Political Law Review Atty.

Jacinto Jimenez

ARTICLE VI SECTION 1 ABAKADA V. ERMITA (long version; delegation of legislative power issue only) R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950 Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit: . . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %). ABAKADA: o abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution Pimentel: o Questions the stand-by authority o contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12% contingent on any of the two conditions being satisfied violates the due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people, in that: (1) the 12% increase is ambiguous because it does not state if the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and (3) the increase in the VAT rate, which is supposed to be an incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should only be based on fiscal adequacy. the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the no-amendment rule upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

o -

Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers o these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory: 1.) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on depreciable goods shall be amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition, excluding the VAT components, exceeds One Million Pesos (P1, 000,000.00); 2) 3) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax; and Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final withholding tax on gross payments of goods and services, which are subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108 (sale of services and use or lease of properties) of the NIRC.

premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due

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process of law. like any other property or property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and that by limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added o equal protection of the law the limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2) invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification. o Regressive the smaller businesses with higher input tax to output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences thereof for it wipes out whatever meager margins the petitioners make Escudero: o undue delegation of legislative power

o
o

The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass on provisions present in Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705 Violation that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives

RESPONDENTS COMMENT:

ISSUES

the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e., legality of the bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate concomitant thereto, have already been settled in the Tolentino case With regard to the issue of undue delegation of legislative power to the President, respondents contend that the law is complete and leaves no discretion to the President but to increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions provided therein arise A reform in the value-added system of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt the balance towards a sustainable macroeconomic environment necessary for economic growth.

The Court defined the issues, as follows: PROCEDURAL ISSUE Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: a. b. Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26(2)

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution: a. b. Article VI, Section 28(1), and Article VI, Section 28(2)

2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution: a. b. HELD: law VALID SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 1. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power a. Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government. Article VI, Section 28(1), and Article III, Section 1

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o They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation o Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are provided in the law on what basis and as to how he will make his recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not. Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive

it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than the legislature itself.\

In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.[56] The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. ERMITA

RA 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills: House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 and Senate Bill No. 1950. The Act amends Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC): imposing a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties (Sec.4), a 10% VAT on importation of goods (Sec.5), a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties (Sec.6). The Act also contains a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Sec. of Finance to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006 after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (a)VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent or (b) National govt deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent. The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption and is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods, properties or services. Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer. A direct tax on the other hand, is a tax which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business without transferring the burden to someone else. This value-added system has long been in existence but in a different manner. The system was a single-stage tax computed under the cost deduction method and was only payable by original sellers. This was then modified and a mixture of the cost deduction method and tax credit method was used to determine the value-added tax. The Legislative has an inherent constitutional power to promulgate its own rules of procedure and pursuant to this, each house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action. It is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing provisions of the House bill and the Senate bill. It is within the power of the committee to include an entirely new provision that is not found in

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either the House or Senate bill. The charge then that the Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is without basis. The revenue bill originated in the House of Reps. and the Senate was acting in its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Article VI, Sec 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibitions or limitations on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House bill. The MAIN PURPOSE of the House bills is to bring in sizeable revenues for the government to supplement our countrys serious financial problems and improve tax administration and control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes and the Senate, approaching from the national perspective can introduce amendments within the purpose such as providing ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure to the consumer (i.e. distributing the burden across all sectors)

Issue: W/N RA 9337 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power as it constitutes an abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Sec 28(2)1 of the Philippine Constitution. Held: The Petition is dismissed and the constitutionality of RA 9337 is upheld in its entirety.

The doctrine of the separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, a doctrine based on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. potestas delegata non delegari potes What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, inherently and exclusively legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete law complete as to the time when it shall take effect and to whom it shall be applicable to and to determine the expediency of its enactment. Thus, in order that a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation. Test of Valid delegation: If the law is (a) complete in itself and (b) fixes a standard to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of power shall be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends. The rationale being that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function but is simple auxiliary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity that the legislature may delegate others to perform. The case is not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which the enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the 12% rate contingent upon a specified fact or condition, which is outside of the control of the executive. Thus, there is no discretion that is exercised by the President. The Sec. Of Finance in making his recommendations to the President is not acting as the Presidents alter ego but as an agent of the legislative department in determining and implementing legislative policy. Thus, the President cannot alter or nullify or set aside any of his findings, Congress merely granted the Sec of Fin the authority to ascertain the two instances when the VAT rate can be raised to 12%. There is no undue delegation of power but only the discretion as to the execution of a law and this is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it and what is the scope of his authority. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy.

