

Osmena vs Pendatuin
G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Ponente: Bengzon J. Facts: Congressman Osmena delivered a privilege speech entitled A Message to Garcia wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the Presidents administration selling pardons. His charges, if made maliciously or recklessly without basis of fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the Office of the President. The House of Representatives (HoR) passed a House Resolution No. 59 creating a committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges. The special committee will submit a report to the House of its finding and recommendations. Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 other congressmen in their capacity as members of the special committee. Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech. Court expressed its doubts over its jurisdiction but decided to hear the matter further and required the respondents to answer without issuing any preliminary injunction. The special committee gave Osmena a chance to defend himself but was nonetheless found guilty for serious disorderly behavior, sentencing him to a 15-month suspension. Respondents challenged the jurisdiction of the Court, defended the disciplinary power of Congress and invited attention to the fact that the Congress has ended its session they have ceased to exist! Issues/Main contentions of Osmena: 1. The Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. 2. His words constituted no actionable conduct. 3. After his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer nor be subject to censure by the House. 4. The House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend any of its members Held: 1. Parliamentary immunity guarantees the members the freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before courts or forum outside of Congress. But this doesnt protect them from responsibility
Ponente: Bellosillo, J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari Facts: Francisco Winceslao, who was elected Executive

Director of the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT), sued Arturo Borjal, who runs the column Jaywalker in Philippine Star, and Maximo Soliven its Publisher and Chairmane, for Borjals articles in Jaywalker. Before filing a complaint on Borjal with the National Press Club (NPC) for using his column as leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm, Winceslao first wrote to the newspaper publication refuting the matters contained in the articles. After filing a complaint, Winceslao also filed a criminal charge for libel against Borjal and Soliven, but were dismissed by the trial court, the DOJ, and the Office of the President. So Winceslao filed a civil action based on libel against them, wherein the trial court decided in favour of Winceslao, ordering herein petitioners to indemnify Winceslao. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but reduced the monetary award. It found that Winceslao was actually defamed by Borjal by describing him as a self-proclaimed hero, a conference organizer, thick face, and a person with dubious ways. Petitioners filed a MR but was dismissed, thus the present case. Issues: 1. WON Winceslao was sufficiently identified by Borjal in the articles. 2. WON the articles constitute qualifiedly privileged communication. 3. WON Winceslao is a public figure. 4. WON there was malice in the part of herein petitioners so as to constitute a valid cause of action for libel. Holding/Ratio: 1. No. Winceslao was not sufficiently identified Borjal in the articles. The articles do not identify Winceslao as the organizer of the event. Although to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable though it is not necessary that he be named. But the things written to identify the person involved were a hero of the EDSA revolution and organizer of the seminar and conferences. There were obviously a lot of heroes in the EDSA revolution that it would be hard to think who it is. Also, as Winceslao himself admitted, the FNCLT had several organizers and that he was only part of the organization. Identification is inadequate when the offended party himself is unsure of that he was the subject of the verbal attack. Had Winceslao not revealed that he was the organizer of the FNCLT, the public would still be ignorant of his identity. 2. Yes. A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith (i.e. Sec 11 Art VI of the Constitution). Qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory amputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or motive. This is where private communications and fair and true comments without any comments or remarks belong. Although Borjals remarks do not fall in both, this does not necessarily mean they are not privileged. The doctrine of fair comment means that in general, every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must, either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. The questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest, thus, it invites close scrutiny by the media which is obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of the activity and personalities behind it. 3. Yes. Winceslao is a public figure, as defined in the case of Ayer Production vs. Capulong which states that a public figure is anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person. Since FNCLT was an undertaking imbibed with public interest, it attracted the media and drew the publics attention, not only to the event, but also to the people behind it. Since Winceslao is the Executive Director and spokesperson, he consequently assumed the status of a public figure. Even if he were not a public figure, because of the publics interest in the event, the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content. Since the articles talked about the persons official conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT, the articles dealt with matters which the public has a right to be informed, especially with the public character of the conference itself. 4. No. To be considered malicious, libellous statements must be shown to have been written with the knowledge that they are false or that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication. The Court found that Borjal has reasonable grounds for his remarks in the article evidenced by several personal interviews and varied documentary evidence provided by his sources. A public official must not be too thinskinned with reference to comments upon his official acts. Ratio Decidendi: 1. Reiterated Ayer Productions, Inc vs. Capulong on the meaning of a public figure. 2. Privileged communications are not actionable unless found to have been done with malice, but when directed to a public figure in his public capacity, it must also be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. Tulfo vs People G.R. No. 161032 (September 16, 2008) Date: 16 September 2008 Ponente: Velasco, Jr. Nature: Certiorari The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to protect and respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with responsibility. There is a fine line between freedom of expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine whether or not that line has been crossed. Facts: Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs filed 4 separate informations against Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in four issues. In this article, it was contended that Tulfo insulted a certain Atty. Ding So of the BoC in the South Harbor. o o 11 May 1999 Pinakamayaman sa Customs: Tulfo referred to Atty Ding So as gagong attorney and as the pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro nito [Iglesia ni Kristo]. o 12 May 1999 Si Atty. So ng BoC: Narrated the corrupt practises of the red tape to avoid paying customs duties and taxes. Highlight: Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So bakit hindi na

lang tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para kumita ng mas mabilis o 19 May 1999 alluded to Atty. So as a standard for corruption o 25 June 1999 referred to Atty. Sos 10million libel suit against Tulfo and editors. Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binanatan ko siya at inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC. Defense says that there was no proof that Atty. Carlos So was the Attorney that was the subject of the articles. They also said that the column alludes to an Atty. So at the South Harbour while Atty. So actually works at NAIA. Tulfo also says that he did not write those articles with malice while the officers of the paper say that it is not their duty to monitor Tulfos writings since he answered directly to one Rey Briones, VP for Editorial and Head of Editorial Division, who was not a party to the case. Prosecution presented four witnesses which attest that the allegations made were untrue and that he was the only Atty. Ding So in the BoC. Atty. So further claims that the articles of Tulfo caused him dishonour, discredit and contempt among the members of the legal profession, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Iglesia ni Kristo, colleagues at the BoC and among ordinary citizens of the country. in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions; (b) made in good faith; and (c) That it is without any comments or remarks. In Tulfo the article he wrote does not fall under Privileged Communication because : (a) Is not met because no details of the acts committed by Atty. So were described and were plain and baseless accusations (b) There was no good faith since the story was not verified before publication (c) Tulfo assassinated the character of Atty. So by calling him names and disgracing him from his profession and religion. Test for malice is the reckless disregard test which Tulfo failed. He had no proof nor basis for his allegations and did not desist when Atty. So filed for an action which further shows malice. Officers of the paper are not exempted from liability because direct participation in the publication is not considered an element to be liable for libel under Art. 360 of the RPC. They claim that no one edited Tulfos columns, which is exactly the misgiving of the officials. The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the First Amendment Daniel Ortiz Summary: This article talks about certain cases demonstrating how the court views how individuals make political choices, specifically decisions in elections. In the civic smarty approach, it is assumed that individuals decide based on the merits of candidates views and policies, and it doesnt matter how much he or she is exposed to the ideas of that candidate. In the civic slob approach, what matters is perception, and how intensely the idea has been put forward to the individual. Introduction Constitutional law allocates power either to an individual or government, and it structures the state; therefore, how we make political decisions and how empowered we are to carry out these decisions determine the legitimacy of our government. Two theories are involved here: o Private Politics refers to how an individual makes individual political choices o Public Politics refers to how individuals can or should be able to carry out their individual choices in the political process To make democratic legitimacy possible, it is important that private and public politics be protected. For example, the voter must be able to make informed judgments and act with others to carry them out through respected collective choice mechanisms, including effective representation. Private and Public politics is protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Several cases show how the first amendment is used to protect them, and to show how the court believes individuals make political choices. Basically, there are two approaches in looking at how individuals make political choices: o Civic smarty approach assumes that individuals make highly informed individual political choices, that people are eager to acquire and sort through political argument
RTC: found petitioners guilty of the crime of libel. CA: dismissed appeal, affirmed RTC SC Decision: Dismissed petition. Lowered fines for Tulfo and the officials of Remate to P6k each + PhP 1,000,000 that they are jointly and severally liable for moral damages. Prison time deleted. Issue: Whether or not the articles can be considered privileged communication and therefore the presumption of malice does not apply. The defense on privileged communication was only raised in the SC petition, creating an unusual burden on the prosecution because the defense had to be refuted in CA/RTC level.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The presumption of malice holds true when the author did not verify the contents of his published material, therefore, the articles were not considered privileged communication. Ratio: In Tulfo, the mere fact that that the subject is a public figure does not automatically exclude the author from liability. Since the allegations turned out to be false, and in addition, since Tulfo did not verify it from his source nor present any evidence, he becomes liable. The Journalist's Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines shows that the press recognizes that it has standards to follow in the exercise of press freedom; that this freedom carries duties and responsibilities. Clearly, Tulfo did not follow the guidelines. Conditions of Privileged Communication (Art. (a) fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered
354):

o and information in order to better evaluate candidates. Civic slob approach assumes that people do not bother to evaluate political information; instead, they rely on images, feelings and emotions. presented. FNB would only give the voters an informed choice. Justice White dissents from the courts view, saying that money will distort choices, since people do not choose completely deliberately
Buckley v. Valeo In 1974, The Federal Election Campaign Act was amended by setting a limit to contributions and expenditures in election campaigns. What was striking here is the limitation set on independent expenditures, where money spent by an individual or entity without the coordination of any political campaign is also being limited. The courts can argue that contributions may pose a threat of political corruption, but expenditures relating to the act of expending money on behalf of the candidate, would not indebt a candidate to a voter, so regulating it would not protect the integrity of the political process. Difference between expenditures and contributions o Contributions have a signaling function when one contributes, they indicate that they support the views of the candidate. Called speech by proxy, this assumes that contributors give money so that the views they also advocate can be promoted by the candidate, yielding a good investment for them. The problem however lies with the assumption that a person who can spend much more may have greater influence on the outcome of the election. With all these, the court offered three reasons why Congress could not restrict political expenditures: 1. The more ideas are expressed, the better. The First amendment prohibits leveling, because it implies government control of political debate, which may prevent voters from making free political choices. 2. Money can influence votes, but each side in a political contest has money to spend in proportion to its preexisting popular support, so it does not threaten to distort the overall political process. 3. Voters decisions are influenced only be ideas and policies of the candidates. This assumes that money only improves choice because with more money, more ideas are communication, and the voters have more arguments to base their decisions from. First National Bank v. Belloti This case decided the unconstitutionality of a Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting corporations from spending money to influence referendums on questions not materially affecting the property, business, or assets of the corporation. First National Bank (FNB) released an ad opposing the graduated state income tax, which is in violation of a Massachusetts criminal statute. However, the First Amendment, which prohibits government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw runs counter to this; therefore, the Belloti court upheld the validity of FNBs referendum, saying that FNBs advocacy of persuading the electorate is no reason to suppress it, since voters would still look at the merits of the arguments
The Academic Debate The battle between intensities and ideas: What matters more, how greatly we are exposed to a certain idea, or how credible the idea is for us from our own consideration? Wright believes that a wellfunded campaign will drown out certain ideas while BeVier believes that the individual chooses how to vote by evaluating issues and ideas, not simply following feelings and passions. Wrights fear of monopolization of ideas, however, would not be tenable, because no one may possibly hog all means of communication. For as long all viewpoints are registered even in the slightest way, deliberate voters will take them into account in political decision making. Intensity of presentation makes no difference. Sustein, a regulationalist, however points out in financial contributions, economic power is being transformed to political power. This cannot be sustained however since according to the Courts civic smarty assumptions, human political personality prevents this transformation. BeVier forwards this further by adopting the political speech theory of the First Amendment saying that free speech serves to make us have informed choices and to allow us to persuade others to share our views. The Dark Side of Political Personality: We are in fact Civic Slobs! Money still matters, therefore, we cant really be completely civic smarties. Downs: The public choice theory would show that it is irrational for us to be civic smarties because people wouldnt want to expend too much resources on this. The reality is that a significant amount of people knows nothing about politics and many of those who know something only know a few issues. Most base their political decision making on the personality traits of candidates. The court has actually recognized this view of politics in two cases: 1. FEC vs Massachusetts Citizens for Life in this case the court allowed an ideological corporation who wanted to endorse candidates in an election to make independent expenditures, because of the First Amendment. It said that relative availability of funds is after all a rought barometer of public support. 2. Austin vs Michigan Chamber of Commerce In this case, an economic corporation was barred from making independent expenditures. It says here that the act does not attempt to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections; rather, it ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espouses by corporations. There is no such thing as too much speech A gap between the resources of a

corporation and public support for its ideas is all the more reason to allow the corporation to spend money on political speech. Lack of initial public support is all the more reason for civic smarties to hear ideas. WITH DETAILS: Before April 14, 1949, said theater was operated jointly by the motion picture firms known as the plaintiffs LVN Pictures, Inc., Premier Productions and the Sampaguita Picture Inc., as lessees ; that on April 14, 1943, Narcisa B. de Leon leased the aforesaid parcel of land to the Filipino Theatrical Enterprise, Inc., who on that date had become the owners of the building, known as Dalisay Theater; the lease contract provided that Narcisa B. de Leon, would become the owner of the building, together with all the equipment and accessories At the expiration of the lease beginning April 14, 1949, the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., operated the theater, the National Labor Union, Eulogio Lerum and Jos Hernandez, were all employees of the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., from April 1949 to August 14, 1951, and said employees worked at the Dalisay Theater during this period. on July 12, 1951, shortly before the expiration of the aforesaid lease, the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., notified its employees of the termination of their employment with it, effective August 14, 1951; that 11 August 15, 1951, after the expiration of said lease, the full and complete possession of the theater building was delivered and turned over to Narcisa B. de Leon who immediately demolished the building and on the same site she constructed and finished, after several months of continuous work the new Dalisay Theater Building; on August 31, 1951, Narcisa B. de Leon executed a contract with her co- plaintiffs for the operation of the new Dalisay Theater as a joint venture among them, whereby the latter would exhibit their pictures in said theater; on January 10, 1952, plaintiffs opened the new Dalisay Theater and began exhibiting films there, with a new set of personnel, retaining only the services of four old employees; that on the last-mentioned date when plaintiffs reopened the Dalisay Theater for business about thirty persons among whom were the herein defendants, except the defendants Eulogio Lerum and Jose Hernandez, all members of the National Labor Union, picketed the plaintiffs at the said theater on 617-619 Rizal Avenue, Manila, from 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., more or less, by walking to and from on the sidewalk fronting the lobby of the theater and displaying placards which bore the slogans: Do not patronize the Dalisay Theater, Dalisay Theater is unfair to labor. Have mercy on the picketers and Sympathize with us, and others; that defendants during the picketing tried to persuade patrons or customers of the Dalisay Theater to refrain from buying tickets or seeing the show because the cines management is unfair to its employees, and to sympathize with the picketers; that after the defendants Jose Ramos and Enrique Montoya had left the lobby of the theater, the iron grill door which separates the theater lobby from the sidewalk was closed, thereby confining the picketing in the sidewalk; that the picketing was done by defendants so that they might be re-employed in the Dalisay Theater; that due to the picketing at the Dalisay Theater, the box office receipts of said theater for January 10, 1952, amounted only to about P1,250; and that a premier showing of such a film like DIMAS would ordinarily earn a P2,500 gross receipt for the theater. HELD: The acts of the defendants which consisted only in walking slowly and peacefully back and forth on the public sidewalk in
Explaining the Conflict 1. The courts inconsistency reflects the genuine conflict it sees in human political personality itself. It cannot see a mixed model of human decision making when fashioning legal rules. 2. There is a tension between the legal role and the symbolic role of the Court. Through its legal role, it takes a constitutional rule (here, the First Amendment), and determines through the application of legal reasoning whatever a particular set of circumstances violates it. Through its symbolic role, it serves to educate the public to lead us to our better selves. Therefore, the conflict lies in that the symbolic role here reaffirms what the legal role denies. The court wouldnt want to instill false consciousness . 3. We have seen that the court assumes that people are civic smarties when individuals make expenditures, and civic slobs when economic corporations do, but the entity doing the expenditure should not be relevant. The identity of the speaker should not matter, because the theory describes how listeners behave. Conclusion This article wanted to challenge the civic smarty model. Courts should not simply assume that people are civic smarties. Instead, it should ask whether the regulation would encourage desirable political decision making by increasing the amount and quality of debate,.
Relationships between private persons
De Leon vs National Labor Union
Ponente: Padilla Facts: SHORT SUMMARY: Eulogio R Lerum and Jose J. Hernandez, the latter two being the president and secretary of National Labor union, had been picketing the Dalisay Theater, owned by Narcisa B. de Leon and ran and operated by her co-plaintiffs, since the time it was reopened on 10 January 1952. he purpose of the picketing being to secure reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater when it was run and operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, then a lessee of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff Narcisa B. de Leon on which the theater was erected, since 14, April 1949.

front of the premises of the Dalisay Theater and displaying placards publicizing the dispute between the theater management and the picketers, were not such as to disturb the public peace at the place. There was no clear and present danger of destruction to life or property or of other forms of breach of the peace. Defendants were missed or laid off from their work at the old Dalisay Theater by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., the showhouse came under a totally different management when it was reopened on January 10, 1952. There was no existence of a relationship of employers and employees between plaintiffs and defendants, though defendants purpose in picketing plaintiffs was for defendants reinstatement of their services in the new Dalisay Theater under the new Management. Picketing peacefully carried out is not illegal even in absence of employer-employee relationship for peaceful picketing is a part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Free Telephone Workers Union vs PLDT and CIR G.R. No. L-24827 April 27, 1982 Justice Makaisar Facts: November 1, 1964: FTWU declared a strike against PLDT to break an impasse over negotiations on a 20-point economic demand, including a demand for wage increase covering a period of three years-1964 to 1967. November 3, 1964: Philippine President, upon authority of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), certified the labor dispute as one clearly affecting an industry indispensable to the national interests, to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The case was entitled "Free Telephone Workers Union, petitioner, vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, respondent" (CIR 51-IPA) November 9, 1964: CIR, after hearing, issued a partial decision, ordering PLDT to pay each of his 1,345 rank and file employees, a P0.16 wage increase per hour from Nov. 9 until 1 year thereafter. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19, Commonwealth Act 103, the members of the Free Telephone Workers Union are ordered to return to work immediately, and PLDT is ordered to accept them in addition to the award herein above indicated while the other unresolved demands of the Union -are under consideration. It shall be understood that during the pendency of the case, the Union its members and/or agents shall not strike or walk out of their employment; and PLDT shall not lockout its employees as public interest demands, considering that the Court, in its opinion can not promptly settle or decide the dispute. (FTWU appealed to the Supreme Court mainly on the sufficiency of the amount granted as increase. The Supreme Court affirmed on July 31, 1970, the November 9, 1964 decision of the respondent CIR.) March 3, 1965: Both parties agreed that while the case was pending, disputes or misunderstandings that may arise by and between them shall be referred to the President of the UNION and the Controller of the COMPANY for possible settlement. If the dispute or misunderstanding is not settled amicably, the dispute or misunderstanding shall be submitted to the courts for final disposition as incidents of CIR Case No. 51-IPA. April 21, 1965: Republic Act No. 4180 (Minimum Wage Law) was enacted, raising the minimum wage to P6.00 a day. Accordingly, PLDT increased the wages of its workers who were receiving below P6.00 a day, in addition to the PO.16 per hour previously awarded by CIR. April 27, 1965: FTWU asked for wage re-adjustment negotiations with the respondent company, since they think there should be a proportionate increase with respect to those employees already receiving P6.00 a day at the effectivity of R.A. 4180 should be subject of negotiations. May 6, 1965: FTWU demanded an automatic P0.25 per hour wage increase for all rank-and-file employees receiving above P0.75 per hour on account of the implementation of the new statutory minimum wage of P6.00 a day. May 17, 1965: FTWU filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor for refusal of respondent company to negotiate on its demand for wage adjustment under Republic Act No. 4180, which allegedly constitutes unfair labor practice. June 2, 1965: PLDT filed with CIR a petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction as an incident of pending Case No. 51-IPA and was thus docketed as Case No. 51-IPA (2). PLDT prayed that CIR enjoin the union from striking as the parties had previously agreed on March 3, 1965 to submit all further disputes to the CIR and that a strike under the situation would violate respondent CIR's November 9, 1964 order. June 3, 1965: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition of June 2, 1965 on the ground that respondent CIR has no jurisdiction to consider it. July 6, 1965: CIR issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from declaring a strike or any specie thereof during the pendency of the issue of jurisdiction. July 7, 1965: Petitioner filed with the respondent CIR a motion for reconsideration of the June 6 order, alleging substantially the same grounds contained in its June 3, 1965 motion to dismiss. On the same day, petitioner, declared a strike. According to petitioner, the strike was precipitated by the (1) summary dismissal of two of its members without a prior investigation at which it should be represented, and (2) respondent company's continued refusal to negotiate on its demand for wage re-adjustment. July 8, 1965: PLDT filed with CIR an urgent motion to declare the July 7, 1965 strike of petitioner illegal, the same being violative of the no-strike order of July 6, 1965 and the court's partial decision of November 9, 1964, and praying that the strikers be ordered to return to work or else forfeit their jobs. July 9, 1965: FTWU moved to dismiss the aforesaid respondent company's urgent motion. July 16, 1965: After due hearing, the trial judge of CIR issued an order denying petitioner's June 3, 1965 motion to dismiss respondent company's June 2, 1965 petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the Partial Decision in relation to Section 19 of C.A. 103, as amended, the petitioner union, its officers, agents and/or assigns and sympathizers are hereby directed to call off the strike declared on July 7, 1965, and to lift the picket lines established in and around the premises of respondent company's various offices and installations. The persons manning the picket lines in these places are hereby enjoined from impeding and interfering with the implementation of this Order as well as from interfering in any manner with the operations of respondent. The striking employees are hereby directed to return to work within three (3) days from receipt of a copy of Order by petitioner, otherwise, if they or any of them fail to do so, considering that as has been found by the President of the Philippines the business of respondent is coupled with national interest, the management of respondent is hereby authorized to replace any and all of them in virtue of Section 19 of CA 103, as amended, provided however, that the employees who shall have been replaced may be reinstated by the Court after due hearing and after establishing good and

valid grounds for their failure to return to work as herein directed. July 17, 1965: FTWU, without first returning to work as above directed, filed with the respondent CIR its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid July 16, 1965 order. July 19, 1965: FTWU filed with this Court its urgent petition for certiorari and prohibitory and mandatory injunction docketed as G.R. No. L-24755, questioning the power and jurisdiction of respondent CIR. The Supreme Court dismissed the aforesaid petition for "being premature and for lack of merit". July 31, 1965: CIR denied petitioner's July 17, 1965 motion for reconsideration of the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders of the trial judge, Ansberto Parades. The court says that after looking at the records as well as the arguments of both parties, they fail to find sufficient justification for altering or modifying the aforesaid orders. The petitioner now questions the validity of the aforesaid July 6 and 16, 1965 orders of the CIR and the July 31, 1965 en banc resolution of respondent CIR. Issue: (1) WON the orders of July 6 and July 16, 1965, Page 671 which were both affirmed by the respondent court en banc, were validly issued (jurisdiction). (2) WON striking employees of an industry certified to be indispensable to national interest could be validly ordered to return to work and lift picket lines under pain of being replaced without violating the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. Held: (1) Yes, they were validly issued. (2) Yes, they can be validly ordered to return to work and lift illegal picket lines under pain of being replaced. Rationale: (1) UNION: Republic Act No. 4180 could not have been envisioned by the President of the Philippines when he certified the labor dispute, subject of CIR Case No. 51-IPA, to the CIR on November 3, 1964. So, their demand was different from and outside the scope of certified Case No. 51-IPA, since the strike of July 7, 1965, happened long after the certification of the President of the Philippines of November 3, 1964. SC: One of the principal issues in the labor dispute that was certified by the President of the Philippines on November 3, 1964 is the issue of wage increases. During the conciliation stage of this case it was made clear that the wage increase demanded by petitioner are on a staggered 3-year basis and covered November 9, 1964 until November 8, 1967. The partial decision of November 9, 1964, which resolved petitioner's first strike declared on November 1, 1964, had settled the matter of wage increase for the first year of the 3- year period. This is precisely why on March 3, 1965, petitioner and respondent company entered into an agreement to insure harmonious labor management relations while the case/s are pending. Therefore, the second union demand for wage increase in May, 1965, which is the basis of this SC case was made within the same period covered by respondent court's partial decision of November 9, 1964 granting petitioner a wage increase of P0.16 per hour. The same demand is likewise covered by the provision of the March 3, 1965 agreement. Also, CIR Case No. 51-IPA (2) is but an incidental case or an ancillary proceeding to CIR Case No. 51-IPA, the main case. When the main case was thrown to the CIR's lap by Presidential directive, the CIR assumed jurisdiction over it, together with all its incidents. If Republic Act No. 4180 has any bearing at all on the issue of wage increases, it is only that it may be used as a justification of the increase. This was what FTWU did when it mentioned the Act in its Memorandum of May 3,1965, filed in support of its stand on the wage increase for the second and third years. The effect of a Presidential certification of a labor dispute to the Court under Section 10 of R.A. 875 is the revival of the compulsory powers of the CIR under C.A. 103. Section 17 of C.A. 103 provides a clear remedy to petitioner in order that it could avail itself of the effect of the passage of R.A. 4180. Pursuant to this legal provision, it could seek the modification, alteration or setting aside or the reopening of the Partial Decision. On November 26, 1965, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a 'Third Partial Decision', wherein the employees represented by FTWU were granted a wage increase of P0.16/hr for the 2nd year, effective November 9, 1965, and increase of P0.18/hr for the 3rd year, effective November 9, 1966. The total gained at the start of the third year as a result of the initial demands was P0.50 per hour. The CIR made use of a detailed analysis of the PLDTs financial situation. These underscore the fact that the increase now challenged by the union as insufficient is supported by substantial evidence. As it has been pointed out in its brief by PLDT, without any denial on the part of the FTWU, that the latter appears to consider the additional wage increases as reasonable and did not even move for their reconsideration. Thus, FTWU seems to have impliedly accepted the jurisdiction of the CIR. (2) UNION: respondent CIR's order of July 16, 1965 violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech because it called for the lifting of peaceful picket lines. SC: Peaceful picketing cannot be restrained because the same is part of the freedom of speech but petitioner fails to realize that the questioned July 16, 1965 order of the Court of Industrial Relations did not refer to peaceful picketing but to illegal picketing which interfered with the order or interfered in any manner with the operations of respondent. In the case of Mortera, this Court ruled that the "order of the Court of Industrial Relations prohibiting picketing must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial Relations must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means" UNION: PLDT could not validly authorize respondent company to replace those striking employees who failed to return to work within the 3 days from receipt of a copy of the July 16, 1965 order since no hearing on the issue of termination of employee status had yet been conducted by the CIR. SC: Section 19 of C.A. 103, as amended, provides that an implied condition to every contract of employment is that when any dispute between the employer and the employee has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration and pending award of decision by it, the employee, shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the Court, after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the Court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled; and if the employees fail to return to work, the Court may authorize the employer to accept other employees. This provision vests CIR with full authority to direct the striking employees to forthwith return to their work and to allow the respondent company to replace those workers who would

choose to defy the court's directive. It is a sanction to enforce petitioner's obedience to the court's order. While termination by reason of an illegal strike requires hearing, replacement by reason of violation of a return-to- work order does not. The sanction is merely provisional and an expedient to enable the respondent company to comply with its duties and functions which are very closely related to the interests of the public, it being involved in an industry affecting national interest. Moreover, such provisional remedy is calculated to minimize the injurious effects of the strike on the respondent company and its clients as well as on the public. The questioned order states that the replaced employees may be reinstated. In fact, the employees replaced by PLDT were subsequently ordered reinstated by CIR in its order of November 4, 1965. UNION: CIR erred in giving the company injunctive relief without the company exhausting all remedies to negotiate with the petitioner (4th assigned error) and in issuing the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders without regard to the procedural requirements of due process (5th assigned error). SC: Both assigned errors are without merit. The subsequent demand for wage increase which precipitated the second strike by petitioner was merely an incident of the main case, CIR Case No. 51-IPA and therefore the conceded jurisdiction of the respondent court over the main case (CIR Case No. 51-IPA) carried with it authority to take cognizance of the aforesaid incident subject of CIR Case No. 51-IPA(2). Consequently, since the second wage increase is part of the main case which was then already subject to compulsory arbitration, negotiation was no longer necessary. With respect to the claim that procedural requirements of due process were disregarded in the issuance of the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders, it must be stressed that the said orders were issued on the premise that the incident subject of CIR Case No. 51-IPA(2) was part of CIR Case No. 51-IPA and therefore, the jurisdiction of CIR over CIR Case No. 51-IPA necessarily includes its authority over CIR Case No. 51-IPA(2). When CIR issued the questioned July 6 and 16, 1965 orders it was merely enforcing the said November 9, 1964 Partial Decision by requiring the striking -workers to return to work under pain of being replaced. As a provisional sanction, it did not require a separate hearing. Dispositive: The July 6 and 16, 1965 orders and the July 31, 1965 en banc resolution of the respondent court of industrial relations are hereby affirmed. Arreza vs Gregorio Araneta University Foundation G.R. No. L- 62297, June 19, 1985. EN BANC June 19, 1985 Nature: Mandamus proceeding Ponente: Fernando, C.J. ONE-LINER: Students who rallied were denied enrollment in their final year, SC said that penalty was highly disproportionate. FACTS: Carmelo Arreza and some other officers and members of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University filed a mandamus proceeding because the said university refused to let them enroll in their final year. This was because they held a rally/demonstration (according to the university) on Sept 29, 1982. The petitioners allege that the said demonstration is just a continuation of their General Assembly, which the school administration authorized. The alleged rally demonstrated the students opposition to the abolition of the schools Institute of Animal Science. According to the petitioners, the students taking courses would not be able to graduate. The university refused to let them enroll after a sham investigation of their alleged violation of school rules and regulations. The university denied the granting of the authorization to hold the assembly and alleged that the students lambasted the school administrations decision to merge the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The merger was a cost-saving measure for the university and it was said that it would not deprive the students enrolled in the former Institute of Animal Sciences from earning their degrees. ISSUES: WON penalty was highly disproportionate WON the rally was non-peaceable in character HELD: Yes, no need to rule on that. RATIO: SC said that student leaders are hardly timid diffident types. Their activities did not present clear and present danger of public order because it was conducted in the school premises and during the daytime. Infractions of university rules or regulations by petitioners-students justify the filing of appropriate charges. However, the infliction of the penalty of denial of enrolment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate was highly disproportionate if in the exercise of their cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them SC cited Art 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where it says that everyone has the right to education and that technical and professional education shall be made generally accessible to all on the basis of merit. Using the said provision, there is justification for excluding 3 of the petitioners because of their academic deficiency. Educational institutions may drop a student with failing grades under standards set by it and made to apply to all similarly situated. Non vs Dames II G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990. Corts, J. Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Doctrine: Contract between the school and its student is imbued with public interest considering the high priority given by our Constitution to education. In imposing disciplinary sanction/action against students, the procedural process laid down in Guzman must be satisfied and the penalty must be commensurate to the offense. Facts: Petitioners are seeking the reversal of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., that a college student once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated. (termination of contract doctrine)
Petitioners are students of Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, who participated in student mass actions against the school. On that basis, they were not allowed to reenroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989. The petitioners filed a petition in the trial court seeking for readmission/reenrollment, but the trial court denied their petition, upholding the ruling in Alcuaz3. The trial court also denied the motion for reconsideration. Issue: WON Mabini Colleges, Inc. accorded the students due process when it prevented them from reenrolling in the said college. Held: NO. Termination of contract theory does not hold. Contract between school and students is not ordinary. It is imbued with public interest. Students do not shed their constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. Our Constitution recognizes and protects the rights of free speech and assembly. The same guarantee is found in the 1973 Constitution, as amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended [Art. III, sec. 8], the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, par. 13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, par. 13]. Said cognate rights are also available to students as settled in the case of Malabanan v. Ramento4, and upheld in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, and Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation.

