GROUP 3 People vs. Encomienda, 46 SCRA 522 [No. L-26750] (Aug.

18, 1972) Elements of self-defense; When is there unlawful aggression; When is there reasonable means to prevent or repel aggression; When is there lack of sufficient provocation Facts: Appellant Encomienda was a farmer and a tenant of a Hacienda, in which a certain Severino Cabaral (Cabaral for brevity) served as Hacienda Overseers. In one occasion, Appellant Encomienda received an instruction from Cabaral to vacate the land he was tilling. The former was advised by the latter to vacate the land for several times until a heated conversation relative to the right of Cabaral to eject a co-tenant in the Hacienda transpired. During said arguments, Cabaral became angry. He drew his revolver but the Appellant managed to struggle for the revolver, which during said struggle fired four times continuously. To prevent Cabaral from using the revolver, the Appellant, in various occasions during the struggle for revolver, hacked Cabaral with his bolo. After said incident, Cabaral even managed wash his wound using the facilities of the Appellant. Appellant personally surrendered himself together with the revolver of Cabaral and his bolo before the proper authorities. Issue: Is the act done by Appellant Encomienda is an act of self-defense. Held: Yes, the act done by the Appellant is an act of self-defense. A legitimate selfdefense exists, when (1) there is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) There is reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Illegal Aggression, according to the Court, is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind. There is unlawful aggression when there is danger to the life or personal safety of the person defending himself. There is a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack when a person, while in an imminent danger of life or personal safety, acted in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. Provocation, on the other hand, exists when a person, without any justifiable means, execute an act which my bring danger to the life or personal safety of the other. In this case, all elements of self-defense exist. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the appellant considering that at the onset, he was merely justifying his stay in the land, which is the only source of his livelihood. Appellant was merely forced and provoked to defend himself against Cabaral when the latter unreasonably and unjustifiably drew his revolver.

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GROUP 3 People vs. Santos, 255 SCRA 309 [G.R. No. 99259-60] (March 29, 1996) When no more unlawful aggression, claim of self-defense not acceptable Facts: Valentino Guevarra in a torn and bloodstained shirt went to his closed friend and compadre, Francisco Lacsa, requested the latter to intervene in settling his dispute with Emmanuel Santos. Lacsa, being a Barangay Tanod and knowing Emmanuel personally readily acceded with Guevarra. Both Francisco and Valentino proceeded to the house of Emmanuel for the sole purpose of talking to him, but were greeted by the latter with a bow and arrow. Fearing for their lives, they retreated and ran a distance when tricycle carrying appellant and others overtook them. The accused and his cohorts alighted from the tricycle and attacked Valentino with a bolo causing him to fall face down. Thereupon, appellant repeatedly stabbed and hacked the wounded body of Valentino using his samurai. The two unidentified men who were armed with ordinary knives also took turns in stabbing Valentino. Meanwhile, Emmanuel arrived at the scene of the crime and pointed his bow and arrow at Francisco. The appellant, together with his cohorts turned their fury on Francisco, and stabbed and hacked the latter, until the same managed to run towards the nearby compound where a security guard fired a shot in the air to scare off the assailants. Francisco did survive, but Valentino died as a consequence of the multiple wounds inflicted upon him. The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal for the crime of "Murder" for killing Valentino Guevarra and "Frustrated Murder" of failure in killing Francisco Lacsa; thus this appeal. Issue: Whether or not act done by Emilio Santos fall within the defense of relative under Art.11 par.2 of the RPC, as amended. Held: The defense miserably failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Francisco and Valentino against appellant's father thereby prompting appellant to act in his defense. The law provides that, defense of a relative is one of the circumstances that justify the commission of a crime and exculpate the accused from criminal liability provided that the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein. In the event that not all of the aforementioned requisites are attendant, the accused shall be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative pursuant to Article 13 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court has consistently held that for the claim of incomplete defense of a relative to prosper, it is essential to prove the primordial element of unlawful aggression. If there is no
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unlawful aggression there would be nothing to prevent or repel. In that event, there could be no defense, complete or incomplete. In this case, the testimony of the appellant himself belies the claim that he merely acted to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression that was being committed by Francisco and Valentino against his father. His unequivocal statements in open court lead to the conclusion that assuming arguendo that Francisco and Valentino had indeed attacked appellant's father, this attack had ceased completely by the time the appellant confronted the duo. Otherwise stated, when appellant stabbed and hacked Francisco, there no longer was any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel. GROUP 3 People vs. Moral SCRA 474 [No. L-31139] (Oct. 12, 1984) When defense of relative not available