SEC.28 (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government.

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Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

PEOPLE VS. ROSENTHAL (from Champ) Osmena and Rosenthal are organizers of the ORO Oil Company which was engaged in mining activities. They are alleged to have violated the ACT 2581: BLUE SKY LAW by selling speculative securities without first obtaining the written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer. The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise of future promotion and development of the oil business, rather than based on actual tangible assets. RTC: found them guilty. On appeal, they assail the constitutionality of the law, that it contravenes the constitutional provisions of the JONES ACT because the law constitutes UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS to the INSULAR TREASURER. Under the BSL, all persons who offer to sell securities to the public must obtain license from the IT. The license to sell is issued only whenever the IT is satisfied that the applicant has complied with the provisions of the BSL. Furthermore, the BSL provides that the IT shall have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said license or permit. Osmena and Rosenthal argue however that the BSL provides NO STANDARD or RULE which can guide the IT in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued or cancelled, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion. Consequently, they argue, legislative powers have been unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer.

ISSUE: Whether the BSL provides a sufficient standard for the IT in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a license or permit. Whether there was undue delegation of legislative powers. SC: LAW VALID. SUFFICIENT STANDARD. In view of the intent and purpose of the BSL to protect the public against SPECULATIVE SCHEMES WHICH HAVE NO MORE BASIS THAN SO MANY FEET OF BLUE SKY, and against the SALE OF STOCK BY FLY-BY-NIGHT CONCERNS, VISIONARY OIL WELLS, DISTANT GOLD MINES, PUBLIC INTEREST in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer. There is no undue delegation of authority since there is a stated criterion public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. 1. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT, 2. THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED, and 3. THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISIONS all show that there is a stated criterion. Also, the decisions of the IT is appealable to the Secretary of Finance, hence the IT does not act and decide without any restraining influence. Delegate potestas non potest delegare. AGUSTIN VS. EDU. (from Champ) President Marcos issued LOI # 229 providing for EWD for all motor vehicles. It provides that all motor vehicles shall have at least 1 PAIR of EWD consisting of triangular and reflectorized in yellow and red, to be used when the vehicle is stalled for more than 30 minutes. The LOI further provided that the LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION shall promulgate rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement the LOI. Agustin was the owner of a VW Beetle equipped with BLINKING LIGHTS. He argues that these lights could very well served as the EWD. Agustin further argues that the LOI is invalid because it clearly violates the delegation of police powers and that it infringes on the non-delegation of legislative powers. It claims that the LOI 229 has no standard.

ISSUE: Whether the LOI provided a standard in the LTCs implementation.

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Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

SC: LAW VALID. According to the case of EDU vs. ERICTA, to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard set by the legislature itself which determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A STANDARD: a) defines legislative policy, b) marks its limits and maps out its boundaries, and c) specifies the public agency to apply it. d) indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command it to be effected e) is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. The standard may be EXPRESS or IMPLIED. The standard does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied form the policy and purpose of the ACT CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE. Here, LOI 229 itself provided the standard. In the REFLECTOR LAW, the legislative objective is PUBLIC SAFETY and SAFE TRANSIT UPON ROADS.

Also, the Philippines has ratified the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, which recommends enactment of legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. Since the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law, the country cannot repudiate its commitment based on the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.

CHIONGBIAN VS. ORBOS (from Champ) Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite in Mindanao. Only 4 provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (LanaoSur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi2) The other provinces who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative regions, provided that the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. So, President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote for ARMM. Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of EO 429. They claim that President Cory had no authority to restructure new administrative regions. They insist that the provinces should remain as they are.

ISSUE: Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power to the President by allowing Cory to merge the existing regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION. Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President Corys discretion. DEFENSE: The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue delegation but only a POWER TO FILL UP THE DETAILS OF LEGISLATION which was given to Cory. SC: LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT. While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Thus there is no abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in conferring on the President the POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS. As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. IT MAY SIMPLY BE GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be EMBODIED IN OTHER STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the STANDARD IS TO BE FOUND IN THE SAME POLICY underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434, THE POWER TO REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. Under said law, the standard is to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government, to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for acceleration socio-economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of public business. Since the original 11 administrative regions were established with this same law/ policy, it is but logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to merge by administrative determination, the existing regions (following the rejection of the ARMM by some regions), the purpose of Congress in enacting the Organic Act of ARMM was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.