and cause of any accusation against them; 2) students shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; 3) students shall be informed of the evidence against them; 4) students shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and 5) evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. The five students who did not incur failing marks were refused reenrollment without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to reenroll. As for the other students, it appears that they were not accorded procedural due process. The reason provided by the school for preventing reenrollment, that the students had failing marks, is a mere afterthought given the undeniable fact that what caused the ire of the school was the participation of the students in the demonstration. Clearly then, this is not only a denial of due process but also a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. This however, does not mean that the students cannot be subjected to disciplinary action as held in Malabanan. However, the penalty must be commensurate and must subscribe to procedural due process as laid down in Guzman. PETITION GRANTED. RESPONDENT MABINI COLLEGE ORDERED TO READMIT AND TO ALLOW REENROLLMENT OF PETITIONERS. Ayer vs Capulong FACTS: Hal McElroy (Australian filmmaker) and his production company, Ayer Productions, wanted to spearhead a film project on the EDSA Revolution. The project was discussed with a local movie producer, Lope Juban, who suggested that McElroy consult with key government agencies, as well as Fidel Ramos and Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the event. The Four-Day Revolution was endorsed by the MTRCB and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also gave his approval. The proposed project was a 6-hour mini-series rendered in a docu-drama style, focused primarily on fictional characters, interwoven with real events, and using actual documentary footage as background. (Tony ONeil, a U.S. journalist; Angie Fox, an Australian journalist; Ben Balano, a newspaper editor and supporter of Aquino; and his daughter Eva whos in love with Tony.) McElroy sent Enrile a synopsis of the proposed project, but Enrile expressed his disapproval of the projects use, appropriation, reproduction and exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of his family. Enrile also barred any references made to him or any member of his family. McElroy ostensibly acceded to Enriles demand: Enriles name was deleted from the screenplay, and they proceeded with filming. Enrile filed a complaint with application for temporary restraining order and writ of prohibition with the RTCMakati he contended that the film constituted a violation of his right to privacy. A hearing for preliminary injunction was set. McElroy moved for the dismissal of the complaint
Contract between a school and its student is imbued with public interest. This is in consideration of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)]. Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools merely serves to protect schools for non-payment of tuition. In fact, the Manual recognizes that the student is expected to complete the entire course once enrolled [Par. 107]. The same presumption has been translated into a right in B.P. Blg. 232, the Education Act of 1982. Academic freedom not a ground for denying students rights. The Court held in Villar that the right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school must satisfy procedural due process. Cardinal rights of students for there to be procedural due process in imposing disciplinary sanctions in schools, as stated in Guzman, are as follows: 1) students must be informed in writing of the nature
In this case the court ruled that once a student is admitted by the school, that student is considered enrolled for one semester. Thus after the close of the semester, PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract with the students and the teachers. PSBA-QC cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with them. This is a case involving students who were granted permit to assemble but held their assembly in a place different from that written in the permit and proceeded with the demonstration beyond the permitted time. During the assembly they manifested their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. CJ Fernando declared that students do not, shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.

the mini-series would not involve the private life of Enrile or that of his family; prelim injunction would amount to prior restraint on their right to free expression; Enrile had no cause of action as the miniseries had not yet been completed. The RTC (Judge Capulong) issued the prelim injunction and ordered that production be ceased. Ayer Productions and McElroy then elevated the case to the SC (via certiorari). Enrile insisted that the film project constituted a violation of his right to privacy. to the extent of keeping the film a truthful historical account Enrile was a public figure! Prosser & Keetons concept of a public figure: a person who, by his accomplishments, fame or mode of living or by adopting a profession which gives to the public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs or character, has become a public figure. Public figures have limited rights to privacy the press has a privilege under the Constitution to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. Enrile became a public figure precisely because of his role in the events that culminated in the EDSA Revolution the absence of reference to him would render the film grossly unhistorical. Enrile, in fact, continues to be a public figure as he is currently a Senator, after waging a successful campaign that took advantage of the status he gained from his participation in the EDSA Revolution. To not be violative of Enriles conditional right to privacy as a public figure: film must be a fairly truthful and historical account of past events No deliberate or reckless disregard of the truth; no representation of the private life of Enrile, and no revelation of intimate or embarrassing facts of a personal nature Enrile vs Capulong J. Sarmiento Brief Background: When the RTC issued the writ of prelim injunction (at Enriles petition), it required Enrile to file a Php2M bond to answer for whatever damages McElroy and Ayer may suffer by reason of said injunction After the SC ruled in their favor, McElroy and Ayer filed a motion to hold Enrile and the First Integrated Bonding Insurance Company solidarily liable on the bond, as they had been forced to move the filming of the movie to Sri Lanka after an extensive locational survey, which entailed additional costs and additional days of shooting and schedule delays. As a direct result, they suffered about Aus$ 438K. The RTC held that McElroy and Ayer were entitled to an award of damages given the SC ruling that Enrile was not entitled to the writ of prelim injunction. Enrile filed the present petition to stop the RTC from acting on the application for damages from the wrongful issuance of a writ of prelim injunction of Ayer Productions and McElroy Held: McElroy and Ayers claim for damages brought about by a wrongful injunction should have been commenced prior to the date the Ayer judgment was entered. Because Ayer had achieved finality, it follows that all proceedings after such are void and of no effect. A claim for damages arising from a wrongful injunction should be filed in the main case. If the lower court's decision, denying injunction, is however appealed to the CA, and the latter affirms the denial, the application may be commenced in the CA, which may either direct a remand of the case for reception of evidence or otherwise hear the claim itself So also, it must be commenced before judgment attains
The SC framed the issue of this case as a conflict between the right to free expression (McElroys and Ayers) and the right to privacy (Enriles). HELD/RATIO: Freedom of expression includes the freedom to produce and film motion pictures and to exhibit such; film is a principal medium of mass communication Gonzales v. Katigbak: film as an important medium and organ of public opinion, regardless of its informative or entertaining nature (no clear distinction between entertainment and education) This freedom is available to both local and foreign production companies, commercial or non-profit The right to privacy is not absolute; the production and filming of The Four-Day Revolution does not constitute an unlawful infringement of Enriles right to privacy Limited intrusion into a persons privacy is permissible when that person is a public figure and the information sought to be published is of a public character What is protected is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs of an individual which are outside the realm of public concern Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales: dealt with a similar conflict between claims of freedom of speech and expression and claims of privacy. Freedom of speech and expression is validly constrained by the clearand-present-danger rule and the balancing-ofinterests test. Judge Capulongs issued judgment constituted prior and direct restraint on the exercise of free speech and expression of McElroy and Ayer Premature as film was not yet completed or exhibited to the public; no clear and present danger of any violation of any right to privacy could be asserted In Lagunzad: no prior and direct restraint, film was completed and screened to the public The subject matter of the film was one of public interest and concern Film related to a highly critical stage in Philippine history part of public domain, appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media Film doesnt relate to the individual and private life of Enrile (as opposed to the Moises Padilla biopic in Lagunzad) Film only refers to the role Enrile played in the EDSA Revolution Film constituted limited intrusion into Enriles life: only

finality. Otherwise, it is barred. J. NARVASA, DISSENTING: The rule is clear in a situation where judgment is rendered by the CA or the SC on an appeal from a decision of a trial court. But, the case at bar concerns the special civil action of certiorari instituted in the SC by defendant parties aggrieved by a prelim injunction issued by a trial court. The SCs pronouncement as to Enriles lack of cause of action should not be construed as absolving Enrile from liability for such damages as might have been caused to Ayer and McElroy by his unfounded action and the prelim injunction wrongly obtained by him. The posting of a bond in connection with a prelim injunction does not operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from responsibility for the damages that the writ may have caused. It merely gives additional protection to the party against whom the injunction is directed. It gives him a right of recourse against the applicant. The special civil action of certiorari was separate and independent of the case initially filed by Enrile (against McElroy and Ayer). The issue of liabilities of the parties on the merits of that case was peculiarly within the RTCs competence; it was not an issue in the certiorari action in the SC. Damages resulting from the injunction may be recovered by McElroy and Ayer in the action before the RTC (Enriles case), rather than in the certiorari suit in the SC. Filipinas Broadcasting Network vs Ago Medical and Educational Center Bicol Christian College of Medicine G.R. No. 141994 (January 17, 2005) Carpio, J. Facts: In the morning of December 14 and 15 of 1989, radio commentators of FBNI, namely Carmelo Mel Rima and Hermogenes Jun Alegre, in their radio program Expose allegedly uttered libellous and defamatory statements against AMEC, stating that : 1. AMEC offered a Physical Therapy course despite not being accredited by DECS to offer such 2. Making their Med students retake all their subjects (even the ones they passed) if they happen to fail any subject. 3. Students are made to enrol required subjects even if the subject does not have an instructor. 4. That AMEC is a recipient of donations from a McDonald Foundation based from the fact that its buildings is called McDonald hall. 5. That AMEC is trying to minimize its expenses by hiring teachers who were removed from Aquinas University for immorality and continuing to employ Dean Justita Lola in spite of her being too old already as evidenced by her inability to see already. AMEC filed a complaint for damages alleging that the above broadcasts are defamatory and destroyed their reputation as reputable learning institution. FBNI, in their answer alleged that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report what was going on in AMEC, which is an institution imbued with public interest. Trial court found in favour of AMEC, but absolved Rima. Both parties appealed the decision to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision but modified it so that Rima is adjudged to be solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed for an MOR which the CA denied, thus this petition. Issues: 1. Whether the broadcasts are libellous 2. Whether AMEC is entitled to Moral Damages 3. Whether the award of attorney fees is proper 4. Whether FBNI should be solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for payment of Moral Damages, Attorneys Fees and Costs of Suit Held: 1. Yes 2. Yes 3. No 4. Yes Ratio: 1. The petitioners cite Borjal v. CA, contending that the broadcasts fall within the coverage of qualifiedly privileged communications for being commentaries on matters of public interest. The Court said the Borjal case does not apply since the commentaries of the petitioners may not reasonably inferred from established facts. The broadcasts are patently libellous because they were patently defamatory without any support or evidence as to their truth. Much of the defamatory statements by the petitioners were patently false. Had the petitioners exerted a little effort to verify these claims, they would have easily known this, like the allegation that AMEC is offering a course not accredited by DECS. Had they gone to DECS, they would have known that such accreditation exists, and have existed since 2 years prior to the broadcasts. And Dean Lola, is old, but when she testified in court, it was proven that she is not incompetent at all as the broadcast suggested. Also, the petitioners failed to provide any of the students who claimed to have been victimized by the schools policies. 2. Although a juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because they cannot experience suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 under Article 2219 of the Civil Code which expressly authorizes the claim for moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation, and notably, does not distinguish between actual and juridical persons. Although, 300k is too much, so the Court reduced it to 150k. 3. AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for attorneys fees. Also, the RTC and the CA failed to justify its award of attorneys fees, which was elucidated in the case of Inter-Asia Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Although, in that case it was said that the award of attorneys fees is up to discretion of the court, it nevertheless requires such an award to be justified or at least explained why it was given. 4. FBNI failed to show that it exercised the diligence of a father of a family in it supervision of its employees namely Alegre and Rima. And, the circumstances of the case validly adjudge him as a tort feasor. AMEC was correct in anchoring their claim against FBNI on Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Individual Enhancement

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs Philippine Blooming Mills G.R. L-31195, June 5, 1973. Facts The petitioner organization is a legitimate labor union comprised of the employees of the respondent corporation, while the private petitioners are officers and members of said union. On March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang on March 4 to protest the alleged abuses of the Pasig police, and they informed the respondent Company of their intention. This strike was to be participated by workers from the first shift (6AM 2PM) as well as the workers of the regular shifts (7AM 4PM and 8AM 5PM) The company then called a meeting on March 3 and advised the Union that although their staging of a mass demonstration is a right given be the Constitution, this right should not unduly prejudice the normal operations of the Company. Therefore, they asked that those who work the first and regular shifts, who had not previously filed a leave of absence, should still report to work on March 4 or they would be dismissed for violating the existing CBA as their actions would be tantamount to an illegal strike. Instead, they suggested that the Union should organize those from the send and 3rd shifts. However, the Union said that it was too late to change their plans since the demonstration would happen the following morning. As such, they proceeded with their demonstration so the Company filed a charge against the employees of violating Sections 4a-6, 13, 14 and 15 of RA 875 and the CBA that provided for No Strike and No Lockout. The Union countered that they did not violate the CBA because they gave the Company prior notice of the mass demonstration, it was in valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the abuses of some Pasig policemen, and, in any case, the mass demonstration was not targeted against the Company and therefore was not a strike. On September 15, the Court of Industrial Relations found in favor of the Company, stating that the Union had bargained in bad faith, perpetrating unfair labor practices and were considered to have lost their status as employees of the Company. Union then claimed that they received the order on Sept 23, but only filed their motion for reconsideration on Sept 29 because Sept 28 had fallen on a Sunday. They allege that the order made by the Court of Industrial Relations was contrary to law and evidence, and asked for 10 days to file their arguments pursuant to the Rules of the CIR. The Company argued that the Union, having received the order on Sept 22 had only 5 days by which to file their motion for reconsideration and that because it was two days late, it should have been dismissed. Union countered that their failure to do so was of excusable negligence and an honest mistake. They then appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues 1. WON Petitioners were in lawful exercise of their freedom of expression 2. WON the Motion of Reconsideration was rightfully dismissed by the Court of Industrial Relations for being two days late Held 1. 2. Yes No 1. Re: Freedom of expression and Right to Property The demonstration was in valid exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances. It was in fact the duty of the Company to protect the Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers as it is in their best interest that their employees arrive to work free from harassment, vexation and peril. The assumption of the Company that it would incur losses as a result of the absence of its employees is simply for the protection of their property rights. However, the Court has held the primacy of human rights over property rights. Furthermore, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position since they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions. Furthermore, the court argues that the CBA that fixes the working shifts of the employees constitutes virtual tyranny over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe condemnation. As such, the mass demonstration could not have been legally enjoined by any court since this would entrench on the freedom of expression of the members of the Union. The Companys argument that not all of the employees were necessary for the mass demonstration fails because it completely disregards the whole purpose of a mass demonstration. The absence of one third of the members of the union will display disunity among its members and will render the demonstration ineffective. Furthermore, the Union notified the Company two days ahead, which was enough time for them to have made counter measures or to prevent any losses it may have sustained. In any case, the Court of Industrial Relations did not report any findings regarding any lose or damages that the Company may have incurred and the Court therefore assumed that it did not sustain any. In fact, the company may have actually saved money from not having to pay wages and other fees in relation to the workers and this should have offset the unrealized profits. Re: Unfair Labor Practices The Company is also guilty of unfair labor practices for violating Section 3 of RA 875 (The Industrial Peace Act) which guarantees employees the right to engage in concert activities for mutual aid or protection and Section 4(a-1) which prohibits employers from interfering, restraining or coercing employees in their exercise of their rights. To stress, the purpose of the mass demonstration was for the mutual aid and protection of the Union members against the police abuse. Therefore, the insistence of the Company that the employees of the first and regular shifts report for work or be dismissed is a potent means for inhibiting speech. 2. The period of five days to file a motion for reconsideration is too short because aggrieved workers do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses. The Court has previously ruled that the procedural rules of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right, therefore the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations must also give way. It is also accepted that the Supreme Court has the power to suspend its own rules whenever the purposes of justice require it do so. To stick to the application of a five-day time limit for the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration would deny justice to the Union members and is unconstitutional because it subverts the human rights of the Union and the workers. Finally, the court rules that the penalty against the workers
Rationalization

should have been to charge the absence on sick or vacation leave rather than having them fired. doesnt apply to con-con delegates ii. The candidate can utilize relations up to the 4th civil degree of consanguinity affinity iii.Employ a campaign staff for one of every ten precincts iv.Members of a political party, acting individually, can campaign for or against the candidate v. Utilize the allotted space in the COMELEC billboard. vi. Utilize the allotted COMELEC time for radio and tv broadcasting vii. Appear on radio and tv provided other candidates are also invited viii. Be included in news coverage of mass media of significant or newsworthy events d. The limitations in Sec. 12 (F) of RA No. 6132 are less restrictive than RA 4880 which the SC has already held to be constitutional. e. The limitations in Sec. 8 (A ) of RA No. 6132 are more restrictive than the Sec. 12 (F) of RA No. 6132 because it prohibits political parties or groups from giving aid for a candidate, and even then it was still held to be constitutional by an SC vote of 6. f. Substantively, in the balancing of interests tests, Sec. 12 (F) of RA No. 6132 far outweighs the interests of the state in preserving the purity of the ballot and equal protection of law than liberty of expression. MAKALINTAL, J. (concurring): 1. The assailed provision is actually an empirical and pragmatic approach to the problems of our electoral process FERNANDO, J. (dissenting): 1. It is an abridgement of the freedom of the press, contrary to the mandate of the constitution. Due to the editorial policy of a publication and other items in it, a candidates chance of being featured is very limited and may only obtain publicity through advertisement. His right to press freedom entitles him to dictate what is included in his ad; matters are made worse when he is not only restrained on what he could place, but also forced to include others on the pain of not being able to advertise at all. 2. Freedom of expression is significant as a political right for this freedom for without the free press and free speech guarantees, one may not effectively make use of prerogative in the choice of the public officials in who the power to govern is vested. 3. The evils being prevented here cannot stand under the scrutiny of the clear and present danger rule whether the circumstances are of such evil that the Congress shall have a right to intervene. It is a question of proximity and degree 4. While the evil feared of is substantial and should be met, the legislation made should not be at war with the constitutional command of press freedom 5. It fails the constitutional test where the permissible scope of legislation that otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger doctrine, it should have been narrowly drawn and the precisely delineated.
To equalize opportunities
Badoy vs COMELEC G.R. No. L- 32546, October 17, 1970 Ponente: Makasiar Overview: This case is about Anacleto Badoy, a candidate for the Constitutional Commission seat representing the lone district of North Cotabato contesting the provision F on Section 12 of the Revised Election Act 6132 for being unconstitutional because the law imposed limits on the freedom of speech of candidates when it provided guidelines relating to the publishing of their campaign materials. The court denied his original petition to the Supreme Court as the provision a. Prevents a clear and present danger of having the electoral system being perverted b. Enforces Equal Protection of the Laws Facts: Anacleto Badoy filed two cases: 1. In G.R. No. L-32551 he prayed that printing of publications about a candidate which are not paid to be allowed even if they do not contain any mention of other candidates; and that Comelec Resolution No. RR -724 be declared unconstitutional for prohibiting articles that are not paid from being published. 2. In G.R. No. L-32546 he challenges that Sec. 12 (F) of RA No. 6132 is unconstitutional as it unduly abridges the freedom of expression of an individual whether candidate or not. Held: 1. In G.R. No. L-32551 the issues were rendered moot and academic as the relevant portions of the RR-724 were amended by RR-739 and no longer prohibits the printing and publication of unpaid articles that do not mention the other candidates, or mentions but not in the same prominence other candidates. 2. In G.R. No. L-32546, freedom of expression can be subjected to police power when the restriction imposed is narrow enough to allow the basic liberty to remain (Imbong vs. Comelec and Gonzales vs COMELEC). The candidates are still able to publish such advertisements provided, that they include other candidates in the spiel. a. The purpose of Sec. 12 (F) of RA No. 6132 is to give poor candidates a fighting chance in the elections While it is true that the mere mention if the poor opponent in the same advertisement or paid article does not by itself alone engender perfect equality of chances; at lease the chance of the poor candidate for victory is improved because thereby his name will be exposed to the reading the public in the same article as that of the wealthy candidate b. The restriction is only one of the measures devised to promote equal chances among the candidates c. The other sections of RA 3142 provide other avenues where the candidate can exercise his freedom of expression including his freedom of assembly i. The election campaign period limit

Freedom of expression ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values, a preferred position which should not be evaded by accident or by design. It should not allow dubious intrusion. There should be a clear and present danger of substantive evil. Barredo, J. (dissenting): The provisions give more reason for people to shy away from the coming election because it has increased the difficulties of the means of communication between the candidates and the electorates. There should be more information given to all instead of curtailment. Teehankee, J. (dissenting): 1. The statute affects the political discussion and curtails the support that is given to one candidate, an aberration in republican governments. 2. It not only violates freedom of expression, but also freedom of the press and freedom of association, also denying due process and equal protection of laws. 3. The COMELEC space given to candidates only consists of the name of the candidates as their total number come in the close of 3,000. Instead of enabling a relatively modest candidate to procure adspace for himself, the regulation becomes prohibitive as the cost of the advertisement becomes bigger. 4. Considering the prohibition of juridical entities publishing articles in support of candidates, only single proprietory publishers would be allowed to do so however, publishers are normally companies now as to avoid personal liability that may be incurred from libel suits. 5. The premises under the Imbong Gonzales cases are not applicable here a. Would the banning of the political parties purify the electoral process? b. Without political parties there would be no one to discipline crooked politicians, whereas if they were present the latter could be disciplined c. Removal of political parties would facilitate the preponderance of King Pins, creating a political vacuum, perpetuating personal political machineries and followers. 6. The clear and present danger test is a n oversimplified judgment unless it takes into account the following: a. Relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity b. The availability of more moderate control than those the state imposed c. The specific intent for which the activity was launched. The main opinion conveys a delusion of certitude. 7. Factors to be considered in the Balancing of Interests Criterion: a. Social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation b. The specific thrust of the restriction c. The value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by legislation d. Whether the specific restriction decreed by congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of public interst e. Whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by 6. 8. some other less restrictive measure for freedom The provision limiting the candidates expenditure to P32,00 if properly implemented would adequately cover the evils the act seeks to avert without having to go through the limitation on freedom. The provision fails in the Due Process clause for the means employed defeat the purpose of the act in maximizing equality for candidates. Those with the same names as to the nuisance candidates have no recourse to clarify themselves. National Press Club vs COMELEC Date: March 5, 1992 Ponente:Feliciano, J. Facts: Three petitions were consolidated assailing the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of RA 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987). Petitioners consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements, candidates for office, taxpayers, and voters. Petitioners argue that Section 11 (b) violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression: 1. It amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992 2. Derogation of medias role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues 3. Abridges freedom of speech of candidates 4. Substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion Sec 11 (b) of RA 6646: Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful; xxx b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. Section 11 (b) of RA 6646 should be read together with Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code: Sec. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be
9.

known as 'Comelec Space' wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. Sec. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as 'Comelec Time' which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the are of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. Issue: WON Sec 11 (b) of RA 6646 is unconstitutional for violating freedom of speech, expression and of the press Held: No. The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or unreasonable Ratio: 1. (topic) The objective aim of Sec 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests No one disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by the provision in relation to sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code The objective is of special importance and urgency in a country like ours which is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between elite and rest of society The objective also has been given constitutional status under Article IX(C) (4): The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution The provision on freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Art III (4)) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C)(4) They are not unlimited rights, and are not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic polities Equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at ones disposal, is 3. clearly an important value (Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.) No presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press (topic) Section 11 (b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution: -equalization of the situations of the candidates with the deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets; or to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves The restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations a. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability to election periods b. Section 11 (b) is limited in scope of application: i. Apply only to purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for Campaign or other political purposes ii. Does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth - Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises. iii. Cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates c. Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to Comelec of print space or air time
2.
Davide, J (Concurring) The freedom of speech and of the press, or of expression is not an absolute right. It does not comprehend the right to speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, and the manner, and place, or time of public discussion can be constitutionally controlled. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility but freedom with responsibility There can be no higher form of limitation to a right than what the constitution itself allows. The present constitution lays downs certain principles authorizing allowable restraints (same as main opinion). They contemplate measures that would bridge the gap between the rich and the poor in society. Framers of the present Constitution saw it fit to diffuse political power in the social justice provisions. social justice-humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the

State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated The airing and printing of a candidates political advertisements can still be done during Comelec Time and within Comelec space electorate of the credentials and platforms of the candidates that they are allowed to campaign during the election period. All channels of communication should be kept open to insure the widest dissemination of information bearing on the forthcoming elections Ends and Means Test: lawful objective may be readily conceded. Lawful method here applied falls short of the constitutional criterion. Financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a common maximum. The rich candidate violates no law as long as he does not exceed the maximum amount prescribed by the Election Code The proposed distribution of Comelec time and space is hardly workable considering the tremendous number of candidates running all over the country Section 11 (b) constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of ideasillegal intent to suppress free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for the molding of public opinion, and on the candidates who want and have the right to address the greatest number of voters through the modern facilities of the press, radio and television
Padilla, J (Concurring) These freedoms are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power Section 11 (b) aims to uphold the States policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service; and acts as an equalizer between the rich and poor candidates. Section 11 (b) is a positive and effective measure against corruption in public office: To tolerate even indirectly overspending in print space or air time for campaign purposes will open floodgates to corruption in public office because a winning candidate who overspends during the election period must necessarily recover his campaign expenses by hook or crook Electorate are given opportunities to know the candidates and be informed of their qualifications and platforms. Sec 9 of RA 6646 states that Comelec shall encourage non-political, non-partisan private and civic organizations to initiate and hold in every city and municipality, public fora at which all registered candidates for the same office may simultaneously and personally participate to present, explain, and/or debate on their campaign platforms and programs and other like issues Gutierrez, Jr., J (Dissenting) Section 11 (b) is censorship pure and simple: it will certainly keep the voters ignorant of who the candidates are and what they stand for and will result in gross inequality. We owe it to the masses to open all forms of communication to them during this limited campaign period Comelec is already overburdened with the conduct of elections and cannot supervise publicity campaigns of almost 100,000 candidates Existing restrictions (campaigns are allowed only within a limited period and amount they may spend is restricted) are more than sufficient Cruz, J. (Dissenting) Freedom of Speech according to Milton: the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties Freedom of Expression according to Phillips: at once the instrument and the guaranty and the bright consummate of all liberty; the sharpest and handiest weapon to blunt the edge of oppression Every citizen has a right to offer his opinion and suggestions in the discussion of the problems confronting the community or the nation. He can articulate his views through many methods but whatever form he employs, he is entitled to the protection of the Constitution against any attempt to muzzle his thoughts. One especially significant way by which the citizen can express his views, and that is through the ballot. By that vote, he is able to participate in the selection of the persons who shall serve as his representatives in the various elective offices in the government It is for the purpose of properly informing the
Paras, J. (Dissenting) Serious attack on our freedom of expression. Should the campaign for votes be carried out in other for a, the rich candidate can always be at a great advantage over his less fortunate opponent Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-119694, May 22, 1995. Facts: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2272: Sec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city. Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. "Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or

political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest. Pursuant to this, COMELEC sent letters to several periodicals (ie., Phil Star, Malaya, etc) directing them to provide half a page of free print space for use as COMELEC space PPI assails the constitutionality of the Resolution on the grounds that: o Sec 2 violates the prohibition on government and its agencies against taking private property for public use without just compensation. o Letter requiring them to give free COMELEC space and at the same time process raw data from candidates to make it camera ready constitutes impositions of involuntary servitude. o Sec 8 violates the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. OSG and COMELEC defense: o COMELEC Resolution does not impose an obligation upon the publishers to give free space as it does not criminalize or sanction the refusal to do so. It is designed merely to solicit free space from publishers. o Even if the Resolution and letter directive are mandatory in nature, they are nonetheless valid as an exercise of Police Power. o Sec 8 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision/regulation of the COMELEC over communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election to ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Is Resolution No. 2272 constitutional? Held: Sec 2 suffers from a constitutional vice and should therefore be nullified Appeal as to Sec 8 is dismissed for not being a justiciable issue. Ratio: I. PPI cannot be faulted for interpreting the Resolution and letter directive as a taking of private property without due process, despite the claim of COMELEC that refusal to follow the directive is not criminalized or sanctioned. The Resolution and letter directive are in fact susceptible to the same interpretation as PPIs. o The wording of Sec 2 does not demonstrate that the intention of COMELEC is to merely solicit. Directing print media companies to donate print space amounts to taking a private property for public use, within the concept of the exercise of the power of eminent domain. o Requisites for lawful taking: (1) necessity for the taking; (2) legal authority to effect the taking. COMELEC failed to prove the existence of the first element. They did not even allege that the publishers were unwilling to sell the print spaces at the prevailing price. It has not even been shown that COMELEC has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the constitution or legislature. Sec 2 is not a valid exercise of eminent domain, Sec 2 has no constitutional basis for compelling publishers to donate against their will. Decision is in line with the theory of democratic representative government: o The benefits which flow from heightened level of information and awareness of the electoral process is community wide, therefore the resulting economic burden should be distributed as widely as possible throughout the society by utilizing public funds. It has not been shown that Police Power has been constitutionally delegated to COMELEC. In any case, they also failed to show that they complied with the requisites for lawful taking under the police power. o Sec 2 does not show the existence of a national emergency or an urgent public need that need to be addressed and that the measure taken is the only reasonable and calibrated response available. Instead, it indiscriminately takes the private property of publishers. PPI failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of COMELEC to enforce Sec 8. It also failed to allege that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of the provision. Sec 8, is a poorly phrased provision implementing the doctrine in the case of NPC v COMELEC, where the court ruled that: The Electoral Reforms Law which prohibits the sale of print space or airtime for campaign and other political purposes, except to the COMELEC does not include in its scope the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of opinion by reporters, broadcasters, columnists, etc not intended for advertising as such are protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.
II.
No limitation based on content or on the characteristics of the speaker

