Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea Region: An Unequal Partnership?

Alexander Jackson1
The Black Sea region is the key area in which Turkey and Russia interact. As post-imperial powers which retain extensive military, political, economic and cultural influence in the region, they have the ability to significantly affect regional geopolitics. Therefore understanding their bilateral relationship, and the extent to which one partner is dominant in different aspects of that relationship, is critical for any comprehensive understanding of regional dynamics. This paper studies four key aspects of their bilateral relationship and finds that Turkeys economic and energy dependence on Russia ensures that Moscow is the dominant player in the region. The Black Sea region remains a contested concept, but the dominant positions of Turkey and Russia within this space are undoubted. Their geopolitical, military, economic and cultural influence gives them the capability to shape the region in a way which outside actors do not. Given this, the relationship between them is critical to understanding the Black Sea region. The changing dynamics of competition and cooperation between the two powers has historically had an enormous influence on the area. Although neither is now an imperial power, the same dynamics are still significant today: the bilateral relationship helps to determine the multilateral environment. This paper will not dwell on each aspect of the Moscow-Ankara relationship. Instead it will identify key areas of conflict and cooperation. However, it is useful to summarise the main contours of their bilateral relationship. Historically, relations between the two were tense, with the Black Sea region serving as a zone of conflict and confrontation between them (a western version of the Great Game which Russia played with Britain in Central Asia). Since the end of the Cold War, ties have greatly improved, particularly in the Putin/AKP era a remarkably significant historical shift2. There are four main aspects to their relationship. Firstly, energy has been a critical component. Russia provides around 70% of Turkeys natural gas and oil, which is essential to support the countrys economic boom 3. Russia is also investing heavily in Turkeys energy infrastructure and is heavily involved in building nuclear power stations in Turkey. Secondly, the two sides are close economic partners, even excluding energy4. Russia became Turkeys largest trading partner in 2008; mutual trade is now around $26 billion, in which tourism, construction, and small-scale shuttle trade are prominent. Turkey runs a serious deficit: Turkish imports from Russia were $21.6 billion in 2010, whilst Turkish exports to Russia were just $4.6 billion5.
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The author is an independent writer and analyst focusing on the Caspian region. He currently acts as a political risk consultant. 2 Punsmann, B (2010) Thinking about the Caucasus as a Land Bridge between Turkey and Russia TEPAV Policy Note. Available at: http://bit.ly/rtVeML 3 Turkey, Russia accelerate cooperation Hrriyet Daily News 19/1/12011 4 Kiniklioglu, S (2006) Turkey and Russia: Partnership By Exclusion? Insight Turkey Vol. 8 No.2. Available at: http://bit.ly/qfK4yS 5 Russia becomes Turkish exporters target market with visa-free travel Todays Zaman 24/4/2011. 1

Thirdly, both sides share an interest in maintaining security in the Black Sea region. At a basic level this involves a joint desire to prevent non-conventional and inconsequential threats such as terrorism, weapons proliferation and drug smuggling. However, it also involves refraining from becoming involved in disputes which the other is involved in. Thus Russia has ended its earlier support for Kurdish separatists, and Turkey has clamped down on Chechen rebels based in Turkey. Fourthly and most broadly, both Russia and Turkey seek to cooperate politically and limit the intrusion of Western powers into the Black Sea region. The extent to which they seek to do this, and the extent to which they cooperate (as a Moscow-Ankara axis), is hotly contested. Clearly, Russian opposition to encirclement by Western blocs is stronger than that of NATO member and EU aspirant Turkey. This aspect of their relationship, which acts as a conditioning framework on other aspects, fluctuates with internal politics, regional geopolitics, and most crucially the status of relations between both parties and the West. As Turkeys relationship with its traditional allies has faltered, Russia has become a more attractive partner. In that regard the March 2003 decision by the Turkish Parliament