Metteyya Brahmana’s Review of “What the Buddha Thought” by Richard Gombrich.

Book Review: “What the Buddha Thought”, by

Richard Gombrich

What the Buddha Thought, by Richard Francis Gombrich

London & Oakville: Equinox, 2009, 239 Pages, ISBN 978-1-84553-612-1 (hb), UK

Reviewed by Metteyya Brahmana

Abstract
“What the Buddha Thought”, by Richard Gombrich, is the latest attempt to explain away
Buddhist Cosmology as “satire”, in which Gombrich argues that the Buddha had prior
knowledge of Hindu Vedas and Upanishads and merely borrowed concepts from these
Brahminacal teachings to form Buddhist Cosmology as an effort to put down and mock the
Brahmins. The cosmology, or cosmogony according to Gombrich, is therefore satire and not to
be taken seriously (i.e., too literally). As this review makes plain, Gombrich appears to be way
off base on this one, and largely ignores the Buddha’s numerous discourses on samma–vacca
(right speech), fails to comprehend the entire connection between one’s kamma (Skt., “karma”)
and the cosmology taught by the Buddha, and fails to consider that in previous lives the Buddha
himself was the Maha Brahma “God” that Gombrich claims the Buddha was mocking. While
any work purporting know what the Buddha thought 2,600 years ago written from a Western
cultural perspective that values put-downs of others as humor is probably safe to dismiss as
pretentious imaginings, Gombrich’s particular denigration of Buddhist Cosmology does great
damage to the central cause of the Buddha that all sentient beings be liberated from that which
makes them suffer – a cause that even Gombrich acknowledges as central to the Buddha’s
teachings. Viewing the cosmology as satire and humor makes one less inclined to inquire
concerning the connection between spiritual liberation and the cosmology, and Gombrich misses
much of the reason why such inquiry might be important and useful from a spiritual point of
view. Granted, Gombrich admits that he does not consider himself to be a practicing Buddhist,
and therefore may be less concerned about the spiritual impact of his writings, any reader –
especially the Buddhist practitioner - must nonetheless read What the Buddha Thought with
caution and consider the likelihood that much of what the Buddha thought about Buddhist
Cosmology may be missing from Gombrich’s presentation.

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Metteyya Brahmana’s Review of “What the Buddha Thought” by Richard Gombrich.

Review
Gombrich starts his analysis in this book by attempting to lay down Braminical antecedents in
the Vedas and the Upanishads that he believes suggest that the Buddha was largely borrowing
from and responding to Brahmins, and was teaching within a Brahminical context in his major
sermons on kamma, rebirth, and cosmology. The first example he uses is kamma, and argues
that an obscure interpretation of the Rg Veda from Obeyesekere and Jurewicz that converts the
Sankrit word “pitrbho” to the ablative rather than the dative case that is commonly used to
change the meaning so that the departed don’t actually stay with their ancestors after death but
are “reborn” on Earth eventually as other family members die. There are no supporting accounts
in the book that such an interpretation was commonly understood and practiced by the Brahmins
or their converts at the time of the Buddha, and actual discourses between the Buddha and
Brahmins suggest quite the opposite.

In the Saleyyaka Sutta, 1 for instance, the Buddha is asked by a group of Brahmin householders
why some people are born into blissful states and others woeful states – a question that they
would not ask if they already believed in or had any understanding of kamma and rebirth.
Gombrich does acknowledge, however, that this “rebirth into your family’s offspring” was
firmly rejected by the Buddha as part of the rejection of the Brahmanical caste system, and does
not offer a Brahmanical antecedent for rebirth being independent of caste. In fact, this appears to
be the main gripe the Brahmins had with the Buddha that they could not continue to reign as part
of the highest caste after rebirth if their kamma did not support such a condition.