BAYAN vs Ermita FACTS: Petitioners come in three groups. - Bayan, et al., alleged that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in was violently dispersed by policemen implementing BP 880. - Jess del Prado and 26 others allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. - Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al allege that their rights as organizations and individuals, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that a rally they co-sponsored was to be

conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them and forcibly dispersed them. They further allege that a multisectoral rally was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Ave in front of UST and going to Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them and prevented them from proceeding further. Three rallyists were arrested. - They all assail BP 880 Secs 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. Pet contentions: - Bayan: BP 880 is a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that: 1) it requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger; 2) it curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the freedom expression is exercised; 3) it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government; 4) the words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government; - Jess del Prado: it is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in BP No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. - KMU: BP 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane. As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of BP 880 and violates the constitutional right to peaceably assemble. Respondents (Ermita, Atienza, PNP, et al) contentions: 1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had been injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR and BP 880. 2. Neither BP 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner regulation embodied in BP 880 violates the three-pronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) it is content-neutral; (b) it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; (c) it leaves open alternative channels for communication of the information. 3. BP 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the statement of the public assemblys time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in BP 880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a rallys program content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear and present danger test." - Meanwhile, the SolGen agreed with the observation of the CJ that CPR should no longer be used as a legal term because it was merely a "catchword" intended to clarify what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set forth in BP 880 and that it does not the maximum tolerance policy embodied in that law. ISSUES: W/N pet have standing (YES) W/N BP 880 is constitutional (YES) W/N CPR is valid/constitutional (NO) RATIO: 1. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition is directly affected by BP 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. 2. Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and to organize or form associations, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities, are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution (Sections 4 and 8 of BOR). These rights enjoy primacy in the realm of constitutional protection: without this, all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. - However, it must be remembered that these rights, while sacrosanct, are not absolute. They may be regulated that they shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" - There can be no previous restraint or limitation on free speech, free press, or freedom of assembly unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. - The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes v Bagatsing, to wit: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. His decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. - It is very clear that BP 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. - BP 880 refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful

causes; otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. - As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard (which is the clear and present danger rule). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. - Finally, the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time. 3. In view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. It merely confuses the people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. NB: In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities. Reyes vs Bagatsing RATIO DECIDENDI: The only exception to the right of the people to free speech and peaceably assemble is the presence of clear and present danger which is of a character both grave and imminent, and a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. NATURE: Suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction FACTS: Petitioner, retire Justice JB L. Reyes on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy. A short program was to be held and after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. Mayor Raymond Bagatsing denied said permit based on intelligence reports on the plans of subversive elements to disrupt said assembly. Mayor Bagatsing, however remained amenable as long as the Anti-Bases Coalition chose to hold the rally in Rizal Stadium or in any other closed space. ISSUE: Is Mayor Bagatsing s denial of the rally permit applied for by JB L. Reyes tantamount to a violation of Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution? HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1) Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. 2) There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the venue for the start of the peace rally. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy. The Court cites Justice Roberts in Hague v CIO: Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. 3) It being the case that the Philippines is a signatory to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the State is under a special duty based on the second paragraph of the Article 22 of said treaty which reads: The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. However, only if there was a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. According to the Court, this clear and present danger was absent in this case since General Narciso Cabrera, Superintendent, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, assured Mayor Bagatsing that the police force is in a position to cope with such emergency should it arise. Also from him came the commendable admission that there were the least five previous demonstrations at the Bayview hotel Area and Plaza Ferguson in front of the United States Embassy where no untoward event occurred. It was also made clear by petitioner, through counsel, that no act offensive to the dignity of the United States Mission in the Philippines would take place and that, as mentioned at the outset of this opinion, that all the necessary steps would be taken by it to ensure a peaceful march and rally.
4) Mayor Bagatsing sought support from the Ordinance

No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. However, there was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Because of this, the Court held that the need to pass on the issue was obviated. Procedure for securing permits for peaceable assemblies: a) The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. b) Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. c) It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If the licensing authority is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. d) Thereafter, the decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Gonzales vs Katigbak G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985 JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs. CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION (BRMPT), respondents. Irene R. Cortes, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Haydee Yorac and Joker P. Arroyo for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents. Overview: This is a certiorari proceeding over the controversy revolving around the motion picture entitled, Kapit sa Patalim, over which, the respondent Board is being questioned about its scope of power. This case also discusses the question of what constitutes obscenity. This is a balancing between the right to freedom of expression of the petitioners and the scope of power of the respondent Board relevant to the said right. Ponente: Fernando, C.J. (concurring: Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., in the result, Aquino, J.) Facts: The film, Kapit sa Patalim, was granted a permit but was classified as For Adults Only by a sub-committee of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures (Board), with certain changes and deletions effected on it. Upon this resolution, Antonio Gonzalez, the President of Malaya Films filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the said classification was
without basis. The Board affirmed the resolution of its subcommittee and further ordered the Chairman to withhold the granted permit until the petitioners comply with certain deficiencies. Gonzalez, et. al filed this motion for certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Board, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the case, as it has already revoked its prior decision and has granted the petitioners the permit to exhibit the film without deletions. In an affirmative action, the Board contends that the petition does not question the validity of the classification, therefore is already moot and academic. The petitioners amended petition raises objections on the classification of the film as without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The Board however asserted that the issues have been all rendered moot. It was also submitted that the standard of the law for classifying films afford a practical and determinative yardstick for the exercise of judgment. For the Board, the only question left to be answered is the sufficiency of the standards of classification. Issue: Is obscenity a valid basis of invasion of the right to the freedom of artistic and literary expression embraced in the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution? (a) What constitutes obscenity? (b) What is the scope of the exercise of power of the Board? Discussion: Motion Pictures In Burstyn v. Wilson, it is said that notwithstanding the pronouncement of the importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion, that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform, there is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. However, in Reyes v. Bagatsing, press freedom, is said to be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. The Court emphasizes here that despite this, the freedom is not absolute, and can be limited if there is a clear and present fander of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Censorship or Previous Restraint The Court says that the emphasis should be put on the freedom from censorship or restraint than on the restraint itself, because the power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. In this case, the Court sees that the scope of power of the Board is limited to the classification of films, in determining what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. Clear and Present Danger Test Danger must not only be clear but also present and imminent, and the causal connection must be evident. Danger must not only be probable, it should be inevitable Danger of evil is to public morals, public health or any
5)

other legitimate public interest. Obscene Unorthodox, controversial, hateful ideas are still protected unless they infringe upon other rights. In United States v. Bustos (1918), the court recognized the principle that libel, though beyond the pale of constitutional protection, still passes a determination as to whether there is no violation of the right to freedom of expression. Justice Brennan (in the case of Roth): sex and obscenity are not synonymous, and obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. States Patronage of Arts and Letters On one hand, the Board contends that it applies contemporary Filipino cultural values as its standard, as supported by EO 878. The Court however reminds that the arts and letters shall be under the patronage of the State, stating that this is a constitutional mandate, i.e. it is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation, and what is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. On the question of obscenity, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. No Grave Abuse of Discretion The abuse is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. The Boards perception of what constitutes obscenity also appears to be unduly restrictive. But there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave, therefore certiorari does not lie. The respondent Board, in its Answer enumerated a number of scenes which it believes will not be suitable for non-mature viewers and the classification is thus a warning to theatre operators and viewers alike that some contents of the picture are not fit for the young. Note: Petition is dismissed on the ground that there are not enough votes to rule that there was grave abuse of discretion. In re Letter of Atty. Noel Sorreda A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC (July 22, 2005) Overview: The current case is about the disciplining of Atty. Noel Sorreda due to his letters to the court wherein he complained, lectured, and generally disrespected the Court for not getting his desired results in several of his cases. He also imputed that the court is corrupt and is specifically out to get him and not let him win any of his cases. In this case, a persons right to freedom of expression, more specifically Atty. Sorredas right to criticize the court is weighed against his lawyerly duty to maintain respect to the Courts at all times according to Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the ROC, and the following cases: (a) Justice Conrado vs. Sanchez, (b )Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel and Zaldivar vs Gonzales. THE FACTS February 25, 2005 Atty. Noel Sorreda as a member of the Philippine Bar wrote to the Chief Justice furnishing all associate justices, RTC justices and counsels in the involved cases. In the loetter, he expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcomes and the manner by which the court arrived to its decisions. The following cases were cited by Sorreda. o UDK-12845, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals et al. o G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs Commision on Elections o G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals o G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals et al. o G.R. No. 154310 Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals et al. o G.R. No. 155446 Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals et al. o G.R. No. 156630 Ronilo Sorreda vs Court of Appeals et al. o G.R. No. 157046 Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations Commission et al. o G.R. No. 164163 Glenn Caballes vs. People et al. o G.R. No. 164677 Marisa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta et al. In his first letter, Sorreda stated that the way the court acted is EXECRABLE and ATROCIOUS. He stated that these were not the actions of men of reason and men who follow the rule of law, but of BULLIES AND TYRANTS. Lastly he stated that the court should be ashamed. Naturally, the court asked for Sorreda to show cause why he shouldnt be held in contempt. In response to the show cause order, Sorreda wrote another two letters, one dated December 2, 2001 and the other June 16, 2002. He basically argued for the propriety of his actions and lectured the court on his proper concepts of ethics and constitutional law. The following are important passages in his letters: o Something is terribly wrong with the countrys justice system. What is happening to the justice system in our country Mr. Chief Justice? o I deplore and condemn in strongest term the strong-handed actuations of the Court. These actions can be found in dictatorship and authoritarian regimes o The 10 cases are one of the most meritorious cases ever. A reasonable and impartial mind cannot ignore their merit. The High Court has taken it personally against me, to the detriment of my innocent clients and justice. If the court had anything against me, I stood ready to have the ax fall on my own neck. o If I had indeed wronged the Court in the way they say, no punishment save DISBARMENT will do. Given that, the Court has resolved to deny the opportunity for self-defense that I

dont have any way to defend myself. Am I punished because I said that the court cant give a fully reasoned judgment as in Re Almacen? But rather than admit that it made a mistake, the Court resolved to get back at me. o Mr. Justice, this is craven cowardice to deal with an adversary like that. o That nine of the ten cases were only assigned the First and Second Division. The First Division, chaired by the Chief Justice and the Second chaired by Justice Bellosillo. That after Justice Bellosillo retired and was replaced by Justice Vinita V. Chico-Nazario, only then did a case of this counsel did not fall under the First and Second Division. Could it be because the chair of the Third Division, Justice Vitug and Justice Nazario had reputations for independent mindedness that the powers that be prevented them from being at the bench? o I am sad as a counsel to come to the realization that the high institution of which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a citizen, that the public officers that should help instead give judgments that insult the intelligence. How can the court pronounce 29 days as greater than 60 days? How can the court suffer a widow and her children to live in their toilet and sanction the illegal demolition of their home? Did the court even try to put themselves in the shoes of the innocent man kept locked up for 3 years? Where did the Court get such shameless boldness to dismiss a case on lack of docket fees when evidence shows that it has been paid? How can they invoke that they are like Frodo fighting the evils in society when they themselves are committing the evils. Didnt the Court already bought into the What-are-we-in-powerfor mentality? On March 15, 2005, the Court en band required again Atty. Sorreda to show cause. But Atty. Sorredas reply was to say tat he does not need to say any more because the cause has already been shown as clear as day. He dared the Court whether it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the Supreme Judge. The Court stands by the rulings it made that Sorreda alleges to be unfair. The Sollegue case was not dismissed only because I was filed after the reglementary period in Sec.4 Rule 65, but also because the duplicate original or certified true copy was not submitted. In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, the case wasnt only dismissed due to insufficient verification but because the petition was being used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. The other cases werent discussed but they are equally valid and well supported. o ISSUE The sole issue in this case is whether or not Sorreda is liable for his writing to the Court. HELD Yes. RATIO Unfounded accusations or allegations tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. They constitute direct contempt of court and a violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ang vs. Castro states that any offensive and malicious statements submitted to the same court or judge in which proceedings are pending is direct contempt. Sorreda also violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer should always maintain the respect due to the courts. Under the same Canon, Rule 11.03 states that a lawyer should abstain from scandalous, offensive and menacing language. Rule 11.04 also states that a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by record. Both rules were also violated. Although Sorreda owes fidelity to his client, he must do so only within the bounds of all. A lawyer is entitled to criticism according to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, but as all freedoms, this is not absolute. A lawyers fidelity to his client should not be at the expense of orderly administration of justice. In Justice Conrado vs. Sanchez, it was establishes that there can be no excuse to violate Section 20(b) Rule 138 of the ROC, because it spells out such duty. A lawyer should protect the court from unjust criticism and clamor. In Surigao Minderal Reservation Board vs Cloribel, a lawyer has the duty not to promote distrust in th administration of justice. To undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, it was recognized that a person is indeed entitled to free speech, but it is not absolute and should be weighed against equally important public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of the administration of justice. The Supreme Court especially should be accorded respect because it serves as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Sorreda should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and his clients success is always subordinate. JUDGMENT Atty. Sorreda has transcended the bounds of permissible comment and constructive criticism. Any gross misconduct of a lawyer puts his moral character in serious doubt. Sorreda has shown that he is unfit as a member of the bar and his rehabilitation should be outside the brotherhood he had dishonored. Therefore, he is found guilty of contempt and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is

indefinitely suspended. Chemerinsky, Erwin, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content Based Choices, 42 Clevland State L. Rev. 199 (1994). I. Introduction Senator Helms succeeded in adopting a bill that prohibited the use of federal funds for obscene material. Also, artists receiving such federal funds must certify in advance that no such material shall be disseminated by them. Is this unconstitutional? Can the government make contentbased choices? II. The Prohibition Against Content-Based Discrimination The US SC, in a long line of cases, declared that contentbased choices of the government shall be considered violative of the First Amendment. In Simon and Schuster, Inc. vs. New York Crime Victims Board: New York adopted the Son of Sam law that prohibited crime perpetrators from profiting from their crimes by selling film, book and television rights of their stories. SC struck down the measure as violative of the First Amendment. Justice OConnors opinion mentioned that the First Amendment prohibits content- based choices that regulate free speech unless the government can show that such regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: St. Paul, Minnesota adopted a measure prohibiting the burning of crosses or placing swastikas or other expressions of hate in a manner likely to elicit alarm, anger or resentment. Justice Scalia also opined that this is a content- based choice, thus, violative of the First Amendment. In Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission: The US SC, through Justice Kennedy, endorsed a two-tier system of review: (1) viewpoint neutrality- the government cant regulate speech based on the ideology of the message (2) subject matter neutralitythe government cant regulate speech based on the topic of the speech. Why is there so much concern about content neutrality? - The fear is that government will target particular messages and attempt to control thoughts on a topic by regulating speech. The SC also says that Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion and not persuasion. III. Content- Based Choices are Sometimes Inevitable When can a city deny the use of its theatre or auditorium based on the content of the speech? It is not helpful to say that the government cannot make content-based choices because it must. Another example: choice of books found in the library . Which books should be bought, considering the scarcity of funds? Another example: disbursement of funds for artists. In what type of material should be published to warrant the award of funding? Observations: (1) the problem of making content-based choices is pervasive, not isolated (2) outcomes of the cases are completely inconsistent (sometimes the government wins, other times it loses), with no principle to account for the inconsistent results and (3) there are many similarities in all cases (the government more of a provider of speech, not merely a regulator; allocation of scarce resources) How are such choices to be appraised under the First Amendment? When do government decisions violate the Constitution? IV. The Failure of Traditional Responses First approach- The Government cannot make content-based choices- as shown, this is clearly inevitable. Second approach- Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine (the government cannot condition the receipt of a benefit on a person giving up a right - Criticisms (1) its current viability is in doubt, since in Rust v. Sullivan, the gag rule was held constitutional, and the government had the choice of expending federal revenues (2) it is not analytically useful to solve the problem, since it begs the question of when content- based choices by the government are constitutional. Third approach- doctrine of Prior Restraint (attempt of the government to censor speech before it occurs) - Criticisms (1) the government is facilitating speech by subsidy and the restraint seems secondary to the enhancement of First Amendment values (2) if choices by the government as to what to fund are prior restraints, the government cannot avoid prior restraints in this area (what prior restraints are allowed and w/c are not?) This brings us to two conclusions: Either we say that the government has the free rein in making content-based choices, or it should never consider making contentbased choices at all. IV. Towards a Solution The solution will not be found in the First Amendment. It is largely focused in limiting the governments ability to regulate speech. Here, the government inherently must regulate. Ultimately, the issue is about how to control the government in a situation where it must act- this is what due process is about. Due process is based on the notion that personal freedoms can be secured only when there is an institutional check on arbitrary government actions. The best solution when the government must make content -based choices is to assure the fairest possible process in accord w/ the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. Substantively, the government must make choices; procedurally, the courts should insist that they are done in the fairest possible way. What a fair process should include: (1) the government must have clearly stated the criteria for how choices will be made (this limits discretion among government officials) (2) criteria must be specific as possible and should be invalidated if they are unduly vague. A reasonable person should be able to understand the basis upon w/c the government will be making its funding decisions (3) the criteria must not discriminate among speech and speakers based on the ideas expressed. Thus, subject matter restrictions would be permissible, but viewpoint ones will not be allowed. Problems: (1) Funding authorities can purport to be making quality-based determinations, but in reality make decisions based on viewpoint (2) Subject matter restrictions can hide viewpoint discrimination (3) Even viewpoint discrimination will be allowed if there is a sufficiently compelling state interest. (4) courts should be able to assure that the criteria have been reasonably applied.

Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems Robert H. Bork Argument of the essay: A problem of constitutional law is the LACK OF THEORY which therefore results to courts having no without effective criteria and, therefore we have come to expect that the nature of the Constitution will change, often quite dramatically, as the personnel of the Supreme Court changes. The essay therefore provides for ranging shots, which attempt to establish the necessity for theory and to take the argument of how constitutional doctrine should be evolved by courts a step or two farther The first section centers upon the implications of Professor Wechsler's concept of "neutral principles," and the second attempts to apply those implications to some important and much-debated problems in the interpretation of the first amendment. The Supreme Court and the Demand for Principle Debate has been on regarding the proper role of the Supreme Court under the Constitution, posing the question of when is authority legitimate. This question arises when any court either exercises or declines to exercise the power to invalidate any act of another branch of government. Take the example of the Warren Court. Professor Herbert Wechsler argues that the Court must not be merely a "naked power organ," which means that its decisions must be controlled by principle.' "A principled decision," according to Wechsler, "is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in a case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved. Wechsler chose the term "neutral principles" to capsulate his argument, though he recognizes that the legal principle to be applied is itself never neutral because it embodies a choice of one value rather than another. Wechsler asked for the neutral application of principles, such that: a. The judge "sincerely believes in the principle upon which he purports to rest his decision." b. He "must believe in the validity of the reasons given for the decision at least in the sense that he is prepared to apply them to a later case which he cannot honestly distinguish." The requirement that the Court be principled arises from the resolution of the seeming anomaly of judicial supremacy in a democratic society. If the judiciary really is supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the society is not democratic. The anomaly is dissipated, however, by the model of government embodied in the structure of the Constitution, a model upon which popular consent to limited government by the Supreme Court also rests, which we may call "Madisonian. A Madisonian system: a. Not completely democratic, if by "democratic" we mean completely majoritarian. b. Also has a counter-majoritarian premise, which are areas properly left to individual freedom, and coercion by the majority in these aspects of life is tyranny. Dilemma of the Madisonian system: a. Majority tyranny occurs if legislation invades the areas b. properly left to individual freedom. Minority tyranny occurs if the majority is prevented from ruling where its power is legitimate.
The resolution, however, of the dilemma imposes severe requirements upon the Court. For it follows that the Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority and minority freedom. On the other hand, the Court violates the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone justifies its power if: a. It does not have such a theory but merely imposes its own value choices, or b. It pretends to have a theory but actually follows its own predilections Judge Skelley J. Wright, however, supports the valuechoosing role of the Warren Court, adopting the technique of confession and avoidance. He seems to be arguing that a Court engaged in choosing fundamental values for society cannot be expected to produce principled decisions at the same time: Decisions first, principles later. His argument then rests on a syllogism: a. The Supreme Court should "protect our constitutional rights and liberties." b. The Supreme Court must "make fundamental value choices" in order to "protect our constitutional rights and liberties. c. Therefore, the Supreme Court should "make fundamental value choices."' Author then concludes that a legitimate Court must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the Justices. Logic has a life of its own, and devotion to principle requires that we follow where logic leads. Judges must be neutral in the: a. Definition b. Derivation c. Application of principles Example: Griswold v. Connecticut, a Warren Court decision, which raises the questions of: Why does the principle extend only to married couples? Why, out of all forms of sexual behavior, only to the use of contraceptives? Why, out of all forms of behavior, only to sex? The question of neutral derivation also arises: What justifies any limitation upon legislatures in this area? What is the origin of any principle one may state? This is to illustrate the authors point against the Warren Court, as he pushes the idea of neutrality--that a decision is neutral if its interpretation may be applied to different cases consistently. His other points: a. All opinions of the case failed to justify the derivation of any principle used to strike down the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute or to define the scope of the principle. b. Justice Douglas created here the miracle of transubstantiation. He did not disclose how a series of specified rights combined to create a new and unspecified rightthe right to privacy. c. It fails every test of neutrality as it gives no idea of what the principle really forbids. Where the Constitution does not embody the moral or ethical choice, the judge has no basis other than his own values upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied in the statute. But this is NOT an

adequate basis for judicial supremacy. The judiciary has no role to play other than that of applying the statutes in a fair and impartial manner. Equal Gratification Clause From this, the author concludes: a. That the choice of "fundamental values" by the Court cannot be justified. b. Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other. c. The judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights. From the discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, then, the author says that it is always a mistake for the Court to try to construct substantive individual rights under the due process or the equal protection clause. Such rights cannot be constructed without comparing the worth of individual gratifications, and that comparison cannot be principled. TWO PROPER METHODS OF DERIVING RIGHTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION 1. Take from the document rather specific values that text or history show the framers actually to have intended and which are capable of being translated into principled rules. We may call these specified rights. 2. Derive rights from governmental processes established by the Constitution. These are secondary or derived individual rights. a. Essential to the interpretation of the first amendment, to voting rights, to criminal procedure and to much else. b. Not possessed by the individual because the Constitution has made a value choice about individuals. Neither are they possessed because the Supreme Court thinks them fundamental to all humans. c. Rather, these rights are located in the individual for the sake of a governmental process that the Constitution outlines and that the Court should preserve. They are given to the individual because his enjoyment of them will lead him to defend them in court and thereby preserve the governmental process from legislative or executive deformation. *The distinction between the two is derived from the economic market place. A right is a form of property, and our thinking about the category of constitutional property might usefully follow the progress of thought about economic property. SOME FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEMS: THE SEARCH FOR THEORY Points: 1. The law has settled upon no tenable, internally consistent theory of the scope of the constitutional guarantee of free speech. 2. Some people ask why the need for theory in the area of free speech when we tolerate inconsistencies in other areas of the law so calmly. 3. Author believes that the constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic. When decision making is principled it has nothing to say about the speech we like or the speech we hate; it has a great deal to say about how far democratic discretion can govern without endangering the basis of democratic government. Theres also a problem in peoples interpretation of the guaranty of free speech as absolute. Authors take: absolute. "Freedom of speech" may very well be a term referring to a defined or assumed scope of liberty, and it may be this area of liberty that is not to be "abridged." Government cannot function if anyone can say anything anywhere at any time. And so we quickly come to the conclusion that lines must be drawn, differentiations made. The First Amendment seems to be hastily drafted that we are forced to construct our own theory of the constitutional protection of speech. 4 BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM SPEECH: a. The development of the faculties of the individual; b. The happiness to be derived from engaging in the activity; c. The provision of a safety value for society; and, d. The discovery and spread of political truth. The difference exists only with respect to one kind of speech: explicitly and predominantly political speech. This seems to me the only form of speech that a principled judge can prefer to other claimed freedoms. All 2 problems arising from the resolution of applying it only political speeches: a. The difficulty of drawing a line between political and non-political speech. b. Such a line will leave unprotected much speech that is essential to the life of a civilized community. Explicitly political speech is speech about how we are governed, and the category therefore includes a wide range of evaluation, criticism, electioneering and propaganda. The core of the First Amendment is political. POLITICAL TRUTH a. An absolute set of truths that exist independently of Constitution or statute. b. A set of values that are protected by constitutional provision from the reach of legislative majorities. c. Within that area of life which the majority is permitted to govern in accordance with the Madisonian model of representative government, whatever result the majority reaches and maintains at the moment. Values protected by the Constitution are one type of political truth. They are primarily truths about the way government must operate, that is, procedural truths. The use of the IMMEDIATE DANGER or CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER requirement to determine whether or not the guaranty of free speech applies. Finally, the author went back to the use of the NEUTRALITY in defining, deriving, and applying principles.
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54 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 right of those who choose to participate in the solemn Not to be used as condition for exercise or proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, enjoyment of another constitutional right.
Ebranilag v. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu G.R. Nos. L-95770, 95887, March 1, 1993. Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition: March 1, 1993 SYLLABUS TOPICS: 1. Not to be used as condition for exercise or enjoyment of another constitutional right. 2. Exercise of freedom and conscience. 3. Restraint on Exercise of another right. 4. Freedom of religion RATIO DECIDENDI: The flag, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty is protected by the Constitution, however, this protection is subject to exemptions, such as when such decree violates another constitutional right (in this case, the right to freedom of religion and the right to free education) and when violation of such does not produce imminent danger to the public. FACTS: The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control. ISSUE: Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8 HELD: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified (Teehankee). The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the
there is no warrant for their expulsion. Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV)
Type of Expression
Thought, Speech, Act and Advocacy Distinction
People vs Ferrer G.R. No. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972 CASTRO, J. EN BANC Two cases were being tried under the ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT (Act 1700) Feliciano Co was charged guilty of Anti-Subversion Act being found an officer of the Communist Party of the Phils. and being an instructor of Mao Tse Tung University. Co moved to quash on the ground that the Act is a bill of attainder. In another case, Tayag and 5 others were accused as members and leaders of Kabataang Makabayan; Benjamin Bie and Commander Melody as officers and leaders of CPP and NPA. Tayag moved to quash, impugning validity of statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder (2) it is vague (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in title (4) it denied him of equal protection of laws. Judge Ferrer (trial court) declared the statute void because it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard. Trial Court said Congress usurped judicial power by pronouncing guilt of CCP without trial, creating a presumption of organizational guilt (one is guilty by virtue of joining the org). Govt appealed. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder? Bill of Attainder a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban on it serves to implement principles of separation of powers and imposed against the evil of suppressing unpopular causes and political minorities (singling out of definite class). a. CCP is issued solely for definitional purposes focusing on conduct not on individuals. Viewed in actual operation, it does not specify CPP for the purpose of punishment but only to declare it as an organized conspiracy for purposes of prohibition against membership in the outlawed org. b. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. c. It is not enough that the statute (A) specify persons or groups for it to be a bill of attainder. It must (B) apply retroactively; must have (C) ex post facto features (they are united in the clause no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed). The (D) penalties prescribed have to be

inescapable. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable. Does it violate due process? No. There is a legislative finding of an evil sought to be prevented and the act only punishes knowing membership. Declaring CCP as an organized conspiracy is intended not as a legislative finding of guilt but to justify proscription. There must be substantive evil to justify the limitation on the freedom of expression and freedom of association. (Recital of legislative findings has determined a clear and present danger to national security. Purpose of CCP is to establish totalitarian regime and alien domination). The govt has a right to protect itself. This legislative finding passes test of distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact: 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The requirement of knowing membership (with knowledge of orgs unlawful purpose),as distinguished from nominal membership, has been held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membership in a subversive organization. Is it constitutionally overboard? No, the word overthrow clearly imported an overthrow of the Govt by violence (not by peaceful means), and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow' could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. Does it violate the guaranty of freedom of expression? The Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions in his country. Does it embrace more than one subject beyond the scope of the title? Main Title of the Act: An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes" It also has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversion in general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist conspiracies. The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. HELD: Resolution of 15 Sept 1970 is set aside and the two cases are REMANDED for trial on merits. Court establishes the ff guidelines: Subversive Orgs other than CCP: 1. purpose is to overthrow the govt and establish a totalitarian regime under foreign power 2. accused joined such org 3. he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts CCP: 1. CCP continues to pursue the same subversive objectives declared by Congress in 1957 2. accused joined CCP 3. he did so knowingly, willfully, and by overt acts
Forms Political and Public Interest

Ayer Productions vs Capulong David vs Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988. Doctrine: It is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed. Facts: Seven petitions challenge the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 1017 and General Order No. 5 Respondents version: On the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, by virtue of the powers vested by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that Bases for the declaration: elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists to bring down the duly constituted Government; such hinders the growth of the economy and sabotages the peoples confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country; also included are the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan and the raid of an army outpost in Benguet The President then issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017 President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments Protesters still marched undeterred Hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City Police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan, Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno CIDG of the PNP raided the Daily Tribune offices, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante, in Manila and confiscated news stories by reporters

Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum. Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates. Exactly one week after the declaration, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist limitation or check upon the other. In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations. a. Facial Challenge Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens. Overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. First, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct". Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored. Lastly, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid.. "Void for vagueness doctrine" holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017 First provision is consitutional the calling out power: "by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion" o Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-inChief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. o Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. o It is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence Second provision is unconstitutional the take care power: "and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Issues: Procedural 1. WON the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic 2. WON petitioners have legal standing. Substantive 1. WON the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017 2. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional a. Facial Challenge b. Constitutional Basis c. As Applied Challenge Held and Ratio: Procedural 1. Yes A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value But courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. 2. Yes, considering the transcendental importance of the issue involved, the Court relaxed the standing rules. Substantive 1. No The Presidents "calling-out" power as a discretionary power is solely vested in his wisdom, but "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. 2. No Although each department is supreme within its own sphere, none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as

