A Voice for IO Broadcasting: David Bailey Interview

Interviewed by John Whisenhunt, Editor David Bailey was a visiting instructor and consultant to JIOWC in 2008. He describes his somewhat unconventional military and broadcasting backgrounds, successful use of radio in recent influence campaigns, and why IO practitioners should take greater steps in using social networking tools. IOS: Some say thinking like an insurgent helps you fight them. You started off as a pirate radio broadcaster, and ended up getting decorated by Queen Elizabeth II for a broadcasting effort that helped bring peace to a region. Tell us about that evolution. DB: Initially, in my mind it wasnt about helping people, or anything like that. It was more about doing something I really wanted to do. From a very young age, I wanted to be a soldierthats a fact. But something else happened in the early 1960s: my Irish grandparents introduced me to the radiothough they didnt know they were doing it at the time. In those days in Britain, the BBC were telling us what to listen to, or perhaps we heard Radio Luxembourg broadcasting from continental Europe, though that was only in the evening. So, you never got any popular music or anything like that, and I was too young to go out and be a rocker. Like most kids I would hear the music coming out of the shops along the street and this music was really infectious! So there was this radio station called Radio Caroline, and Id never heard anything like it, or presenters [announcers] like that people who were breaking the law to broadcast. The British government of the time, under the Labour Party, tried to figure out ways to shut this pirate radio station down, and by Act of Parliament, made them illegal. Most of them did shut down, though the original Radio Caroline moved to the Dutch coast, and continued for a time. Even our group of four teenagers didnt think our government could get away with this. Since they werent going to give us free radio, we decided to do it ourselves, and we launched Radio Jackie. We were hounded by the police, and some of my colleagues went to prison for as long as a year, for constantly annoying the magistrate and the judicial system. But, we operated through the late 1970s before closing down. One legacy is that Radio Jackie is now a licensed radio station in Londonnot as big as it used to bebut it still is. I went through the rites of passage, hanging around radio stations, talking to people, making the coffee and emptying the garbage. And just like it appears on TV, one day someone said to me Do you fancy doing a radio show? Of course, I was terrified, but exhilarated at the same time. So I thought, at least now Ive done it. Ive stuck with it all along, had some highlights along the way, tried to be innovativeeven when I was disabled, dealing with a very serious neurological disease in the late 1980s. All of these things satisfied me until around 1992, when I was in the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in the Army, and our regimental colonel wanted some ideas about how to do fund-raising. I said Ive got it we run a radio station. So with a lot of assistance from British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS), we were an outrageous success. I couldnt have foreseen how things would play out. At the final wrap party, after our license was up, I was thanking the BFBS managing director for letting us use all their equipment and technical assistance, and he asked me What do you think youve achieved? I should have said Weve raised a lot of money for charity, but for some unknown reason what came out of my mouth was Ive set up the first British Forces radio station in this region and you havent! He asked me when I was being demobilized from the Army, and asked Do you want a job? Well, Im often accused of being immature and a little wacky, but this was like having all my childhood Christmases and birthdays rolled into one. So there and then I ran to the colonel, and as a senior warrant officer Im babbling like a five-year-old, and told him of the offer. The colonel said Thats good news Mr. Bailey, because we have to put you on gardening leave [furlough], as we cant keep two people in the same post [billet]. So, go off and enjoy it for six months. I stayed with them until 1996, went off to BosniaId done a number of radio projects in the Falkland Islands as welland was asked to help get some messages out to the population in the Balkans. In 1999 the Kosovo Crisis started, and suddenly no one in our area, the northern part of Bosnia, wanted to take our programs or our magazines. The Serbs didnt want it because of what was going on in Serbia, and I believe the Muslims and Croats didnt want to take our programs because they feared if everything went wrong, the Serbs would use that against them. So we were stuck. Then one night Im in the officers mess in Banja Luka, and I can admit now I was feeling quite jolly and cheeky from the contents of a bottle, the Chief of Staff asked me what we should do about getting these products out. My boss was on leave, so I said Well, its quite easy. We have a radio studio in the old Banja Luka Metal Factory. If we just get a transmitter, we can have our own station, and say whatever we want! The wine beat me to the answerand shock and horrorI said two days! Knowing the way the British Army worked, I never thought theyd expect me to really do thatwell it took two weeks not two days but, we launched what became Radio Oksigen. It grew, and years down the line was very successful. The real shock was a couple of times someone decided to give me something for doing that [his decorations under the British Honours System].

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IOS: Certainly those are great rewards for your work. In your talks, you introduce yourself as not the typical guy in this business. In the influence business we always say we need good techies as well as good creative types. Youre able to work both sides. But can we recruit for that combination in the same person, or just mix a good team with some of each? DB: Remember I was the archetypical British Sergeant Major, shined and proper, not the long-haired fellow you see today. Soldiers used to hide from me in dustbins [garbage cans]! I was not the guy you wanted to be around if you were a soldier who had transgressed the unwritten rules. Nowadays, Im totally different. In military spheres, having someone who is truly passionate about something, who really wants to emotionally pursue the solution to something, is normally regarded as a guy we dont really want. Because in many military occupations, becoming that involved means youre not going to be good for the mission. For example, on a humanitarian operation, letting starving children and devastated peoples really get to you means youll be less effective in doing the tasks. In my view, what we need in the IO and PSYOP business is commitmentand that is far from a 9-to-5 level, where youre worried about how much or little youre being paidyou have to actually live it. You have to be immersed in it. Sometimes it ruins your private life because youre always accused of being more concerned with helping others than in your own relationships. Thats a sad fact of life. Having said all that, what sort of military guys should we look for? Youll get a lot of resumes of young soldiers the commander thinks will be good for you, and when you really read them, they are indeed top-of-the-class, smartest soldierand I send them to the shredder, asking to see the real people. I dont want yes sir, no sir soldiers! If you tell someone to build a bridge by nine oclock, and you know theres no way the logistics allow for that. But when times up, the guy still turns around and says look what I did. Hes been

creative, hes used friends, he knows the man that can, and he most likely stole something because he borrowed something someone else wasnt looking after properly. And hes passionate about what hed done, and will bounce an idea off you, even if it sounds crazy. So, my answer is yes, we need people who are at once techie and creative. I dont think you can be effective in IO or PSYOP unless you are multi-skilled. We use many types of media: print, broadcast, Internet, so you need to be master of one of those, but with an appreciation of what other people are doing. I think the military has the most difficulty finding the articulate, creative, multitalented people because those people come with the most baggage: independent thought, a penchant for questioning.

David Bailey, MBE. (Author) IOS: Youre great advocate of lessons learned, and you talk about that in your presentations. What is your preferred method of capturing the important things from these current campaigns, so they dont become lessons forgotten? DB: A British General named Frank Kitson wrote what I think has held up as the best book on counterinsurgency. He came up with the inkspot [understanding minds] logic of stopping certain elements within an operational area, those that we didnt want to win the target audiences hearts and minds. And it worked. But it worked because everyone acknowledged that. So if we talk to the modern day

general in Afghanistan or Iraq, and ask if its working the same for him as it did for Kitner, he might say well, we are inkspotting the target audience. But youd reply, right, but youre not inkspotting the way he did. Why? Because what you should be doing is saying, Ive read Kitner, and even though this is the 21st century, what add-ons, what new inkspots must we add, rather than say we dont need that old doctrine any longer. Talking out of turn a bit, if inkspotting has been done properly in Iraq, why did you need the Surge? Why dont people look to the past? Is it because theyre not from my culture, or nationality-or whatever background? We can say what Kitson or others did right or wrong in Malaya, see what was good and bad, say well never do the bad again, and use that as the basis for what were going to do next. That to me is lessons learned. In the IO broadcast business, I suppose I could go back to WWII and do a critical assessment. One guy that I really respect is Sefton Delmar, who really pioneered influence ops in the European theater of operations, on behalf of the UK. After the war, he didnt do as wellmaybe he needed chaos in order to thrive? He had the support of the government to just go for it! But he had help from everyone from [British Prime Minister Winston] Churchill on down. Look at how well Churchill did OPSEC! We still have a problem though in what were doing with our information. For example: military intelligence is like dung. You put it all together, and it stinks. But if you selectively give it out to people, it might just be the jigsaw puzzle piece that you as an IO guy need to complete the picture-and build a new dynamic platform for getting the word out. Its a two-way street: in both my Bosnia and Afghanistan operations, we give everything we get back to the intelligence section. I might not know what theyre actually looking for, but what I feel is of no consequence might be just the puzzle piece the intelligence section needs. IOS: A lot of people are looking for the next big thing, and in your presentation youre quite an advocate

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for new media. But do we go too far, throwing out something traditional like broadcastingin which youve been so successfuland replacing it too soon? How do you balance traditional and new media? DB: What I like to bring to a mission commander is the biggest toolbox, with the greatest range of tools we can provide. Lets give them all we have. Yet I dont have all the ones I want, because a few of them havent been made yetthough Id like to make them. In a nations IO armory I would have shortwave radio, longwave AM, FM, and digital radiohaving a great take-up in Europe nowadays, and by satellite in North America. I need to have all these ready, because Im like the guy on Home and Garden Television whos already under the sink. I cant pop down to the hardware store for a wrench. I need to have it in my kit already, else Ill waste time and lose customers and opportunities. Not all new ideas excite me, but they must be useful because so many people are using them. My toolkit would also have mobile printing presses, video and film, digital imaging, and the ability to dominate the Internet through social media platforms. Someday shortwave will die, when no one listens any longer, and well need to put it to bed. Should it gather dust in a hanger for thirty years just in case? If not, well, we cant wait for a government procurement process to get another one! I dont think Im a Luddite [one opposed to technological change], but in this fast-moving time, I think some military leaders are 21st century Luddites. IOS: You use the expression response to influence. Determining performance, finding measures of effectiveness are critical, yet the truth cant simply be a lot of statistics. Where is the truth of how our influence campaigns are working? DB: You have to realize that influence is a military weapons system, deployed for a reason. In something traditional like armor, the aim is to go forward, destroy or neutralize he target, or move onward. Until there 48

is quantifiable evidence that the tank is out of action, the mission does not progress. Quite rightly so, a commander has to know how were doing, how many losses, how much damage, and how well modify the plan and get forward with things. What we do is no exception. But in radio its very difficult to quantify things accurately. Despite what a lot of folks say about surveys, and yes we pay them the money to do these, its not an exact scienceI think theyre just bluffing! In the influence operations environment, we need to know if we have listeners, and what will those listeners do? Some things we might be able to prove, and some well never be able to prove. For example, how many responded to our message of not supporting suicide bombers? I firmly believe in results related, and the only way we can do that is by having audience interactivities. For example, in Bosnia our surveys showed we had listener take upand you can always prove anything you want with statistics yet we always had the naysayers or crows (remember, a collective of crows is called a murder). One way of measuring is doing all of your own posters, handbills, and broadcasts, that way you know if a listener received something, he got it from the military. Or, host a gathering or party and see how many people turn upbecause they either heard your broadcast, read your newspaper, or spoke to somebody that did. Once you see that, it helps give the commander a warm, cozy feeling that hes not wasting money. I can say to him: see, two thousand people here heard us. But you need the constant interactivity: ringing up the station on their mobile phones, sending SMS text, participating in talk shows. Yet, my end state is very Monty Python, [British comedy troupe] where we need to answer What have the Romans ever done for us? You come back to the operational area and the station has evolved, and people dont realize you did this, they say What do you mean you were here? We did this! This is where we need to get to, where we facilitate the audience solving their own problems, convincing their own leaders

to do thingsand thinking they wanted to do it all along. IOS: We talk about getting people to the table for a dialogue. But what about virtual or cyber dialog? Can these work as well as face-to-face meetings? DB: Sure. Look at French entrepreneur Loic Le Meur, whos launched Seesmic. Hes a great advocate of having a conversation... of having a chat. A lot of what he talks about resonates with me, and I see how we can employ those in the influence operations battlespace. People love to talk; they like the intimacy of talking, and trust is bred from getting to know people. You tend to solve problems better when you have the intimacy of a close conversation, because you get to know someone. All over the Internet you can go places and see people from a lot of different cultures engaged in conversation. Yet at the end of the day, were not all the samewe have niche needs, whether we want to argue about our favorite team, or the ingredients list of Shiner Beer [local Texas product]. Weve been pretty successful using our transmission systems to get our message out, but even with something like talk radio, you can only door facilitateso much. But if we take the next step using available technology, and the suitable social media platforms, and start to integrate them, we now get out target audience, whoever they may be, to start a conversation. In Afghanistan today, I tend to criticize people who say they are doing focus groups and the like, and claim we are meeting the Afghans on a one-to-one basis in free and open environmentI mean, thats pie-in-the-sky isnt it? Those who sit down with us are the ones who are worried about what happens when we leave, and theres a lot of peer pressure. Were normally meeting people in a shura [local council] environment, which means we are primarily talking to the village elder, wholl be supported by the next tier of people. But he wont always be able to express his individual views, because he is a community spokesman. Younger members of the community probably dont want to come up to a Fall 2008

soldier dressed as Robocop and start a chat. I learned this years ago working with the metropolitan police: the sooner they take their hats off, the better the kids respond to the message of supporting the police. As Army recruiters, my corporal and I eventually wore t-shirts, and addressed each other by first name which youd never dobecause the kids didnt understand our culture. Yet we cant go into places in Afghanistan without body armor on, because we dont know whats going to happen. So with that security level in place, for years perhaps, how do we engage people in meaningful conversation? The only way is by encompassing new means, new technologies. But people say Thats all well and good, David, but the mullah in this area doesnt have Internet. Hes not our target: were not going to change someone whos that old and in mindset. Anyone who thinks well change these key communicators is frankly from a different planet! The people who are going to change things are the new Afghanistan, those people we call the uncommitted in our info ops business. If we are successful, the uncommitted will form the new Afghanistan, in the image they want, and the ultraconservatives will be talking to the clouds, because traditional shura will no longer be there. The young people are becoming more and more tech savvy, and we should be communicating in ways that they like - in ways that excite them. They all have cell phones, and Im not always sure if those are status symbols or a true primary communications means, but if they have one, I want to be able to talk to them. And I want to talk to them in ways they like... in ways that excite them. Better yet, I want them to be calling my radio station in Khandahar, and be unable to bear being away from it! Most young Afghans work and work very hard for that phone, some probably havent eaten to save for it, and some buy a deluxe model with an onboard radio. Now they can listen to what they want, and communicate with who they wantand they cant bear the thought of not having that phone. Maybe the family bought a second radio, and guess what? The kids father is now listening

to my station as well. This is anecdotal, but it shows how youth, and all of us embracing social media platforms, can make connections. People who say well, theyre just living in caves, have got it all wrong. Afghans love talking, whether about poetry or stories or issues. It doesnt matter what the topic is: building a dam in their district, whos running for election, should we let the Taliban in herethose things get you into intimate conversations. As long as were being fair and morally right, theyll respect what we say, even if they disagreeand that can help us find a new way forward. But its going to be a tough sell in this campaign, as some of our own planners still expect Ahmed in Wakhan District, and Hizmarrah in Arghandab Valley and Abdullah in Khandahar to sit around a table, but thats not what theyre doing. Tribal and historic reasons would keep them apart... wouldnt let them associate at all. This is where social networking tools become the icing on the cake. People are already using Twitter and Pownce, and Seesmic, and what Id really like to see us develop similar sorts of tools for IO use. When people who have gotten to know one another have actual meet ups, they often find they have developed a relationship with someone

from a background they wouldnt previously have been too keen about. That breaks down a lot of barriers, and might just break down some historical hatred. Can you imagine eight different people from eight different tribes now speaking that wonderful Pastun expression that translates as I love you, brother. I think its achievable, and where we should go next. IOS: Thats quite a call for action, with a lot of potential, should someone take action. DB: Sometimes the hard part is just getting through our layers, our folks who say well, weve studied the Afghans, and that will never work. I dont know everything, but I know sometimes you have to give it a shotand fortunately sometimes it works! I say that because then the leadership expect you to score a goal every time, and certainly none of us can do that. But I do love it when an educated expert says prove me wrong. IOS: David, weve really enjoyed your visit. Thank you for joining us. DB: Its been great. Ive loved every minute, thank you.

David J. Bailey served in the British Army, rising through the ranks to Warrant Officer/Regimental Sergeant Major, and leaving at the rank of Captain. He has been involved in the radio industry since his teens. David produced features for several UK commercial radio stations, and the British Forces Broadcasting Service, including REME Radio, the first UK military radio station. He launched Oksigen FM, the first truly multi-cultural youth radio station in post war Bosnia. He was twice decorated for his broadcasting efforts, earning the Queens Commendation in 1999, and being admitted as a Member of the British Empire (MBE) in 2002. Recently he served as a consultant to the Canadian Forces, operating Rana FM in Khandahar, Afghanistan. He currently manages two radio stations in Kosovo. Readers may contact him via www. davidbaileymbe.com

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DOD Computer Network Operations: Time To Hit The Send Button

By Joseph Glebocki, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF Editorial Abstract: Lt Col Globecki analyzes the current DOD cyber security role, particularly as it applies in support of US Military Assistance to Civil Authority. He examines the impact of the Posse Comitatus Act, and how some interpretations unnecessarily hinder a cooperative effort to protect US critical infrastructure. Terrorists in a cyber caf in Kansas City, Missouri, infiltrate Department of Defense (DOD) computer networks and unleash a malicious virus that shuts down US missile defense systems, leaving the United States vulnerable to an intercontinental ballistic missile attack. esides defensive measures aimed at protecting its systems from further damage, DOD remains extremely vulnerablethere is not much else that it can do without the help or acquiescence of federal civilian authorities. In the meantime, lives could be lost, cities destroyed, and the American way of life could be changed forever. Although this is a hypothetical scenario that sounds like a science fiction thriller, such unthinkable events could happen in the future if US law and policy are not changed to enable DOD to fully defend and fight in cyberspace. Clearly, DOD is moving into the cyber domain of warfare, but the US Government will not be ready to exploit its full potential until DOD is given the tools and the authorities to become more aggressive in cyberspace to perform these evolving cyber missions when necessary, before it is too late. Legal and policy barriers against the use of DOD resources from the outset to defend and then respond to cyber attacks against US national infrastructure can severely hamper its homeland security posture. With the United States facing national security threats at home and abroad like never before, this article advocates that it is time to provide a new policy and legal regime for cyber offense and defense. different depending upon the context. The official DOD definition provides that cyberspace is the notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks. Regardless of how we define it, there can be little debate over the potential vulnerability of our networked systems. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) recognizes US economy and national security are highly dependent upon the global cyber infrastructure, creating a highly interconnected and interdependent network of Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/ KR). Although new technologies and interconnected networks enhance productivity and efficiency, they also serve to increase Americas risk to cyber threats. For example, [t]he expansive growth of new Internet technologies, from wireless access to voice-overInternet telephony, has engendered new threats that have been outpacing the security responses of private and governmental users on the whole. One of the great advantages of cyberspace is anonymity, plus the ability to undertake attacks remotely in an almost untraceable way, while using third party computer systems, and often with minimal risk of detection or retaliation. Despite extensive government and private industry efforts, the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coordination Center list of reported vulnerabilities grew from about 2,500 in 2001 to more than 7,200 in 2006 about 20 new vulnerabilities every day. Similarly, an August 2005 International Business Machines (IBM) report showed more than 237 million computer security attacks reported worldwide in the first half of 2005, with US Government organizations being the most likely target by far. One can only imagine how many attacks must go undetected. General James Cartwright, then USSTRATCOM Commander, warned in a March 2007 statement to the House Armed Services Committee that America is under widespread attack in cyberspace. Unlike air, land, and sea domains, we lack dominance in cyberspace, and could grow increasingly vulnerable if we do not fundamentally change how we view this battlespace. The scope of enemies in this domain is potentially limitless: traditional hostile countries trying to gain information on our military capabilities; malicious individual hackers looking to steal valuable information from the federal government; terrorists; criminal elements; and even economic competitors. Retired General Barry McCaffrey stated every classified brief I receive underscores the absolute certainty that all our potential adversaries, terrorist organizations, and many private criminal groups conduct daily electronic reconnaissance and probes of the electromagnetic spectrum and devices which are fundamental to our national security. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) even predicts terrorists could use hackers to conduct cyber attacks to complement large scale conventional attacks. Similarly, the US National Military Strategy contends that cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or transportation networks could conceivably have a greater economic or psychological effect than a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack. It is well-documented that increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has enabled our terrorist enemies to communicate, train, rally support, proselytize, and spread their propaganda without risking personal contact. The National Strategy for Combating

The Cyber Threat to US Critical Infrastructure Cyberspace is a difficult concept to define, since it might mean something

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Terrorism seeks to eliminate such cyber safehavens because the Internet provides an inexpensive, anonymous, geographically unbounded, and largely unregulated virtual safe haven for extremists. Such activities will have a much higher future likelihood of success if the US restricts DOD from conducting robust counterattacks and offensive operations in cyberspace. Impact of the Posse Comitatus Act

