Hizballah: Deception in the 200 Summer War

By David A. Acosta, Major, USA Editorial Abstract: Major Acosta describes the contemporary Hizballah-Israeli conflict, then provides a extensive analysis of successful deception practices used in the recent campaign. He evaluates use of several information operations core competencies, and explains how traditional deception methods remain relevant in the modern battlespace.

he 2006 summer conflict between Israel and Hizballah was six years in the making. As it played out, certain things became quite clear: Hizballah was ready, Israel was not. Over and over again as the war unfolded not only in southern Lebanon but on the televisions and computers of the rest of the world, the power of Hizballahs deception plan played out. Key to their success was use of deception in support of their overall strategy. Using all means available, Hizballah prosecuted the conflict with very successful results. As one reporter describes: From the onset of the conflict to its last operations, Hizballah commanders successfully penetrated Israel strategic and tactical decision-making cycle across a spectrum of intelligence, military and political operations, with the result that Hizballah scored a decisive and complete victory in its war with Israel. Prior to launching a discussion on the actual deception campaign, this article examines those events leading up to the conflict, as well as describing the other critical pieceHizballahs use of denial in the conflict. Demonstrating effectiveness of this element makes it easier to show how well their deception worked. Criteria used to evaluate Hizballahs acts include the objectives and categories of deception listed by Daniel & Herbig, the techniques listed by Dunnigan and Nofi, and the sensors utilized to pass the information or signal. Table 1 shows example deception evaluation criteria. Background Since its creation in the early 1980s, Hizballah has been fighting a guerrillatype war against Israel. In 1985,

following a nearly three year occupation of most of Lebanon south of Beirut, Israel pulled out of much of Lebanon into a security zone along its northern border. While Israel hoped to stabilize its northern border, Hizballah remained persistent with attacks against Israeli military targets in this area. Twice Israel launched sustained ground offensives outside of their self-proclaimed security zone, in attempts to stop Hizballahs attacks. The IDF launched Operation Accountability in 1993 with the intent of putting pressure on Syrian and Lebanese forces to weaken Hizballah, but to no avail. The second operation, launched in 1996 as Operation Grapes of Wrath, was again aimed at putting pressure on Syrian and Lebanese forces to weaken Hizballah, and it too failed. By the end of the 1990s following nearly two decades of conflict, Israel unilaterally withdrew from its southern security zone in Lebanon after the loss of nearly 1,500 soldiers and low public support for the mission. This withdrawal, as Avi Jorish points out in his book Beacon of Hatred, led many to believe that Hizballah had defeated Israel, and the partys reputation consequently soared throughout the entire Arab world. Following the pullback, Israel and Hizballah engaged in a quasi peace along the southern Lebanese border known commonly as the Blue Line, monitored by members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). A phony war developed on the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon. Nicholas Blanford in Janes Intelligence Review describes the situation between Hizballah and the IDF in a report from 2006: The IR [Islamic Resistance]

Criteria Three Objectives ? - Condition the targets beliefs ? - Influence the targets actions ? - Targets actions must benefit the deceiver ? Sensors targeted ? Type: M-type (Misleading) or A-type (Ambiguity) ? 9 Characteristics ? (concealment, camouflage, false and planted information, ruses, displays, demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight) Table 1. Deception Evaluation Criteria had been attacking the IDF along the Blue Line for six years in a finely calibrated campaign of periodic hitand-run raids, roadside bombings and artillery bombardments. The goal of these actions was, as Blanford describes, to maintain pressure on the IDF without provoking Israel into a massive retaliation that could harm Hizballahs domestic popularity. Furthermore, in an effort to gain the release of its own Israeli held prisoners, Hizballah began a new strategy: the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. The group made five attempts before the July 2006 kidnappings to abduct IDF personnel. Frustrated by Hizballahs previous actions, Israel had enough, and a senior IDF leader stated to the UNIFIL commander that if Hizballah attempted another kidnapping, we will burn Beirut. While this information was passed on to the Lebanese government, no one is certain if it reached Hizballahs leadership. Thus, the situation was quite tense by the early summer of 2006. Even in the days leading up to the 12 July incident, Hizballahs leadership,

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aware of the importance of the tourist season to Lebanons economy, reassured Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora that Hizballah would take no actions against Israel. Meanwhile, standing orders to Hizballahs Islamic Resistance units along the Blue Line went unchanged: exploit Israeli military weaknesses and abduct IDF soldiers given the opportunity. Under these circumstances both sides stood poised for a clash on the morning of 12 July 2006. At a little after nine in the morning local time, an IDF patrol consisting of two Hummvee type-vehicles came under fire from IR forces along the Blue line. Within minutes, the patrolout of communication range with higher headquarters and in a blindspot from IDF covering firehad two dead, three wounded and Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser lay in Hizballahs hands. In the following hours, both Hizballah and the IDF embarked on a series of skirmishes along the border resulting in several Israeli soldiers killed and injured. In Beirut senior Hizballah leaders attempted to calm Lebanese officials fears about Israeli reprisals, even going as so far to speak to the Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. Unlike previous attempts, this time Israel did react swiftly. Within hours Israeli warplanes attacked Hizballah positions along the Blue Line and destroyed several bridges on the Litani River, in an attempt to isolate the southwest portion of the country. As a response, Hizballah began to unleash scores of Katuysha rockets into northern Israel. A new chapter in the battle between Israel and Hizballah had begun. As the bullets and rockets began to fly across the border, both sides identified strategic objectives for the conflict. Anthony Cordesmen from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, points out that from the onset of hostilities the Israeli Cabinet under the direction of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert laid out five key Israeli objectives for the war: Destroy the Iranian Western Command before Iran could go nuclear. 1

Restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and countering the image that Israel was weak and forced to leave. Force Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state, and end the status of Hizballah as a state within a state. Damage or cripple Hizballah, with the understanding that it could not be destroyed as a military force and would continue to be a major political actor in Lebanon. Bring the two capture Israeli soldiers back alive without major trades in prisoners held by Israel.

Beirut during the 2006 Summer War. (Defense Link) On the other side, Hizballah had its own objectives. Their main goal lay in humiliating Israel by sheer survival, as Hizballahs Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah pointed out in an interview on 21 July. Nasrallah claimed the victory we are talking about is when the resistance survives. When its will is not broken, then this is a victory. While not much else is known of their objectives, because of the tight security within Hizballah, perhaps another can be found in Ron Schliefers piece, Psychological Operations: A New Variation of an Age Old Art: Hizballah versus Israel. Schliefer describes psychological warfare executed by

Hizballah in their campaign to push Israel out of southern Lebanon, leading up to the 2000 withdrawal. Schliefer exerts [Hizballah] launched a guerilla war psychologically waged, meaning the organization attacked IDF soldiers not to conquer land, but as an end in itself. By drawing out and killing Israeli soldiers, Hizballahs objective was reducing Israeli morale and public opinion to the point where the IDF would withdrawas they had done in 2000. Thus, much of the Hizballahs battle plan lay in the use of information operations to wear down Israel. The war played out on land, in the air, and at sea across Lebanon and northern Israel. Shortly after the commencement of hostilities, Israel began a naval blockade of Lebanese ports, hoping to cut off arms shipments to Hizballah. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched what seemed like a brutal series of attacks, first aimed at Hizballah missile and rockets sites in southern Lebanon, but then turning on critical Lebanese infrastructure. This included crucial road intersections, bridges, and even the Beirut airport, in images reminiscent of Lebanon in the mid-1980s. Despite the IAFs destruction of 54 long range rocket and missile launch sites in 39 minutes, on the first day of the conflict, Hizballah continued a daily rain of shorter range Katyusha rockets on Israels northern towns and villages. By the end of the first 72 hours, Israels air campaign showed little results of degrading Hizballahs capabilities, and the chances of Israel achieving a decisive victory became increasinglyand highlyunlikely. By 17 July, Israel turned to the ground option to combat Hizballah in the south of Lebanon. Land forces yielded little more than the air option, as IDF forces quickly found that the guerrilla force in front of them was quite exceptional. We didnt know what hit us, observed one IDF soldier in a Sunday Times interview, In seconds we had two dead. As units pushed north, many found themselves surrounded at times, fighting a true asymmetric threat as guerrillas swarmed seemingly from all sides with anti-tank missiles and other weapons. Because of this slow going, Winter 2008

the ground war had to be expanded to account for the problems Israeli forces faced as their blitzkrieg style assault ground to a halt. In early August, with Israel unable to score a decisive victory, the UN pushed all sides in the conflict towards a ceasefire. On 14 August, both Hizballah and Israel agreed to the cease-fire proposal and the guidelines of UN resolution 1701. In 34 days of fighting Israel sent nearly 30,000 soldiers to fight in southern Lebanon, while reports of Hizballahs numbers are considerably less, perhaps as low as 3000, or just one brigades worth of militia. Even on the last day before the cease-fire, Hizballah rockets and missiles continued to rain down on Israel, despite all prior Israeli actions. UN Resolution 1701 provided that the Lebanese Army, under the observation of increased UNIFIL force would ensure Hizballah leaves southern Lebanon, the likes of which remain to be seen. At the termination of hostilities little had changed, and Hizballah was left still standing, deception having played a key role at the tactical and operational levels to shape the outcome of the battle. Hizballahs Denial Operations Even before the conflict started, Hizballah began its campaign to control the information battlespace with Israel. The groups ability to maintain operational security, and deny Israel the critical information it would need to adjust its battleplans during the course of the conflict, would have significant repercussions. By controlling the information environment, Hizballah in effect dictated the rules of the game. Key to denial is having access to the enemys sensors. There are two strikingly different examples of how Hizballah targeted Israeli sensors and exploited them to support the war effort. The first comes through more traditional means, namely the use of spies. The second, broader example, deals with the accessibility of information in a closed society versus an open one. Both methods of denial significantly contributed to both the war effort, and the deception plans employed throughout.

The use of spies is one of the oldest methods of intelligence gathering known in warfare and Hizballah made good use of it. Significantly, Hizballahs agents made major inroads in the previous ten years of counterintelligence efforts against Israel, and in the summer of 2006 this work paid off. In an Asia Times article, authors Alistair Crooke and Mark Perry write over a period of two years, Hizballahs intelligence officials had built a significant signals-counterintelligence capability Hizballah had identified key Israeli human-intelligence assets in Lebanon. They add that in the month before the abduction of the two IDF personnel, the Lebanese government with assistance from Hizballah broke up an Israeli spy ring inside Lebanon. Finally, Crooke and Perry remark that Hizballah had successfully turned a number of Lebanese civilian assets reporting on the location of major Hizballah military caches in southern Lebanon to Israeli intelligence officers. These actions, which had dire consequences for the Israelis, were critical to Hizballahs deception plan. In effect they effectively closed down Israels human intelligence capability, often regarded for its intelligence dominance in previous conflicts with its Arab neighbors. The other key element to Hizballahs denial campaign involved the high degree of internal security within this organization. As a state within a state, Hizballah demonstrated a high level of security among its members, using two primary ways to control its information footprint. The first involves its soldiers and militia on the ground. So secretive were Hizballah preparations for the conflict, reportedly no single commander knew the location of each bunker from which they would be fighting. Additionally, after being hidden during several attempts on his life, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah remarked on how good Hizballahs security apparatus was, noting Not even I knew where I was. Alongside the individual security and denial that Hizballah exhibited, they tightly controlled open source

information coming out of Lebanon. This allowed Hizballah to tell their story better than Israel, because there was only one story to tell and then only told by a few high ranking people in Hizballahs organization. Hizballahs information campaign opens a debate in some circles on lessons from the war. Marvin Kalb describes it this way: If we are to collect lessons from this war, one of them would have to be that a closed society can control the image and the message that it wishes to convey to the rest of the world far more effectively than can an open society, especially one engaged in an existential struggle for survival. An open society becomes victim of its own openness A closed society conveys the impression of order and discipline; an open society, buffeted by the crosswinds of reality and rumor, criticism and revelation, conveys the impression of disorder, chaos and uncertainty Hizballah never admitted how many casualties it took during the fighting, another indicator of the high level of security it maintains. Thus having a closed society with tight control over the media picture greatly enhanced Hizballahs ability to control information broadcast to the rest of the world. This closed society greatly contributed to their overall denial capabilities because it produced a limited information signature, greatly restricting Israels ability to obtain open source information. Again and again throughout the conflict, these two key denial operations would be very significant, not only within the overall conflictbut more importantly to this discussionHizballahs deception operations. By examining these operations in depth, and evaluating their effectiveness, Hizballahs successes become even clearer. Battle Plans As mentioned earlier, after the first 72 hours of Israeli airstrikes against targets across Lebanon, IDF leaders decided to begin limited ground incursions into southern Lebanon. The Israelis very quickly discovered they were in for a surprise. Hizballah began

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preparing its future battle plan on the Israel again crossed over into southern it and Israel: EW. Reports suggest heels of Israels earlier withdrawal from Lebanon, much of the intelligence Hizballah, probably assisted with Iranian southern Lebanon, in 2000. driving their planning proved false, and supplied technology, was able to intercept Hizballah undertook an elaborate Israeli ground forces paid the price for Israels secure frequency hopping radio construction effort of display fortifications this intelligence failure. transmissions, monitoring information along the Blue Line, with the intent of Evaluating this case of tactical on troop movements, casualty reports deceiving information gathering assets deception shows just how successful and supply routes. As one Israeli officer such as Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles it really was. Furthermore, based on claims, They monitored our secure (UAV), UNIFIL observers and Lebanese the Dunnigan & Nofis examples, these communications in the most professional spying for Israel. Meanwhile, in secret fake bunkers are prime examples of way, adding that Hizballah would send locations out of sight of information displays, in that they attempt to make it [casualties names] to their Al-Manar gathering assets, Hizballah built their the enemy see what isnt there and TV, which broadcast it almost live, long real bunkers. It was a classic example of that youre simply attempting to make before the official Israeli radio. This military deception; Hizballah purposely it appear other than what it really is. action clearly represented an effective lured observers into believing that the Looking at the type of deception (Table use of PSYOP as well, designed to openly visible bunkers should be targeted 2), using the Daniel & Herbigs model, erode popular support for the war back if conflict occurred. Asia Times reporters these fake bunkers fall into the realm of in Israel. The alleged sophistication of Alistair and Crooke note these electronic attacks that at the same time, underscored how the Criteria Evaluation Hizballahs construction Three Objectives? Shia group had higher - Israel felt it knew where Hizballahs of real bunkers went - Condition the targets beliefs? military capabilities than bunkers were and attacked them early on. f o r w a r d i n a r e a s - Influence the targets actions? many in Israel and the - Hizballah was able to operate from kept hidden from the - Targets actions must benefit the United States originally deceiver? the real bunkers with little threat from Lebanese population. thought. Israeli attacks They go on to add that Sensors targeted? While Israel did not Israeli UAVs, UNIFIL observers, Nearly 600 separate publicly comment on Lebanese spies. a m m u n i t i o n a n d Type: what it did to counter M-type: the fake bunkers served to weapons bunkers were M-type or A-type? this threat, Hizballahs mislead the IDFs attacks. strategically placed in 9 Characteristics? EW attacks prompted one Display: making the enemy see what isnt there. Israel and UNIFIL saw the region south of the (concealment, camouflage, false and former Israeli general to bunkers but did not see the real bunkers Litani. When asked planted information, ruses, displays, remark that the groups demonstrations, feints, lies, and until combat began about these bunkers, insight)y listening capabilities had Senior IDF commanders disastrous consequences reported that Its a very for Israels offensive in Table 2. Evaluation of Bunker Deception hilly area and its not southern Lebanon. The easy. You cannot identify their bunkers misleading or M-type because these news of Hizballahs EW attacks and until youre right there. The tunnels displays took attention off of the main penetration of Israels secure airwaves and bunkers built in view of Israeli and effort: Hizballahs construction and have since proven untrue. During and UNIFIL observers, along with the targets defense of the real bunker system. The immediately following the conflict both fed back to Israel through Hizballahs overall effectiveness can be measured in US and Israeli technicians examined the counterintelligence operations, identified the statements above taken from UNIFIL problem of whether or not Hizballah key emplacements that did not, in fact, representatives and IDF leaders, in that could actually listen in to supposedly exist. As one former UNIFIL observer they knew virtually nothing about the secure frequency-hopping technology. describes We were meant to see these extent of the real bunkers, and focused In Aviation Week & Space Technology things They were not making any effort almost entirely on the fake ones. This author David Fulghum paints a more to stop us looking they really fooled case serves as a textbook example of realistic pictureand the title says it all: us on that one. In comparison to the tactical deception in warfare. Doubt as a Weapon. The first to expose decoy bunkers another UNIFIL officer this deceptive act, Fulghum noted Electronic Warfare Bluff reported to Janes on the real bunkers: Hizballah is incapable of penetrating We never saw them build anything. Another successful use of deception, and exploiting the Israeli armys tactical They must have brought the cement in Hizballahs electronic warfare (EW) radio systems as it claimed it did during by the spoonful. The bunker deception bluff also contributed to their overall the recent fighting in Lebanon, pointing was reinforced by the tight secrecy that battle plan. From the onset it appeared to senior US electronics officials for Hizballah maintained through all the Hizballah was using a new, previously reference. The author continues: What years leading up to the battle. Thus when unseen weapon in the conflict between theyre really doing is a very good

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psychological operations one of the things you want to do is instill doubt. Hizballah makes the pronouncement that they can read encrypted radios. They wanted the IDF troops to believe they werent as invulnerable as they thought. It ran like wildfire through the US troops as well. What youre witnessing is unsophisticated technology exploited by sophisticated information operations. They scored big time in the psychological warfare department the enemy is figuring out ways to use the information age against us. The article points out what most likely occurred: confusion by other news agencies, in which reporters confused cell-phone and frequency hopping radio technology. Listening into cell phones is a basic signals intelligence techniqueeasily accomplished since everybody out there has a cell phone. In what might be considered part of the EW bluff, UNIFIL supplied another bit of evidence regarding Israels vulnerabilities. In his piece on the medias role in the 2006 conflict, Marvin Kalb argues UNIFIL published information on its official website about Israeli troop movements, information that in military circles would be regarded as actionable intelligence. He provides examples such as key IDF units being reinforced, types of equipment traveling across the border, and which directions these units headed on various days during the battle. While it is impossible to know for certain whether Hizballah acted on the information provided by UNIFIL, Kalb suggests it would be silly not to consider this as a prime Hizballah intelligence source. Having already seen the resilience of Hizballah in preparing the defense of southern Lebanon, and knowing they have an organic OSINT capability, one cannot put it past this organization to use these sources to help put together a very credible EW deception. Hizballahs EW bluff serves as another effective use of deception in this conflict, highlighting their capability to conduct more sophisticated information operations as well. While this seems to be more of a problem for Israel at the

tactical level, it has operational level implications as well: specifically, it forced Israel to rethink its communications network in the wake of Hizballahs alleged EW capabilities. Again, this is a case of a misleading deception type, whereby Hizballah sought to convince Israel of the attractiveness of one wrong alternativethat their communication system security had been compromised. Hizballahs dissemination system passed false and planted information through sources like Al-Manar, and other media outlets and reports. While Israeli statements clearly show they were convinced Hizballah could listen into their radios, it is unknown how the IDF respondedbut it most likely had the psychological effect of painting them as

Israeli ground and air campaigns would only further allow Hizballah to paint a picture of disproportionately of Israeli acts. With all of these results in mind, the EW bluff successfully benefited Hizballahs overall campaign plan. Table 3 summarizes this example. Another key lesson from this example are the linkages between various information activities. Like many deception operations, while Hizballah bluffed about their exact capabilities, a certain amount of truth existed in the lie. They successfully exercised electronic warfare by being able to listen into Israeli cell phones, and exploiting other information sources as part of the deception. Hizballah also used information broadcast on Al-Manar for PSYOP purposes. Finally, Fulghum describes this deception tactic as having PSYOP implications, because Hizballah wanted the IDF troops to believe they werent as invulnerable as they thought The same effect ran like wildfire through the US troops as well. Only months after the conflict, when engineers explained the impossibility of the act, did Israeli and US fears subside. But by that time, the damage was done. Media & The Battle of the Story One of most remembered aspects of the 2006 Summer Conflict will be the medias role in the war. Hizballahs use of media shows just how effective it can be in modern deception operations. Radio, TV and the Web became a primary weapon against Israel, and a key deception tool. Marvin Kalb describes it this way: During the summertime war in Lebanon, it [the Internet] helped produce the first really live war in history not until this war have networks actually projected in real time the grim reality of the battlefieldpictures of advancing or retreating Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, homes and villages being destroyed during bombing runs, old people wandering aimlessly through the debris, some tailed by children hugging tattered dolls, Israeli airplanes attacking Beirut airport, Hizballah rockets striking northern Israel and Haifa, forcing

Lebanese call for help message. (Associated Press) no longer invulnerable. Furthermore, on the objective of being able to benefit from the targets actions, Hizballah made out in a more subtle way. As the fight continued and casualties mounted, many reservists called up for the war began to wonder why they were being sent out as cannon fodder into Hizballah-controlled villages, instead of air strikes going in first. An 11 August 2006 survey conducted by an Israeli newspaper found that 91% of respondents felt the IDF should bomb villages to take out Hizballah, versus only 8% who felt that ground forces should be used instead. The results only served to benefit Hizballah because of their control of the story inside Lebanon.