to prevent US forces from entering Iraq via Turkey is widely seen as a watershed, a sign that Turkey was willing to defy its traditional partners. This paper assesses four key aspects and events of the Russia-Turkish relationship, identifying areas in which the balance of power dynamics are equal and areas in which one party has been able to exercise significant influence over the other. The Russia-Georgia War There is no better illustration of the regional tension between Turkey and Russia than the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Turkey was faced with a major conventional war between two of its Black Sea neighbours; one of its biggest regional commercial and political partners on the one hand, and its immediate neighbour and a valuable strategic ally on the other. Ankara was therefore in a deeply uncomfortable position. Its response was restrained and cautious during the conflict itself. Turkish officials limited themselves to statements calling for a ceasefire, avoiding any measure of blame. After the end of hostilities the polarisation of the regional community into two camps, pro-Russian and pro-Georgian, continued. In the immediate post-war period Turkey made two decisions which encapsulate its approach in the Black Sea region and the complexities of its relationship with Russia. Firstly, immediately after the end of hostilities Turkish officials proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP), which would serve as a mechanism to solve regional problems through dialogue. Despite some concerns in Moscow that Turkey was using the CSCP to increase its influence, Russia broadly welcomed the move, approving of its regional focus to problemsolving (i.e. it excluded non-regional players like the EU and US)6. One analyst notes approvingly that this increased Turkish influence in the Caucasus without putting TurkeyRussia relations at risk7. The CSCP appears to be moribund, as the regions complex and overlapping conflicts make it almost impossible that a forum containing all the key players could be established.
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Punsmann, B (2009) The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability p4. ICBSS Policy Brief 13. Available at: http://bit.ly/o910FC 7 Beat, M (2009), Turkey and Russia Meet in the Caucasus Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol 8. No. 3. Available at: http://bit.ly/nP9nNb 2

Nonetheless, Turkeys willingness to propose this mechanism shows that it was seeking to address regional instability in a way which was inclusive. It sought to include, not exclude, Russia from regional security arrangements despite serious concerns about Russias willingness to destroy the regional status quo and threaten Turkeys interests. However, the failure of the CSCP and Turkeys inability to improve Russia-Georgia ties at the bilateral level indicates that good intentions are simply not enough. This was not a situation which Turkey wanted to find itself in, and in that sense the CSCP was an exercise in damage limitation, underscoring the imbalances in the Ankara-Moscow relationship. Russia acted, contrary to Turkeys interests; Turkey was forced to react. The second, related decision which Turkey made was to publicly acknowledge the extent of its dependence on Russia in trade and energy. A trade dispute flared up shortly after the war, widely believed to have been orchestrated by Russia to show displeasure with Turkeys decision to allow US warships delivering aid to Georgia through the Bosphorus, in alleged violation of the Montreux Convention of 1936 which governs access to the Black Sea8. Prime Minister Erdoan said bluntly that Turkey could not afford such disruption in ties with Russia Otherwise, we would be left in the dark9. He underscored that message by saying that It would not be right for Turkey to be pushed toward any side... One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkeys national interests require10. This stance was realistic but remarkably candid, and illustrated that Turkeys actions are constrained by its reliance on Russian energy. Indeed, Turkish policy throughout the RussiaGeorgia war demonstrated the inequalities in the partnership. The Armenia-Turkey Thaw Another critical aspect of the relationship involves the Turkish thaw with Armenia, Russias closest ally in the South Caucasus. The border has been closed since 1993 when Turkey closed it in solidarity with Azerbaijan, then fighting Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Efforts to repair ties had been slow since then. However the August war gave an added urgency to the reconciliation process, as Turkey sought to