The debate over the proper role Despite the growth of cyberof the military on the domestic front based threats to US national security continues to be a hot topic since 9/11 and and critical infrastructure, the Posse Hurricane Katrina (2005). Nonetheless, Comitatus Act (PCA) continues to serve the US Congress reaffirmed its support as a significant potential roadblock to for the PCA by stressing its continued DODs dominance in the cyberspace importance, stating it has served the domain. The PCA provides in pertinent nation well. However, the US Congress part: whoever, except in cases and also makes it clear the PCA is under circumstances expressly not a complete barrier to use authorized by the Constitution or the Armed Forces for a range of Act of Congress, willfully uses any domestic purposes, including law part of the Army or the Air Force enforcement. In fact, the statute has as a posse comitatus or otherwise already been amended many times, to execute the laws shall be fined creating numerous exceptions that under this title or imprisoned not dilute the scope of the law. more than two years, or both. Exceptions to the PCA fall In general, the statute makes it a in four major areas: insurrections/ crime for the military to execute civil disturbances, counterdrug the laws of the United States, operations, disaster relief, and specifically performing domestic counterterrorism/ weapons of civilian law enforcement functions. mass destruction. PCA language Originally, the PCA prohibited the use of the Army as a posse Who is keeping an eye on our critical infrastructure? contains a clear exception clause (Defense Link) for circumstances expressly comitatus, arising from the end authorized by the Constitution or of Civil War reconstruction and surveillance of individuals, or acting conditions throughout the US western as an undercover agent or interrogator. Act of Congress. Furthermore, it offers frontier. The Acts prohibitions do The Justice Departments Legal Counsel some discretion in situations where an not apply to members of the military uses a hybrid of the first and third tests immediate response is necessary for reserves when not on active duty status, when judging military activities against temporary emergencies, when the local members of the National Guard when not a standard of whether there is no contact authorities are overwhelmed. Most in Federal service, civilian employees with civilian targets of law enforcement, importantly, statutory law provides that of DOD; the US Coast Guard when no actual or potential use of military assistance in the context of a WMD attack not employed under DOD, nor military force, and no military control over the may include use of DOD personnel to arrest persons and conduct searches and members in an off-duty and private actions of civilian officials. capacity. From a legal analysis standpoint, seizures, with respect to violations of this The courts have come up with at the jury is probably still out as to section. Even direct military assistance least three different legal standards when whether all types of DOD responsive is permitted in limited circumstances, discussing potential violations of the and offensive cyberspace operations with the two major exceptions being PCA; however, there is general agreement would violate the PCA. Both sides make the Military Purpose Doctrine and the that passive law enforcement assistance strong arguments. It also appears that the Insurrection Act. Yet laws that allow the military is permitted. In United States versus Red Department of Justice (DOJ) standard Feather, the District Court delineated would not be violated, since there does to help address the problems of drug the general standard of permissible not need to be contact with civilian trafficking, natural disasters, and terrorist

passive roles and impermissible active roles. In another case, the Court stressed whether the use of any part of the military pervaded the activities of federal law enforcement officers. Another Federal District Court decision came up with the third standard, which asks if military personnel subjected citizens to an exercise of military power that was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature. The Defense Department basically adheres to each of the three generally enunciated judicial standards, as well as any Congressional restrictions on military participation in civilian law enforcement activities. However, DOD appears to specifically endorse the third test in defining permissible activities, while adding express prohibitions on direct assistance, against searches and seizures,

targets of law enforcement, no use of military force in the traditional sense, and no military control over civilian officials. One can further argue the military purpose doctrine would be satisfied whenever protection of DOD critical infrastructure and equipment serves as the supporting rationale. Regardless of the legal scholars conclusions, there is still too much uncertainty in the current state of the law to be of much value. Exceptions to the PCA

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attacks have consistently weakened the Act. Some of the PCAs biggest changes came after President Reagans War on Drugs in the 1980s. After powerful testimony by state and local leaders requesting military assistance, Congress pushed DOD to provide indirect assistance to law enforcement including: intelligence, equipment, maintenance, use of military facilities, plus specialized training and tactical advice. In addition to modern challenges faced by law enforcement, the Presidents Constitutional and statutory authorities have further eroded PCA prohibitions. With so many exceptions already in place, is there really a need for the PCA in todays dangerous environment considering the cyberspace threat we already face? If the US maintains the current PCA structure, Congress should create a new exception allowing DOD to fully defend itself against cyber attacks, and properly respond to the growing threat. Since Congress has already provided DOD with police powers in the context of WMD incidents, it would not be a stretch to extend this policy to cyberspace. Although the law is still relatively new in this area, there are strong arguments that a search and seizure has taken place whenever the government conducts cyberspace investigations relating to personal and business network servers. However, this is the only way for DOD to be able to protect US national security interests. Such activities should be even less visibleand hopefully less objectionablethan having military forces on the streets during civil disturbances or border patrol operations. National Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) The Presidents Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), created by the Clinton administration, was charged with reviewing all national critical infrastructure physical and cyber threats. In Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/NSC-63, the President stated the United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both

Under the National Response Plans Cyber Annex, the National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) is designated as the main interagency mechanism to prepare for and respond to cyber incidents of national significance. Among its duties, NCRCG leverages the capabilities of US Government agencies from a cyber defense perspective, providing situational awareness to detect and recognize incidents of significance. Further, NCRCG is tasked to attribute the source of attacks and malicious activity, coordinate responses, and help with the recovery of potential disruptions. physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems. This Directives national goals state interruptions or manipulations of critical functions must be brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated and minimally detrimental to US welfare. The associated guidelines provide the authorities, capabilities and resources of the US Government including defense preparedness to achieve and maintain critical infrastructure protection. Further, every federal department is responsible for protecting its own critical infrastructure and cyber-based systems. One major challenge was the development of a system for responding to significant infrastructure attacks already underway, with the goal of isolating and minimizing damage. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) was supposed to provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the overall response, mitigating attacks, investigating threats, and monitoring reconstitution efforts, while maintaining that foreign attacks could place them in a direct support role to DOD. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD), part of DHS Preparedness Directorate, provides the federal government with a centralized cyber security coordination and preparedness function. NCSD further serves as the focal point for interactions with state and local government, the private sector, and the international community regarding cyberspace vulnerability reduction. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace Securing cyberspace is a difficult strategic challenge, requiring coordinated and focused efforts from our entire society: the federal government; state and local governments; the private sector; and the American people. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace has three strategic objectives: preventing cyber attacks against Americas critical infrastructures; reducing national vulnerability to cyber attacks; and minimizing damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that do occur. It also identifies six major actions and initiatives to strengthen our national security and international cooperation including: 1. Strengthening cyber-related counterintelligence efforts; 2. Improving capabilities for attack attribution and response; 3. Improving coordination for responding to cyber attacks within the US national security community; 4. Fostering the establishment of national/international watch and warning networks to detect and prevent emerging cyber attacks. Another important policy document, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-7, establishes a national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize CI/KR and to protect them from terrorist attacks. Some of the major difficulties with protecting these areas: most are privately owned and operated; most include cyber-based resources; and most span all sectors of our economy. HSPD-7 states it is

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US policy to enhance protection of the countrys critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts that could: 1. Impair Federal departments and agencies abilities to perform essential missions, or to ensure the publics health and safety; 2. Undermine State and local government capabilities to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services; 3. Damage the private sectors capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and delivery of essential services; 4. Have a negative effect on the economy through the cascading disruption of other critical infrastructure and key resources; 5. Undermine the publics morale and confidence in our national economic and political institutions. The Secretary of Homeland Security has the apparent responsibility to coordinate the overall national effort, and to serve as the lead federal official. In addition, the Secretary is directed to maintain an organization to serve as the focal point for cyber security, with DOD and other organizations collaborating and supporting this overall mission as necessary under current law. The DOD is specifically designated with

lead responsibility for the defense industrial base. DHS established the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) as the 24/7 single point of contact for cyberspace analysis, warning, information sharing, and incident response and recovery operations through partnerships between DHS and the public and private sectors to protect the national cyber infrastructure. Further, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) promotes cyber security by facilitating participation and partnership in CI/KR protection initiatives, leveraging cyber-specific expertise and experience, and improving information exchange and awareness of cyber security concerns. The resulting framework enables security partners to work collaboratively in making informed cyber risk management decisions, defining national cyber priorities, and addressing overall cyber security. DOD Capabilities and Policies In February 2003, President Bush provided classified guidance, NSPD16, to determine how and when the United States would launch a Computer Network Attack (CNA) against foreign systems, and who would be authorized to conduct such operations. Due to many uncertainties in the cyberspace realm, DOD recommended a legal review to determine what level of cyber intrusion amounts to an actual attack; whether the response could infiltrate unknowing third party systems; and an overall framework that might apply separately to domestic or foreign attackers. Clearly, there is much in the area of policy and law the US must resolve at the national and DOD levels before taking a final course of action. Yet, DOD officially acknowledges that cyberspace is considered a warfare domain just like air, land, sea, or space. Cyberspace is also recognized as a new theater of operations by the National Defense Strategy because successful military operations depend upon the ability to protect information infrastructure and related data. However, DOD leadership knows that it will take time for our military forces to adapt to this new way of warfare: it has no battle

lines; intelligence is intangible; and attacks come without warning, leaving no time to prepare defenses. DOD states it is building an information-centric force, with networks increasingly recognized as operational centers of gravityso it must be prepared to fight the net. However, current US cyber warfare strategy is dysfunctional resulting in a disjointed effort, argued General James Cartwright, former Commander of STRATCOM. Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility to oversee, develop, and ensure implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for the security of information systems that support military operations. Current DOD Organization The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns USSTRATCOM as the DOD lead for Computer Network Operations (CNO). The Joint Functional Component Command Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), a subordinate command of USSTRATCOM, serves as the lead for coordinating DOD network warfare. The Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) is responsible for operating and defending US worldwide information networks associated with the Global Information Grid (GIG). Established Computer Network Defense (CND) policy includes three tiers of response actions, with corresponding levels of approval authority up to Tier 1, which includes STRATCOM being authorized to take defensive measures and actions that may minimally and temporarily adversely affect adversary systems and may have a similar affect upon intermediate systems. However, it is apparent that CND lacks any updated policy and legal guidance to adequately guide responses to attacks against DOD networks. Although any aspects of Computer Network Attack (CNA) and its implementing organizations are likely to be highly classified, it is generally believed that the US can actually destroy networks and penetrate enemy computers to take data and disable command and control networks in an interagency framework. General Barry

Critical infrastructure connects us all. (US Air Force)

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McCaffrey states we must sort out clearly the international legal and policy considerations upon which we will base widely understood Joint Directives governing the centralized employment of offensive cyber-warfare. This is the first sword to unsheathe in time of modern combat. Reportedly, the United States did not use CNA during Operation Iraqi Freedom, even with comprehensive information operations plans in place, perhaps since top-level approval was not granted in sufficient time to support campaign objectives. Clearly, CNO mission areas are growing more important as DOD becomes increasingly dependent upon computer systems and networks to support our warfighters. Many DOD capabilities could be degraded if adversary military groups or terrorists were able to conduct sustained cyber attacks against DOD infrastructure. Within the United States, DOD would be unable to fully defend and respond to these threats without changes to the current policy framework. Furthermore, DODs homeland defense and homeland security missions, including sovereignty protection and protection of defense critical infrastructure, could be unduly hampered. DOD has invested significant manpower and resources to address the cyber-based threat, with STRATCOM and its Service components primed to respond. In many cases, DOD has expertise that exceeds what is available in the civilian arena. With the stakes so high it does not make sense to leave the military as a reserve force, or to only break the glass, when civilian authorities make a specific requestsor are already overwhelmed. Accordingly, DOD should serve as the lead: its mission can be focused upon the cyber defense of defense critical infrastructure and the corresponding response, as well as responding to cyber attacks that seriously degrade other national critical infrastructure. We can draw an analogy to defending US airspace from enemy aircraft, as well as hijacked aircraft already within our airspace, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. There can be no differentiation between

threats emanating from within and outside the US, because the risk of potential devastation is too great. Just as N O RT H C O M a n d NORAD provide defense of our sovereign airspace, using Service component assets, and with full cooperation of civil authoritiesthe same should be done for cyberspace. The US DOD is focused on cyber defense Government will have (Defense Link) to determine a set of protocols, and make this determination as would still need to determine what level expeditiously as possible. Two potential of cyber attack can be considered an act standards for DODs cyber response are of war or aggression by another state. within the DOD Strategy for Homeland If a foreign-based extremist conducts Defense and Civil Support, and HSPD-7 the attack, the same rationale applies, policy. If the New York Stock Exchange although some might argue the FBI or was struck by a cruise missile from CIA should handle the response. If the another country and severely damaged, actor is a domestic terrorist, or US citizen a military response would certainly be hacking from within our own borders, we warranted. It should be no different if a face the most difficult problem resolution cyber attack from that same state resulted due to domestic legal requirements. in a similar level of devastation. DOD Nonetheless, DOD should still serve should be able to respond in a timely and as the lead when the attack targets effective manner to protect and serve US defense critical infrastructure, or when national interests, even when the national other national critical infrastructure is critical infrastructure in question belongs seriously degraded. These operations to the private sector. should not impact the capability of To achieve success in the long federal civilian authorities to prosecute run, the US will need to develop better the perpetrators in a court of law. capabilities to determine the second, Military Assistance to Civil third, and even higher order effects Authorities (MACA) of offensive cyber operations, while minimizing outside disruptions to the Under the heading of civil support, greatest extent possible. Certainly we employment of military forces within must also address potential discrimination the US borders typically falls under the and proportionality issues related to the broad mission of MACA. This construct law of war. It will be necessary for the includes three main areas: international community to get together 1. Military support to civil authorities and work out many of these cyber warfare (MSCA); issues. Even when the source location 2. Military support to civilian law of the attack is known, controversial enforcement (MSCLE); matters will need resolution. If a foreign 3. Military assistance for civil state is the attacker, and DOD response disturbances. is certainly warranted, then DOD should DOD Directive 3025.15 establishes always serve as the lead. In fact, PDD/ policy and assigns responsibilities for NSC-63 provides that foreign cyber providing military assistance to civil attacks could place the NIPC and other authorities. The Directive defines MACA civilian agencies in a direct DOD support as activities and measures covered role. Of course, the US Government under MSCA plus DOD assistance

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for civil disturbances, counter drug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. It further provides that DOD shall cooperate with and provide military assistance to civil authorities as directed by and consistent with applicable law, Presidential Directives, Executive Orders, and this Directive. DOD employment within the United States is supposed to be heavily weighted toward managing the consequences of the terrorist threat or use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) WMD. In reality, this does not appear to be the case. All requests for DOD military assistance are evaluated against several criteria including legality, the potential use of lethal force, risk to military forces, impact on the defense budget, appropriateness for a DOD mission, and any effect on military readiness. DOD is supposed to always remain in support of a lead federal agency during both crisis management (FBI) and consequence management (FEMA), as delineated in the Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan and the Federal Response Plan. Under the broad MACA umbrella, it is consistent with DOD policy to move more aggressively into defensive and offensive cyber space operations. There is no likelihood of lethal force, no risk to military forces, and probably little relative impact on the defense budget and military readiness. Military Support to Civil Authorities Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) refers to DOD support in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents such as terrorism, major disasters or other emergencies. DOD Directive 3025.1 governs MSCA for all DOD components and defines such actions as: those activities and measures taken by the DOD components to foster mutual assistance and support between the DOD

and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. Military forces employed in MSCA activities shall remain under military command and control at all times and shall not perform any functions of civil government unless absolutely necessary on a temporary basis in certain emergency circumstances. The Secretary of Defense has the responsibility to develop regulations to ensure that these actions do not include or permit direct participation by Service members in searches, seizures, arrests or similar activities unless otherwise authorized by law.

MSCA in action: Air National Guard disaster response. (US Air Force) Any military forces involved in responsive or offensive cyber activities would likely be performing such functions only when absolutely necessary, on a temporary basis, and in emergency circumstances. Of course, military personnel would need to be trained adequately to determine when it would be appropriate to respond to cyber attacks using some type of risk analysis and established minimum criteria such as those delineated in HSPD-7 or the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement (MSCLE) involves military

forces supporting a lead federal agency during various events: 1. National security special events; 2. Support for combating terrorism; 3. Support to counterdrug operations; maritime security; 4. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 5. General support (such as training, equipping, advising). It is DOD policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement as much as possible while remaining consistent with the needs of national security and military preparedness, while maintaining the historic tradition of limited direct military involvement, plus and the requirements of applicable law. Arguably DOD cyber activities would not violate MSCLE directives when taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military function of the United States, or when taken to protect DOD classified information or materials. It is also unlikely civilian authorities would be capable of providing an adequate response to large-scale attacks against DOD cyber-based infrastructure. There are often access or classification issues involved, so it would not make sense to hand off these problems to civilian officials. However, military members will definitely need additional training in areas such as evidence collection, especially for cases subject to American criminal jurisdiction. Lessons Learned From Cyberspace Exercises In the last several years, military and civilian authorities have recognized significant challenges in the cyberspace realm, especially when diverse organizations must work together in response. In late 2002, the city of San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas, and the surrounding region conducted exercise, Dark Screen, to test the ability of local, state, and federal organizations to respond to a cyberattack. In fact, after action reporting from this exercise found the issue of military participation

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continuously presented more questions than answers. Participants had concerns over the PCA, numerous DOD regulations, and other federal statutes addressing military support to civilian authorities. CyberStorm, a 2006 cyber attack exercise led by DHS, highlighted gaps and shortcomings in response planning at all levels of government. Specifically, the use of classified information and networks made coordination among agencies, levels of government, and the private sector increasingly difficult. Cyberstorm was the first full-scale government-led cyber security exercise to examine response, coordination, and recovery mechanisms to a simulated cyber event, involving international, federal, state, and local governments, in conjunction with the private sector. This specific scenario simulated a significant widespread cyber campaign affecting critical infrastructure elements within the energy, information technology, transportation, and telecommunications sectors. The exercise had three main objectives: to disrupt specifically targeted infrastructure through cyber attacks; to hinder the governments ability to respond; and to undermine public confidence in the governments ability to provide essential services. As a result, it became clear that all players require more: additional standard operating procedures (SOPs) and contingency plans; additional clarification of roles and responsibilities; and more education, training and exercises. The Central Intelligence Agency conducted its own cyber exercises, notably the 2005 Silent Horizon, which examined a major cyber attack against the US. During this activity it became apparent that many defenses are controlled by civilian telecommunications interests. Another CIA-sponsored exercise, Livewire, determined significant questions over the governments role depending on the source of the attacks terrorists, foreign States, or private citizensstill remain. These exercises provide concrete examples of the serious issues the US could face under the current convoluted regime, if a large-scale cyber attack took

place. Valuable time would be lost as DOD and civilian officials determine their proper roles. One answer might be the use of National Guard members or civilians in each state, to avoid PCA restrictions, but this would be an inefficient and likely unsupportable solution. Clearly, civilian and military officials need to do more in preparing and responding to threats, but not at the cost of limiting DODs capability to protect its mission critical systems in a timely and comprehensive fashion. A More Active DOD Cyber Defense Role The cyber attack threat to US critical infrastructure is well-documented, both here, and throughout many other sources. The US defense critical infrastructure and other national critical infrastructure (economic, communications, transportation) are too intertwined to permit stovepipes across the federal government, the private sector, and elsewhere. The US cannot afford to have an attack, like Russias purported 2007 actions against Estonia, that shuts down sectors of the government. In addition, cyber security exercises consistently show that the United States is not prepared or properly organized to meet the growing threats from States, terrorists, criminal organizations, and individual hackers. The US has made some progress with the framework laid out by the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, HSPD-7, the NIPP, and other relevant policy documents. In addition, the US Government has made significant investments in building a foundation of cyberspace capabilities. DHS, NCSD, NCRCG, and US-CERT provide vital information exchange, awareness of cyber security issues, and build important partnerships. Similarly, DOD has made great strides with STRATCOM, its subordinate commands (JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW), and numerous other agencies to address the new warfighting domain of cyberspace. Yet, all of these efforts may ultimately only amount to window dressing if the PCA and current US policy remain in effect.

PCA Structure: Too Complex and Unnecessary The Posse Comitatus Act has been more symbolic than real, as evidenced by the many exceptions permitted by Congress, the Courts lackadaisical approach toward the statute, and the lack of federal enforcement. While the PCA has been on the books for more than 120 years, there has never been an actual prosecution for violating its provisions. Leaders from the Executive and Legislative Branches have acknowledged that the current system needs to be reviewed, and changes made where necessary. For example, President Bush outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security that the threat of catastrophic terrorism requires a thorough review of the laws permitting the military to act within the United States in order to determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts would benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so, how. General Ralph Eberhart, former NORTHCOM Commander, said he would favor changes in existing law [including the PCA] to give greater domestic powers to the military to protect the country against terrorist strikes. Senator John Warner, thenChairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has also stated that the reasons for the [PCA] have long given way to the changed lifestyle we face today here in America Clearly, there is considerable support to rescind or amend the PCA to allow DOD to take a more active role in the defense of the United States, including one of its most vulnerable domains: cyberspace. There is a general consensus that the PCA is full of uncertainty and complexity. It is debatable when the PCA applies, what military activities are prohibited, and what boundaries for exceptions actually exist. All of this leaves policymakers, legal practitioners, lawmakers, and military personnel confused. This stems primarily from two reasons: (1) the difficulty in classifying situations as homeland defense or civil response and (2) misconceptions about the PCA due to the patchwork of legal

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authorities in this area. The PCA is widely misunderstood and does not provide a basis for defining civil-military relations in the current War on Terror. It is time for the US to rescind the PCA and replace it with a new law. In critical situations like responding to nuclear terrorism or sophisticated cyber attacks, the current PCA interpretation can create a convoluted command and control structure, decrease response times, and increase continuity problems leaving the federal response more vulnerable to exploitation. The PCA is irrelevant and even dangerous to the proper use of military forces for 21st century domestic duties such as cyber defense of national critical infrastructure. It is imperative that a new law provide clear guidelines for use of American military forces in homeland security duties, as well as enforcing US laws. One comprehensive statute could maintain the basic principles originally intended by the PCA, while setting clearer lines of demarcation between permissible and impermissible DOD activities. DOD is Better Suited for Cyber Response DOD can respond in the cyber arena in its area of expertise better than civilian authorities because cyber is at the core of the DOD mission. David McIntyre, the Director of the Integrative Center for Homeland Security at Texas A&M University, notes the Pentagons authority trumps that of DHS in the event of an attack [and that] the Pentagons role in a disaster leans heavily toward response and recovery, while DHS is more focused on prevention and mitigation. Things should be no different in cyberspace. Cyber attacks need to be compared to vessels crossing into our territorial waters, or tanks rolling across the Mexican border. Arguably, any cyber attack that causes damage indistinguishable from a kinetic attack should be legally indistinguishable from more traditional military attacks.