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Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

YNOT VS. IAC (from Champ) EO 626 was enacted prohibiting the INTERPROVINCIAL MOVEMENT OF CARABAOS. Those found violating the law shall be subject to confiscation and FORFEITURE BY THE GOVERNMENT. The law further provides that the confiscated beef shall be distributed to CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, and OTHER SIMILAR INSTITUTIONS AS THE CHAIRMAN of the NMIC may see fit. Ynot was found to have violated the law, transporting 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. Ynot assails the constitutionality of EO 626, claiming that there is undue delegation of legislative powers to the chairman of the NMIC, with respect to the MANNER OF DISPOSITION OF THE CONFISCATED BEEF. Ynot argues that the term, as may see fit is extremely generous and dangerous, and with an opportunity for partiality and abuse.

ISSUE: Whether the phrase as may see fit is a sufficient standard. SC: LAW INVALID. NO SUFFICIENT STANDARD. There are no limitations nor reasonable guidelines which said officers of the NMIC must observe when they make their distribution or disposition of the confiscated beef. There is invalid delegation of legislative powers to the offers who are granted UNLIMITED DISCRETION in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of the beef and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answers, and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, in the own executive discretion. Definitely there is here a roving commission, a wide and sweeping authority, that is not canalized within the banks that keep it from overflowing. In short, a CLEARLY PROFILGATE AND INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

Another issue: Whether the law has a lawful subject and lawful method? NO. there is no reasonable connection between the purpose and the means. We cannot see how the prohibition of interprovincial transport of carabaos (means) could prevent their indiscriminate slaughter (purpose) considering that they can be killed anywhere. Retaining carabos in one province will not prevent there slaughter there, any more that moving them to another province.

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO (from Champ) An application for habeas corpus in favor of RUBI and other MANGUIANES, who are allegedly deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of Mindoro. They are held on a reservation somewhere in Mindoro. They were held following the adoption of Resolution # 25 of the Provincial Board, authorizing the provincial governor to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied sites selected by him in the interest of law and order. Following the Board Resolution, Governor Morent issued an order specifying the areas where the Manguianes should stay. Any Manguian who shall refuse to comply will be imprisoned. The basis of the Board Resolution is Sec 2145 of the ADMINISTRATIVE CODE which provides that provincial governors, with the approval of the department head, may direct the non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation in unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Rubi et al thus assailed the provisions of the administrative code, as invalid delegation of LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS.

ISSUE: Whether Legislature, in enacting the Administrative Code, merely conferred upon the provincial officials, DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY AS TO THE EXECUTION OF LAWS? SC: LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION. Judge Ranney said: the true distinction therefore is between: 1) the delegation of power to make the law which necessarily involves a discretion as to what is shall be, this is NOT ALLOWED

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Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

2) conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of law. this is ALLOWED. Sec 2145 of the Admin Code merely confers discretionary authority (to the local officials) as to the EXECUTION OF THE LAW. An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by IMMEMORIAL PRACTICE, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of MIndoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. Who else but these officers, as the official representatives of the province, are BETTER QUALIFIED TO JUDGE WHEN SUCH A COURSE IS DEEMED NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF LAW AND ORDER. As officials charged with the administration of the province, and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the PEOPLE WHO HAVE THE MISFORTUNE OF BEING IN A BACKWARD STATE!! Section 2145 of the Admin Code is not an unlawful delegation of legislative powers by the Philippine Legislature to the Provincial officers.

PEOPLE VS. VERA (from Champ) Mario Cu-Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case. He applied for PROBATION under the provisions of ACT # 4221. He insists that he is innocent of the crime for which he has convicted, and that he has no prior criminal record and the he would observe good conduct in the future. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office, but the Office DENIED THE PROBATION. Nevertheless, Judge Vera heard the petition. The City Fiscal obviously opposed the grant of probation. Among the arguments raised was that Act 4221 (which granted probation) was violative of the Constitution as an undue delegation of legislative powers to the provincial boards of several provinces. o This is because Act 4221 ENDOWS THE PROVINCIAL BOARDS WITH THE ABSOLUTE POWER TO MAKE SAID LAW EFFECTIVE OR NOT IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PROVINCES, AND SUBJECT TO THE DIRECTION OF THE PROBATION OFFICE. o Act 4221 gives discretion to provincial boards whether the Probation Law can be made applicable in their area, and subject to whether they have APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR THE SALARY OF PROBATION OFFICER