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Criteria Three Objectives? - Condition the targets beliefs? - Influence the targets actions? - Targets actions must benefit the deceiver? Sensors targeted? Type: M-type or A-type? 9 Characteristics? (concealment, camouflage, false and planted information, ruses, displays, demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight)

Evaluation - Israel thought Hizballah could listen to secure radio communication. Hizballah forced Israel to re-look their actions. - Hizballah appeared to be stronger than it really was through this act. Media, open source intelligence M-type: this bluff the attractiveness of one wrong alternative (the capability to listen to secure radio comms) Lies: While able to listen to cell phones, Hizballah could not listen to secure radio communications, but said they could.

Table 3. Evaluation of EW Bluff 300,000 to evacuate their homes and area became a key part of their defense; move into underground sheltersall it could now reach out via satellite conveyed live, as thought the world broadcasts to Israel and much of the had a front-row seat on the blood and Arab world. gore of modern warfare. Satellite broadcast of Al-Manar Kalb adds that because so much began on 25 May 2000, coinciding information was now available to with the day that Israel pulled its last the media and the public, a shift in forces out of southern Lebanon, and as information flow occurred. Once upon Avi Jorisch describes, came to signify a time, he writes, such information freedom from Israeli occupation. By was the stuff of military intelligence the summer of 2006 Israelis could turn acquired with considerable efforts and on their televisions and be exposed risk; now it has become the stuff of to daily propaganda broadcasts from everyday journalism. The camera and Beirut including My Blood and the the computer have become weapons Riflehighlighting Hizballah fighters of war. who died fighting against Israeland Hizballah realized the power of The Spiders House, a talk show pointing manipulated media years before the out both the weakness of the Zionist conflict, and exploited this to the fullest entity. Al-Manars reporting skills had during this war. Hizballahs use of the also developed over the years. Long media shows where deception can be before the US picked up the concept of found in information warfare. Essentially, embedded reporters, Hizballah placed Hizballahs deception operations utilized Al-Manar reporters inside elements of the media to conceal the locations of the groups Islamic Resistance militia. its rocket sitesoften located in urban Schliefer highlights this as a key channel areasand deflect attention from their of communication own actions, while painting a picture f o r H i z b a l l a h s of Israels disproportionate response to PSYOP capability, the kidnapping the two IDF personnel. and goes so far as to There are two examples of how the sum up Hizballahs media became a conduit of Hizballahs p r o p a g a n d a deception plans: through Hizballahs machine thusly: internal media, Al-Manar; and through If you havent external media such as CNN, and other captured it on film world networks. Al-Manar had long you havent fought. been Hizballahs primary propaganda F u r t h e r m o r e , tool; one journalist goes so far to say that h e a d d s t h a t Al-Manar was to Hizballah what Pravda H i z b a l l a h was to the Soviet Union. In Hizballahs r e g a r d e d t h e preparations for another conflict with video as an object Hizballah bunker uncovered near UN outpost. Israel, expanding Al-Manars coverage of operation and (Israeli Defense Forces)

that in the run up to the 2000 Israeli withdrawal saw how it was possible to net large military and psychological dividends from a video camera and a patrol. By summer 2006, Al-Manar had mastered this technique, placing its reporterswho many believed were trained fightersinto guerrilla units, having them record the battles and then broadcasting the material around the region. Even more interesting is the fact that other networks such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya used this footage, without checking the validity of AlManars version of events. Such usage aided in Hizballahs deception of unit locations and Katyusha rocket launching sites. In addition, pictures from the war zone often made their way to the front page of newspapers and Internet sites from sources inside the conflict area, without verification of their authenticity. Because Hizballah tightly controlled the operating environment through a variety of OPSEC activities, only the information they wanted released usually made it out of Lebanon and into news broadcasts, websites, or newspapers. Hizballah even began giving guided tours of bombed out neighborhoods, stating reporters could only take pictures of sites approved by their Hizballah minders. Violations they were told, would be treated harshly offending reporters would never again be allowed access to Hizballah officials or Hizballah-controlled areas. Some reporters recognized it for exactly what it was: attempts to create and control stories. Yet few journalists did

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anything about this, and continued to tell Hizballahs narrative to the world, whether it was true or not. This theme resonated disproportionately, seen across the world from Yahoo News to CNN and from Al-Jazeera to the BBC. Content analysis from Harvards Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy found in repeated surveys that based on media content in various outlets both in the Middle East and in the West, Israel was consistently labeled the aggressor in the conflict. Hizballah did this to deceive the masses about what was really happening: the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, the daily rocket attacks against Israeli from inside populated areas, and Hizballahs own tactics for fighting the war. Unlike other deception operations Hizballah utilized, this one would have mixed results. The information age truly puts an emphasis on the individual and even the populace as the centers of gravity or target audiences in conflicts. No longer are they purely military-on-military battles, but the possibility exists that every single person with access to a cell phone or computer can contribute to the war effortas witnessed in the summer conflict. With one audience Hizballahs media deception proved very effective; with another it was exposed for what it was: a fraud. Following the initiation of hostilities Hizballah was publicly rebuffed by many Arab states (to include Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt) for kidnapping two IDF soldiers, describing the action as reckless and full of adventurism. However, these countries populaces did not share the same opinion. As the conflict wore on and Hizballah continued to stand up to Israeli air and ground attacks, many of the same governments founds themselves in trouble. A growing schism developed between the governments who had earlier rebuffed Hizballah, and their people. In the midst of the conflict Faiza Ambah of the Washington Post stated that in respect to the conflict that for these Arab governments that each day the assault continues, they lose popularity and the respect of their people. Hassan Nasrallah became a hero across countries

like Egypt and Jordan as people took to the streets in support of Hizballah, and to denounce their own governments for not supporting the extremist group. As hostilities continued, public opinion forced these same governments to reverse course on earlier statements and try to take an uneasy middle ground, while distancing themselves from both Israel and the United States. Jordan dispatched medical teams to Lebanon to help the victims of Israeli aggression while Saudi Arabia threatened to pull the plug on a 2002 peace plan between Arab states and Israel. While the Arab states fell for Hizballahs ploy, something very different happened in the United States. If there are three names to remember for the summer conflict, they will probably be Hizballah Leader Hassan Nasrallah, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud

Figure 1. A doctored Adnan Hajj photo. (Reuters) Olmert, and photographer Adnan Hajj. While Nasrallah and Olmert will be remembered for their roles as leaders, Hajj will probably be remembered for something very different. Working for Reuters, Adnan Haj took the photographs in Figure 1: the first being the original and the second being doctored and sent out across the wire services. Shortly after the photo was published, the website Little Green Footballs ran an entry questioning the authenticity of the photo. This website, already popular for exposing the fraudulent memos regarding President Bushs career in the Air National Guard, which ultimately forced Dan Rather to resign from CBS News, again struck a coup of sorts. Within days Reuters pulled these photos, and all photos Hajj had

taken, and issued an apology. While it is unclear whether or not Hajj was working for Hizballah, the fact remains that he was attempting to execute his own deception operation which supported Hizballahs overall objectives. This was not the only time this occurred during the conflict; several bloggers banded together against other reportedly doctored photographs taken in Lebanon to combat what they saw as the lamestream media. This incident showed a powerful new tool in combating deception in the information age. If journalists were part of new weapons systems, then bloggers are now finding themselves in a role as a club against the entire mainstream media. In an interview, Ravi Nessman of the Jerusalem office of the Associated Press asserts that the influence of bloggers was unprecedented in this conflict and that when the bloggers [in the US] discovered that photographs had been doctored, the credibility of the bloggers skyrocketed and our credibility plummeted. Hizballahs use of deception finally met a speedbump. The use of information technology is not a traditional deception operation. But in evaluating this deception tactic, it is possible to see how the information age is producing new opportunities for deception in warfare. First of all, Hizballah took measures to simultaneously condition different targets beliefs, quite apparent in the responses of US versus middle eastern audiences to the media narrative. Specifically, Hizballahs story influenced those governments once seen as hostile to the organization at the onset of hostilities, to reverse their opinions. This leads to the final objective set forth by Daniel and Herbig: being able to benefit from the deception. Hizballah profited from the targets actions not only through direct aidas was the case with Jordanbut in further isolating Israel through Saudi Arabias actions. While in the West, the rise of bloggers had a reverse effect on the populace, and in fact helped challenge the medias role in the deception outrightsomething never been seen before in a conflict. Deception type in this case would fall into the category of ambiguity, increasingly

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because of the varied audiences and many other supporting facilities such as found at that IP address, and the hijack is global network of ideas readily available antenna and broadcasting sites. Despite complete. If the hijack goes undetected, to the massesno one was really sure repeated attempts by the IDF to put the the IP address can be linked to a new what to believe. television network out of commission, domain name, opening up the site to Examining the types of deception, Al-Manar broadcast continuously from anyone who might search online for Althis example lies in the realm of false and hidden locationsand even thwarted Manar content. planted information. Hizballah controlled hacking attempts by IDF intelligence In the past, many companies would the story and what was published, and corps elements. Ultimately, the IDFs not realize such a takeover occurred, could often be found working behind the hacking campaign only affected the and groups such as Hizballah could get scenes to ensure the story was perfect. In internal Lebanese broadcasts of Al- away with it. This tactic proved very essence, they created their own television Manar, but the rest of the Arab street useful for terrorists or insurgent groups show to be broadcast around the world maintained an uninterrupted satellite to continue to get their messages out, via more mainstream media channels. feed for the duration of the war. even if it was impossible to do so from On the final aspect of sensors in this This cyber war between IDF hackers their home countries. While similar deception, it is becoming ever more and Al-Manar pushed the conflict into a instances of cyber deception worked in apparent in the information age a new new arena. Hizballah turned to hiding and the past, this time it failed due to the work sensor now existsunaddressed before hijacking on the Internet in an attempt to of networked groups like the Society in military operations: for Internet Research, an Criteria Evaluation the individual. How an informal consortium of - Through al-Manar & other new individual responds to the Three Objectives? self-described freelance - Condition the targets beliefs? agencies on the ground, Hizballah story and the networks, - Influence the targets actions? counterterrorists who sit painted its story to the world. and comes together with - Targets actions must benefit the in home offices and dens - Arab audiences were convinced of Hizballahs actions and it reversed others to make their deceiver? tracking jihadist activity the attitudes of the governments. voice(s) heard, is clearly on the Internet. It was The media, also the individual. a new type of sensor. Sensors targeted? this group that tracked M-type: Hizballah sought to mislead This challenge s the Type: Hizballahs web activities audiences and decisionmakers from existing information flow M-type or A-type? to the Texas cable company their true actions inside Lebanon. structure, particularly and notified US authorities, False and planted information: i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e 9 Characteristics? who in turn shut down the (concealment, camouflage, false and Hizballah only showed the reporters bureaucracies, as a key planted information, ruses, displays, IP address. As a result, what they wanted, the reporters means of influencing demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight) Hizballahs Al-Manar was broadcast the facts that they had. decision makers. forced to look for other Table 4. Evaluation of the Media Altogether this is a IPs until its own could mixed case of deception, be re-established after the because what worked to change the restore its message of resistance. Hilary war. While this case of cyber-hijacking minds of leaders in the Middle East failed Hylton of Time researched this aspect is not as strong a deception case as the dramatically in the United States. The use of Hizballahs information plan, and previous examples, it still deserves of the media as a tool for deception, and found that militant Lebanese hackers mentionit shows the lengths groups its challenge from networked individuals, searched the Internet for vulnerable like Hizballah will go to in an effort clearly shows a new instrument of war in sites to hijack, and then communicate to put out their messages. Examining the information age. Table 4 summarizes with one another. She states Hizballah deception type criteria, this action does this deception operation. uses these Web sites to run recruitment not meet the idea of conditioning a videos and post bank account numbers targets beliefs; rather it is simply an act Hijacking The Internet where supporters can donate funds designed for the deceiver to hide within The final case of deception focuses on and that these communications portals the target, and maintain some level of deceit in cyber conflicts. Like the media, are critical as Hizballah tries to get cover and concealment. Furthermore, cyberspace is a newer nontraditional its global message out to the world. there is no influence aspect to the area for deception, and like the media One hijacking occurred on a US South targets actions. However, by having an it was the work of individuals outside Texas cable company: Al-Manar linked open IP address the deceiver is able to of state run institutions who stood up to to the small cable companys internet benefit from the targets actions. This challenge these deceptive acts. As Israel protocol (IP) addressessentially case is best considered in the category mounted its bombing campaign against adding an extension to their telephone of concealment or camouflage, yet does Hizballah in the summer of 2006, one line, allowing message traffic to flow. not fit into either of the two types of of the prime targets became not only the Hizballah then gets the word out through deception identified: neither ambiguity headquarters of Al-Manar television, but e-mail and blogs that they can now be increasing, nor misleading. Therefore,

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Criteria Three Objectives? - Condition the targets beliefs? - Influence the targets actions? - Targets actions must benefit the deceiver? Sensors targeted?

Evaluation - IP addresses in cyberspace for its alManar websites. - Networked groups around the US looked for and found these hijacked sites. The only sensors targeted were unknowing ISPs who had no idea what Hizballah was doing. Neither type fits into this criteria for deception because it success lies in staying hidden. Concealment: Hizballah hid from plain view and known IP addresses after Israel destroyed many of their support facilities in Lebanon.

Type: M-type or A-type? 9 Characteristics? (concealment, camouflage, false and planted information, ruses, displays, demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight)

Table 5. Evaluation of Internet Hijacking this case provides the possibility for a new type of deceptionone in which the deceiver attempts pure concealment. Regarding sensors, cyber hijacking primarily rests on the host leaving its systems back doors open for these hacking bodies to exploit. Finally, the case of cyber hijacking reinforces the power of the individual or networks to counter this and similar threats in cyberspace. While seemingly a weak form of deception within the cyber warfare realm, the fact that networks like the Society for Internet Research are patrolling the Internet on their own without government involvement shows another prime example of how the information age empowers traditional noncombatants. The cyber fighters take matters into their own hands, and counter deception from the comfort of their own homes. Table 5 summarizes the Internet hijacking case, demonstrating how concept of deception still plays out in cyberspace today. Conclusion The preceding paragraphs present several cases of deception from the Israel-Hizballah conflict, along with supporting information on how Hizballah managed to deny Israel many of their traditional sources of information. This allowed Hizballah to dominate Israel, in ways unforeseen only a short time ago. Traditional forms of deception are still very applicable to modern warfare, while at least one of the last two cases shows how using the media is transforming deception in the information age. The last instance of Internet hijacking shows how groups like Hizballah hide in cyberspace, utilizing unknowing targets to further their objectives.

There are still key lessons to be learned and applied regarding deception in these types of conflict. Regardless of how Israel may portray its accomplishments during the recent conflict, including destruction of Hizballahs missile capabilities and reducing the organizations ability to wage war, Hizballah still managed to spin a story of success: an IO campaign ripe with deception. Delivery of the deception signal to sensors, and that signals interpretation by not just traditional agencies but by networked individuals, has become as important as bullets fired at the enemy. Hizballah realized the importance of the concept, and employed it fervently in this conflict. Forces around the world must be aware of these deception tactics and methods less they face the same fate as Israel; the clock is ticking.

Bibliography/references for this article are on the IO Sphere Home Page at: https://www.jiowc.osis.gov/ Publications/IOSphere/index.cfm Click on the updates link under the Winter 2008 issue

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Strategic Communication: Distortion and White Noise

By Charles S. Gramaglia, Lieutenant Commander, USN Editorial Abstract: The author examines the current state of Strategic Communication, highlighting a lack of clarity in US Government guidance, and a range of confusion-inducing behaviors and attitudes among different departments. He proposes doctrinal and educational solutions to help curb current levels of information fratricide. Introduction Strategic Communication (SC) is a relatively new construct to the Department of Defense (DOD) and its component services and agencies. The relationship between SC and other DOD activities is currently evolving at the highest levels of the department. This state of flux had led to widespread misunderstanding and to misguided efforts by lower echelons to define SC, often in ways to advance their organizational interests. The absence of unified direction permits DOD components to create messages and themes that compete with those SC is intended to communicate. Joint doctrine recognizes that lower echelon components may define a term differently, and it further stipulates that in such cases joint doctrine takes precedence. Such a hierarchy of terminology is a coherent and useful means to permit freedom of action at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, and enables the Services to conduct their Title X responsibilities (organize, train, and equip) with greater efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless, such a hierarchical construct cannot be applied to Strategic Communication without destroying its meaning. The process that is SC is intrinsically anchored to the Presidents policies, therefore it cannot be separated from the content it conveys. SC is intended to enable unified action throughout the interagency environment. DOD in its entirety can only support, as one of numerous players although often the most visible and well resourcedthe larger executive branch-wide effort. This article examines the nature of strategic communication, current joint and service SC doctrine, assesses the unnecessary friction created by these various constructs, and makes recommendations for improving SC unity of effort. What is Strategic Communication? Strategic communication is the process to synchronize the actions and verbal communications of all departments and independent agencies of the executive branch, in order to make real the Presidents policies and achieve his desired ends. SC is not the creation of policy, it is the process specifically, the synchronization of disparate operations, activities and other effortsto achieve the goals or objectives of National policy and strategy. [Emphasis added.] (Dr. Steve Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 11 December 2006, USSOCOM Conference.) Employing SC-like processes to pursue lower-echelons ends, regardless of those ends value, means that such actions can not be considered strategic communication. Policies and strategic communication cannot be separated. (Defense Science Board, 2004, p. 3) SC involves all elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME). Strategic communication processes and supporting capabilities must be included in all aspects of the federal governments activities and synchronized vertically and horizontally. (Murphy, et al., 2006, p. 55) Any DOD programs or actions to support SC must be synchronized, via interagency coordination, throughout the executive branch of the USG, to ensure coherent physical and informational activities. There is no single lead agency with formal tasking authority responsible for developing an information strategy for promoting and magnifying the USGs goals and objectives. (Ecklund, 2005, p. 6) Simply, the various USG departments, agencies, and organizations must coordinate what they say and do to create unity of effort. Strategic Communication must include themes, synchronized across the departments and agencies, and messages reinforced by premeditated actions. (Josten, 2006, p. 16.) Operationalizing SC SC is not a capability, and military commanders do not control SC assets. However, commanders engage in certain activities that provide enormous utility to communicate SC themes and messages. Unfortunately, doctrine released by the Joint Staff diverges from that provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on what these activities are. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication (hereafter, SC Roadmap), dated 25 September 2006, identifies five primary communication supporting capabilities: 1. Public Affairs 2. Aspects of Information Operations, principally Psychological Operations 3. Military Diplomacy 4. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy 5. Visual Information, principally Combat Camera. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, dated 26 December 2006, states that the predominant military activities that promote SC themes and messages are:

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informational dimension. be engaged (DASD(JC), USJFCOM Certainly informational Briefing, 2007.) dimension effects can SC is employed to create cognitive s u b s e q u e n t l y c r e a t e effects in order to elicit specific behavior second-order cognitive or actions from identified groups or effects. Nevertheless, individuals. As SC focuses on specific it is overly restrictive audiences, the diplomatic, economic, to assert such indirect and particularly the military elements means are the onlyor of national power can often times be even the primarymeans leveraged more effectively than can the of creating effects in the information element to create the desired cognitive dimension. The effects. The arrival on-station of a carrier coordination and integrated strike group, or a decline in tax revenue Figure 1. The relationship of DOD support to the planning of kinetic military due to US-sponsored trade sanctions, are larger USG SC process. The inclusion of feedback activities is potentially the much more likely to create intense and mechanisms, media analysis under Operations most unambiguous SC immediate cognitive effects on a nations Research, and Defense Intelligence, is notable and capability. decision-makers than any mass media are critical to understanding key audiences. It Strategic Communi- delivered information. further illustrates ongoing efforts to provide greater cation is neither a subset White Noise: Contradictions in granularity to SC at the highest levels of DOD nor a product of the Joint Doctrine information element of 1. Information Operations national power. Rather, SC focuses Even within joint doctrine, the 2. Public Affairs activities of all four DIME elements significance and nature of strategic 3. Defense Support to Public across the physical, informational, and communication can be inconsistent and Diplomacy cognitive dimensions of the information obfuscating. Although the doctrinal Clearly the tools and capabilities domain on key audiences to achieve definition recognizes that interagency available to joint commanders for specific effects (see figure 2). SC nature of SC, the recently updated JP 5-0, coordination under SC are important. processes and supporting capabilities Joint Operation Planning, states: Inconsistent identification of the must be included in all aspects of the Strategic communication (SC) is a capabilities in these documents can federal governments activities and natural extension of strategic direction, create unnecessary confusion among synchronized vertically and horizontally and supports the Presidents strategic lower echelons. To illustrate, even Joint (Murphy, et al., 2006, p. 55.) The SC construct recognizes the guidance, the Sec Defs National Defense Professional Military Education (JPME) Strategy, and the CJCSs National institutions such as Joint Forces Staff interdependency of the elements of College have inaccurately equated SC national power, and seeks to maximize Military Strategy. as the sum of the various identified DOD s u c h p o w e r t h r o u g h the integration and capabilities. Nevertheless, by identifying only synchronization of the capabilities that function primarily DIME. SC orchestrates in the informational dimension of appropriate elements of the information environment, these national power through documents lend themselves to further synchronized lines of misinterpretation. All military activities operation to influence have a communication element. SC is behavior of the target the broadly overarching concept targeting audience. (S)trategic key audiences and focusing on the c o m m u n i c a t i o n cognitive dimension of the information planning identifies those Figure 2. Transformation of national policy into action environment. Strategic communication combinations of kinetic as elements of national power are focused via the SC seeks to create effects in the cognitive, and non-kinetic actions and lens. An unnecessary ambiguity is the intersection vice informational, dimension of the words that are most likely of the Informational and Military elements, while the information environment. (Army War to produce the desired understanding and actions Economic and Diplomatic do not. Considering Defense College, 2006, p. 12) Support to Public Diplomacy is one of the primary By comparison, capabilities in key audiences, and capabilities supporting SC, at the least the Military such as PA and IO are frequently then synchronize those and Diplomatic elements should intersect. (Recreated employed to create effects in the (capabilities) that need to - DASD (Joint Communication) briefing, Jan 07)

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Non-DOD organizations, while participating in strategic communication, will obviously not do so to support strategies released by the Sec Def or CJCS. Rather, what is being discussed here is the DOD subset of the SC process. JP 5-0 continues: SC planning and execution focus capabilities that apply information as an instrument of national power to create, strengthen, or preserve an information environment favorable to US national interests. Although SC achieves effects in the information environment, as discussed above, it does not merely apply information as an instrument of national power. It focuses all four elements of national power, applying the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of national power in concert with information. When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, `it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less. The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean so many different things. The question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be master -thats all. -- Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, 1871 Signal Distortion: Diverging Definitions Despite Strategic Communication having been defined under joint doctrine, many players inconsistently employ the term it in such a manner as to render it meaningless. The most frequent errors are (1) the separation of SC from its national-level content and (2) divorcing SC from kinetic activities and restricting it to informational communication capabilities (i.e., words alone, not actions.) Some of the more egregious errors can be found in service doctrine and policy as we shall see in current Air Force and Navy writings. US Air Force efforts in strategic communication are summarized in

a standard briefing entitled Strategic Communication 101. Of note, this briefing was presented to the Joint Staffhosted 2006 World Wide IO Conference (WWIO) and currently serves as a standard service resource available at the Air Force Portal website. This briefing, used to shape service members understanding of and contribution to SC, eliminates the link with national-level concerns and limits SC largely to being a task of the services public affairs offices. The Air Force defines strategic communication as the process of informing and appropriately influencing key audiences by synchronizing and integrating communication efforts to deliver truthful, credible, accurate and timely information. The Air Force SC mission is not tied to higher-echelon policies or guidance. Rather, the Air Force conducts SC to foster, mutually beneficial relationships between the Air Force and its strategic stakeholders. Stated USAF mission support objectives are: 1. Increase awareness of and support for the US Air Force 2. Strengthen trust relationships with key audiences 3. Ensure accurate and timely data in the information domain 4. Develop effects-based, proactive, long-term focused communication processes 5. Enable Airmen to tell The Air Force Story (SC 101, slide 10) The SC 101 briefing states that every Airman is a communicator whose SC role is to promote the Air Force to external audiences. Air Force Public Affairs releases expand upon this briefing. Sounding like a sisterservice satire on the Air Forces overly corporate culture, these releases discuss employing SC to better position the Air Force brand while helping to shape the future debate about military roles and missions. (Weckerlein, 2006) Having built what amounts to a marketing mechanism in the competition for public goodwill and budgetary considerations relative to the other armed services, the S in Air Force SC should

stand for service vice strategic. The Air Force makes no pretense that its SC efforts support national level policies, vice parochial bureaucratic interests. SC 101 clearly orients Air Force SC toward domestic audiences. Notably, the Air Force defines SC as appropriately influencing key audiences. Despite the use of the mitigating appropriately, such phrasing seemingly endorses activities that would violate the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act. This law prohibits the employment of information to influence public opinion in the United States. Air Force employment of strategic communication processes to advance the services interests by influencing, appropriately or otherwise, a domestic audience would appear to violate federal law. The current capstone document on Navy SC is Playbook 2005: Navy Strategic Communication Plan. This document incorporates strategic communication as a mechanism to distribute themes and messages advancing the interests of the Navy as a service. USN Strategic Communication themes and messages in this document make no pretense to uphold any policies outside those of the service: 1. Mission First, People Always 2. Transforming Naval Forces 3. Excellence in Warfighting While the interests of the Navy as a warfighting organization are the ultimate basis for the military element of national power, such themes bear no direct relation to Presidential ends or policies. This document further dissociates Navy SC from the current interagency construct when it identifies target audiences for Navy strategic communication: Our primary internal communication goal is to ensure that our sailors and their families understand that they are at the core of our readiness and operational effectiveness. Furthermore, we want them to know that Navy leadership appreciates the sacrifices they make and is committed to providing both quality of life and career opportunities. Our primary external goal is to communicate to the American people

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our customersthat our people are the best, our strategy is sound, and the Navy is a solid investment in our nations security. (p.18) Playbook 2005 subordinates SC to the Navys public affairs community, the trigger pullers on the information battlefield (Dept. of the Navy, Playbook, p. 2). In doing so, it replaces nationallevel processes to advance Presidential policies to being merely an improved mechanism for internal communication with sailors and for public relations with the taxpayer. Broken and Unreadable: The Impact of White Noise on SC

for the combatant commands. SC staff officers must be capable of proficiently functioning not only jointly, but throughout the interagency environment. By redefining it as a parochial interest support function, the services fail to instill an accurate understanding of SC across the officer corps. Strategic Communication Integration Group: Squelching White Noise In an effort to better integrate national strategic communication support, the Deputy Secretary of Defense created a senior-level DOD Strategic Communication Integration Group

The SCIG Directorate coordinates Combatant Command actions in support of SC with guidance from the Joint Staff, OSD, and across the interagency environment (see figure 3). For Combatant Commanders to successfully implement SC, they must have an unequivocal definition of the overall US Government policy in dealing with a particular issue or regional objective. (Perkins & Scott, 2006, p. 27) The Directorate provides guidance at the field-grade level to Combatant Command staffs to increase SC signal fidelity. Conclusion

The absence of clarity on The Air Force and Navy, Strategic Communication from having conflated service interests the highest levels of DOD leaves with national interests, create a void that lower echelons attempt competing signal content in the to fill. Perhaps to be expected, public information environment. those components have attached Such competing information can parochial content to SC, thereby drown out the content that strategic creating competing information to communication should relay, leading the themes and messages intended to content fratricide. to support realization of nationalThese service functions have level policy. further, albeit indirect, costs to Beyond the content conveyed by national-level SC. Under Title X, SC, this doctrinal ambiguity creates the US Armed Forces are responsible confusion for operational-level to organize, train, and equip in commanders whose kinetic actions support of the operational combatant commands. As warfighting Figure 3. The SCIG Secretariat plays a crucial role in are frequently the most dramatic organizations, the COCOMs are coordinating the operational efforts of the Combatant mechanisms supporting Strategic the DOD entities most likely to Commanders to ensure DOD activities are in concert Communication. Nevertheless, participate in national-level strategic with and support the wider interagency SC efforts. joint doctrine misguidedly limits communication. The Services (Adopted and simplified from Josten, 2006, p. 18) SC to the information element of national power, ignoring the failure to train and indoctrinate its officers on strategic communication (SCIG) in April 2006. The SCIG ensures kinetic options often violent and inflicts an opportunity cost on the the Departments SC strategies, plans, lethalavailable to the COCOMs and combatant commands. That is, the and programs are supportive of the JTF commanders. The Department must provide COCOMs must assume responsibility for Presidents national security and foreign indoctrinating, training, and educating policy goals. (Army War College, 2006, consistent doctrinal and policy guidance regarding DOD support of national-level its assigned service officers on strategic p. 81) A sixteen person Directorate strategic communication. Moreover, communication. Joint officers are built upon service composed representatives from OSD educating the officer corps on the nature of SC should become a priority. In officers... possessing an unprecedented and the Joint Staff supports this body: the two decades since the Goldwaterability to integrate diverse elements in Under Secretary for Policy (3) Nichols Act, the career officer has a complex environment. (CJCS, 2005, Under Secretary for Intelligence (1) become fully joint. For DOD operations p. 4) This CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Under Secretary for Personnel and to integrate completely with the USG Development specifically addresses strategic communication process, the JPME and applicable joint career force Readiness (1) Asst Secretary for PA (1) armed forces must now build a career training. Nevertheless, it is a succinct Comptroller (1) officer with the expertise to function in and accurate description of the SC staff the interagency environment. They can officer the services should be developing Joint Staff (8)

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begin to do by codifying what SC is and is not. Strategic communication is not merely the effective marketing of the Presidents policies: SC achieves those policies.
Bibliography

Cox, Joseph L., MAJ, US Army, Information Operations in OEF and OIF What Went Wrong?, Monograph, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, May 2006 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, November 2005. Department of Defense, Directive, O-3600.01, Information Operations, 14 August 2006 Department of Defense, QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication, 25 September 2006. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004. Department of the Navy, Playbook 2005: Navy Strategic Communication Plan, Navy Office of Information, Washington, DC, undated. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication, Strategic Communication: Concept of Operations, Briefing dated 16 January 2006. Ecklund, Marshall V., MAJ, US Army, Strategic Communications: How to Make It Work, IO Sphere, Fall 2005, JIOC, San Antonio, TX. Gregory, Bruce, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms, The American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, The George Washington University and Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 31 August 2005. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 9 November 2006. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006. Josten, Richard J., Strategic Communication: Key Enabler for Elements of National Power, IO Sphere, Summer 2006, Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, Lackland AFB, TX. Julian, Gregory, LTC, US Army, Transforming the Department of Defense Strategic Communication Strategy, Masters thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle PA, March 2006. Murphy, Dennis M.; Groh, Jeffrey L.; Smith, David J.; and Ayers, Cynthia E., Information As Power: An Anthology Of Selected United States Army War College Student Papers, US Army War College, Carlisle PA, 2006. Perkins, Stephen P., COL, US Army, and Scott, Gary T., Col, US Air Force, Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands, IO Sphere, Spring 2006, JIOC, San Antonio, TX. Steele, Robert David, Information Operations: Putting the I Back in DIME, Strategic Studies Institute,

US Army War College, Carlisle PA, February 2006. Stratton, Mark E. II, Maj, US Air Force, The Crisis in Strategic Communication: A Combatant Command Solution, Masters Thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, May 2005. Tussing, Bert, Strengthening the Interagency and Maximizing its Effort in Combating Terrorism, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks 2005, as printed in The Struggle Against Extremist Ideology: Addressing the Conditions that Foster Terrorism. US Special Operations Command, Conference Report, Foreign Military Attachs Conference, A Strategic Communication Workshop, October 1820, 2005. Weckerlein, Julie, SSgt, US Air Force, Air Force Officials Take Strategic Communication to Next Level, Air Force Print News, December 22, 2006. Willard, James E., MAJ, US Army, Military Diplomacy: An Essential Tool of Foreign Policy at the Theater Strategic Level, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College: Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2006.

LCDR Charles Grama Gramaglia, US Navy Reserve, currently serves as an Intelligence Planner in the Operations Directorate of the Combined-Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula at Balad AFB, Iraq. He is attached to the HUMINT Directorate at Defense Intelligence Agency where he serves as a reserve Naval Attach. He recently completed a six-month project researching and coauthoring the USSOCOMdirected Study of Department of Defense Psychological Operations. He previously served in the IO Directorate in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. LCDR Gramaglia earned a BS in Foreign Service from Georgetown University and a Master of Public Policy from Princeton University. Readers can contact him at charles.gramaglia@dia.mil

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Analysis of Layered Social Networks

J. Todd Hamill, Major, USAF, Dr. Richard F. Deckro , Dr. James W. Chrissis , and Dr. Robert F. Mills Editorial Abstract: The authors present an analytical construct for understanding complex social interactions and relationships. Advanced models may offer decision makers better courses of action when targeting influence, perception, or outcome of actors within a network, through either direct or indirect means. responses within a sociological survey are not equitable between two given actors (e.g., the forgetting of friends), From the film Battle of Algiers a directed, or asymmetric, arc is more [Pontecorvo, 1967]. appropriate [cf. Brewer and Webster, Overview 1999]. The majority of SNA measures The character suggesting this perform calculations upon the strategy, Colonel Mathieu, was tasked mathematical representation of the with quelling the violent insurrection lead sociogram, the sociomatrix (X). The by the National Liberation Army, which sociomatrix is a two-way, numerical sought Algerian independence from matrix, indexed by the sending actors French rule. The need to understand the (the rows) and the receiving actors (the adversarys objectives, their underlying columns) . . . , which is equivalent to the social structure, the ebb and flow of socialadjacency matrix of a graph [Wasserman or other forms of power, consequently and Faust, 1994, pg. 77]. placed a greater reliance upon Leveraging the natural intelligence and analysis, rather connection to the mathematically than mere application of military powerful genre of graph theory force. It could be argued that and its ability to quantitatively defeating the elusive terrorist study networks, Moreno had organizations that impose chaos devised a means to examine the and suffering throughout the Figure 1: Sociogram of a Notional Social Network qualitative nature of relationships world today may require a among individuals within a similar strategy. SNA approaches to analysis with those social grouping [Moreno, 1953]. Since Truly knowing these clandestine of operations research (OR) and other then, a variety of tools and techniques organizations means understanding how fields of study have been and should have been developed to study the they arrange and build their structures continue to be explored in the context structural nature of social networks and through recruitment, their underlying of understanding and taking advantage the implications of topology (i.e. network motivations for violent and seemingly of organizational phenomena [Hamill, structure) and personal characteristics irrational behavior, and their methods 2006, Clark, 2005, Renfro, 2001]. upon overall network behavior. The of operational control and execution of sociomatrix and the sociological study terrorist activities. Once gained, this Social Network Analysis of networks generally focus upon the knowledge can then be used to identify The field of social network analysis two fundamental items of interest within key individuals, relationships, and organizational practices. Subsequently, is often traced back to the work of Moreno SNA: individual-specific characteristics such analysis may lead to the identification [1953], who developed the sociogram, (such as age, experience, and so forth) of weaknesses that can be exploited a pictorial representation of a social that facilitate the attainment of various in an endeavor to either eliminate the group via a graph as shown in Figure network positions and the social network as a whole, cause it to become 1. Individuals are represented as nodes. consequences based upon the actors operationally ineffective, or influence it Known relationships and their direction, position within the social network. Measures of network position attempt to directly or indirectly support our own if appropriate, are indicated by arcs. objectives. In todays interconnected Undirected, or symmetric, relationships to equate an actors relative location to world, proficiency in this type of warfare imply that the relationship or bond runs the roles they may serve in promulgating, is a necessary condition to ensure US equivalently in either direction. If the or inhibiting, the flow of influence and national security, as well as to promote context of the sociometric data (e.g., information. The most common class accounting for supervisory roles) or if of such measures is network centrality. and maintain global stability.

To know them means to eliminate them.

One research area that provides some opportunities to accomplish these goals is social network analysis (SNA). Although the techniques themselves are certainly not new, the notion of their incorporation into the analysis and investigation of non-cooperative organizations (e.g., clandestine, criminal, or terrorist) is of recent interest. In light of the ultimate goal of negating the threat of terrorist networks via the application of influenceranging from psychological operations to lethal forceSNA provides a means to quantify the roles and promulgation of interpersonal influence. Opportunities to merge the sociological

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Variants of centrality such as degree, closeness, and betweenness, measure the connectivity, proximity, or mediating effect of a given individual, respectively [Brass, 1995, pg. 46]. Unfortunately, the majority of existing SNA measures attempting to describe how information, influence, rumors, adoption, and other influences may flow through the network rely only upon a single, presumably dominant, dimension within which the interpersonal relationships have formed. This is primarily due to the belief that the existence of one network (e.g. interpersonal communication) is highly predictive of another (e.g. friendship) [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 296]. This contrasts with the fact that commonly cited characteristics of relationships include frequency of contact, stability of the relationship over time, strength, and multiplexity [Brass, 1995, pg. 45]. These widely accepted concepts or features underlying personal relationships imply that interpersonal relationships may hold more information than a the traditional yes or no, is or is not observed, or all or nothing type of response, and corresponding data, that serves as input to the mathematical models. The question that remains is Could we be missing critical insights into the behavior, strengths, and weaknesses of social networks by ignoring the multi-dimensionality of human relationships? Multiplexity & Layered Networks Suppose there exist multiple relations pertinent to the evolution of an adversarial network, each measured on the same set of actors. These values ultimately form a super-sociomatrix, offering a means to capture the layers of relations as depicted in Figure 2. Each layer represents a context within which the actors may or may not be affiliated. Contextual examples could include familial relationships, training camps attended together, known friendships, business interactions, known animosities, resources shared, specialized skills or training, and so forth. For each layer or context, if an actor is connected to

Figure 2: Layered Social Network any other actor in the same context, those actors and that link are recorded. Given that the network of interest is comprised of N individuals, each layer can include no more than the same set of N individuals. Examining the diagram from directly overhead, an actor appearing in more than one context would be aligned vertically, as noted by the unique actor label. Given a set of actors, when more than one relationship or context of interaction is studied the analysis is considered multiplex [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 35]. This term, like many other concepts in SNA, appears to be borrowed from communications theory, which defines multiplex as combining multiple signals into one to facilitate transmission, in such a way that they can later be separated as required [DOD, 2005, pg. 354]. Consequently, communication and interaction between two individuals will generally transmit through several different contexts simultaneously. As Haythornthwaite noted, we operate in a multiplex world, maintaining multiple roles and relations with others, sustained through a variety of media [Haythornthwaite, 1999]. Probably the earliest, formal recognition of multi-dimensionality among relationship was described by Granovetter, who suggested that the degree of overlap of two individuals friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one another [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1360]. He further defines the strength of a tie as a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1361]. Ultimately, tie strength assumes that human interaction simultaneously accounts for multiple, underlying relationships or contexts within which those relationships were developed. For example, two complete strangers may be treated differently based upon the known contexts that comprise a newly formed relationship. Such a case could involve the difference between a random individual standing beside you on a sidewalk and the lady just introduced to you as the new fiance of your brother. Both are strangers, yet an inevitable difference between the strengths of the two relationships occurs due to the implied trust gained from a familial context. Consequently, it is suggested that by increasing or at least acknowledging the dimensionality of information gathered on individuals of interest, a better understanding of the overall network behavior can be achieved. Determining the contexts or layers of interest is potentially one of the more difficult areas of this problem area, as the types of ties that result in the strong, trusting relationships are likely dependent upon the origins of the organization and the scenario under analysis, or simply predicated upon the available intelligence information. Relationships that lend themselves to the dimensions of the linear