Preparing to hit the send button. (US Marine Corps) The DOD should serve as the lead when necessary, as they are trained, equipped, and prepared to respond. In DODs homeland defense role, the mission of responding is defined as the ability to rapidly deter, repel, or defeat an attack. If deterrence fails, the military must be prepared to rapidly respond and defend against threats, including the use of preemptive or offensive actions such as computer network attack. Of course, it is still vital to work with and coordinate response capabilities with civilian counterparts as necessary. Furthermore, concerns that US service members will serve as a substitute for civilian law enforcement can be overcome through proper guidelines, and training to use the military in limited emergency circumstances. Foreign vs Domestic Attacks It is often too difficult to make distinctions between foreign and domestic attacks in cyberspace, so the military should be able to respond against both targets when necessary. The distinction between enemies at home and abroad has grown blurry in the information warfare age. Specifically, this new type of homeland defense must ignore the distinction between foreign and domestic threats to be successful, a fundamental difference found within the PCA. The 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provides that the speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing among the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states

difficult, a task which occurs only after the fact, if at all. In most cyber attacks, the identity, location, and objective of the perpetrator are not immediately apparent. Nor is the scope of the attack, often making it impossible to determine at the outset if an intrusion is an act of vandalism, organized crime, domestic or foreign terrorism, economic or traditional espionageor a strategic military attack. The only way to determine the source, nature, and scope of the incident is to gather information from victim sites and intermediate sites, such as Internet Service Providers and telecommunications carriers. Given the difficulty in determining the specific source of cyber attacks, it is arguable that unlike responding to traditional criminal acts, the focus should be on the act itself, rather than the perpetrator. Thus, the threshold for launching defensive and offensive actions should be lowered. Many cyber security experts agree it is hard to determine the origin of most cyber attacks due to the deliberately diffuse setup of the Internet. An attack that seems to emanate from one country can actually be controlled by another state, such as hijacking the victims systems through a botnet army or other mechanisms. Consequently, the PCA may need an additional exception carved out of the law, particularly for terrorist threats that law enforcement is not designed to handle, and when probable cause exists that those involved are foreign nationals or American citizens working on their behalf. Until we have the capabilities to determine cyber attack sources with the utmost confidence, such a solution is probably impractical. There are significant international law ramifications as well, such as what constitutes selfdefense in cyberspace, and such issues still need work. Nonetheless, the PCA forces DOD to try to delineate between foreign and domestic sources, which is simply not possiblewith reasonable certainty before it is already too late.

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Homeland Defense vs Homeland Security Another distinction raising significant issues is trying to draw the line between permissible homeland defense and impermissible DOD homeland security operations in cyberspace. Joint Doctrine provides military support for homeland security in two ways: homeland defense and support to civil authorities with some of the relevant mission areas including: sovereignty protection (includes defense against CNA); protection of critical defense infrastructure; military assistance to civil authorities (includes CBRNE incidents); and military support to civilian law enforcement (includes combating terrorism and protecting critical national infrastructure). Under the current system, the military may not be able to adequately address a terrorist attack on American soil due to the lack of clear, explicit guidelines as to when the military should act, compounded by a cumbersome bureaucratic approval process. In addition to the Presidents ability to respond with military force to sudden attacks, without Congressional approval, it is arguable that lower level commanders could do likewise when faced with defending the homeland against a terrorist attack. However, terrorism is defined more as a law enforcement problem than a national security concern, and this limits DODs ability to counter such actions in the United States. If military activity falls under the realm of homeland defense or as part of a civil response not involving law enforcement activity, then it should be defendable under the PCA. Yet, the PCA tries to make distinctions between military attacks and terrorist aggression which are more theoretical than reality-based. DOD is supposed to be the lead agency for homeland defense missions. Consistent with law and policy, the Services support combatant command requirements against all incursions that threaten our national security, including computer network attack. Trying to draw lines between homeland defense and homeland security missions, in an effort to satisfy the PCAs requirements, does more harm than good

in the event of a cyber attack. Conclusions/Recommendations Before a cyber attack does serious damage to US national security, whether against DOD or other national critical infrastructure, the United States needs to re-evaluate its policy and legal framework. We must enable this nations response to the likely cyber challenges of the 21st century and beyond. After what may have been the first true cyber war in historyperhaps supported by RussiaEstonian Defense Minister Jack Aaviksoo warned: we havent yet defined what can be considered to be a cyber attack, or what are the rights of member states and the obligations of EU and NATO in the event such attacks are launched. The EU and NATO need to work out a common legal basis to deal with cyberattacks. how to tackle different levels of criminal cyberactivities, depending on whether what we are dealing with is vandalism, cyber terror or cyber war. A Pearl Harbor in cyberspace could be devastating to US national security, and it should not be allowed to happen especially when it could have been prevented. Accordingly, DOD should not only serve as the lead for cyber defense of

defense critical infrastructure, it should also be in the lead for the response. This determination can be based on standards derived from the existing HSPD-7 or the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. In addition, the PCA needs to be amended or rescinded. The PCA has succeeded in putting forth an ideal, but has fallen woefully short in creating a practical, legal impediment to the use of the military for civil law enforcement. The legal and policy arguments discussed in this article conclusively show this is the route we must take. Since it might be too sensitive a political issue to do away with the PCA completely, it could be more prudent to develop a new DOD exception for cyberspace activities. Again, such an exception could be based on the existing US government guidance and standards discussed earlier. Nonetheless, it would be very beneficial if all of the exceptions were combined with the PCA language into one comprehensive statute. Perhaps this can serve as another step toward dismantling the existing cumbersome structurebut only if the political will exists in the future. Too bad its not as easy as a potential enemys cyber attack, with one finger on a keyboardjust hit the send button.

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Beijings Rising Hacker Stars How Does Mother China React?

By Scott Henderson Editorial Abstract: Mr. Henderson examines a major hacker organization in the Peoples Republic of China, exploring the linkages between government and private network exploitation. He reviews political, military, and economic targets, and warns against using a Western model to explain intricate online behaviors and motivations. n 2007, government information systems inside the US, UK, Germany, France, Japan and Taiwan fell victim to cyber attacks. While not conclusive, most indicators pointed to China as the country of origin and the possible culprit. Based on growing online demographics, it is very likely we will see an increase in Chinese hacker activities in the coming year. Security experts at Arbor Networks even predicted this year (2008) would be the Year of the Chinese hacker. While little is known about military hackers employed by the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, we are starting to get an understanding of their civilian counterpart known as the Red Hacker Alliance. This organization, responsible for many of the headline grabbing accounts of Chinese hacker attacks, was formed in response to the 1998 ethnic riots in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Indonesian populace unfairly blamed their ethnic Chinese community for the countrys out of control inflation. Indonesian citizens turned on the Chinese living among them, committing murders, rapes, and destruction of businesses. News of these atrocities filtered back to individual Chinese hackers, who in retaliation formed the Chinese Hacker Emergency Conference Center, sending e-mail bombs to Indonesian government websites and mailboxes and conducting Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against Indonesian domestic sites. Since their founding, the group has been involved in at least five major cyber conflicts. Its membership has climbed from a few thousand to around 300,000many of whom are young nationalist males in their early to mid20s. Initially composed of only seven rudimentary websites, the alliance now contains 250+ stations stretches across three major municipalities; seventeen

provinces; one autonomous region; and the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. For network security personnel throughout the world, determining the government affiliation of the Red Hacker Alliance has become a key question demanding an answer. Are they, or are they not, an officially sanctioned apparatus of the state in terms of tasking, oversight, and control of the organization? The simple answer is no. They are not a branch of the government

The State and Alliance Relationship The masses figure heavily into Chinas strategic calculations and will be actively used in times of conflict and peace. So, while applying the label of a nongovernmental entity to the Red Hacker Alliance is true, it is also deceiving. Affixing this tag implies the alliance is not associated with the official intelligence structure in any capacity. This is also incorrect. The inability to derive a yes or no answer to this problem is rooted in our tendency to apply mirror imaging of US societal normswhere they do not exist. From a Western perspective, the idea of active espionage against another nation requires government initiative, involvement, and direction. It is hard for us to conceive of links being formed between state authorities and quasifreelance intelligence operations, simply because it does not fit our preconceived notion of the proper relationship. There is a very good chance this is exactly the type of association taking place between the PRC central government and the Red Hacker Alliance. Western nations assign virtually no intelligence-gathering role of any kind to non-governmental citizens in peacetime; even during periods of active conflict, Western citizens are probably best defined as heightened citizen watch groups. China on the other hand, does not make a distinction between these two responsibilities; citizens are expected to take part in both arenas. The Peoples Liberation Army emphasizes the integration of military and civilian roles in their strategic doctrine of future wars: In the high-tech local war which we will face in the future, the role of the masses as the main body of the war is embodied by the country. The great

Chinese hacker Withered Rose greets his online community. (thedarkvisitor.com) or the military. Chinese hackers are most likely who and what they claim to be: an independent confederation of patriotic youth dedicated to defending China against perceived threats to national dignity. However, it is also true the question of direct government affiliation is itself flawed, and the simple answer of no is highly misleading. The central problem with our inquiry is that we are viewing the situation from a US paradigm and applying our cultural bias. In China, independence from government direction and control does not carry with it the idea of separation from the state. The PRC government views its citizenry as an integral part of Comprehensive National Power, and a vital component of national security.

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power of the peoples war is released through comprehensive national power, the combination of peace time and war time, the combinations of the military and the civilian, and the combination of war actions and non-war actions. Besides the direct participation and cooperation with the armys operations in the region where war happens, the masses will support the war mainly by political, economic, technical, cultural and moral means. The Chinese believe in the idea of a Peoples War, in which the entire population is mobilized to struggle on behalf of the nation. The Red Hacker Alliance will gladly assume its role as protector and seek out targets of opportunity to attack. Being a civilian organization will in no way limit their participation in striking out at the enemies of China. If history is any indication, as the numerous examples of Chinese hacker attacks represent, they will take the lead in launching preemptive or retaliatory assaults. So, what would this quasi-official relationship look like and what are its characteristics? An interview with a Chinese hacker from Beijing provides an excellent example of this nontraditional relationship: One Beijing hacker says two Chinese officials approached him a couple of years ago requesting help in obtaining classified information from foreign governments. He says he refused the assignment, but admits he perused a top US generals personal documents once while scanning for weaknesses in Pentagon information systems for fun. The hacker, who requested anonymity to avoid detection, acknowledges that Chinese companies now hire people like him to conduct industrial espionage. It used to be that hackers wouldnt do that because we all had a sense of social responsibility, says the well-groomed thirty something, but now people do anything for money. This technique used above typifies the same soft-control the government exercises on human intelligence collectors in the US and other countries. China relies on a broad informal network of students, tourists, teachers, and 26

foreign workers inside targeted nations, collecting small bits of information to form a composite picture of the environment. Rather than set a targeted goal for collection, they instead rely on sheer weight of information to form clear situational understanding. Alliance members make ideal candidates for flexible operations; they have proven themselves to be capable, patriotic, and motivated. To clarify, this is not to suggest that every member or even a majority of the members have connections with the government. In fact, there are probably only a select few who have any dealings whatsoever with officials. Additionally, there are intricacies and complexities of this dynamic that move it far beyond the headline grabbing probes for international secrets. Political, economic, and social issues

Chinese Trojan database. (thedarkvisitor.com) account for a majority of the contacts between the two, and require a delicate balance of constraints and freedoms. We can even surmise that there are times when an uneasy truce exists between the two parties. Such unease stems from alliance concerns over a possible crackdown on the organization, and the governments fear of a hacker instigated rebellion among its youthful members. Better understanding points where mutual interests converge will aid us in unraveling what mechanisms bind them together, and how they might interact. Intelligence and Economics From the Partys viewpoint, the Red Hacker Alliance must have benefits that outweigh their liabilities. If political activism and attempts to penetrate foreign systems brought about only international condemnation and created points of contention between

China and other nations, the Party would halt the Alliances activities. Beijing is well aware of the possible downside this group represents, and the inherent dangers of their involvement especially during times of crisis. An international dilemma on the verge of resolution might be exasperated by cyber attacks on infrastructure or governmental institutions, possibly resulting in unforeseen and unmanageable consequences. On the other hand, if the returns are greater than the costs and the benefits outweigh the risks, then the government would see the Red Hacker Alliance as an assetand allow them to continue. At the moment, there are no indicators that authorities in Beijing are making any attempts to rein in or shutdown the alliance, a telling sign that the cost-benefit analysis is still in the alliances favor. So, what factors make it more profitable to protect the organization, and risk a possible escalation of international tensions, than to be rid of them? The most obvious reason for Beijings apparent tolerance of the Alliance is that it likely receives valuable information from the group. Thousands of hackers, working around the clock, could surely fill in some of the blanks of a composite intelligence picture. As a civilian organization, the Red Hacker Alliance also provides the government with plausible deniability. Even if Alliance members are caught red-handed breaking into a system, it is easily disavowed as the actions of overzealous youth, not that of the government. In December 2005, as accusations of Chinas involvement in government-sponsored hacking heated up, Peoples Republic of China Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang flatly denied charges of PRC government involvement, asking the US to produce any information proving these allegations. The foreign minister offered nothing further, simply dismissing the idea in its entirety. Qin held fast to the argument that Chinese regulations prohibit attacks on the Internet, suggesting that should be proof enough they were not involved. Such an approach is highly effective at deterring further inquiry. It requires Fall 2008

the US reveal specific incidents and explain the techniques that led to those conclusions, thereby revealing US operational capabilities in intrusion detection, backtracking, and identifying attacking points of origin. We should also be careful in assuming the relationship between the government and the alliance is a oneway street, with authorities requesting information and Red Hacker Alliance members providing it. It is quite possible there are times when the alliance, of its own volition, initiates collections against certain targets and then supplies such sensitive data to the government. Owing to the increased entrepreneurial nature of the organization, we cannot rule out financial compensation as a possible motivator for breaking into foreign systems. Going even further with this speculation, we cannot be certain the Chinese government is the only client or requestor for information. This knowledge is highly valuable to other governments, or even private companies around the world. Corporate espionage is another arena where we must put aside our cultural bias and make judgments based on the Chinese system, rather than Western practices. If someone asks a US citizen Who would be the most likely suspect in a crime involving the theft of corporate secrets for financial gain? The US answer would probably be another company. That the government would condone or even encourage industrial spying and data theft for fiscal gain is a very remote idea for us. However, the Chinese government does not divorce itself from domestic industryall assets inside China are viewed as assets of the state. Financial institutions are deemed a vital component for the health and stability of the nation, at least on par with if not on a higher priority, than development of military capabilities. Hacker efforts to assist in advancement of state enterprises, whether offered in return for monetary compensation or not, would be viewed as advantageous and likely overlooked by officials. In a wave of industrial spying that began in August 2004 and lasted through at least the first quarter of 2005,

hackers from China unleashed the Myfip Trojan on corporate computers. Myfip is designed to search for files related to high-tech research and development, and send them back to an individual named Si Wen in Tianjin, China. Joseph Stewart, a senior security researcher and the man responsible for reverse engineering Myfip, noted Tianjin is Chinas thirdlargest city and the second-biggest hub for manufacturing, particularly electronics. Notably, the attacks were so brazen, the hackers didnt bother to obscure their location, a norm for most experienced hackers. Weighing in on the issue, Chief of iDefense John Watters said Nothing suggests that Chinese authorities are vigilantly prosecuting those who are attacking foreign interests. They turn a blind eye to it as long as it doesnt oppose national interests. Sectors where the financial interest of the Alliance and the security interests of the state coincide could present even greater difficulties for outside industries wanting to protect trade secrets. Chinas rising energy needs and its worldwide search for energy resources present a prime example. There are tremendous pressures exerted on the state to sustain the countrys forward economic momentum, and to do so they must ensure a consistent and steady fuel supply. The competition to secure finite resources such as oil and natural gas can be highly competitive, and the methods to attain them may move far beyond those of traditional market mechanisms. Chinese hackers, working for personal gain, could find a lucrative market in the sale of information related to the petroleum industry. The state may be more inclined to turn a blind-eye to the practice, if it facilitates expansion of Chinese industrial interests. Political In addition to intelligence gathering and economic interests, politics are a driving force that binds the alliance and government together. The political front can be divided into two distinct categories: domestic and international. Internal or domestically-motivated political hacking is aimed at dissident elements and separatist movements

inside the country, extended to supporters of those same movements outside the country. Recipients of these attacks typically threaten national sovereignty and challenge the legitimacy of the ruling party: the Falun Gong; the Free Tibet movement; and Hong Kong activists. In 2002, dissident groups outside of China complained Chinese hackers attempted to shut down their operations through virus and Trojan attacks focused on the e-mail addresses of the Falun Gong, banned news sites, freenet-china. org, and Xinjiang independence activists. Notably, the attacks began at roughly the same time the PRC Minister of Public Security called for more aggressive measures in going after foreign forces subverting China via the Internet. Chong Yiu-kwong, a human rights activist who organized democracy marches in Hong Kong, discovered that his e-mail was being monitored, noting: I didnt know that my computer had been monitored ever since, until I found that all my e-mails from the account registered to the University of Hong Kong disappeared all of a sudden. I approached the computer center of Hong Kong University. They told me that my account had been monitored by three different IP addresses from China and that information from the account had been downloaded every few minutes. A Chinese Internet security official described separatist activities as one of the major trends in cyber crime for 2002. According to this account, Falun Gong practitioners used the Internet to spread their philosophy and organize illegal activities. Splittist and anti-Chinese elements had evoked disunity and made attacks on the government and Party leadership. Luo Gan, a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Commission on Politics and Law, identified cyber crimes as one of the three most important problems facing the country: Hostile forces at home and abroad as well as the Falun Gong cult are doing everything in their power to spread rumors and launch attacks on the Internet Hostile forces and some people with ulterior motives may disrupt our Internet system through such means 27

as computer virus attacks and hacker attacks. Other illegal and criminal acts, such as online financial fraud, are also growing. In international disputes, Beijing has been able to count on the Red Hackers as a surrogate political hammer, and a rallying force for mainland solidarity. Historical accounts of the Alliance, from its inception to present day, demonstrate an organization that aggressively backs governmental policy through flexing cyber muscle. As documented in the book The Dark Visitor, these international cases include the attacks against the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Indonesia. Other favorite targets are elections and referendums that touch on Taiwanese independence. During the June 2005 Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum held in Seoul, an officer of the Taiwanese Criminal Investigation Bureau approached PRC delegates and requested their assistance in a joint crackdown on hacker attacks. Chinese delegates cold-shouldered the Taiwanese officers request. Favorable public sentiment for the alliances nationalistic stances also provides some degree of guaranteed protection and support from the government. Ordinary citizens see them as a voice for the people, stretching across great distances to right the wrongs against China. Some circles view famous Chinese hackers as Hollywood stars and not criminals. During the Sino-Japanese hacker attacks of 2000, Japanese officials requested that the websites of known hackers in the Guangxi, China area be shutdown for attacking Japanese websites. Police responded that they had no intentions of doing so, because it was a patriotic website. Recruiting China, which is still in the early stages of informationizing the nation and its military, recognizes the disparity in technical knowledge and experience between itself and other countries. To some extent, and in certain circles, the government has also come to appreciate this same gap between the older and younger generations. It is easy for us to lose sight of the fact that China has only

recently gained access to the Internet, and the migration process from social elites to the average citizen has taken some years. Familiarity and comfort levels with new programsand the Web in generalare likely sharply divided between age groups. Chinese youth, like those in most nations, are more flexible and quickly adapt to new technologies while the older generation struggles to incorporate it. Chinas elders are now reaching out to their children for help in understanding the uses of this new technology and the children are eager to assist. Evidence taken from Chinese Internet forums and news broadcasts demonstrates that members of the Red Hacker Alliance would like to be a statesponsored agency, and are somewhat offended they are not. In August 2005, Phoenix Television News carried a report that Chinese hackers wanted to be recruited by the government to form network security units in order to protect the safety of domestic networks. Postings on the Honker Union of Chinas website were in firm agreement: We n e e d t o m o v e t o w a r d standardized honker unions. We cant wait until the nation has a crisis to act; we must be prepared to do something meaningful for the motherland. Why cant we become a government-approved network technology security unit? According to other postings, various members of the organization had learned of foreign countries establishing hacker network security units and felt China should do the same, noting It should have been this way earlier! The US, Westerners, Israel, and even the good guys have all formed hacker army groups! We cant lag behind! Similarly, portions of the government have expressed interest in recruiting or at least learning from members of the Alliance. Following the Sino-US cyber conflict of 2001, ignited by the mid-air collision of a US reconnaissance aircraft and a PRC fighter aircraft, renowned Chinese military expert Professor Zhang Zhaozhong expounded on the vital significance of the 7-day network war. He suggested the government officially research these real-life network

warfare experiences for the benefit of the country. As the Director of the National Defense Universitys Military Science and Technology and Equipment Research Department, Professor Zhang pointed out that during the course of the cyber conflict, Chinese hackers had developed many new tactics and gained much experience. However, he also believed neither the Chinese nor the US government could tacitly condone this type of behavior, as it was harmful to the relationship between the two nations, being at odds with both national interests. Professor Zhang also expressed concern over the violation of treaties and laws. He felt that on the one hand the hackers should be commended for their well-intentioned spirit and motives for carrying out the attacks, but on the other they needed to be educated on the serious consequences of these attacksand how easily innocents can be harmed. Returning to his argument for studying this incident, Professor Zhang brought up President Clintons invitation for expert hackers to attend a meeting at the White House to discuss network security. Perhaps such an invitation could be used as a precedent for China to explore the special role of hackers. According to Zhang, network warfare was one of the measures of a states comprehensive national power. To underscore the importance of the study, he gave examples of the levels of difficulty in systems penetration: While it is relatively easy to tamper with a few Web pages, it is much harder to attack the Department of Defenses network. Trying to penetrate the Pentagon, stealing nuclear secrets, or passing yourself off as a high ranking US military commander issuing orders to operational units is like reaching for the stars. Even though this mutual attraction toward collaborative efforts could be seen as a positive trend in the relationship, in the end it may produce the opposite effect. Such actions may wind up as a source of tension between the hackers and the Chinese government. In early 2006, members of the Red Hacker Alliance were dissatisfied with the governments Fall 2008

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slow reaction in responding to what they considered a deterioration of the domestic network security environment. The Alliance began taking matters into their own hands. Through monitoring of foreign hacker websites, Chinese hackers had discovered numerous daily intrusions into Chinese government systems. The foreign hackers were making a game of counting the number of Chinese servers they could access. When alliance members attempted to notify officials of these security vulnerabilities, they were rebuffed, and told appropriate security firms were handling the situation. In some cases, it took days for the defaced websites to be discovered and returned to normal. The frustrated Chinese hackers, in an effort to reinforce their warnings of the defective security measures, took to defacing their own government websites. One hacker felt it might even have ramifications on any future cyber warfare with Japan: If there really is a China-Japan Hacker War in the future, will this type of network technology do? Last week I spent an immense amount of energy to get into a petty Japanese trash website. I uploaded the modified main page. Half an hour later I took a look and its main page was, to my surprise, restored. Looking at those websites, those Chinese websites, which are, moreover, the websites of government departments, they were hacked over a week ago and still no one knows. Geez! The weakness of government servers may be another possible explanation for cyber espionage charges leveled at China. Civilian hackers inside the country and foreign hackers outside the country, hijacking these systems, could account for a large number of the attacks originating from Chinese government owned resources. It is doubtful that the Peoples Liberation Army or any other affiliated group would attempt intrusions from accounts so easily identified. However, independents could find their servers easily coopted targets and excellent launching pads for attacks. In March 2005, the Ministry of Public Security arrested a man from Hubei Province for forming a Botnet of 100,000 stolen computers.

