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Catalogue Reference:cab/66/26/41

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1S DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OF H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T ^ g

MOST S E C R E T .

Copy N o . 2 9

W.P. (42) 311.

j ly 21, 1942.
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I t is requested t h a t special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this d o c u m e n t

REVIEW

OF

THE

WAR

POSITION.

Memorandum

by the Prime

Minister.

T H E time has come to review the whole field of the w a r a n d place i t s salient features in their t r u e proportion. 2. T h e first is the immense power of the G e r m a n m i l i t a r y machine. Because the G e r m a n armies have been so long busy in Russia, we a r e a p t to forget this terrible engine. W h e n we feel w h a t a couple of P a n z e r divisions and the 90th German L i g h t Division can do in N o r t h A f r i c a a g a i n s t our g r e a t l y superior numbers and resources, we have no excuse for u n d e r r a t i n g G e r m a n m i l i t a r y power in 1943 and 1944. I t will always be possible for them to set u p a h o l d i n g front against Russia and b r i n g back fifty or sixty, or even more, divisions t o the West. They could make the transference w i t h very g r e a t r a p i d i t y across the m a i n r a i l w a y lines of E u r o p e . W e have no r i g h t to count upon a collapse of G e r m a n m i l i t a r y power on the E u r o p e a n Continent. I n the event of the overthrow of t h e N a z i regime, it is almost certai n t h a t the power would p a s s to the Chiefs of the German A r m y , who a r e by no means ready to accept the k i n d of t e r m s which Britain and the U n i t e d S t a t e s deem essential to f u t u r e world security. 3. The second m a i n fact is seaborne tonnage. W e can only ge t t h r o u g h this year by r u n n i n g down our stocks heavily. A t the cost of much i n t e r n a l friction a n d disturbance, we may, by " t i g h t e n i n g the belt," save p e r h a p s a million tons. W h e t h e r this should be done as a moral exercise, should be carefully weighed. I t can, however, have no appreciable effect upon the problem of maintaining our w a r effort a t home and abroad. T h e r e is no reason to assume that we cannot get t h r o u g h the present year or t h a t t h e tonnage position in 1943 will not steadily improve as a result of the prodigious A m e r i c a n shipbuilding. B u t we must be careful not to let our position d e t e r i o r a t e to an
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unmanageable degree before we have a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g with the United States as to the future. W i t h this object we m u s t now in the next few weeks come to a solemn compact, almost a treaty, w i t h the U n i t e d States about the share of t h e i r new building we are to get i n 1943 and 1944. U p till the time when the U n i t e d States entered the war, we h a d pretty well recouped ourselves for our losses by a c q u i r i n g control of the s h i p p i n g of Continenta l States as they were successively subjugated by the enemy. No more windfalls can be expected from this source. W e can only expand our own buildin g sensibly at dire expense to our w a r effort. Is othing we can do can change our minimum import requirements appreciably. T h e tonnage needed to g u a r a n t e e these must be a first charge. W e ought, therefore, to ask the U n i t e d States to deliver to us during I943 sufficient tonnage to occupy fully our available merchan t crews. A s it would be foolish to have large numbers of B r i t i s h life-trained merchant seamen and officers s t a n d i n g idle w i t h o u t ships while i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s crews will have to be t r a i n e d specially, our desire should not be deemed unreasonable.
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4. On no account must we r u n our stocks down to a dangerou s level for the sake of g e t t i n g through 1942, withou t knowing where we stand in 1943. And the minimum stocks needed must not be w r i t t e n down unduly. Serious bombing of our ports m i g h t well h a m s t r i n g our i n t a k e for considerable periods when we should be lost w i t h o u t something in the larder. Moreover, we should not start on the basis t h a t the B r i t i s h should make a greater sacrifice of their pre-war s t a n d a r d of living t h a n the American people. W e should p o i n t out that any further c u r t a i l m e nt of i m p o r t s t a k i n g 1942 and 1943 together can only be made through a definite c u r t a i l m e n t of our munitions output . A l r e a d y nearly threeq u a r t e r s of B r i t i s h and British-controlled s h i p p i n g is p r i m a r i l y employed on the w a r effort, a n d only one-quarter is exclusively engaged i n feeding and supplying this island. 5. I t m i g h t be t r u e to say t h a t the issue of the war depends on whether H i t l e r ' s U-boat a t t a c k on Allied tonnage, or t h e increase and a p p l i c a t i on of Allied A i r power, reach their full f r u i t i on first. T h e g r o w t h of U-boat w a r f a r e and its spread to t h e most d i s t a n t waters, a s well as improvements i n U - b o a t design, in a formidable degree m u s t be expected. A g a i n s t this may be set the increase of Allied a n t i - s u b m a r i ne c r a f t a n d improvement in methods. B u t here is a struggle in itself. 6. On the other hand, we Allies have the A i r power. I n the days when we were fighting alone, we answered the question : ' ' H o w are you going to win the w a r ? " by- s a y i n g : " W e will s h a t t er Germany by bombing." Since then the enormous injuries inflicted on t h e German A r m y a n d man-power by the Russians, a n d the accession of the man-power and m u n i t i o n s of the United States, have rendered other possibilities open. W e look f o r w a r d to mass invasion of t h e Continent by liberating armies, a n d general revolt of the populations a g a i n s t the H i t l e r tyranny. A l l the same, it would be a mistake to cast aside our original t h o u g h t which, i t may be mentioned, is also strong