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combination serve as strong ties graphsoriginally described by according to Granovetter [1973]. Bonacich et al. [2004]as a proxy for Alternatively, weak ties are composed contextual weighting. Application of of casual or intermittent relationships; this measure, however, is dependent however, weak ties are potentially upon symmetric, unvalued relationship strong themselves. The strength of data that describes a connected graph. a weak tie lies in its ability to bridge In general, this area poses several communication or influence between opportunities for investigating tradetwo or more distinct groups, or promote offs between aggregate and independent diffusion of influence and ideas between analyses of contextual relationships, as them [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1363-7]. Clearly, both forms of relationships may prove valuable within a militarys investigation of adversary networks. Of course, how the models (and calculations involved) of such linear combinations Figure 3: Improper Multiplex Aggregation should be developed, and even which contexts should be included, remains of theoretical well as weighting techniques to facilitate interest [cf. Granovetter, 1973, Marsden aggregation as needed. and Campbell, 1984, Hite, 2003]. Another related advancement is There are a handful of other works detailed in Carley et al., which proposed that acknowledge the dimensionality an innovative concept describing a of interpersonal relationships and its composite network that incorporates the importance, albeit from a conceptual multi-dimensionality of interpersonal perspective rather than a mathematical relations via a meta-matrix. The metaone. For example, Haythornthwaite matrix concept is based upon the premise hypothesized that, in general, the more that network dynamics are functions of individuals have in common, the stronger (1) the social structure, (2) the distribution the relationship between them. An article of knowledge and information, (3) by Friedkin discusses the construction the interrelations between domains of of a Guttman scalewhere different knowledge, and (4) the distribution of stages or assessments can imply others work and requirements [Carley et al., that incorporates (implicitly equally 2002, pg. 83]. These network-related weighted) dimensions such as claims of frequent discussion, of seeking help, and of close friendship [Friedkin, 1990]. Gould found solidarity within insurgent ranks to be positively impacted when pre-existing Figure 4: Potential Aggregation Scheme informal ties reinforced formal, organizational ties. E v e n f e w e r a t t e m p t t o aspects of an organization within the mathematically model the implications meta-matrix construct serves as input of multiplex relations upon relationship into an agent-based network simulation, strength. Renfro numerically estimates which evaluates the organizations the influence potential of such bonds via ability to perform tasks, communicate a social closeness functionthe stronger effectively, and so forth [Carley et al., the bond, the greater the value of social 2002]. closeness. Clark [2005] used a normalized The lack of previous studies may version of the multidimensional also be attributed to the complexity centrality measures between relational encountered when dealing with multiplex

networks. Interestingly, Wasserman and Faust recommend that commonly used centrality and prestige measures be calculated for each relation separately and recommend against aggregating the relations into one sociomatrix [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 219]. Although rationale for this is not provided, the answer is likely the loss of information incurred when merely combining occurrences of links among relations. For example, consider the three possible instances within which two individuals can share relations in two out of three contexts (Figure 3). Assuming that the contexts were familial, frequently interacts with, and is fond of, one could posit examples where all of these possibilities would yield different strengths of relationships. However, a simple summation of dichotomous occurrences results in identical strengths and is therefore likely insufficient to capture or infer the strength of a relationship based upon multiplex data. Nonetheless, when two people interact, regardless of the value of the relationships strength or a means to quantify it, we assume that both actors are cognizant of the underlying contexts that prevail and make their relationship either strong or tenuous. Consequently, social network measures applied to each of the networks or contexts independently will also fail to capture the combined effect due to the multiplexity inherent within the relationships. This suggests that, prior to determination of centrality, prestige, and so forth, an appropriate aggregation of contexts would be analytically prudent. One potential means could comprise a weighted function, based upon how the actors internal to the network of interest place importance upon each context. A notional example of this is illustrated in Figure 4. Of course, one could ask the question Is a familial link equivalent in strength to a tie that shares both the bonds of fondness and frequent interaction,

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since the weighted sum in either case equals 0.5? The most likely answer is it depends, and therefore remains an area ripe for further research. Seeking to improve upon the available theoretical and methodological approaches used to analyze layered social networks, a series of approaches were developed to investigate various aspects of social networks where multiplex information is available [cf. Hamill, 2006]. The layered concept primarily provides a means to (1) derive a measure of relationship strength and (2) offer insight into potential courses of action that may increase the fragility of the target network or disrupt it entirely through the use of information operations. It should also be noted, however, that methods attempting to measure strength of ties are generally criticized when applied to non-cooperative networks, such as terrorist organizations, in that increasing sophistication of analysis methodologies may still not yield a more useful map towards understanding the underlying network behavior [Fellman and Wright, 2003, pg. 5]. Nonetheless, ignoring this type of information automatically presumes all interpersonal ties are identical. When it is important to know not only who may successfully be exploited, but which interpersonal relationships play predominant roles within the efficacy of IO courses of action, assuming identical ties is ineffective. Several methods (some of which apply contextual weights) to combining such information and their analytical implications are proposed in [Hamill, 2006]. When weights are applied, these values correspond to the relative importance the target network in toto places upon a particular relationship context. As the majority of this data is unlikely to be directly measurable, expert opinion familiar with the culture, indoctrination procedures, and institutional foundations will always play a vital role in providing guidance regarding the weights. Approaches involving contextual weights lend themselves to additional

Figure 5: Layer Aggregation and Strength analyses. For example, if PSYOP is applied to one or more layers, but not necessarily all of them, investigation of how these weights may change over time and the affect upon the network performance and exchange of influence (or power, or status, etc.) in response to these external forcescourses of actionare performed. The incorporation of a dynamic weighting scheme may also help ascertain the impact of information operations upon the network relationships. For example, compare the bottom layer to the top two in Figure 5. If information operations marginalized the weight of the top two layers from the individuals point of view, a fissure between the network members may be observed. Therefore, despite the ability to measure exactly how much each context contributes to the strength of interpersonal relationships, the sensitivity of a given network to perturbations of the weight set, and the subsequent impact upon associated measures can be explored. As todays terrorist organizations are increasingly multi-cultural, extensions allowing for individual-specific weight sets should also be examined. This quest to quantify the nature of a networks links will (hopefully) lead us to a better understand of the resultant flow of information and influence among its members. The Ebb and Flow of Influence The seminal work of French described the thencurrent theory of social power and analyzed and addressed some of its limitations. In the course of his work, French defined the basis of interpersonal power as the more or less enduring relationship between (two individuals) A and B which gives rise to power [French, 1956, pg. 183]. He then described five bases for power: attraction, expert, reward, coercive, and legitimate [French, 1956, pg. 183-4]. In examining the impact of peer group influence upon opinion formation, Friedkin and Cooks interpretation of Frenchs work was that [French] first proposed that social influence was a finite distributed resource [Friedkin and Cook, 1990, pg. 130]. Within the context of OR methodologies, Renfro postulated that influence was analogous to a commodity flowing through a (social) network [Renfro, 2001, pg. 80-1]. These and other works such as the network flow centrality measure developed by Freeman et al., substantiate the modeling the flow of influence as a commodity within a network model. Measurement of influence in the context of social network analysis (SNA) is based upon the importance of relationships among interacting (individuals) [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 4]. Additionally, one of the underlying principles of SNA is that individuals view the network structural environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 4]. This implies individuals take into account opinions of those socially close, or in positions of authority, for example, when faced with a decision point. There are a variety of examples in SNA literature that investigate and attempt to measure this influence [cf. Frank and Yasumoto, 1988, Friedkin and Cook, 1990, among others]. A predominant concentration of research in this area deals with determining what conditions, both internal (via the network structure and connectedness of

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individuals) and external (via the outside influences or requirements for a groupsupported decision), are required to bring a group of individuals to agreement upon a group decision. Friedkin and Cook discuss social influence in the context of interpersonal relations within a network, and their subsequent role regarding the interpersonal influence required to enable . . . the process of (group) opinion formation [1990, pg. 122]. This process utilizes network models to deal with the attainment of collective agreements, usually beginning with a network of fixed and discrepant opinions [Friedkin and Cook, 1990, pg. 122]. Modeling the processes of interpersonal negotiation and the subsequent change in individual opinions form the unique theoretical thrust of network models of social influence [Friedkin and Cook, 1990, pg. 122-3]. The resulting models essentially attempt to describe the dyadic interaction required to transform a network of individuals with discrepant opinions into a network where the individuals opinions have coalesced, at least to some degree. Similar concepts in social network literature based upon an exchange of influence between individuals include contagion (of behavior) (Leenders [2002]) and diffusion (the rate of acceptance of innovative and possibly risky ideas or behavior) [Valente, 1996]. Just as there are many network model formulations within the OR domain, numerous formulations and approaches exist within the study of social network modeling. Amblard and Deuant [2004] studied the propagation of extremist opinions throughout a variety of small-world networks. Their results suggest a critical level of connectivity and some disorder in the network (is necessary) in order for extreme opinions to invade a population [Amblard and Deuant, 2004, pg. 738]. However, this phenomenon is not necessarily confined to small-world networks. As Buchanan states the infectious movement of desires and ideas from mind to mind is even the basis of a new theory of advertising known as

permission marketing [Buchanan, 2002, pg. 160-1]. Essentially, this connotes the flow of influence propagating through a general populous, which may not necessarily be a small-world network in the classical sense. This is an important point because not all organizations may naturally evolve as small-world networks; ultimately, influence will inevitably flow regardless of the underlying network structure [Renfro, 2001]. Beginning with Frenchs influential work, it is clear that the social science research and theory liken the interaction between two individuals or groups to that of a commodity that flows between them. Operations Researchers and Social Scientists generally apply network models differently, a key difference being that social science models tend to be descriptive, while OR models tend to be both descriptive and prescriptive, where appropriate. Descriptive models, in general, attempt to describe how a process or system works via underlying relationships and behaviors. The focus of prescriptive models is improved decision making by attempting to describe the best or optimal solution of a given system [Clemen, 1996, pg. 14]. Oftentimes, the process of obtaining a prescriptive model requires an understanding of the underlying processes or systems inherent to the decision problem and therefore results in a descriptive model as a byproduct. Numerous modeling techniques within the SNA literature rely solely upon a single, presumably dominant, underlying context to study influence within a social network. If the simultaneous accommodation of multiple contexts is desired, the classic SNA techniques will almost certainly misidentify the key relationships of interest within a target network. Consequently, taking advantage of the strengths of both the SNA and OR modeling techniques offers new opportunities to improve our understanding of adversarial organizations. Unfortunately, simply obtaining the information necessary to characterizing adversarial networks presents a number of challenges.

Challenges of Network Data and SNA Methods traditionally used to collect sociometric data include questionnaires, interviews, observations, archival records, experiments, and others; this implies that data sets comprise populations rather than subsets of them [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 45]. Granovetter notes It is clear why network methods have been confined to small groups: existing methods are extremely sensitive, in their practicality, to group size because they are population rather than sampling methods [Granovetter, 1976, pg. 12878]. Due to the potential N (N-1) number of directed ties between N individuals, collecting complete and accurate data on large populations is costly and problematic. Further, Granovetter argues that such studies can only make implicit connections between the nature of the data collected and the nature of the true population from which the data came. Ultimately, we are left guessing about the representativeness of the patterns of social relations found [Granovetter, 1976, pg. 1288]. Viewing interpersonal relationships as multidimensional, as opposed to the generally single dimensional assessment, offers a means to improve upon existing models of social networks. Although this, and other, research efforts assume that the data required for the methodologies presented is available and known with certainty, the mathematical nature of OR techniques permit the investigation of relaxations to this assumption via an array of sensitivity analyses. One other potential limitation underlying social network research in general is the inherently static analysis of inevitably dynamic networks. It is certain that over time, some individuals may change their opinions or strategies, relationships evolve and devolve, and the overall social network structure changes due to recruitment of new individuals, new opportunities for interaction, and departures from the network. However, given the nature of available intelligence information and the near-term focus to

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which these techniques are amenable, it could be assumed that key changes in the network are primarily due to the actions or influence imposed upon it. Other efforts are pursuing the capability to simulate dynamic network behaviors, Carley [2003], for example; however, this can also require collecting a great deal more information that may or may not be available. Unless the individuals that comprise the population are known with certainty, how representative the sample will be of the true population will always remain in question. For example, Tsvetovat and Carley [2005] have estimated Al Qaeda membership to be as high as 120,000. Even if such an extensive network could be mapped, it is likely that the magnitude would leave many current analysis capabilities computationally intractable. Hence, samples or subsets of the true networks comprise currently available data sets. Other issues pervading network data that describes non-cooperative networks includes missing data and potential structural bias, as a result of the data gathering processes available. In a sociological or anthropological context, truly capturing information regarding a relationship between two individuals requires interviewing both [Stork and Richards, 1992, pg. 194]. When dealing with extremists, unless both individuals are in custody and amenable to truthful interviews, this is a difficult process dependent upon the skills of the interviewer and the interviewee, as well as some degree of luck. As a result, analysis must be performed on incomplete data. Summary When it comes to affecting networks of people in some way, in our context via information operations that may involve kinetic and non-kinetic means, the evaluation of potential target sets and courses of action must be accomplished. The evaluation of multiplex relations, in conjunction with other mathematical techniques, may be used to develop or evaluate the efficacy of proposed influence courses of action.

The overarching goal of this research area is to use new combinations of modeling techniques to improve our understanding of potential behavioral patterns that belie the target network, and their reactions to information operations imposed upon them. Subsequently, such understanding may help develop improved courses of action to effectively achieve a specified change in behavior in one or more actors within the target network. Weve briefly presented a number of methodologies and theories dealing with primarily open and cooperative social networks. The variety of Operations Research, Sociological, and Behavioral Theory efforts, all provide the bases for understanding relationship contexts and their affect upon the potential for interpersonal action (i.e. strength). The simple act of constructing these methodologies has brought economic, psychological, and other genres of study together with focused background investigation of various terrorist organizations. The overall goal is realization of new and useful theory, and concomitant methodologies, describing and analyzing social networks of non-cooperative organizations. Given the improved understanding and insights provided by this developing research area, decision makers can be offered better courses of action seeking to achieve a target influence, perception, or outcome to one or more actors within the network through either direct or indirect means. These activities will then inevitably act as a forcing function to better understand and know the enemy, providing new means to stifle their evolution, or eliminate them entirely. References Amblard, F., and G. Deffuant. The Role of Network Topology on Extremism Propagation With the Relative Agreement Opinion Dynamics. Physica A, 343:725738, 2004. Bonacich, P., A. C. Holdren, and M. Johnston. Hyper-edges and

Multidimensional Centrality. Social Networks, 26:189203, 2004. Brass., D. J. A Social Network Perspective on Human Resources Management. Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, 13:3979, 1995. Brewer, D. D., and C. M. Webster. Forgetting of Friends and its Effects on Measuring Friendship Networks. Social Networks, 21:361373, 1999. Buchanan, M. Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Theory of Networks. W. W. Norton, New York, 2002. Carley, K. M. Dynamic network analysis. In R. Breiger, K. Carley, and P. Pattison, editors, Dynamic Social Network Modeling and Analysis: Workshop Summary and Papers, pages 133145, Washington D. C., 2003. The National Academies Press. -- J. Lee, and D. Krackhardt. Destabilizing networks. Connections, 24(3):7992, 2002. Clark, C. Modeling and Analysis of Clandestine Networks. Masters thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2005. Clemen, R. T. Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Decision Analysis. Duxbury Press, Pacific Grove, 1996. DOD. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and associated terms, 2005. Fellman, P. V., and R. Wright. Modeling Terrorist Networks Complex Systems at the Mid-Range. In Complexity, Ethics and Reativity Conference, 18 Sep 2003. Frank, K.A., and J. Y. Yasumoto. Linking Action to Social Structure Within a System: Social Capital Within and Between Subgroups. American Journal of Sociology, 104(3):642686, 1988. Freeman, L.C., S. P. Borgatti, and D. R. White. Centrality in Valued Graphs: A Measure of Betweenness Based on Network Flow. Social Networks, 13(2):141154, 1991. French, J. R. A Formal Theory of Social Power. Psychological Review, 63:181184, 1956.

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Friedkin, N. E. A Guttman Scale for the Strength of an Interpersonal Tie. Social Networks, 12:239252, 1990. -- and K. S. Cook. Peer Group Influence. Sociological Methods & Research, 19(1):122143, 1990. Gould, R.V. Multiple networks and mobilization in the Paris commune, 1871. American Sociological Review, 56(6):716729, 1991. Granovetter, M.S. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6):13601380, 1973. -- M.S. Network sampling: Some first steps. American Journal of Sociology, 81(6):1267 1303, 1976. Hamill, J.T. Analysis of Layered Social Networks. PhD thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2006. Haythornthwaite, C. A Social Network Theory of Tie Strength and Media Use: A Framework for Evaluating Multi-level Impacts of New

Media. Technical Report UIUCLIS 2002/1+DKRC, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999. Hite, J.M. Patterns of Multidimensionality Among Embedded N e t w o r k Ti e s : A Ty p o l o g y o f Relational Embeddedness in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms. Strategic Organization, 1(1):949, 2003. Leenders, R. Th. A. J. Modeling Social Influence Through Network Autocorrelation: Constructing the Weight Matrix. Social Networks, 24:2147, 2002. Marsden, P.V., and K. E. Campbell. Measuring Tie Strength. Social Forces, 63:482501, 1984. Monge, P.R., and N. S. Contractor. Theories of Communication Networks. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. Moreno, J.L. Who Shall Survive? A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations. Beacon House, Inc., Beacon, 1953.

Pontecorvo, Gillo. Battle of Algiers, 1967. Renfro, R.S. Modeling and Analysis of Social Networks. PhD thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2001. Stork, D., and W. D. Richards. Nonrespondents in communication network studies: Problems and possibilities. Group & Organization Management, 17(2):193209, 1992. Tsvetovat, M., and K. M. Carley. Structural knowledge and success of anti-terrorist activity: The downside of structural equivalence. Journal of Social Structure, 6(2):np, 2005. Valente T. W. Social network thresholds in the diffusion of innovations. Social Networks, 18:6989, 1996. Wasserman, S., and K. Faust. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge University Press, 1994.