According to the bureau, of the 100,000 infected, more than 60,000 were inside China, with a portion of those being government computers. A year later, Xinhua News Agency reported that in the first quarter of 2006, hackers had changed information on 2,027 official government websites. The 2006 first quarter statistics almost matched the total for all of 2005. A further blurring of the lines between civilian and government ties is the way the Chinese Communist Party co-opts public use facilities, drafting them into military service. Western corporations may contract the government on issues of national

groups such as these may be adding to the confusion of what is state-organized and what is civilian. Communications An interesting facet of the interaction between the government and the Red Hacker Alliance is the evolution in means of communications between the two. Without direct control over the daily workings of a group, how do you signal that they have crossed a line of departure, and it is time to cease certain activities? Again turning to the US-Sino cyber conflict of 2001 and anti-Japanese protests of 2005, a picture of indirect communications through mass media, universities, text-messaging, and online postings begins to emerge. The ability to ensure compliance with these directives seems tenuous at best, and may aim to keep the situation under control, rather than enforce 100% observance. When authorities in Beijing decided the hacker war between China and the US had gone on long enough, they began issuing public statements, then contacted leaders of the alliance telling them that it was time to stop. The opening government salvos came from a variety of sources, all aimed at getting their message across? - Official website of the Peoples Daily: The attacks by the Honker Union of China, or Red Guests, on US websites are unforgivable acts violating the law. It is Web terrorism. - Liao Hong, the director of the Peoples Daily Online editorial office: We understand the passion of these hackers but we do not endorse their way of expressing it. We do not want to offend patriotic Web surfers but it is important we alert the public to the risk of such acts and prevent further disasters. - Officials from Chinas Internet security: The war between Chinese and American hackers that led to the White House website being shut down was illegal. - Spokeswoman for the Internet Safety Bureau, under the Public Security Ministry: Such attacks are not legal. It is against the law to enter other peoples systems. 29

defensebut they are not drafted. In 2003, Dongshan District of Guangzhou China, one of the major science and technology centers in the Southern region, spent US $54,000 to turn the provincial telecommunications company, data communications bureau, microwave communications bureau, and Southern Satellite Telecommunications Services Corporation into a militia information warfare battalion. While these public facilities were becoming an official unit in the militia battalion, others such as NetEase Guangdong and the China Unicom Paging Company in Guangzhou were being brought onboard, even though they did not have an established mission. The Guangdong area has been cited as one of the major areas for government sponsored hacking, and activities of

- Su Zhiwu , Vice-president of the Beijing Broadcasting Institute: Sino-US conflicts should be resolved through diplomatic channels, not hacking maneuvers. On 15 August 2001, primary Red Hacker Alliance leader Wan Tao announced a temporary termination of attacks on foreign/enemy websites. According to Wan, this was based on instructions from government departments. In May of 2002, after negotiating an agreement with five other Chinese hacker websites, to include the Honker Union of China, a joint statement callined for an end to anniversary attacks recalling the 2001 incident. From 2001 to 2005, the government gradually developed more sophisticated and expansive methods for communicating with its patriotic youth. Simple calls from recognized state newspapers and agencies were supplemented with Web postings and text messaging. The Party quickly grasped that traditional methods alone were inefficient at reaching a generation that felt more at home on the computer, and who used cell phones to communicate with their peers. Beginning in April 2005, antiJapanese demonstrations spread across China. Japans bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council and additional revisions to history texts that downplayed Japanese actions in WWII brought out large crowds of Chinese protestors. The demonstrations, ranging across cities from Beijing to Shenzhen, were characterized by attacks on anything symbolic of Japan: government buildings, cars, businesses, and restaurants. There were even reports of Japanese citizens being attacked during the protests. Toward late April, the Ministry of Public Security was tasked to halt the demonstrations. Using Internet postings and text messages in combination with traditional print media, the ministry ordered protestors not to organize antiJapanese demonstrations without police approval. Chinas Minister of State Council Information summed up the Partys ability to control the populace: Most citizens obey nodemonstration orders You need to 30

understand that Chinese citizens still respect the government. So if the government makes clear that this kind of demonstration is not OK, 90% of the people wont go. Conclusions The history of the Red Hacker Alliance clearly shows it to be a civilian initiated and run organization. The rapid growth from a few cells, to several hundred thousand members has been fueled by nationalism and international incidents. While there have been occasional sparks on both sides of the aisle, the Chinese government and the alliance have maintained what can be characterized as a status-quo relationship. Neither party is ready to embrace or reject one another. However, with the shift away from nationalism and simple website defacements to hacking for monetary gain, it is unlikely both sides can maintain this equilibrium. Beijing faces several dilemmas in in dealing with the Red Hacker Alliance. On the one hand, it is much better to have a large number of young males protesting foreign incidents outside the country than focusing their sights internally. The alliance can be useful in times of political conflict, and in the past it has been more of an annoyance to foreign governments than an outright threat to Chinese national security, infrastructure and economics. This has kept Beijings external pressures to a minimum. Alternately, the days of simple annoyance appear to have past. Many

nations strongly protest the Peoples Republic of China, asking them to reign in their civilian hackersand the perception is growing they are a centrally-controlled entity. There is hardly a government, military or industry that has not been the subject of some sort of attempted intrusion by Chinese hackers. The patriotic aura has long worn off the Alliance, leaving much less sympathy in the Party leaderships eyes. Given these two sets of conflicting dynamics, Beijing will need to either disband the organization, or incorporate it into a more manageable state-directed enterprise. Disbanding the Alliance is unlikely, as such a move provides few benefits to the state and leaves behind a large number of disgruntled youth looking for an outlet. Incorporation provides a new security body for the countrys information systems and a method to curtail the worst of the groups activities. It is vital we accurately understand the unique relationship between the Chinese government, the Red Hacker Alliance and other hacker groups. This is only a preliminary step in grasping the complexities and intricacies that shape the movement. Without this knowledge, it will be difficult to anticipate the next wave of attacks or the motivations behind them. We must confront two equally difficult situations: we must understand if we face a state sponsored attackor the act of a defiant child.

Fall 2008

US Public Diplomacy: Waiting for the War of Ideas

By Hiram Henderson, Commander, USNR Editorial Abstract: Commander Henderson analyzes current US Public Diplomacy organizations, actions, and levels of support. He concludes that contemporary efforts lack the critical mass needed for successful US messaging in the War on Terror, then recommends revised government and commercial constructs to address these shortcomings. he terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated that public diplomacy was the weakest link in our foreign policy arsenal. Americans were astonished by the wide scale of Usama Bin Ladens popular support among Muslims. Media coverage of anti-American activities since 2001 underscores Al Qaedas strategic message. Why do they hate us? is still a common headline. While the US information response to 9/11 appeared halting and confusing, subsequent military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were anything but. Both operations have put the Defense Department at the center of public diplomacy. Both campaigns, marked by lengthy post-combat phases, make plain that military power alone is insufficient to defeat a shadowy, nihilistic and implacable global terror networkwhose world view is spreading. The multi-layered insurgency in Iraq is ground center in the War on Terror. Muslims, by contrast, see a historic movement of Islamic restoration and renewal. This broader Islamist movement has millions of adherents, of which radical fighters are only a fraction, that share a common goal of removing what are termed apostate regimes. The belief that their governments are unfaithful to Islam, that Islam is the answer, that the West has declared war on Islam are long-standing themes that resonate in Muslim discourse. Al Qaeda leaders acknowledge much of their fight will occur on the battlefield of the media. Modern technologies speed information delivery, in turn changing information dynamics across the globe. Digital convergence of audio, visual and print media impose a form of global transparency. Tactical events rapidly elevate to strategic significance. Governments, Arab ones in particular, no longer control the flow of information. Public diplomacy messages must vie for attention. Credibility and agility matter. US public diplomacy (PD) has come under intense scrutiny over recent years. A host of studies conclde that public diplomacy is in crisis, and suffers from lack of strategic direction, leadership gaps, insufficient resources and ineffective coordination. Some suggest Americas image problem is linked to perceived double standards in its policies. Muslim public opinion of the US remains at disturbing lows worldwide, making it difficult for the US to gain international cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives. Still, the US must ensure that Muslim societies have access to democratic ideas and values, which hold great appeal. We can identify progress, especially in international broadcasting. However, more could

Traditional around the table Public Diplomacy. (Defense Link) be done to restore critical mass in public diplomacy; to use private sector talents; and to better integrate information operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs. This article argues that US public diplomacy has not enhanced post-9/11 national security, nor has yet to fully engage in the battle of ideas. It traces declines in public diplomacy capability since the end of the Cold War, and responses to 9/11. Taken together, recommendations in this examination would optimize interagency support to time-sensitive planning and countering ideological support to terrorismthe War of Ideas. The classic definition of public diplomacy comes from the former US Information Agency, which managed the nations public diplomacy for over 45 years: Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. As an art, PD is not the same as public affairs (PA). Public Affairs deal mainly with the press and are reactive, short-term and informative in nature. Public diplomacy is pro-active and covers the whole spectrum of society. PD seeks to change attitudes, persuade target audiences as well as to inform. The emphasis on proactive persuasion makes PD similar to psychological operations. Timeframes can range from hours to decades to achieve success, but one should view PD as longrun effort requiring consistent application.

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Instruments of Public Diplomacy: The Tools of Engagement The basic instruments of public diplomacy are: 1. International information activities; 2. Education and cultural exchanges; 3. International broadcasting. International information activities include a mix of strategic communication (SC) products and services, designed to inform, engage and influence key international target audiences and to provide localized context for US messages. These activities include news, publications, lectures, workshops, overseas information resource centers as well as foreign press centers. Education and cultural exchanges comprise what former USIA Director Edward R. Murrow, termed as the last three feet of public diplomacy. International academic, professional and military exchanges build personal and institutional relationships and are powerful long-term instruments of foreign relations. They break down barriers, promote dialogue and learning, and enhance mutual understanding between US citizens and people of other countries. International broadcasting refers to a mix of independentlymanaged, branded radio, satellite television and Internet services. International broadcasting is the US Governments largest nonmilitary information dissemination activity. The mission of international broadcasting is promotion of open communication of information and ideas, in support of democracy. By statute, international broadcasters have journalistic independence from the US foreign policy bureaucracy, and must provide balanced and comprehensive news. Media reaction and opinion research are intelligence functions that can provide measures of effectiveness for public diplomacy. The US State Department houses media and opinion research functions within its Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and analysis mainly centers on mainstream media. The Open Source Center, including the former Foreign Broadcast Information Service, analyzes foreign print, radio, TV, Web-based, and gray literature. Products are also available from US embassies, the Defense Department, CIA, and private pollsters. One continuing problem is that product databases are stove-piped. As one study quoted, the US often doesnt know what it knows. Organization of Public Diplomacy: Department of State The present bureaucracy for PD resulted from the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. That legislation abolished the former United States Information Agency (USIA) and merged its functions and resources within the State Department. Most USIA functions transitioned to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (US PD/PA) on 1 October 1999. Four entities now report to the US PD/PA: 1. The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) has the mission to inform, engage, and influence international

audiences about US policy. IIP provides news articles, electronic and print publications and information programs. IIP conducts strategic planning for public diplomacy efforts. 2. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) has the mission to foster mutual understanding between the US and other countries through international educational and training programs. ECA activities include: Fulbright fellowships; US studies programs; English teaching programs; and exchange grants for professional, cultural and youth programs. 3. The Bureau of Public Affairs (PA) has a mandate to inform the American people and feed their concerns back to the policymakers. PA provides briefings for domestic and foreign press corps; media outreach and town hall meetings. PA retained two USA capabilities: (1) foreign press centers (located in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles); and (2) American Embassy TV which transmits news and events to US embassies and international broadcast services. 4. The Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (PPR) will provide long-term strategic planning and performance measurement capability for public diplomacy and public affairs programs. PPR advises the Under Secretary on resource allocation and will coordinate the State Departments PD presence in the interagency. Regional bureaus are the traditional power centers within the State Department, and these inherited the staffs and funding lines from former USIA regional bureaus and field operations. While this achieved nominal integration between PD and foreign policy, in practice PD priorities get diluted in the mix of individual bureau interests. The regional bureaus control most of the budget for information programs, and have often pursued separate, disconnected regional PD strategies. Broadcasting Board of Governors The International Broadcasting Act of 1994 consolidated all non-military US international broadcasting under a parttime, bipartisan Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The eight member BBG, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, draws from prominent citizens in the media, mass communications and foreign affairs fields. The Secretary of State serves as a non-voting member and is represented by the US PD/PA. As a result of the Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act, BBG became the independent federal agency responsible for all US government and government sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting. The mix of services managed by the BBG includes: Voice of America (VOA) is the official US international broadcasting service. VOA broadcasts news content via radio, television and Internet formats in 44 languages reaching over 90 million listeners. Regional broadcasters include Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti). The newer services for the Middle East are Radio Sawa (Arabic for Together), Al-Hurrah (Arabic for The Free One) satellite television, and Radio Farda (Persian for Tomorrow). Fall 2008

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The International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), established by the International Broadcasting Act of 1994, is the engineering arm of the BBG. This bureau maintains a global network of domestic and overseas transmitting stations, including owned and leased facilities, plus a satellite network and an Internet delivery system. IBB places programming through media outlets, and produces daily editorials for VOA services. Department of Defense Theater security engagement efforts in connection with the WOT have pushed the DOD to the forefront of public diplomacy. Military support to public diplomacy (MSPD) can encompass military-to-military training and exercise programs, military exchanges, humanitarian and civic assistance, along with information activities. Key events in this arena involve: 1. Public Affairs: During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the journalist-embed program was enormously successful in countering enemy propaganda by providing unfiltered views of combat events on the ground. Joint Combat Camera is a powerful resource consisting of task-organized, service equipped capabilities to provide still imagery and motion video in support of wartime operations, contingencies, and joint exercises. The Joint Public Affairs Support Element is an experimental unit providing deployable PA support. 2. Information Operations (IO): As DOD IO lead, US Strategic Command reorganized in 2004 to facilitate access to joint component support for network warfare and IO planning. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was designated the Principal Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for IO in 2003. 3. Military Support to Public Diplomacy (MSPD): Pursuant to the October 2003 DOD IO Roadmap, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs assumed responsibility for MSPD, in addition to its legacy responsibilities for policy coordination and regional planning. [Editors note: term later replaced byDefense Support to Public Diplomacy] 4. Psychological Operations (PSYOP): The US Special Operations Command established the Joint PSYOP Support Element (JPSE) in 2003 to plan, coordinate, and integrate trans-regional PSYOP to promote US objectives. JPSE sponsored two trans-regional PSYOP initiatives aimed at reinforcing US country teams ability to assist selected host nations. Specifically, these helped exercise better control over territory used as potential terrorist safe havens. The first, an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, focused on disseminating information in denied areas. Secondly, the MC-130E Commando Solo special mission aircraft, capable of broadcasting radio and color TV in all worldwide standards, flew periodic missions in support of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting. US Agency for International Development USAID is a low-profile agency that has also been pushed to the frontlines in the WOT. Foreign assistance is a key component of the National Security Strategy of the United

Radio Sawa studios. (Broadcasting Board of Governors) States. USAID humanitarian affairs and development programs arguably represent public diplomacy at it best. USAID generates goodwill by: building schools; restoring mosques; funding media training; providing disaster relief; and has instituted a product branding initiative. Public Diplomacy and National Security: Wars and Ideas In the National Security Strategy of the United States, President Bush conveyed the necessity of refocusing public diplomacy to combat radical extremist ideological threats: Just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America. The War on Terror is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideasan area where America must excel. Unfortunately, the US has yet to excel in the struggle for ideas. What the United States terms a global war on terror, Muslims by contrast see as a historic movement of Islamic renewal. This broader Islamist movement has millions of adherents, both political and militant; radical fighters are only a fraction. The overarching political goal is the removal of what Islamists call the apostate regimes to include: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. The perception of US support for tyrannies in the Muslim world is a critical public diplomacy vulnerabilityone that strongly undercuts US credibility. Political Islamist movements also reflect Muslim resentments with autocratic governance, rampant youth unemployment and declining living standards. The belief that their governments are unfaithful to Islam, that Islam is the answer, and the West has declared war on Islam, are long-standing themes that resonate in Muslim popular imagination. In Iraq, many Arabs perceive that Muslim lands are being re-colonized. In Europe, mosques teach alienated and angry Muslim youth that they live in the Dar Al Harb (Realm of War). 33

Global terrorist propaganda callously exploits Muslim feelings of humiliation, and inspire others to fight in so-called fields of jihad. For now, Al Qaeda sees Iraq as the principal battleground, and its suicide bomber network is the most dangerous component of an adaptive multi-layered insurgency. The AQ-Iraq efforts aim to create a psychological climate of insecurity, undermine domestic and foreign support for the Coalition, and divide Iraqis. Public diplomacy must seize every opportunity to de-legitimize these extremist networks. Tactical events can rapidly elevate to strategic significance. Governments, Arab ones in particular, no longer control information, and must vie for credibility. In informationsaturated environments, getting attention and achieving resonance is as important as getting information out. The swift public release of the intercepted Al Qaeda leaders communicationsthe Zawahiri letter to Al Zarqawi in October 2005 provides a tactical exemplar.