promote stability and reduce possibilities for conflict across the region. The thaw began in September 2008 and culminated with the October 2009 signing of protocols aimed at opening the border and restoring relations. Since then the process has foundered, largely due to nationalist politics within both Turkey and Armenia. Progress is unlikely to occur without concurrent movement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Turkish government cannot move forward with Armenia whilst the status of the Karabakh conflict remains unchanged; Armenias leaders cannot, politically, restore ties with Turkey and make sacrifices over Karabakh at the same time. Russias stated support for the rapprochement raised eyebrows among analysts. The conventional wisdom is that Russia seeks to maintain the frozen status of Karabakh - and, by extension, the impasse between Ankara and Yerevan - in order to maintain its influence in Armenia. This includes security (the Russian military base at Gyumri) economics (Russian
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Jenkins, G (2008) Ongoing Trade Crisis Demonstrates Turkeys Lack of Leverage Against Russia Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor 9/9/2008. 9 Torbakov (2008) p15. 10 Aliriza, B (2008) Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus p2. CSIS Commentary. Available at: http://bit.ly/q4ytEn 3

firms control large chunks of Armenias strategic infrastructure) and geopolitics (Armenia acts as one of the bastions of Russian post-imperial power in the Black Sea region). After the Russia-Georgia war this calculus seemed to have changed. At the fraught, touch-andgo signing ceremony in Zurich, Russias Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov allegedly pressured his reluctant Armenian counterpart into signing the protocols11. This vignette illustrates that Russian involvement was not confined to passive approval: Moscow gave active support to a reconciliation process which was initiated and driven by Ankara. Partly this support like Russias sudden intensification of direct diplomacy to settle the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict - was intended to restore Russias image, which was severely damaged by the war with Georgia. However this is only part of the story: substantive politics is always more important for the Kremlin than its international standing, and it seems that it Russia was keen to promote stability in the Black Sea region for its own sake. The question may be asked whether Turkey would have been able to initiate the thaw without Russian approval, which leads to the inference that the process collapsed because of meddling from Russia. However despite Moscows significant influence, it does could not easily derail the rapprochement. The only possibility would be to punish Turkey or Armenia bilaterally, by cutting economic contacts or energy supplies. This is not impossible, given Russias use of energy as a weapon, but would be unlikely given the low stakes involved (compared with, say, the Georgia war). In any case the collapse of the thaw occurred because of domestic political opposition in Ankara and Yerevan, not Russian meddling. The implications for the status of the Turkey-Russia partnership are clear. This thaw was Turkish-led, with Russia playing only a passive role. Although the process has now stalled (seemingly for the long term), success would have had significant impacts on Black Sea geopolitics and Russias position. The thaw should be seen as an instance when Turkey and not Russia was the defining force in the region. Black Sea Maritime Security The Black Sea is a unique maritime space. Unlike most other seas, it is accessible only through a narrow channel under Turkish control. Under the Montreux Convention of 1936, all nonmilitary vessels enjoy free passage during times of peace. However the size, tonnage, and duration of non-littoral warships is closely regulated12. The Montreux Convention has been upheld in the post-Cold War era not only because of a Turkish desire to maintain its influence over Black Sea access; Russia has also supported the Convention in order to limit NATOs presence in its southern rim. Both Moscow and Ankara are therefore agreed on the need to maintain the status quo. However, their varying commitment to this goal, and differing security perceptions, affect their bilateral relationship. In addition the exclusion of outside actors because littoral states can provide for their own security calls for a very particular understanding of security, by which is meant security for the few (strongest) regional players, which then impose their interests on everyone else13.