President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following: EO, AO, Proc., Memo. Ord., Mem. Circ., Gen. Or Special Powers o President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081 during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. Third provision is unconsitutional the power to take over: "as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency." o A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. o Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency, (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only, (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe, and (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress o The taking over of private business affected with public interest cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the Presidents military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. o Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, Court cannot hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nations lawmakers, not for its military authorities. o Furthermore, the Presidents power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. o Hence, while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. c. As Applied Challenge PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents o calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. But there is nothing in PP 1017 nor in G.O. No. 5 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights. Davids arrest without warrant is illegal. That petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Here, the search is illegal. There was no search warrant issued, the search was done without the presence of legal occupant, and warrant was not served in a daytime. Also, the search violated the freedom of the press. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments.
Political Freedom as an Outlaw: Republican Theory and Political Protest Simon Bronitt and George Williams
Publications and Freedom of the Press

Planas vs Gil Santiago vs Fart Eastern Broadcasting Babst vs National Intelligence Board Counsel for petitioner: Atty. Joker P. Arroyo Facts: Journalists (who some of them are now famous ie. Jo Ann Maglipon, Yes! Magazine and PEP Editor-in-Chief and Sheila Coronal, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism) of PANORAMA magazine were invited by members of the National Intelligence Board for questioning through letters like: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila, (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by this

Committee. Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law. They were asked questions like why they write bad stuff about the military and told they were on the borderline of legitimate journalism and writing things that arouse the people. General Ver terminated NIBs questioning while Brig. Gen. Tadiar filed libel suits with a P10M claim against the writers specifically over the article Forty Years After the Fall Bataan is Under Siege Again (which reported military operations in Bataan amounting to raids, tortures, arrests, and killings). Remedy prayed for: Prohibition with preliminary injunction 1) stop NIB from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and interrogating them 2) declare the interrogations unconstitutional and unlawful 3) stop NIB from filing libel suits Legal provisions: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, Art. IV Sec. 9, 1973 Consti Issue: 1) 2) Whether or not petition is still justiciable? Whether or not remedy of prohibition will issue in respect to the libel charges? officers or tribunals and if the questions involved are likely to arise frequently in the future unless they are settled by a court of last resort. (Teehankee, J.)
2) The court should set aside procedural niceties

and consider the RTC and the People as formally impleaded. Brig. Gen. Tadiar filing libel in his personal capacity is not borne out of record. The information filed recites that the libel was committed against "the character... of Brigadier General Artemio A. Tadiar, Jr., Commanding General of the 3rd Philippine Marine Brigades... both as a man and as an officer in the Armed Forces of the Philippines." There is no legal alchemy by which a State may create a cause of action for libel "by transmitting criticism of government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism..." Article on Bataan is protected right to fair comment and not an actionable libel. (Teehankee, J.) The proceedings are odious and had chilling effects because they were cloaked by a mantle of pseudo legality. The letter of respondent Estrada to Ms. Babst uses the word "law" twice a law which vests authority in him and which also authorizes his committee to proceed if Ms. Babst should fail to appear. I have asked and searched but I have yet to discover the law respondent Estrada had in mind. It is now well-settled that prohibition can be issued in the sound discretion of the court in order to prevent oppressive enforcement of the criminal law. Upon the other hand, the reasons advanced by Justice Plana why prohibition should not be issued are based on technical and ignore equitable grounds. He forgets that prohibition is a prerogative and an equitable writ. The interrogations were violative of the freedoms of speech, press and privacy. They were the proper objects of prohibition or injunction. Similarly, any libel suit, whether civil or criminal, on matters inquired into in the interrogation can also be prohibited. (Abad Santos, J.) People vs Godoy Date: March 29, 1995 Ponente: Regalado Facts: Judge Eustaquio Gacott of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City filed a complaint to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso Jr., a columnist, and Eva Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board of Palawan Times. The complaint was based on an article written by Reynoso in his column published in July 20, 1994. According to the article, Godoy had sentenced to serve the penalty of double death and that Judge Gacott has been receiving threats to his life because of this. It is alleged that Gacott has been bringing with him an army of men in full battle gear for security. There were also averments of statements allegedly said by the Judge, something to the effect of Tagilid na raw ang mundo. (yung totoo, di ko gets yung article. Ahehe)
Held: (Planas, J., ponente) 1) No. Petition has become moot and academic. Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation. 2) No. First, a writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The libel cases are not pending before respondent NIB or any other. Second, the issue of validity of libel charge and admissibility of evidence elicited in the course of NIBs inquiry should be settled in the proper forum ie. the court where it is filed. Third, Brig. Gen. Tadiar filed the suit in his personal capacity.
Dissent:
1) Even though the inquiry has been terminated, the

Court should still rule squarely on the questioned acts of harassing and intimidating journalists if it will be useful as a guide for the conduct of public

The complaint avers that the article: 1. Tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice 2. Contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory 3. Does not only cast aspersions on the integrity of and honesty of the judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him 4. Is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review. Reynoso contended that his article does not impede justice because it was published after the case had been decided upon; that such publication will not affect the Supreme Courts eventual decision on the case because the paper circulated in Palawan only; that the comments made were in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom and expression and of the press; and that it was erroneously filed with the Supreme Court. Ponce de Leon, on the other hand, contended that the article was merely in reaction to the TV interview given by Judge Gacott in the show Magandang Gabi Bayan; that the article is no longer sub judice; that it cannot be considered contemptuous in the absence of a clear and present danger; that it is a valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that it does not constitute contempt and instead is a fair criticism at most; and that she did not gave either actual knowledge or personal connection with the authorship of such article. Issues: 1. WON the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature 2. WON there can be contempt of court in case of postlitigation statements or publications 3. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the trial court while the case is pending on appeal Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3. Yes Ratio: 1. The alleged disparaging statements had been taken out of context. There were three particular statements that Judge Gacott complained about. With regards to the death threats Such statements do not even deal with the merits of the case, they only make mention of the public accusations being made by Judge Gacott that his life is being threatened by Godoy. With regards to rumors about Godoys affairs They are rumors only and not presented as facts, Reynoso even acknowledged that he doesnt know if the statements are true or not. With regards to the possible effect of the Supreme Courts decision The statements constituted a fair analysis of possible developments in the case. With regards to the statements of Atty Paredes The article merely reported what Atty Paredes said in reaction to Judge Gacotts public statements in Magandang Gabi Bayan Snide or sarcastic remarks do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The article could not have intended on influencing the Supreme Court because it wasnt capable of doing so. It had not transcended the legal limits of editorial comment and criticism and it has not been shown that there is a substantive evil which is extremely serious and imminent as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. It is in the nature of the duty of the judge that in every case, he decides in favour of one party and therefore the disappointment on the part of the losing party is inherent. A judge ought to be patient and tolerate everything which appears to be a momentary outbreak of disappointment It has been held that criticism of courts after a case has been finally disposed of does not constitute contempt. But criticism should be distinguished from insult, and an insult hurled to the cirt. Even after a case is decided, can under no circumstance be justified. The rule is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be contempt of court when: i. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, scandalize the court ii. There is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded Moreover, the general rule that there can be no contempt in post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain situations. But the termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a contempt charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or libellous, depending on the purposes and effects thereof. One may still be cited for contempt where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavour and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court. Allowing such situation to go unpunished would have mischievous consequences. The administration of justice, no matter how righteous, may be identified with all sorts of fancied scandal and corruption. Litigants, discontented for having lost their cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect and obedience to law will ultimately be shattered, and as a consequence, the utility of the courts will completely disappear. Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged. The rule has been that no other court than the one contemned will
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punish a given contempt, for the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders, and processes. However, there are exceptions: a. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial court. b. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court. c. An appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal. It presupposes however that there must be a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court, and where contempt does not relate to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court. d. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or agencies (e.g. courts with branches or divisions) e. Where the singular jurisdiction of a given matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court (e.g. improper venue) f. A new court replacing a prior court, although an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt court is necessary to empower the successor court where the successor court is created by statute which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor. g. Contempt committed after an appeal is taken is contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court; hence, jurisdiction is given to the appellate court h. Where a judge is disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. i. When the contempt is against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other. j. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court. k. Some contemptuous acts which are also crime, usually misdemeanours, are often punishable in other courts. Notes: Balancing of Interests On one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts must be maintained, while, on the other hand, free speech, a free press, and the liberty of the citizen must be preserved. Both are equally valuable rights. Although the Constitution itself guarantees free speech and liberty of the press, it never intended that the power of the court should be trenched upon under the guise of these constitutional guaranties. The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, whether it respects governments and individuals; the right freely to publish whatever the citizen may please and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing, except in so far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, are as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, reputation or pecuniary interests of individuals. The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he pleases, but he is liable for the abuse of this liberty. Gacott vs Reynoso & Ponce de Leon (G.R. Nos 115908-09) Date: March 29, 1995 Ponente: Regalado Facts: Judge Eustaquio Gacott of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City filed a complaint to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso Jr., a columnist, and Eva Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board of Palawan Times. The complaint was based on an article written by Reynoso in his column published in July 20, 1994. According to the article, Godoy had sentenced to serve the penalty of double death and that Judge Gacott has been receiving threats to his life because of this. It is alleged that Gacott has been bringing with him an army of men in full battle gear for security. There were also averments of statements allegedly said by the Judge, something to the effect of Tagilid na raw ang mundo. (yung totoo, di ko gets yung article. Ahehe) The complaint avers that the article: 1. Tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice 2. Contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory 3. Does not only cast aspersions on the integrity of and honesty of the judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him 4. Is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review. Reynoso contended that his article does not impede justice because it was published after the case had been decided upon; that such publication will not affect the Supreme Courts eventual decision on the case because the paper circulated in Palawan only; that the comments made were in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom and expression and of the press; and that it was erroneously filed with the Supreme Court. Ponce de Leon, on the other hand, contended that the article was merely in reaction to the TV interview given by Judge Gacott in the show Magandang Gabi Bayan; that the

article is no longer sub judice; that it cannot be considered contemptuous in the absence of a clear and present danger; that it is a valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that it does not constitute contempt and instead is a fair criticism at most; and that she did not gave either actual knowledge or personal connection with the authorship of such article. Issues: 1. WON the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature 2. WON there can be contempt of court in case of postlitigation statements or publications 3. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the trial court while the case is pending on appeal Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3. Yes Ratio: 1. The alleged disparaging statements had been taken out of context. There were three particular statements that Judge Gacott complained about. With regards to the death threats Such statements do not even deal with the merits of the case, they only make mention of the public accusations being made by Judge Gacott that his life is being threatened by Godoy. With regards to rumors about Godoys affairs They are rumors only and not presented as facts, Reynoso even acknowledged that he doesnt know if the statements are true or not. With regards to the possible effect of the Supreme Courts decision The statements constituted a fair analysis of possible developments in the case. With regards to the statements of Atty Paredes The article merely reported what Atty Paredes said in reaction to Judge Gacotts public statements in Magandang Gabi Bayan Snide or sarcastic remarks do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The article could not have intended on influencing the Supreme Court because it wasnt capable of doing so. It had not transcended the legal limits of editorial comment and criticism and it has not been shown that there is a substantive evil which is extremely serious and imminent as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. It is in the nature of the duty of the judge that in every case, he decides in favour of one party and therefore the disappointment on the part of the losing party is inherent. A judge ought to be patient and tolerate everything which appears to be a momentary outbreak of disappointment It has been held that criticism of courts after a case has been finally disposed of does not constitute contempt. But criticism should be distinguished from insult, and an insult hurled to the cirt. Even after a case is decided, can under no circumstance be justified. The rule is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be contempt of court when: i. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, scandalize the court ii. There is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded Moreover, the general rule that there can be no contempt in post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain situations. But the termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a contempt charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or libellous, depending on the purposes and effects thereof. One may still be cited for contempt where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavour and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court. Allowing such situation to go unpunished would have mischievous consequences. The administration of justice, no matter how righteous, may be identified with all sorts of fancied scandal and corruption. Litigants, discontented for having lost their cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect and obedience to law will ultimately be shattered, and as a consequence, the utility of the courts will completely disappear. Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged. The rule has been that no other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt, for the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders, and processes. However, there are exceptions: a. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial court. b. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court. c. An appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal. It presupposes however that there must be a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court, and where contempt does not relate to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court. d. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge
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e. constituting one of its parts or agencies (e.g. courts with branches or divisions) Where the singular jurisdiction of a given matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court (e.g. improper venue) A new court replacing a prior court, although an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt court is necessary to empower the successor court where the successor court is created by statute which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor. Contempt committed after an appeal is taken is contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court; hence, jurisdiction is given to the appellate court Where a judge is disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. When the contempt is against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court. Some contemptuous acts which are also crime, usually misdemeanours, are often punishable in other courts. De Leon vs National Labor Union Philipine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs Philippine Blooming Mills Biflex Phils Inc Labor Union vs Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation G.R. No. 155679 December 19, 2006 Petitioner: Biflex Phils. Inc. Labor Union Et Al. and Fiflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union Et Al. Respondents: Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation and Biflex (Phils.), Inc. Ponente: Carpio Morales, J. Nature: Review on Certiorari of CA Decision setting aside the NLRC Resolution and Reinstating Labor Arbiters Decision. FACTS: On October 24, 1990, the labor sector(in general) staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil. Then the petitioner unions Fiflex and Biflex Unions staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days prompting respondent corporations to file a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirement. Petitioners on the other hand claimed that they were locked out by respondents and that they were prevented from reporting to work (but this was not believed by the court because if the petitioners were indeed locked out, they should have filed a protest with the management). Labor Arbiter Rendered a Decision and held that the strike was illegal and declared the officers of the Unions to have lost their employment status. NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the employees. The Court of Appeals again reversed NLRCs decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision. ISSUE: Was the Union officers dismissal valid? HELD: YES RATIO: Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute. For the protection of other significant state interests such as the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth enshrined in the 1987 constitution must also be considered. There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention or that they were allowed to join the welga ng bayan, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection. Article 264(e) of Labor Code provides: no person engaged in picketing shall obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. Assuming that in staging the strike, the petitioners had complied with the legal formalities, the strike would still be illegal for blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. Article 264(a) of Labor Code provides that, Any union officer who knowingly participated in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement has been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
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Notes: Balancing of Interests On one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts must be maintained, while, on the other hand, free speech, a free press, and the liberty of the citizen must be preserved. Both are equally valuable rights. Although the Constitution itself guarantees free speech and liberty of the press, it never intended that the power of the court should be trenched upon under the guise of these constitutional guaranties. The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, whether it respects governments and individuals; the right freely to publish whatever the citizen may please and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing, except in so far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, are as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, reputation or pecuniary interests of individuals. The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he pleases, but he is liable for the abuse of this liberty. In re: Emil Jurado
Labor Picketing and other actions

employment. Reinstatement of a striker or retention of his employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative which the court may not supplant. DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED GSIS and Garcia vs Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS G.R. No. 170132 (December 6, 2006) GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & General Manager, petitioners, vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents. GARCIA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari by Garcia to challenge the ruling of CA. Oct/4-7/2004 Demonstration of GSIS employees - 4 day walkout and rally was concerted by GSIS employees including the herein respondent union and contingents from contingents from other government agencies. The mass action's target appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior approved leave by the GSIS management Oct/10/2004 - Investigation by GSIS management - the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. KMG's counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Nov/2/2004 - KMG filed for Prohibition at CA - KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco, filed a suit with the filing of the Petition for Prohibition at bench. On the ground that its members should not be made to explain why they supported their union's cause and faulted Garcia with blatant disregard of Sec. 10, Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, a.k.a Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action, requiring government agencies to "harness all means to hear employees' grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance machinery or other modes of settlement allowed by law and civil service rules." KMG filed two supplements to that petition: 1. That its Speaker, Atty. Molina, had been placed under preventive suspension for 90 days and that the formal charges thus filed will not only deprive its members of the privileges and benefits due them but will also disqualify them from promotion and other employee privelege. 2. That Garcia served a spate of additional formal charges against 230 of KMG's members for their participation in the demonstrations. GSIS management: 1. Albert Velasco had already been dropped by GSIS and thus ceased to be President or a member of KMG. 2. Invoked the rules on forum shopping because two pending petitions for certiorari and prohibition were already filed by Velasco, and thus prayed for dismissal. The management continued with the investigation of the administrative cases and 207 of the 278 cases filed was resolved, resulting in the exoneration of 20 respondentemployees, the reprimand of 182 and the suspension of 5 for 1 month + CA held that Garcia's "filing of administrative charges against 361 of [KMG's] members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition." Dispositively, CA GRANTED KMG's petition and held Winston F. Garcia PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts and events. Motion for Reconsideration was filed and denied. There is no question of facts about the participation of the employees in the demonstration. Thus the question is whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. If yes, then the filing of the administrative charges would be prima facie tenable, had the right to file such in the interest of the civil service. If no, then CA would be correct. Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the employee's acts. On the other hand, CA and union contend that it was nothing more than an airing of grievances in the exercise of their "broader rights of free expression." They also assert that although the filing of administrative charges against KMG's members is well within Garcia's powers under Sec. 45, RA 8291, it was tainted with arbitrariness and vindictiveness because the mass demonstrations were directed against Garcia. They also argued that the gravity of the offenses and the sheer number of persons charged is antithetical to the best interest of the service. They also argued that alongside the consequences of the right of government employees to form, join or assist employees organization, is the broader rights of free expression which is an anathema to Garcia's filing. CA impliedly equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available to workers in the private sector. Citing what Justice Isagani Cruz said in Manila Public School Teachers Association [MPSTA] v. Laguio, Jr., CA concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees' organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action. ISSUE: WON GSIS and Garcia committed grave abuse of authority. HELD: No, it was within his authority to file and the GSIS employees does not have a right to demonstrate. RATIO: + Civil service governs all agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, like the GSIS. Thus, they are also subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), inclusive of matters involving selforganization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions. Among these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector. ON GSIS EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN MASS ACTIONS: - SC held that CA's position is contrary to what Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02131617 provides. - Invocation of Justice Cruz's opinion in MPSTA is clearly offtangent - the Justice's opinion is a dissent. - It is true that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances

stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Government personnel's situation is different however. + 1973 Constitution - Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment - it would be unfair to allow employees of government corporations to resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike to wring benefits from Government. + 1987 Constitution - expressly guaranteed, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in "peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." - Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals.21 In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., - employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. - Jacinto v. CA - the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But for the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national security. As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in accordance with law." E.O 180 - provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service" by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed. - Gesite v. Court of Appeals - the Court defined the limits of the right of government employees to organize in the following wise: It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. - 1986 Constitutional Commission member Eulogio Lerum When we proposed this amendment providing for selforganization of government employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to organize, they have also the right to strike. Prohibited concerted activity - any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees' organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. During the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or 48% of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,28 leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. 2nd day - 707 participated. 3rd day - 538 participated. 4th day 306 employees participated. To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those 4 days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. ASSEMBLY OR STRIKE?: - According to the demonstration is only a "parliament of the streets," or only an "assembly of citizens" to only air grievances, not a striking crowd. According to the respondent, a strike presupposes a mass action undertaken to press for some economic demands or secure additional material employment benefits. SC said however that it does not matter whatever name CA desires to call the demonstation because the fact remains that the erring employees could have employed non-crippling activities during their free time instead. Thus, GSIS employees acts can only be defined as a "prohibited concerted activity." The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and gathering in question did not involve some specific material demand. But then such, even if true, did not make such mass action less of a prohibited concerted activity. It is allowed only if in accordance with that law and "[i]n the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose." ON GARCIA'S GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: In Garcia rests authority and responsibility, under Sec. 45 of RA 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. It does not matter whatever mood he is in when he filed the charges because his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction. Arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner Garcia cannot also be simplistically inferred from the sheer number of those charged as well as the gravity or the dire consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as the appellate court made it to appear. The principle of accountability demands that every erring government employee be made answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed. And lest it be overlooked, the mere filing of formal administrative case, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged, does not overcome the presumptive innocence of the persons complained of nor does it shift the burden of evidence to prove guilt of an administrative offense from the complainant. - MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a case involving over 800 public school teachers who took part in mass actions for which the then Secretary of Education filed administrative complaints on assorted charges, such as gross misconduct. Of those charged, 650 were dismissed and 195 suspended for at least 6 months. The Court, however, did not consider the element of number of respondents thereat and/or the dire consequences of the charges as fatally vitiating or beclouding the bona fides of the Secretary of Education's challenged action. CA also faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing grievance machinery and other modes of settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG Collective Negotiations Agreement (CNA) before filing the charges. Art. VI of CNA states however that: "the parties (GSIS and KMG) mutually agree that the KMG shall not declare a strike nor stage any

concerted action which will disrupt public service and the GSIS management shall not lockout employees who are members of the KMG during the term of this agreement. GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air their sentiments through peaceful concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to reasonable office rules. None of the employees bothered to avail of the grievance procedures under the GSIS-KMG CNA should not be taken against the GSIS. The Union should thus be blamed and at best, both GSIS management and the Union should be considered as in pari delicto. VELASCO'S LEGAL STANDING - The legal standing of Alberto Velasco was no longer discussed because a KMG resolution stated the he had ceased to be member, let alone president, of the KMG, having previously been dropped from the rolls of GSIS employees. While the dropping from the rolls is alleged to have been the subject of a CA-issued temporary restraining order (TRO), the injunction came after Atty. Velasco had in fact been separated from the service and it appears that the TRO had already expired. DISPO: 1. Judge Issagani Cruz's opinion in MPSTA is a dissent and the majority opinion should be the controlling jurisprudence. 2. The right to strike given to unions in private corporations/entities is not applicable to civil service employees. 3. CA's decision, in effect, would allow prohibited mass actions by civil servants that is unlawful and an aberration that would be intolerable. CA is thus REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the writ of prohibition issued by that court is NULLIFIED. Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner says it is not valid as it contains unconstitutional provisions and it goes beyond the law it is supposed to implement. The said RIRR contains, among others, an absolute prohibition on advertisements of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related products. Note: This is a long case under the COMMERCIAL SPEECH heading. However, the main opinion does not say anything at all about commercial speech. What is more at point is the separate and concurring opinion. So, maybe you could skip the whole main opinion and just read the separate and concurring opinion digest. FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Consti o One of the preambular clauses of this law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981 o WHA adapted several resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, Phil ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child Art 24 of which states that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. In 2006, DOH issued the assailed RIRR Petitioner contends that DOH violated the Consti and exceeded its authority when it issued said RIRR ISSUES: 1. Standing HELD: YES Jurisprudence states that an association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action (Exec. Sec. v. CA); that it has the legal personality to represent its members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests Also, the petitioners Amended Articles of Incorporation states that the association is formed to represent directly or through approved representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions and the general public 2. WON the RIRR provisions are constitutional A. WON the international instruments (ICMBS, WHA, etc.) invoked by respondents are part of the law of the land o Petitioner says RIRR went beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law
Exercise of Freedom of Conscience

Ebranilag v. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
Campaign paraphernalia
Adiong vs COMELEC G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992
Art
Gonzales vs Katigbak Whats Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography and the Problem for Artistic Expresion Amy Adler Adiong vs COMELEC
Commercial Speech
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs Duque AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CERTIORARI This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify Admin Order (AO) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The Milk Code, Relevant International Agreements,

o The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that [n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least twothirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution embodies the incorporation method The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as theopinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it Bernas defines customary international law to mean a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]. This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do. The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states. The required duration can be either short or long. Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the generality of the practice. Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law. Have WHA Resolutions attained the status of customary law and should be deemed as part of the law of the land? Under the 1946 WHO Consti, WHA determines the policies of WHO Several provisions (Art 19-22) states that regulations adopted by WHA bind member states But Art 23 states that recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members. They are not binding but they carry moral and political weight The ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere recommendation Unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting

advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law o the provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature B. WON the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law o Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national health policy and implement a national health plan within the framework of the government's general policies and plans, and issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation of established health policies. o AO No. 2005-0014 declared the ff policy guidelines: ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; micronutrient supplementation; universal salt iodization; the exercise of other feeding options; and feeding in exceptionally difficult circumstances o The primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national health policy; however, nowhere in A.O. No. 20050014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited o In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature C. WON the provisions of the RIRR are in accordance w/ those of the Milk Code Petitioner alleges the ff: o The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to young children or those from ages two years old and beyond SC says the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on the kind of product being marketed to the public As long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR provides exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months and declares that there is no substitute nor replacement for breastmilk SC says the RIRR should be read in its entirety and that Section 7 of the RIRR provides that when medically indicated and only when necessary, the use of breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete and updated information. Section 8 of the RIRR also states that information and educational materials should include information on the proper use of infant formula when the use thereof is needed.Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain cases, the use of breastmilk substitutes may be proper. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable requirements for advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-24 months old or beyond, and forbids the use of health and nutritional claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which provides for a total effect in the promotion of products within the scope of the Code, is vague The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code The two issues above were resolved by SC together SC says health is a legit subj matter for regulation by the DOH in exercise of the police powers delegated to it Sec 938 of the1917 Revised Admin Code charged DOH with the duty to protect the health of the people, and vested it with such powers as (g) the dissemination of hygienic information among the people and especially the inculcation of knowledge as to the proper care of infants and the methods of preventing and combating dangerous communicable diseases The 1987 Admin Code tasked DOH to carry out the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. To that end, it was granted under

Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to (6) propagate health information and educate the population on important health, medical and environmental matters which have health implications The Milk Code specifically delegated to the DOH the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control such information. Also, the Milk Code authorized DOH to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-avis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. However, the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes. Sections 13 on total effect and 26 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling requirements, specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and used appropriately. Section 16 of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Milk Code, such as claims of increased emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the Milk Code, to wit: SECTION 8. Health workers xxxx (b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products within the scope of this Code shall berestricted to scientific and factual matters, and such informationshall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent orsuperior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section 5. and Section 10(d) which bars the use on containers and labels of the terms humanized, maternalized, or similar terms. These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply or create a belief that there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which is humanized or maternalized, as such information would be inconsistent with the superiority of breastfeeding However, Secs 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR violates the Milk Code since the Milk Code only provides for the regulation of advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials for breastmilk substitutes through the IACwhile the RIRR absolutely bans the same
The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula to health professionals; the RIRR totally prohibits such activity The Court finds that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Milk Code and the RIRR. Section 7(b) of the Milk Code, in relation to Section 8(b) of the same Code, allows dissemination of information to health professionals but such information is restricted to scientific and factual matters. Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the giving of information to health professionals on scientific and factual matters. What it prohibits is the involvement of the manufacturer and distributor of the products covered by the Code in activities for the promotion, education and production of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials regarding

breastfeeding that are intended for women and children. Said provision cannot be construed to encompass even the dissemination of information to health professionals, as restricted by the Milk Code. o The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and continuing education of health professionals; RIRR absolutely forbids the same SC says the prohibition in the RIRR pertains to breastfeeding promotion and education for women and children and not to health professionals o The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits it SC says the Milk Code gives DOH the discretion to request or accept donations and is not mandated to accept donations The assailed provision in the RIRR is, therefore, an exercise of this discretion o The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk Code. SC says DOH has no authority to fix or impose administrative fines; so, Sec 46 is null and void But the DOH is not left w/o recourse since Sec 13 of the Milk Code provides for penalties for violators of the Milk Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant to it o The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary SC says this is a frivolous argument RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders, issuances and rules and regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within the DOH's rulemaking power. WON the RIRR is unnecessary and oppressive and is offensive to the due process clause in so far as it is in restraint of trade o SC says the framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests. o Despite the fact that our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. o Free enterprise does not call for removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. o Petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes o Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade. o Petitioner also failed to convince the court that the provision in RIRR w/c defined the term milk company is unreasonable and oppressive The term milk company only merged together the entities defined separately in the Milk Code as distributor and manufacturer So, the RIRR was held constitutional except for Secs 4(f), 11, and 46 for being ultra vires. Punos Separate and Concurring Opinion: Another reason why the absolute ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes found under Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 20060012 (RIRR) should be struck down: Advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the ambit of the term commercial speech-that is, speech that proposes an economic transaction o This is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission is the watershed case that established the primary test for evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations o 4-part analysis for evaluating the validity of regulations of commercial speech: 1. The commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading if it is to be protected under the 1st Amendment It is not contended that the advertisement at issue is an unlawful activity or is inaccurate In fact, both the Milk Code and International Code recognize and concede that there are instances when breastmilk substitutes may be necessary 2. The asserted governmental interest for regulating commercial speech must be substantial The governmental interest in providing safe and adequate nutrition to infants and young children is substantial; this interest is expressed as a national policy in the Consti and is also embodied in various intl agreements If the two requirements are met, 3. Whether the state regulation directly
3.

advances and governmental interest asserted There is an undeniable causal relationship bet the interest of govt and the advertising ban Breastfeeding is the tested and proven method of providing opitmal nutrition to infants and young children. The rationale of the absolute ban is to prevent mothers from succumbing to suggestive and misleading marketing and propaganda which may be contained in advertisements of breastmilk substitutes. And whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. The absolute ban on advertising prescribed under Sections 4(f) and 11 of the RIRR is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young children. It ought to be self-evident, for instance, that the advertisement of such products which are strictly informative cuts too deep on free speech. The laudable concern of the respondent for the promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot justify the absolute, overarching ban. petitioned to the SC under certiorari. She invoked her right to freedom of expression, while ETSI posited that Punzal acted in bad faith in sending the second email, which was tantamount to a grave violation of the companys Code of Discipline. ISSUE: Whether or not Punzal was legally dismissed HELD: Punzal was legally dismissed. SC affirms CA decision with modification, granting her nominal damages. RATIO: An employee must show deference to his superiors. If aggrieved, the employee should approach the superior directly or ask for mediation (Philippines Today, Inc. v. NLRC). The second e-mail was not just an opinion by a direct attack on Geisert. It even encouraged other employees to ignore his authority. As SVP, Geisert had the authority to cancel the Halloween party. Samson v. NLRC, which Punzal invoked is misplaced. In that case, the challenged actions of the employee in speaking out against a superior were excusable because they were under different circumstances. In Samson the speech in question was done at a Christmas party (where they had been drinking liquor) and not directed against the superior directly. In the case at bar, Punzal knew her superior would find out about the e-mail, given her supervisors earlier warning. Punzal was correctly dismissed, but denied due process. ETSI failed to inform her of her right to be represented by counsel during her conference with Remudaro and Geisert. This goes against the Labor Code so she is entitled to nominal damages for such violation. Republic Act No. 9211 AN ACT REGULATING THE PACKAGING, USE, SALE DISTRIBUTION AND ADVERTISEMENTS OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech Balancing: A Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Products Howard K. Jeruchimowitz
4.
Punzal vs Etsi Technologies DOCTRINE: Freedom of expression in the work place is subject to deference and respect due to superiors FACTS: Lorna Dising Punzal was a Department Secretary who had been working at ETSI Technologies for 12 years. On October 30, 2001, she sent an e-mail to her officemates announcing the holding of a Halloween party at the office the following day and inviting their children to come and dress in costume. Her supervisor, Carmelo Remudaro, received the e-mail and told Punzal that the event did not meet the approval of SVP Werner Geisert. Punzal then sent a second e-mail saying Geisert was unfair and parang iniisahan and invited her co-workers to skip work the following day and go to Megamall which was doing a trick or treat event. Punzal was later informed by HR that Geisert got wind of her e-mail and required her to explain her side. Her employment was later terminated because she was found in violation of ETSIs Code of Discipline (acts of discourtesy and disrespect). Punzal filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. The LA found in favor of ETSI: that Punzal was legally dismissed. She then appealed to the NLRC where they ruled that her dismissal was not proportional to her actions. They ordered reinstatement (which was no longer to possible because of ill relations between Punzal and her former employer) or separation pay. No back wages were given to Punzal, so she then appealed to the CA. ETSI also appealed to the CA to set aside the NLRC decision. The CA reinstated the LA decision, which upheld Punzals dismissal. She then
Symbolic Speech
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis John Hart Ely Overview: Professor Ely describes a doctrinal framework for first amendment analysis originally developed by the Supreme Court of the late Warren era. This framework, he argues, not only provides a stable basis for judicial resolution of free expression questions generally, but also suggests both the immediate difficulty and the ultimate resolution of the flag desecration problem. The crux of the Courts opinion in United States v O'