Tactical Expedients Strategic Imperatives

News coverage of the 9/11 attacks made plain just how weak public diplomacy had become. Non-stop visuals carried across the globe of commercial airliners crashing into the World Trade Center, followed by Usama Bin Ladens prerecorded video, along with media coverage of anti-American demonstrations. All of these actions served to advance Al Qaedas strategic message, and eventually inspire a likeminded worldwide movement. The US public diplomacy response was halting and confusing. Why do they hate us? became a common headline. The need to repair Americas image problem led the State Department to bring in a former advertising executive, Charlotte Beers, for the post of US PD/ PA. Ms Beers conceived a Shared Values initiative featuring a series of mini-documentaries on Muslim life in America. The programs reached an estimated audience of 288 million, but were widely criticized by Muslim viewers as simplistic Public Diplomacy: Lack of Critical Mass propaganda. Other efforts included US officials making From 1953 until its dissolution in 1999, the US governments regular appearances on pan-Arab TV services, and the recall to service of Retired Ambassador and fluent Arabic speaker, tools of public diplomacy were resident in the former United Chris Ross, to engage Arab media. States Information Agency (USIA). The The US has made several attempts to agency consolidated the governments tools improve public diplomacy coordination of influence into a single entity that reported at the strategic level, yet most are now to the President, while taking foreign policy dormant. Building on the Coalition guidance from the Secretary of State. The Information Center model, which proved decision to create an independent agency successful in managing news cycles to counter Soviet propaganda fit the times, in Afghanistan operations, the White as well as State Department inclination House created the Office of Global to separate statecraft and propaganda Communication in early 2003. While this functions, but also reflected a realization organization had wide responsibilities for that traditional diplomacy was insufficient interagency coordination on messages to to meet Cold War ideological threats. Over foreign audiences, in practice OGC mainly its 46 history, the small yet nimble USIA focused on tactical production of daily played a triumphal role in getting the truth talking pointsnot all of which focused Who is enabling new PD into closed societies. on counter-terrorism issues. Within messaging capabilities? With the collapse of the Soviet Union DOD, the short-lived Office of Strategic (Wiki Media) in 1991, USIA suffered declining interest Influence (OSI) was designed to provide from a White House and Congress that were anxious for a information policy options and coordinate long-term influence post-Cold War peace divided. During the 1990s, USIA programs for countering hostile propaganda, disinformation budgets were slashed, resulting in regional program cuts in and misinformation directed against the US from foreign places like the Middle East and Indonesia which are now a sources. The OSI experience points to lingering bureaucratic priority. By 1999 the agency was dismantled and its functions sensitivities that continue to impede strategic-level integration dispersed throughout the State Department. While the merger of PA, IO, and PSYOP disciplines. had the effect of nominally integrating public diplomacy into Following OSIs demise, the National Security Council State Department policy functions, it also had the effect of (NSC) launched two Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) reducing critical mass for public diplomacy. Funding for in 2002: one for Strategic Communication; and one for Counterpublic diplomacy continued to decline and bottomed out in Terrorism Information Strategy. The Strategic Communication the year 2000. PCC (SC PCC) was chartered to ensure coordinated interagency In retrospect, PD should remain within State Department, support for international broadcasting, foreign information retaining a position to both influence, and explain foreign programs and public diplomacy, and to produce a National policies. But to be truly successful, public diplomacy functions Information Strategy. This PCC convened few meetings. should also be re-assembled under direct US PD/PA authority. The Information Strategy PCC (IS PCC) was established by The current fragmented structure lacks the responsiveness for classified memorandum to coordinate the information strategy unified action. component of the War on Terror. The IS PCC was a leading

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contributor to strategic communication during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but it was disbanded in early 2005 with the advent of the National Counter-Terrorism Center. A Muslim World Outreach (MWO) PCC was created in July 2004, replacing the former Strategic Communications PCC. Based on input from US embassies in the Middle East, the MWO PCC did develop a strategic plan and white paper. Yet PCCs are part-time efforts, neither fully resourced nor empowered for their charters, and still lack authority to levy direct tasking on military IO capabilities. The US needs a focused Interagency Secretariat. Seven years have passed since 9/11, and there is no national PD strategy. However, US DP/DA has identified three new strategic imperatives: (1) encouraging freedoms; (2) isolating violent extremists; and (3) fostering shared values. Public Diplomacy Outlays: Less Bang Same Buck Through the early 2000s, annual spending for State Department information programs and US international broadcasting was approximately US $1.2 billion. This amounts to one-quarter of one percent of the military budget, not much more than what the DOD spends in a single day. Many reviews pointedly ask whether a military budget 400 times greater than a public diplomacy budget is adequate to US national security strategy, and to a war on terrorism viewed as a struggle about ideas? Yet in the absence of anational PD strategy that sets forth clear strategic priorities and baselines for success, it is far from clear how extra spending would improve overall performance. Thus far, Congress has passed modest increases in funding. Yet the 2004 public diplomacy budget, in nominal terms, was not much higher than its 1999 levels. However, the composition of spending on the major of instruments of public diplomacy has changed. In fiscal year 2004, well over half of the PD budget went to international broadcasting, at just under US $600 million. The newer Middle East-oriented services (Sawa and Al Hurra) were nearly $89 million. Appropriations for educational and cultural exchanges had increased from $200 million (in 1999) to slightly under $316 million in 2004. Spending on international information programs (approximately $305 million), however, is far below former 1990s USIA levels; and most of this (over 75%) goes to the regional bureaus. Surely the US should spend more to use the talents of the private sector in areas of communications, cultural and opinion research. One tool for doing this is creation of a taxexempt Corporation for Public Diplomacy, able to offer grants to independent or indigenous media. Similarly, a Center for Strategic Communication is another concept for conducting media opinion and research; developing themes, products and programs; and deploying advisory teams. Muslim Public Opinion Anti-US sentiment among Muslims bottomed-out during the height of the Iraq War, with nowhere to go but up. According

to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, US favorability ratings increased significantly in Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco, and identifiably in Pakistan and Turkey. The Pew survey found declining support for terrorist violence against civilians due in part to perceptions of Islamic extremism as an internal threat. Terrorist attacks in Jordan fueled a sharp reaction against Al Qaeda. Other signs of backlash point to less flattering, even cartoonish portrayals of extremists in Muslim media. Pew data also reveals broad and consistent support for democracy among a predominantly Muslim public. Pew surveys since 2002 uncovered widespread support for specific features of a democratic system, such as the right to criticize the government; honest, multiparty elections; a fair judiciary; and a free, independent media. Despite widespread distrust of America among Muslims, many believe the US wants to see their region move toward democracy. Majorities in Morocco and Lebanon believed the US is backing democracy in their countries. Current public diplomacy efforts may bear some credit for these results, but it is not clear how much. AC Nielsen surveys indicate Radio Sawa has country market shares ranging from 27 to 73 percent across the Middle East for listeners aged 15 and higher. Al Hurra TV has country shares ranging from 7 to 46 percent of those households having satellite TV access. Nielson surveys indicate very high news reliability ratings from listeners. BBGs Chairman noted that Radio Sawa is the most popular radio station in Morocco, the country having the highest US favorability ratings; but Morocco has already been on a gradual path of political reform. Nonetheless, Pew polls also indicate continued widespread Muslim opposition to the US-led WOT. Muslim perceptions of US policy still matter a great dealand have not fundamentally changed. Waiting for the War of Ideas Years after 9/11, we are still waiting for public diplomacy to fully engage in the battle of ideas. The merger of the former USIA into the State Department provided needed integration of foreign policy and public diplomacy. However, the present public diplomacy infrastructure lacks the mass, flexibility, and responsiveness it enjoyed when managed under an independent agency. Policy coordination committees perhaps should give way to more focused interagency coordination efforts that can meaningfully direct resources and tasking. Tactical expedients to date lack a broader strategic framework. A unified public diplomacy strategy that identifies priorities and baselines for success would rationalize outlays and future investment. The newer international broadcasting services have made gradual gains in building audience share and credibility. Still, perceptions of policy matter and Muslim opposition to the USled WOT remains widespread. However, democratic values and freedoms hold wide appeal among Muslim audiences, and these present opportunities for public diplomacy.

35

The strategic imperative to marginalize and isolate violent extremists, who are part of a broader movement of Islamic restoration, will require considerable finesse, resourcefulness, and cultural awareness. The US must amplify and grant political space to Muslim voices, particularly those who advocate tolerance, democratic reform, and modernity. This task lies at the heart of the War of Ideas. Recommendations: Educate, Engage, Exchange and Empower Al Qaeda leaders admit that half of their struggle is in the battlefield of the media. Radical extremist mass communication has become more sophisticated, as evidenced by an array of e-jihad websites, studio quality videos, interactive media, and now a webcast called Voice of the Caliphate. US public diplomacy must become no less inventive. In recent speeches, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs articulated four public diplomacy tactics: Educate, Engage, Exchange, and Empower. We can leverage this framework to summarize PD recommendations, with emphasis on national security issues in context of the WOT. Educate: Promulgate A New Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on Public Diplomacy This new directive would identify the roles and contributions of public affairs, information operations and psychological operations within public diplomacy. Notably, it should establish horizontal coordination and review mechanisms. This new public diplomacy effort should update and supersede NSDD77 (Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security) and PDD-68 (International Public Information). This directive should make a re-engineered US PD/PA the center of gravity for coordinating US government wide public diplomacy efforts. Engage: Establish an Public Diplomacy Interagency Secretariat The aforementioned PDD should establish a focused, senior-level Interagency Secretariat to plan, direct coordinate and monitor public diplomacy and supporting information activities across the US Government. This Secretariat should also have a supporting standing fusion cell or joint interagency task force, optimized to support time sensitive planning. Such a center would facilitate coordination of Combatant Command strategic communication efforts in connection with WOT operations, and would enhance responses against fleeting terrorist targets. Exchange: Leverage Private Sector Expertise and Talent The US could surely do much more to use the talents of the vast private sector in areas of media, 36

communications, cultural and opinion research. One model suggested by the Council for Foreign Relations is a Corporation for Public Diplomacy, to provide grants to independent and indigenous media projects. It would function much like the Corporation for Public Broadcasting; its programming would be removed from direct association with the US Government and would perhaps be seen as less radioactive. Another concept suggested by the Defense Science Board would be a Center for Strategic Communication to conduct media opinion and research; develop themes, products and programs; and deploy advisory teams. It would function in a manner similar to the Rand Corporation. Both capabilities would help unleash private sector creative potential, and most would agree such assets are worth having in the long-run battle of ideas. Empower: Restore Critical Mass in Public Diplomacy The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy is the national focal point for Public Diplomacy; however, the position has nothing close to the span of control and budget authority enjoyed by former USIA directors. Its time to re-engineer critical mass by granting US PD/PA full control of the public diplomacy budget. In addition, US PD/PA should promulgate a national public diplomacy strategy that rationalizes investment and connects disparate regional PD strategies. Recent moves to elevate senior PD officers in the regional bureaus seem promising. Ideally, regional PD staff and field officers should be wholly under the operational control of US PD/PA. This effort could attain even more mass by transferring media reaction and opinion analysis functions from INR back to the US PD/PA. Media analysis needs to widen beyond elite and mainstream press, to include influential political Islamist and extremist outletsespecially if public diplomacy is to marginalize and isolate extremist threats. Until then, the war of ideas waits.

Fall 2008

The Impact of Collateral Damage on the Taliban Insurgency

By Raja G. Hussain, Lieutenant, USN Editorial Abstract: LT Hussain describes the relationship between death of innocent civilians and the Afghan tribal concept of badal (revenge). He analyzes the compromise of popular support caused by collateral damage stemming from Coalitions tactics. He concludes by offering non-kinetic solutions to curbing the Taliban insurgency. even years after embarking on Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO forces continue to fight a resilient insurgency. With Al Qaeda leadership as elusive as ever, the Taliban have become the main adversary in Afghanistan. Despite the kinetic tactics and state-ofthe art technology at the Allies disposal, the insurgency seems to show no signs of weakening. On the contrary, terrorist attacks are up 53 percent in Afghanistan, according to statistics compiled by the National Counterterrorism Center. Given these startling figures, the national level is expressing growing criticism with regards to failures in what began as the primary front on terrorism. As the Taliban insurgency continues to gain strength, the overwhelming US response has been articulated through the need to deploy more troops. The Coalition has devoted little emphasis to the underlying causes that may be fueling the Taliban insurgency; cultural elements of the Afghan people have been disregarded as they pertain to curbing the anti-US sentiment and Taliban recruitment. Furthermore, ongoing collateral damage caused by the allies hinders the campaign of winning hearts and minds. In order to discover the negative effects of the current military strategy we will study the Taliban propaganda campaign, to outline the anti-US sentiment as it stems from innocent civilian deaths caused by Coalition strikes. Additionally, propaganda reveals that Pashtun culture (Pashtunwali) and jihad (Holy War) have played a vital role in compromising the popular support, and reactions to collateral damage. Violations of tribal customs and religion have led to shaping the Coalition forces image as occupiers, no different from the invaders who marched into Afghanistan before. Moreover, Taliban tactics have evolved to create further cultural and religious violations

by the Coalition, pulling the friendly forces into creating additional collateral damageand dilemma in the very tasks the Coalition set out to accomplish. In lieu of the growing insurgency and the ongoing civilian deaths, there may be grave implications for the future of United States national security and interests in South Asia. If the current military strategy in Afghanistan doesnt change, the center-of-gravity (people) may favor the Taliban, in turn prolonging the conflict and depleting the American influence and economy through a war of attrition. While the low number of US casualties may appear to be an indicator of success given the scope of operations and years in the country, the rising pattern of casualties represents possible challenges from the insurgency. Despite dedicating costly resources and seven years of military presence in the country, the insurgency seems to show no end. As of November 2006, the cost of Afghanistan conflict was estimated to be US $88 billion, not including the aid given to neighboring Pakistan for their assistance in the War on Terror. Concept Of Badal In any society, the cause of collateral damage to human life carries the potential of creating resistance movements, by invoking morality. However in a society like Pashtuns, the effect is three-fold. Not only is morality invoked through mere human emotion, but also through the tribal custom of nang (honor), as well as jihad. These three factors combined not only motivate and create a jihadi force unlike any other, but also render the Coalitions efforts useless in the face of very people it is trying to protect. To best explain this loss of hearts and minds, we must study Pashtun tribal code, more specifically the concept of badal. The word means

revenge-killing or vendetta. It is a highly-held tribal custom in Pashtunwali. Badal is an action taken to avenge death, or when the honor of a woman has been involved. The right to avenge by death is the prerogative of the individual immediately concerned, but that right also resides in the family, section, clan, or tribe. Further, badal need not be restricted to action against the culprit, but can be taken against any member of his kinship group. Pashtunwali is unique to the Pashtu-speaking tribes in Afghanistan who comprise of over 42 percent of the population; a separate percentage lives in the adjacent Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. Moreover, Taliban are Pashtu-speaking thus adhering to these tribal customs, in addition to the religious guidance of Islam. Generally speaking, offending the honor code of any majorityand especially the group which happens to be the opposing force and part of the most dominant tribebecomes a significant issue. Pashtuns belong to a contact society, where extended relationships and tribal interactions take precedence over the individual. As such, the honor of one affects the honor of the collective unit of family and tribe. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the individual to restore his family or tribal honor if insult should occur. Among many factors in Pashtunwali, loss of life is at the hierarchy of nang violations, thus demanding vendetta or some type of reconciliationeven if the loss of life is accidental. Reconciliations are done through a Jirga (group of elders) who come to a mutual agreement, be it monetary or some other arrangement that satisfies the victims family. In view of this very concept, it is apparent that Pashtuns are a society unlike any in the Western world, and that closure is a very important concept which cannot

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Fall 2008

be overlooked by the offender. Even as a Muslim society, nang seems to take priority over the Islamic elements of mercy and forgiveness, often creating a contradiction between the two value systems. Collateral Damage Coalition tactics have become counterproductive in the face of culture and insurgency. Overall, Allied military tactics have depended primarily on technology to oppose the enemy. As such, they often employ aerial assets following a contact or skirmish with the Taliban forces. A host of Close Air Support (CAS) fighters and bombers have been utilized in reaction to intelligence reports and ground support. Aircraft have even been used interchangeably, despite their intended roles. For instance, according to a November 2007 Navy Times report, B-1B [Lancer] bombers flew fortyone CAS missions in a single day, following the discovery of mechanical failures in the F-15 [Eagle]. While the US hailed this as a success story, in terms of adaptability and reinforcement for the ground forces, the broader strategy alludes to a continued reliance on aerial bombing. These weapons systems provide roles traditionally accomplished with lighter payloads, and closer proximity to the targets. To qualify the previous statement, the US Air Force is bolstering this immediate strike capability, combining the payload, long-loiter, and high-altitude capacity of bombers with precision munitions. This, along with improved command and control, and precise targeting, allows bombers to conduct CAS. However, the precision capabilities of high-altitude munitions are negligible in the face of faulty intelligence and poor decisionmaking on the ground. Even as Coalition forces were apologizing and handing out blood-money of US $2000 per family for a recent (March 2007) ground-related episode of collateral damage, an air strike killed at least 21 civilians in the southern province of Helmand that same day. Unfortunately, even one death of a civilian is one too many, given the cultural aspects of the affected tribes.

Current Afghan areas of conflict. (Author) Taliban Strategy K n o w i n g t h e C o a l i t i o n s technological might and superiority, Taliban maintain their unconventional tactics, luring friendly forces into situations that promote collateral damage, and reduce their ability to protect the civilian population. The insurgents have largely sought to avoid full-on battlefield confrontations and instead relied on guerrilla-style tactics, including suicide attacks, roadside bombings and kidnapping. Such techniques may also be driven by the Coalitions predictability of using air strikes, and lack of cultural familiarity. This is not to say the Taliban are free from collateral damage. As of June 2007, the death toll for the period of 2006 and 2007 amounted to 6,000 people with over 1,500 civilian casualties, the bulk of which were attributed to suicide bombings and other insurgent activities. Nonetheless, friendly forces are held to the standards of international law and rules of engagement, while Taliban are known to carry out human rights violations. Additionally, the Talibans goal may not be to win hearts and minds for their own cause, but to ensure friendly forces are unable to gain the trust of the Afghan people. In this regard, knowing the nature and wrath of the aerial strikes, Taliban may intentionally be taking the fight into inhabited villages and residential dwellings. Running into a village after an encounter with the Coalition forces has become routine activity for many Taliban fighters, knowing that an aerial attack will most likely follow the incident. Sacrificing fighters may be a price worth paying for their political aspirations, compared to the damage inflicted on the friendly forces image. According to Nader Nadery, Vice President of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, the casualties are an easy propaganda tool for the Taliban to use in the affected areas. People feel under attack by both sides. This does not win hearts and minds. Perception Operation Enduring Freedom began with the aims of freeing the oppressed Afghan people from a ruthless Taliban regime, and to promote stability in order to disrupt the safe havens of Al Qaeda. In doing so, American policy makers promised safety, security, and an improved quality-of-life for the people. Seven years later, the situation is anything but ideal. More so than its inability to protect the people from Taliban atrocities, innocent deaths caused by the Coalition forces are beginning to turn away initial popular support. Many people no longer view Coalition forces as liberators, but as a military that makes indiscriminate decisionsin which people are acceptable losses. Compounding the issue are the meager compensations and the rare apologies to the affected families, if any. If not

15

reduced and mediated appropriately through tribal customs, these cultural violations can only complicate matters. As noted in the concept of badal, the honor of the entire family or clan is at stake. Without reconciliation from both sides, the only outlet for the insulted member(s) is to take revenge. The lack of reconciliation not only paints the Coalition as arrogant, but also feeds the perception of an occupationwhere people feel victim to the oppression and injustices of the invading force. Jihad and Madrassas Having perceived the Coalitions presence as an environment of oppression and injustice, the concept of jihad begins to surface in combination with badal, further aggravating public resentment. According to Islam, oppression and injustice are sufficient criteria to justify a Holy War against an invading non-Muslim force. Unfortunately, extremists advocate jihad at a lesser level than that declared by the state itself (Dar-ul-Harb). This is a consequence of the fact that Afghans view President Hamid Karzai as an extension of the West, similar to the historical events surrounding Shah Shuja and the first Anglo-Afghan war. The following Quranic verses highlight the basic criteria pertaining to armed struggle: Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress limits and slay them wherever ye catch them. And turn them out from where they have turned you out; for persecution is worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the sacred Mosque unless they first fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who reject faith. But if they cease, Allah is oftforgiving, Most Merciful. And fight them on until there is no more persecution. And the religion becomes Allahs. But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression. According to these verses, there are elements of forgiveness and rules of engagement for termination of an armed struggle. Whereas perception is reality, termination is dependent upon creation 16

In an effort to restore the Coalitions tarnished image, they must considerably reduce collateral damage, while instituting an effective propaganda campaign to win back the hearts and minds of the people. The current propaganda campaign lacks the depth required to change the resentment and perception of the people; it is not deeply rooted in concepts of Pashtun culture and Islam. Leaflets currently distributed throughout the region are often too simplistic, and lack the moral fiber in comparison to the Talibans propaganda campaigns (Figure 1). In the portrayed leaflet, the common theme is that of friendship between the Coalition forces and the people. However, with continued collateral damage, such themes may appear as a contradiction in the Coalitions efforts. Secondly, the honor and privacy of women (zan) are deeply-held values for the Pashtuns, concepts ignored by the current leaflets. To show Pashtun womens faces, coupled with a comparison to the unveiled Western women, is a degradation of nang. It is critical that future campaigns consider the culture and values of Figure 1. Coalition leaflet. the intended targets. (Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan) While the portrayed leaflet system. The type of education offered offers gestures of friendship, there in most of these schools centers on are numerous others that place their religion alone. Upon graduation from emphasis on monetary issues and wrath these centers, students become ripe of the Coalition military. They either for recruitment by the Taliban. When probing deeper into this phenomena, the offer rewards (pictures of US dollars) problem is large enough to sustain an for the capture of targeted individuals insurgency for years to come. Haqqani or show images such as an AC-130 madrassa (in Pakistans NWFP) alone [Spectre] gunship approaching to produces over 3,000 graduates each year, eliminate human targets. In view of the whose sole purposeabsent of other collateral damage caused by the aerial opportunitieswill be to fight jihad. strikes, it may be worthwhile to omit Regrettably this issue is not limited to the images which many may view as the FATA alone. According to a 2002 Human vehicles of indiscriminate death. As Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) seen throughout the Soviet occupation, report, there were an approximate 28,000 advanced technology did not deter the madrassas in Pakistan with only 8000 of resistance, instead the locals perceived it them registered. By March 2002, there as the tools of ruthless, brutal tactics. Whereas Coalition propaganda falls were around 600,000 students in 6000 registered madrassas. Compared to 4000 short on its emphasis on cultural and Taliban killed in 2006, even one percent religious elements, Taliban propaganda of the student population is ample to more than makes up for its reliance on local values. Taliban leaflets, known sustain the resistance in Afghanistan.

of an environment where the people no longer feel oppressed. Until such circumstances exist, the struggle remains a mandatory act upon all Muslims, hence attracting support from outside Afghanistan , be it in terms of financing or personnel who may wish to fulfill their religious obligation. After the context of jihad is established, madrassas [Islamic schools] often carry out the duties of rallying the youth for the religious cause. In the case of Afghanistan, the recruitment pool is abundant because of its proximity to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Due to influx of refugees from the 1980s Soviet invasion and the present conflict, thousands have settled in the FATA despite its broken socioeconomic conditions. Because of the poor quality-of-life, madrassas have become the primary mode of education

Information Warfare

Fall 2008

as Night Letters, (Figure 2) reveal the power and effectiveness gained from Pashtunwali, Islam, and collateral damage caused by the Coalition, as noted in the following translations: Pious Afghans, Brave and Courageous People! Accept our greetings; Dear Muslim and devout brother! As you all know some countries in the Islamic world and specifically our dear country-Afghanistan-are spending day and night under the grip of the crusaders in the last few years. During this time the cruel crusaders army and their domestic servants have committed grave atrocities, barbarity and savagery against our innocent brothers and sisters. Their cruelties have not ceased. You have watched and heard of their ongoing savagery in Afghanistan and Iraq, the two best examples that have been exposed by the international media Message to the Mujahed (freedom fighter) Afghan Nation! You have served Islam a great deal throughout history and have defeated the non-Muslims of the world. Your ancestors such as Ahmad Shah Abdaali, Mahmood Ghaznawi, Shahaabuddin Ghori and other heroes have recorded a great history in fight against non-Muslims, but it is a pity that today some of America-trained servants under the name of brightminded have destroyed the honored history of Afghanistan. Today once again your sons, clerics and Taliban and the faithful people, in these circumstances are fighting against non-Muslims and are serving Islam. If you dont do any thing else, at least support your Mujahed sons and do not be impressed by the false propaganda of non-Muslim enemies. God forbid one and half millions of martyrs of jihad (religious Islamic fight) against Russians and one hundred thousand of martyrs of Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan (martyr Taliban) will ask you for the cost of their martyrdom, so we hope that you meet our expectations. Theyre stopping the Islamic education and instead are teaching Christianity to your children. Taliban never want to kill common civilians, but unfortunately some so-called Afghans have become the supporters of our enemies. Non-

Muslims want to kill and pit Afghan against Afghan and in the name of Talib they are attacking everybody and they are killing Afghans and destroying your houses and they are destroying Islamic madrassas in Afghanistan. They burn their Afghan arms and ammunitions. They want to make Afghanistan as helpless as Palestine. You have seen that in all Madrassas (Islamic schools) nowadays they teach Christianity to your children. Once again, we request you not to support non-Muslims, otherwise you will have the whole responsibility here and hereafter. Notably, Taliban information campaigns revolve around perceptions and sentiments of those affected by Coalition actions. Not only are the Taliban campaigns more thorough, they also incorporate aspects of honor, history, and tradition to summon the support of the people. With the Soviet invasion not far from the memories of the Afghan people, they compare the atrocities of this conflict to the indiscriminate actions of the previous war, drawing parallels to undermine Coalitions efforts. Nonetheless, it is the Coalition who finds itself in a defensive stance, not only to counter the Taliban propaganda but to gain legitimacy from a populace that has begun to lose confidence in its efforts. In the end it is the people who will determine victory or defeat; Taliban seem to know this fact while the liberators often appear to overlook the power of such information. Modeling the Trends In the full research project which formed the basis of this article, the author used a computer simulation model, STELLA , to forecast general Taliban insurgency trends for the next 72 months. This model takes key factual data and couples it with speculations. Further, it links collateral damage to the Talibans ability to affect public opinion and recruit fighters via madrassa population. The model only takes into account factors pertaining to civilian deaths, Taliban propaganda, recruitment, and Coalitions kill rate. The following facts were used to formulate the simulation.