Next, Gombrich attempts to use the Upanishads – mainly the Brad-aranyaka, but indicates the
Chandogya also supports his argument – to suggest that spiritual liberation from the cycles of
rebirth (samsara) was also borrowed from the Brahmins by the Buddha, but doesn’t attempt to
refute any of the evidence by others that these texts post-date the Buddha. 2 And, like with
kamma, actual discourses between the Buddha and Brahmins show a lack of Brahmanical
understanding concerning spiritual liberation, as Upanishadic notions such as “I am Brahman”
don’t transcend the cycles of rebirth at all. The Buddha made this clear in the Brahmana Sutta 3
to two Brahmins who were trying to understand how to escape samsara. In this sutta, the
Buddha explains that any clinging to any realm of existence does not permit one to “cross over
attachment in the cosmos.” Brahman, whether personified through a Brahma “God” or a
neutered essence permeating the entire universe is nonetheless in the cosmos, and therefore
identity with it through so-called self-realization keeps one in samsara. One simply can’t gloss
over this insight of the Buddha as Gombrich has done, as it is clear that this was not borrowed
from the Brahmins at all.

1
Majjhima Nikaya 41; PTS, M i 285.
2
Bronkhorst, Johannes, (2007), “Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India,” Leiden & Boston.
3
Anguttara Nikaya 9.38; PTS, A iv 428.

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Gombrich then discusses what he believes to be Jain antecedents to the Buddha’s thinking but
stumbles quite a bit before acknowledging that it may be just “doctrinal terminology” that was
borrowed from the Jains. He also acknowledges that the Buddha gave new meaning to these
doctrinal terms that often contradicted the meaning that the Jains previously had ascribed to these
words. There simply is no way to get around the fact that the Buddha’s spiritual enlightenment
experience under the Bodhi tree was in large part a rejection of the austerities practiced by the
Jains, as the Buddha discovered that these austerities themselves caused more suffering than they
eliminated.

As with Jain antecedents, Gombrich struggles to find a Brahmanical antecedent to the Buddhist
doctrine of anatta (“no-soul”) and anicca (“impermanence”). This is one of the key defining
differences between Buddhism and Brahmanical thinking, so this is no surprise. But Gombrich
lumbers on by first acknowledging that the Buddha placed no importance on the dream state that
is part of the Upanishads’ hierarchy of consciousness, and then admits that the expression of
ultimate reality in the Upanishads as an unchanging being in a state of bliss is at odds with the
Buddha’s doctrine of anatta. Gombrich misses discourses of the Buddha explaining why he left
his former teachers Uddeka Ramaputta, and Alara Kalama, 4 in which appearing in a blissful state
in higher realms of existence (“arupa-loka”) through meditation was not satisfactory to the
Buddha, as one would simply cling to these realms of existence and the blissful sensation
experienced there, and obviously suffer tremendously if one could not continue this impermanent
experience. This omission obscures the fact that neither the Jains nor the Brahmins were
responsible for these anatta and anicca doctrines, as they merely developed as a reaction to the
dukka (dissatisfaction) experienced by the Buddha in these blissful meditative states with his
former teachers who were neither Jain nor Brahmin.

Gombrich’s omission of the discourses regarding the Buddha’s former teachers is significant, in
that much of the Buddha’s thinking on attaining spiritual liberation through direct knowledge
and experience as opposed to second-hand or through blind faith was shaped by these two
teachers, 5 and this is another key feature that distinguishes Buddhism from Brahmanical or Jain
thinking in which one relies on a guru, or Semitic religions that either have intermediaries such
as Jesus or hierarchical “authorities” such as popes, bishops, priests, rabbis, imams and sheiks.
This direct experience feature also distinguishes the Buddha’s thinking from certain Mahayana
Buddhist sects who use lamas (Tibetan) and priests (Zen) much in the same way they are used in
the Semitic faiths or Hindu gurus of today, which do much more than just “point the way” and
are essentially religious authorities within their respective Buddhist sects. The Buddha’s radical
claim in the Kalama Sutta 6 that essentially says “you are your own authority” was influenced by
his former teachers, and based on his own authority he rejected their teachings due to continued

4
Ariapariyesana Sutta, Majjima Nikaya 26; PTS, M i 160.
5
Ibid., see especially the reason why the Buddha is attracted to these teachers as stated in this sutta, in which he was invited to
attain spiritual liberation through his own direct knowledge and experience.
6
Angutarra Nikaya 3.65; PTS, A i 188.