in American minds, namely, t h a t the severe, ruthless bombing of G e r m a ny on n ever-increasing scale will not only cripple her w a r effort, includin g U-boat and aircraft production, but will also create conditions intolerable to the mass f the German population.

7. I t is a t this point t h a t we must observe with sorrow a n d a l a r m the woeful shrinkag e of our plans for Bomber expansion. The needs of the Navy d of the M i d d l e E a s t a n d I n d i a , the shortfall of our B r i t i s h production programmes, the n a t u r a l wish of the A m e r i c a n s to fly their own bombers a g a i n s t the enemy, a n d the inevitable delay in these machines coming into a,ction, all these falling exclusively upon Bomber Command, have prevented so f a r the fruition of our hopes for t h i s summer a n d a u t u m n . W e m u s t r e g a r d the Bomber offensive a g a i n s t G e r m a n y a t least as a feature in b r e a k i n g her warwill second only to the largest m i l i t a r y operation s which can be conducted on the Continent until t h a t w a r - w i l l is broken. Renewed, intense efforts should be made by t h e Allies to develop d u r i n g the w i n t e r a n d o n w a r d s ever-growing, ever more a c c u r a t e a n d ever more f a r - r a n g i n g Bomber a t t a c k s on Germany. In this way alone can we p r e p a r e the conditions which will be favourable to the major m i l i t a r y operation s on which we a r e resolved. Provision must be made to ensure t h a t the bombing of Germany is not i n t e r r u p t e d , except p e r h a p s temporarily, by the need of s u p p o r t i n g m i l i t a r y operations. H a v i n g r e g a r d to the fact t h a t Allied a i r c r a f t construction a l r e a d y outnumber s A x i s a i r c r a f t construction by between two and three to one, these requirements should not be unattainable.
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8. A l t h o u g h no expansion of A . R . P . services can be accepted and, on the contrary, j u d i c i o u s p r u n i n g m u s t still continue, we should be unwise to assume that heavy bombing a t t a c k s on G r e a t B r i t a i n will not be renewed. A t present over half of t h e G e r m a n Bomber s t r e n g t h is occupied a g a i n s t Russia. By a transference to the West, the G e r m a n s could assemble d u r i n g the next few months an e q u a l i t y in Bomber a i r c r a f t for our account. W e have developed an elaborate, a n d indeed wonderful, system of scientific defence which has enabled us to a w a i t a renewal of the former " b l i t z " w i t h confidence. If anything should go wrong w i t h this scientific system of defence, even t h o u g h the enemy were similarly affected, then the reciprocal bombing of both countries would be conducted on very much t h e conditions of the w i n t e r of 1940-41. Should this develop, our a d v a n t a g e over G e r m a n y would have to be expressed by the ever-increasing numerical s u p e r i o r i t y of our Bomber a i r c r a f t a n d the bombcontent capable of being discharged by us. W . S. c. July 21, 1942.