Figure 2. Taliban Night Letter propaganda leaflet. (CFC-Afghanistan) Coalition Kill Rate of 333 per month, based on 4,000 Taliban killed in 2006. Civilian Death Rate of 52 per month, based on 314 civilian killed in the first six months of 2007. Madrassa Population of 600,000 based on the 6,000 of 8,000 registered madrassas in Pakistan; additional 22,000 madrassas population remains unaccounted. Graduation Rate of 1 percent of 600,000 per year. Recruitment Rate of less than 6000 Students per year due to possible attrition (less than 1 percent of Madrassa Population). In 2001, Pakistans official figures report only one percent of madrassas sent their students for military training in Afghanistan. Positive Perception of Coalition Behavior determined to be an important factor in countering Taliban Propaganda Effectiveness. According to a BBC countrywide poll, the number of Afghans who believe that their country is headed in the right direction dropped a precipitous 22 percentage points between 2005 and 2006, from 77 percent to 55 percent, while the number of Afghans who approve of the US presence in their country eroded from 68 percent to 57 percent. Meanwhile, Afghan President Karzai has repeatedly urged NATO and the US military to act with greater restraint. 17

Findings The STELLA simulation, exclusive of other contributing factors, produced startling results as to the duration of the insurgency. Based on the current Coalitions Kill Rate and Taliban Recruitment Rate (stemming from the madrassas), the numbers favored the insurgency. Despite assuming the concept of revenge is more relevant for Pakistan than for the outside forces (Coalition) in Afghanistan, and assuming Taliban fighters to be at a low stock of 5,000, the stock was not reduced to half until a period of six years; 23,654 Taliban were killed in 72 months. The model also revealed another dilemma: while the Coalition needs tactical restraint to reduce collateral damage, it may also reduce the kill rate needed to reduce the number of fighters. In view of this, the only way to improve the Coalitions perception while curbing the insurgency is to interfere with Taliban recruitment. However, interfering with the recruitment pool requires nonkinetic solutions. There are no military solutions for reducing an enormous madrassa population in the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To accomplish the task of curbing the Taliban insurgency, solutions must appear in the broader Coalition policies and strategies towards Afghanistan. Applications The implications of these findings cannot be understated. With a renewed Coalition emphasis on reducing collateral damage, restraint and improved decisionmaking at the operational level are instrumental to offsetting the factors which promote and sustain recruitment. Without drastic improvements at the tactical level, the Coalitions kinetic methods will continue to produce innocent civilian casualties, thus playing into the hands of Taliban. Notably, improvements at the tactical level must not be limited to technology alone; they must extend down to the actual trigger-pullers. Whereas culture and language are the overlooked factors in understanding the enemy, we need better educated fighting men and women, as

well as those in the upper echelons of tactical decision making. It should be no surprise that Taliban guerilla tactics lure the Coalition forces into creating collateral damage, however, tactical level enhancements can provide increased situational awareness to soldiers and commanders as to possible consequences of a strike on a fleeing or hidden Taliban target. This added piece in the decision making process can provide dividends to the overall counterinsurgency strategy, especially since the military continues to desire the full effect of kinetic weapons to destroy the enemywhile limiting the likelihood of collateral damage. With regard to Information Operations campaigns, the efforts must incorporate culture, religion, and concerns of the locals. The amount of information, when compared to Taliban leaflets, pales in comparison to a typical Coalition leaflet. Additionally, the Coalition must take into account the unintended consequences stemming from overlooked details such as Pashtu language or tribal dominance in Afghanistan. Not only do such matters highlight the need for cultural expertsin the greater CENTCOM Area of Responsibility or in countrybut also the need to revamp current Coalition IO efforts to counter and compete with Taliban influence campaigns. Non-Kinetic Approach To Afghanistan While the previous focus was on collateral damage stemming from the military campaigns in Afghanistan, this section delineates an indirect approach to insurgency. More specifically, it addresses the turbulent Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan as catalysts to stabilizing Afghanistan. Since FATA serves as a critical component for the Taliban recruitment, it may be the center-of-gravity for stability in the entire region. Also, it is important to note that possible solutions or policies must coincide with a drastic reduction in collateral damage on both sides of the border. Without a reduction in collateral damage, any attempts to stabilize FATA may only result in costly failures and additional loss of life. In order to forge possible solutions for FATA, we must

explore its broken socio-economic and political systems. Fundamental problems plague the inhabitants and have lead to its current role as a haven for many extremists. Poor Quality-of-Life The 10,510 square mile FATA is home to over six million, along with significant number of refugees who have settled there since the onset of Soviet invasion in 1979. When probing deeper into FATA dynamics, one can conclude that extremism offers the only attractive outlet for many youth, who otherwise could not be gainfully employed elsewhere. Due to a large youth population and a broken education system, madrassas have become the only institutions of education, taking in children from ages five to their teens. From many parents points of view, madrassas offer a valuable service, since students are able to learn while receiving three meals a day, eliminating the parents burden in a region where poverty is abundant and job opportunities scarce. Unfortunately, since the 1980s most madrassas have taught a religious curriculum with no emphasis on modern, more applicable education. Attempts to modernize madrassa education and to incorporate females into the student populace has been challenging, often resulting in rocketing or bombing of a particular school. Graduating with a strict emphasis on Islam, the students are mentally prepared to take up arms, making them susceptible to Taliban explitation. The Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 notes around 20,000 children below eighteen were recruited by madrassas in Pakistan to fight in Afghanistan. The report quoted Pakistans official figures as saying only one percent of madrassas sent their students for military training in Afghanistan. This figure may have risen in the wake of growing insurgency in Afghanistan but even 20,000 is significant numbermore than sufficient to sustain Taliban recruitment efforts. Neglected infrastructure within the FATA is also a reflection of Pakistans broader domestic politics and policies. The area is stricken with lack of basic social services, resembling more an Fall 2008

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Afghan region than a territory of the call of extremist Islamist elements. estimated 3.5 to 5 million drug users in Pakistan. Adequate health and security Such occupations are driven out of Pakistan, in many ways creating the kind systems do not exist to maintain any necessity as well as consumer demand. of demand that attracts suppliers to areas quality-of-life. Naturally, the inhabitants Unemployment, in combination with west of the border. Drugs not only hinder find themselves sympathizing with their lack of security and education, make a Pakistani efforts to reform the area, but tribes and families further west, rather dangerous recipe for illegal activities. offer motives to keep the chaos alive than their country of residence. Lack Further, despite having repatriated over for survival of illegal industry. This of security also makes fertile grounds 2.5 million refugees, over one million indirectly contributes to the extremists, for the influence of local and foreign still remain in the area. Until the basic who may discover new alliances with the militants. Government officials who day-to-day issues are addressed, all drug smugglers by virtue of a common have spent time in the tribal areas say Coalition efforts towards the War on enemy. Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan has there may be as many as 1,000 foreign Terror may be rendered useless. Without a capable government and the revenue to militants there, but because many have restoring stability and basic human offer viable options in place of the drug intermarried and raised families, their necessities, it remains difficult at best to business; its a matter of acknowledging status as foreigners is somewhat blurred. win hearts and minds. the severity of the problem and then Such reasons lead many to believe Al addressing it with feasible options. Drugs Qaeda leadership may have blended Current Approach into lawless regions of the FATA. The The border areas between Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Area has and Afghanistan serve as critical routes In an effort to enforce its domestic 7,000 Khasadar (local police) for about for drug smugglers. The drug mafia policies, assist the Coalition forces, and four million people. These forces are network enjoys a multi-billion dollar reform the FATA system of governance, considered inadequate, although Pakistan has deployed over the North West Frontier Province 100,000 troops to the areas can also call on the services of the between Afghanistan and 17,000 members of the Frontier Pakistan. The task has proven Constabulary. [Editors Note: difficult, since the military has for further insight, see Policing met armed attacks from the local Pakistans Northwest Frontier, tribes. The bulk of the resistance Mr. Fasihuddin Interview, IO has materialized in the Waziristan Sphere, Spring 2008.] For area (the most volatile regions Pakistani forces to gain any in the FATA). Fierce clashes positive influence and credibility, coupled with suicide attacks the government must provide killed 250 people in the month of basic human services must in July 2007 alone. As of December order to give locals an incentive 2006, the Pakistani military had to oust the radical elements from lost over 750 troops while trying A Jirga council confronts tribal issues. (US Army) their society. For now, the FATA to hunt for terrorists. This raises is plagued with the kinds of industry, which disrupts the states the question: has this strategy produced issues practically unheard of from the ability to control and enforce laws any results in the quest to revive the perspective of a citizen in the West. As of in an already unstable area. Such Maliks [traditional leader, literally December 2006, 135 out of every 1,000 instability works in the favor of the drug king], or will a different method yield children under the age of five died early, smugglers by providing outlets for labs a better outcome? Many feel that the often due to chest infections, diarrhea, and clients. Analysts estimate over half current approach has further radicalized or other treatable ailments. For every of Afghanistans opium is smuggled the area, resulting in a scenario where 1,000 child births, six mothers die, often through Pakistan. And while we cannot the military is in constant confrontation because quality medical assistance was call the entire country of Pakistan a with the clerics, while the traditional unavailable. Clearly, there is much room narco state, the FATA and adjacent leaders and civil servants have become for progress in winning the support from North West Frontier Province (NWFP) even weaker. a region that gave birth to the Taliban can be labeled as such, given how The costly ordeal, bloodier than the and may be continuing to support its breakdown of law and order provides loss of American troops in Afghanistan, endeavors. critical value for the drug network. With suggests the present Pakistani policy Insurgency and terrorism are not the drugs making an already bad area non- will continue to encounter resistance only outlets in FATA. In the absence of conducive to Coalitions efforts to root from the locals. Even the 100,000 troops viable options to earn a living, the lure out radical forces, the War on Terror must in FATA have appeared inferior in the of illicit activities such as smuggling and have another and equal front: a War on locals eyes. According to Pajhwok drug trafficking is as difficult to resist as Drugs. In 2004 alone, there were an Afghan News (3 September 2007), the 19

ambush of a Pakistani military convoy in Waziristan resulted in the capture of over 300 security personnel, making it one the most embarrassing incidents thus far. This not only highlights the difficulty of conducting operations in the FATA, but shows the resilience of extremistswho have managed to capture the assets and weaponry of a formal army unit. Death of the Innocent We can also attribute the broader implications of the struggle in FATA to collateral damage. In an already alienated region, innocent civilian deaths have invoked jihad even against a Muslim state. The implications of citizens rising against their government may have far greater dangers, since theology has come in confrontation with secularism, thus dividing the Pakistani populace, while creating civil unrest in a country that enjoyed a fair amount of domestic peace prior to 9/11. Given this tension between the religious and secular forces, two radical ideals come into view. First is the religious groups quest to overtake and run the state, as was the case with Khomeinis Islamic revolution in Iran. Second, Syed Qutbs [Egyptian author, considered an Islamic extremist] philosophies surface amidst the struggle in Pakistan, in that use of force and jihad are sanctioned against ones own Muslim state. Combined, the two create a recipe for disaster for Pakistans long term stability. In view of these implications, kinetic means must halt in order to diffuse the two radical ideologies. The following excerpts from a 2004 propaganda video filmed in Waziristan, lend credibility to issues pertaining to collateral damage and jihad: Parvezs army, instead of removing their burnt vehicles and collecting the dead, brought more artillery. They used thousands of rounds against true Muslims and made thousands of innocent children cry, and made many holes in the beautiful mud houses. This ignited the Muslims of the area who rushed to the streets and attacked all military convoys who were entering the area, as a result of 20

which 8 big vehicles were burnt and tens of soldiers killed; others fled. Finally Parvezs army warned people of the area to abandon their houses or else be bombed. When these Muslims were taken out of their houses, they bombed all these convoys of departing people. Hey military soldiers, how did your dignity allow you to bomb Muslim houses? Who do you believe in? Almighty Allah, Bush, Blair, or Parvez? These are traitors who eliminated your history. You were those who people used to salute but now they fight you. Why? Think a little about what you are doing. Muslims of the world were proud of your power. People expected that you would free the Holy Land Jerusalem. They expected you

Dilemma of the Pakistani Army By all practical purposes, the Pakistani Army is in confrontation with religious extremists who view themselves as fighting jihad against the near enemy. Coupled with badal and Holy War, the resulting domestic instability creates unique challenges for the army and its role in a counterinsurgency. The Pakistani Army was not designed to fight internal insurgencies, but rather focus on outside threats such as its rival India. The events of 9/11 have not only brought a Muslim military in confrontation with its own citizens, but also tested the very capabilities and training of the Pakistani Army. According to Lieutenant General Mohammed Hamid Khan, President of Pakistans National Defense University and a former Combatant Commander for the Frontier Corps, the long term FATA policy must involve non-kinetic solutions; incidents of collateral damage and poor quality-of-life alone aggravate the anti-government sentiment there. Such acknowledgments, while giving credence to nonkinetic solutions, may also reveal rifts amongst commanders on the ground and broader government policies pertaining to the War on Terror and support of the Coalition. Continuing on the current kinetic path is likely to create further animosity towards the army and government of Pakistan. Repercussions of Kinetic Methods There seems to be an assumption that uniformity of kinetic strategy is needed to counter the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Further, ongoing debates within the US political arena assert that Pakistan has not dedicated sufficient resources and efforts to root out terrorism from the FATA. Thus, the West blames many failures in Afghanistan on the Pakistani military. However, when comparing the domestic issues of the two states, there is little room to employ the strategy in Afghanistan to the rugged areas of FATA. Additionally, we must compare

would protect the Holy Land (Mecca & Medina). You obtained atomic power to protect Muslims but now you kill Muslims in order to protect atomic bombs. You make a reverse history. What would historians write about you? As Islamic military or Crusader military? O Believers, do not make friendships with Jews and Christians. Amongst you some make friends with them and they will be counted as one of them. O killers of Muslims, come and repent for your actions. Allah is forgiving; otherwise He will destroy you, or you will be killed at the hands of Muslims and Almighty will send you to hell, a very bad place.

Fall 2008

the resulting instability, since kinetic means are likely to produce two different sets of consequences. From the Afghan perspective, outside forces (US and NATO) are engaged with an enemy that played a role in the events leading up to 9/11. From the Pakistani perspective, the government has revamped policies that once used the very populace it now must now face. The repercussions also differ due the immediacy of the problem. When badal and collateral damage are the underlying issues, the concept of revenge is more relevant for Pakistan than for Coalition outside forces in Afghanistan. Though an angry generation may be left in the wake of a future withdrawal from Afghanistan, should the conflict subside, US and NATO forces will enjoy the safety afforded by physical/geographic separation. On the other hand, Pakistan will be left to police an angry populace, which it must govern for the sake of domestic harmony. With suicide bombings on the rise and Pashtun nationalism more vocal than ever, the Pakistani military must carve its own strategyone that balances military objectives as well as their aftermath. Pressuring the Pakistani regime to employ tactics used by the US and NATO forces may jeopardize the legitimacy of this newly elected government. The Way Forward In light of the broken socio-economic systems, alienation of the Pashtuns, and extremism, Pakistan can no longer afford to keep FATA separated from mainstream politics and the national economy. Be it drug mafias or terrorists, their government has lost too much control due to history of the region and the trends in criminality. A separate system of governance is no longer feasible for FATA, as the Malik system too will keep the region alienated, just as it had before the rise of Mullahs. Two extreme forms of government are not conducive to the functions of any state. The FATA Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) may have been useful under the British, where a master-subject relationship existed, but the same cannot be true for a state trying to reform its populace and bring it into the mainstream society. The mere nature

of FCR stems from mass punishment of an entire tribe, possibly leading to further aggravation if enforced by the Pakistani government. Maintaining this outdated system of governance will only keep the classic ethnic stereotypes alive, specifically the Punjabi-Pashtun tensions that have lasted since the British and Ranjit Singhs rule over Punjab. A divided system will confirm the Punjabi domination of national politics and economy in the eyes of the Pashtuns. This same belief led to the East Pakistan revolts, the 1971 India-Pakistan War and the secession of Bangladesh (former West Pakistan). Besides, failures to absorb the Pashtuns into mainstream society, politics, and economy may also keep the concept of a separate Pashtunistan (a separate state carved out of the FATA areas) alivea prospect which the Pakistani government cannot afford to consider. Such an event would cripple the state, reducing it to half the territory it holds today. Modern Education Clearly many of the FATA problems stem from madrassas and heavy emphasis on religion. The lack of practical education has led to lowered prospects and opportunities for the overwhelming number of youth, in turn leading them to the luster of illegal activities. The literacy rates are also indicative of the overall social-ills of the region. Female literacy rates are especially alarming. Notably, there is a great disparity between the FATA literacy rates and the remainder of Pakistan. In addition to instituting modern education, government must also monitor and register the madrassas, to track their curriculums and agenda. Madrassas initially offered education in remote areas where government influence, resources, or transportation were unreachable. However, since 1979 the madrassas may have far exceeded the scope of necessity. There are approximately 28,000 madrassas in Pakistan, with only 8000 of them registered. The proliferation of madrassas began in the 1980s and continued in the 1990s. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

(HRCP) 2002 report, by March 2002, there were around 600,000 students in 6000 registered madrassas with more than 250,000 students in Punjab alone. Compare this to 1979, when there were less than 2000 of these schools. They are now seen and portrayed as fundamentalist institutions, and breeding grounds for militants to wage war all over the world. From being established centers of learning in the Middle-Ages, they have traveled a long way. Agriculture When dealing with issues related to opium, a successful war on drugs must be accompanied by agricultural developments. For now, the drug markets and smuggling may offer lucrative incentives for many with no other source of income. With only eight percent of land cultivated and three percent irrigated, additional cropland and irrigation are necessary before addressing the issue of drug enforcement. Taking away the illicit market without providing reasonable substitutes will only aggravate those entrenched in this occupation, be it for profit or basic livelihood. Though agricultural projects require time to institute various crops based on harvests and seasons, they are the best solutions for gradually reducing the opium market. Also, such projects will require tremendous monetary resources to erect the infrastructure needed to bring about a positive change. Some may argue that Pakistan does not have the financial resources or allocations to carry out such projects, due their reliance on US support during the War on Terrorism. However, research suggests otherwise. According to the US State Department, Pakistan has publicly expressed its support to Afghanistans President Karzai and has pledged $100 million toward Afghanistans reconstruction. Despite this generous offer, the large sum of money may best be spent on the broken and turbulent regions of the FATA. As evident through the various socio-economic systems and poor quality-of-life discussions, the FATA regions should be the most immediate concern for the Pakistani regime.