ISSUE: Whether there was valid delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards, in the matter of implementation of the Probation Law? SC: LAW INVALID. UNDUE DELEGATION. The Probation Law does not fix nor impose upon the provincial boards, any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a ROVING COMMISSION which enables them to exercise arbitrary discretion. In reality, the Legislature has left the entire matter to provincial boards to determine. The legislature has not made the operation of the Law contingent upon any specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is BOUND BY NO RULE, LIMITED BY NO PRINCIPLE OF EXPEDIENCY. If a province does not want to enforce said law, all it has to do is to simply decline appropriations needed for the salary of a probation officer. It need not give any reason for refusing or failing to appropriate funds for the salary of the probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its pleasure. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

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Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

US. VS. PANLILIO (from Champ) ACT # 1760 was passed prohibiting the importation of animals suffering or infected with dangerous communicable diseases. Said law further authorizes the Director of Agriculture to require suspected animals to be QUARANTINED. Panlilio was charged with violation of said law. o Earlier, Panlilios caraboas were found to have a contagious disease (RINDER PEST) such that they were quarantined by the Director of Agriculture. o Panlilio however, illegally TOOK THE QUARANTINED CARABAOS, transported them from one place to another, without authorization. The Information Sheet however failed to specify the section allegedly violated. Panlilios DEFENSE: that the facts alleged in the info do not constitute a violation of Act 1760.

SOLGEN insists that: Section 7 of the law states that whenever the Director of Agri has ordered any animal placed in quarantine, the owner of such animal should deliver it at the place designated for quarantine, and provide for its food, water, etc. Should the owner fail to comply with the requirement, the costs of said supplies shall be chargeable to the owner. ISSUE: Whether Panlilio could be convicted of violation of the quarantine order issued by the Director of Agri. SC: NO. Nowhere in the law makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply with the provisions of Section 7. The Section merely provides the means by which the refusal to comply will be punished. But it does not have the aspects of a penal provision nor does it prohibit any act. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the Directors Orders made unlawful, nor is there any punishment provided for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that any person violation any of the provisions of THIS ACT shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not more than 1000 or imprisonment of up to 6 months, or both. What the law penalizes is the VIOLATION OF THE ACT, and does not extend to VIOLATION OF THE RULES issued pursuant to said law. BUT, a VIOLATION OF THE DIRECTORS ORDERS (that is, an order to quarantine animals suffering from contagious diseases), is NOT A VIOLATION OF THE ACT ITSELF. The orders of the Director while they may possible be said to have the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. NOWHERE IN ACT 1760 IS A VIOLATION OF THE DIRECTORS ORDERS MADE A PENAL OFFENSE, NOR IS SUCH VIOLATION PUNISHED IN ANY WAY. ** the point of this case is that there can be no delegation of the power to criminalize where the law itself : 1) does not define a crime, 2) nor provide a penalty.

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Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

SECTION 5 ANG BAGONG BAYANI OFW VS. COMELEC Akbayan and Ang Bagong Bayani filed their MOTIONS before Comelec to have some party-list groups DELETED FROM THE OFFICIAL LIST OF PARTIES. (for the 2001 elections) They contend that there are SOME POLITICAL PARTIES (PMP, LAKAS-NUCD, NPC, LDP, AKSYON DEMOCRATICO, PDP-LABAN, NATIONALISTA) included in the party-list system. The argue that the party-list system is for the marginalized and underrepresented.