Brien, a decision upholding a conviction for draft card burning, refers to governmental regulation. A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and, (3) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. According to Ely, however, the test in O Brien is limited in the sense that it is incomplete. On Criterion No. 1 Important or substantial governmental interest o Addition of the word substantial seems to be no protection at all since legislatures do not enact wholly useless provisions. On Criterion No. 2 shifts from ontology to teleology; an inquiry into whether the governmental interest or interests that support the regulation are related to the suppression of expression o Obviously this approach is not self-defining: it can, for one thing, be interpreted in a way that will guarantee that its demand can always be satisfied. o The critical question would therefore seem to be whether the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating, and more particularly out of the way people can be expected to react to his message, or rather would arise even if the defendant's conduct had no communicative significance whatever. On Criterion No. 3 - Incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest o Less Restrictive Analysis - Weakly construed, it could require only that there be no less restrictive alternative capable of serving the state's interest as efficiently as it is served by the regulation under attack. In effect, therefore, this weak formulation would reach only laws that engage in the gratuitous inhibition of expression, requiring only that a prohibition not outrun the interest it is designed to serve. o Tendency to involve traditional notions of freedom Two Reviews: (1) No gratuitous prohibition (upheld the draft card burning law) and (2) balancing approach. Emersons Expression-Action Distinction - To some extent expression and action are always mingled: most conduct includes elements of both. Even the clearest manifestations of expression involve some action, as in the case of holding a meeting, publishing a newspaper, or merely talking. At the other extreme, a political assassination includes a substantial measure of expression. He nonetheless maintains that the "predominant element" in a course of conduct can be identified, and first amendment protection thereby determined. o Attempts to determine which element "predominates" will therefore inevitably degenerate into question-begging judgments about whether the activity should be protected (ex. burning a draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, Ioo% action and Ioo% expression) First Amendment Analysis: The debate on the first amendment has traditionally proceeded on the assumption that categorization and balancing (used as a generic term, to encompass all approaches including "clear and present danger") that consider the likely effect of the communication are mutually exclusive approaches to the various problems that arise under the first amendment. The categorizers, or "absolutists," were surely right that theirs was the approach more likely to protect expression in crisis times. But what the decisions of the late Warren era began to recognize is that categorization and balancing need not be regarded as competing general theories of the first amendment, but are more helpfully employed in tandem, each with its own legitimate and indispensable role in protecting expression. State laws typically extend American flags two separate sorts of protection: (1) Desecration Provision ("No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag.) and (2) Improper Use Provision (outlaws affixing to the flag any "word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement of any nature," or publicly displaying any flag so embellished). o The state does not care what message the defendant is conveying by altering the flag: all that matters is that he is interrupting the message conveyed by the flag. o What has not yet been sufficiently noted is that although improper use statutes do not single out certain messages for proscription, they do single out one set of messages, namely the set of messages conveyed by the American flag, for protection
Judicial actions
Concerned Trial Lawyers vs Veneracion A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920 (April 26, 2006) Ponente: Corona Nature: Administrative Matter. Misconduct, Tardiness, Gross Inefficiency. Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a letter from the Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila (members are not named in the letter) alleging misconduct and tardiness of Judge Lorenzo Veneracion of Manila RTC Br. 47. The letter alleged these things against the Judge: 1) that he is reluctant to try petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages, despite their alleged merit, by dwelling on technicalities, 2) that he would force complainants to read and interpret Bible verses, and castigating them when they fail to give the proper interpretation, 3) that the judge is habitually tardy resulting in delay in disposition of cases. The OCA designated an investigator and here is what they found. Judge was really famous for having litigants read from the Bible. Also, yes, there were withdrawn petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages but all of these withdrawn cases were handled by one Atty. Rizalino Simbillo. In the Judges sala, there was also a considerable number of cases that were pending or unacted upon (ex. cases not decided within 90-day-period, cases with pending motions or

resolutions, cases not reset for trial). Judge defended himself. On the delayed cases, he said that his branch was just designated to try family, tax, and heinous crime cases but was changed to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Hence, there was a lot of work and many cases were misfiled due to lack of personnel and space. Plus, he suffered a mild stroke, his handwriting was affected and therefore could not take notes while hearing cases, and so he had to wait for TSN before he could decide. In many of the alleged unresolved cases, Judge said he had already dictated his decisions but the stenographer hasnt transcribed them yet. On the Bible-reading issue, Judge did not deny it. He presented thank you letters from litigants who got enlightened. Judge prayed for optional retirement if he was found guilty of violations. Issues: 1) Was Judge guilty of Gross Inefficiency? Tardiness? Delay? 2) Was Judge guilty of misconduct? (consti issue) Was Judge excessive in his display of freedom of religion? Held and Ratio: 1) OCA and SC: there is NO Concerned Trial Lawyers. The letter was traced to Atty. Simbillo who was embarrassed once by the Judge in the latters sala. Atty was made to read a Bible verse, he was displeased, and from then on Atty withdrew all his annulment cases whenever they get raffled to Judges sala. ON TARDINESS: NOT GUILTY No evidence presented here. ON DELAYED CASES: NOT GUILTY SC accepted the Judges explanations above. But ON GROSS INEFFICIENCY: GUILTY Judge failed to decide some cases within the 90day period (required in Consti Sec 15(1) Art. VIII). He also violated New Code of Judicial Conduct Sec 5 Canon 6 (on efficiently, reasonably, fairly doing judicial duties) and Rule 3.09 (supervision of personnel) Even though he had no new personnel upon the re-designation of his branch, it is up to the judge to devise an efficient recording and filing system for his branch. Regarding the cases, SC could have allowed/excused the failure to decide within 90 days, BUT the judge should have first requested for an extension of time. This he failed to do, and this is inexcusable. Violated Rule 140 of Revised Rules of Court: undue delay in rendering a decision order, or in transmitting the records of a case a less serious charge punishable by 1-3 mo. suspension or P10-20,000 fine. 2) EXPRESSION OF RELIGION NOT EXCESSIVE. NOT amounting to MISCONDUCT. New Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4 Sec 6 states that judges are also entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly but they must still conduct themselves in a dignified manner to preserve the image of the judiciary. The judges practice of reading Bible verses in hearings is an exercise of his religious freedom. SC said: we hesitate to castigate him lest we trample on this right. There were indeed letters showing that people appreciated the Judges efforts in helping them find their way in life Judges practice doesnt impair his judicial duties anyway
DISPOSITIVE: DISMISS charges of misconduct and tardiness LIABLE for Gross Inefficiency. Fined P11,000, to be deducted from retirement benefits as Judge is already retired.
What is outside
Pornography/Obscenity People vs Kottinger People vs Padan J. Montemayor FACTS: A live show was exhibited in a building in Tondo. The building (nothing more than a shed) was principally used for table tennis matches with floor space for the table and surrounding bleachers. The live show (an exhibition of human fighting fish) was advertised by word of mouth, with tickets being sold at Php 3 each. The show had been scheduled for 8pm, but did not start until 9:15pm. There were about 106 attendees. The Manila Police Department got wind of the event, and sent plain-clothes policemen (with a search warrant) who conducted a raid and made arrests after the show. Marina Padan, Cosme Espinosa, Ernesto Reyes and Jose Fajardo were charged with a violation of RPC Art. 201 (immoral doctrines, obscene publications & exhibitions, & indecent shows). Fajardo was the manager, Reyes the ticket collector, and Padan and Espinosa were the performers. Two civilians at the event gave testimony. Reyes was seen at the door selling and collecting tickets. Fajardo was seen at the door overseeing ticket selling and collection. He ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the center of the floor. Once all the attendees were inside, he riled up the audience by asking them to choose between 2 girls. Padan was the favored choice. She and Espinosa then approached the bed, disrobed, and began to indulge in lascivious acts, which culminated in sexual intercourse (3 different positions!). Other witnesses for the prosecution testified that they were excited beyond description. All pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, but Padan eventually withdrew her plea and pleaded guilty instead. All 4 were convicted as charged. Only Padan and Fajardo appealed. Padan doesnt question her conviction, but prays for a lesser penalty (no more prison sentence, prisin correcional). Fajardo insists that he wasnt the manager, but

merely an innocent bystander. Because of his sigasiga reputation, he had been urged by the audience to select the performers for the show. He insists that he had left before the show started, and only returned when he heard the commotion of the police raid. HELD/RATIO: The actual exhibition of sexual intercourse, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, cant possibly be considered art No redeeming features! Clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals Such an exhibition inspires lust and lewdness, and exerts a corrupting influence on society (especially the youth!) The SC wont disturb the lower courts judgment as to Padans sentence Lower court already took into consideration her plea for leniency when it reduced her fine to Php 200 from Php 600. The imposed penalty is reasonable! There is conclusive evidence of Fajardos active participation Witnesses testified! His name was stamped on the tickets (Pepe Fajardo which he admitted was his name) Fajardo is the most guilty of the 4, as he was the one who conducted the show, and presumably derived the most profit or gain Gonzales vs Katigbak Pita vs CA G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989 LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO CABRERA, respondents. William C. Arceno for petitioner. Casibang, Perello and De Dios for private respondent. Overview: This is a case which aims to determine the balance between the States police power and peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure and right to freedom of expression over the seizure of materials allegedly containing indecent, pornographic and obscene contents. Ponente: Sarmiento, J. Facts: In furtherance of the Anti-Smut Campaign of the City of Manila, Mayor Ramon Bagatsing initiated a seizure and confiscation operation along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent, and later burned these materials in public at the University Belt along C.M. Recto Avenue. Among the materials was the magazine, Pinoy Playboy, published, and co-edited by Leo Pita. Leo Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera (WPD superintendent) (a) seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation of these materials claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, (b) and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Later filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction in view of the Mayors pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. Court granted this. Upon lapse of this TRO, again filed for another, which was countered by Bagatsing, claiming that the second application for TRO will be contrary to an SC Resolution.
Mayor Bagatsing Admitted the confiscation and burning of obscene reading materials, but claimed that those were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities, and that the actions were undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The actions do not constitute a raid. Cabrera No answer. RTC: Dismissed the case for lack of merit. CA: Dismissed the appeal upon the following grounds: (1) that despite the petitioners constitutional guarantee protecting its right to express oneself in print, and the protection afforded by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure, that freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals as supported by the pertinent laws (2) The case falls within the exception to the rule against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, or search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or movable Issue: Can police officers, without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate materials on the basis of their determination that the same are obscene? Discussion: Standards in Jurisprudence Kottinger - concept of community standard in determining decency/obscenity Go Pin - no protection if picture is not used for art but for commercial purposes Padan - concept of redeeming element of art inspiration Gonzalez v. Katigbak - obscene if, to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest

Memoirs v. Massachusettes - obscenity is one "utterly without any redeeming social value Miller v. California - abandoned Massachusettes, and established basic guidelines: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 5. 6. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene."
Disposition: Petition is granted. But since the magazines subject of the search and seizure have been destroyed, the Court declined to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the case was rendered moot and academic UP vs Catungal G.R. No. 121863, May 5, 1997 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, VICE CHANCELLOR ROLANDO P. DAYCO, VICE CHANCELLOR MARTIN GREGORIO, PROF. ARTURO BALBASTRO, PROF. CECILIA FLORENCIO, and PROF. LETICIA PENAO-HO vs. HON. ELPIDIO M. CATUNGAL, JR. (deceased); HON. OSCAR C. HERRERA, JR., in his capacity as former acting Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. PEDRO M. AREOLA, in his capacity as Present Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and SALVADOR CARLOS [G.R. No. 121863] Date: 05 May 1997 Ponente: Davide, Jr. Nature: Certiorari and prohibition Facts: Petitioner University of the Philippines is a state university created by virtue of Act No. 1870. Petitioner Posadas is the Chancellor of UP Diliman. Petitioners Dayco and Gregorio are Vice Chancellors for Administration and Community Affairs, respectively, of UP Diliman. Petitioners Balbastro, Florencio, and Penao-Ho are UP Diliman faculty members and members of the UP Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (Tribunal), the administrative body created to try the administrative case filed by UP against the private respondent. Private respondent Carlos is a UP Diliman faculty member. On 5 October 1994, RTC Quezon City issued an Order granting the application filed by the Quezon City Central Police District Command for the issuance of a search warrant against Carlos based on three witnesses. They alleged that on different occasions they were brought by a certain Rea to the residence of Carlos to have themselves photographed for publication in a magazine. Instead, Carlos threatened them with a gun and ordered them to strip naked. Nude photos of them were taken, and they were forced to have sex with him. With the cooperation of the UP Diliman police, search warrant was served upon Carlos at his residence. The following were confiscated: (1) One 38 caliber revolver, Smith & Wesson W/Sn 88659 with six live ammunition (unlicensed); (2) One Ansco 1090 AFS camera; (3) Twenty-nine live bullets for 38 caliber revolver; (4) Six spent shells for 38 caliber revolver; (5) Two pictures of nude women;
Courts Say Court begins in ascertaining the power to exercise censorship in this wise: that there must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of a clear and present danger, and that it is essential for the validity of previous restraint or censorship that the authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. Here, the Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought because they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant "Police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are police power measures, but these decrees do not exempt law enforcers, in carrying from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, because these may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. Court outlines the following rules in determining seizure of materials similar to the objects of this case: 1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order; 2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; 3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion. 4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for;

(6) One artificial rubberized penis about 8 inches in length; (7) One artificial rubberrized penis about 2.5 inches in length; and (8) One rubber suction pump Carlos was arrested and detained at the Quezon City jail for illegal possession of firearm. Petitioner Dayco ordered a preliminary investigation and designated Atty. Marichu C. Lambino of the UP Diliman Legal Office to conduct the investigation. On 7 October 1994, Atty. Lambino submitted her Preliminary Investigation Report wherein she confirmed that a prima facie case existed against Carlos and recommended that Carlos be charged with grave misconduct and placed under preventive suspension for ninety days. On 7 October 1994, the Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman, through petitioner Dayco as officer-in-charge, filed a Formal Charge for grave misconduct against Carlos. During the hearings, there were a lot of problems regarding presentation of evidence due to Carlos missing counsel. Carlos, on his own behalf, filed a motion for postponement and a complaint for oppression and grave misconduct against petitioner Balbastro as Chairman of the Tribunal. In a letter-motion addressed to petitioner Posadas, Carlos sought the dissolution of the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction. He likewise requested that his preventive suspension be lifted and his Christmas bonus and cash gift be released. Petitioner Posadas denied the requests. Carlos filed a complaint for injunction before the RTC Quezon City praying for (1) the issuance of a temporary restraining order against the petitioners, (2) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for the Tribunal to cease and desist from proceeding with the administrative case during the pendency of the case, and (3) his reinstatement and payment of his withheld salary and Christmas bonus. In support thereof Carlos alleged that he was compelled to submit himself to the Tribunal when there never was a proper complainant; that the proceedings were used as a fishing expedition and were conducted in violation of the Constitution and the Rules. On 1 February 1995, the trial court issued order which granted a writ of preliminary injunction which is what is being assailed in this case. The petitioners were directed to refrain from proceeding with the administrative case against Carlos. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order against the petitioners and the following day, the Tribunal issued an order granting the request of Carlos for the resetting of the presentation of his evidence, subject to the outcome of the hearing on the preliminary injunction. After the lapse of the effectivity of the restraining order, the Tribunal issued another order setting the administrative case for the presentation of Carlos' evidence. Calos was warned that failure on his part to present his evidence would constitute a waiver and the case would be submitted for resolution. In the report submitted to petitioner Posadas, the Tribunal found private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of dismissal SC Decision: Petition granted, Writ of preliminary injunction order for pre-trial is nullified and TRO made permanent. Issue: Whether or not grant of preliminary injunction was proper RATIO DECIDENDI: Those who ask for preliminary injunction from the courts must come with clean hands after exhausting all administrative reliefs possible. Ratio: Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the following as grounds for the grant of a preliminary injunction: (a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the nonperformance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or (c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. The court must state its own findings of fact and cite the particular law to justify the grant of preliminary injunction. Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands. We are convinced that Carlos did not come to court for equitable relief with equity or with clean hands. Having in fact participated at the preliminary conference, agreed to the matters therein taken up, attended the hearings and cross-examined a witness, Carlos had waived any legal issue which he initially raised. If the Tribunal acted in the manner it did in proceeding with the hearings, Carlos and his counsel had themselves to blame for their unfair maneuvers. In no way can the Tribunal's action be characterized as illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. That Carlos was under preventive suspension and that his salary and Christmas bonus were withheld could not cause "irreparable" injury. He himself delayed the lifting of the suspension because of the postponements of the case at his request, and his unpaid salary and Christmas bonus are of fixed amounts which would be paid him depending on the outcome of the case. Indisputably then, Carlos' immediate recourse to the court was effectively barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Fernando vs CA December 6, 2006 | Ponencia: Quisumbing Doctrine: The state has a right to regulate obscenity (as an unprotected speech) in line with its mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials. Determination of what is obscene is an issue proper for judicial

determination, as it will be treated on a case to case basis. Facts: The PNP conducted a search of the Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair where copies of magazines with nude obscene pictures and VHS tapes containing pornographic shows were seized. Gaudencio Fernando, a certain Warren Tingchuy, and the storekeeper Rudy Estorninos were charged with violation of Article 201 of the RPC. The trial court gave the petitioners an opportunity to present evidence, but they opted to just submit the case for decision. Tingchuy was found innocent for lack of sufficient evidence, but Fernando and Estorninos were found guilty by the RTC with the affirmation of CA; thus, they are appealing to the SC. Issue: Did the CA err in affirming the guilt of Fernando and Estorninos? Held: No. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. In this case, the materials confiscated where offensive to morals - they depicted sexual acts which were offensive to public morals inspiring lust and lewdness, and will corrupt the minds of the youth. For the videos depicting a naked body of a woman, it may be argued that the motive may be innocent, but the performance was nonetheless revolting and shocking to good morals. Mere possession is not a violation since the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public, and the law does not require that the person be caught in the act of selling the materials. However in this case, the petitioners were involved in selling these materials, and it has been proven that they were involved in it, so there is a violation: o Fernando was indeed the owner of the Music Fair, as the business permit of the store was under his name even if it was already expired. Also, the address in his bail bond had the same address as the stores. o Estorninos was identified by Barangay Chairperson Lipana and Inspector Tababan as the store attendant, and with that there is a presumption of regularity of performance on their part especially since the petitioners waived their right to present evidence when they opted to submit the case for decision. Of Course, More than Words C. Edwin Baker
Rationale: The state, by parens patriae, has a right to regulate obscenity as an unprotected speech in line with its mandate to protect the public, from obscene, immoral and indecent materials. o Obscenity has been previously defined in People vs Kottinger as something offensive against chastity, decency or delicacy. In determining if something is indecent, it should (1) have the tendency to corrupt those whose minds are open to immoral influences, and that (2) it can shock the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency o People vs Go Pin - claiming that indecent pictures are for art's sake is just secondary to the real purpose considering that those who went to their galleries were not exactly artists. o People vs Padan - there is no art in an exhibition of a sexual act o Gonzales vs Kalaw Katigbak - involves motion pictures, looks at the dominant theme of the material and not just isolated passages. o Pita vs CA stated that from previous jurisprudence, it can be inferred that what is obscene depends on what the judges think it is o Miller vs California laid down a guideline to determind what is obscene: Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest Work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. Work lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value From all the jurisprudence provided, clearly, obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination, and treated on a case to case basis.
Hate Speech
R.A.V. vs City of St. Paul Minnesota US. Supreme Court No. 90-7675. June 22, 1992 Justice Scalia Facts: On June 21, 1990, RAV (a juvenile) and other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping together broken chair legs. They then allegedly burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the street from the house where petitioner was staying. Even if they could have been charged under different other laws, R. A. V. was charged under the St. Paul, Minnesota, Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance, which punishes "whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The trial court dismissed this charge on the ground that the ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content based, and therefore invalid because of the First Amendment. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. It rejected the overbreadth claim because the phrase "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others" had been construed in earlier state cases to limit the ordinance's reach to "fighting words" within the meaning of this Court's decision words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.", a category of expression unprotected by the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the ordinance was not impermissibly content based because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling

governmental interest in protecting the community against bias motivated threats to public safety and order. WON: The ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the First Amendment. (Freedom of Speech -- WON a municipality may constitutionally enact an ordinance that makes it a crime to place a symbol on public or private property that arouses anger in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.) Held: The ordinance is facially invalid under the First Amendment since the ordinance unconstitutionally prohibits speech on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses. (a) This Court is bound by the state court's construction of the ordinance as reaching only expressions constituting "fighting words." R. A. V.'s request that the scope of the Chaplinsky formulation be modified, thereby invalidating the ordinance as substantially overbroad, need not be reached. (b) The First Amendment generally prevents government from prohibiting speech or even expressive conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content based regulations are presumptively invalid. A few limited categories of speech, such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting words, may not regulate them based on hostility, or favoritism, towards a nonproscribable message they contain. When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class. Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a content defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to be associated with particular "secondary effects" of the speech, so that the regulation is justified without reference to the content of the . . . speech." (c) The ordinance, even as narrowly construed by the State Supreme Court, is facially unconstitutional because it imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on the disfavored subjects of "race, color, creed, religion or gender" although the phrase in the ordinance, "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others," has been limited by the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction to reach only those symbols or displays that amount to "fighting words." Those who wish to use "fighting words" in connection with other ideas--to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality--are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. At the same time, it permits displays containing abusive invective if they are not addressed to those topics. Moreover, in its practical operation the ordinance goes beyond mere content, to actual viewpoint, discrimination. Displays containing "fighting words" that do not invoke the disfavored subjects would seemingly be useable ad libitum by those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc. tolerance and equality, but not by their opponents. St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules. The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content. (d) The content based discrimination reflected in the ordinance does not rest upon the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue is proscribable, it is not aimed only at the "secondary effects" of speech within the meaning of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., and it is not for any other reason the sort that does not threaten censorship of ideas. The ordinance's content discrimination is not justified on the ground that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in ensuring the basic human rights of groups historically discriminated against, since an ordinance not limited to the favored topics would have precisely the same beneficial effect. The majority held that "fighting words" were not truly without any protection and that even a prohibition against "fighting words" could not be content-based, that is, restrict only certain types of fighting words. The Court concluded by writing "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire." Reversed and remanded. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. I agree with petitioner that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Although the ordinance as construed reaches categories of speech that are constitutionally unprotected, it also criminalizes a substantial amount of expression that--however repugnant--is shielded by the First Amendment. Our fighting words cases have made clear, however, that such generalized reactions are not sufficient to strip expression of its constitutional protection. In the First Amendment context, "Criminal statutes must be scrutinized with particular care; those that make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate application." The St. Paul antibias ordinance is such a law. Although the ordinance reaches conduct that is unprotected, it also makes criminal expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment, and is protected by the First Amendment. The ordinance is therefore fatally overbroad and invalid on its face. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. The St. Paul ordinance regulates speech not on the basis of its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but rather on the basis of the harm the speech causes. Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, the St. Paul ordinance does not regulate expression based on viewpoint. The St. Paul ordinance is evenhanded. In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does not prevent either side from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas, but it does

bar both sides from hurling such words on the basis of the target's "race, color, creed, religion or gender." It does not, therefore, favor one side of any debate. It only bans a subcategory of the already narrow category of fighting words. Such a limited ordinance leaves open and protected a vast range of expression on the subjects of racial, religious, and gender equality. The St. Paul ordinance (as construed by the Court) regulates expressive activity that is wholly proscribable and does so not on the basis of viewpoint, but rather in recognition of the different harms caused by such activity. Taken together, these several considerations persuade me that the St. Paul ordinance is not an unconstitutional content based regulation of speech. Thus, were the ordinance not overbroad, I would vote to uphold it. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. I see no First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in preventing the people of Saint Paul from specifically punishing the race based fighting words that so prejudice their community. I concur in the judgment, however, because I agree with Justice White that this particular ordinance reaches beyond fighting words to speech protected by the First Amendment. Free Speech by the Light of a Burning Cross Jerome OCallaghan This article is evaluates and criticizes the decision RAV v. City of St. Paul. See digest to know more about this case. I. Introduction The case of RAV v. City of St. Paul decided that a hate speech ordinance is against the first amendment. Case illustrates that no one theory of application of the free speech guarantee but commands widespread support because of the majority of opinion and numerous concurrences Court was united in judgment but divided in understanding Concurring Critiques Important to look at concurrences because o Justice Scalias analysis became the majority opinion at 5-4 o The concurrences leave open the possibility that a hate speech law could pass First Amendment analysis Justice Whites concurrence attacks Justice Scalias opinion on three grounds 1. Procedural issue unimportant 2. Justice Scalias argument has the effect of undermining the categorical approach that has measured the reach of the free speech guarantee. Certain classes of speech are simply not covered by free speech. These include defamation, obscenity and fighting words. The decision is an ironic result that says that fighting words are protected by the First Amendment when the govt is too selective in the prohibition. 3. Justice Scalias opinion removes the essential effect of the strict scrutiny review. The irony is that Scalia agreed that St. Paul had a compelling interest in preventing the cross burning and that the ordinance issued promoted that interest. However, the ordinance was still declared unconstitutional. The majority suggests that while fighting words are proscribable, there is a danger in isolating one subset of fighting words for prohibition. Scalia finds in the ordinance government interference with the marketplace of ideas. The first amendment does not allow St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects Dilemma: if the government is forbidden from proscribing subsets of categorically unprotected speech, wont laws against threatening govt officials unconstitutional? Scalias solution: special force argument reasons why threats are outside the first amendment have special force when applied to the person of the president. Another difficulty: this special force argument can be used to justify the ordinance fighting words are bad. When they are directed to people who have been discriminated for a long time, it brings more harm. Justice Scalia does not see the special force as a double edged sword Justice Whites critique by deciding that a state cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not, the court seems to abandon the categorical approach and relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based laws. Justice Stevens concurrence Justice Scalias disdain for content based restrictions. III. Justice Scalias Majority Opinion a. The Beauharnais/Chaplinsky Dilemma Ironies of main opinion: reliance on Beauharnais v. Illinois as precedent. First is to support the contention that defamation is a traditional limitation on free speech. Second,
II.

some categories of speech are not constitutionally protected. The government may proscribe libel but it may not make further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the govt. Chaplinsky reasoning dichotomized all speech for first amendment purposes categories that are protected and not. Beauharnais and Chaplinsky survived doctrinal shifts because it is a categorical approach to standardized tests and dilemma in free speech cases is captured in this case. b. The Posadas Argument This case upheld the power of govt to restrict advertision for some forms of gambling in Puerto Rico. It gave Puerto Ricans less access to information and put advertisements for casino gambling beneath advertisements for other forms of gambling. Reference to this case is ironic since in this case, it strengthens the hand of govt while in the case at bar, it does not. To determine the appropriate place of a particular instance of expressive conduct in a hierarchy of first amendment speech examine topic and content. In the case, topic was race relations. It is difficult to interpret burning cross without using the word intimidation The argument that no comparison can be made between expressive conduct and commercial speech is flawed. IV. Fundamental Flaws Prominent theme in RAV is the accusation that the govt has chosen to display favoritism in the realm of speech. Ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination. Raises 2 questions 1) WON ordinance punishes one side of a debate, 2) WON punishing one side is at odds with first amendment doctrine There is no debate here unless you count non-verbal expression of hate as debate. If we do this, then youre categorizing debate as a form of public discussion Ordinance involves not viewpoint favoritism but content favoritism A social interest in order and morality is furthered by minimizing incidents where debates degenerate into hate fests. V. Justice Scalias Erratic Standards Three ironies o Justice Scalias faith in marketplace is ironic as his position in other First Amendment cases indicates skepticism about free trade for speech. Several values that outweigh free speech rights o Willingness to see expression of some value, expression worth protection. o Equality arguments that are frequently used by proponents of govt restriction of hate speech RAV raises the question whether punishing one side of a debate violates First Amendment principles. Justice Scalia is blind to the unique relevance of other Constitutional guarantees like 13th and 14th amendments (involuntary servitude, due process and equal protection) VI. Conclusion: Schizophrenia Essence of the problem two track first amendment doctrine. o First approach antimajoritarian nature of the free speech guarantee, minimal role of govt in any public debate and courts duty to ensure that govt meets highest standard before a restriction anti chilling effect o Second approach emphasizes the purposes of the text, limited reach of the term speech and countervailing interests in order, morality and security. o Justice Scalia attempts in RAV to intergrate these two which explains why the reasoning is convoluted. However, his effort to integrate is unconvincing. Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups Kenneth Karst
Type of Limitations
No content based limitations
Reyes vs Bagatsing Osmena vs COMELEC Chavez vs Gonzales February 15, 2008 Ponente: Puno, CJ Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court, Certiorari and Prohibition Overview: This case discusses whether or not the Hello Garci tapes can be reported by the media. While this was written by Puno, accounting for its long discussion, its imperative that the case be read in its entirety as its quite a textbook for the freedom of speech.