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sense-object clinging and binding. And in his discourse to a young Brahmin in the Canki Sutta,7
the Buddha likened following a lineage of teachers to following a row of blindmen, stating that
“the first one doesn’t see, the middle one doesn’t see, and the last one doesn’t see” so how can
anyone following them see.

In Gombrich’s chapter on Positive Values, he at least makes a convincing case that the Buddha
had prior knowledge that the Brahmins were supposed to know the Vedas – especially the first
three (Rg, Sama, and Yajur). The rest of his analysis of the Tevijja Sutta conflicts with other
core teachings of the Buddha concerning removing all 10 fetters 8 to attain spiritual liberation.
Metta, meditating on thoughts of loving kindness toward all sentient beings, only removes ill-
will – the fifth fetter – but does not remove lust, clinging to rites and rituals, or skeptical doubt,
which are three of the five first fetters. The supposed first 9 fetter – identity with a permanent
personality or individuated self - can be reduced through metta practice, but certainly is not
eliminated. Metta also doesn’t remove conceit, clinging to form or formless realms, restlessness,
and ignorance, the so-called higher fetters. Here is where Gombrich’s admission that he is not a
Buddhist practitioner shows the most, in which he doesn’t even see key parts in the soteriology
described by the Buddha and the obvious shortcomings of metta practice in addressing these key
components.

Maybe Gombrich senses this shortcoming, because he then shifts focus to the Four
Brahmaviharas – metta, karuna, mudita, and upekkha – which are meditations on loving
kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. These Four Brahmaviharas get us
closer to spiritual liberation than metta alone, but if one applies the same 10-fetter analysis that
we applied to metta, we see that it still falls short of the mark. Specifically, metta eliminates ill-
will, karuna helps further reduce identity with a permanent individuated self through selfless
compassion toward the suffering of others, mudita eliminates jealously, which is different than
conceit but related, and equanimity eliminates lust, clinging of any sort, restlessness, and goes a
long way toward reducing ignorance. So we are still left with “some” individuated self, skeptical
doubt, “some” conceit, and “some” ignorance. Certainly, removing six out of 10 fetters and
reducing an additional three produces a pretty advanced spiritual being, and may well land one in
the Brahma heaven realms where one could find “union with Brahma” as desired by the Brahmin
who queried the Buddha in the Tevijja Sutta. But Gombrich equates this advanced spiritual state
with the spiritual liberation taught by the Buddha, and this is plain error when using 10-fetter
analysis. 10

7
Majjhima Nikaya 95; PTS, M ii 104.
8
Samyutta Nikaya 45.179 and 45.180; PTS, S v 59.
9
There is some debate whether this is actually the first or last fetter, since some sense of self must be present to remove the other
fetters. Similarly, the last fetter – ignorance (of the dhamma) – should be first, as removing this fetter is foundational to
removing the others. In the oral tradition it is possible that 1 and 10 got transposed, as oral repetition would put them together.
10
The other broader point about the utility of 10-fetter analysis that was also missed by Gombrich is that the Buddha himself
used 10-fetter analysis in the Maha-Parinibbana Sutta – his last discourse before his death - in response to queries of how
certain lay persons and monks faired in the soteriology after death, in which he cited specific rebirth abodes where they had gone

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Metteyya Brahmana’s Review of “What the Buddha Thought” by Richard Gombrich.