Influencing Friends & Allies: The Role of the Combatant Commander

By Jon-Paul R. Bruiser LaBruzzo, Lieutenant Commander, USN Editorial Abstract: Combatant Commanders have a clear mandate to carry out Department of Defense regional influence activities, but joint doctrine limits exactly whom COCOMs may influence. The author recommends doctrinal changes to enable a new concept of Information Operations-Friends & Allies, to better serve US Government strategic messaging roles. Editors Note: The thesis which is the basis for this article won Honorable Mention in the 2007 Armed Forces Communication and Electronics Association essay competition. MOGADISHU, SOMALIA (CNN) May 12th, 2010A resurgent Islamic Courts Union (ICU) conducted a series of attacks in both Mogadishu and Kismayo in an attempt to disrupt the Somali Transitional Government. However the ICU attacks were largely unsuccessful due to the ability of Somali government forces to effectively respond. Most importantly, the citizens of Mogadishu and Kismayo have reacted very strongly in opposition to the ICU, instead supporting the Somali government in its efforts to bring lasting peace to the troubled state. It seems Somalia is no longer the fertile ground for Radical Islamist support that it used to be. Reading this news report, the Commander of US African Command (AFRICOM) knew that his combatant commands efforts in influencing the hearts and minds of the Somali people were having a positive effectin the geographic region as well as in the greater Long War. Somalia has been through quite a journey since the ICU forces were defeated over three years ago in the Battle of Ras Kamboni. The UN supported Transition Government has worked to stabilize the state and has steadily progressed toward the countrys first general election in a generation. Of key interest to the combatant command was the willingness of the Somali people to support the government over the ICU. The ICUs inability to garner popular support in its fight against

What lies ahead for the leaders of the newest US Command? General Kip Ward, US Army, Ambassador Mary Ward, US Africa Command. (Defense Link) the Transitional Government was the successful outgrowth of a concerted Information Operations campaign conducted by his J39 team. AFRICOM responded to the crisis brought on by torrential rains and flooding, by establishing a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) in the port of Kismayo and coordinating an interagency and international effort to deliver foreign humanitarian assistance, providing water, food, and temporary shelter to the Somalis affected by the floods. The after-action report from the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operation revealed that the port of Kismayo was woefully inadequate to support such an operation. Fifteen years of conflict and neglect had rendered this important Somali port ineffective. In 2008 AFRICOM initiated a civil-military operation that helped Somalia rebuild the port facilities. Following this, the IO team recognized that the good news story about the port needed to be told to all Somalis as evidence of the growing stability and strength of the Transitional Government. AFRICOM began an information effort to provide the Somali people accurate news on how the Transitional Government was providing for their security (thanks to military training with US forces), building the economy to address their needs, and establishing the central government in preparation for a general election. By 2009, when the ICU attempted to regain the initiative, they were unable to enlist (or co-opt) the people in support of their efforts. The commander of AFRICOM smiled, saying looks like the Somalis are supporting their government over the Islamists. Maybe they would be willing to support the United States over radical Islamists in the Long War?

he above story is fictionbut it reveals a dichotomy between the potential application of information operations by the combatant commander and current IO joint doctrine. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 states information operations are described as the integrated employment of [core capabilities], in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt,



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corrupt, or usurp adversarial [emphasis added] human and automated decision making while protecting our own. While this definition addresses the full measure of joint efforts in effecting the mind of the enemy decision maker, it cordons off other potential recipients of IOfriends and allies of the United States. The term adversarial in the JP 3-13 definition of IO is limiting; IO has beneficial application in US efforts to influence states and peoples friendly or allied with the United States. Certainly, some aspects of IO are best reserved for unfriendly target audiencenamely actions to disrupt, corrupt, and usurp. But if IO represents a panoply of capabilities that can be used to affect the enemy, it also includes capabilities that can be used to influence friends. Therefore joint IO doctrine should be changed to include friends and allies of the United States as targeted audiences. Furthermore the geographic COCOM has a role to play in IO focused on decision makers friendly to the United States. Indeed, the Somalia vignette provides an outline for exploring the COCOMs role in conducting Information OperationsFriends & Allies (IO-F/A). Yet before delving into an examination of these roles, an analysis of current joint doctrine regarding IO (and its supporting and related capabilities) is useful. Current Joint Doctrine: A Rose by Any Other Name Two questions are at the forefront of our analysis of joint doctrine regarding Information Operations: Is current IO doctrine useful vis--vis friends and allies and if so how? Interestingly enough, JP 3-13 possesses the concepts and capabilities that support IO efforts focused on friends and allies of the United States. JP 3-13 provides the joint force commander (and staff) the guidance needed to plan and execute information operations with the goal of achieving and maintaining information superiority. The desired dominance is over the information environmentthe aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or

act on information. JP 3-13 identifies three dimensions of the information environmentphysical, informational, and cognitive. Further, JP 3-13 states the cognitive dimension is the most important of the three, for in it resides the mind of the decision maker. Finally, JP 3-13 recognizes IO can produce effects and achieve objectives across the range of military operations, with the ultimate objective of securing US national interests in the information environment. The publication identifies specific capabilitiescore, supporting, and relatedto be used in the three dimensions of the information environment. Adversaries merit application of all these capabilities, but friends and allies are not enemies and thus should not be the recipient of IO capabilities that destroy, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp their information environment. This eliminates the physical and informational dimensions for IO-F/A application, but the cognitive dimension provides a working space for IO efforts to influence friendly decision makers. Thus current joint doctrine is useful in conducting IO-F/A and it identifies the tools for doing so. Yet throughout JP 3-13 the motif is a focus on IO planning and execution against adversaries of the United States. But, as we have seen throughout the Global War on Terror (GWOT) the decisions and actions of our friends and allies have not always been supportive of US national interests whether those decisions have been regionally focused (such as Turkeys decision not to allow US ground forces to invade Iraq from inside her territory) or globally focused (such as France and Germanys resistance to US initiatives regarding Iraq on the UN Security Council). Turkey, France, and Germany are all long time US friends and allies, but the decisions of their leaders impacted the means with which the United States pursued major operations in the GWOT. Granted, the above examples are more relevant to the national-strategic level, and would involve the US Department of State more than the affected COCOM. But CENTCOM was certainly affected

(at the operational level) by the decisions of these friends and allies. Thus if the ultimate objective of IO according to joint doctrine is to secure US national interests (in the information environment or simply in the mind of the decision maker), then shouldnt the executor of joint IOthe geographic COCOM be able to apply IO (at the operational level) towards affecting the minds of those decision makers who can impact US national interests? By examining the geographic combatant commanders role in conducting IO-F/Athrough Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), and Strategic Communications (SC)we can answer this question. The Geographic Combatant Commanders Role in IO-F/A T h e C O C O M s r o l e i n I O F/A depends on the integration and coordination of the core, supporting, and related IO capabilities identified above specifically psychological operations, combat camera, public affairs, civilmilitary operations, and defense support to public diplomacy. PSYOP pervades IO-F/A because at its heart are actions designed to influence the behavior of the targeted audience. Combat Camera provides COCOMs with the capability to record and document, via visual media, information valuable to the operational commander and pertinent to national objectivesinformation that can then be transmitted to the desired targeted audience. The COCOM utilizes public affairs activities to maintain the trust and confidence of the US friends and allies as well as to counter adversary propaganda. By providing truthful, pertinent, and timely information to the targeted audience, public affairs contributes to effective IO-F/A. By encompassing all joint force commanders activities to establish, maintain, and influence positive relations between their own forces, civil authorities (and the general population in friendly or neutral areas), civilmilitary operations represent a robust tool kit for conducting IO-F/A. CMO



activities such as foreign humanitarian Strike Group and USS Bonhomme and the Horn of Africa as a direct result assistance (FHA), military civic action, Richard Expeditionary Strike Group to of our and other nations humanitarian and domestic support operations provide the area of operations (AOR) the day assistance and disaster relief. the COCOM with effective means for after the tsunamis hit, and they were SECNAV Winters comments also shaping the battlespacewhich in on station shortly thereafter delivering reflected the HA/DR experience of US the context of IO-F/A equates to the much needed water, food, and medical Central Command (CENTCOM) in the minds of friendly decision makers. supplies. Soon afterward, the hospital devastating October 2005 earthquake Furthermore, CMO provides a conduit ship USNS MERCY arrived to continue that struck Pakistan. Much as PACOM for interagency coordination as well urgent medical care. Conducting HA/ responded to the Southeast Asian as connection with non-governmental DR in support of a USG lead agency is Tsunami, so did CENTCOM quickly and intergovernmental organizations not new to the COCOMs, nor to the US respond to this natural disaster. As part of professional relationships that positively military in general. The CMO tools used Operation Lifeline, CENTCOM utilized contribute to the COCOMs ability to by PACOMFHA, HACC, and civil- forces in-theater forces supporting influence friends and allies. The most military operations center (CMOC)are Operation Enduring Freedom to conduct important linkage to connect in IO-F/A already detailed in joint doctrine. But in HA/DR missions. Medical supplies, is between the COCOMs activities the context of information operations, water, foodstuffs, and building materials and United States Government (USG) OUA enabled PACOM to use its forces to were all delivered to the hard hit areas via public diplomacy efforts. DOD support influence our friends in the region. In his CENTCOMs logistical support. Again, for public diplomacy represents the study of the US Navys efforts in OUA, details of the relief effort have been alignment of the COCOMs documented elsewherewhat efforts and the national-strategic is important is this HA/DR goals of the USGan alignment effort in the IO-F/A context. that at its core matches strategy If IO-F/A is about influencing to policy. friends and allies, then the Armed with a deeper HA/DR effort should be part of understanding of the specific a relationship with the targeted core, supporting, and related audiencein this case our ally, capabilities that energize IO-F/ Pakistan. And indeed that is A, lets examine the COCOMs what CENTCOM did: build role in conducting IO-F/A on the success of Operation through HA/DR actions, TSCP Lifeline with Operation Promise endeavors, and USSTRAT Keepinga follow up mission COM. to deliver aid to the Pakistani people still recovering from The Influence of Good Deeds. US Navy doctors help The Influence of Good the earthquake one year later. provide AFRICOM AOR Humanitarian Assistance and Deeds Operation Promise Keeping Disaster Relief. (Defense Link) again utilized CENTCOM The deadly December 2004 tsunami that ravaged Southeast Asia Bruce Elleman noted that the operation, assets to provide building materials and resulted in the largest international dramatically improved US-Indonesian construction teams to areas in northern humanitarian assistance and disaster government-to-government and military- Pakistan still in need. Commenting on relief operation in history. At the to-military relations, and so furthered their mission to provide relief and to forefront of this massive HA/DR effort the goals of the global war on terror show the Pakistani people that America was US Pacific Command (PACOM) and of regional cooperation. The last is their ally and friend, a CH-46 pilot the combatant command responsible for point from Elleman is key: the impact stated that Pakistan is one of the most the affected region. PACOMs efforts on future operations in the GWOT. important partners in the global war have been thoroughly documented and PACOMs humanitarian assistance on terrorism, especially in Operation our purpose here is not to recount them, efforts in Operation Unified Assistance Enduring Freedom. [The] Taliban and but rather to examine this HA/DR effort positively influenced the opinions of other fighters are all over the mountains (and others) through the perspective of regional governments and people vis-- on the border between Afghanistan and vis the United States, thereby paving the Pakistan. When the Pakistanis see that IO-F/A. Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) way for better cooperation in the future. America is an ally and we help them provided PACOM with the opportunity Commenting on the impact of OUA, when theyre in need, then the Taliban to use its vast resources of hard power Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter has no place to go. You sure dont see to create soft power effects. PACOM stated We have seen significantly the Taliban helping people in northern ordered USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier positive impacts in Indonesia, Pakistan Pakistan.



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Operation Unified Assistance and Operation Lifeline represent successful COCOM HA/DR actionswith IOF/A benefits. But a COCOM does not require a natural disaster in order to use CMO and FHA activities. In June 2007, the hospital ship USNS COMFORT deployed on a goodwill mission to Latin America and the Caribbeana mission planned and coordinated by US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). By providing medical care to the people of Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Columbia, and eight other countries, the USNS COMFORT humanitarian assistance mission spread the benevolence of the United States into the region signaling as did PACOMs tsunami relief and CENTCOMs earthquake assistance, that the United States is their friend and ally. The purpose of looking at the HA/ DR efforts of PACOM, CENTCOM, and SOUTHCOM is not simply to present examples of COCOM success in delivering FHA. Look at these operations from the perspective of the COCOMs respective IO Cells. In the context of IO-F/A, these HA/DR actions provide excellent opportunities to positively influence the minds of US friends and allies (government and peoples alike). Moreover, with IO-F/A as a stated part of joint IO doctrine, the COCOM J39 shop would incorporate the appropriate core, supporting, and related IO capabilities in its planning for these HA/DR missions in order to achieve the best IO-F/A effects. An accompanying PSYOP effort to get the word out about American HA/DR actions; the COCOM PA team countering any negative press; effective COMCAM footage to back the PA piece up; and IO-F/A DSPD planning would work to ensure that the COCOMs actions were aligned with USG national policy and strategic objectives. Building the Neighborhood One of the primary means COCOMs support USG policy and objectives is via their Theater Security Cooperation Plans. These activities encompass FHA missions such as those noted above, military-tomilitary training programs, and regional

military exercises. SOUTHCOM again provides rich examples of how COCOM TSCPs can be utilized in the context of IO-F/A. The aforementioned USNS COMFORT deployment could stand alone on the merits of its FHA mission, but it is synchronized with other regional missions as part of SOUTHCOMs TSCP. Shortly before Comfort deployed this summer, SOUTHCOM sent a specially configured ship on a sevenmonth deployment to engage regional allies with training and maintenance events designed to help our partner states in Latin America better secure their ports and coastal waters. USS Swifts deployment to the SOUTHCOM AOR is part of the Navys Global Fleet Station initiative in which a single US Navy ship is sent to an area of interest to act as a base of operations for security patrols, construction assistance, and other outreach missions. Indeed, military-to-military activities such as this have enabled SOUTHCOM to build and maintain positive relationships throughout the region. In addition to the activities of USNS Comfort and USS Swift, SOUTHCOM further engages through sequencing of their annual New Horizons exercises. New Horizons 2007 had US engineer, medical, and combat service support units conducting humanitarian and civic assistance missions, to provide much needed services and infrastructure to rural, underprivileged areas in South and Central America. Such joint and combined exercises enable US forces to work with regional military and civilian organizationsand equally important, to interact with local people as they build schools and clinics, and fix roads. Fixing roads may seem bland in comparison to building schools or clinics, but it actually presents a different approach to what COCOM civil affairs (CA) teams have generally done in the past. While schools and clinics have their purpose (and are attractive endeavors for FHA), building and repairing infrastructure holds the possibility of gaining greater influence vis--vis a targeted audience. As commander of

Operation Task Unit Manda Bay Kenya, LCDR Tristan Rizzi worked with the Kenyan government in efforts to improve their maritime security capabilities. While in Kenya, Rizzi observed that the port facilities in Manda Bay needed repair and were unable to meet the needs of the local people (who used it to transport food and waterespecially when the dirt roads were washed out during the monsoon season). A new school may be nice for future generations in Manda Bay, but a COCOM supported CMO working alongside the Kenyans to fix the piers would have a more immediate impact on the Kenyans ability to use Manda Bayand on their attitudes toward the United States. Furthermore, CMO that focuses on simple infrastructure provides a greater benefit to the targeted audience as a whole: a school benefits the kids; a clinic helps the sick; a road helps everyone. Were using our CA teams for what we think they need, stated Rizzi, Instead we need to help them build the stuff they really need. Moreover, LCDR Rizzi witnessed the potential benefits such infrastructurefocused CMO could produce. The Chinese government built a 60 mile paved road from Mombassa to Nairobi. Rizzi believed that the road went by an oil refinery that the Chinese used, but that was not the important thing to the Kenyans. They just were happy to have the new roadand they talked openly and positively about the Chinese who built it for them. Strategic Communications at the Operational Level In Terrorism as a Psychological Strategy, Maurice Tugwell argues that in order to successfully conduct a military campaign, the warring state must meet three psychological criteria convictions the author terms the Mobilizing Trinity: 1. A belief in something good to be promoted or defended. 2. A belief in something evil to be destroyed or resisted. 3. A belief in the ultimate victory of the good cause. Coupling these convictions in terms



of the Long War and the role of the combatant commander is useful. The COCOMs IO-F/A efforts in conducting HA/DR missions, and in building regional relationships through the TSCP, should contribute to their belief in the good of Americaour institutions, our support for human rights, and our fight for freedom. We can address the other two legs of the Mobilizing Trinity via IO-F/A by conducting information operations that illuminate the enemy for what he is and that tell the good news stories about our successes. In order for IO-F/A to be effective in this regard, COCOMs actions must be aligned with an effective nationalstrategic narrative for fighting the Long War. But in order for this to happen, we must have a US national communications strategysomething that has eluded the USG since the end of the Cold War. This brings up an issue that is beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say the US has demonstrated the ability to have a very effective strategic narrative for confronting the enemy at hand. President Ronald Reagans strategic communication plan provided an effective national-strategic narrative from which to fight the Cold War against the Soviet Union and communism. Reagan succeeded in demonizing the USSR, calling it the Evil Empire and framing the Soviets as the bad guys. His communication strategy ensured the American peopleand our friends and allies across the globeknew the Soviet Union was the enemy, and that we must oppose communist forces. Moving forward to the 21st centurys Long War against extremism, and down to the operational level of war, strategic communication plays a vital part in the COCOMs role in conducting IOF/A. If HA/DR and TSCP efforts communicate to regional friends and allies that the United States is the good guy, then STRATCOMutilizing the capabilities of PSYOP and COMCAM can communicate that Radical Islamists are the bad guys and they are worth fighting against. CENTCOM can use its COMCAM teams to document the nihilistic violence of the insurgents.

Language is importantwhether doctrinally or locally. (Defense Link) This is already being done by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interiorshowing videos of captured insurgents being confronted by grieving and angry mothers whose children died by the insurgents hands. By providing true information (and images) about the enemy, the COCOM can influence friends and allies by publicizing the enemys evil nature. Additionally, COCOMs can utilize those same IO capabilitiesPSYOP, COMCAM, and PAto provide accurate information on our operational and tactical successes. This piece is critical in maintaining the support of friends and allies in the Long War, by providing evidence of progress towards victory. Just as the COCOM can document the evils of al Qaeda, so can the COCOM document our triumphsand then clearly communicate them to the media (and our friends) via effective public affairs engagement. So What? Can COCOMs Even do IO-F/A? Thus far in this examination, weve used numerous acronyms in building the argument. Here is one for the counter argument: MOTOMaster of the Obvious. Outlining the COCOMs role in IO-F/A has mostly identified actions, plans, and programs that regional combatant commands are already doing and will continue to do. Changing joint IO doctrine to include friends and allies as targeted audiences will not establish HA/DR as a COCOM mission or call for the development of a TSCP. Moreover, the core, supporting, and related capabilities used to conduct IOF/A are already established in current joint doctrine. Beyond the substantive argument that current IO doctrine is sufficient is the interagency argument that the military and the regional combatant commands specificallyshould not be engaging in IO designed to influence friends and allies. Such has generally been the purview of the Department of State (DOS). The US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (more commonly called the Smith-Mundt Act) established Cold War activities to direct US global communications and propaganda against the USSR and other communist antagonists. The primary messaging institution was the US Information Agency (USIA), whose mission was to inform and influence foreign audiences in an effort to promote US national interests. In 1999 DOS disestablished USIA, its mission subsumed by the State Departments Public Affairs office. In essence, IO-F/A is still a DOS mission. Yet recognizing the growing importance of information operations in the 21st century techno-revolution, DOD wrestles with how it should conduct IO. The 2003 DOD Information Operations Roadmap calls for the establishment of IO as a core military competency, and acknowledges the legal limitations of PSYOP and the Smith-Mundt Act, but

8

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does not provide any actual limits as long as DOD forces do not target the American public. This last pointin revealing an inherent ambiguity in the IO Roadmapleaves the door open for the military to conduct IO-F/A. And if the door is open, who is most able to walk through it? Beyond having a budget that dwarfs the DOS, DOD specifically the regional COCOMhas the capabilities to effectively conduct IO-F/A. The Somalia vignette is again useful; it succinctly shows the cumulative effects of COCOM actions in HA/DR, TSCP, and STRATCOM. Furthermore, as we have seen, the COCOM has been successful in influencing friends and allies through real world actions in Southeast Asia, and New Horizons engagement in Latin America. Language is Important Which brings us back to the question: why should we change current IO doctrine if the COCOM is already able to do IO-F/A? Because language matters. Language provides the knowledge, the guidance, and the lexicon necessary for understanding and conducting joint operations. And the specific language

in joint doctrine drives planning and impacts execution. If joint IO doctrine was not limited by the term adversarial, then the COCOM J39 would be able to build IO plans focusing on all potential audiencesfriends and foesas part of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (JIPOE). This would enable joint force commanders to accomplish the mission. Furthermore, with friends and allies as recognized IO audiences, the staff J39 can plan IO-F/A activities that shape the battlefield (in Phase 0, as part of the deliberate planning process) for contingency operations. Therefore, current joint IO doctrine should be changed to include friends and allies as targeted audiences. This conclusion does not supplant DOS national-strategic efforts to influence the thoughts and behaviors of foreign audiences. To the contrary, this conclusion points to greater interagency coordination, particularly at the operational level, where the COCOM CA and PA teams can partner with embassy country teams (and USAID) to promote US national policy and strategic objectives. Further, IO-F/A is not simply a game of semantics: it

recognizes a real and important audience and the effective means to address it. Thus it acknowledges the combatant commanders vital role. Understanding this, JP 3-13 should be changed to include IO-F/A as part of doctrine. If political sensitivities are still at play, then a classified supplement can help mitigate them. Additionally, as the primary agents for conducting IOF/A, the regional COCOMs should be empowered to do soparticularly with funding lines to support greater TSCP engagement activities that support IOF/A objectives. Information Operations-Friends & Allies is not about lying to our friends. Nor is it akin to the propaganda efforts of Joseph Goebbels. IO-F/A is simply a recognition of the important fact that what our friends think about us and our intentions impacts our ability to operate across the full spectrum of the DIME. Through language and leverage, IOF/A empowers the regional combatant commanders to perform good and truthful deeds. Such actions positively influence the minds of friendly decision makersthose who we must work with in order to win the Long War.