Facts: 1. maintain the balance od stability and change. Controversy arose after the June 2004 national elections were there is a supposed fixing perpetrated, evidenced by the conversation between PGMA and a COMELEC official procured via wiretapping. Press Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the recording, one as the complete, while the other is a doctored one. He later retracted his statement that the voice is of PGMA. June 7, 2005, Former counsel of Erap, Atty. Alan Paguia came forward and with an alleged authentic recording which also includes Commissioner Garciliano, First Gentleman, and Senator Barbers. June 8, 2005, Secretary of DOJ Raul Gonzales warned the media that broadcasting and publishing its contents could be held liable under Anti-Wiretapping Act. June 9, 2005, Secretary Gonzales issued another press statement urging the NBI to issue an investigation to media outfits that are distributing the tapes contents, starting with Inq7.net (PDI and GMA News) June 11, 2005, NTC issues a press release to the effect that continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the may lead to the cancellation of their licenses to operation. a. NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85 reiterated by 111-12-89: pertains to all media that shall have the tendency to disseminate false or misleading information that shall incite or propose treason, rebellion or sedition June 14, 2005 NTC had a dialogue with Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster sa Pilipinas and released a statement that a. The NTC did not issue a memorandum restraining press freedom b. That it asks for responsible reporting c. That the standards be upheld in news and public affairs programs, and there be sensitivity in discussing these affairs. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition based on Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against Secretary Raul Gonzales and the NTC-certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to prevent unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by said offices; praying for the nullification of orders issued from June 6, 2005 to present. Respondents aver that this is merely a fair warning, and under the scope of the NTC. Justice Holmes- it is the freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. This freedom extends to nearly all forms of communication. Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans- all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of speech and expression. Three Tests on the Restraints to Freedom of Speech and Expression: a. Dangerous tendency Doctrine: permits limitation on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech contained and the danger contemplated b. Balancing of Interests Tests: standard to weigh conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interest observable c. Clear and Present Danger Rule: premised that speech may be restrained because there is a substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent; this rule requires that the evil consequences be: i. Substantive ii. Extremely serious iii.And the degree of imminence must be extremely high Four Aspects on the Freedom of the Press: 1. Freedom from prior restraint: Refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or others forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination censorship of publication: permits to publish, license taxes, closure of printing offices. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution: a. Content Neutral Regulation: merely concerned with the incidents of speech, or merely controls the time, and place or manner; not designed to suppress any particular message but an intermediate approach somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law b. Content Based Restraint: based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech, is subjected to the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact; is viewed critically under the clear and present danger rule with the government having the burden of overcoming unconstitutionality. The government has to show the gravity and imminence of the harm based on proximity and degree. 2. Freedom from punishment subsequent to publication 3. Freedom to access information 4. Freedom of circulation Dichotomy of Free Press: Print vs. Broadcast Media Broadcast Media has limited protection under the First Amendment of the US Constitution for three reasons: The scarcity of the medium the frequencies
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Issues: 1. WON Petitioner has Legal Standing? No 2. WON there has been an abridgement to the freedom of speech? Yes Held: 1. Chavez failed to illustrate a personal interest in the outcome of the controversy. Nonetheless, the courts proceed due to transcendental importance. 2. Discussion of the Right to Free Speech Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections free speech and free press entails the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment unless there is a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent; such freedom is needed in a democracy to assure participation of the people and

by which the medium operates The pervasiveness as a medium Unique accessibility to children the US interpretation is not adopted in the Philippines wholly; our courts have made no distinction between print and broadcast media. DYRE vs. Dans: all forms of media whether print or broadcasts are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitation is the clear and present danger rule Conclusion: The danger that the government wishes to prevent is the airing of the recording that supposedly violates the Anti wiretapping Law. Not every violation of a law will justify impeding on the freedom of speech; while the violation is a factor, the effects would be more injurious. The need to prevent the violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. There is no showing that the violation endangers national security. The mere statements of the Secretary of the Press and the DOJ and the statement of the NTC, which were uttered while they were in their official capacity, can be considered as prior restraint to freedom of speech even without the follow-up memorandum that shall detail how their statements will be operationalised. These utterances gave a chilling effect on the media. 9 J. Tinga Pls. see separate opinion (Dissenting & Concurring); Grant the petition insofar as DOJ Sec. Gonzales Press Statement is concerned Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion; Grant the petition insofar as the NTCs Press Statement is concerned Comments e.g. dissenting opinion (DO), joined DO I join the dissent of Mr. Justice Nachura Please see my separate dissenting opinion Please see my dissent I join the dissent of Justice Nazario and Justice Nachura Pls. see separate opinion (Dissenting & Concurring); Deny the petition insofar as the NTCs Press Statement is concerned Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion; Deny the petition insofar as DOJ Sec. Gonzales Press Statement is concerned
10 J. Velasco, Jr.
3.
11 J. Reyes
Dissenting Justices 1 J. Corona 2 J. Chico-Nazario 3 J. Nachura 4 J. De Castro 5 J. Tinga
Summary of Voting 6 J. Velasco, Jr. Title Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzalez, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) G.R. No. 168338 Date of Promulgation February 15, 2008 Ponente C.J. Puno
Docket No.
No. of Participating Justices Unanimous Decision (Yes/No)
15 No
Concurring Justices 1 C.J. Puno 2 J. Quisumbing 3 J. Ynares-Santiago 4 J. Sandoval-Gutierrez 5 J. Carpio 6 J. Austria-Martinez 7 J. Carpio Morales 8 J. Azcuna
Comments e.g. separate opinion (SO), joined SO, reservations In the result and I join the separate concurring opinion of J. Carpio Please see my separate concurring opinion See separate concurring I also join in the separate opinion of J.Carpio I join in the separate concurring opinion of J. Carpio I concur in a separate opinion
Sandoval Gutierrez (Concurring): Where they have burned books, they will end in burning human beings Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees freedom of speech regardless of frontiers. The Canadian SC promotes it as it facilitates the flow of ideas need to sustain democracies, helps the search for truth, valuable in the process of self actualization, and check on governments. The issuance of the press release by the NTC constitutes censorship as it was released with the threat of suspension, revocation or cancellation of licenses of media outfits. o Licensing Act of 1643: licenses did not permit anything against the Church or State be disseminated. o Near vs. Minnesota: where there is a permanent enjoining for contents considered obscene, lewd, lascivious or malicious, scandalous and defamatory. o Justice William Brennan: the constitutional protection does not turn upon the truth, popularity or social utility of the ideas and the belief which are offered. The fact that the tapes were obtained in violation of wiretapping laws does not make the media privy to the crime. The balancing test should be used in this case

American Communication Association vs. Douds: when a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in a indirect, conditional and partial abridgement of the speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of there interests demand the greater protection o The right of the people to know matters pertaining to the elections is of paramount importance as its exercise is the instrument of democracy. o Justice Douglas: The dominant use of the first amendment was to suppress embarrassing information. Carpio , J.(Separate Concurring Opinion): In Carpios statement of facts he added the Francisco Chavez, as a citizen filed this suit on two grounds 1. The respondents conduct violated the freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern under Sec 7 Art 3 of the Constitution and 2. The NTC acted ultra vires when it warned the media from the Garci Tapes. He names the issue as WON NTC posed an impermissible prior restraintyes. o Sec 4 Art 3 prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing the freedom of expression o The course carved unprotected expression that may be subjected to prior restraint (four categories): Pornography Fake or misleading advertisement Advocacy of imminent lawless action Danger to national security o Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint and even then it must hurdle two things prior restraint being presumed unconstitutional, and proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint. o If the subject does not fall in the above categories, then the restraint is unconstitutional without exception(protected expression). o Prior restrain is more severe than a subsequent punishment because it prevent the dissemination of ideas altogether. NTC in issuing the prior restraint failed to prove that the Garci Tapes were under unprotected expression and hurdle the two requirementso The NTC had no factual or legal basis in claiming that there was a violation of the wiretapping laws as even the office of the president played the conversation, and since it was a mobile conversation the technicality of WON wiretapping law can be applied is not settled o The NTC did not give the media outfits the opportunity to be heard; they were denied of basic due process stated in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations Azcuna (Separate Concurring Opinion): The NTC and DOJ warnings violated Sec10, Art 16 of the Constitution which was the provision designed for new technologies applied to media. The state shall be responsible for the development of an environment fostering Filipino capability, emergence of o communication structures and respect for the freedom of speech and the press. The regulatory warnings work against the flow of communication. Tinga (Separate Opinion Dissenting and Concurring): Writ be granted against DOJ but not against NTC The NTC is a regulatory body which has some capacity to impose sanction or otherwise perform acts that could impinge on the right of its subjects of regulations while the DOJ secretary heads the department of government which can initiate and litigate prosecution of just about anybody. For as long as the expression is not libelous or slanderous , not obscene, or otherwise not dangerous to the immediate well being of the State, it should be protected by the constitution. The chilling effect has not been proven and there is no guideline set to adjudge it. Velasco (Separate Opinion Dissenting and Concurring): There was chilling effect proved when the NTC, five days after making the statement enjoined the KBP to clarify its statement that it is not a condemnation of media outfits. In comparison, there was no proof of impact towards the said media outfits when the DOJ secretary made his utterances. Chico-Nazario (Dissenting): There was no abridgement of the rights. Read in the proper context and in its entirety, the assailed statements of the NTC were nothing but a warning. Nachura (Dissenting): It was not improper for NTC to warn the media as it was part of its regulatory authority. Also the press statement was not of the nature of a prior restraint for the has been no forbidding of speech, expression or imposition of onerous requirement for the publication and dissemination of idea. There is no transgression of the people right when the matter is of public concern. Adiong vs COMELEC
Prior Restraint/Consequent Punishment

Prior restraint
Chavez vs Francisco/Gonzales MTRCB vs ABS-CBN and Loren Legarda Date: January 17, 2005 Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Facts: ABS CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the TV program The Inside Story produced and hosted by Loren Legarda. It named the Philippine Womens University (PWU) as the school where female students moonlighted as prostitutes to be able to pay for their tuition. The faade of the PWU building was also used as the background of the episode. Complaints from the Chancellor, parents and teachers associations were filed with MTRCB alleging that the episode besmirched the name of PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of it female students. ABSCBN argued that The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political

editorial, the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. The MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a decision ordering ABSCBN to pay for the non-submission of the program for review and approval of the MTRCB, and that all other programs of ABSCBN of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing. MTRCB Chairman Mendez affirmed the ruling. ABSCBN filed a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC seeking to declare Sections 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4, 7, and 11 of P.D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28(a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations unconstitutional as they constitute prior restraint on ABSCBNs exercise of freedom of expression and of the press. RTC decided in favor of ABSCBN. MTRCB filed a petition for certiorari contending that: television programs, including public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials are subject to their power of review under Sec 3(b) of PD 1986; their power to review does not amount to prior restraint and in violation of ABSCBNs freedom of expression and of the press. Law: Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties: xxx b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or nontheatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export; c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime, such as but not limited to: xxx To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television; xxx Issue: WON MTRCB has the power to review The Inside Story prior to its exhibition? Held: Yes. It is within the power given to MTRCB by the law to review all television programs including The Inside Story. Ratio: The Inside Story is a television program and is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB to review. Ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo v CA is applicable. In that case, Iglesia ni Cristo sought to be exempted from contending 1. that the term television programs did not include religious programs. The Court held that the law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine ALL television programs whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. (Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos-when the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it). Also, the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still the Court did not exempt Iglesia ni cristos program from MTRCBs power to review. Freedom of expression and of the press has not been declared of preferred status. 2. The Inside Story is not a newsreel ABSCBN contends that The Inside Story is a newsreel; therefore, included in the exceptions from MTRCBs power of review under Sec 7 of PD 1986 which are (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies and (2) newsreels. MTRCB Rules and Regulations implementing PD 1986 defines newsreels as straight news reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels. The Inside Story is a public affairs program which is a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. Note: The decision on the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of PD 1986 is not necessary for the determination of the case itself; therefore, the Court did not rule if the Rules and Regulations specified contravened the Constitution. MTRCB only penalized ABSCBN for non-submission before their broadcast of the episode but did not ban or disapprove the showing of the latters program or cancel their permit. David vs Macapagal-Arroyo ABS-CBN vs COMELEC G.R. No. 133486 28 Jan 2000 Doctrine: The power to exercise prior restraint is not presumed; rather, the presumption is against its validity. Facts: COMELEC en banc issued a resolution restraining ABS-CBN or any other group from conducting exit poll surveys. Laws invoked: o Sec 2 Art 5 1987 Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus election code relating to its constitutional and statutory duty to ensure clean, honest, and credible elections and to maintain the secrecy of ballots. Exit polls will create confusion as to who won the election, it will compromise the COMELEC and NAMFREL counts which will in turn sow violence and anarchy. It also lures voters into revealing the contents of their ballots. ABS-CBN assails the resolution arguing that the holding of exit polls and its nationwide broadcast is a

legitimate exercise of the freedom of expression and the press. Issue: May the COMELEC, in the exercise of its powers, ban exit polls? Held: No. Ratio: Gonzales v COMELEC: Free press and free speech consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint. o J. Holmes: the freedom encompasses the thoughts we hate no less than the thoughts we agree with. Limitation: Police Power Test/standard for validity of restraint: o Clear and present danger rule: requires that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance is extremely serious and the degree of imminence is high. Present refers to the time element. The evil must not only be probable but also inevitable. o Dangerous tendency rule: that the natural tendency and the probable effect of the utterance is to bring about the substantive evil that the legislature seeks to prevent. The power to exercise prior restraint is not presumed. To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. The total ban on exit poll is not justified because: o COMELECs claims are purely speculative. The poll is to be conducted randomly therefore, the result would be representative of the general opinion of the voting population. The result is not meant to replace the COMELEC and NAMFREL counts, but merely reflects public opinion. It also does not create a bandwagon or unduly influence the voters as the result is to be broadcasted a day after the election. No evidence that the conduct of exit polls will create chaos or disorder. o COMELECs duty may be fulfilled in a less invasive manner, ie, regulating the conduct of exit poll to minimize if not entirely avoid disorder or confusion. o The provision on ballot secrecy is meant as a safeguard against vote buying. Voters are prohibited to exhibit the contents of their ballot for the purpose of assuring that their votes have been cast in accordance with the order of a third person. This purpose is not achieved through the conduct of exit polls. In any case, the poll is only voluntary, the voters may even choose to conceal their identities. Kapunan dissenting: The presumption of invalidity for restrictions to freedom of speech and of the press is not applicable where as in this case Constitutional functions are being exercised. And where the presumption of invalidity does not apply, there is no occasion for the application of the clear and present danger rule. SWS vs COMELEC COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496 MENDOZA FACTS: - SWS is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. - Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features election surveys. - Petitioners filed an action for prohibition to enjoin Comelec from enforcing 5.4 Fair Election Act, which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. - Election surveys as defined in 5.1 of the law, refer to the measurement of opinions of the voters as regards a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms in relation to the election, including voters preference for candidates. Petitioners contentions: 1. The restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. 2. They claim that SWS conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the previous elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters. 3. There is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting process posed by election surveys. 4. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. 5. There is no reason for voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys. Respondents contentions: 1. the prohibition bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply 2. it is narrowly tailored to meet the evils sought to be prevented 3. the impairment of freedom is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. ISSUE: w/n Fair Election Act is unconstitutional (YEAH, constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press) RATIO: - 5.4 lays a prior restraint on said freedoms by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days and seven (7) days. Because of the preferred status of the said rights, such a measure is presumed invalid. The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.

- Even if it is argued that Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication, such power is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for public information campaigns and forums among candidates. The effect of this is that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although it may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. - But KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects the test of clear and present danger for determining the validity of 5.4. This test was originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech. Hence, while it may be useful with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may not be adequate for this case. For such a test is concerned with questions of the gravity and imminence of the danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of 5.4. - Instead, KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by such regulation. After canvassing the reasons, (bandwagon effect to favor candidates, the junking of losing candidates), the dissenting opinion concludes that its limiting impact on free speech and press is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. Indeed, it is a mere restriction on the publication of election surveys. It is limited in duration; it applies only during the period when the voters are presumably contemplating whom they should elect. - The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the challenged legislation and leaves such freedoms with little protection. For anyone who can bring a plausible justification forward can easily show a rational connection between the statute and a legitimate governmental purpose. In contrast, the balancing of interest was a strong one. - The test that should be employed is laid down in United States v. OBrien, which provides that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if : 1. it is within the constitutional power of the Government; 2. it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 3. the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 4. if the incidental restriction on alleged freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. - First. S5.4 fails to meet criterion 3 of the OBrien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, it actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by other media. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. - The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of 15 days and 7 days. - Second. 5.4 fails to meet criterion 4 of the OBrien test. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of the creation of bandwagon effect, junking of weak or losing candidates, etc. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. - As for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with this naturalenough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be identified with the winners. Some are susceptible to the herd mentality. - To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
Burden of unconstitutionality
Iglesia ni Kristo vs CA RATIO DECIDENDI: The only exception to the right of the people to free speech and peaceably assemble is the presence of clear and present danger which is of a character both grave and imminent, and a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. NATURE: Petition for review decision of Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." FACTS: On September, October, and November 1992 Iglesia Ni Cristo submitted VTR tapes of its TV program Series to the Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." INC took two courses of action against the Board: n peal t the Office of the President regarding the classification of its TV Series and a civil case. Both succeeded. The respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC regarding the civil case. Thus, this present case. ISSUES: 1) Is the respondent Board vested with the power to review Iglesia ni Cristos TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"? 2) Assuming it was vested with authority, did the respondent board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program for the reason they constitute an attack against other

religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs? HELD: 1) Yes, 2) Yes RATIO: 1) Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 vests the Board the power to screen, review and examine all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime." According to J. Isagani Cruz, the right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. INCs broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. 2) The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. a. The respondents cannot rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner for it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. b. The respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. OBITER: Justice Kapunan and Justice Mendoza suggested that ". . . the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. " The Court held that while the thesis has a lot to commend itself, the Court is not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts
Standards Clear and Present Danger

Gonzales vs COMELEC Ruiz vs Gordon G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983 EN BANC HECTOR S. RUIZ, as coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, petitioner, vs. RICHARD GORDON, as City Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent. Teddy C. Macapagal and Engelberto de Castro for petitioners. Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar for respondent. Standards; Clear and Present Danger Forum; Rallies Ponente: Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion, JJ. with Separate Opinions by,
Overview: This is a case for mandamus filed by Hector Ruiz, the coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, which consists of several interest groups against Mayor Richard Gordon, to compel the latter to issue a permit to hold a prayer-rally and a parade/march in Olongapo City on December 4, 1983, invoking their rights to free speech and free assembly. The case ruled that without precluding direct filing to the Supreme Court, future mandamus petitions of this kind could be filed at the trial courts, for early disposition, in the interest of justice and public convenience. Facts: (Note the dates as the Court poses arguments on filing and receipt of notices, litigation etc.) November 19 Letter/Request sent to Gordon November 22 Letter received by Office of the Mayor of Olongapo November 23 Mandamus Petition filed by Ruiz, et. al November 23 Request granted by Gordon, with certain conditions as to the peaceful conduct of the rally, as to liabilities in case of loss or damage to government property and to cleanliness, and as to the itinerary of the parade and the requisite coordination of the group with the police force for traffic assistance. November 29 Court issued a resolution requiring Gordon to file an Answer to the Petition, not a Motion to Dismiss, within two days from notice November 29 (afternoon of the same day) Respondent Gordon filed a Manifestation with Prayer

for Dismissal alleging that the request for prayer-rally was received by his office on November 22, and was approved on November 23. Further, respondent Mayor manifested that verbal approval of the said request has already been communicated in several instances: on a flag ceremony; over his radio program; and on the newspaper Guardian wherein the said pronouncement was published on November 22-28. Court granted plea for dismissal. December 1 Ruiz filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition, as the permit sought has already been granted December 2 Respondent answered reiterating what was set forth in his Manifestation, the delay being accounted to the distance between Olongapo and Manila. Also, the notice of resolution was served only on November 30. could have checked with the issuing office the status of his application, and if he fails to do so, notice of the decision regarding the application should be sent to the petitioner. This way, there will not be a waste of time in litigation. Litigants should be aware of the guidelines set forth in the J.B.L. Reyes decision and convenience to the parties would be better served if litigation starts on the trial court level. Court says that the clear and present danger test should be adhered with first for the earliest disposition of cases like this. The proper remedy for the losing party after the decision has been made by the said authority/issuing officer, is certiorari. Case is DISMISSED. Teehankee, J. Concurring. The J.B.L. Reyes decision stresses that the right to peacefully assemble, speak out freely and petition the government for redress of grievances should be accorded the utmost deference and respect and is not to be limited much less denied, except under the clear and present danger standard, i.e. there must be a clear showing of the "danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest - a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. This is in support of the Courts sway that the presumption "must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such right of free speech and peaceful assemble, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy." Burden of proof of imminent danger is on the issuing authority. The basic right of peaceable assembly could well be abridged, if not denied, if its exercise were to be saddled with onerous conditions. The accountability as to damages which will be incurred during the rally should be on an individual level. In U.S. v. Apurado, the Court says that, disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd (be not seized) as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultous rising against the authorities" as this will render illusory the right of peaceable assembly
Discussion J.B.L. Reyes Decision This case set forth guidelines regarding the role of the judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable assembles. It lays down the following points regarding permits to hold an assembly: Requisites. Applicants should inform the licensing authority of the date, public place (where), and the time (when) it will take place. If to be held in private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Timeliness. Application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. Clear and Present Danger Test. This is the indispensable standard to arrive at a decision for refusal of granting a permit. o If the authority is of the view that there is an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. o The decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity to provide them opportunity for recourse to judicial action. o Burden of proof is on the issuing authority, and it is essential for the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or censorship that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough. Petition unnecessary The petitioners could have verified with the Office of the Mayor first whether the permit was granted before taking recourse to judicial action. Court said that after a reasonable time, the petitioner
Concepcion, J. Concurring. The rights provided for in the free speech clause give life and meaning to a democratic society and are sacred and inviolate. However, they are not absolute and not licentious. The exercise of these rights must take into account the exercise of the rights of others and of the State. The right to peaceably assemble is not absolute but relative. While a person has a constitutional right to freedom of speech, the exercise of such right does not give him any license to libel or slander another. Nor to incite the people to commit the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or assault upon a person in authority or his agents. (citing RPC provisions) Public officials authorizing/issuing permits to hold rallies, demonstrations, etc., do right by basing their decisions on the existence or non-existence of a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent, which application

and interpretation should be measured and weighed in the light of circumstances as to persons, time, and place. In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in the granting or denying of such permits, the following guidelines are deemed necessary: 1. When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot, house, or edifice, only the consent of the owner of the place is necessary. No permit from the government or any public officer is required. 2. When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful assembly has to make use of public places like parks, plazas, and streets, the public authority charged with the duty of granting or denying the permit should also consider the convenience and the right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy these same facilities. 3. Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully considered and precautionary steps taken to prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and other criminals from turning into a violent one what otherwise should be a peaceful demonstration. Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan 12, 1954, no further step was taken by the court or the parties. December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed office and issued E.O. #1 creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC). E.O. #1 was superseded by E.O. #19 promulgated on March 17, 1954. Cabansag wrote the PCAC and furnished a copy to the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The letters contents included gratitude for the Presidents creation of the PCAC because now poor people have somewhere to turn to. He stated that he had been deprived for a long time of his land due to the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer. He stated further that the case could not progress due to the fact that the stenographers havent transcribed the notes yet and that they are already assigned in other courts. Cabansag also wrote that he feared that he will be deprived indefinitely of the land he owns. The Secretary of Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of Court of Pangasinan with the instructions to require the stenographers to transcribe their notes. The Clerk of Court referred the matter to Judge P. Morfe. Judge Morfe informed the Secretary of Justice that under Act No. 2383, the stenographers are not obliged to transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since the litigants are not poor, they are not entitled to free transcription. Judge Morfe also told he Secreatary that both stenographers were already not under his jurisdiction. On September 1, 1954, counsel for the defendants filed a motion to hold Cabansag in contempt for the words through the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer in his letter to the PCAC. Cabansag filed his answer and Judge Morfe dismissed the case but asked Cabansag to show cause within 10 days. Cabansag answered that he did not mean to belittle the respect due to the court or that he acted with malice. The lawyers of Cabansag submitted a manifestation that they consented to Cabansags letter because they found no wrong in it. They were also asked to show cause. Cabansag and his lawyers were found guilty and thus this case of appeal. ISSUE Was the decision convicting Cabansag and his lawyers correct? HELD No.
Dangerous Tendency
Cabansag vs Fernandez OCTOBER 18, 1957 G.R. No. L-8974 Overview: The current case is an appeal of Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyers Roberto and Rufino Merrera of the decision finding them guilty of contempt of court. Cabansag wrote a letter to the newly created Presidential Complaints and Actions Commission (PCAC) due to the fact that his case which involved land, has been dragged on for so long and the court stenographers of the case havent transcribed the notes and were already under a different jurisdiction thats why the case cant further progress. Opposing counsel filed a motion before Judge Morfe, the new presiding judge, for Cabansag to be declared in contempt for his scurrilous remarks in his letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President and the people. THE FACTS The first ever case was filed by Cabansag on January 13, 1974. It was a complaint for ejectment of Fernandez et al. from a parcel of land. The hearing was set for July 30, 1947. It was postponed to August 8, 1947. Because on that day, only one witness testified, the case was again postponed to August 25, 1947. From there, three incidents developed, (1) claim for damages, (2) issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, (3) alleged contempt for violation of an agreement of the parties. The case was postponed and continued until October 4, 1949. The Court, then presided by Judge Villamor, ordered the stenographers to transcribe within 15 days of the payment of their fees. Again the case was postponed until December 9, 1952 largely due to having only partial hearings. On December 9, 1952 Judge Pasicolan issued an order regarding the transcription of the stenographers. From December 9 August
RATIO It has already been established by a long line of jurisprudence that the courts have the power to preserve their integrity and maintain their dignity through the power to punish for contempt. The question arises, did the court properly exercise this power in this case? At the heart of this case is the balancing again of two rights. The right to petition the government for redress or grievance and the right of the judiciary to protect itself. Two theoretical formulas had been devised to

determine the correct judgment when there exists conflicting rights. First is the clear and present danger rule and the second is the dangerous tendency rule. Clear and Present Danger Rule This rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented. This evil is primarily the disorderly and unfair administration of justice. This rule originated from Schenck vs US. The case stated that this rule is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to be prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy. The Supreme Court of the US states that the clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a judges decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute and imminent not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. Dangerous Tendency Rule This rule applies in cases wherein there exists extreme difficulty in confronting where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to these borderline cases. The basic principle of this rule is that the freedom of speech and the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance are not absolute. This rule can be epitomized as follows: if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. It us sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect is to bring about the substantive evil which is sought to be prevented. The immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot be expected to wait until actual disturbances happen before it can act upon the imminent danger. If this is the case, the right to protect itself will only arise when the government has already been overthrown. Judgment Cabansags letter fails both tests. It is evident from the letter that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and mush less to belittle or degrade it. He only gave vent to his feelings that he has been long been deprived of his land and will continue to be deprived unless the notes are transcribed. If there ever exists criticism, it is not against the court but against the opposing counsel. About the only thing disturbing about the letter was the fact that it was sent to the Office of the President. But since the PCAC is part of the office of the Although Cabansag is completely without fault, his lawyers are another matter. Since they are knowledgeable in the law, they should have acted with more care (not said how) to avoid the courts embarrassment and unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings. But since they werent in bad faith, they were just warned. President, and since the DOJ is also under the Office of the President, it can be inferred that the letter was meant for the DOJ through the PCAC. His sending it to the president also fails the 2 tests.
Balancing of Interest Test