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Reconciliation None of these measures can be achieved without certain levels of diplomacy and cooperation from the FATA population. As seen through the Pakistani militarys experience, kinetic methods have only widened the gap between FATA and mainstream Pakistan. They have also led to domestic instability for the country, creating challenges associated with fighting an internal insurgency, a mission which the Pakistani forces were not designed to fight. To reduce future instability, the Pakistani Government must pursue reconciliation efforts. As noted previously, damage caused by the Pakistani forces must be addressed through tribal code of Pashtunwali. This may include forming alliances with moderate elders in the tribes, or payments of blood money to the families of collateral damage victims. Pakistani forces are also guilty of collateral damage. Like the Taliban organization, resistance forces in FATA are not monolithic, and may be susceptible to agreements for the broader good of the region and country. An entire society or region must not stay isolated from the remainder of the state based on the actions of radical element within them. Winning the trust of the locals may prove to be the best aid in ousting extremism from FATA. Summary The FATA are the pivotal factor in curbing the Taliban insurgency, not only in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan. Over time, the neglected regions have become ripe for the intrusions of outside actors, serving as conduits for illegal activities and terrorism. The effects of alienation, and the subsequent induction of radical religion, transformed FATA into a recruitment pool for extremism. The cross-border incursions continue to disrupt the security of Afghanistan, since collateral damage from military strikes allows the Taliban propaganda to flourish among the youth and non-gainfully employed populace of the FATA. This article identifies broken systems which can be repaired, to increase the quality-of-life and offer alternatives to the thousands of youth who may otherwise become targets of the Taliban 22

recruitment. By nationalizing the FATA region and offering socio-economic opportunities, the Pakistani government may win the favor of the locals. Since the military strategy has done more harm than good, mirroring the Coalitions failures to the west, the real solution may be imbedded in reconciliation with the moderate forces, plus bringing the region into modernity similar to the mainstream Pakistan. Only state authority can transform the region. Otherwise the FATA will continue to be a volatile point of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Not only do the Taliban trace their origins to FATA, they have supporters within these lawless regions; Coalition forces cannot cross into this area due to sovereignty factors. Saving FATA will most certainly pay dividends to the security in Afghanistan. We must grant the conditions for change by dramatically reducing collateral damage, to hinder the credibility and recruitment campaigns of the Taliban on both sides of the border. By studying the culture of the Pashtuns, we find current Coalition military tactics have done more harm than good. Contrary to the Coalitions premise, technological superiority and mass didnt prove useful in the face of tribal customs.

Finally, the issue of collateral damage provides the fuel for many Taliban propaganda campaigns, worsening anti-Western sentiment. The deaths of innocent civilians have led to mistrust of the Coalition while creating a perception of oppression and injustice, key requirements for invoking badal and jihad. The concept of revenge, coupled with Holy War, has been the underlying theme behind the loss of hearts and minds campaign in Afghanistan. Simply put, neglect of Pashtun tribal customs has compounded the insurgency. Additionally, the peoples role as the key center-of-gravity has been ignored, further damaging the Coalitions image and hindering our objectives for stabilizing and securing Afghanistan. To ensure a lasting success, the Coalition must explore the political and social aspects of winning the hearts and minds of a populace it claims to have liberated from the clutches of the Taliban. Being the primary front in the War on Terrorism, a defeat in Afghanistan or Pakistan may not only compromise the security of South Asia but it may have deadly consequences for the broader international communitypossibly encouraging the terrorists cause and confidence.

Fall 2008

Employ Chaplains as an IO Asset in the War on Terror

By Christopher Ieva, Major, USMC Editorial Abstract: Major Ieva examines the challenges of leveraging religion as an element of national power. He argues that alignment of military chaplains faith with appropriate influence audiences can serve as a viable technique for US Forces, particularly in current campaigns against religious extremism. Wars and conflicts in the 21st century are increasingly of promoting religious freedom as a core objective of US non-conventional and ideologically motivated. Religion plays foreign policy, it falls short of its potential. By the same token, a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many people and the United States has been extremely cognizant of preventing has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure a global perception in the information domain that the WOT of society. In some cases, religious self understanding may represents a war against Islam. While both approaches to the play a determinative or regulating role on policy, strategy, issue of religion are viable, they represent a form of sufficing. or tactics -- (Joint Publication 1-05, Religious Support in This is analogous to a boxer climbing into the ring and waiting Joint Operations) for the round to end to prevent a knockout punch. It is not a he US militarys approach to managing the element bad technique if one is ahead, but a terrible technique if one is of religion in the War on Terror is characterized by a behind. As a remedy to our nations deficiency in leveraging largely purely secular and risk-averse mindset. Despite a religion as an element of national power, we require an high empirical correlation between the Islamic faith and the interagency solution to promote the global religious objectives critical WOT IO audiences, overall the military has failed and associated means, as shown in Table 1. to tackle the religious aspect of the war. From a grand The shift from a defensive to an offensive position on the strategy perspective, the ethnocentric issue of religion places the enemy on omission of religion as one of the the horns of a dilemma. Currently, customary elements of national terrorists can strategically exploit power (Diplomatic, Informational, the overt gap in US national power Military, and Economic) illustrates regarding religion. If religion is a flaw at the strategic level of war. implemented as part of the US grand Reducing the issue from the state to strategy, the enemys blind attacks the individual level, the American must cease, because the terrorists infusion of a strong legal and would be forced to compare their normative sense as to the separation actions to those of the US As it of church and state limits an intuitive is easier to be deconstructive than structural understanding of the power constructive, extremists would then Commanders and their staffs may also of religion. To compensate the have to deliver on their promises consider religion, other cultural issues, stated theoretical and organizational instead of supporting their conduct and ideology while developing schemes weaknesses, military chaplains through false claims about future provide a feasible and suitable soft of maneuver and rules of engagement prospects. While the American form (Defense Link) IO foil by marginalizing the enemys of religious freedom, promotion, ability to dominate the religious practiceor even non-practicemay aspect of national power, across all levels of war. not be a perfect match from the lesser of two evils perspective, The omission of religion as a stand-alone element of the US stance is the better choice. national power serves as an extension of our ethnocentric The US Constitution codifies the nations view of religious perspective of religion and the state. Unfortunately, the freedom as a vital component of American democracy. It omission ultimately weakens our national security strategy. requires the state to both protect religious freedom and If we define grand strategy as developing, applying, and maintain a wall of separation between itself and the church. coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve While continued social and legal arguments over the role objectives that contribute to national security, then the absence of church and state cloud the exact nature of the separation, of religion could disrupt the linkage between instruments and average Americans possess a workable understanding of the objectives. By not treating religion as an element of national states role regarding religion. While not unique, the American power, the military relinquishes a global reality whereby the understanding of the relationship between church and state enemy gains an asymmetric advantage. The commonly used does not always align well with the role of religion in the DIME acronym requires an expansion to include Religion, WOT. This contest is not conducted in isolation, but rather Intelligence, Finance and Law Enforcement (DIME-RIFL) is carried out under the sensitive eyes of global neutral and to produce a harmonious integration of national power. friendly audiences. Even though the Department of State, through the Office of The totality of the friendly reaction to an enemy who International Religious Freedom and possibly the Office of uses religion as an element of power produces an extremely Strategic Communications and Planning, possesses the mission risk-averse decision-making mindset. Instead of focusing on

Fall 2008

alignment of chaplain faith with influence audience serves as a viable technique. Educate the Islamic friendly, neutral Arrange faith-based tours of the During the Vietnam War, the residual and hostile audiences regarding Americas United States. Focus on American Islamic French Catholic influence in Indochina vast Middle Eastern, Arabic and Islamic communities, but ensure the trip includes all population. faiths as well as those Americans who chose inadvertantly enabled Navy Catholic chaplains operating with Marine units near not to believe. the urban areas of Saigon to connect with Marginalize hostile manipulation Provide voice to Muslim religious figures and sanctification of violence based upon who oppose many fatwas that sanctify the the local populace. The early successes of the Marine Corps Combined Action principles through the use of religion. killing of innocents. Through religion, challenge neutral and Platoon (CAP) were supported by the chaplains ability to influence the local hostile religious propaganda. hamlet or village population while still Table 1. supporting the isolated Marines and sailors. ways to make use of the great tenets of Islam, many commonly Additionally, the chaplains were able to tie perceive this as simply not angering the worst elements of into the pre-existing Catholic humanitarian structure to help the religions practice. This approach may work for a tourist, members of the influence audience, while self-enabling the host but not for a nation at war. In order to win the informational nation. Just as the former Chief of Naval Operations [current battle, the US military must step outside its comfort zone and Joint Chiefs Chairman], Admiral Mike Mullen, promoted his integrate religious factors into the WOT. Consider Colonel concept of a thousand-ship navy through partnerships with John Boyds near-complete depictions of his theorized foreign navies, Muslim chaplains could connect with the vast Observe-Orient-Decide-Act cycle, or OODA loop. In order to number of Islamic-oriented non-governmental organizations win, one must operate inside the enemys OODA loop. This and charities. A Muslim chaplain would have unique access to feat can be theoretically accomplished in two ways: tighten the populace, and thus add value to non-lethal IO operations. the friendly loop or loosen the enemys loop. Presently, the Additionally, his mere presence would challenge false charges enemys loop uses implicit guidance & control to quickly regarding Islam and America. The United States, with its unique move through the orient and decide stages, producing fast paced level of diversity, has a resource pool of Islamic Americans who action. Due to friendly consistency on the issue of religion, the could be recruited to help bridge the information gap regarding hostile observe and orient stages have become operationally religion in America. predictable, enabling the enemy to conduct what Boyd labels This concept is not only the best, but perhaps one of the as fast transient maneuvers. This creates a tight OODA loop. only viable methods to win hearts and minds in the Middle East. Operational IO focused on disrupting or delaying the enemys A fleeting opportunity exists, while preserving the chaplains observe and orient stage would loosen the loop, while at the non-combatant status, to expand upon the excellent foundation same time tighten our ownthus creating favorable conditions established by our Chaplain Corps. Explicit employment of for victory. the military chaplains would provide the US with an immense At the tactical level, the enemy aggressively manipulates IO asset in the conduct of the War on Terror. With this nations the Islamic faith to recruit, rally and support forces of instability proven history of both defending and promoting religious and violence. The US Militarys Chaplain Corps provides freedom, the US should not concede religion to the enemy as a legal and doctrinal method to support effective IO. The a free arena in which to operate. precedent is captured in Joint Pub 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations: Commanders and their staffs may also consider religion, other cultural issues, and ideology while developing schemes of maneuver and rules of engagement or planning civil-military operations, psychological operations, information operations, and public affairs (PA) activities. This is not a new or even original concept. Since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the US Chaplain Corps have performed extremely well, both in their traditional role of spiritually nourishing the living, tending to the wounded and honoring the dead, and in favorably influencing the overall mission. The humanitarian foundations and calling of the chaplain corps members have led to a substantial level of individual initiatives to perform good acts. The deliberate recruitment of Muslim chaplains should become a priority based on the religious nature of the WOT. Understanding the internal dynamic of balancing an individual chaplains faith with his or her role as a command spiritual adviser, the Objectives Means 7

Red Teaming in EM Space

By Richard P. Johanning and Jason C. Winn Editorial Abstract: The authors examine the limitations of the electromagnetic training environment, including procedural and technical complexities. They present enhancements to the Joint IO Range as a current, realistic working solution.

arine Corps Reference Publication 3-01A , Rifle Marksmanship, states the following regarding fundamentals of marksmanship: For rifle fire to be effective, it must be accurate. A rifleman who merely sprays shots in the vicinity of the enemy produces little effect. These skills must be developed so that they are applied instinctively. During combat, the fundamentals of marksmanship must be applied in a limited time frame which corresponds to the size and the distance of the target. It is no different with the nonkinetic fires of electronic warfare (EW) and computer network attack (CNA), as stated in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, these skills must be developed so that they are applied instinctively. JP 3-0 also states The fires function encompasses targeting, joint fire support, counter-air, interdiction, strategic attack, electronic attack (EA), and computer network attack (CNA), so training the force to deliver those fires effectively and accurately should be common practice. Unfortunately, robust EW (specifically EA) and CNO (specifically CNA) integration and training efforts are woefully absent from the majority of Joint exercises. To many leaders, EW and CNO efforts are filled with the apparently eye-glazing techno mumbo jumbo that puts a majority of them (at every level) to sleep. Alas, we can no longer tolerate this reality. The Congressional EW Working Group points out, Dominance in EW is essential for America to maintain its military superiority. EW provides access to the battlespace, degrades our enemys capability to attack, and, most importantly, saves lives. It is time to

realize we need more tangible, relevant Red Teamsor Opposition Forces (OPFOR)to provide a legitimate electromagnetic environment (EME) that is representative of the enemy target set. Concurrently, we must abolish the bureaucratic barriers and status quo mindset that often manifests themselves in limited frequency clearances, specialized programs, and range space restrictions.

this is that our ground forces lack comprehensive EW training, which enables our forces to effectively operate in the domainthe electromagnetic spectrum. (Congressional EW Working Group, April 2007) Complexity Decision makers seem unable to understand how emerging technology influences the battle space, which results in our constant reactive response to enemy tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), such as cell phone detonators and 802.11 [wireless network standards] trigger devices. It is often impossible to get permission to operate and train against many EW/CNO targets, the majority of which are commercial off-the-shelf technology (COTS). Alternatively, if we had the proactive foresight to evaluate and train against new technologies, our forces would be better prepared. Unwarranted fear of attribution and lack of support for legitimate EW/CNO training requirements also contribute to the problem. Here are some common examples: - The US Federal Communications Commission bans high-powered cordless phone (HPCP)/long range cordless telephone (LRCT) transmissions, yet they represent a significant portion of enemy C2 and IED infrastructure. - Cellular is a public domain and we are all aware of US Signal Intelligence Directive 18 rules and regulations. Nevertheless, cellular technology represents a large portion of enemy C2 and IED infrastructures. -Wi-Fi is also a public domain and, like HPCP and cellular, it is a viable and thriving enemy battlespace. These are not fantastic or ethereal 23

...cellular technology represents a large portion of enemy C2... (US Army) Training Why is it so difficult to incorporate focused training efforts into Joint exercises that are designed to force integration, synchronization and the ability to train like we fight? The simple answer is twofold; EW and CNO seem both complex and difficult to execute. The byproduct is that we are not fighting like we train because we are not training in a realistic EME. Therefore, we are not winning. Over the last several years, Congress and the Department of Defense have poured huge amounts of money into force protection and counter-IED equipment, but we are still fighting an uphill battle. A main reason for

advanced technological concepts they are real targets. Everyday we are operating and fighting in arenas influenced by these targets, yet we do not adequately train the force to engage them, operate near them or mitigate EM interference around them. Difficulties in Execution There are few EW ranges that appropriately depict what US forces will encounter in combat. The overwhelming majority of test and training ranges have significant limitations on what they can emulate and propagate for training versus EW/CNO targets. More often than not, antiquated frequency policies and red tape dictate what can and cannot be transmitted. Moreover, even if the range space and frequency clearances are available, the active and relevant targets are not. Not nearly enough tangible, relevant Red Teams exist to provide a legitimate, robust enemy EME. In many cases, frequency clearances are denied because of potential civilian infrastructure interference. These same concerns exist when we go to war, and should not limit or mitigate our training objectives and focus of effort. In combat, inevitable coordination/synchronization challenges are inherent to accurate delivery of non-kinetic fires, yet we do not provide our warfighters the ability to solve those problems, execute efficiently and deliver fires accurately because they cannot train to that standard. Returning to the aforementioned rifle analogy, figuratively speaking we provide our non-kinetic players with a rifle but no ammunition, inadequate targeting information, and a range that is open for 15 minutes every other Tuesday. We then expect them to effectively deploy to combat zones highly trained with good sight alignment, trigger control, target discrimination, tight groupings and no fratricidea preposterous requirement. Limited EW/CNO focus by the Services, and an inability or unwillingness to interconnect capabilities precludes the existence

of coordinated training environments. The Congressional EW Working Group identified the same shortfalls in April 2007: Its not only important for each Service to provide EW training, but each Service must be able to integrate its EW capabilities synergistically in a joint environment. In other words, its not just about combining capabilities and operating effectively with each other. Its about operating together to produce a effect greater than any individual Service can produce, or simply the sum of Service EW capabilities. Solutions To address DOD-wide, Joint EW/ CNO training and synergy issues, enter the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) IO Range (IOR). The JIOWC Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC)/JFCOM IOR initiative seeks to interconnect all test and training facilities (particularly the Joint Combat Training Centers) to create a live, virtual target country EME construct. The IOR will present emergent adversarial technologies, and will enhance EME training, TTP validation and training cost-efficiency. This makes it a potentially significant

force multiplier, allowing intelligence and operations personnel and equipment to train like they fight. The IOR defines the play area in the information environment, also allowing planners to evaluate the potential for unintended effects throughout executionas defined in Joint Pub 3-13. To address target set issues, JIOWC, specifically the JEWC, provides robust, relevant adversary target sets, operational and technical expertise, and is incorporating ground, air, sea, and cyber EW capabilities. This provides the much-needed realistic EME in which to train. Examples of target sets include GSM cellular, 802.11 wireless, General Mobile Radio Service, Extreme Radio Service and various digital VHF and UHF push-to-talk systems. As we move forward to resolve these EW and CNO training initiatives, the JEWC will continue to integrate current and emerging Joint EW effects for worldwide military operations by providing adaptive operational and strategic solutions. This fosters the coherent evolution of long-term electromagnetic capabilities, in order to ensure Global Spectrum Control across the range of military operations.

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Editorial
by Regina G. Walker, Executive Editor Thank you to the Directorate of Force Development for a warm welcome into this new role. As Deputy, and now Director, Ive had the privilege to become immersed in many issues affecting our Joint IO community. In serving this broad group of professionals in an executive role, Ive gained even greater appreciation for the sheer scope of our mission. Among our primary duties is helping to define career paths for military and government IO practitioners. This is one of many jobs, in addition to being the home of this journal, which keeps our team fully engaged with the greater strategic communication (SC) and information operations worlds. One of the most notable challenges we encounter is scoping the sheer breadth of knowledge IO professionals require. We group a number of core capabilities into a doctrinally common place, yet recognize its very difficult to harness experience and expertise in a single placevirtual or actual. Thus, were keenly aware of the need to balance depth of specialization with breadth of general expertise. I spent part of my career as an information technology professional, exploring complex systems, and helping develop a variety of applications and tools. Yet every team Ive led knows my philosophy: we must constantly emphasize the need for balance between software and wetware; builders are only useful when their product fully serves the end user. Several branches of computer science such as artificial intelligence and visualization show great promise to assist IO/SC planners and analysts. So while we often enjoy spirited debates about the intricate differences between humans and machines, their respective needs will always be different, and ultimately the tools still serve the people. In our role as force developers, people buildingtraining and education of our military and civilian personnelwill always be top priority. There are many ways to share and expand professional knowledge and were committed to providing you with the latest and most interesting examples. Our publication is here to express the broadest range of IO topics and interests, and I look forward to hearing your ideas on how we can best serve you. RGW Regina Walker serves as Director of Force Development, JIOWC/J7. She has been with the command since 1999, previously serving as Chief, Planning Support Initiatives Division. Ms Walker led project management and software development teams for the 690th Information Operations Group at Lackland Air Force Base and worked at the Misawa Cryptologic Operations Center, Japan. She holds a BS from the University of Texas at San Antonio and a Masters from St. Marys University. She is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and holds a Chief Information Officer Certification from the National Defense University. She is also a member of the Park University Adjunct Faculty.