9

A Critical Analysis of the US Governments Current Perception Management Efforts

By Matteo G. Mooch Martemucci, Major, USAF Editorial Abstract: Maj Martemucci describes divergent US strategic messaging efforts, highlighting findings from critical assessments originating from three separate areas of governmenteach calling for prompt action. He offers recommendations for a single executive level Director of Strategic Communication with both proper authorities and appropriate interagency relationships. (This article is derived from his full thesis, available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA468873)

eptember 11 was a watershed event for US Public Diplomacy and the subsequent rethinking of the role of Perception Management (PM)/Information Operation (IO) across all areas of national power. US State Department Middle Eastern specialist Christopher Ross opined, In the 10 years between the Cold War and September 11, we had forgotten about the outside world. The harsh anti-American rhetoric and images that quickly began to overtake initial responses of international sympathy and support, he said, showed us what people think of us, and we were shocked. Americans should not have been shocked, however, considering the US retreat from Public Diplomacy and Perception Management over the previous decade. A review of strategic and operational attempts to refocus the informational element of national power post-September 11th reinforces the three reasons for the Governments inability to leverage the informational element of power: politics and personalities, bureaucracy, and a historical/ institutional aversion to the effective use of mass media. Strategic Direction The initial reaction by the White House after the 9/11 attacks was to stand up the temporary Coalition Information Center (CIC). This was very much reactionary, both in the way it was established and in the manner in which it operated. CIC was established to counter Taliban and Al Qaeda disinformation regarding the war in Afghanistan. By its very nature it was on the defensive, acting as the rapid response team to address propaganda put out by the newly identified enemy. It operated as a tactical entity rather than a long-term strategy-making body. Also in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush appointed Madison Avenue advertising powerhouse Charlotte Beers as the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Moving into a position which had been vacant for the first nine months of the Bush administration, Ms Beers approached the problem as an advertising campaign. But, as Safford argued as early as 1953, Psychological or political propaganda is not the same as advertising. Ms Beers drew criticism from those who argued that even an unsophisticated foreign audience would immediately recognize and reject such directed marketing. Reports claim she was shunned by her

department, and her tenure lasted only 17 months. The office once again went unfilled by a primary Undersecretary after her abrupt departure in March 2003. While the CIC was still reacting to a relatively effective terrorist propaganda machine, the White House created the Combating Terrorism Information Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) in July 2002. This was followed less than two months later by the creation of the Strategic Communication PCC. Both NSC-level committees were charged with creating a national strategic communications strategy. Established for the first time by the Bush administration, NSC PCCs are responsible for the management of national security policies and are the main day-to-day forums for interagency coordination of national policy. Unfortunately, they wield no authoritative power to direct any one or combination of agencies to act. The Strategic Communications PCC drafted a national communication strategy, but never issued it before the organization was dissolved six months later in March 2003. Still without a national communications strategy 15 months after the 9/11 attacks, the White House office created the Office of Global Communications (OGC) in January of 2003. Created by executive order, the OGC formalized the ad hoc CIC. The order is clear in its mandate: The office shall coordinate the formulation among appropriate agencies of messages that reflect the strategic communications framework and priorities of the United States, and shall facilitate the development of a strategy among the appropriate agencies to effectively communicate such messages. Almost four years after it was given this mandate, the OGC has yet to produce a national communications strategy. With previously described historical case studies in mind, it becomes clear that a long-term National Perception Management strategy is critical for the coordination of interagency efforts. Without it, the myriad efforts of multiple government entities work inefficiently at best. At worst, countervailing efforts can lead to Perception Management fratricide or even real casualties in the nations military conflicts. State Department Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, headed the Departments strategic communication efforts from 2005-2007. Her position as a department Undersecretary, however, did not make her

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effective in the interagency arena. In addition to a relatively small staff, she had no budgetary authority over public diplomacy officers in the department or embassies. Without budgetary authority, Hughes position as undersecretary was crippled from the start. In recognition of the continued gap in interagency coordination, President Bush replaced the Strategic Communication PCC with the newlycreated Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication PCC in April 2006 and made Karen Hughes its chairperson. Like the OGC before itwhich Hughes is largely credited with creatingthis PCC has not yet (as of 2007) produced a national communications strategy.

coordination between them and the OSI could lead to confusing and contradictory messages which would damage the overall government Perception Management effort. At worst, they feared a loss of government PA credibility and negative press coverage based on perceived OSI disinformation efforts. However, the immediate and universally negative reaction to the creation of the OSI by the domestic press brought about its disillusion, only a week after news of its creation was widely reported. Unfounded accusations were the chum in the water. It was not long before the sharks began to circle, and in four weeks the office was dead. Secretary Rumsfeld announced on February 26, 2002 that the office has clearly been so damaged that it is pretty clear to me that it could not Review of Operational-Level Perception function effectively. Perceptions became reality, and with Management Strategy in the Long War no one managing perceptions from within the Pentagon, The Department of Defense is by no means immune from failure was inevitable. All this happened with no enemy the Perception Management struggles faced by the rest of the involvementmaking this another instance of American Government. In fact, the institutional friction between the Perception Management fratricide. The OSI debacle illustrates two of the three challenges that media and the Government is nowhere more pronounced than form the theme of this article, in the Defense Department. that politics & personality and In the post-9/11 confusion the adversarial governmentand amidst a lack of strategic media relationship hinder direction and interagency a n e ff e c t i v e P e r c e p t i o n coordination, the Pentagon Management campaign. created the Office of Strategic A tactical example from Influence (OSI) on October Operation Iraqi Freedom 30, 2001. The OSI was illustrates the third. doomed to early failure after As a battalion commander unsubstantiated accusations responsible for sector security were made that it would plant in Baghdad in 2005, US Army false stories in the foreign Lieutenant Colonel Robert press. The OSI was brought Roth built a relationship with down in a barrage of criticism a local leader with known from within by US Government Operational level perception management in practice. ties to insurgent elements. critics and from without by the (Defense Link) This relationship was paying American media. The OSI dividends for the American battalion in terms of information debacle serves as an example of the power of perceptions. Perceptions, rather than reality, were enough to doom and enemy understanding (reinforcing the maxim Keep an organization to failure before it even started. The OSI your friends close and your enemies closer...). Without serves as an example of a wartime organization that died his knowledge or prior coordination, forces of another US from wounds not inflicted by an external enemy, but rather by Government agency snatched this local leader, whom they had governmental and nongovernmental forces within the United listed as an insurgent worthy of capture, in a nighttime raid. The local Iraqis in Lieutenant Colonel Roths sector saw States. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith built the OSI to serve as the coordinator of a strategic information campaign him as the face of the American military administration. They in support of the war on terrorism. This office was to develop were shocked and angered by the nighttime arrest and asked a full spectrum influence strategy that would result in greater him how the captured leader could be a friend of the Coalition foreign support of US goals and repudiation of terrorists one day and be arrested the next. Despite efforts to contact and their methods. It was ostensibly established to provide the US Government agency that arrested the Iraqi leader, LTC strategic oversight and coordination to the traditionally tactical Roth was unable to get any answers. This operation shook up application of military IO, namely PSYOP (radio/TV broadcast the neighborhood, sent mixed messages to the local population, and print operations). However, the OSI came under almost damaged LTC Roths credibility, and eliminated any chance immediate attack by the press as well as public affairs officials he had in succeeding in his endeavor to gain the trust of the in various government departments. Public affairs branches of local populace. other government agencies and departments (even within the Interagency confusion is not unique to this or any war, DOD PA community) were concerned that, at best, a lack of but in this age of instant communication and more rapid

information flow, the need for close coordination to manage perceptions has never been more important. At the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, the lack of a unified Perception Management campaign with commonly understood tasks, effects, objectives, and end states, can adversely affect the accomplishment of Americas long-term goals. These examples, from both the strategic and tactical levels of operation, underscore the importance of politics & personality. They also highlight the frictions caused by an adversarial government-media relationship. Finally, they illustrate that bureaucracy is not confined to the Washington, D.C. Beltwaysoldiers must battle the Interagency Bureaucracy Leviathan on the streets of Iraq. Despite honest efforts by well intentioned leaders and government employees, all of these factors continue hinder an effective Perception Management campaign. The informational element of power may be the most elusive for the US Government to wield, but its importance is proportional to its difficulty. Viewing the Perception Management problem through the lens of three specific reports, originating from three separate areas of the US Government, we can clearly identify both the difficulty in achieving a coordinated Perception Management strategy and the necessity for it. These documents identify the problem of Americas strategic direction, in terms of both the overall War of Ideology, and the Perception Management policies in that war. While distinct in their viewpoint and recommendations, the reports all agree that a partial solution lies in a presidential-level direction to refocus the efforts of the interagency community with respect to the national Perception Management strategy. The reports reveal several consistent themes in their analysis: Informational element of power receives significantly less attention than other traditional elements of power A unified strategic direction is critical for the successful employment of the informational element of national power Current US Government informational efforts are tactical and reactionary and are not producing results PM campaigns can only be effective when their application is nested in a series of mutually supporting plans tied to a central, long-term Perception Management strategy The 200 DSB Report on Strategic Communication In September of 2004, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication published its report, which found that US strategic communication lacks sustained presidential direction, effective interagency coordination, optimal private sector partnerships, and adequate resources. Among its recommendations, the DSB Task Force urged the President to establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the NSC, headed by a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication. It also recommended he work with Congress to create legislation and funding for a Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC and an independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication. Of these recommendations, only that to

create an NSC Strategic Communications Committee has been implemented. This article shows however, that a committee of equals without an authoritative director is a recipe for inaction. The previous analysis of the Strategic Communication Committee reveals that it has yet to deliver the product it was created to produce. The DSB report argues that A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from Cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required. It shares this finding, that an orchestrated interagency Perception Management campaign must be led by strong White House direction, with the other two reports cited below. The DSB Task Force also recognized that the current interagency environment is large, insular, and heavily dependent on the strength of key personalities. The report targeted the ineffectiveness of the government structures created in the wake of 9/11, when it stated: Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, this Strategic Communications Committee should have the authority to assign responsibilities and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations; concur in strategic communication personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; and provide program and project direction to a new Center for Strategic Communication. Giving an individual or committee the power to direct other government elements is a necessary step, but it cannot guarantee success. In its references to the success of the former US Information Agency (USIA) in its advisory role to the President and NSC, for example, the DSB conceded that its effectiveness was linked to its proximity to key decision makers. Its report recognized that the degree of participation depended almost always on personal relations between a President and a [USIA] Director. This recommendation harkens back to the importance of former directors George Creel, Edward R. Murrow, and Charles Wickand their access to power in the government. The report also emphasizes the importance of long-term planning, stating that even if all its recommendations are implemented, we are dealing with at least a decade to have a significant impact. In a complementary train of thought, the report argues that the highest levels of Perception Management operations in the US Government (i.e. the NSC, the Office of Global Communication and the Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy) must get away from tactical actions and focus on long-term strategy. With respect to the Office of Global Communications, the DSB report asserts that despite its charter to develop and coordinate a strategic direction for Perception Management, the OGC evolved into a second tier organization devoted principally to tactical public affairs coordination. The OGC does not engage in strategic direction, coordination, or evaluation. This problem is not unique to the OGC. As

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illustrated by examples in this article, the speed and complexity of the current informational terrain combined with institutional and individual friction at the highest levels had left the US Government in a reactive, vice proactive stance. The 200 Djerejian Report Representing a comparably diplomacy-centric view, the 2003 Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim Worldknown as the Djerejian report made a series of recommendations to overhaul what it called an inadequate public diplomacy apparatus. The report made nine major recommendations, supporting a three-part theme of dramatically increased strategic (specifically presidential) focus, increased funding for information programs designed to reach foreign (specifically Muslim) audiences, and an increased interagency coordination to support the new strategic direction for US public diplomacy. Most importantly, the Djerejian report focused on responsibility at the executive level, and it identified the President, specifically through the NSC, as the central coordinator of all Perception Management efforts. The report argues Public Diplomacy requires a new strategic directioninformed by a seriousness and commitment that matches the gravity of our approach to national defense and traditional stateto-state diplomacy. Recognizing that the effort will only succeed if driven from the top, the report recommends the creation of a cabinet-level Counselor to the President. Stating that the current structure is strictly tactical [and] inadequate to meet the demands of public diplomacy today, the report recommends a new strategic architecture, headed by an eminently qualified person who has the Presidents ear. The Djerejian report also addressed the interagency struggle, and it specifically outlined the challenges of interagency balance in the current overseas effort. While the State Department is generally considered the lead agency in public diplomacy, the report states, the Defense Department dominates public diplomacy in Iraqthe most immediate battleground in the struggle for ideas. In its recognition that the Defense Department has a clear role in public diplomacy due to its obvious and pervasive influence of the populations it directly influences, the commission stated that the Defense Department Must be more closely tied to the reinforced strategic direction and coordination that we propose. The report reveals an acceptance of the reality that under the current paradigm of the Long War, DOD is currently the dominant actor in US global engagement. The authors of the report were justifiably concerned that unilateral planning and action by one dominant element of national power prevents the effective synergies that can arise from coordinated interagency operations.

The 200 GAO Report on Public Diplomacy The third analysis came from the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2005. The GAO report found further evidence of a lack of effective interagency coordination, succinctly summarized in its title: US Public Diplomacy Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy. It stated that since 11 September 2001, the creation of additional coordinators and committees at the highest levels of US government did little to coordinate interagency efforts. The report identified that the Presidents executive order creating the Office of Global Communications in 2003 had not yet been implemented fully. It stated that because the Office of Global Communications had not developed a National communication strategy, Agencies have developed their own roles and missions and coordinated their activities on an ad-hoc basis. The report echoed the Defense Science Boards 2004 finding that the Office of Global Communications has evolved into a second-tier organization devoted principally to tactical public affairs coordination, and stated that the Defense Department reports were an attempt by the department to fill the planning void left by the lack of strategic direction from the White House. Specifically, the GAO report recommended the full implementation of the role envisioned for the office, including the development of a national communications strategy to guide and coordinate the efforts of the State Department, Defense Department, and other agencies. In its report, the GAO concluded that: [The] State [Department] lacks a comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy strategy to guide the implementation of programs. Furthermore, there is no interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide States and all federal agencies consistent messages to overseas audiences and thus achieve mutually reinforcing benefits. [T]he disparate efforts by individual agencies and departments could result in Perception Management fratricide. The report by no means singled out the White House or State Department for criticismthe Defense Department received equally poor marks. Simply put, the military application of informational power has remained at the operational and tactical levels, predominantly as relatively narrowly defined psychological operations. The report notes: Historically, DOD has been reluctant to define any of its activities in public diplomacy terms, though the department has begun to develop a defense support for public diplomacy strategy, which acknowledges that the department has a role to play in this arena. When placed along side the two other reports, the GAO report completes the picture of the current problem: there is

While all three reports focus on the strategic level of government, it is clear that the implications are far-reaching and affect operational and tactical actions in the Long War. In the arena of Perception Management, operational-level actions are inextricably linked to strategic direction. Operational-level actions, whether they be military, economic, diplomatic, or informational, can only work when they tightly coordinate with and reinforce the national strategic Perception Management campaign. Recommendations Interagency cooperation on the tarmac: US State and Defense Department senior leadership visit Baghdad. (Defense Link) still no single individual or office with the power to control the direction of the National Perception Management campaign. All three reports offer either an outline of a Perception Management process or specific elements of a public relations strategy. They offer recommendations that mirror very closely the process undertaken by any reputable public relations firm or well-run political campaign. Why, as the Djerejian report asks, can the White House put together a well-orchestrated campaign to research, enact, and sell a domestic program with a good PM campaign, yet fail so miserably in a larger international campaign to dissuade negative public opinions that can lead to violence against the US? This question has no easy answer. There are obvious differences from a short term political campaign. The first is an issue of scope. A Perception Management campaign on a global scale necessarily involves the synchronization of all elements of national power, not to mention coordination among disparate and far-flung elements of government from the strategic to the tactical levels. The second is an issue of time; namely the long-term nature of a national Perception Management campaign. A political campaign, for example, has a definite beginning and end. Even presidencies have a finite time frame mandated by law. A national Perception Management campaign to change the will of an enemy combatant (at least) and world opinion to be more favorable to the United States (at most) is, on the other hand, a task that may take generations. Nevertheless, the difficulties posed by such a campaign are not a justifiable reason to not undertake the effort. The three reports are strikingly similar, not only in their recommendations but also in the sense of urgency they convey in the need for solutions. All three reports call for increased presidential-level leadership to elevate the informational element of power to a level commensurate with the other elements of power and appropriate to the current strategic environment. All three call current government efforts tactical and reactionary. All agree a partial solution lies in a presidential-level direction to refocus the efforts of the interagency community with respect to the national Perception Management strategy. Two of the three recommend a cabinet-level counselor or advisor for Strategic Communication to the President. 8 Andrew Garfields observation bears repeating: It is a paradox of our time that both the public and politicians are prepared to tolerate the use of bombs and bullets, but shy away from the use of information as a weapon of war. History reveals that previous administrations have used Perception Management campaigns successfully in the past. These successes were, of course, relative and difficult to achieve. They happened despite the ever present and easily recognized frictions of politics & personalities, bureaucracy, and historical/ institutional aversion to the effective use of mass media. Americas strategic direction in terms of both the Long War and its Perception Management policies in that war shows clear weaknesses. A historical review and analysis of the current environment have shown that American policies and the global perceptions associated with them cannot be separated. Because they are inextricably linked and because Perception Management is so important, the two must be managed together in a unified direction. This direction can only (and must) come from the White House. The burden lies with the President. As US chief diplomat and military Commander in Chief, he must place a priority on the Perception Management campaign to support the prosecution of the Long War. As head of the executive branchwith the authority to designate relationships of authorityhe must give the person entrusted with implementation the power and authority to not only coordinate, but also direct the disparate elements of national power. Only then can the national Perception Management campaign achieve the operational synergy required to be an effective part of the National Security Strategy. Personalities and their placement do matter. Today, we have no George Creel, no Wild Bill Donovan, no Edward R. Murrow. To this end, the administration must consider the collective recommendations of the reports cited and install a single Director of Information to serve as a cabinet-level direct advisor to the President. The title does not matter the position and authority relative to the Governments Departmental Secretaries does. This individual must have the authority to direct and coordinate the disparate efforts of the government as they relate to the overall Perception Management Campaign. This is not a new idea. In 1953 former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Barrett argued for a Persuader in Chief who would fit the criteria above and provide authoritative direction to synergize the disparate efforts of the interagency community. Winter 2008

Aside from politics and personalities, institutional bureaucracy large nation state. Second, it is not bound by the ethical and is an unavoidable point of friction in an organization the size of cultural mores that prevent the US from responding in kind. the US Government. Departments and agencies pay lip service Third, the nature of modem commercial mass media gives a to interagency coordination in their various strategy documents, disproportionate advantage to those who use acts of spectacular but unless they are held accountable by a single overarching violence as a means to get their message across. Finally, a director with budgetary and policy authority, Perception recent historical legacy of mutual distrust exists between the Management efforts will remain disjointed at bestand self- US government (particularly the military) and the media. This defeating at worst. A great deal of friction currently stems from has resulted in a government abrogation of sorts on the use of individual agency interpretation of priorities and approaches the press as a medium to combat extremism. to PM. While unified executive branch direction will not To an observer of current events, these problems may seem eliminate inherent interagency friction, a clarified Government insurmountable. The recommendations in this article, too, may Strategic Communication policy for the Long War and a seem to some as simply another Government restructuring to unified vision for a National Perception Management campaign deal with the latest problem. A review of history, however, will set the conditions for operational success. reveals that it is possible to have moments of interagency With respect to media relationships, the government must coordination, clear strategic direction, and nested, integrated, take a proactive, vice reactive, stance. The government and and effective Perception Management operations in support of its key institutions must get over its aversion toand fear a larger unified Perception Management campaign. World War ofa media that often operates counter to its aims. It is very I, World War II, and the Cold War all offer examples, however possibleand quite necessaryto better engage the media fleeting, of such successes. in a legal and truthful manner as a key component of the US The informational element of power may be the most Perception Management campaign. elusive for the Government to wield, but its importance is It is all too easy to find examples of strained government proportional to its difficulty. Perception Management is more and particularly militarymedia relations. Senior leaders and critical now than at any time in Americas history. All who young Public Affairs officers alike fall back on these examples serve in the US Government must strive to synergize their as justification to not engage in a proactive manner. The media efforts so that America can once again regain the Perception establishment will argue that they are not a tool to be used Management high ground. to further the governments aims, but that is exactly what must happen. The media are the primary means through which the Government exercises the informational element of power. Please see bibliography/references on the IO Sphere Home The government must be willing to use the media to engage Page at: foreign audiences as readily as it is willing to deploy military https://www.jiowc.osis.gov/Publications/IOSphere/index.cfm forces to foreign lands. This is not to say that these actions Click on the updates link under the Winter 2008 issue should be done deceitfully or illegally. Truthfulness is the only way to achieve credibility, and credibility is essential for effective PM. The military principle of Offense has been an enduring principle of war for very good reason: one cannot win by simply defending. One must go on the offensive Maj Mooch Martemucci, US Air Force, is a career to win. In the war of ideas, as with intelligence officer and European Foreign Area Officer. He conventional war, battles cannot be won has served in intelligence and Special Operations assignments by simply reacting to enemy attacks. This across the US, Europe, Korea, and the Middle East at the squadron, is what the US Government has done since wing, sub-unified command, Air Staff and Office of the Secretary 9/11, and it is one reason American soft of Defense levels. He deployed in support of Operations Decisive power has declined in recent years. Endeavor, Southern Watch, and Iraqi Freedom. He holds a Conclusion Violent Islamic extremists and others combating US interests with terrorist tactics currently hold the Perception Management high ground. There are four reasons, none of which lend themselves to easy or immediate solutions. First, the enemy is small, agile, and unencumbered by the governmental bureaucracy of a Bachelors in International Relations from Pennsylvania State University, a Masters in International Politics from Troy State University, a Masters in Joint Campaign Planning from NDU, and a Graduate Certificate in Organizational Management from the George Washington University. He is also a graduate of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, and Air Command and Staff College.