Gombrich is correct to note, however, that jhana is not necessary to the soteriology described by
the Buddha, and is merely one of two main paths. But Gombrich relies on absence of jhanas in
the Tevijja Sutta to make this point, when the Buddha actually states this in the Kitiagiri Sutta.11
In this sutta, the Buddha describes seven kinds of people, in which the first two had attained
spiritual liberation. The only distinguishing feature between person one and two is that person
one transcended form and formless realms touching with his body (i.e., he was there as a body –
individuated being) to reach spiritual liberation and person two did not have to touch these
realms with his body, and used wisdom (panna through attaining jhanic meditative states in these
realms) instead.

Admittedly, the word choice of touching with his body (te kāyena phassitvā) can cause
confusion, especially since most translations of this sutta are not very good, and the meaning of
this sutta is further obscured by references to discourses by Ananda 12 – Buddha’s chief aid – that
attempt to place both person one and two within the jhana method. But there is no question that
some beings according to the Buddha are reborn into anagami realms and formless realms as
actual beings (touching with the body), and eventually become spiritually liberated in these
higher realms after removing their remaining fetters. These beings fit the description of person
number one. And those who never have to be liberated in this manner because they are able to
experience these higher realms of existence in jhanic meditative states and engage in the non-
clinging to form and formless process without actually physically living in these realms fit the
description of person number two. It certainly would have been less confusing if the Buddha
simply said there are beings in the world who were reborn in the highest brahma realms
(anagamis) and in formless realms because they were able to remove five or more fetters as
human beings and attain spiritual liberation in these higher realms by removing their remaining
fetters, and there are others who are able to attain liberation in the human realm through
removing all 10 fetters which can be expedited through wisdom and insight gained through jhana
meditative states associated with this fetter removal process.

The other thing Gombrich could have added is that if one just breaks down each of the 10 fetters,
it is clear that specific meditation antidotes (e.g., loving kindness for ill-will, 32-parts of body for
sensuality lust, equanimity for restlessness, etc.) that do not necessarily involve jhana states can
eliminate each of these 10 fetters. In this sense, jhana meditative states - if they are experienced
at all - are simply a byproduct of fetter removal rather than the focus of one’s practice. I don’t
think any practicing Buddhist would seriously argue that a being that has successfully removed

based on how many fetters were removed when they were living in the human realm or indicated that they had attained spiritual
liberation.
11
Majjhima Nikaya 70; PTS, M i 473
12
The problem with the Ananda discourses (Angutarra Nikaya 9.44 and 9.45), is that Ananda’s own experience with spiritual
liberation could only occur through the jhana method as he was given only one year prior to the start of the First Buddhist
Council to attain spiritual liberation because of his “punishment” by the original sangha, which therefore precluded any gradual
method discussed by the Buddha in the Uposatha Sutta (Khudakka Nikaya, Udana 5.5; PTS, Ud 51) or being reborn in anagami
or arupa-loka realms and becoming liberated there through actually living in these realms of existence and removing the
remaining fetters.

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all 10-fetters but has never had a jhana experience in meditation would not be liberated from
samsara. After all, jhana meditative states, like any sensation, feeling, or perception, are within
samsara, and must ultimately be let go of if one is to be truly liberated spiritually. But, again, if
one has never engaged in Buddhist practice, it is difficult to glean this particular insight.

Continuing with the Tevijja Sutta, Gombrich then attempts an analogy between Buddhist
“salvation” with Brahmanical ideas concerning “final salvation” after death, but omits much of
the Buddhist cosmological uniqueness in which beings can be reborn in anagami realms after
death, never return to the human realm, and eventually attain “final” liberation in one of these
realms, or die again and get reborn in one of the higher formless realms, and attain final
liberation there. In fact, the very idea of a rebirth abode like the anagami realms where one can
only improve one’s spiritual condition and never fall backward is unique to Buddhism.
Gombrich is therefore clearly reaching here in trying to ascribe Brahmanical antecedents to the
soteriology discussed by the Buddha, as nothing in the five fire wisdom (pancagni-vidya) in the
Upanishads describes realms of existence with these anagami-like features even if one assumes
that this text pre-dated the Buddha and the Buddha had knowledge of it.