Finding Focus

by Craig L. Prichard, Major, USAF While non-kinetic targeting is well understood to those involved in IO, the benefits of this approach to warfare must extend beyond contemporary operators if it hopes to achieve legitimate status as a core military competency. Those involved primarily in kinetic activities will undoubtedly find little utility in exploring second and third order effects, as long as mission objectives focus on physical destruction and tangible BDA. The challenge to those services that have not committed to an actual IO career force is to propagate the fundamental utility of IO, and recognize areas for application outside normal constructs. A three year tour in a command that concentrates on providing non-kinetic options to COCOMs is insufficient to gain a full appreciation for the nuances this sort of warfare demands. This is even more exaggerated when transiting between assignments, where feedback from specific actions is immediate and transparent. A key link in bringing a holistic approach to tactical operations is the intelligence personnel who are admirably tasked with spanning both worlds on a daily basis. Those with exposure to IO must be adept at translating effects to those audiences where discussions beyond physical destruction and collateral damage are foreign subjects. On a plate already filled with estimates, priority requirements, and nodal analysis, bringing IO outside the bubble requires an aptitude in another capability frequently associated with information operations: strategic communication. Regardless of ones respective views on how SC fits into the overall context of operations, there is a concerted effort throughout DOD to improve efficiency and effectiveness of overarching themes and messages. This endeavor must be mirrored in the intelligence community to provide transmission experts capable of speaking to external audiences, or spectators raised on lethal approaches to warfare. The other vital networks necessary in the proliferation of IOs inherent potency are the transients. Once removed from an environment where influence and perception management are part of the vernacular, it becomes increasingly difficult to articulate the value of non-lethal actions. Suggesting that a new Ensign in a Prowler squadron receive indoctrination on the five core capabilities outlined in JP 3-13, is both unrealistic and unreasonable. Yet with a cursory knowledge of OPSEC and EW, he/she has at least a couple pieces of the puzzle. An Air Tasking Order or target folder no longer represents a simplified version of the commanders intent, just as BDA is not a singularly inclusive measure of effectiveness. There are takeaways from every tour of duty, and as I head back to the USAF aviation community, I intend to broaden IOs exposure to a diverse, yet distinctive congregation. Armed with a modicum of fluency in SC, PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO, I feel well equipped to teach future generations of pilots and navigators that a show of force does more than disperse enemy personneland a JDAM drop leaves more than just a large crater in its wake. -- CLP (Maj Prichard served JIOWC/J7 as Chief of the Training and Advocacy Divisions) 5

Carrying IO Outside the Bubble

The War of Ideas: The Unheard Voice

By Roy Schmadeka Editorial Abstract: The author contends the current US information strategy is flawed at the conceptual level. Whereas promotion of the US values continues to be an important foreign policy cornerstone, it adequately addresses neither the current terrorist threat nor the strategic communication objective of diminishing support for violent extremists. He offers realistic, complementary programs as a new strategy to decrease support for violent extremism. [Editors note: Written in early 2008, this article explores the the importance of applied Information Operations as a critical aspect of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. Notably, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, James Glassman the US Government lead in the War of Ideasechoed the same themes six months later, in June 2008.] any have proclaimed the War of Ideas to be of paramount importance in Americas prosecution of the War on Terror. This general concept has been further developed to state the center of gravity for war and terror are the populations that can provide sanctuaries, safe havens and/or recruitment for terrorists. In this war, the object has been to influence targeted populations to accept the US idea over that of extremism. To this end, great efforts are being made on many fronts to promote (or salvage) the US image in the Muslim world, with the goal of reversing anti-American sentiment and garnering widespread Muslim support. Proponents of this Public Diplomacy strategy contend these actions will counteract anti-US propaganda, thereby severely hampering popular support for extremism. This strategy, while appearing to be theoretically sound, is flawed at the conceptual level. Whereas bolstering the US image is a necessary and worthwhile endeavor, it should notindeed, cannot be the primary strategy to erode popular support for extremism. This War of Ideas is not a battle to win support for America. This is not freedom and democracy on one side, and Islamofascism on the other. Neither is this a choose America or choose Al Qaeda scenario. It must be dispassionately viewed as a battle to defeat religious extremism, with the primary objective of wholesale, popular rejection of violent totalitarian within Islam itself: the Mainstream Voice, composed of Muslimsboth Sunni and Shiitewhose moderate ideology is so at odds with that of violent Wahhabism. The US can assist and enable the Mainstream Voice, expand its reach globally, and magnify its effectiveness. Only in this fashion can the US erode acceptance of the hatefilled extremist rhetoric ubiquitous in the global media. Not the Cold War The strategy of promoting American freedom and democracy during the Cold War, as a direct counter to Soviet-led Communism, was a hugely successful endeavor. Cold War historian and author John Lewis Gaddis writes, Promoting democracy became the most visible way that the Americans and their Western European allies could differentiate themselves from their Marxist-Leninist rivals. America is no longer fighting the Cold War. The enemy is not Communism, but religious extremism. The enemy is neither a superpower nor even a nation-state. Given these dichotomies between the Cold War and the current War of Ideas, it should be obvious that a different strategy is necessary. The Problem The greatest challenges to the current Public Diplomacy strategy are twofold: 1. The High Ground. During the Cold War, a large portion of the world saw America as the good guy. More recently, this image has suffered a major setbacka development that has vastly diminished the credibility

Enabling the Mainstream Voice. (Defense Link) ideologythe Wahhabist view of Islam currently promulgated by Al Qaeda. Viewed in this fashion, this war should be fought not by making the US idea (i.e. freedom, democracy,opportunity) look more attractive, but by concentrating efforts on diminishing the widespread appeal and acceptance of extremism. The US can attain this objective objective, but only by shifting its informational focus toward Muslim audiences from promoting America and its values, to that of invalidating violent Wahhabist ideology. The most effective counter to Islamic extremism is found

Fall 2008

The ruling to kill the Americans and their alliescivilians and militaryis an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the alAqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. -Usama Bin Laden, World Islamic Front, February 23, 1998 of its messages... and messengers. Susceptibility to US influence efforts, especially within Muslim audiences, is at a very low ebb. A 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey showed the overall US image remains abysmal in predominantly Muslim countries. Information released by the US is viewed as self-serving manipulation, and those government or organizational entities that cooperate with them are seen as American puppets or Zionist collaborators within much of the Muslim world. This view existed well prior to the 9/11 attacks, but has been intensified by the invasion of Iraq and other atrocities against Muslims that Al Qaeda so effectively uses to further their cry against Muslim victimization. As will be seen later in this article, this view is not a randomly developed phenomenon. 2. Weaponized Media. Al Qaeda is well versed at using and manipulating the media to serve their purposes, whereas America generally performs at a level that can only be viewed as well below average. For example, the recent Al Qaeda invitation for international journalists to pose interview questions to Ayman al-Zawahiri is seen as an AQ strategy to reach a broader audience, and represents al-Zawahiris attempt to present himself as a sophisticated leader rather than a mass murderer. This singular act may well elevate al-Zawahiri, in the minds of many, to the same level of political viability as any leader on the world stage. Added to their rapid-reacting, far-ranging and complementary use of mass media (especially the Internet) to promulgate

extremist messages, this veneer of political respectability may dramatically increase the effects of AQ propaganda efforts. Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, formerly of RAND Corporation and currently a graduate instructor at Georgetown University, states ... their media capability is as sophisticated as ever. It shows how this group with 7th century ideology is exploiting 21st century media capabilities. Compare this to the well-intentioned but stumbling efforts of the US, who cannot even agree upon a lasting definition, much less a workable solution, for a national-level strategic communication policy. Us or Them President Bush, in a 2001 news conference, stated Youre either with us or against us in the fight against terror. Although this comment was directed to actual and potential national allies, many among the general Muslim populace have taken this to mean, if you are not with America, then you are with Americas enemiesin this case, Al Qaeda. Extremists, never slow to attack a potential opening, have fostered this sentiment among regions with historical or growing anti-American views. South and Southeast Asia, in particular, are home to strong feelings of anti-Americanism. P. W. Singer of the Brookings Institution summarizes the 2006 Pew Forum study that went to nine countries and surveyed Muslim

youth attitudes, drawing from more than 2,000 interviews: Whether it was in Turkey or Indonesia, the study found a consensus about how youth in the Muslim world our key target audience in this war of ideasthink America regards them and their faith. As one student researcher described of the interview results, They think Americans just dont care and think all Muslims are evil or terrorists. They say, We get your media and see how you view Islam. Added another, Wherever the group traveled, Fox News was on, and youd see Ann Coulter calling people ragheads over and over, or Glenn Beck on CNN. Add to this unfavorable opinions about US policies with regards to Palestine, Iraq, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and its no mystery why so many in the Muslim world view America in a negative light... they believe America has actually declared war upon Islam. President Bushs unfortunate use of the term crusade early on fostered this belief enormously. The Enemy The quote from UBL (above left) unequivocally states Al Qaedas position, and has been taken up as a clarioncall by extremists worldwide. Many extremists also draw their guidance from a treatise titled The Management of Savageryauthored by Abu Bakr Naji, a well respected strategistwhich gives

Whose messages best reach the ears of the Muslim world? (US Air Force)

explicit detail into how to destabilize apostate regimes (secular Muslim governments supported by the US) and take the fight directly to America. Further, this treatise offers two main goals with specific regards to fomenting anti-Americanism: 1) Destroy a large part of the respect for America and spread confidence in the souls of Muslims, through fighting America directly. 2) Replace the human casualties sustained... that will probably come for two reasons; 1) Being dazzled by the operations undertaken in opposition to America; and 2) Anger over the obvious, direct American interference in the Islamic World, such that the anger compounds the previous anger against Americas support for the Zionist entity. A large portion of the extremist strategy hinges upon rampant antiAmericanism. By focusing solely upon bolstering the American image worldwide, the US is fighting this war the way Al Qaeda wishes. The Mainstream Voice King Abdullahs quote (above right) is representative of theview espoused by the vast majority of Muslims worldwide, be they Sunni or Shiite. The problem is this type of statement receives limited exposure in either Western or Muslim media, so gains minimal traction with either audience. Compare this to the daily media barrage whenever Bin Laden or al-Zawahiri so much as write a note or release a radio statement. King Abdullahs quote also brings up a significant point: the vitriolic hatred directed against America has spawned its own backlash against Islam in general, by many Americans. Even those among the US political and military leadership have called Islam a religion of evil and stated the enemy is Islam. This American rhetoric airs in every corner of the Muslim world, with predictable results. The mainstream voice also has neither contagion nor Stickiness Factor, two concepts Malcolm Gladwell introduced in his book The Tipping

Our religion calls us to live and work for justice and to promote tolerance. Daily, we share Gods blessing: Salaam Aleikum Peace be upon you. This is the true voice of Islam, but it is not the voice that Americans always hear. Instead, they hear the hatred spewed by groups mistakenly called Islamic fundamentalists. In fact, there is nothing fundamentally Islamic about these extremists. They are religious totalitarians, in a long line of extremists of various faiths who seek power by intimidation, violence and thuggery. -His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan Point: We tend to spend a lot of time thinking about how to make messages more contagioushow to reach as many people as possible with our products or ideas. But the hard part about communication is often how to make sure a message doesnt go in one ear and out theother. Stickiness means that a message makes an impact. This is the focus area we must address, as it represents the most effective means with which to defeat extremism... by garnering widespread support for mainstream Muslim views, and active rejection ofextremist ideology. Winning support for the US is a tertiary goal in this endeavor. America has the capability to expand the reach of mainstream voices, and enable the contagion that Gladwell mentions. Further, if the US selects the correct voices (key communicators), and they are properly presented, stickiness is sure to follow. The Oblique Approach The UNESCO quote (opposite page) captures the essence of this approach to the War of Ideas. We must influence worldwide audiences in the proper way, to promote peace and non-violence. What is needed in this War of Ideas is a method to remove the entrenched perception that Muslim populations must choose between religious extremism

(Al Qaeda) and the United States of America. Many recent studies and polls show support for the US has appreciably waned within the Muslim world. By equating rejection of extremism with love for America, the US is fighting an uphill battle. Wahhabist extremism is very much a minority faction within Islamthe vast majority, whether secularists or fundamentalists, do not espouse violence to further political agendas. Imam Hamza Yusuf, perhaps the leading US-based Islamic scholar, summarizes the mainstream view: We are living through a reformation, but without any theologians to guide us through it. Islam has been hijacked by a discourse of anger and a rhetoric of rage. Thomas Friedman goes so far as to state Were not fighting to eradicate terrorism. Terrorism is just a tool. Were fighting to defeat an ideology: religious totalitarianism. He further mentions that informational effortsfrom within the Muslim communitymust be the key focus, with schools and mosques at the forefront of any battle. This then, should be the focus of US informational efforts, whether executed unilaterally or through Muslim partners: reject extremism and the use of violence to effect change because you do not agree with violent extremist totalitarianism. J. Michael Waller, in his work Fighting the War of Ideas Like A Real War, promotes the concept of branding terrorism for the criminal and unacceptable violence it is. He states The US should start with a message that its audiences are most likely to acceptreadily: the evil nature of the enemy. Identifying and selecting material for this task is not difficult. The following definition of Wahhabism is representative of the mainstream view of this extremist ideology: Wa h h a b i s m i s a f i e r c e l y fundamentalist form of orthodox Sunni Islam. After a brief examination of its tenets it is clear that it is one of division, domination and hate. This radically fundamentalist dogma is fanatically bigoted, xenophobic and lends itself to serve as the catalyst for

10

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much of the Islamofascist aggression populous Muslim nationand Malaysia personalities. Other communicators being perpetrated around the world. It show that religious extremism is not must at least be well respected within is a wrathful doctrine that rejects the welcome. Although there have been Muslim communities, irrespective legitimacy of all religious philosophy recent, high profile successes against of their faith. The major supporting but its own. Wahhabism condemns terrorist activity in Indonesia, many themes for this goal should be commonly Christians, Jews and all other non- recognize the public at large has not yet accepted by all, and transcend cultural or Muslims, as well as non-Wahhabi been fully involved inthis matter... there national boundaries. The mainstream voices we should Muslims. Wahhabists believe it is a is a need for a campaign to encourage religious obligation for Muslims to hate active involvement of the people in the most readily promote are listed below. prevention, overcoming and elimination In perusing these categories, remember Christians and Jews. Take this branding concept one of terrorism. In addition, Indonesian that what should be promoted is neither step further. If the US were to enable views historically reflect pluralism in acceptance/support of the US nor and expand similar mainstream Muslim religion and culture is a fact of public American values. Rather, the primary branding efforts, we could dramatically life, while for others it is often a matter goal is, first and foremost, rejection of magnify the parallel effects. In fact, US of pride. The overall Malaysian view extremist ideology. A. Highlight mainstream Muslim Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice indicates their Muslim community is called for this type of activity during driven more by the need to make a living, Key Communicators and their efforts a 2004 speech at the US Institute of not the thought of jihad, and that any against terrorism/extremism (actions move toward violence would threaten and ideology). Peace: 1. Islamic scholars/clerics/Imams We must also do everything that the prosperity and comfort that people we can to support and encourage the seek. Thus, Wahhabist extremism is who decry use of violence, openly reject voices of moderation and tolerance and at odds with the mainly Sufi Islam of Wahhabism and disavow Al Qaeda. pluralism within the Muslim world... these two republics. However, this has This type of influence messaging carries lasting progress and reform in society not precluded the growth of terrorist extreme weight, as it originates from within Islam, and is presented must emerge from within. Today, outside support for Since wars begin in the minds of men, as guidance from established and respected spiritual leaders. Many extremists is common, while it is in the minds of men that the defenses examples of this existthe key moderates too often struggle is to capitalize upon messages with inadequate resources and of peace must be constructed. that parallel US objectives. too little solidarity. That has to - UNESCO Organizational a. Shaikh Muqbil bin Hadi changeand we have to help Constitution al-Wadii, a famous salafi-mufti change it. inYemen, required the following Environmental Issues elements within the region. These obligations when authorizing jihad: 1) Of the various aspects of executing respective governments are addressing the Muslim capability of waging jihad this type of mainstream Muslim support, the terrorist threat as well as they are able, does not cause conflict among Muslims perhaps the most challenging is to and are having some success. Enabling, themselves, and 2) Jihad is not applied by determine how best to work with those expanding and coordinating official and Muslims to gain any political position or Muslim elements that do not wish to non-governmental elements in this fight to get personal interest in this world. b. Yusef al-Qaradawi, a leading be associated with America. Whereas could provide dramatic effects. Muslim scholar, issued a fatwa some Islamic organizations would The Strategy immediately after the attacks (9/11), welcome direct US support, there are T h e U S m u s t i m p l e m e n t a saying Usama Bin Laden could not call manyperhaps even the majority who would consider association with comprehensive information program himself a Muslim. 2. Reformed terrorists that disavow America an anathema. As previously supported by actions whenever possible stated, sensitivities to this issue run targeting selected populations Al Qaeda and terrorism. Expanding the quite high. Any indication that a to attain the following overarching reach and impact of repentant terrorists Muslim organization is under American communication goal: wholesale rejection serves as a very strong anti-recruitment influencea US puppetmeans instant of violent extremist ideology. The key and anti-support tool. This type of loss of credibility, with organizational component of this program is audiences messaging reaches the audience on an must perceive that views espoused come emotional level, as these former terrorists death sure to follow. The information environment is from within Islam. This perception will are usually well-respected fighters within well primed for this type of activity, not be a fallacy... the main drivers behind their region of origin (and beyond), especially within Southeast Asia. Recent selected messages will, for the most part, whom the audience often relates to and polls in Indonesiathe worlds most be well-known and respected Muslim admires.

11

The worldwide Muslim audience awaits. (Defense Link) a. Nasir Abas, a former leader in Jemaah Islamiyah, and Bali-bomber Ali Imron actively preach against terrorism in Indonesia, and try to persuade former comrades to give up the idea of violence against the West in the name of Islam. b. Sayed al-Shareef (a.k.a. Doctor Fadl), one of the main ideologues of the Islamic Jihad movement, has produced an elaborate recantation of his extremist views. 3. Celebrity figures that resonate with Muslim audiences and who promote (or will promote) messages of peace and anti-violence. Reaching the audience again on an emotional level, this type of messaging offers perhaps the quickest measurable impact, due to immediate audience accessibility and susceptibility. a. Sports figures: soccer players Cristiano Ronaldo and Zinedine Zidane are extremely well known throughout SE Asia [Zidane would be particularly relevant to an anti-violence campaign, due to his famous World Cup head butt and following repentance]. Manny Pacquiao, champion boxer, is well respected throughout the region, and is a national hero in his native Philippines. b. Many television and movie personalities resonate well throughout SE Asia. Celebrities from Hollywood, Hong Kong, Bollywood and regional stars should all be considered forinclusion in any program. Oprah Winfrey is huge in Indonesia, and her show is described there as one of the great programming 12 [sic] in the world. Watched by an [sic] million people in the world, The Oprah Winfrey Show is the undisputed leader of daytime television. c. Muslim pop culture is a vastly underutilized influence resource. Pop music personalitiesMuslim and nonMuslim alikehave huge followings, especially amongst the younger generation, the primary audience in this ideological battle. B. Highlight historical and ongoing civic activities of both Muslim and Western charities/organizations that promote peace & prosperity as a primary goal. This is most effective whenever the civic action is acooperative effort between the US (USAID) and a Muslim entity (either a government agency or Muslim charity organization). All efforts should push the Muslim entity to the forefront, and relegate US involvement to that of a supporting agent. In this way we increase confidence in host nation capabilities, which is of primary importance in engendering an atmosphere of hope and prosperity within target audiences. 1. Officials and celebrities that promote awareness of Muslim civic actions throughout the world. a. A prime example of this would be the actions of the Aga Khan Foundation (AGF). His Highness the Aga Khan, leader of 25 million Ismaili Shiite Muslims, has created a vast network of charitable works and humanitarian

aid. He is well known and respected worldwide. These and similar actions would instill, augment and/or bolster Muslim pridein may cases, AGF requires no outside (especially Western) assistance. However, AGF does sporadically partner with other aid organizations, which may provide the perfect opportunity to highlight intercultural/interfaith cooperation. 2. Officials and celebrities that promote American goodwill and awareness of US civic actions throughout the Muslim world. a. This public diplomacy activity complements the primary focus of terror rejection, and acts as strong support for US-led PD efforts... especially messages not of US origin. There is an entrenched perception among Muslim populations that the US does little for the Muslim world except steal their resources. Whereas love for America is not a primary goal of this program, any efforts to negate anti-Americanism should be viewed as an important parallel and complementary activity. For example, pro-American sentiment throughout SE Asia was extremely high immediately following the 2006 SE Asia tsunami disaster relief efforts. The US must maintain and capitalize upon this sort of effect. C. Highlight commonalities & interfaith dialogue. This type of activity attacks extremism on an intellectual level, and attempts to remove the emotions of angst, hatred and victimization. 1. Activities and events that promote peace, opportunity and pluralism/ tolerance. a. Television events, especially serial programming, that promote pluralism and interfaith dialogue are of immense value. If presented properly, such shows can reach millions, engender meaningful dialogue and have a lasting impact on society. A good example of this concept is The Doha Debates, presented as public forum for dialogue and freedom of speech in Qatar. Chaired by internationally known broadcaster Tim Sebastian, formerly of the BBCs HARDTalk, these programs provide a platform for serious discussion of the

Fall 2008

hottest issues in the Arab and Islamic worlds, striving to be both controversial and informative. The shows reach could easily be expanded into SE Asia, or a new regional-specific program could be created using this model. b. High-profile, international religious conferences draw in just the sort of key communicators necessary to influence the masses. However, these conferences often pass with little or no media fanfare, losing any potential gains for the cause of pluralism. For example, Shaykh Kabbani, Chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America, was one of the organizers of a four-day International Conference of Islamic Scholars held in late 2005. This forum featured worldrenowned Muslim scholars including: Dr. Husain Haqqani of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. Khaled M.Abou El Fadl of the University of California at Los Angeles School of Law; Dr. Abdul Ghani Le Joyeux of the Muslim World League of France; and Dr. Rahma Bourqia, President of the Universite Hassan II MohammediaCasablanca in Morocco. The conference provided a forum for Islamic leaders to discuss strategies, programs and plans to elucidate a modern vision for civil society institutions in Muslim societies. These types of activities, and there are many of them, need widest promotion throughout selected regions. D. Execute a comprehensive AntiViolence Program (AVP) throughout Muslim regions. This program should highlight universal themes that transcend cultural and national boundaries, and reach audiences via multiple media The fourth component to Abu Yahyas proposed grand strategy is strengthening and backing Islamic movements far removed from Jihad, particularly those with a democratic approach. Beyond supporting them, he counsels governments to push these mainstream groups into ideological conflict with extremist groups in order to keep the extremist scholars and propagandists busy responding to their criticisms.

platforms. Although managed and coordinated for effect by the US, all voices and messages promulgated by the program should adhere to the abovelisted points. The most influential and resonant messages impacting Muslim audiences are not those originating from the US. In conjunction with the programs previously mentioned, AVP will capitalize upon the recommendations of Shaikh Abu Yahya Al-Libia senior member of Al Qaeda, and one of the foremost experts on the strengths and vulnerabilities of the contemporary extremist movement: This approach helps strip the extremist movement of its monopoly on the dialogue, and instead unleash a torrential flood of ideas and methodologies which find backing, empowerment, and publicity from numerous parties against them. Conclusions The US can quickly and effectively implement such a comprehensive program. Notably, this approach in no way replaces the curent Public Diplomacy strategy, primarily led by the US Department of State. The dedicated professionals of the Diplomatic Corps consistently make great strides in promoting American values worldwide,

especially within the Asia-Pacific region. Selling democracy and American values has long been a cornerstone of foreign policy, and will continue to have strong effect in the coming years. To complement this overarching global strategy, and assist in ever-expanding strategic communication efforts, America must shift its Muslim-audience focus toward magnifying those Islamic views and values that most closely parallel US regional goals and objectives. Many avenues exist to help the US and the Coalition work toward the aforementioned communication goal of wholesale rejection of violent extremist ideology. The US has taken the global lead in their proclaimed War on Terror, and will continue to prosecute this fight until they achieve victory. Now that we recognize the War of Ideas as the key component of the WOTa battle that could easily be renamed War of Ideology, and one that must be won in order for extremism to be defeatedAmerican policymakers must determine the exact parameters of this new War. Its time to shed antiquated strategies, regardless of their former utility, and operationally focus all communication efforts in accordance with new paradigms.

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