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Report: Nalbandian signed deal at Lavrovs insistence Todays Zaman 13/10/2009. Karadeniz, B (2007) Security and Stability Architecture in the Black Sea Perceptions Winter 2007. Available at: http://bit.ly/p9ipRA 13 Dubovyk, V (2011) Should Europe Care About Black Sea Security? PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 138. Available at: http://bit.ly/pceKQn
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The security mechanisms and fora which have emerged are limited to littoral states as a direct consequence of the Montreux Convention and the shared interest of Russia and Turkey in limiting non-riparian access. The most significant is BLACKSEAFOR, a Turkish-led initiative set up in 2001. It is a naval task force comprising ships from the littoral states which conducts biannual exercises and serves to protect against soft security threats like organised crime, terrorism and weapons trafficking. In a practical sense BLACKSEAFOR has achieved little because there the threats present are low-key and not suited to being addressed by conventional navies, most of which are ageing collections of former Soviet vessels14. The same is true of Black Sea Harmony, a Turkish-led initiative established in 2004 as an anti-terrorism initiative, analogous to NATOs Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. However, with regard to Russia and Turkey, BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony provide an opportunity for the Black Seas two largest navies to interact and become familiar with each other - confidence-building measures. The initiative provides a platform for them to operate on equal terms, despite the fact that Russias Black Sea Fleet is superior to Turkeys Northern Sea Area Command15. Although both are increasing their naval forces in the Black Sea, this is not indicative of a regional arms race, and their shared participation in multilateral fora provides an avenue to share information and reduce any grounds for miscommunication. In both of these initiatives Turkey and Russia cooperate successfully and on an equal footing. However there remains tension over non-littoral access to the Black Sea. In the immediate aftermath of the Russia-Georgia War Moscow criticised Ankara after it permitted three US warships to enter the Black Sea and stop in Georgia to deliver humanitarian aid. Russia warned Turkey that if the warships overstayed the 21 days provided for by the Convention, or were in fact carrying military supplies for Georgia, it would hold Turkey responsible16. Ultimately Turkey upheld the Montreux Convention: it denied access to two US hospital ships which earlier sought to access the Black Sea, as they violated tonnage requirements, and it ensured that NATO warships left the area before the 21 days expired. However, it came at a time when Moscow was blocking Turkish trucks from entering Russia, ostensibly because of a technical trade dispute. Russias sharp response and warnings to Turkey demonstrate that, although Turkey is responsible for the Bosphorus, Russia also sees a role for itself in upholding the Montreux Convention. Flagrant violation of this by Turkey would be greeted by punitive Russian responses. Another example came in June 2011, when a US guided-missile cruiser entered the Black Sea to participate in bilateral exercises with Ukraine. The USS Monterrey is within the tonnage requirements of the Montreux Convention and Russias objection was not specifically framed with the Convention in mind, but rather focused on the sensitivity on the region. It was viewed as a significant intrusion into an area which Moscow likes to view as a Russo-Turkish lake. Russia can act on its vocal opposition to non-littoral forces present in the Black Sea. It has economic and political leverage over Turkey which it can use to ensure compliance with Montreux. Thus, although Turkey and Russia cooperate on an equal footing in ensuring
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The BLACKSEAFOR states acknowledged the low level of the threat in a 2005 risk assessment. Black Sea Peacebuilding Network (2010) The Black Sea Region In Turkish Foreign Policy Strategy: Russia & Turkey On The Black Sea p4. Available at: http://bit.ly/oJe8lq 16 Torbakov (2008) p14 5

maritime security, with regard to preventing non-littoral intrusion in the area, Moscow is the dominant partner. Although Turkey has control of the Bosphorus, Russia has sufficient leverage in other spheres to ensure that Ankara broadly adheres to Moscows reading of the Montreux Convention. Energy Russia is one of Turkeys biggest energy suppliers. It accounts for around 70% of Turkish gas and oil imports, is extensively investing in key energy infrastructure including nuclear power plants and gas storage terminals, and is working towards constructing new pipelines across Turkish soil. For Turkey that assistance has been a huge boon as it seeks to fuel its booming economy energy demand is forecasted to double from 2009 to 201917. Just as importantly, Turkey is seeking to become a regional energy hub at the crossroads of Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. Western-backed pipelines also play a role in Turkeys portfolio of pipelines: the BTC and BTE pipelines run from the Caucasus to eastern Turkey, whilst the planned Nabucco pipeline would bring significant quantities of natural gas from the Caspian region to Turkey. Some would be lifted off for domestic use whilst the rest would be sent on to Europe. However, Western-supported projects are limited in their use for Turkey. The quantities provided by existing pipelines are small. Although Nabucco would be more significant, they would not be game-changing