The formless realms are also unique to Buddhism, although two of the four formless realms –
nothingness and neither perception nor non-perception - may have been borrowed from the
Buddha’s previous teachers since they share the same name and characteristics. And while
Gombrich asks rhetorically “how do bodiless beings have locations?” in expressing his doubt
that these are real realms of existence, he almost admits that these formless realms are well
beyond the brahmanical concept of brahman which is limited to the material universe. The idea
that there could be infinite space and consciousness, nothingness, and neither perception nor
non-perception which all exist outside of the cyclical expanding and contracting material
universe doesn’t seem to occur to Gombrich at all.

Eventually, Gombrich reaches his main theory about 3/4ths into the book that the Buddhist
Cosmology was all a joke and satire intended as a put-down of the Brahmins. This is indeed an
outrageous claim, akin to telling Christians that Jesus meant heaven and hell to be only a joke
and put-down of Jews who broke God’s covenant.

Gombrich starts his analysis using a Jataka Tale from the Buddha’s previous life prior to being
born as Siddhattha Gotama and attaining Buddhahood. This is rather odd, as it could not
possibly speak to what the Buddha thought at all since it was an experience in another lifetime
eons ago when he was called, Vessantara. Nonetheless, Gombrich is convinced that because an
old Brahmin man called Jujaka who was given Vessantara’s children as workers so that his
young wife would not have to endure ridicule from other women when going to fetch water
means the Buddha wanted to portray Brahmins as “lechers”. This is indeed a dubious piece to
Gombrich’s argument, not just because it tells us nothing about what the Buddha thought, but the
“lecher” opinion/judgment itself seems curious, as Gombrich could not possibly know whether
Jujaka was even sexually able as an old man and had married a young wife for sexual reasons.

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Gombrich’s next example of satire is also dubious, in which he states that a verse from a
canonical poem – Brahmana-dhammika Sutta – in which spiritual diseases multiplied when
certain Brahmins became envious of those who had a lot of cows and therefore the Brahmins
began killing their cows in ritual sacrifice, means the Buddha was trying to put-down the
Brahmins. Because removing the third fetter – clinging to rites and rituals – as well as the other
seven fetters that bind one to samsara is part of the foundational teachings of the Buddha, it is
doubtful that the Buddha was singling out Brahmins in opposing the ritual sacrifice of cows, as
he was opposed to all clinging to rituals and rites, not just Brahmanical ones.

Gombrich’s assertion that the Buddha made an exception for funerary rites and rituals based on
his discourse in the Janussonin Sutta13 is not correct, as the Buddha is merely expounding on the
concept of dana and its relationship to kamma (i.e., the donor is rewarded for his generous
intentions) in this sutta. In fact, the Buddha shifted the entire focus from “the gift accruing to the
dead relative” to “the donor does not go without reward” irrespective of whether the gift accrued
to the dead relative. This is a major sea change in how the Brahmin perceived the gift he was
making so that it was more about the kammic effect of generous intentions (dana) than what may
accrue to a dead relative. The actual funerary rite and ritual as practiced by the Brahmins was
“kamma-blind”.

Gombrich claims the Buddha used the word “Brahmin” to connote “evil states of mind” but then
in the very next paragraph acknowledged that the Buddha redefined the term “Brahmin” to mean
a set of spiritually wholesome characteristics that were independent of caste or familial lineage.
It appears that Gombrich is having a difficult time accepting that Brahmins were one of the main
social groups that the Buddha would encounter during his time, and therefore used them
frequently to illustrate elements of the dhamma that he was teaching.