ISSUE: Whether Comelec was correct in including some of these political parties in the Party-List Election. SC: THEY ARE QUALIFIED. These political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list election merely on the ground that they are political parties. The Constitution provides that the members of the House may be elected through a party list system of REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. Under the Party List Law RA 7941, a PARTY is defined as either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. A political party is also defined as a group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles, and policies for the general conduct of government, and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. Thus, political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. While RA 7941 mentions the labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, ICCs, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, OFWs and professionals as marginalized and underrepresented, they ENUMERATION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. Looking into the Policy behind RA 7941, it is not enough for a candidate to claim representation among these enumerated groups because representation is easy to claim and feign. The party list group (even political parties) must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Again, the POLICY OF THE LAW: To enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors who lack well defined political constituencies but who could contribute to legislation. SC: CASE REMANDED TO COMELEC TO DETERMINE QUALIFICATIONS OF THESE POLITICAL PARTIES. GUIDELINES: 1) party must truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors 2) major political parties allowed but they must still represent the marginalized 3) religious sector may not be represented but a religious leader may be a nominee 4) must not be disqualified under Sec 6 RA 7941 5) must be independent from the government (not adjunct, not funded, not assisted) 6) nominees must themselves be qualified (age, residence, citizenship) 7) nominees must belong to the marginalized/underrep 8) nominee must be able to contribute to appropriate legislation

SECTION 11 JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG Jimenez (hindi sa Jack), brought a suit for the recovery of money as damages for PUBLICATION OF A LIBELOUS LETTER made by Cabangbang. He claims that the Cabangbang letter is false, and intended to impeach his reputation, expose him to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule. Cabangbangs DEFENSE: 1) that the letter was not libelous, and 2) it was privileged communication. o This is because at the time the letter was written, Cabangbang was a member of the House and the Chairman of the House Committee on National Defense o The letter involved was an OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILS, dated November 14, 1958, when CONGRESS WAS NOT IN SESSION. This was published in several newspapers of general circulation. o The letter describes 3 OPLANS. that there is an insidious plan or a massive political buildup where DND Secretary Vargas was plotting to become the new President, that P4M of intelligence funds are allegedly being used to finance the political campaign. o The letter also mentions JIMENEZ AS ONE OF THE PLANNERS of a COUP DETAT.

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara.

Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

o Cabangbangs open letter also recommended that Vargas resign and that the AFP should stay away from politics, and that all other intelligence officials of the AFP should be reassigned.

ISSUE: Whether Cabangbangs letter is privileged communication? Does it fall under privileged speech or debate? Whether Cabangbang can be held liable? SC: The Constitution protects utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of: 1. their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, and while the same is in session, as well as 2. bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and 3. other acts performed by Congressmen either in Congress or outside its premises in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees. The publication involved in this case DOES NOT BELONG TO THIS CATEGORY. It is obvious that in causing the communication to be so published, Cabangbang was NOT PERFORMING HIS OFFICIAL DUTY, EITHER AS A MEMBER OF CONGRESS OR A MEMBER OF ANY COMMITTEE THEREOF. Hence, the communication is not absolutely privileged.

Incidentally, Cabangbang cannot be held liable for damages. The SC said that although the letter mentions or alludes to Jimenez as one of the planners and was probably handpicked by Vargas, Cabanbangs open letter added the phrase, of course it is possible that Jimenez are merely unwitting tools to a plan to which they may have absolutely no knowledge of. This statement is NOT DEROGATORY to Jimenez, considering he is an officer of the AFP, and that by law, they are under the control of the Secretary of the DND (Vargas).

SECTION 14 PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN This is a case questioning the Order of SEC granting Congressman Estanislao Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC case. Prior to this, there was an election for the directors of Intl Pipe Industries (IPI). There were 2 factions: the Puyat Group and the Acero Group The Acero Group instituted a QUO WARRANTO proceeding before the SEC claiming that the votes were not properly counted. The Puyat Group claims that Congressman Fernandez orally entered his appearance as counsel for the Acero Group. Naturally, the Puyat Group opposed Fernandez appearance as counsel citing that a Congressman cannot appear as counsel in any administrative proceeding like SEC. So Assemblyman Fernandez no longer appeared as counsel. However, he later purchased 10 SHARES OF STOCK in IPI to qualify him to run as Director. After the purchase, Fernandez filed a Motion for Intervention in the SEC case, because now, Fernandez is owner of 10 shares. SEC granted the motion.

ISSUE: Whether intervention in the SEC case is in effect an appearance as counsel (indirectly) before an administrative body. SC: YES. Ordinarily, it seems that Fernandez was not appearing as counsel as he was theoretically appearing for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares. HOWEVER, certain salient circumstances militate against this. The FACT OF ACQUIRING A MERE P200 worth of stock of only 10 shares (out of 262,000) shows an OBVIOUS CIRCUMVENTION OF THE RULE. He acquired them AFTER THE FACT, after the Quo Warranto proceedings had been filed and one day before the schedule SEC hearing. Whats more, before he moved to intervene, he already signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, which was earlier objected to. Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an INDIRECT APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL BEFORE AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in SOME OTHER CAPACITY.