Prospects for an Information Operations Force

By Michael O. McMahon Editorial Abstract: Despite the high profile information operations have attained in joint and service-level structures, the mission largely remains homeless, without an institutional champion or advocate that generates and protects the resources necessary to accomplish it. Using current USAF efforts as a basis, McMahon argues for dedicated, fully trained and certified independent IO Force to carry out future cyber-missions.

hile it may be convenient to conclude that transformational change in our Armed Forces occurs as a result of informed insight into future threats or progressive institutional evolution, all too often change occurs as a reaction torather than anticipation ofseismic shifts in the national security landscape. Such changes are often hastily executed to satisfy an immediate need, and only later normalized as a new institution. As we consider the emerging threats foreign information operations and influence programs targeting the United States and its interests worldwide pose, is it possible to anticipate and implement necessary realignments to our force posture prior to a cataclysmic event that prompts hasty and poorly planned change? A Looming Crisis The United States is already facing a crisis in the global information space that holds our national security and foreign interests at substantial risk. We need look no farther than our own news services for examples of the predicament before us: international terrorist organizations employ web portals, bulletin boards, and e-mail communications hosted by US Internet service providers to conduct their nefarious operations ; senior military officials openly describe sophisticated, multi-year electronic intrusions into Defense Department computer networks that exfiltrate large volumes of data to foreign countries; and 24 hour satellite news services provide impressionable audiences worldwide with saturation

coverage of terror, insurgency, and violence against US personnel and interests. In the midst of a global war on terror, overseas impressions of the United States are at all-time lows. Meanwhile, our Defense establishment continues to publish an ever-expanding library of policy and doctrinal statements calling for information dominance and decision superiority in the information

Are we prepared to respond? (Defense Link) environmentboldly characterized as the new battlespace of the 21st century. How is it, a full decade after the Defense Department and Joint Staff began to articulate requirements for engaging these and similar threats to protect US interests in the global information space, that the Defense community continues to ask even the most basic questions concerning the posture of information operations within the overall context of US military capabilities and across the spectrum of armed conflict? In early 2001, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Dr. Ashton

Carter characterized some of our most critical security priorities, to include information warfare, as homeless missions: those accomplished in an adhoc fashion by unwieldy combinations of departments and agencies designed a half-century ago for a different world and nowhere are the authority, resources, and accountability brought together in sharp managerial focus. Carter explains that these missions require the coordinated action of several agencies, as the problems they address do not respect neat distinctions between foreign and domestic issues, or states of war and states of peace. Carters observations, especially with regard to information operations, have proven frustratingly durable. Despite the high profile information operations have attained in joint and service-level structures, the mission largely remains homeless; it lacks an institutional champion or advocate that focuses on the mission by generating and protecting the resources necessary to accomplish it. Traditional military operations in the physical environment (land, sea/littoral, and air/space) have such institutions in the form of Service departments that perform the vital functions of organizing, training, and equipping combat forces. The Services also sponsor development of highly specialized weapon systems to support their combat missions. Finally, the Services have the political muscle to acquire resources, defend programs, and advocate in their own interest in the tumultuous and often hostile Federal budget process. US dominance of combat operations in the physical environment

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is unsurpassed largely because of these critical Service functions. However, combat in the information environment continues to lag, because of the lack of a corresponding institutional advocate. Until the United States begins seriously to consider establishing an Information Operations Force organized as an independent Service, its efforts to engage effectively in the battlespace of the 21st century and live up to the rhetoric of its own policy documents will continue to founder. When we examine the need to prepare ourselves for combat in a new operating environment, we see that the United States has been down this road before. A Lesson from History The early history of the United States Air Force can provide insight into our experience with institutional change, while preparing to fight in a new combat environment. The struggle to establish an independent air service is an exhaustive tale spanning 40 years and two world wars. Although both the Department of the Army and the Navy developed air combat capabilities, it was under the Army that the air forces truly began to view themselves as an independent service. Whereas the Navy viewed naval aviation as an additional means to achieve and maintain maritime dominance, the Armybased air service developed specialized missions such as strategic bombing that were sufficiently separate from ground maneuver to spark independent thinking. Air proponents argued these missions would require substantial investment in their own theoretical and doctrinal studies, resource allocations to develop new technologies, and, ultimately, a new command structure. As long as the air service remained a component element of the Army, air advocates were convinced their interests would remain subordinated to a service ultimately dedicated to military operations on land. It was only after World War II, when observers noted both the critical role of strategic bombing in the conflict and the simultaneous emergence of new

technologies such as jet power, nuclear weapons and missile systems, that the Air Force was finally established as an independent service. It was the ultimate recognition that excellence in air and space power required the doctrinal development, mission focus, professional career sustainability, and dedicated weapon systems development that only a Service department can support. Similarly, it recognized that continued investment in strategic air capabilities by the Army would ultimately detract from its primary mission to fight and win wars on land. By 1947, the separation was completed with the passing of the National Security Act establishing the United States Air Force as an independent Service on equal footing with the Departments of the Army and Navy. This example can inform our discussion on the disposition of information operations capabilities today. As with air power in the early part of the 20th century, existing Service departments are making investments in information operations, largely with the view that these capabilities augment each Services primary mission in the physical environment. Each develops its own doctrine which, in turn, drives its own disparate force development and uneven career paths for their respective officer corps and enlisted ranks. Joint force commanders frequently have little idea what information operations capabilities are truly at their disposal because of the wide disparity in levels of professional development across the service members that report for duty. Some report for duty lacking even a basic understanding of information operations concepts. This situation largely is attributable to the fact that information operations are a collateral responsibility of the existing Services, and this is reflected in the current state of doctrinal, professional, and weapon systems development. The general disarray in the information operations community, reflected in everything from command structure, force development, and intelligence support is largely reflective of the situation of air power in the first

F-80 Shooting Star, the first operational US jet. (AviationHistory.com) half of the 20th century; as subordinate, and ultimately collateral, responsibilities within the existing Services, the information operations community lacks a sufficient advocate to garner and focus resources, establish professional career paths from enlistee to general officer, and develop an appropriate force structure for 21st century combat. We can only hope that it will not take another world war to force necessary change. A Roadmap to Nowhere Are we not already engaged in a world war? Countless writers and commentators characterize the United States and its partners as being on a perpetual defensive in the global competition for opinion and influence. Consider the role of Qatar-based AlJazeera television in stalling Coalition operations in Fallujah in 2004, or the decisive role played by Lebanese Hizballah media and information services played in its summer 2006 war with Israel. When Usama bin Ladin and others exercise the capability to relay a strategic communication message via US news networks to the American people less than a week before they head to the presidential polls, as he did in October 2004, we should realize the global information war has already begun. Our first strategic priority should be to develop a trained and ready career force singularly dedicated to the mission of information operations. This is a primary intent of the Defense Departments Information Operations Roadmap. Completed in 2003 and sanitized for public release in 2006, the Roadmap documents the current shortcomings

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Usama bin Ladin addresses the American people, 29 October 2004. (Associated Press) in developing an IO career force, and makes a series of recommendations for change. Despite its good intentions, the Information Operations Roadmap is in many respects a roadmap to nowhere. The stated goal of the study is to transform IO into a core competency, on par with air, ground, maritime and special operations. With the exception of special operations, each of these core competencies benefit from Service institutions that develop doctrine; recruit, train and sustain a career force; and sponsor development of specialized weapon systems. Although the special operations forces do not have their own Service structure, they do benefit from several unique institutions, such as a dedicated Combatant Command with independent acquisition and training authority, which ensures mission readiness. It is difficult to envision bringing information operations to the same level of proficiency as these competencies while lacking the same structures and institutions that support and sustain them. The Roadmap aggregates 15 topic areas as designated in the 2004 Defense Planning Guidance into 5 major areas for reform: Policies and Procedural Controls; Command and Control and Supporting Organizations; Trained, Educated and Ready Career Force; Analytic Support; and Enhanced Core Capabilities. In each corresponding Current Situation section, the study rightly and accurately captures the disarray in the information operations community. However, many of the recommendations are at best halfmeasures when we fully consider the scope of the problem and the nature of

the threat facing the nation. For example, under Policies and Procedural Controls, the study finds there is not a consensus on how to define IO or its contribution to warfighting, and later the Department cannot currently identify what is spent on IO or even on specific core capabilities. These concerns speak to the general disorder at the very foundations of the information operations community, and reveal the need for a fully-empowered advocate to establish these definitions and doctrines, and account for the means by which a national force capability will be trained, equipped and organized to carry them out. These concerns will not be remedied by yet another generation of Departmental or Joint Staff policy documents; rather, they would best be addressed by a Service-level institution that is empowered to act, can speak with authority, and account for itself. Perhaps the most important section of the Roadmap for this discussion is its third major area: A Trained and Ready Career Force. Again, the study provides accurate and illuminating descriptions of the current state of affairs in the information operations workforce: Service constructs of IO produce a varying work force. The five capabilities of IO are not universally defined, understood or applied across the Service Departments. As a result, each Service develops specialists in those disciplines that meet Service-specific requirements the complexity and technological growth in EW, PSYOP and CNO tend to isolate the specialists who practice these disciplines from one another there if often little application or awareness of the relationships of one core capability to the others retention of personnel possessing these key skill sets may be a challenge officers assigned to Combatant Commands lack necessary operational IO planning experience and must depend upon onthe-job trainingthe military population lacks an understanding of IO as well. These observations speak directly to the problem of each Service attempting to build an information operations cadre in the context of preparing for combat operations within its primary physical

domain (land, sea/littoral, air/space). Each service maintains independent doctrine, training and education, and work force development programs for information operations which leave the joint force commander in the unenviable position of attempting to sort out each service members skills, capabilities and mindset even before operational planning can begin. These points highlight the lack of a common military culture in the field of information operations; a culture created by officers and enlisted personnel forming collegial bonds from the beginning of their careers in their respective training and education programs that clearly inculcate mission, doctrine, and capability from the outset. These are the types of bonds formed not at joint commands, rather within Services. Although the Roadmap does not address the idea of creating an independent Service for information operations, it does suggest it may be necessary to consider making IO a dedicated military occupation specialty or career field. Although this may improve career force development within the respective services, it will not remedy ongoing concerns that the Services themselves cannot provide comparably prepared officer and enlisted specialists to a joint force commander. This recommendation is a well-intentioned half-measure. Ultimately, the Roadmap fails to address the structural problem of information operations as a collateral function of the Services. Despite the steady support provided by the Services, it is unlikely they will ever devote the resources and personnel necessary to move information operations to the place it needs to be for combat in the 21st century at the expense of their primary missions. Sovereign Options Although each Service continues to make investment in information operations, the United States Air Force clearly is leading the way with a wide range of structural changes designed to elevate information operations within

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its range of combat capabilities. As captured in its December 2005 mission statement, the Air Force is now posturing itself to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests to fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace . In effect, the Air Force will attempt to fully support combat superiority fully in two entirely separate operational domains; the physical (air/space) and the informational (cyberspace). Examples of the Air Forces investment in information operations include unique doctrinal developments, command structures, and combat units. Air Force doctrine builds a seamless link between combat superiority in air, space, and cyberspace largely through evolutionary developments in its intelligence and airborne reconnaissance capabilities. A brief review of the history of the 67th Network Warfare Wing shows its lineage in the field of airborne reconnaissance and technical intelligence collection. These capabilities merged in August 2000 with the establishment of the 67th Information Operations Wing, a first-of-its-kind unit that supported the emerging concepts of battlespace awareness and information superiority through the execution of both offensive and defensive information operations. Today, the 67th Network Warfare Wing demonstrates its commitment to the discipline of information operations by organizing, training, and equipping an organic fighting force to carry out these missions. The Air Force is also restructuring its intelligence and reconnaissance organizations that will support the further development of information operations capabilities. In May 2007, Air Force officials announced the establishment of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency, a centralized organization that underscores the nature of ISR as an Air Force-wide enterprise. This ISR agency will also be postured to support a reorganized 8th Air Force under the title Air Force Cyberspace Command. Significantly, Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne has stated that the Air Force is working to develop

educational plans and career paths for those Airmen that will work within the new command (emphasis added). In terms of doctrine, structure, and career force development, the Air Force clearly is making substantial investments in the field of information operations. But where will it all lead? Is it possible for the Air Force to sustain the necessary commitments to information operations without compromising its initial missions of air and space superiority? As the Air Force continues to expand its organic information operations capabilities, it likely will find itself in the same position as the Army

operations capabilities that will extend well beyond the Air Force, and the successful concentration of funding and capabilities could promote Cyberspace Command as a Defense-wide center for cyberwarfare operations. In time, Cyberspace Command potentially could develop into a joint structure, with independent authorities for training and procurement such as US Special Operations Command enjoys today. A Way Forward Although each of the Services is investing in information operations capabilities, this discussion has focused on the Air Force, because it is proceeding with substantial investments and institutional changes that a future IO Service ultimately will draw upon. However, all of the Services ultimately would contribute personnel and resources at the time of its establishment. The question facing defense planners today should be one of evolution or revolution. An evolutionary approach would entail an extended nurturing period, not unlike the early air service components under the Army. Under this model, defense planners would carefully monitor the development of a national information operations capability within the existing Services until two specific break-points: 1) information operations reaches a level of maturity, as characterized by doctrinal sophistication, professional development, and overall combat capability that exhibit the ability to stand on its own, and 2) the existing Services continued investment in information operations begins to compromise their primary missions in the physical domain. In our historical example, the air service became an independent Air Force only after its massive expansion during the Second World War. Will we need the experience of a future Information War One to prompt a similar development? Some may argue that Information War One has already begun; therefore, the mandate already exists for a revolutionary approach that would entail the immediate consolidation of existing information operations capabilities into an

67th Network Warfare Wing Airmen in action. (US Air Force) did in the first half of the 20th century, with a burgeoning component force yearning for the independence it rightly requires to fully develop doctrine, career paths, and combat capabilities. It would be ironic, indeed, were the Air Force to cling to information operations as the Army did with the air service for so long. By taking the additional step of linking its doctrinal foundations closely across the physical and information domains, the Air Force may make the inevitable separation all the more difficult. Already, some observers note the Cyberspace Command likely will build information



Information Operations Force. Although this option may appear attractive to advocates of structured career paths and professional development, other aspects such as doctrine, strategy, integration within joint command structures, and operationalization of emerging capabilities require additional work. Clearly, the complete package of doctrine, professional development, and weapons systems lack the maturity required for information operations to make an immediate break from parent services at this time. Given these options, the evolutionary approach is the better course. Because substantial progress has already been made, we should hope for a maturation period of shorter than 40 years. What will warfare look like in the 21st century? Many feel major armed conflict between states has become anachronistic and future warfare will consist primarily of intrastate affairs focused on issues of national, cultural or religious identity, rather than on the grand ambitions of major powers. Others suggest that major interstate warfare is only on temporary hold because of this short, transitory period in which the United States faces no real challenger to

Are we best postured for 21st century combat? (Lockheed Martin) its conventional combat capabilities a situation that can certainly change later this century, as emerging or resurgent conventional powers develop their force structures to sufficient parity with the United States. In either scenario, it is virtually impossible to envision a future conflict in which comprehensive battlespace awareness, strategic messaging, sophisticated employment of international media, cyber operations, and effective opinion shaping will not play critical roles. Combat in the 21st century must be engaged, sustained, and won in both the physical and informational domains. Our adversaries have already engaged us in the information domain and our responses have been marked largely by disarray. Information operations call for engaging the adversary in an entirely new combat environment - one that requires a trained cadre of military experts. They would share a common professional culture and enjoy the confidence of a dedicated institution that would provide them with the resources and weapon systems to allow them to excel in combat. To offer our nascent information warriors anything less is to undercut their potential and place our own national interests at serious risk.



Winter 2008

Editorial Balancing and Assessing

By Michael G. Miller

fter doing the IO thing for a number of years now, and having been offered the opportunity to rock the boat a bit, I wanted to lay out two things that I believe pose a major challenge to the IO community. These topics are separate, but related to some degree; identifying solutions to either one may benefit the other as well. Challenge One: Incorporating advanced computer-based tools into IO planning and integrative analysis. There is great pressure on the community to improve the efficiency of IO integrative analysis, planning and assessment processes by harnessing advanced computing tools. In general, I believe that tools can make some jobs easier and help produce a better product. There is, however, a balance that must be attained: we have to balance the integrating of advanced tools that will force changes in business processes with the peoples need to use the existing processes to get the work done. In this regard, the people and the business processes should always drive the technologies to be employed, and not vice-versa. The tools should always serve the master; the master should never serve the tools. After 12 years of direct observation, I am of the opinion that the IO community already has plenty of good, usable tools that help provide IO analysis and planning support to combatant commanders. These tools need to be integrated where appropriate to improve their efficiency; further, a dedicated cadre of personnel needs to be trained to use these analysis and planning tools, and then they need to use them. As this dedicated cadre of tool-smart people is using the tools, we will: find out which tools work well; lash them together properly to improve their performance when appropriate; and see where gaps exist or where things could be improved. As new tools come along, these should be evaluated to

determine their suitability for improving process and product; acquiring new tools for the sake of acquiring new tools should be avoided like the proverbial plague. At bottom, there should be a productive tension between keeping existing processes, and acquiring new technologies that would force process revision; if the tension is kept productive (not destructive), the integration of tools into the IO communitys operating culture will be much less painful. The Joint USJFCOM-USSTRATCOM program known as the Virtual Integrated Support to the Information Operations Environment [VISION] must hold to the principles outlined above to build a tool set for the IO analyst-planner that helps produce better planning products more quickly. Challenge Two: Effects and Actions Assessment. A great deal of emphasis is being placed on this topic in the IO community now, and for good reason: we in the IO business need to know clearly how well were doing what we intended to do. The challenge of assessment lies not in establishing the business processes for doing assessmentthese exist. The challenge lies in two other areas: the first is that the data to make the assessment meaningfulespecially to support the measures of effectiveness calculationsare hard to acquire. The second component of the challenge that seemingly is not well understood is this: when determining how well influence programsstrategic communication, psychological operations and public affairs campaigns especiallyare working, there is short-term assessment and there is long-term assessment.