Gombrich’s primary argument that the Buddha was putting down the Brahmins in satire is based
on two of the three main suttas – the Brahmajala and Agganna Suttas - the Buddha uses to
describe Buddhist cosmology and how beings came into existence on Earth. Here, the Buddha
describes the Maha Brahma “God” as a deluded god who thinks he created other beings because
they appeared after him in a new empty world during the cyclical expansion of the universe. I
guess if you did not read anything else in the dhamma taught by the Buddha concerning Maha
Brahma this may appear as a “mocking” of the Brahmanical deity. But Gombrich fails to
consider that the Buddha, himself, claims he was the Maha Brahma “God” seven times, and
would appear in an empty abode as Maha Brahma each time the universe expanded during seven
cycles of expansion and contraction. 14 So it appears that the Buddha was mocking himself rather
than the Brahmins, if he was mocking anyone at all, and it is much more likely that the Buddha
was describing the actual cosmology as he experienced it in the Brahmajala and Agganna Suttas
rather than a joke of any sort.

13
Angutarra Nikaya 10.177; PTS, A v 269.
14
Itivutaka 22, Group of Ones, Khudakka Nikaya; PTS, Iti 1-19.

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The Jains, according to Gombrich, were also subjected to put-downs, although Gombrich backs
completely away from the joke or satire argument he made concerning the Brahmins. But when
one reads the actual sutta cited by Gombrich in support of his argument – the Cula Dukkha-
kkhandha Sutta – one can’t help but notice the Buddha’s compassion for the suffering of the
Jains performing certain austerities. How can anyone sit and watch someone standing for days in
the same spot, in which they are visibly suffering from sharp and extreme pain caused by this
austerity? The Buddha simply made them think about the kammic connection to the austerity
they were performing and the evil deed – if they did any – and see that their kamma is not
actually improved by the austerity and may become worse. This sound advice appears to be an
effort to pull them up spiritually rather than put them down, as they were obviously doing great
damage to their bodies and were suffering greatly as a result.

The other point that must be stressed about the very idea of the Buddha putting down anyone in a
mocking way is that this violates the Buddha’s numerous discourses on right speech. Gombrich
does not discuss right speech at all in his book, which is another glaring omission since his
argument is essentially that the Buddha engaged in wrong speech. The salient principle in right
speech is that one’s words are always helpful to one’s spiritual condition, even if they are a bit
biting at times because of their truthfulness. In a famous discourse on right speech contained in
the Abhaya Sutta, 15 the Jain leader – Nigantha Nataputta (Mahavira) – tried to trick the Buddha
by getting him to say that he would never say words that are unendearing and disagreeable to
others, and then trip the Buddha up with his own words when he said that Devadatta – a
wayward monk – was headed for hell. Nigantha sent a young prince – Prince Abhaya – to do his
bidding, but when the Prince asked the Buddha whether he would ever say words that were
unendearing and disagreeable to others, instead of the Buddha saying, no, he said, “Prince, there
is no categorical yes-or-no answer to that.” The Buddha then used an analogy of a baby with a
rock stuck in their throat, and asked the Prince would he draw blood to dislodge the rock. The
Prince, said, yes, and the Buddha then gave his famous discourse on the elements of right
speech.

On the whole, What the Buddha Thought is worth reading as a case study on why certain
academic discourse is unhelpful to the practicing Buddhist. A non-practicing scholar invariably
misses much of what the Buddha thought because they have no spiritual context in which to
properly frame his teachings. Gombrich does better than most, but his shortcomings as a
Buddhist commentator are exposed in this review, and much of this is not attributable to neglect
but to non-practice and an academy that rewards individual argument that appeals to a scientific
orientation rather than serious spiritual discourse. While this approach may be more appropriate
in religious studies of spiritual practices that are blind-faith at their core, the Buddha’s specific
call for one to use one’s own direct knowledge through experience requires spiritual engagement
with his teachings to glean the most from them and discover first-hand what the Buddha thought
and be liberated as a result from that which makes one suffer.
15
Majjhima Nikaya 58; PTS, M i 392.

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