Badoy vs Ferrer Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan German vs Barangan PONENTE: J. Escolin NATURE: Petitioners seek the issuance of [1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into and praying in said church FACTS: October 2, 1984- petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacaang grounds located in the same street. Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. They were barred by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacaang security area. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation. ISSUE: WON petitioners freedom of religious worship and of locomotion had been violated HELD NO RATIO While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable

and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. Art. 19 of CC: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties ... observe honesty and good faith." Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the Malacaang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacaang. The need to secure the safety of heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their lives and safety is constant, real and felt throughout the world. Restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive offices within the Malacaang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. Sec. 6 Art III of 87 Consti (freedom of locomotion) is superseded by the wisdom and the reasonableness of the national security measure imposed by State. Sec 5 Art III of 87 Consti (freedom of religious worship), according to US SC in Cantwell v. Connecticut: ..On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. In Gerona v. Secretary of Education: .. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it. DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed. the future. That is to invoke freedom of religion as a preferred right of undoubted primacy. Specifically prior restraint is ruled out except under a clear showing that its exercise would be attended by a clear and present danger of substantive evil. Why a concurrence in the result then? => Clear manifestation by the Solicitor General that such a right would be accorded the fullest respect with due regard to the countervailing consideration of avoiding danger to the lives of the President and his family. It may be observed that the non-establishment clause in the Philippines which in the United States is the basis for the concept of separation of church and state is made much more explicit by this constitutional command: "The separation of church and state shall be inviolable." Had there been no clear manifestation by both petitioners and respondents that the right to attend mass at St. Jude's Church would be respected, even if it is located in a security area but with due precautionary measures taken to avoid infiltration by subversive elements, this Court would have been called upon to rule and, if possible, to delineate with some degree of precision the scope of such a right to free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. From the very wording of the clear and present danger principle, the question, to follow Holmes, who was the author of this concept, is "one of proximity and degree." Necessarily in each and every instance where it is invoked, there must be the most careful scrutiny of the environmental facts and conditions. In times of stress-and much more so in times of crisis-it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. It bears repeating that the promise made by the respondents of not restricting petitioners from entering and worshipping at St. Jude Church is a guarantee that no such impermissible restraint of religious freedom would thereafter be attempted. That the Court is united in the view that the free exercise of religious profession and worship is to be accorded the amplest protection. The dismissal of the petition is not a bar to the application hereafter of the clear and present danger principle. If no mention was made in the opinion of the Court of such controlling doctrine it is my perception that it is due to the assurances made by the parties to the controversy that the right to the free exercise of religious profession and worship will be accorded the fullest respect. J. Teehankee, Dissenting: Right of free worship and movement is a preferred right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to prior restraint except where there exists the clear and present danger of a substantive evil sought to be prevented. There was and is manifestly no such danger in this case As can be understood in J. B. L Reyes vs. Bagatsing (w/c was also referred in part in C.J. Fernandos opinion): - Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly "along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. - In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there is to be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent punishment of any illegal acts committed during the exercise of such basic rights. The sole justification for a prior restraint or
SEPARATE OPINION: C.J. Fernando, Concurring: Concurring in the result and dissenting insofar as the opinion fails to declare that the freedom of exercise of religious profession and worship can only be limited by the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. The plea to enter and pray at such church on Friday, October 12, 1984 is moot and academic. There is in addition, however, a plea for the injunctive relief to prevent respondents from interfering with petitioners exercising their constitutional right to attend mass at such church in

limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. - The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify prior restraint and bar a group of persons from entering the church of their choice for prayer and worship lies on the military or police officials who would so physically restrain them. (Remember: Art 132 of RPC penalizes public officers and employees who "prevent or disturb the ceremonies or manifestations of any religion" and Art. 32 of CC grants an independent cause of action for moral and exemplary damages and "for other relief" against such officials or employees or private individuals "who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair (the) freedom of religion (and) freedom of speech"). - Good faith on both sides is and must be presumed. Respondents were in full control and there is no question as to the capability of the security forces to ward off and stop any untoward move. They had placed an advance checkpoint as far back as the Sta. Mesa Rotonda and could stop the flow of people in the church if they deemed it unmanageable. There definitely was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacaang. Petitioners have given full assurance of their peaceful intentions. They were walking and would walk along the sidewalks. They did not and will not hold any demonstrations. They were and are unarmed, and were and are willing to be searched and have pledged peaceful and orderly behavior. J. Makasiar, Dissenting: Petitioners gave the assurance that they are marching towards St. Jude's Church only for the purpose of praying or attending mass therein; that they were and are going to march in an orderly manner without blocking the traffic and with the marshals policing and Identifying the marchers; that they are not armed and are not going to be armed with any kind of weapon; and that they are willing to be frisked. Respondents likewise assured that they are not going to block or stop petitioners as long as they march peacefully and their real purpose is just to hear mass inside St. Jude's Church. Respondents or their agents can frisk petitioners for any concealed weapon. Their wearing yellow T-shirts and clothing and bearing yellow emblems or banners, are forms of expression which are also protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression in general, and religious freedom in particular. With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacaang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents have adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence. J. Abad Santos, Dissenting: It is highly presumptuous for both the respondents and this Court to attribute unstated and unadmitted motives to the petitioners. The petitioners said that they wanted to pray and hear mass. Why can't good faith be accorded to them in the light of the constitutional provision that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall forever be allowed? I fail to perceive the presence of any clear danger to the security of Malacaang due to the action of the petitioners. J. Melencio-Herrera, Dissenting: The act of petitioners in converging at J.P. Laurel Street, majority of whom were wearing yellow T-shirts, marching towards St. Jude Chapel, there to hear Mass, shouting anti-Government invectives with clenched fists as they marched, did not in my opinion pose any clear and present danger. Petitioners were unarmed, marching peacefully, albeit noisily. But neither can respondents be taken to task for impeding petitioners from proceeding along J.P. Laurel Street, which is within the perimeter of the Malacaang security area, since it was not by chance that petitioners were marching as a group, evidently also to hold a public demonstration. In other words, their objective cannot conclusively be said to have had a purely religious flavor. The location of the St. Jude Chapel within the perimeter of the Malacaang security area is not, to my mind, sufficient reason for a prior restraint on petitioners' right to freedom of religious worship. Proper security measures can always be taken. It is only when petitioners, in the exercise of their religious beliefs, exceed those bounds and translate their freedoms into acts detrimental or inimical to the superior rights of public peace and order, that the test of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil is met and the acts having a religious significance may be infringed upon in the exercise of the police power of the State. J. Relova, Separate vote and statement: October 2, 1984 was a Tuesday and was not a particular day of devotion to St. Jude, known as the Saint of the impossible. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners' intention that afternoon was to conduct an antigovernment demonstration because if the purpose was to stage one they would have gone to St. Jude Chapel on a Thursday and be favored with a crowd to hear them. Stated differently, Thursdays would be the best day to stage a march at the place and, after praying and/or hearing mass, deliver speeches outside the chapel before the many devotees. Petitioners claim that they were on their way to hear mass and/or pray. For respondents to say, even before petitioners have reached the place, that they would be delivering speeches is pure speculation. Respondents should have allowed petitioners to hear mass and/or pray and, thereafter, see what they would do. Only then would We know what were really in their minds. J. Gutierrez Jr., Concurring: Noted the unique phraseology in Sec 5 Art. III (freedom of religious worship): No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The clause "shall forever be allowed" is simply an expression

of the framers' faith that the Filipino people cherish religious freedom so much that they would never remove this freedom from the Constitution or water it down through a modification. The free exercise of religious freedom is not only intended to last "forever" but the clause guaranteeing it is interpreted within limits of "utmost amplitude". If the presidential security forces or any other public functionaries try to impede any genuine and legitimate exercise of a person's religious profession or worship, there can be no doubt that this Court would rule against such an attempt. At the same time, any claim to the free exercise of religion must be a genuine or valid one The facts as stated by contending counsel show that the problem is one of a failure of communications and not a denial of freedom of worship. If the respondents do not deny completely free access to church goers while the petitioners had absolutely no intention to hold a political demonstration, the petition belabors a non-existent issue. b. c. 3364, be declared unconstitutional and illegal That the City be ordered to refund to the (P) the amount it paid under protest. Other relief and remedy as the court may deem just and equitable.
(R) City of Manila answered: a. The said ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by Section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949 by Section 18, subsection (1) of RA No. 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. b. It prayed that the complaint be dismissed. In the hearing, (P) proved that: a. It has been in existence in the Philippines since 1899. b. Its real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate taxes. c. It was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor was the American Bible Society in the US required to pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale of Bible there. d. It also tried to establish that it never profited from the sale of the bible. However, the difference between the dollar prices and the peso purchase price of the bibles show otherwise. CFI DECISION: Case dismissed. The meanings of repealed sec (m-2) of the RAC and the repealing portions (o) of Sec 18 of RA No. 409 are practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in the said legal provisions. CFI also stated that the taxes to be levied by the ordinances is in the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec 3 Ordinance No. 3000), as amended, and Sec 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinance No. 3364. (P) appealed to the CA, but the CA certified the case to the SC as it involves purely questions of law. (P) argues that the subject ordinances are unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession: the distribution and sale of bibles to residents of the Philippines. Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the 1935 Constitution provides: (7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Section 3 of Ordinance 3000 contains item No. 79, which reads as follows: 79. All other businesses, trades or occupations not mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax .... P5.00. Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028 prescribes the following: SEC. 1. FEES.-Subject to the provisions of section 578 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, as amended, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for engaging in any of the businesses or occupations below enumerated, quarterly,
Forms of restraint
Fees and Taxes American Bible Society vs City of Manila Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila. Ponente: Felix, J. Facts: (P) American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November 1898 with its principal office Manila. The (R) City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of RA No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. In the course of its ministry, (P) distributes and sells bibles and gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines, translating the same in several dialects. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of Manila: a. Informed the (P) that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945 without the necessary Mayors permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028, and 3364. b. Required (P) to secure the permit and license fees within 3 days/ c. Also required (P) to give a compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5, 821.45. (P) protested against the requirement, yet the City Treasurer required and demanded such payment, hence, the (P) paid the said amount in protest. At the same time, (P) sent a letter to the City Treasurer, informing it that a suit shall be filed to question the legality of the ordinances. In its complaint, (P) American Bible Society prays: a. That the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028, and

license fees based on gross sales or receipts realized during the preceding quarter in accordance with the rates herein prescribed: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a person engaged in any business or occupation for the first time shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable gross sales or receipts for the first quarter beginning from the date of the opening of the business as indicated herein for the corresponding business or occupation Issues: 1. WON Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028, and 3364, are constitutional and valid (As to the topic Forms of Restrainttaxes and fees). 2. WON the provisions of said ordinances are applicable to the case at bar. (As to the topic Freedom of Religion). Held/ Ratio: 1. The ordinances are constitutional. a. Ordinance No. 3000 is of general application and not particularly directed against institutions like the (P), and it does not contain any provisions whatsoever prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. b. The necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade, or occupation (Item No. 79, Section 3, Ordinance No. 3000). c. As to the license fees that the City Treasurer required the (P) society to pay, Section 1 of Ordinance 2529, as amended, does not impose directly the said fees upon any religious institution, but upon those engaged in any of the business or occupations therein enumerated, such as retail dealers in general merchandise, which, it is alleged, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles, books, etc. d. (P) further argues that the subject ordinances are no longer in force and effect as they were enacted under sec 2444, subsection (m-2) of the RAC, as amended by Act No. 3659, which was already repealed by sec 102 of RA No. 409 or the Revised Manila Charter. However, the SC says that the only substantial distinction between the two provisions is that the latter does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the appeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption. The SC therefore holds that the ordinances are still in effect. e. Moreover, the business of retail dealers in general merchandise is expressly enumerated in subsection (o), sec 18, of RA No. 409. 2. Ordinance No. 3000, which prescribes that the (P) must get Mayors permit, APPLIES. Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which prescribes payment of fees and taxes, does NOT apply. a. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. b. Sec 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code, exempts the (P) as a religious institution from tax, except only when such activities are for profit. SC held that although the bibles and pamphlets are sold in prices a little bit higher, this cannot mean that the (P) was already engaged in the business or occupation of selling said merchandise. c. SC therefore held that Ordinance No. 2529 cannot be applied to (P), for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. d. As to Ordinance No. 3000, SC finds that it does not impose any charge upon the right granted by the Constitution. Judgment: CFI decision reversed. (R) City ordered to return to (P) society the amount of P5, 891.45. Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance En Banc: October 30, 1995 RATIO DECIDENDI: Regulations imposed by the state such as that of taxation, as a form is restraint, shall be interpreted as binding even to constitutionally guaranteed rights/institutions exercising such (i.e. Freedom of religion/expressionChurch/media) provided no differential treatment or censorial motivation is behind the enactment -In bold are those related to the topic. FACTS: Republic Act 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. However, the constitutionality of RA 7716 was being challenged on the grounds of its procedural and substantial aspects. TIMELINE: July 22, 92-Aug 31: Several bills were introduced in the house of representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to VAT. The bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended the substitute measure, H.No. 11197, entitled: AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED Nov. 6, 93: H.No. 11197 was considered on second reading Nov. 17, 93: H.No. 11197 was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.

Nov. 23, 93: H.No. 11197 was sent to the Senate Feb 7, 94: Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S.No. 1630, entitled: AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 AND 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Feb 8, 94: Senate began consideration of S.No. 1630. March 24, 94: Senate finished debates on the bill and approved it on 2nd reading Senate approved bill on 3rd reading by means of affirmative votes of 13 of the members and 1 abstention April 13, 19, 21, and 25, 94:H.No. 11197 and S.No.1630 were referred to a conference committee who met 4 times and recommended that H.No. 11197 and S.No 1630 be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees April 27, 94:Conference Committee Bill entitled AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was approved by the House of the Representatives May 2, 94: Senate likewise approved the Conference Committee Bill May 5, 94: Bill presented to the President of the Philippines who signed it at the same day; hence, it became RA 7716 May 12, 94: RA 7716 was published in 2 newspapers in gen circulation May 28, 94: RA 7716 took effect May 28-June 30, 94: RA 7716s implementation suspended to allow time for business registration. was of Representatives. Because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House Bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. Given the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House of Representatives can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. The Senators, on the other hand, are expected to approach the problem on national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. B. Does it violate Art VI Sec 26 (2) violate the constitution? NO. The president had certified S.No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of the legislative practice. C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee? The conference committee shall settle the differences of Senate and House of Congress. It shall make a detailed and sufficient report with explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees. II. Substantive Issues A. Does the law violate the provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art 3)? NO. Since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. With regard to Freedom of Expression, even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, the press is not immune from general regulation by the state. There is no differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a VAT, it is not because it is singled out but only because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and scope of the VAT system. Hence, no discriminatory treatment was given to the press since it is not the only one affected by such change in VAT system. This is even highlighted by the fact that transactions, which are profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to show that by and large this is not so and that the exemptions are granted for a purpose. The VAT is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
ISSUE: I. Procedural Issues A. Does RA 7716 violate Art VI Sec 24 of the Constitution? B. Does it violate Art VI Sec 26 (2) violate the constitution? C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee? II. Substantive Issues A. Does the law violate the ff provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art 3)? Sec 1 Sec 4 Sec 5 Sec 10 B. Does the law violate the ff other provisions of the Consti? Art VI Sec 28 (1) Art VI Sec 28 (3) HELD: I. Procedural issues A. Does RA 7716 violate Art VI Sec 24 of the Constitution? NO. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by Constitution to originate exclusively in the House

constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution In terms of religious freedom, PBCs allegation that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication, or importation of books or religious articles violates freedom of thought and conscience. The free exercise of religion does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. Moreover, the VAT registration fee is a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. The fixed amount of P1,000 is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege BUT only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration is a central feature of the VAT system. For Art III Sec 10, it is enough to say that the parties to contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the state. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure peace and good order of society. Moreover, contract clause is not a limitation on the power of taxation save only where a tax exemption was granted for a valid consideration. B. Does the law violate the ff other provisions (Art VI Sec 28 (1) and Art VI Sec 28 (3)) of the Consti? NO. There is no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners right to due process and equal protection clause. The absence of threat or immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of law. Furthermore, in absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive, and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the contract clause are prematurely raised and likewise, do not justify the grant of prospective relief. Miranda. Respondent Mayor stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays whn they would not cause great disruption of normal activities of community and offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative venue for demonstration. Every time assemblies are announced, they cause fear and tension in the community such as offices and classes being dismissed, storefronts being boarded up and transportation being disrupted to the general detriment of the public. Petitioner has even manifested that it has no means of preventing disorders. Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor Villegas to grant their application for permit unconditionally. As in Primicias v. Fugoso, the mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. Petition is dismissed. SEPARATE OPINIONS: Villamor, J. concurs. Right to freedom of assembly is neither unlimited nor absolute. The mayor did not arbitrarily refuse the permit and even offered an alternative. Castro and Fernando, JJ dissent. Right to freedom of assembly, although not unlimited, is entitled to utmost respect. There is no clear showing that Mayors refusal met criteria in Primicias v. Fugoso . The effect is of prior restraint of a constitutional right. Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956) Ignacio vs Ela (Time and place) Doctrine: The right to freedom of speech, to peacefully assemble, etc. are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, they are not absolute. They may be regulated by the state through police power so that they shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. Facts: Fernando Ignacio and Simeon dela Cruz (petitioners) are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as Jehovahs Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic religion They asked Mayor Norberto Ela (respondent) to give them permission to use the public plaza together with the kiosk, but, instead of granting the permission, Respondent allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy that the Kiosk should only be used for legal purposes. When their request for reconsideration was denied, Petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus.
Moral compulsion
Babst vs National Intelligence Board
Time and Place

Reyes vs Bagatsing Navarro vs Villegas 26 FEB 1970 RESOLUTION, EN BANC Petitioners sought unconditional permit to assemble at Plaza
Issues: WON the action taken by Respondent is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by our Constitution Held and Ratio: No The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully

assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But the exercise of those rights is not absolute. They may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power. The power exercised by Respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. Respondent never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that Petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble, considering that the tenets of Petitioners congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which Respondent must have considered in denying their request. Such conclusion is predicated on facts. The presiding judge, through information, personal experience and through the papers, has known of unfortunate events which caused the disturbance of peace and order in the community. If the Petitioners should be allowed to use the kiosk which is within the hearing distance of the catholic church, this may give rise to disturbance of other religious ceremonies performed in the church. Primicias vs Fugoso Arbitrary actions due to national security Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs Dans Restraint on exercise of another right Ebranilag vs Superintendent of Schools of Cebu Villar vs Technological Institute of the Philippines Facts: Seven students of TIP filed the petition with four of them passing most of their subjects and only having a few (1-2) failing grades while three of them had multiple failing grades. (the only explicit facts, but I assume that these students rallied and such) Remedy prayed for: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition Legal provisions: Institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom Art. XIV Sec. 8(3), 1973 Consti Issue: 3) Whether or not exercise of freedom of assembly could be a basis for barring enrolment?
Held: (Fernando, C.J., ponente) 1) Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrolment in view of their failing grades. Villar and others are entitled to the remedies.
2) The invocation of the right to freedom of

peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent."
3) "Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable

assembly and free speech, they are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'" 12 Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College
4) It is quite clear that while the right to college

education is included in the social economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.
5) The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of

higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate

against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. Non vs Dames Censorship Gonzales vs Katigbak Pita vs CA Fernando vs CA Regulation of the Forum See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Television Violence and the First Amendment Ian Matheson Ballard To accord due process Webb vs De Leon G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995 Petitioners: Hubert J. P. Webb, Michael A. Gatchalian, and Antonio L. Lejano Respondents: Honorable Raul E. De Leon, Presiding Judge of RTC Paranaque, et al. Nature: Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with application for TRO and Preliminary Injunction Ponente: Justice Puno Overview This is the case of Hubert Webb questioning the validity of arrest and preliminary court proceedings. The court said that in the preliminary investigation, only probable cause is to be determined and not the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, there will be no use for the actual trial. Facts NBI filed with DOJ a letter-complaint charging Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano, and six others with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Carmela Vizconde was raped and killed her mother Estrellita Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer were also killed. During the Preliminary investigation, NBI presented the following sworn statements: (1) Maria Jessica M. Alfaro saw the actual rape and killing; there are inconsistencies with the first and second affidavits. (the inconsistencies was sufficiently explained; Jessica said that at first, she was hesitant to divulge the information) (2) Two Former Housemaid of the Webb family Nerissa saw Hubert in the Webbs residence on June 29, 1991; Mila, laundry woman, washed clothes on June 30, 1991 and found fresh stains. (3) Carlos J. Cristobal, passenger of United Airlines on March 9, 1991. Was not sure if the person we saw was Hubert. (4) Lolita Birrer, former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, investigator. She said that on the dawn of June 30, 1991, Biong has a phone call and returned home around 7am. Then moments later, Biong was called to investigate the killing in the Vizconde home. Webbs Alibi: He was in the US during the said occurrence of the crime. He bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car during the said dates. He was issued Drivers License in California of June 14, 1991. Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy confirmed Webbs arrival in San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991. Gatchalian, Alejano Alibi: 11 on the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 oclock, they watch video tapes. ISSUE Were the accused denied of their constitutional right to due process during the preliminary investigation? (NO) Held/Ratio No. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case. The various types of evidence extant in the records of the case provide substantial basis for a finding of probable cause against the petitioners. It was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take further step of examining ex parte the complainant and their witnesses with searching questions. Section 1 of Rule 112 provides that a preliminary investigation should determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the RTC has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause the DOJ panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.
Consequent Punishment Laws Sedition/ Inciting to Sedition

Espuelas vs People US vs Perfecto
Libel
US vs Bustos Orfanel vs People GMA Network vs Bustos GMA NETWORK, INC. (formerly known as "REPUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.") and REY VIDAL, petitioners, vs. JESUS G. BUSTOS, M.D., TEODORA R. OCAMPO, M.D., VICTOR V. BUENCAMINO, M.D., CESAR F. VILLAFUERTE, M.D., ARTEMIO T. ORDINARIO, M.D., and VIRGILIO C. BASILIO, M.D., respondents. GARCIA, J.: FACTS: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision dated January 25, 2001 of CA.

On February 10, 1988, a certain Abello and 226 other examinees who failed the physician's licensure examination filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to recheck and reevaluate the test papers. As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage for the ten oclock evening news edition of GMAs Channel 7 Headline News. The text of the news report stated that, after being allowed to examine the test papers, the petitioners found errors in the checking and these errors "were so material that they actually lowered the scores that formed the individual ratings of the examinees in the various subjects." The report also stated that "the petitioners said that the haphazard and whimsical and capricious checking should now be stopped once and for all" while the failed examinees cited their 9 years of hardship to obtain a degree in medicine. The Respondents, then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine, claimed that it was a false, malicious and onesided report filed and narrated by a remorseless reporter. They filed an action against GMA for recklessly disregarding the truth, defaming them by word of mouth and simultaneously presenting it in Channel 7. They added that, as a measure to make a forceful impact on their audience, the defendants made use of an unrelated and old footage (showing physicians wearing black armbands) to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in question actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital management. They argued that the Vidal report have exposed them, as professionals, to hatred, contempt and ridicule. And in a bid to establish malice and bad faith on the part of the defendants, the plaintiffs adduced evidence tending to show that the former exerted no effort toward presenting their side in subsequent telecasts. GMA and Vidal claimed that it was contextually a concise and objective narration of a matter of public concern. They also invoked that press freedom guarantee covered the telecast in question, undertaken as it was to inform, without malice, the viewing public on the conduct of public officials. They also asserted that they were "neutral." They also asserted that the PGH footages were accompanied, when shown, by an appropriate voiceover, thus negating the idea conjured by the plaintiffs to create an effect beyond an obligation to report. The trial court dismissed the complaint and also the counterclaim. Reconsideration was filed and denied. CA reversed and ordered GMA to pay for moral damages; exemplary damages; attorneys fee; and cost of suit. ISSUE: (1) WON the televised news report in question on the filing of the petition for mandamus against the respondents is libelous; (2) WON the insertion of the old film footage depicting the doctors and personnel of PGH in their 1982 demonstrations constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages to the respondents. HELD: No. The subject news report was clearly a fair and true report, a simple narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances surrounding the filing by the unsuccessful examinees of the petition for mandamus before the court, and made without malice and the petitioners are thus entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under A354 (2) RPC. RATIO: It bears to stress, at the outset, that the trial court found the disputed news report not actionable under the law on libel, hence no damages may be recovered. The Trial Court found that the disputed news report is but a narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances attending the filing of the said Petition for Mandamus and merely of a summary of the allegations in the said Petition for Mandamus, filed by the medical examinees, thus the same falls within the protected ambit of privileged communication. CA found the same but said that the news failed to be a fair, accurate and true report of the proceedings. CA said that the PGH demonstration footage tend to show that the PGH demonstrators supported the failed examinees. They further stated that the words "file video" should have been inserted and the network knows this - and thus, in wanton and reckless disregard of their duty to the public to render a fair, accurate and true report of the same. SC is of the view that, given the parallel unchallenged determination of the two courts below that what petitioner Vidal reported was privileged, the award of damages is untenable as it is paradoxical. An award of damages presupposes libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel - the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel requisities: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the imputation (malice in law). - Brillante v. Court of Appeals - malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal illwill or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. In the instant case, the newscast was basically a narration of the contents of the aforementioned petition for mandamus. This is borne by the records of the case and was likewise the finding of the trial court. And the narration had for its subject nothing more than the purported mistakes in paper checking and the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the August 1987 physicians licensure examinations attributable to the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. There may be hypothetically some failing by network but it bears to stress that not all imputations of some discreditable act or omission, if there be any, are considered malicious thus supplying grounds for actionable libel. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption. Privileged matters - may be absolute or qualified. Absolute - not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Qualified or Conditional - the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. This kind of privilege, in

fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in A354 RPC. The enumeration under the aforecited A354 RPC is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest. The report falls under the second kind of privileged matter, being a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the mandamus petition by the failed examinees devoid of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the narration to be without accompanying distortive or defamatory comments or remarks. It was thus simply an act to inform the public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent doctors. It was clearly within petitioner Vidals job as news writer and reporter assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments therein. It must be reiterated that the courts a quo had determined the news report in question to be qualifiedly privileged communication protected under the 1987 Constitution. ON THE PROOF OF ILL WILL AND MALICE: The CA the respondents thinks that ill will and malice was established. As the CA noted, the insertion of an old film footage showing doctors wearing black armbands and demonstrating at the PGH, without the accompanying character-generated words "file video," created the impression that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the unsuccessful examinees. SC however, disagrees. The OLD PGH footage - the words "file video" it may indeed remove doubts and misrepresentation of a footage and RTC stated "the use of file footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice." SC said however that the absence of the accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. The footage was thus not a libel in disguise; without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature. Personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real - not automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects ones interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as good as ones character and conduct warrant" in the community. It is the community, not personal standards, that matters in allegations of libel and any attached claims for damages. + Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel - "Community" - may be drawn as narrowly or as broadly as the user of the term and his purposes may require. For libel, the reason for adopting the more general meaning of community in the ascertainment of relevant standards is rooted deep in our constitutional law. Our constitution protects and promotes free speech and expression, an interest shared by all Filipinos. A newspaper should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest, wherever they may take place within the nation and as well in the outside world, with minimum fear of being charged with criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the general community. A contrary rule is likely to produce an unwholesome "chilling effect" upon the constitutionally protected operations of the press and other instruments of information and education. SC also took note of the voice over used in the old footage and there was nothing in the news report to indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create another news story beyond what was reported. Actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausibly be deduced from the fact of petitioners having dubbed in their telecast an old unrelated video footage. As it were, nothing in the said footage, be it taken in isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal report, can be viewed as reputation impeaching. It did not contain an attack or defamed the honesty, character or integrity or like personal qualities of any of the respondents, who were not even named or specifically identified in the report. If the matter is not per se libelous, malice cannot be inferred from the mere fact of publication.22 And as records tend to indicate, the petitioners, particularly Vidal, do not personally know or had dealings with any of the respondents. There is thus no pereivable reason nor motive on the part of either petitioner for malice. They also failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioners were animated by a desire to inflict them unjustifiable harm or at least to place them in a discomforting light. Petitioners failure to obtain and telecast the respondents side is not an indicia of malice. - US 5th Circuit CA in NY Times Co. v. Connor - "a reporter may rely on statements made by a single source even though they reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution by a public official." What is more, none of the herein respondents ever made a claim or pretence that he or all of them collectively was or were among the demonstrating PGH doctors in the 1982 video footage. They could thus not claim to have been besmirched by the use of the same video in the subject news telecast. Thus, the awards for damages may not be recovered. DISPO: Petition is GRANTED. CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the trial court is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in toto. Flor vs Poeple 31 March 2005 Topic: Consequent punishment - Libel Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. Facts: This is a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Regional Trial court of Pili, Camarines Sur in a criminal case convicting Salvador Flor and Nick Ramos of libel and in a civil case awarding damages in favor of the private complainant, former Governor of Camarines Sur and Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization Luis R. Villafuerte. Flor and Ramos were the managing editor and correspondent of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper. On or about August 18-24, 1986, in the Bicol Region (Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, Iriga City and Naga City), the accused published in the front page an article with the banner Villafuertes Denial Convinces No One claiming that government funds by way of cash advances to public officials were used for Villafuertes trips to Israel and Japan. He was accompanied by mayors who supposedly did not have any public function to exercise in those trips, and that the trips, amounting to P700,000.00, were for pleasure, specifically when they went to Japan to watch the 1986 baseball games. The information was later amended to include Jose Burgos, Jr.,
publisher-editor of the Bicol Forum, but he became a fugitive and was never arrested. Prior to the criminal complaint, Villafuerte had filed a civil action for damages. Thus, the cases are consolidated pursuant to Article 360 of the RPC. Originally, the Information was filed in Naga City, but pursuant to RA 4363 which outlines the venues for libel cases where the offended party is a public official, it was transferred to Pili, Camarines Sur. Flor and Ramos pleaded not guilty. In the witness stand, Villafuerte refuted the claims. He said that he never went on a Japan trip and he had clarified that on the radio. The issue was never brought up again until the questioned news article. Also, he said the Provincial Auditor and Budget Officer denied the issue of the cash advances. He claims that his trip to Israel was made in his capacity as a Cabinet member of Corazon C. Aquino and that his personal funds were used for the trip. He said that the Bicol Forum did not even bother to get his side of the story or verify the contents of the news article. Furthermore, he thinks that the title of the article mocks his previous explanation on the issue and thus subjects him to public humiliation and ridicule. On the other hand, Ramos testified saying he got the information in the news article from a note given to him by a source he refused to name who was connected to the Provincial Treasurers Office. He talked to the source and he was given a copy of the Schedule of Cash Advances of Disbursing Officers and Other Officers. Among the provincial government officials listed therein were Villafuerte who had a 1986 balance of P25,000.00 incurred for cultural activities; Atty. Jose Maceda who also had a 1986 balance of P130,084.00 for sports development, Operation Smile, NAMCYA Festival, and prisoners subsistence; and Eulogio Panes, Jr., who had beside his name a 1986 balance of P250,000 for the purpose of sports development. Ramos also claimed that when he went to the Provincial Treasurers Office to conduct his investigation, he was shown some vouchers and was told that many of the members of the baseball delegation to Japan were not elected provincial officials and, in fact, some mayors and private individuals were sent as part of the Philippine group. On the witness stand, Flor admitted to writing the headline and sub-headline which he claimed was suitable and fitting to the contents of the news article written by Ramos. Trial Court and CA found both guilty and liable for damages on the grounds that the sweeping conclusion of the article about Gov. Villafuerte without verification was published with malice, thus destroying the privilege of a free media. Issue: Whether or not the article is libelous? Held & Ratio: No, it is not libelous. Libel is penalized under Article 354 of the RPC. It is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. There is a presumption of malice in defamatory imputations under libel, except for: A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. There are two categories of privileged communications. The first class is those that are absolutely privileged, which include those made in official legislative proceedings and Court proceedings for as long as it is connected to the issues involved. The second class is the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged which is susceptible to libel when found to have been done with malice. This class includes the exceptions in Article 354 of the RPC. According to Borjal v. CA, libel is not merely confined in the wordings of Article 354 of the RPC. Libel is made more expansive in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of the press. Thus, in US v. Bustos, it is said that for every case of libel concerning a public official as an injured party, it should be analyzed in connection with the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. This is because public opinion will always be the check-and-balance of the Government and the constant source of liberty and democracy. This does not mean, though, that there is no recourse for injured public official. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, it is said that public officials may recover damages for libel but only after close scrutiny of the act and proving that it has been performed with actual malice, which is knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The OSG claims that the article was meant to malign the integrity and reputation of the Governor, and that it was published with malice because it was based on mere speculation and conjecture. This, along with their failure to produce their source in Court, proves malice under the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan test. The SC disagrees. For the test of New York Times to hold, there must be clear showing of a reckless disregard of the truth. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show this. At the time of publication, the topic of the article was legitimately an issue to be discussed since it was a hot topic in Camarines Sur at that time, as evidenced by Villafuerte going so far as to explain himself on the radio. Furthermore, the accused relied on information from a source connected to the government. Their conclusion from the information given to them, along with public documents, may have been false but it does not amount to a conviction. As discussed by Newell, slight unintentional errors shall be excused. The fact that the accused did not verify the information and did not hear out the side of Villafuerte does not amount to malice or reckless disregard. While substantiation of facts is important in responsible news reporting, it is acceptable that a journalist relies on a lone source for information. Also, failure of the accused to produce their source in Court is acceptable, as in the case of Rodolfo Vasquez v. CA, wherein the Court stated that the burden of proof is not on the accused but on the prosecution, especially in libel cases wherein journalists are constrained to give out information on confidential sources. The fact that the informant worked in Government is enough to explain why he did not want to be exposed in the trial concerning a superior public official. Finally, the argument regarding the headline of the article does not hold. The Court explains that the headline must be taken with the whole article, such that even if there is an
exaggeration in the headline, the same may nevertheless present a fair index in the content of the article. Guingguing vs CA TINGA CERTIORARI This case assails the decision of RTC which was affirmed by the CA finding Ciriaco Boy Guinguing and Segundo Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. RATIO: The constitutional guarantee of free speech should be construed as not only protecting polite speech but even expression in its most unsophisticated form. FACTS: Cirse Choy Torralba filed against petitioner and Lim a complaint for libel Torralba was a broadcast journalist who handled to programs for radio stations DYLA and DYFX which were based in Cebu City but broadcasted over a large portions of Visayas and Mindanao Lim caused the publication of records of criminal cases filed against Torralba as well as photos of him being arrested o These were published by means of a onepage ad paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by petitioner o The Sunday Post was circulated in the province of Bohol as well as in the Visayas and Mindanao Torralba asserted that he had already been acquitted and the cases referred to in the publication had already been settled o He alleged that the publication placed him in public contempt and ridicule and that it was designed to degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist Lim alleged that Torralba was making scurrilous attack against him and his family and since he had no access to radio time, he opted for paid ads to answer the attacks as a measure of self-defense o Also argues that Torralba, as a media man and member of the 4th estate, occupied a position almost similar to a public functionary and should not be onion-skinned and be able to absorb the thrust of public scrutiny The lower court concluded that the publication complained of was indeed libelous. Declaring that malice is the most important element of libel, it held that the same was present in the case because every defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and publisher towards the person subject thereof. o lower court gave no credence to Lim and petitioners argument that the publication was resorted to in self-defense. o Also disregarded the insulative effects of Torralbas status as a mediaman to the prosecution of the criminal libel charge. The publication of a calumny even against public officers or candidates for public office, according to the trial court, is an offense most dangerous to the people. It deserves punishment because the latter may be deceived thereby and reject the best and deserving citizens to their great injury. It further held that a private reputation is as constitutionally protected as the enjoyment of life, liberty and property such that anybody who attacks a persons reputation by slanderous words or libelous publications is obliged to make full compensation for the damage done CA affirmed the finding of guilt o Said self-defense was unavailing as a justification since the defendant should not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him. o Also asserted that the purpose of selfdefense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it does not license the defendant to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return for what he received. Once the defendant hits back with equal or more scurrilous remarks unnecessary for his defense, the retaliation becomes an independent act for which he may be liable. Petitioner contends that as editor-publisher of the Sunday Post and as a member of the fourth estate, the lower courts finding of guilt against him constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press o Also faults the LCs failure to appreciate selfdefense
ISSUE: WON the publication is indeed libelous HELD: NO Under the criminal law, libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: o (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; o (b) publication of the imputation; o (c) identity of the person defamed; and, o (d) existence of malice The Court then historicized libel: o 1603 libel against a public officer is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man and that truth of a defamatory imputation is not a defense o 1735 truth was unofficially acknowledged as defense in libel o Then, in New York Times v. Sullivan, from where the modern libel law emerged, the actual malice doctrine was established Said that a public official may not successfully sue for libel unless the official can prove actual malice, which was defined as with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true Leeway was allowed even if the challenged statements were factually erroneous if honestly made.
The Court cited more American cases but Im no longer including them here since I dont think theyre impt. The prominent American legal commentator, Cass Sunstein, has summarized the current American trend in libel law as follows: [C]onsider the law of libel. Here we have an explicit system of free speech tiers. To simplify a complex body of law: In the highest, most-speech protective tier is libelous speech directed against a public figure. Government can allow libel plaintiffs to recover damages as a result of such speech if and only if the speaker had actual malicethat is, the speaker must have known that the speech was false, or he must have been recklessly indifferent to its truth or falsity. This standard means that the speaker is protected against libel suits unless he knew that he was lying or he was truly foolish to think that he was telling the truth. A person counts as a public figure (1) if he is a public official in the sense that he works for the government, (2) if, while not employed by government, he otherwise has pervasive fame or notoriety in the community, or (3) if he has thrust himself into some particular controversy in order to influence its resolution. In Adiong v. COMELEC, the Court accepted the actual malice stadard regarding criminal libel cases concerning public figures Public figure definition in Ayer v. Capulong w/c the Court got from an American textbook on torts: o A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. In order to justify a conviction for criminal libel against a public figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice, meaning knowledge that the statement was false or with o reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true 2 determinants of the petitioners guilt: o WON Torralba is a public figure YES, he is He is a broadcast journalist for 2 radio stations He even asserted before the trial court that his broadcast was listened to widely, hence, his notoriety is unquestionable. o If yes, WON the publication was made w/ actual malice SC said any statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection However, during the trial, Torralba himself admitted the truth of the content of the ad The information, moreover, went into the very character and integrity of complainant to which his listening public has a very legitimate interest. Complainant hosts a public affairs program, one which he himself claimed was imbued with public character since it deals with corruptions in government, corruptions by public officials, irregularities in government in comrades. By entering into this line of work, complainant in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life. He likewise gave them a stake in finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to have the right to criticize others for their conduct. SC held that Art 354 of RPC, as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free expression, and this Courts precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous. Art 354 provision itself allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense good intention and justifiable motive. The exercise of free expression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on public affairs and public figures, certainly qualify as justifiable motive, if not good intention. The guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite speech, but even expression in its most unsophisticated form. Criminal libel stands as a necessary qualification to any absolutist interpretation of the free speech clause, if only because it
prevents the proliferation of untruths which if unrefuted, would gain an undue influence in the public discourse. But in order to safeguard against fears that the public debate might be muted due to the reckless enforcement of libel laws, truth has been sanctioned as a defense, much more in the case when the statements in question address public issues or involve public figures. Thus, the publication of the advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true, the intention to let the public know the character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done with good motives and for justifiable ends. The advertisement in question falls squarely within the bounds of constitutionally protected expression under Section 4, Article III, and thus, acquittal is mandated. In ascertaining the degree of falsity that would constitute actual malice, the Court, citing New York Times, has even gone so far as acknowledging: Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community. To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement. Philippine Journalists vs Theonen DOCTRINE: Qualifiedly privileged communication ceases to be privileged when published FACTS: Christina Lee, as a reporter for Peoples Journal, acquired a copy of a letter sent by a certain Atty. Efren Angara to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation. The letter asked for information regarding Francis Thoenen, a Swiss living in BF Homes. The letter alleged that Thoenen had been known to shoot stray pets in the neighborhood. Prompted by this letter, Lee published an article in the Peoples Journal on the same subject. She deviated from the original contents of the Angara letter, saying that Thoenens deportation was being sought. She included not only the identity of Thoenen but also his home address. She added certain details absent from the Angara letter about complaints from neighbors and a confrontation that took place with a pet owner. Thoenen, a retired engineer permanently residing in the country with his Filipina wife, filed for damages claiming that the report was defamatory. He also says that there was never any shooting of pets that took place. In addition to the other discrepancies in the report (mentioned above), he also contests the identity of Atty. Angara who could not be found in the rolls of lawyers. The RTC decided in favor of Peoples Journal and Lee, saying that there was no malice in publishing the report. The court said that the report fell under the purview of a qualifiedly privileged matter and therefore cannot be presumed malicious. The CA reversed this decision and ruled that a violation of Civil Code, Art. 195 was committed. MR of Peoples Journal and Lee was denied so they petitioned to the SC under certiorari. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Lees report was qualifiedly privileged 2. Whether or not damages may be awarded to Thoenen HELD: SC affirms CA decision 1. No. The letter of Atty. Angara may have been qualifiedly privileged (SC did not say if in fact it was), but it ceased to be so when published 2. Yes. Thoenen is awarded moral and exemplary damages and is granted legal fees. RATIO: Peoples Journal and Lee argued that the issue is not under NCC 19 (as the CA held) but one under Libel (RPC 353). Libel has the following requisites: 1. Allegation of a discreditable act 2. Publication of a charge 3. Identity of the defamed 4. Existence of malice Generally, malice is presumed in defamatory remarks, but this
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
is not the case in qualifiedly privileged matters (private communication or report regarding public officials). Petitioners say that because the report was qualifiedly privileged, no malice can be presumed and therefore the 4th requisite for libel is not met. SC finds this of no merit. In US v. Bustos, the Court held that in order for a report regarding a public official to be qualifiedly privileged, it must be addressed solely to an official with proper jurisdiction over the matter. Thoenen is not a public officer. Even if it is held that the letter of spurious Atty. Angara was privileged when he inquired to the CID, this ceased to be the case when Lee published its contents in her Peoples Journal report. Further, article is not a fair and true account so it cannot be privileged. Because it is not privileged, malice is presumed and the 4th requisite of libel is met! A publication that knowingly publishes false matters cannot enjoy the protection under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution. duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands...among other reasons which there is hardly time to state herein, the prayer in the instant petition cannot be granted. Facts: In 1981, the BP (Batasang Pambansa) proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite for the peoples approval. The YES vote was being advanced by KBL Marcos Party while the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. Earlier, to ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c, to wit, provided that there be equal opportunity (1467), equal time (1468) and equal space (1469) on media used for campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide. Pursuant to the letter of UNIDO to COMELEC dated 10 March 1981 requesting for equal opportunity, the same prime time and number of TV and radio stations all over the country which were utilized by President Marcos last March 12 from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M., it requested that the public meeting on Saturday, March 21, at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, be covered by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. In spite of its supplication, COMELEC denied the demand, stating that: The UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional prerogatives vested in the President/Prime Minister ... As such, it has no right to 'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos. The UNIDO, however, is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations concerned. This Commission, however, cannot direct these media to grant free use of their facilities. First of all, the COMELEC cannot assume dictatorial powers and secondly, the rule of equal time for campaigning as to duration and quality is not applicable under the circumstances of this case.. In its motion for reconsideration, UNIDO justified acquiescence to its prayer since contrary to what the decretal section of COMELEC the assailed resolution concluded the radio and television coverage on March 12th, did not deal with any program of government [or] any guideline of national policy but the core of the program (Pulong-pulong sa Pangulo) [was] a campaign for the approval of the constitutional amendments; and that the President had utilized this avenue of campaign without charge. Notwithstanding these defences brought forth by UNIDO, COMELEC did not find any cogent reason to reverse its earlier resolution and grant the supplicants prayer. UNIDO assailed this denial as a violative of the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, and they are not conducive to insure free, orderly and honest elections, hence, this appeal for review. Issue: WON the COMELEC erred in denying the petition of UNIDO. Held: (No.) Ratio: The Supreme Court was of the considered view, in consonance with the COMELEZ resolution, that when Pres. Marcos conducted his pulong-pulong or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible... for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy ( Art. IX, Sec. 2 ). It also saw the Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo as merely a veritable channel whereby the President imbued with the
Contempt
In re: Emil Jurado
Forum Rallies
Primicias vs Fugoso Reyes vs Bagatsing Ruiz vs Gordon German vs Barangan
Media
Santiago vs Far Easterning Broadcasting Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs Dans Gonzales vs Katigbak Ayer vs Capulong UNIDO vs COMELEC Ponente: Barredo, J. One-Liner: The denoument of the ponencia writes of an unsuccessfull finis of UNIDOs prayer to compel the COMELEC to bequeath upon them the same free air time Pres. Marcos had enjoyed in advocating his vote of confidence in the amendments to the 1973 Constitution in the coming plebiscite as thus: (1) being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelecr egulations contemplate [ralated to the pleas being impractical under prevailing circumstances, and for its failure to join in the instant petition indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act], for (2.) being more than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the
power and duty to inform the voting populace of indispensable information related to the plebiscitean event of transcendental importance to the government and the people constituting it. In the present scenario the Court also noted that the COMELEC indeed has the power to supervise and regulate but absent any showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or person the right to which it or he is entitled this remedy is not forthcoming. Disposition: Appeal unmeritorious. Obiter Dicta: The Supreme Court could not compel TV stations and radio stations, being indispensable parties, to give UNIDO free air time as they were not impleaded in this case. UNIDO must seek a contract with these TV stations and radio stations at its own expense. The logic of this edict is highlighted if all the other oppositors of the amendment came for judicial recourse; an absurb situation would thus materialize the court being constrained from granting them less aid than justice would heed. No. 285 filed by Madrigal); and (5) Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines (based on Senate Res. No. 295 filed by Biazon). o General Senga requested for postponement due to a pressing operational situation that demands his personal attention. Also, some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters. o Executive Secretary Ermita also requested for postponement so that the requested officials of the Executive Department can have ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues to be discussed. Senate President Drilon responded to this saying that he cannot grant his request since all preparations and arrangements to all resource persons were completed the previous week. o Jose Cortes, Jr., President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation, requested that the hearing on the Northrail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured. September 28, 2005 the President issued EO 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution and For Other Purposes, which pursuant to Sec. 6 thereof took effect immediately. o Sec. 1 Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress All heads of departments of the Executive Branch of Government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress (in accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of 1987 Constitution) o Sec. 2A Nature and Scope Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including: (1) conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this EO; (2) military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged; (3) information between inter-governmental agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements; (4) discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings; and (5) matters affecting national security and public order. o Sec. 2B Who are Covered (1) Senior Officials of executive departments who in the judgment of department heads are covered by the executive privilege; (2) Generals and flag officers of the AFP and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; (3) PNP officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Political Campaigns
Santiago vs Far Easterning Broadcasting UNIDO vs COMELEC National Press Club vs COMELEC Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC
Other Interests
Freedom of Information
Adiong vs COMELEC Senate vs Ermita (G.R. No. 169777) Constitutional Law II Topic: Freedom of Information Date: April 20, 2006 Ponente: Carpio Morales Facts: September 21 23, 2005 Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (North Rail Project). Likewise, the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security issued invitations to some AFP officials (i.e. Senga, Esperon, Mayuga, Danga, Gudani, and Balutan) for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing on September 28, 2005 regarding: (1) Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005 (based on Pimentels privilege speech); (2) Wire-Tapping in the Philippines (based on Jinggoys privilege speech); (3) Clear and Present Danger (based on Biazons privilege speech); (4) Role of Military in Gloriagate Scandal (based on Senate Res.
PNP are covered by the executive privilege; (4) Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; (5) Such other officers as may be determined by the President. o Sec. 3 Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress Officials enumerated in Sec. 2B shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. September 28, 2005 Drilon received another letter from Ermita informing him that the requested executive officials have not secured the required consent from the President so they would not be able to attend the abovementioned hearings. Gen. Senga also sent a letter to Senator Biazon informing him that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security. Despite these, the investigation pushed through with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudan attending. These two were later relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. October 3, 2005 three petitions were filed before the SC challenging the constitutionality of EO 464 o Bayan Muna, Ocampo, Beltran, Mariano, Maza, Virador, Casino, Courage, CODAL claim that EO 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations (i.e. right as a political party to participate in governance, rights and duties as members of Congress, right to tenure of members in public office, duty to uphold the rule of law, right to information and to a transparent government). For this, they prayed that EO 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional; and, that Ermita be prohibited from imposing and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. o Chavez (citizen, taxpayer, law practioner) o Alternative Law Groups, Inc. claims that EO 464 denied to the public their right to information on public concerns. As such, the group prayed that said order be declared null and void and that Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it. October 11, 2005 Senate of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It argued that EO 464 directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern. October 14, 2005 PDP-Laban (political party) filed a similar petition. it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the government. February 2006 Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him to attend the wiretapping hearing. Again, he refused pursuant to EO 464 since their request to attend such was not yet approved by the President. As none of those invited appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was cancelled. In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee (re: mismanagement of fertilizer fund), the invited cabinet officials also invoked EO 464. In the budget hearing set by the Senate, Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez and Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to EO 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita. February 13, 2006 - Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void. Petitioners submit that EO 464 violates the following constitutional provisions: (1) Art. VI, Sec. 21 (Inquiries in aid of Legislation), (2) Art. VI, Sec. 22 (Question Hour), (3) Art. VI, Sec. 1 (Legislative Power), (4) Art. XI, Sec. 1 (Public office is a public trust.), (5) Art. III, Sec. 7 (Right to Information), (6) Art. III, Sec. 4 (Freedom of Speech, Expression, Press, Assembly, etc.), (7) Art. XIII, Sec. 16 (Right of people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decisionmaking shall not be abridged), (5) Art. II, Sec. 28 (Full Public Disclosure of Transactions). Respondents, on the other hand, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
Procedural Issues: Except with respect to requisites of standing and existence of actual case or controversy, where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites for judicial review shall be omitted. 1. WON petitioners have standing 2. WON there is an actual case or controversy Substantive Issues: 3. WON EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress (in the light of the validity of certain sections of EO 464) 4. WON EO 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern 5. WON respondents have committed a grave abuse of discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation Held/ Ratio: 1. Petitioners have legal standing standing except PDPLaban because its allegation that EO 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a generalized interest which it shares with the
rest of political parties. The Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. Yes. As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464. The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress. Sec. 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI, is valid. Likewise, Sec. 2A is also valid as it merely provides guidelines. On the other hand, Secs. 3 and 2B must be invalidated. Validity of Section 1 o Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. o Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. o The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. o Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Validity of Sections 2 and 3 o The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. o No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. o The President may not authorize her
2.
3.
subordinates to exercise power to invoke such privielege. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score. It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. Yes. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. Dispositive: The petitions are partly granted. Sections 2B and 3 of EO 464 are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2A are VALID. Ratio Decidendi: Sec. 1 of EO 464 must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. Sec. 2A must be interpreted as providing guidelines on what is covered by the executive privilege. Concepts: Judicial Review - Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Standing on the Ground of Transcendental Importance - For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. Power of Inquiry - The power of inquiry is coextensive with the power to legislate. Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Executive Privilege - the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress; the right of the President and highlevel executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public o Tribes Varieties of Executive Privilege (1) State Secrets Privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. (2) Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. (3) Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
4.
5.
Neri vs Senate Romulo Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security September 4, 2008. GR No. 180643. 564 SCRA 152 EN BANC. Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro FACTS: Neri appeared before all 3 respondent committees (or respondents) on Sep. 26, 2007 for the hearing on the National Broadband (NBN) Project between the DOTC and ZTE. Neri said that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200M for his approval of the project. Neri also said that he reported this bribery attempt to PGMA and he told him not to accept the bribe. However, Neri refused to answer these 3 questions, invoking executive privilege (EP): a. WON PGMA followed up on the NBN Project b. WON she directed him to prioritize it c. WON she directed him to approve it. Of course the respondent committees tried to force him to answer. Exec. Secretary Eduardo Ermita intervened and requested respondents to stop asking these questions because of EP, invoking Senate vs. Ermita. Neri did not appear on the next hearing because PGMA ordered him not to go, invoking EP. Respondents issued a show cause letter requiring Neri to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. Neri said he did not mean to ignore the hearing. He thought that the remaining questions were covered by the EP anyway, but should respondents have other questions, hed be willing to appear again provided hes given the questions to be asked in advance. Respondents, instead of replying, issued a contempt order against Neri and ordered his detention and arrest. Neri filed for certiorari (the March 25, 2008 decision) and it was granted by SC on 2 grounds: 1) that the communications elicited by the 3 questions were covered by the EP because a. they relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President b. they were received by a close advisor of the President c. respondents failed to show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the info elsewhere by the appropriate investigating body 2) that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a contempt order because a. there was a valid claim of EP b. their invitations to petitioner did not contain the questions relevant to the inquiry c. there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt order d. they violated Consti Art VI Sec 21because their inquiry was not in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure e. they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately So the respondents filed this MR.
ISSUES 1. WON there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system 2. WON there is a factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by the executive privilege 3. WON respondents have shown that the communications elicited by the 3 questions are critical to the exercise of their functions 4. WON respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. HELD and RATIO 1. YES, THERE IS A RECOGNIZED PRESUMPTIVE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE o Senate vs. Ermita, Almonte vs. Vasquez: the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and is rooted in the separation of powers. Also, the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information o In this case, its the president herself through Exec. Sec. Ermita who invoked the EP. In the Senate vs. Ermita case, only executive officials invoked it. o Senate vs. Ermita: when Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege only one executive official may be exempted from this powerthe President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. 2. YES. THERE ARE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES TO HOLD THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED BY THE 3 QUESTIONS ARE COVERED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. Yes, the President has to have the concurrence of the Monetary Board to enter into foreign loans, but the power is still executive in nature. The President still makes the final decision. Even the legislature ahs duties which are essentially legislative even
though they require the participation of the president (ex. passing laws) B. The doctrine of operational proximity was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege, but, in any case, it is not conclusive. Doctrine of operational proximity In Re: Sealed Case: this is used to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege The privilege should apply only to communications authored, solicited, received by staff members who have the duty of investigating and giving advice to the president regarding the subjectmatter at hand. Here, in this case, Neri is a Member of the Cabinet. He is advisor to the president, in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. There is also the organizational test (Judicial Watch, Inc. vs. Dept. of Justice) (NOT defined in the case) The main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President because of their function and their position in the Executives organizational structure Presidents claim of the EP is not merely based on a generalized interest on confidentiality Our diplomatic and economic relations with China will be prejudiced if Neri answers the questions Akbayan vs. Aquino: diplomatic negotiations have a privileged character President cant do her functions well if she and her advisors would be investigated by the Congress everytime o Respondents argue that the SC disregarded, in the March 2008 decision, constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability, disclosure of information, namely : Art III Sec 7, Art II Sec 24 and 28, Art XI Sec 1, Art XVI Sec 10, Art VII Sec 20, Art XII Sec 9, 21, 22) o SC: We didnt say that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. We only say that the 3 questions are covered by the EP and that they must respect the EP. o The right to information is not an absolute right. o The constitutional provisions cited do not espouse an absolute right to information. In o fact, they are about limitations on that right. See Art III Sec7 and Art II Sec28 Chavez vs PCGG: it was said that the right is limited on 1) national security matters (including military and diplomatic matters, and government exchanges prior to signing of treaties and executive agreements), 2) trade secrets and banking transactions, 3) criminal matters, 4) other confidential information NOTE that in this case, what respondents seek is the right to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, NOT the peoples right to information (which the cited provisions of respondents protect)
3.
C.
NO. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE ANSWER TO THE 3 QUESTIONS IS CRITICAL IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS Respondents cant just simply mention statutes or pending bills as a justification for their legislative inquiry The test: The presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by the EP. The burden is on the respondents to show how critical the information sought is in the discharge of their functions and THEY FAILED The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated to the courts need of facts in deciding cases In this case, there is only a generalized assertion that the information is important to the exercise of power to legislate. It wasnt clearly explained by respondents which matters or which pending bills they wont make progress on if the 3 questions werent answered. Even counsel for respondents during oral arguments impliedly admitted that the legislature can still make laws without the need to answer the 3. So, the presumption in favor of confidentiality still stands. Respondents say they also have a duty to curb graft and corruption. SC said this is only an oversight function of the Congress. You shouldnt be too aggressive to find facts in the exercise of this function. Be more aggressive when you do this to make laws. Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee: Congress is not the proper branch to find out whether a public official did something wrong. Its supposed to be the courts. SC: the 3 questions seem to be geared more towards tracing the
bribery to the President. Yes, your goals might be noble, but that is not your function. Leave it to the OMBUDSMAN. no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress. (if, for example, Neri answers the questions, what will the respondents do with it? They failed already to establish the connection of the 3 questions to their legislative duties) Plus, even though you try to seek the truth, you dont have standards of evidence like the Judiciary has. The Ombudsman has been working on this bribery issue already. And it has the duty to do so, not the respondents. since attendance was lacking, its impossible to get a majority vote. What respondents did was craft a contempt order and present it to other members for signing. This is wrong! Consti Sec 21 Art VI. Neri has the right to expect that all the proceedings would follow the rules, but it was not what happened. Rules were NOT published! Respondents say Senate is a continuing body. SC said Yes, the Senate as an institution is a continuing body, BUT, the members, the business, the matters of each Congress is not continuing. Ex. The Rules of the Senate (Rule XLIV Sec 123) (NOT the one earlier) say that all matters pending shall terminate upon the expiration of 1 Congress but may be taken up by the next as if for the first time Senate Rules say that their rules would take effect 7 days after publication in 2 newspapers of general circulation. This DOESNT mean that the previous rules will carry over into the next. Rather, it emphasizes the need for publication! Here in this case, the present Senate merely adopted the published Rules of the previous Senate. What the SC is saying is that even if you decide to adopt previous Rules, you need to publish them still!
4.
4.
YES, THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE CONTEMPT ORDER 4 grounds here: 1. Theres a legitimate claim of EP Already discussed above 2. Senate vs. Ermita requirements are not met An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. Witnesses also have their right to due process! And part of that is to be informed of the matters to be taken up by the inquiry, so they will be able to prepare the information and the documents needed. Neris advance request for the questions is a reasonable one. Respondents should have granted it. The subpoena order did not include the name or number of any Senate pending bill where the answers would be usedthis is required in the Senate vs. Ermita case 3. Court can check if the rules of procedure of the respondents are violative or not of the Constitutionin this case, it was violated The deliberations on the issuance of the contempt order was not attended by a majority of members of the respondents. The Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (or The Rules) , Sec 18, say that there must be a vote of majority of all the members of a Committee before issuing contempt orders! Only 7 were present in the contempt deliberations! The CAPOI has 17 senator members, the CNDS has 18, and CTC has 9 members but only 3 of those 9 attended. So,
Judicial Integrity/Contempt
Cabansag vs Fernandez Zaldivar vs Fernandez People vs Godoy In re: Emil Jurado Santiago vs Far Easterning Broadcasting
Private Property
Adiong vs COMELEC Philippine Press Institute Punzals vs ITCSI
112 | Constitutional Law 2 | Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen | Compilation of Digests | C2014 Privacy Due Process
Webb vs de Leon hours a day or 40 hours a week (Res. No. 00-0227). Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco, Jr., recommended that the Muslim judiciary employees be allowed to hold flexible office hours from 7:30am to 3:30pm without break during Ramadan, and that they be excused from work from 10:00am to 2:00pm every Friday. To compensate for the lost hours, they should be required to observe flexible working hours from 7:00am to 10:00am and from 2:00pm to 7:00pm every Friday.
Freedom of Religion
American Bible Society vs City of Manila Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers Union German vs Barangan Ebranilag vs Superintendent In Re: Request of Muslim Employees in Different Courts In Re: Request of Muslim Employees in Different Courts in Iligan City (2005) J. Callejo, Sr. FACTS: Several Muslim employees in different courts in Iligan City sent a letter (19 November 2001) to Executive Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC Iligan City, requesting that the be allowed to enjoy certain privileges: o To hold office hours from 7:30am to 3:30pm without lunch break or coffee breaks during Ramadan o To be excused from work from 10:00am to 2:00pm every Friday (Muslim prayer day) during the entire calendar year Salazar forwarded the letter to the Office of the Court Administrator averring that he agreed to the first proposal, but had misgivings about the second The Muslim employees invoke P.D. No. 291 (as amended by P.D. No. 322) enacted by Marcos, which reinforced national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and making them part of Philippine national holidays. Sec. 2, P.D. No. 291 contains a list of recognized Muslim holidays, during which Muslim government employees are excused from reporting to work. Sec. 3 further provides that Muslim government employees shall only observe office hours from 7:30am to 3:30pm, without lunch or coffee breaks, without diminution of salary or wages, provided that non-fasting employees are not entitled to such benefits Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) enacted Res. No. 81-1277 (13 November 1981), which adopted the Ramadan measure, as well as that for the Muslim prayer day (no work from 10:00am to 2:00pm), for all Fridays of the calendar year. However, the CSC also prescribed the adoption of a flexible working schedule to accommodate the Muslims Friday prayer day subject to certain conditions, so as not to contravene Sec. 5, Rule 17 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, which requires all civil servants (regardless of religion) to render public service or no less than 8
HELD/RATIO: Recommendation of Court Administrator with respect to the Ramadan measure is well taken The measure has statutory basis in Sec. 3(a), P.D. No. 291 (as amended) Muslim prayer day measure must be denied for lack of statutory basis Office of the Court Attorney (Edna Dio) report: the CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared in its resolutions that Muslim employees are excused from work from 10:00am to 2:00pm every Friday subject to certain conditions. Neither P.D. No. 291 nor P.D. No. 322 mentions the Muslim prayer day as one of the recognized Muslim holidays. Sec. 5, Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution Contains 2 aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause, (2) the free-exercise clause (upon which the subject requests are based) The right to religious profession and worship has a 2fold aspect: freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones beliefs. According to J. Isagani Cruz: o Freedom to believe: absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. o Freedom to act on ones beliefs: subject to state regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Religious freedom can only be enjoyed with a proper regard for the rights of others. Police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. o The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities; it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. The need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce them uniformly to all civil servants (regardless of religion) cannot be disregarded! Sec. 5, Rule 17 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292: interest of the general public to be assured of continuous government service during officer hours, Monday-Friday. To allow Mulsim employees the Muslim prayer day measure would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours (12 hours short of required monthly hours). This would only encourage other religious denominations to request for similar special treatment. The performance of religious practices should not prejudice the courts and the public. The exercise of
religious freedom does not exempt anyone form compliance with reasonable requirements of the law. Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, 259 SCRA 529 (July 26, 1996). Estrada v Escritor, A.M. No. A.M. No. P-02-1651 (June 22, 2006)
Freedom to Associate
Gonzales vs COMELEC
Academic Freedom
Santiago vs Far Easterning Broadcasting
Other Considerations Overbreath/ Void for Vagueness doctrine

Gonzales vs COMELEC Chilling Effect Doctrine David vs Macapagal-Arroyo

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Section 9 Eminent Domain Republic vs Vda De Castellvi

UP Law SecC 2014 Constitutional Law 2 Digests

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Paranaque vs VM Realty Corporation

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A third reading is necessary.

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Section 19 Cruel and Unusual Punishment People vs Echegaray

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Freedom of Expression, Association and Cognate Rights

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Passage from the first Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson

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Preserve Public Institutions

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Santiago has right to contest

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Right as a public political figure

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Relationships between private persons

De Leon vs National Labor Union

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No limitation based on content or on the characteristics of the speaker

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4) Mayor Bagatsing sought support from the Ordinance

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