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara.

Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

If we were to uphold the intervention, then it would make the constitutional prohibition ineffective. All an Assemblyman has to do if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire minimal participation in the interest of the client and then intervene in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection. SECs grant of Motion to Intervene reversed and set aside.

SECTION 16 (1) AVELINO VS. CUENCO Feb 18 Senator Tanada requested his right to speak on the floor to formulate charges against Senate President Avelino be reserved. Request approved. Feb 21 1949 hours before the opening of session, Senator Tanada filed a resolution enumerating the charges against the Senate President and ordering an investigation. Senate President Avelino refused to open the session at 10am. He delayed appearance at session hall until 11:35am. He read the charges against him in public. At around 12pm, due to the insistent demands of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco, the session was finally called to order. Sanidad however, moved that the roll call be dispensed with. Avelinos allies, Senators Francisco and Tirona, insisted that the roll be called in an obvious conspiracy to prevent Senator Tanada from delivering his speech. The roll was called. Senator Tanada repeatedly stood up so that he could deliver his speech but was continuously ignored by Avelino. Avelino even threatened to arrest any talking senator. Disorder broke out in the gallery of the Senate. Senator David, moved for the adjournment of session but Sanidad still opposed. Suddenly Avelino banged the gavel and walked out of the session hall (along with David, Tirona and Francisco). The pro-Tanada senators remained. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz, suggested that Cuenco take over and preside over the session. Cuenco did and took the Chair. Senator Tanada was able to deliver his speech. The position of Senate President was declared vacant by a unanimous resolution (#68), by those who were still there. Cuenco became Acting Senate President, he took an oath and was recognized by the President of the Philippines the day after. Avelino now filed a QUO WARRANTO proceeding to declare him as the rightful Senate President

ISSUES: 1) does the court have jurisdiction 2) was the resolution making Cuenco acting president validly approved ? WAS THERE MAJORITY TO TRANSACT BUSINESS IN THE SENATE? 3) can Avelino reclaim his position? SC: 1) COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION. In view of the separation of powers, and the political nature of the controversy, the Constitution grants the Senate the power to elect its own president. It cannot be interfered with, nor taken over, by the Judiciary. The selection of the senate president affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty to choose at any time their officers. The remedy thus lies in the Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court. (THIS IS THE ISSUE RELEVANT UNDER SECTION 16) 2) ASSUMING LANG THAT SC HAS JURISDICTION, the session under Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz was VALID. It was merely a continuation of the morning session and that a MINORITY OF 10 SENATORS may not, by leaving the Session hall, prevent the MAJORITY OF 12 OTHER SENATORS from passing a resolution with their unanimous consent. When the Constitution says that a majority shall constitute a quorum, THE HOUSE DOES NOT MEAN ALL THE MEMBERS. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE, and a majority of THE HOUSE. Therefore, an absolute majority, that is 12, of all the members of the senate (23 lang), constitutes constitutional majority for the purpose of a quorum to do business. The office of the Senate President is one that essentially depends on the will of the majority of the senators. Hence, Cuenco is the new Senate President.

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara.

Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

*Note: 23 lang yung total number because absent si Senator Tomas Confessor. He is out of the country. Majority of 23 = 12.

SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA Senate convened as follows: 10 members = LAMP 7 members = LAKAS NUCD 1 member = LP 1 member = Aksyon Democratico 1 member = PRP 1 member Gabay-Bayan 2 members = Independent TOTAL = 23 (*one position was vacant because GMA became Vice President) There was an election for Senate President. There were 2 contenders, Senator Fernan and Senator Tatad. By a vote of 20 to 2, Fernan won as Senate President. (the 2 who voted for Tatad were of course, Miriam and Tatad himself!) Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that he was assuming the post as minority leader since according to him, only those who had voted for him, belonged to the minority. This was opposed by Senator Johnny Flavier. He manifested that 7 LAKAS NUCD Senators are also part of the minority and they chose Senator Guingona as minority leader. Senator Guingona was recognized by the Senate President as Minority Leader. Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted QUO WARRANTO proceedings to oust Senator Guingona as Minority Leader, and to declare Tatad as the rightful minority leader. Tatad argues that the term majority refers to the group of senators who voted for the winning senate president and accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, the say, that those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no committee chairmanships comprise the minority.