and even more importantly they would not come on-stream for several years if at all. Unlike Europe (or the Arab world, where pipelines to Turkey have yet to materialise), Russia has a proven track record of delivering on large-scale energy projects, so it is a natural partner for Turkey. Talks are underway to expand the Blue Stream pipeline, which runs north-south through the Black Sea and emerges near the Turkish port of Samsun the expansion would run southwards to the Turkish Mediterranean, allowing Russia to export gas to countries in the Levant. Russia is also seeking to run its grandiose South Stream project (which would cross the Black Sea and enter Europe through Bulgaria or Romania) through Turkish territorial waters rather than those of Ukraine. Lastly but perhaps most significantly, Turkey has been calling for Russian inclusion in the Nabucco project. This position has also been stated by senior US officials involved in the region however, unlike Turkey, the US will not be directly receiving Nabuccos core output. Turkey will do, and including Moscow would defeat the object of diversifying European and Turkish gas supply away from Russia18. Turkish officials began to realise the risks associated with reliance on Russian energy following the gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. Moscows ability and willingness to cut off gas supplies for a combination of political and economic reasons was a serious lesson for other Gazprom customers. Russia has also used energy as a political weapon against Turkmenistan, Georgia and the Baltics, which reiterates the message. The Turkish diversification strategy is intended to hedge against the prospect of such a cut-off, using increased gas imports from the Caspian region and Iran. However there are several issues with this plan. Firstly, pipelines from the Caspian and Iran run through insecure areas, and are often targeted by Kurdish militants. Although pipelines can be
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International Energy Agency (2009) Turkey 2009 Review p7. Available at: http://bit.ly/nFldx5 Nabucco partners call for Bakus participation News.az June 9 2011. 6

fixed relatively easily, this is not a fully secure energy supply. Secondly, Turkey currently lacks adequate gas storage facilities, meaning it is additionally vulnerable to supply fluctuations and reducing its ability to cope with any sudden Russian shut-offs19. Thirdly, other import sources pale in comparison to imports from Russia. Thus for the medium term Turkey will remain dependent on energy particularly gas from Russia. This leaves it extremely vulnerable to Russias politicisation of energy. To be clear, to date Russia has shown no inclination to turn off its exports to Turkey, which unlike other victims is not a former Soviet state and may be considered a more risky target. Nonetheless in a serious crisis in relations a cut-off could not be ruled out. Erdoans statement cited above, that Turkey would be left in the dark if it angered Russia, indicates that Ankara does take this seriously and acts accordingly. Turkeys reliance on Russian energy, therefore, is a direct constraint on its political freedom of movement, and illustrates the extent of Russian leverage. Conclusions The examples cited above do not fully cover the relationship between Russia and Turkey. However, they do comprise some of the key aspects and current trends which affect their relationship and, thus, the wider Black Sea region. The most critical point is that Turkish dependence on Russian energy and their wider economic ties, as well as Russias clear willingness to use all instruments (including military force) to achieve its goals, are strong constraints on Turkish action in the Black Sea region. The Georgia war put Turkey in a corner. Russian forces threatened the South Caucasus transport and energy corridor which Turkey and Georgia had built up over several years; Russia made stark warnings about upholding the Montreux Convention; blocked Turkish trucks; and blamed Turkey for training Georgian forces. Turkeys response was passive and reflected its economic dependence on Russia. The CSCP proposal acceded to Moscows demand that non-regional players be excluded from peacemaking, essentially allowing Moscow and Ankara to dictate regional settlements. The Turkish-Armenian thaw was different. Driven by Turkey, it received Russian approval and indicated that Moscow was not all-powerful in the region. Although Moscows support may have been part of a convoluted Machiavellian scheme, in reality Russia was simply eager to reduce regional tensions and was happy to back Turkeys initiative. There is also a degree of equality in Black Sea maritime security. The Black Seas tightly controlled access makes it an area with few security threats, and one where Turkey and Russia can cooperate easily and equally. However, their slightly differing approaches to non-littoral forces in the region is a cause for tension and Russia can and does pressure Turkey to accede to its own criteria for Black Sea access. The extent of Russian influence over Turkey in the Black Sea region ensures that this is not an equal partnership. Russian and Turkish interests have coincided in the past few years, but this has had much to do with their mutual dissatisfaction with the West and their growing economic relationship. It is by no means necessarily permanent. Changes in government in either state, a realignment of international geopolitics or a major energy dispute would cause the tensions and inequalities of their relationship to emerge in the Black Sea region.

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Conversation with energy expert based in Istanbul, June 2011. 7