Commanders are inclined to look at short-term assessment to gauge the success of their efforts; it may be, however, that progress will only be seen over the long term. Failure of the assessment staff to forecast both the short and long-term expected effects of their influence operations does the commander a disservice. This is because the commander may decide, based on incomplete staff analysis, to abandon a perfectly good influence campaign because the effects desired were not forthcoming in the short term. Commanders must realize that the effects desired might only be created over the long termin many cases, after the commanders tenure has ended. In the current unpleasant, terrorism-driven (but far more complex) national security environment, the emphasis should be on the longer-term assessments of our progress in creating effects, while simultaneously understanding when the short-term assessment results are harbingers of longer-term problems. Also, assessment is not intelligence gathering; rather, it uses intelligence gathering, as well as information gathering, to craft judgments regarding our progress and how to direct further efforts. Additionally, it takes time to grow skilled assessors: though an intelligent person can be trained to do assessment in short order, real assessment expertise comes as a consequence of actually conducting assessment. Finally, there is still the problem of acquiring the data to make a valid assessment: this area, however, is where the tools I discussed in Challenge One can help. Tw o c h a l l e n g e s t w o opportunities how will we proceed? -- MGM

The Trouble With Strategic Comunication(s)

By Dennis M. Murphy Editorial Abstract: With no overaching distinction between strategic information ways and means, current US messaging efforts are hampered by misunderstanding. Mr. Murphy recommends development of an organizational culture that values and understands SC, to better integrate perception management into military planning.

ecently the US Southern C o m m a n d s A d m i r a l J a m e s Stavridis paraphrased World War IIs great naval commander and strategist Ernest King: I dont know what the hell this [strategic communication] is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.1 This past summer over 200 strategic communication practitioners and academics met at the National War College for the first annual Worldwide Strategic Communication Seminar. Senior government officials urged attendees to get on with the business of strategic communication, noting that we will be flying the plane while were building it. 2 Both of these previous statements point to the urgency of integrating effective strategic communication into military operations while recognizing that we dont quite understand how to do it or even understand what it is. So, if the intent is to fly the plane while building it, the pilot check-list becomes of paramount importance to ensure the aircraft not only gets off the ground but also avoids crashing and burning once it takes flight. In other words, we must educate leaders, particularly warfighters, about what strategic communication is and what it isnt. The difficulty, of course, is that there is no military doctrine for strategic communication, leaving both its definition and the process associated with it open to interpretation. Strategic Communicationor Strategic Communications? The trouble with an emerging (and important) concept sans doctrine is that the terminology (i.e. the lexicon) can act to define that concept. Thus, military leaders loosely throw about the term strategic communications (with an s) validating Kings modified quote.

Lacking any further understanding beyond the term itself, the default definition of strategic communication in the minds of many has to do with media interaction, which further devolves to establishing effective talking points for the next press briefing.3 This is not only wrong; it is dangerous. It significantly limits the ability of the actual process of strategic communication (no s) to synergistically support military operations. In that light, it is important to examine what strategic communication is in order to better exploit its full capabilities. There is no overarching US government definition of strategic communication.4 However, there is a Department of Defense definition as a result of the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which produced the DOD Strategic Communication Roadmap. Strategic communication is focused US Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.5 The Roadmap goes on to list the primary supporting capabilities of strategic communication as Public Affairs, aspects of Information Operations (principally psychological operations), Military Diplomacy, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Visual Information.6 Unfortunately this list limits the perceived means available to communications (emphasis intentionally added) based activities and so reinforces the lexicon of the term itself. And therein lies the rub with our military leaders current interpretations of strategic communication. Considering SC as a

menu of self-limiting communications capabilities will ensure the plane never takes off (to use the previous analogy). Instead, interpretation of the definition itself must serve as the basis of understanding by educators who teach strategic communication and by practitioners who plan and implement it. Strategists use a model of ends, ways and means to describe all aspects of a national or military strategy. Strategy is about how (the way) leaders will use the capabilities (means) available to achieve objectives (ends).7 Understanding and engaging key audiences is meant to change perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and, ultimately behaviors to help achieve military (and in turn national) objectives. Thus, parsing the QDR definition it is apparent that strategic communication is a way to achieve an information effect on the cognitive dimension of the information environment (the required end). 8 Strategic communication employs multiple means and these means should be restricted only by the requirement to achieve the desired information effect on the target audience. Messages are certainly sent by verbal and visual communications means, but they are also sent by actions. Note the QDR definition specifically includes actions. In fact, senior officials point out that strategic communication is 80% actions and 20% words. 9 Specifically, how military operations are conducted affects the information environment by impacting perceptions, attitudes and beliefs. Recent examples include use of US Navy hospital ships in regional engagement and Pakistani earthquake relief efforts in permissive environments.10 But hostile environments like the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters

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also provide opportunities to positively shape the information environment. This clarification and expanded understanding of the definition is critical if the military hopes to effectively educate leaders on how to fully exploit strategic communication to support military operations. Key to success is an organizational unit culture that values, understands, and thus considers strategic communication means as important capabilities to be integrated within established planning processes. SC & IO: A Side by Side Comparison Strategic communication, as analyzed above, allows consideration of another dilemma in military education and practitioners understanding: what is the difference between strategic communication and information operations (IO)? A close look at the doctrinal definition of IO and the QDR definition of strategic communication provides some answers. Information Operations is the integrated employment of the core capabilities in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. 11 Much like strategic communication, the definition of IO should be considered with less regard toward the stated core capabilities than the process that results in an information effect. With that in mind a comparison of the two definitions reveals evident distinctions. Strategic communication is the more broadly overarching concept targeting key audiences and focusing on the cognitive dimension of the information environment. On the other hand, as an integrating function IO more specifically targets an adversarys decision making capability which may be in the cognitive, informational and/or physical dimensions of the information environment (Figure 1). Considering the targets and effects described above, it should be clear that both strategic communication and IO can be employed at all levels of

Target SC IO Key Audiences Adversarial human and automated decision-making

Effect Understand and Engage Influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp

Dimension Cognitive (People) Cognitive, informational, physical (people, processes, systems)

Primary Capabilities PA, PSYOP, MD, DSPD, VI EW, CNO, OPSEC, MILDEC, PSYOP

Figure 1. A side by side comparison of IO and SC. warfare (tactical, operational, theater capabilities. The planning process is not strategic and national strategic). Tactical new. The focus on and understanding commanders routinely employ strategic of this new concept and its capabilities, communication in Iraq today based on however, may be. their interactions with key audiences in First, planners must define the their area of responsibility to a potential information environment and its physical, strategic end. On the other end of the informational and cognitive dimensions. scale, IO could certainly be employed How does the target audience receive strategically as part of a shaping Phase their information (TV, radio, Internet, 0 operation or a deterrent Phase 1 rumor, religious services, etc.)? How operation against a potential adversarys does culture play into the message? decision-making capability. Who are the credible messengers? Next, Confusing these terms, however, planners need to consider the desired should not be of significant concern effect on the cognitive dimension, i.e. provided that the commander does not the ends or outcome. Does the endstate limit himself to the listed capabilities as include changing perceptions, influencing his only means to impact the information people, gaining acceptance, gaining environment.12 Instead, military planners credibility and trust, gaining support? should recognize that achieving a military This will drive how the operation will be objective will naturally have information conducted where themes and messages effects, and that the messages sent by are necessary, but not sufficient. both actions (kinetic and non-kinetic) Any military planner will quickly and communications means contribute see how this logical thought process to and shape those ultimate effects. fits neatly into the established military Strategic communication or IO? It decision-making process (or campaign doesnt matter provided you achieve planning process). The information your objectives with the information environment is considered in the environment shaped as you intended. analysis of the overarching operational Achieving that end though, requires environment. The commanders intent an understanding of how and where establishes an endstate. This must information is considered in the military include a statement of the desired planning process. information environment endstate. A properly expressed information endstate Effectively Integrating Strategic will guide staffs in the selection of Communication appropriate courses of action, and drive R e m e m b e r i n g t h a t s t r a t e g i c the way subordinate units conduct communication is a way to achieve operations to achieve that endstate. cognitive information effects using any Units then wargame a selected course means available takes the mystery out of of action using the traditional friendly the concept. Strategic communication action, expected enemy reaction, and simply employs capabilities (limited friendly counteraction methodology. The only to the imagination) to support the wargaming process must also include achievement of a military objective. Just an eye toward information effects. as a commander integrates air, land and This becomes especially important in sea capabilities into military planning counterinsurgency operations where the and execution, he can and should enemy uses information as an asymmetric integrate strategic communication strategic means, and where changing

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indigenous populations perceptions can turn them from a neutral position to one favoring coalition forces. But it also applies across all levels of the spectrum of conflict in an environment where military operations will likely be covered in real time by both mainstream and new media sources. Currently staff sections exist at both the service (the G7 in the Army) and joint (the J39 for IO) levels to focus on the information environment. Most COCOMs have also established strategic communication directorates or incorporated strategic communication planning into effects cells. US forces have recently employed brigade level Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) in Afghanistan, to support a focus on the information environment in planning with very positive initial success. These teams include a social scientist with expertise in cultural issues. 13 The education pipeline is not overflowing with trained information experts and most brigades will likely never see a social scientist assigned to them. On the other hand, it is less important to have a school-trained information staff section than to have the command understand the value and importance of information effectsand incorporate strategic communication means to achieve those effects into the existing planning process. Conclusion Strategic Communication is simply a way to affect perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of key audiences in support of objectives. Certainly communications means are very important in ultimately achieving desired information effects. But how we conduct military operations is also a key component of strategic communication, since actions send very loud and clear messages. Effective SC requires an organizational culture attuned to the information environment and a recognition that strategic communication, as a way to achieve information effects, consists of many capabilities (means) that are an integral part of the commanders arsenal. Staff expertise may be available to support these efforts. Still, the trained staff section is less important than a

unit culture where the commander both recognizes what strategic communication is (and isnt) and emphasizes strategic communication as important to successful military operations.
Notes
1

James G. Stavridis, Strategic Communication and National Security, Joint Force Quarterly, 3rd Quarter, 2007, p. 4. 2 The July 2007 Worldwide Strategic Communication Seminar took place under Chatham House rules to protect the anonymity and allow for full and open discussion. 3 The author has developed and organized a strategic communication higher control cell for the US Army War Colleges Capstone exercise for the past three years. Faculty surveys consistently state students performed well at SC, but more detailed questions indicated that doing well consisted principally of effective press briefings. 4 The National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, published in May 2007, does not define strategic communication. It further muddies the waters by distinguishing between public diplomacy (a means) and strategic communication (a way).

US Department of State, QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication, September 2006, p. 3. 6 Ibid, p 2. 7 Harry R. Yarger, Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model, US Army War College Guide to National Strategy and Policy, June 2006, p. 107. 8 Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, pp. I-1. 9 The author attended numerous briefings by the Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication (DASD (JC)) and his staff where this has been stated. 10 Anju S. Bawa, US Aid Ship Cures Public Opinion, Washington Times, 17 November 2006, p. 15. 11 JP 3-13, p. I-1. 12 Colonel Ralph Baker refers to his actions as information operations but a close read reveals his unit was primarily conducting SC. See The Decisive Effort: A Brigade Combat Team Commanders Perspective on Information Operations in the MayJune 2006 issue of Military Review. 13 Department of Defense, Human Terrain Team Preliminary Assessment: Executive Summary, July-August 2007, pp. 1-6.

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On Being an Electronic Warfare Officer in Iraq

By Marcus T. Williams, Lieutenant, USN Editorial Abstract: The author shares a candid first person account of applied electronic warfare work in the Iraqi theater of operations. He reflects on the challenges of leaving the Fleet for an on-the-ground joint assignment, and the utility of well-rounded IO professionals when planning and integrating core competencies at the operational and tactical levels.

rom May 2006 to Jan 2007 I served as an Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) for two US Army battalions in Al Taqaddam, Iraq. When I originally arrived in theater I saw being an EWO as dealing solely with the variety of CREW (Counter Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare) systems, and resources used to counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (RCIEDs). EWOs typically perform many EW missions at the battalion level that dont directly relate to counter-RCIED: coordination between air and ground units; electronic attack (EA) mission support requests; and electromagnetic spectrum deconfliction. While I recognize these missions were part of my core responsibilities, I believe that it is safe to say the vast majority of a Battalion EWOs time in the 2005-07 operational environment was taken up by counter-RCIED. Therefore, it was very easy to become fixated on coordinating EW in order to conduct the IED fightand not see the forest for the trees. Upon leaving Iraq I came to realize that being an EWO included more duties and responsibilities then just being a CREW subject matter expert. At the time of my departure from theater, I didnt have a good definition for EWO roles outside of counter RCIED; many of my duties didnt fall into what I perceived (at the time) as an EWOs domain. After leaving Iraq I was assigned to the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) in San Antonio, Texas. Only upon my arrival did I learn Electronic Warfare was a core competency of Information Operations. Recognizing that my own experience was part of a larger concept helped me articulate what I consider a battalion EWOs additional non-counter-RCIED duties. These were actually part of a larger set of capabilities, once I truly understood where they fit in on the battlefield. I believe that had I arrived already aware that my EWO position was bigger than the counter-IED fight, I would have been a greater asset to the in-theater command. Applying IO in Theater When employed correctly, a EWO quickly becomes involved in other areas of operations that dont directly relate to defeating RCIEDs. While EWOs should be trained extensively in managing force protection assets, helping people outside the wire, they must bring other key expertise. Prior IO knowledge would have provided me the guidance needed to work with the other battalion staff sections outside traditional spheres of

The author (far right) and his Joint CREW Composite Squadron One teammates pose with then CNO, now Joint Chiefs Chairman, Admiral Mullen. (Authors collection) influence. In fact, the majority of my jobs not directly related to IEDs dealt with IO in some shape or form. For that matter, even my CREW-specific duties dealt with a number of other disciplines. Though I literally didnt realize it at the time, I used four of the five core components (PSYOP, OPSEC, MILDEC and EW of course) on a daily basis. At battalion level, it was very easy to become entirely focused on counter-RCIED and not examine the big picture of how EWOs can be a true force multiplier. Often the most important skill set an EWO brings to the fight is a broader IO knowledge. Arriving in theater as a full-range Information Operations planner provides EWOs a far more solid basis, even at the tactical level. In fact, it is the perfect role outside counter-RCIED. The Road to Iraq I should start with a brief history of how I got to Iraq, and my EW training history before deploying. I am a Naval Surface Warfare Officer by trade, my previous assignments

CREW Logo. (Syracuse Research Corp)



were onboard ships; and none of my other assignments dealt CREW systems within a convoy, or when CREW systems directly with Electronic Warfare. I became part of the initial was blamed for communication problems. To be honest, this wave of nearly 300 personnel requested from the Navy by the arrangement worked well in the beginning. Initially the vast Army, to serve as a Battalion Electronic Warfare Officer in Joint majority of my days were consumed with struggling to make CREW Composite Squadron One (JCCS-1). [I know, leave it sense of the CREW picture within the battalion. to the Navy to place an acronym within an acronym!] We were IO Attitude is Everything embedded with Army and Marine Corps units at every level, Initially, the battalion staff tended to think of CREW as with the goal of helping them get a handle on the employment of CREW systems in theater. Our motto at JCCS-1 was to an accessory piece of communication gear, not an operational find, fix, train and fight CREW systems. To that end, we necessity. While respected for what they considered to be my received excellent basic EW training at NAS Whidbey Island technical expertise, the staff didnt see how Electronic Warfare prior to our deployment. Throughout this preparation we was an integral part of their day-to-day mission. The Army received very little guidance on EWO responsibilities besides doesnt typically train extensively for EW, especially on the counter-RCIED. This was certainly understandable given our battalion and company level, so the idea of having an EW primary mission was to get the CREW systems integrated into officer at this echelon was a brand new concept for them. In the the battlefield in order to save soldiers lives. Of course, our beginning they didnt understand CREW or EW, and therefore training stressed involvement in the intelligence and operations they didnt truly trust that either one really worked. After all, side of mission planning, after all, you cant effectively employ it isnt something that you can see or touch, plus they had gotten by for over eight months CREW systems without them. with no EW programso they But as an EWO, its very easy never missed it, and never to narrow your view, and only saw it as a necessity. That deal with EW as it pertains being the case, I felt as if Id to a very specific mission. failed by not selling myself Over the course of my time at and my abilities better upon the battalion I became more arrival. The battalion viewed involved with duties that I me simply as a Navy CREW considered at that time to be expert, and by not pushing non-EWO related. It wasnt harder to show what more I until arriving at another joint IO could offer, I did nothing to assignment at the JIOWC that I discourage this view. As stated came to realize many of those earlier, my initial focus was non-CIED duties were really on gaining CREW component part of the greater Information accountability, installing the Operations business. It took me roughly four Convoy staging near Fallujah, Iraq. The battalion prepares actual systems, and training the troops who would actually months to get the CREW to move out. (Authors collection) employ CREW systems on program up and running at an acceptable level. Due to the outstanding efforts of my fellow the battlefield. For a while, all of this really was a full time Naval officers/enlisted personnel, and increased Army and Joint job, a walk before you run situation. Frankly, I should in-theater logistical/technical support, we were able to get a have better sold my abilities beyond counter-IED, but at that handle on CREW issues a lot sooner than I believe most of us point I too still considered my role as being only concerned anticipated. For me, the most difficult process was not getting with RCIEDs. But if Id had prior knowledge of the greater the systems installed and the soldiers trained, it was the myriad concepts of Information Operations, I would have known what of challenges that you would expect of a Navy O-2 serving on to do from the beginning. I would have been less hesitant to an Army staff, with virtually no prior experience or training branch out and widen my focus, thereby becoming a greater on ground EW. It was very difficult to show up at the tail end asset to the command. Fortunately, a convergence of events of an Army combat units deployment and explain to them the precipitated a change in my role within the unit. The battalion importance of non-kinetic warfare systems. At first the Army I was originally assigned to was relieved at roughly the same component had very little idea or direction on what to do with time that the CREW program was beginning to run effectively, me; initially I was shuffled off into the S-6 (communication now allowing me to become more involved with other areas section). I was pretty much allowed to do whatever I needed of operations. In a short time, there was a 180 degree change in the in order to get the battalions CREW gear fixed and accounted for, as long as I stayed in my lane. They viewed me solely as view of Electronic Warfare. The difference between the two an EW expert who only got involved in the mission planning battalions was literally like night and day. In my opinion, this process when answering the question of where to employ the change was prompted by increased amounts of EW training,



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and awareness, the Army was providing to units rotating into Iraq. I quickly discovered the incoming battalion staff had a much broader understanding of the importance of non-kinetic fires in mission planning, thanks to stateside EW training prior to deployment. As the new battalion took over, attitudes concerning Electronic Warfare began to change. We moved from, in the words of one company commander, something that might work in theory, but in reality only jammed our own comms, to being an active and important player in the commands mission readiness. Being that I had the longest time on station, and by default, the most experienced person on the forward battalion staff, the command began looking for my input on more than just CREW matters. This change in approach also brought me into other operational planning and executing aspects of the battalions missions. I began working more closely with the battalions S-2 and S-3 (Intelligence and Operations) sections serving as a kind of linchpin between the technical and non-technical sides of the house. (This phase was the time that I most strongly believe prior full-spectrum IO training would have been most beneficial to me, and to the command.) A firmer grasp on the core competencies would have provided a better framework for formalizing my relationships with the different battalion staff sections, and made me more effective. We all understood that we should be working together on analyzing and planning missions, but frankly not one of us understood IO as a formalized conceptand therefore didnt know how to employ it to further build functional relationships. For me, this lack of organizational understanding of where an IO

Catching a brief break in the action atop a HMMWV, near Ramadi. (Authors collection) discipline like EW fits when its not concerned with jamming came to the forefront only when I was ready to depart. The relationships between me the EWO and the other staff sections were built mostly on personalities. Dont let this happen to you. Unfortunately, there is nothing to ensure my relief was, or will be, as closely involved as I was in operations outside my initial scope. It is important to arrive in-theater with a broad knowledge base. This is why I believe it is important for EWOs, or any IO experts, to know that their roles dont begin and end with a single mission even one as critical as counter-RCIED.

LT Marcus Williams, US Navy, serves as the JIOWC representative to the Commanders Action Group, San Antonio, Texas. Previous assignments include serving in Physical Security at the Naval War College as a Radioman Third Class. His first commissioned assignment was Force Protection Officer for USS Robert G Bradley (FFG 49) deploying on two Counter-Drug Operations. He also served as the Fire Control Officer onboard the USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) where he deployed as an Individual Augmentee to support Joint Crew Composite Squadron One (JCCS1) as an Electronic Warfare Officer. While in Iraq he served with the 44th CSB and the 264 CSSB. LT Williams received Bachelors of Arts degrees in Economics and Political Economy from Tulane University, and is currently enrolled in the Kelley School of Business (Indiana University) MBA program. Readers can contact him at marcus.williams@jiowc.osis.gov.