Facts: Teodora Case descended from their second floor apartment to answer a call of nature at their backyard. He was followed by the accused Renato Moral, who without any provocation, stabbed the decease saying: Yayariin kita; that when Teodoro tried to escape by running away, he was pursued by Renato Moral and Alexander Moral who took turns in stabbing him, as a result of which, he fell to the ground. Teodoro was lying prostrate on the ground, Abraham Antonio hit him on the head with a bottle and a stone. Not to be outdone, Leopoldo Pedrigosa also hit the victim on various parts of his body with a stone, and that it was only when Renato Moral said: Bagsak na iyan. Patay na iyan that they stopped. Teodoro died and the State charged Renato Moral, as principal, and Leopoldo Pedrigosa and Abraham Antonio, as accomplices, of the crime of murder committed. Issue: Whether or not accused Abraham Antonio can invoked defense of stranger Held: The defense of Abraham Antonio that he acted in defense of stranger is untenable. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of deceased Teodoro Case since it was the accused Renato Moral who stabbed the deceased without any provocation and, hence, the aggressor. There was also no reasonable necessity of the means employed since the deceased was unarmed at the time, and was already lying prostrate on the ground and bleeding from his wounds inflicted upon him by Alexander Moral and Renato Moral when the accused Abraham Antonio hit him with a stone. Accordingly, the accused Abraham Antonio cannot be said to have legally acted in defense of a stranger when he hit the deceased with a stone. In order to invoke defense of strangers, the accused must prove unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused; that there was a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

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GROUP 3 People vs. Genosa, 419 SCRA 537 [G.R. No. 135981] (Jan. 15, 2004) Parricide; Self-defense; Battered Woman Syndrome applied; Definition of battered woman; what is cycle of violence Facts: Appellant Marivic Genosa, married to Ben Genosa with whom she begot three (3) children, was charged with parricide for killing her husband, using a metal pipe, while the latter was sleeping. Prior to said incident, Appellant andher husband had frequently quarrel, which for various occasions, resulted into abuse and physical violence. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband. When she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appellant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension. The Appellant also testified that during her marriage, she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, However, Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant, with a plea of self defense, admitted the killing of her husband. She was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and was sentence with the penalty of death. The Appellant petition the judgment of the trial court, claiming that she is a battered wife; her act was an act of self defense; and that said incident falls within the justifying circumstances. Issue: Whether or not the appellants contention is tenable. Held: No. Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the one who resorts to selfdefense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. In the present case there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had

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ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. As to the appellant contention under the theory of battered woman syndrome (BWS), the court held that a battered wife is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman." The BWS is characterized by the socalled "cycle of violence," which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. In this case, Appellant fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence". No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. GROUP 3 People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 [L-33466-67] (April 20, 1983) Defense of property when there is unlawful aggression on property Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. Fleischer and Co., the company of Fleischers family, was involved in a legal battle with Narvaez and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. Defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain). On June 25, 1968, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didnt pay rent and was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He asked them to stop destroying his house and asked if they could talk things over. Fleischer and Rubia still proceeded. Narvaez lost his equilibrium, and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Issue: Wether or not CFI erred in convicting Narvaez despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person Held: No. Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites must occur: (1) Unlawful aggression, (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it (3)
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Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victims since the latter cannot claim rights to property since the ownership of the land was still in question. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. As to the second requisite, the killing was disproportionate to the attack when the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing the victims. The third element of defense of property is present, there was no provocation at all on his part since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. Thus, the appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims. Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property.

GROUP 3 Frias vs. People, 130 SCRA 1 [L-65762] (June 23, 1984) Fulfillment of duty as justifying circumstance Facts: Tacas was awakened from his sleep by the sound of gunfire followed by cries of a neighbor for help; he stood up, looked out of the window, saw Pajela bleeding on top of a table about to be carried to his house; he grabbed his armalite rifle, went out of the house, saw Bartolome Arellano with a shotgun leaving Pajela's yard. Frias was also awakened when he heard a loud explosion coming from the eastern side of his house went down and saw Tacas, his father-in-law, calling upon Arellano to surrender, Arellano was in the street proceeding towards the RIC marker, and Arellano was armed with a "bulldog" shotgun. Tacas who was wearing brief and sleeveless shirt went after him, fired a warning shot, and asked Arellano to surrender, and then fired another warning shot but Arellano refused to surrender and tried to elude arrest and pointed his gun at Tacas. Tacas had very little choice but to use his weapon. Arellano and Tacas fired simultaneously. As a consequence Tacas survived in the incident but Arellano died. P/Cpl. GERVACIO TACAS and JOSE FRIAS, JR. are charged with the crime of Murder. Issue: W/N the killing was justified by the defense of fulfillment of duty. Held:

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The Court ruled that Gervacio Tacas acted in the fulfillment of a duty and in the legitimate exercise of his authority. The information clearly states that the crime was committed by the Tacas in relation to his office as a policeman. In fact, according to Paguirigan, Arellano and Tacas fired simultaneously. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that Tacas should not have fired at all. As his life was in peril, his judgment cannot be questioned. The RPC provides any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." The requisites of the defense of fulfillment of duty are: (1) that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or duty; (2) that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right. Gervacio Tacas ACQUITTED of the crime charged. For insufficiency of evidence, Jose Frias, Jr. is also ACQUITTED

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