ISSUES: 1) does the court have jurisdiction? 2) was there a violation of the constitution? What constitutes minority? Was Section 16 (1) not followed in the selection of Senate minority leader? SC: COURT HAS JURISDICTION. The court has judicial power to determine whether or not there has been GADALEJ. (but this is not the issue here.) MAJORITY IS DEFINED AS THE NUMBER GREATER THAN HALF OR MORE THAN HALF OF ANY TOTAL. Sec 16(1) simply states that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than of ALL THE SENATORS. The Constitution does not delineate who shall comprise the majority, much less the minority. While the Constitution mandates that the senate president must be elected by a number constituting MORE THAN OF ALL THE MEMBERS THEREOF, it does NOT provide that the members who will not vote for him shall IPSO FACT CONSTITUTE THE MINORITY. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. HISTORY ALL SHOWS that majority refers to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the minority normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members. MAJORITY = may also refer to the group or party with the larger number of votes, not necessarily more than . PLURALITY. MINORITY = a group or party with a small number of votes than the majority. Between 2 unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than 2 unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader which will represent all minorities. Because we have a multi-party system, there could be several minority parties,one of which has to be identified as the dominant minority. AS TO THE ELECTION OF OFFICERS IN CONGRESS: While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing the Senate President and the House Speaker, it is however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers of Congress. The constitution merely says that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. Hence, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of prerogative conferred by the Constitution. Such METHOD MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY THE SENATE ITSELF, NOT BY

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara.

Political Law Review Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

THE COURTS. The RULES OF SENATE DO NOT PROVIDE FOR THE POSITIONS OF MAJORITY/ MINORITY LEADERS. In the absence of and specific rules, THIS COURT HAS NO BASIS UPON WHICH TO DETERMINE THE LEGALITY OF THE ACTS OF THE SENATE. The Courts cannot intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature. If we were to uphold the contention of Tatad and Santiago, that would amount to judicial legislation. Since no provision of the Constitution or any other rule or law has been violated, NO ABUSE OF POWER CAN BE SHOWN. (Meaning Guingona acted correctly, and Fernan also acted correctly in recognizing Guingona as Minority Leader).

SECTION 16 (2) PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS Congressman Jalosjos (first district ZamboNorte) was confined at the national penitentiary while his case for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He filed a MOTION THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO FULLY DISCHARGE THE DUTIES of a Congressman, including ATTENDANCE AT SESSIONS AND COMMITTEE HEARINGS, despite his conviction for a nonbailable offense. He claims that his re-election as congressman proves as an EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL, and cannot be rendered inutile. (he claims he has the MANDATE OF THE SOVEREIGN WILL) He further argues that under Sec 16(2), a Congressmans function is to attend sessions. He also relies on the case of AGUINALDO, were the court said that a public officer should not be removed from office for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be depriving the right of the people to elect their officers.

ISSUE: May Jalosjos attend sessions despite his imprisonment for a non-bailable offense, which he committed prior to his present term? SC: Under the Constitution, privilege to be free from arrest applies only if the offense is punishable by less than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not shown any reason why he should be exempted from this. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the ABSENCE IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a non-bailable offense (more than 6 years) is certainly authorized by law, and has constitutional foundations. The RATIONALE behind confinement is PUBLIC SELF-DEFENSE. Society must protect itself, and serves as an example and warning to others. A person is taken into custody for purpose of the administration of justice. It is the injury to the public which the State seeks to redress in criminal cases. The Aguinaldo case also does not apply. It refers only to administrative removals and NOT TO IMPRISONMENT ARISING FROM THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW. ELECTION TO HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICE DOES NOT FREE THE ACCUSED FROM THE COMMON RESTRAINTS OF GENERAL LAW. What he is seeking is not mere emergency or temporary leaves from imprisonment. He is seeking to attend congressional session and meetings for 5 days or more in a week. THIS WOULD VIRTUALLY MAKE HIM A FREE MAN. As to POPULAR MANDATE: the voters of the district elected Jalosjos with the full awareness of the limitations of his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could discharge legislative functions within the confines of prison only. As to EQUAL PROTECTION: the performance of legitimate and even essential duties of a public offer has never been an excuse to free a person VALIDLY IN PRISON. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one of its members. Criminal Law Enforcement prevails. (READ ORIG).

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara.