A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy Author(s): Michael McFaul Reviewed work(s): Source:

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A Precarious Peace
DomesticPolitics theMakingof in RussianForeign Policy

Michael McFaul

Thiroughout the historyof the modem world,domestic regimechange-be it democratization, autocratization, decolonization, decommunization, federal dissolution, coups, or revolutions-hasoftentriggered international conflict and war. When a regime changes, decaying institutions from ancienregime the competewith new rulesofthegameto shapepolitical in competition ambiguous ways.This uncertain context provides for opportunities political actors, bothnewand old, to pursuenew strategies achieving for their objectives, including belligerent policiesagainstboth domestic and international In desperation, foes. losers from regime changemayresort violence maintain to to their former privileges. Such internal conflicts becomeinternational whentheseinterest wars groups who benefited from old ordercall upon their the allies to intervene their on behalf strike against or out their enemies a meanstoshoreup their as domestic In legitimacy. the name of democracy, independence, revolution, the the or the of nation, beneficiaries regime changealso can resort violenceagainst to bothdomestic international and to opponents securetheir new gains. The protracted regimetransformation underway in Russia seems like a probable precipitant international of conflict. Overthelastdecade,old political institutions collapsedwhilenew democratic have institutions yetto be have consolidated. Concurrently, political and figures, organizations, interest groups that benefited from old Sovietorder the haveincurred lossesin thenew heavy The new, ambiguousinstitutional Russian polity. context also has allowed militant, imperialist political to entrepreneurs assumesalient rolesin Russian on politics. Reflecting Russia'songoing regime EdwardMansfield and change, have hypothesized JackSnyder that"stateslike contemporary Russia that make thebiggest leap in democratization-from autocracy extensive total to

Michael McFaulis an Assistant in DepartmentPolitical at Science Stanford Professor the of University, where alsohasappointments Hoover he at the Institution theCenter International and and for Security Arms Control. alsois a Senior He at Associate the Endowment International Peace. Carnegie for
I would like to thank Chip Blacker,JimGoldgeier, Andrew Kuchins, Donna Norton, Stephen Sestanovich,and two anonymous reviewers for helpful commentson earlier presentationsand drafts thisarticle.My participation a workshopin July1997,sponsoredjointly the Moscow of in by Carnegie Center and the magazine Businessin Russia, called "The Foreign Policies of Russian valuable in the preparationof this article. Corporations"also was extremely International Vol. Security, 22,No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), 5-35 pp. and of i 1997bythePresident Fellows Harvard Institute Technology. of Collegeand theMassachusetts

International Security 22:3 | 6

mass democracy-areabout twiceas likely fight to wars in thedecade after democratization are statesthatremain as autocracies."l And yet,Russia has not erupted intocivilwar or fought international an war in the last decade. Of course,its transition from communism been has withoutbursts violent of a showdown punctuated conflict, including military in a between Sovietand Russiangovernments August1991, bloodybattle the in and of between legislative executive the branches government October 1993, war in Chechnya 1994.Whencompared to and thetragic begunin December howregime changesin other greatpowersoverthelasttwohundred years, Russia'sdramatic has and ever, regime change beenrelatively peaceful has not a conflict. triggered majorinternational Whynot? of in The answerhas to do withtheideas and interests thewinners Russia's Whiletheunconsolidated institutions Russia'snew polity of regime transition. have provided context old interest a that have groupsor new militants might bothat homeand abroad, thesepotenexploited pursuebelligerent to policies tial war-prone politicalforceshave not assumed power in Russia to date. Instead,politicalleaders,politicalorganizations, economicgroupsthat and have had bothnormative material and in interests international cooperation rather thaninternational conflict haveprevailed. Though challenged several at critical Russianliberals-defined heremostminimally thosecomas junctures, to mitted markets, trade, free individual and defeated rights, democracy-have their illiberal transition.2 opponents duringmostof Russia'svolatileregime in Theirvictories, turn, have ensuredthatRussiahas pursuedpeaceful, intewithall democratic grationist policies states(as well as withmostother nonthanbelligerent democratic states) rather strategies. In underscoring importance liberal the in of victories Russianpolitics, this thatRussia'srelatively argument suggests peacefulbehaviorin the internationalsystem notbeentheconsequence thenormative institutional has of and constraints outlinedin the democratic the peace thesis.3 Rather, absenceof
1. EdwardD. Mansfield Jack and Snyder, "Democratization theDangerofWar," Michael and in Brown, SeanLynn-Jones, Steven and Miller, eds.,Debating Democratic (Cambridge, the Peace Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 302. p. 2. Liberalism a sweeping is withhundreds different concept of in meanings various geographic and historical contexts. thisarticle, minimalist In this definition been adoptedin orderto has of narrow focus inquiry. Russian the On liberalism, thejournal, see a monthly Otkryta, publication v Russianliberalism; Sbornik devotedto explaining YuryKrasheninnikov, LiberalizmRossii: ed., Statei (Moscow:"Znak,"1993);and BorisYeltsin, "Bydem vmeste!'Rossiiskaya Gazeta, July 1-7, 1996, 2. p. 3. Someofthemostimportant statements thisdebate, on including reprint Michael a of Doyle's seminal essay, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, Foreign and Affairs," be found Brown, can in Lynn-Jones, and Miller, Debating Democratic the Peace.In addition thearticles thisvolume, also John to in see

A Precarious Peace| 7

international conflict involving Russiahas beenmuchmorecontingent, resulting primarily from particular outcomesof domestic So political battles. far, Russianpolitical leadersand economic in groupswithan interest peace have but stayedin power, their past victories werenotinevitable their and future hold on power is not certain. Different outcomesin the future, it the be electoral of victory a nationalist leaderor thepolitical resurgence a more of belligerent interest group like the army, could undermine Russia's current amiablebutprecarious towardother disposition liberal states. To developthissetofarguments aboutthedomestic of determinants Russian foreign thisarticle policy, proceedsas follows. The nextsection outlines the causalrelationship between domestic and international regime change conflict, giving particular attention thebelligerent to capacity democratizing of states. The third section an of from provides overview Russia'stransition communist rule,focusing first the belatedemergence democratic on of institutions and thenon thechanging balanceofpowerbetween winners losersin Russia's and The economic revolution. fourth section discusseshow theinstitutions, ideas, and interest created Russia'srevolution haveinfluenced Russian groups during In Russianpolicyregarding Westand theComthe foreign policy. particular, of monwealth Independent States(CIS) is discussed.Thoughnot a foreign interest policyissue,theinterplay and domestic amonginstitutions, groups, from is politicsin the decisionto invade and withdraw Chechnya also addressedas an exampleofRussia'spotential botha belligerent as powerand a The summarizes theoretical policy the peacefuldemocracy. finalsection and implications Russia'speaceful of transition. regime

Domestic and War Regime Change International

Domestic instability frequently causesinternational instability. breakdown The of democratic in earlier thiscentury in regimes Spain and Germany precipitatedinternationalized and wars,one of localizeddestruction one of world destruction.4 theUnitedStates From twohundred yearsago to India,Algeria,
Oneal and Bruce Russett,"The Classical Liberals Were Right:Democracy,Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985,International StudiesQuarterly, 41, No. 2 (1997), pp. 267-294; Bruce Bueno Vol. de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domesticand International Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1992); David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists:Democratic States and War," American Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37; and Randall PoliticalScienceReview, Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War:Are Democracies More Pacific?"World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 235-269. 4. JuanLinz, The Breakdown Democratic of Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, Reequilibrium and (Baltimore, Md.: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1978).

International Security 22:3 | 8

and Vietnam decadesago, decolonization has in just recurrently resulted domestic conffict international Similarly, and war. movestodismantle communist regimes, it in Hungary 1956or theformer be in Yugoslavia theend ofthe at Revolutions 1980s, have producedinternationalized conflict. a mayrepresent kind of regimechangemostproneto war,as social revolutions strategic in countries suchas France, Russia,China,and Iranoften have producedinterstate The also points theopposite in as wars.5 causalarrow direction, interstate in warshave precipitated domestic states.6 regime changes warring Domesticregimechangeand international have been so intertwined war historically the analytic that distinction betweeninternational security and domestic should be called into question.In the premodern security world, regime transitions from smallmercantile statesto largemilitary statesrepresented ofthemaincausesofinterstate In themodemworld, scale one war.7 the in ofinternational that in strife followed regime changes France theeighteenth or and century, Russia,Germany, Italyin thetwentieth century, suggests that in alterations theinternal balanceofpowerofa givenstatemaybe one ofthe mostimportant causes of international war.8 In thelate twentieth the of century, belligerent propensities democratizing stateshave receivedspecial attention, of given thatso manycountries the worldare now undergoing democratic transitions.9 Consolidated democracies one the benefits interaction of rarely fight another. However, peaceful among democratic states result whiletheprocess getting this of to onlyin equilibrium, As and have equilibrium mayproducetheoppositeeffect. Mansfield Snyder do "Countries notbecomedemocracies Moretypically, argued, overnight. they
5. StephenM. Walt,Revolution War(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity and Press,1996);David Armstrong, Revolution World and Order: Revolutionary The in International U.K.: Society (Oxford, Clarendon, 1993); ThedaSkocpol, and A Comparative States Social and Revolutions: Analysis France, of Russia, China and (Cambridge, U.K.:Cambridge University Press, 1979). 6. BruceBueno de Mesquita, Randolph Silverson, GaryWoller, M. and "Warand the Fate of Regimes: Comparative A Analysis," American Political Science Review, 86, No. 3 (September Vol. 1992), 638-646. pp. 7. See Charles Tilly, and Coercion, Capital, European States Mass.:Blackwell, (Cambridge, 1990). 8. This hypothesis about the importance domestic of for politics understanding causes of the international seriously war challenges realist explanations warinthesamewaythat of "democratic peace" hypotheses realist of challenge explanations peace. 9. See Mansfield Snyder, and "Democratization theDangerofWar." this and In important article, theauthors and treat breakdown" twoperiods one as of implicitly "democratization" "democratic regime change, thiskindof categorization onlybe made after fact, transitions but can the as to democracies notalwaysbreak do down.Making distinction the between two these regime changes leavesopen thetheoretical possibility thosefactors lead to democratization notbe that that may thesamefactors lead todemocratic that breakdown. this In I a article,havechosen more expansive label-'regime change"-bothbecause it avoids the debateabout whether Russia shouldbe considered democratizing a state, and becausethecausal variables identified Mansfield by and in also can be found other in Snyder analyzing democratizing states kindsofregime changes.

A Precarious PeaceI 9

a transitional wheredemocratic control go through rocky period, overforeign is wheremasspolitics policy partial, mixesin a volatile waywithauthoritarian elitepolitics, wheredemocratization and In suffers reversals. thistransitional phase of democratization, countries becomemoreaggressive war-prone, and notless,and they fight do warswithdemocratic states."'10 thedemocratic Like peace debate,the correlation betweenregime changeand war maybe more obviousthanthecausalrelationship between two.1" absenceor underthe The development some features consolidated of of democracies offers of the part for explanation why democratizing statesare moreproneto war.Firstand the institutions new democracies of foremost, imperfect createa permissive context elitesto pursuepoliciesthatdo notnecessarily for reflect preferthe In encesof themajority. a statewithnew and weak democratic institutions, "thereis no reasonto expectthatmass politicswill producethe same imdemocracies.'12 the contrary, On pact on foreign policyas it does in mature Mansfieldand Snyder suggest the opposite-a more belligerent foreign policy. This oppositeeffect allowed by weak institutions, is caused by a is but secondcritical variable: belligerent the of preferences socialgroupsthatstand or to lose in theprocessofdemocratization regime transformation genmore In all regimechanges, incumbent the from ancienregime the erally. groups forfeit some degreeof powerand wealthwhilenew groupsgain new rights and privileges. Whenthreatened, the groupsfrom ancienregime mayseekto war.Likemaintain regainpowerthrough or extraordinary means,including from regime the to to their new wise,winners changemayresort force protect In internal counpowersand privileges. turn, wars-especiallyin strategic tries-can becomeinternational wars as the rulinggroupsfrom ancien the in regime usuallyhave allies in otherstateswho come to their aid.13 Victors regime changeas well as defenders the statusquo also are apt to pursue of from warsto distract attention domestic foreign problems. also can result from moreindirect a Belligerent foreign policies, however, causal pattern. the Duringthe processof regimetransition, politicalspace and becomestrategic of opens,new groups actors, theboundaries permissible
10. Ibid.,p. 301. 11. Eventhecorrelation debatable. is Mansfield Snyder and provide statistical showing data the this in correlation between democratization war.Onealand Russett and question correlation "The ClassicalLiberals WereRight." 12. Mansfield Snyder, and "Democratization theDangerofWar," 318. and p. 13. See HarryEckstein, Internal ed., War(London:The Free Press of Glencoe,1964);Henry A The Kissinger, World Restored: Politics Conservatism Revolutionary (New York: of in a Age Grosset and Dunlop,1964);and Walt, Revolution War. and

International 22:3 | 10 Security

ideologies expand.14In thisfluid context, belligerent foreign policiescan serve as a focal for that wouldnotbe formed. Weimar point newcoalitions otherwise is case. Mansfield Germany theparadigmatic Regarding contemporary Russia, and Snyderwritethat"foreign the policyis likewiseproviding glue foran 'red-brown' coalition nationalists neo-communists.!15 of and More emerging in an context which'bad generally, regime changecreates uncertain political leaders"can cometo thefore, and bad leaders"are usuallythecatalysts that turn potentially volatile situations open warfare.!16 into thatRussiandemocratization proneto produce is Thesearguments suggest international conflict, giventhatmanyof thesedestabilizing factors preare sent.First, Russia'sprotracted confrontational and transition from authoritarian rulehas produced institutions. WhileRussia'spolity weakdemocratic may in as constitute the qualify an electoral democracy-asystem whichelections meansforobtaining onlyviable and legitimate political power-this system stilllacksmanyof thecentral of features a consolidated, liberaldemocracy.17 standto changehas created manyloserswho might Second,Russia'sregime domesticconflict international as a means of or war gain fromprovoking their held powerand wealth.In fact, potential the recapturing previously for domestic and international strife shouldbe greater Russiathanother in cases ofdemocratization, Russia'stransition democracy beenaccompanied has as to to The by a simultaneous transition a market economy. breakdown theold of stateand thesimultaneous of and economic instituemergence new political in Russiaconstitute defining tions the of features a socialrevolution,kindof a has in regime changethatoften precipitated international conflict thepast.18 Russia'sregime a Third, changehas created political space fornew belligerent ideologiesand ideologues,ranging fromimperialists such as Vladimir

International Dimensions Internal of (Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 571. Conflict

14. See Jack Snyder and KarenBallentine, "Nationalism theMarketplace Ideas,"Internaand of tional Security, 21,No. 2 (Fall 1996), 5-40. Vol. pp. 15. Mansfield Snyder, and "Democratization theDangerofWar," 329. and p. 16. MichaelBrown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions Internal of in Conflict," Brown, The

17. On electoral versus liberal see "Is WaveOver?" democracies, Larry Diamond, theThird Journal ofDemocracy, 7, No. 3 (July Vol. 1996), 20-37. pp. 18. This definition revolution of follows from SamuelHuntington, Political Order Changing and Societies (New Haven,Conn.:Yale University On Press,1968),pp. 266-267. the application of revolutionary theories metaphors thestudy postcommunist and to of transitions, Charles see Tilly, Revolutions (New York: New YorkUniversity Press,1995);and MichaelMcFaul,"Revolutionary in Comparative Transformations Perspective: Defining Post-Communist a Research Agenda,"in Alexander Dallin(Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 1996), 167-196. pp.
David Holloway and Norman Naimark,eds., Reexamining SovietExperience: the Essays in Honorof European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford,U.K.: Basil Blackwell,1993); Nikki Keddie, ed., Debating

A Precarious Peace I11

Zhirinovsky Nazi followersincludingmembersof Russian National to YetRussia'sprotracted transition democracy notproduced belligto has the erent foreign policiespresaged Mansfield Snyder. by and Whilefragile democratic institutions offered permissive have a context elitesto dominate for the foreign policyprocesswithin Russia,so farliberalgroupswithan interest in peace-and especially new economic elitescreated through Russia'stransition to a market overilliberal economy-haveprevailed groups morepronetowar. Radical politicaland economicchange in Russia has producedleaders, political forces, and economic interest groupsthathave identified withand benefited fromliberalideas. Earlyin the transition, these politicalgroups of to liberal ideas as an ideology opposition overthrow Soviet the appropriated someofthesegroupsdevelopedmaterial to system. Later, incentives promote first at liberalideas, including and foremost markets home and integration withthe Western of democracies. Russia's community capitalist Throughout decade of regime change,no consensus emerged behindtheseliberalideas. of Rather, politics werepolarized between advocatesofchangeand defenders At the old Sovietsystem. everycritical political juncture thusfar, however, illiberalforces. these liberal As liberalforceshave succeededin defeating motivations avoidingwar, for groupshave had bothideational and material withliberal in Russia'sregime democracies theWest, especially changehas not led to belligerent international behavior. To understand how theseliberal groupshave prevailed overmorebelligerin context has fostered entpolitical forces an imperfect institutional that rather thanimpededconflict, following of the section tracesthebelatedemergence Russia'sdemocratic institutions well as thewinners as and losersin Russia's transformation. regime
Union.19

Russia'sTransition Communism from

Russia's transition fromcommunist rule has not been smooth.20 first The at institutions initiated SovietleaderMikhail attempt reforming political by
19. For reviews, AndreasUmland,"The Post-Soviet see RussianExtreme Right," Problems of Vol. Black Hundred: Post-Communism,44,No. 4 (July/August pp. 53-61;and Walter 1997), Laqueur, 20. Thisfollowing section an extremely summary Russia's is brief of transition. elaboration For on thisauthor's of in see interpretation the Russiantransition comparative perspective, Michael D.C.: Center Strategic International for and Studies, 1993); and McFaul, "Russia's RoughRide,"in
The Rise oftheExtreme Rightin Russia (New York:Harper Collins, 1994).

McFaul, Post-Communist Politics: Prospects Democracy Russia and EasternEurope(Washington, for in

International 22:3 Security | 12

in an coup d'etat August endedin armedconffict during attempted Gorbachev a including introduced seriesofliberalizing policies, 1991.In 1987Gorbachev of elections theSovietCongress People'sDeputiesin 1989 to mostdramatically, at and to oblast, locallevelin 1990.21 followed elections soviets therepublic, by for this stimulated publicsupport Gorbachev innovations Initially, setofpolicy with new political emerged organizations and his reforms. 1990, By however, rather thanreform Sovietsysthe societalsupportthataimed to dismantle and leaderBorisYeltsin a coalition In opposition tem.22 theRussianRepublic, Russia" turnedagainstGorof anticommunist groups called "Democratic to bachev when the Sovietleader refused back theirdemandsforRussian the camps and Though Yeltsin Gorbachev capitalism.23 sovereignty market and new institutions in and did makeepisodicprogress crafting political economic reform the and Plan" on economic (suchas the"500-Day through negotiations from "9 + 1 Accord"on federal extremists bothsidesderailedthese relations), In turned violent whenconserattempted pacts.24 August1991thisstalemate but authority, to attempted usurpsovereign vativesin theSovietgovernment Yeltsin his alliesresisted won. and and in The second attempt democratization Russia also ended in armed at In afterthe failedAugust 1991 conflict. the euphoricweeks immediately of Yeltsin and his teamoversawthe peacefuldissolution the Soviet putsch, of and the disintegration theRussianFederation, Union,prevented complete without civil precipitating war-all amazing launchedpartial market reforms At did to achievements. thesametime, Yeltsin little spellouta new setofrules within newlyindependent the Russia.He did to regulate competition political of he from calling a for notpush forratification a new constitution, refrained he to "founding election," refused createhis own political postcommunist
Larry Diamond,MarcPlattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-maolien,eds., Consolidating Third the Wave Democracies, 2 (Baltimore, Johns Vol. Md.: Hopkins University Press, 1997), 64-94. pp. 21. On thesereform measures, ArchieBrown, Gorbachev see The Factor (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press,1996);MikhailGorbachev, Memoirs (New York:Doubleday, 1996);and Jerry Hough,Democratization Revolution the and in USSR,1985-1991 (Washington, Brookings D.C.: Institution, 1997). 22. Michael Urban with Vyacheslav Igrunov Sergei and Mitrokhin, Rebirth Politics Russia The of in (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 23. John Dunlop,TheRiseofRussiaand theFall oftheSoviet Union(Princeton, Princeton N.J.: University Press, 1993). 24. In other words,theactors theSoviet/Russian in transition failedto agreeto a pact.On the importance pactsforsuccessful, of peaceful transitions, Guillermo see O'Donnelland Philippe Transitions Authoritarian Tentative Vol. Schmitter, from Rule: Conclusions, 4 (Baltimore, Johns Md.: Hopkins University Press, 1986).

A Precarious Peace 113

and institutions.25 party, he did notdismantle manySoviet-era governmental At thetime, Yeltsin his new government economic and saw not reform, political reform, their as overriding priority. This series of "nondecisions" about Russian politicalinstitutions fueled ambiguity, stalemate, conflict and bothbetweenthefederal and subnational unitsofthestate, moreconsequentially, and between President Yeltsin the and Russian Congressof People's Deputies. In the first two years of Russian independence (1991-93), consensus no on emerged thekindof economy, the of governmental type system, even theboundaries thestate.26 or of Withno rulesin place to governpolitical competition, stalemate precipitated military confrontation betweenYeltsin and theCongress October in 1993.In a replay ofAugust1991,thisstandoff between twoopposinggroups, each claiming to be thesovereign over endedonlyafter Yeltsin histroops authority Russia, and defeated enemiesin Congress. his Twicein two years,democratization had in produced armeddomestic conflict Russia. the Ironically, tragiceventsof October1993 opened anotherwindow of for institutions. This time,Yeltsin opportunity designingnew democratic seized theopportunity. his September In 1993decreedissolving Congress the ofPeople'sDeputies(theeventthat the precipitated October military conflict), Yeltsin calledfor also elections a new parliament a referenfor immediate and dum to adopt a new constitution. Sinceitsratification December in 1993,the new constitution helpeddecreaseuncertainty has aboutthepolitical rulesof thegame.Although new parliament, Duma, has been dominated the the by forces the the opposed to Yeltsin, relationship between twohas survived new for in elections parliament 1993and 1995,a 1995voteofno confidence the in in a election 1996, and thelegislative government,presidential approvalofthe minister soon thereafter. prime In 1995thisinterim was parliament replaced a new groupofparliamenby elected to underlaw,and in a free and fair tarians, according schedule, process in which65 percent theelectorate of Russiathenheld elections participated. the in of for presidency thesummer 1996.Despitecallsfrom Russian businessmen and some of Yeltsin's own aides to postponethe elections, theywent
25. On Yeltsin's reasonsforinaction, BorisYeltsin, Struggle Russia(New York: see The for Times Books,1994), 126. p. 26. On the economicdebates,see Vladinmr Mau, EkonomikiVlast' [Economics i and power] (Moscow:Delo, 1995).On state and constitutional issues, Oleg Rumyanstev, see Osnovy KonstitutRossii of sionnogo Stroya [Thefundamentals constitutional in development Russia](Moscow:"Yurist,"1994).

22:3 | 14 International Security

relatively and fairby free underlaw, and were considered ahead-on time, was folmonitors.27 1996presidential The election national and international to also considered be elections lowed in the fallby over fifty gubernatorial lost halfof as competitive, and fair(especially incumbents in roughly free, or rather thanstreet demonstrations elections theseraces).Since 1993,then, powerin Russia. have becomethemeansto gaining military might maymark and The adoptionof a new constitution thissequenceof elections as Russian transition democracy, thiscurrent to theend of Russia'stroubled of minimalist definition a democSchumpeter's polity appearsto meetJoseph decisions which in "theinstitutional for at arrangement arriving political racy: struggle individuals acquirethepowerto decide by meansof a competitive The marks for people'svote."28 end oftransition, the however, onlythebeginthe The and process which by ningofconsolidation. confrontational protracted in legacies and wereadopted, fact, left has many practices constitution electoral features a liberal of democracy.29 of thathave impededtheemergence other grantstoo manypowers to the president. First, Russianconstitution the a diffuse power through seriesof checksand balances Liberaldemocracies Russia's1993constitubranches and levelsof government. between different office. tiondoes theopposite, concentrating powerin a superpresidential constitutional courtat the a independent Second,Russia has neither truly nor national level of government a developedrule of law at thelocal level. Constitutional its as beRussia'sfirst Courtrelinquished authority arbitrator of whenthechairman thecourt sided tweenthepresident theparliament and the withtheparliament the 1993crisis. a yearthereafter, For during October and Yeltsin expanded had court ceased to function convened againonlyafter At the number justices dilutethevoice of his opponents. lowerlevels, of to courtsare revamping rights, governbankruptcy slowlyto protect property
Press, 1997). Presidential Election: The End ofPolarizedPolitics(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution 28. Joseph Schumpeter,Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, ed. (New York: Harper, 1947), 2d ELECTORAL VERSUS LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

of see Russia's 1996 McFaul, 27. Fordetails, including discussion electoral a irregularities, Michael of see LinzandAlfred Stepan, Problems p. 269.On thedefining features theendoftransition, Juan
Transition Consolidation and Md.: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1996), ofDemocratic (Baltimore, p.3. and Economic Per29. On path dependency,see Douglass North,Institutions, Institutional Change,

Riker, "TheExperience (Cambridge, Cambridge U.K.: University Press, 1981); William and formance ofCreating The of Constitution," Jack in Knight Itai and Institutions: Framing theUnited States of Press, 1995,) 121pp. Sened, eds.,Explaining Institutions Arbor: Social (Ann University Michigan
144.

A Precarious Peace | 15

procedures, enforce contracts, ensurecompetition.30 ruleof law also and The has becomeweakerregarding criminal civilmatters, Russia'simpotent and as statecannot provide basic security itscitizens. to Third, Russia'sparty system remains underdeveloped fragmented. and Russia has too manyineffective parties and too fewthatare effective.31 1995 The vote parliamentary mayhave inducedconsolidation, onlyfour thefortyas of threepartieson the ballotcrossedthe 5 percent threshold. all of these Yet parliamentary partieshave uncertain futures and poor recordsof representation. Vladimir Zhirinovsky's LiberalDemocratic Party Russiahas creof atedan extensive of network regional offices localorganizers, still but and acts morelikea cultist movement thana political party. Our Home Is Russia,the Viktor is political groupfounded PrimeMinister by Chernomyrdin,endowed withsignificant financial resources, government support, modest and regional but organization, easilycould followthe fateof earlierpartiesof powerin if Russiaand disintegrate therealpowerin theRussianpolity-thepresident and theinterests behind him-withdrew Yabloko support. Grigory Yavlinsky's the to that party, one reformist partynot connected the government won seats mostclosely resembles protoparty, a parliamentary inboth1993and 1995, witha parliamentary and complete faction, grassroots regional organizations, Yabloko'ssmallfaction theparin internal democratic procedures. However, of bodiesoutside Moscow of liament nearlackofpenetration government and and St. Petersburg assignthisnascent will role in Russian partya marginal in of politics thenearfuture. OnlytheCommunist Party theRussianFederation(CPRF)lookslikea realnational witha well-defined party socialbase that will outliveitscurrent leaders.Strikingly, the has however, Communist Party notdemonstratedproclivity legislating behalf itsconstituents the a for on of as Duma's largest Sincelosingthepresidential election thesummer in of faction. withthe government, 1996,the CPRF has grownincreasingly a cooperative movethathas fueledinternal discord. party of and civil Fourth, in partas a consequence thisweakparty system, society in Russiahas becomemarginal apolitical sincethepeakofnational and activity to The of to justprior thecollapseofcommunism. ability civicgroups articulate
30. KarenHalverson, "Resolving EconomicDisputesin Russia'sMarketEconomy," Michigan Journal International Vol.18,No. 1 (Fall 1996), 59-113. of Law, pp. 31. On postcommunist development, M. Steven party see Fish,"TheAdvent Multipartyism of in Russia,1993-1995," Post-Soviet Vol. Affairs, 11,No. 4 (October-December 1995), 340-383; pp. and
Michael McFaul, Russia's BetweenElections:What the 1995 Parliamentary ElectionsReally Mean

(Washington, Carnegie D.C.: Endowment International for Peace,1996).

223 116 International Security

and lobbyfortheir interests the vis-a-vis statein Russia'spostcommunist era has been impededby structural in changes theeconomy and society, delayed the developmentof pluralistinstitutions-especially weakness of representative thecommensurate of institutions-and ascendancy executive power. hit Russia'seconomic revolution hardest civil againsttheSoviet-era emergent Postcommunist society. have no financial grassroots organizations resources, becausethemiddleclass-the financier mostcivicgroupsin theWest-has of in been slow to emerge Russia. Fifth, Russia'sindependent pressis losingitscritical edge. Once thebeacon ofdemocratic in pluralism Russia,thepresshas beenneutralized marginalor ized as an independent force, Russia'scapitalist as have purchased oligarchies mostofthesemediaoutlets. Competition between Russiannational television networkseffectively ended during Russia's presidential elections,when Vladimir NTV (channel withORT (channel Gusinsky's four) joinedforces one) and RTR(channel two)to backYeltsin.32 Newspapers also have been gobbled up by a smallgroupoffinancial housesand oil and gas companies, whichare discussed below.Regional still from newspapers remain independent Moscow, butare tiedclosely local governments. to In sum, elections have become the only game in town,and the general of but have parameters the 1993constitution notbeen transgressed, Russia's of liberaldemocracy. politystilllacksmanyof the attributes a consolidated Pluralist institutions interest of intermediation weak; mass-based are interest and this groupsare marginal; institutions couldhelpredress imbalancethat such as a strong an or parliament, effective partysystem, an independent matrix Russia closelyresembles in judiciary-do not exist.This institutional the kindof transitional thatare proneto domestic conflict the regimes and international belligerent behavior in described theprevious section.
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN RUSSIA S ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

In addition undermining to Russia'spartially consolidated democratic instituRussia'sregime tions, the changealso has undercut old Sovietelitewho have threatened violenceand war as a meansto stayin power.At thesame time, domestic changein Russia,and especially reorganization itseconomic the of has new interest institutions, created that groupsand new organizations have conflict. Whilethebalance of powerbetween soughtto avoid international
32. While Gusinsky's NTV spearheadedthe criticism the Yeltsin of government duringthe Chechen has war,thissamenetwork evolvedintoa mostloyal, mediaoutlet pro-Yeltsin sincethe 1996vote.Similarly, newspaper, Segodnya, almost ofitsfounding lost all reporters and Gusinsky's editors oncethepaperadopteditspro-government line.

A Precarious Peace | 17

thesegroupsof winners and losershas been ambiguous throughout mostof the last decade, the new leaders and theirsupporters have triumphed in overtheold elitesand their political struggles supporters critical at stagesin Russia'stransition. Theirsuccessin turnhas led to a morepeaceful Russian foreign policy. This section tracesthe evolution thesewinning of and losing in interest groupsand organizations Russia'stransition. in Russiais notsimply undergoing transition democracy which rules a to the of thegame regarding political competition have been redefined; rather, is it midstream a socialrevolution whichbothpolitical economic in in and institutionshavebeenand continue be transformed. as thekindand modeof to Just transition itsmarkon thetypeofpolitical left institutions emerge, kind to the of economic reform policiesadoptedby Yeltsin's government since1992has interacted with the old organization the Soviet economyto producea of kindof capitalists, a particular kindofcapitalism, particular a and particular kindoflosersfrom capitalism. of Partialliberalization pricesand tradein 1992 providedthe first major of This stimulant reorganization post-Soviet for economicinterest groups.33 to and liberalization proved especiallybeneficial the oil and gas sector, in the Protected Prime Minister Gazprom particular. by Chernomyrdin, former of its chairman thecorporation, Gazpromhas managedto preserve monopolisticcontrolover the transport and distribution systemof all of Russia's natural making Russia'smostprofitable it not gas, corporation. Though unified in a single like eachofRussia'sdozenmajoroil companies company Gazprom, of in rankin the top twenty the mostlucrative companies thenew Russian Other natural suchas electricity, transeconomy. monopolies communications, metal extractors havefared also well and precious portation (bothairand rail), in thenewmarket order and haveemerged thecoreofblue-chip as companies on Russia'sstockexchange. from Inflation rubledevaluation followed liberalization provided and and for New actorsto amass huge fortunes.m banks opportunities new financial
groups post-Soviet in Russia, see 33. Fora moredetailed analysis thereorganizationinterest of of groupsin contemporary Vladimir Lepekhin, "GruppaInteresov Sovremennoi v Rossii"[Interest in Perioda [Politics society a and Russia], Sergei in Markov, PolitikaObshchestvo ed., i Perekhodnogo 1997). transitional period](Moscow:MoscowCarnegie Center, Barry Ickes, W. Peter Murrell, Randi and 34. On thesources evolution Russian and of bankprofits, The of Stabilization," Post-Soviet Affairs, 13, Vol. Ryterman, oftheTunnel? Effects Financial "End No. 2 (April-June Mikhail Dmitriev Dmitry and Travin, Rossiiskie Banki: Na 1997),pp. 105-133; Iskhode Veka banks:on theend of thegoldencentury] Petersburg, (St. Russia: Zolotogo [Russian Analysis Russian of Banks," unpublished Norma Publishers, 1996); Andrew Warner, Economic "An Aslund, "Reform 'Rent-Seeking' vs. manuscript, Harvard University, September 1996;and Anders 26, pp. in Russia'sEconomic Transformation," Transition, January 1996, 12-16.

Security 22:3 | 18 International

such as Russian NationalCredit,Menatep,Inkombank, and Oneksimbank to used theirclose ties to the Russian nationalgovernment financestate as Gusinsky emerged theMoscow transfers, whileMostBankunderVladimir from Banksand ministries theSovietera central city government's depository. or and such as Agroprombank, Promstroibank, Zhilsotsbank Gosnab (TokoEconomic of Relations (Alpha Bank)also splinbank),and Ministry Foreign entities.35 Partial from stateto becomeprivate the financial liberalization tered for trade also creatednew opportunities of Russian internal and external like head and importers distributors BorisBerezovsky, ofLogovaz,who made cars. his fortune selling domestic and foreign After liberalization, constituted nextmajor set of state the privatization of and reformation economicinterest policies that kindledthe formation in roundofprivatization largeenterprises of (1992-94) groups Russia.Thefirst on of Because society. had a mixedeffect thereorganization Russia'seconomic of insiders won majority control roughly in prithree-quarters all enterprises ratified property the rights claimsof old vatized,the first roundgenerally first the direceconomicinterest and foremost enterprise groups,including this serveda tors.36 inefficient, insiderprivatization Although economically economic from Sovieterathat the critical role elites major political in co-opting otherwise market reforms altogether.37 mayhave resisted created Thesecond, cashphaseofprivatization beguninJuly 1994, however, new opportunities thesame smallbut aggressive for cregroupof financiers with the Russian ated by partialliberalization. Using theirclose contacts economic severalbanks executive branch(whichby 1994controlled policy), offered in for loans to thegovernment return sharesin someofRussia'smost and industrial organization, valuable enterprises. Oneksimbank its umbrella conInterros the phase,acquiring Group,fared bestin thisnew privatization in the nickel in two interests Norilsk exporter theworld; trolling Nickel, largest and Russia's giant oil companies, Surgeneftgas Sidanko;and Svyazinvest, telecommunications Menatepalso did wellin theloans-forlargest company.38 of sharesfire arm, Rosprom, acquired control roughly sale,whenitsindustrial
35. Fora complete ofRussia'slargest list banks, Profil', 3 (January see No. 1997), 34. p. 36. MichaelMcFaul,"The Allocation Property of Rights Russia:The First in Round," Communist andPost-Communist Studies, 29,No. 3 (September Vol. 1996), 1-22. pp. 37. MaximBoycko, Andrei Shleifer, Robert and Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1996).In thissense,privatization servedin manywaysas the"goldenparachute" recomSee mendedby Mansfield Snyder a way to neutralize and as elitesthreatened thetransition. by Mansfield Snyder, and "Democratization theDangerofWar," 332. and p. 38. Oneksimbank's acquiredits stakein Svyazinvest 1997undera morecompetitive in process thantheother but and about purchases, thedeal was stillfraught withcontroversy accusation government collusion.

A Precarious Peace I 19

80 percent Yukosoil company-considered secondlargest of the company in Russiaafter Gazprom-as wellas important in positions several mineral companies.39 Logovaz obtained majorstakesin Sibneft company, oil Aeroflot, and ORT (Russia'slargest television network), whileAlpha Bankacquireda strain Oil tegicposition Tyumen as well as control severalcement of and trading companies. Bankacquisition resource of extraction enterprises marked new phase in a theorganization Russia'seconomic of society, a very as smallhandful actors of acquiredphenomenal proportions Russia'sproductive of assets.Thesebanks in turnformed in financial-industrial groups-a corporate structure whicha largefinancial institution closetiestothestate with anchors array trading an of companies and industrial enterprises. theend of 1996, By BorisBerezovsky of Logovazand now deputy secretary theSecurity of Council boastedthat and he sixother peoplecontrolled percent Russia'sgrossnational 50 of This product.40 kindof merger and acquisition also fusedRussia'snew financial actorswith theSovietUnion'sold profit centers. and Although age, culture, competition dividetheolderoil and gas barons and theyounger banker their small tycoons, number and a mutualinterest maintaining in their lockon Russia'seconomy providethecontext incentives cooperation.41 and for Other economic actors dwarfed boththewealthand political are by organizationof bankers, and gas exporters, ownersof otherextractive oil inand dustries.Afterprivatization, enterprise directors formerly of state-owned once unified fractured severalsectoral into enterprises, a relatively lobby, and industrial regional organizations. Civic Union,theelectoral bloc mostfirmly identified withthiseconomic group, garnered only1.9 percent thepopular of votein 1993.The less successful of enterprises themilitary-industrial complex have formed allianceswith oppositionpartiessuch as the CPRF and the of Congress RussianCommunities lobbiessuchas the (KRO) and havecreated Unionof Manufacturers theLeague of DefenseEnterprises, none of and but thesegroupshas been veryeffective thelastfouryears.42 date,these over To economic losersalso have been political losers.
39. Sector Capital, "WhoRulestheRussian Economy?" mimeo, December 1996, 9, 11;and 9, pp. Andrew "Darkness Palmer, Rising," Business Russia (Economist Intelligence Unit), February 1997, p. 5. 40. Chrystia Freeland, Thornhill, Andrew John and Gowers, "Moscow's Group Seven," of Financial Times, November 1996,p. 15. Moreneutral 1, analysts estimate thepercentage closerto that is 25-20percent. Sector See Capital, "WhoRulestheRussian Economy?" 9. p. 41. Smallgroups withlargestakesare likely be themostwell organized to interest groups. See Mancur Olson,TheLogic Collective of Action Mass.:Harvard (Cambridge, University Press, 1971). 42. "Defense Industry-Ready Battle on Its Last Legs?"Business Russia, 76 (1997), for or in No. pp. 22-25.

22:3 | 20 Security International

have been hurtthe mostby the companies and start-up Small businesses witha less in Russia.Whereas Poland,a country kindofcapitalism emerging the thana fourth populationof Russia,boastsmorethan2 millionprivate The Russiahas less than1 million.43 combiexcluding agriculture, enterprises at the inflation, lackofliberalization thelocallevel, of taxes, nation exorbitant of groupsoccupying the mafia,and the consolidation theselarge financial a environovermanymarkets created veryunfriendly has control monopoly this As force, therefore, group mentforthesmallbusinessperson. a political role. has playedonlya marginal Old and Labor is also disoriented disorganized. Soviettradeunionshave The of to beenslow to reorganize meetthenew challenges capitalism. Federaof Free TradeUnions (FNPR),a consortium sectorally tion of Independent still with members, identifies theinterover50 million based unionsclaiming The Independent in rather than workers most industries. ests of directors of that the the committees brought Soviet Union of Miners, coalition strike has potential to government itskneesin 1991,gradually lostitsmobilization over the last fiveyears. government sidingwiththe Yeltsin by consistently 1996 somespecuraising strikes have increased throughout and 1997, Wildcat to but has started remobilize, the lack of lationthatRussian labor finally will instances. isolated that national suggests thesestrikes remain organization also loser in Russia'stransition, has failedto act Labor,a majorshort-term sincethecollapseofcommunism. collectively to economic losersof Russia'stransition have been thebiggest Pensioners this of the market. Whilea substantial segment Russia'svotingpopulation, the backed a politicalloser,the CPRF,throughout group has consistently if interest grouplittle any voice period, givingthiseconomic postcommunist in Russianpolitics. their to have made sporadicattempts form Russia'smilitary forces Finally, their privileges own political as fast-declining organizations a way to protect In of in thenew Russianstate. the1995elections, hundreds military personnel partiesand blocs were headed by ran forparliament and severalelectoral In Lebed officers. the 1996 presidential GeneralAleksandr election, military in a of withalmost percent thevoteand remains contender the 15 placedthird the GeneralLev Rokhlin, Rusnextpresidential election. The following year, in of sian commander theChechenwar,openlycalledforthecreation a new
43. Timothy and Andrei Frye Shleifer, Invisible "The Hand and theGrabbing Hand,"unpublished manuscript, November 1996.

A Precarious Peace | 21

political organization dedicated serving interests themilitary. to the of Despite thisactivity, the however, Russianmilitary notsucceeded in acquiring has yet realpolitical influence within Russianstate. the Military budgets have continued to decline, and theconcerns themilitary of have been ignored. The creation a market of economy has threatened interests several the of socialgroupsfrom Sovietsystem. the Formerly privileged political actors and economic groupsfrom Sovietancienregime the have resorted force to twice to defendtheir interests, in August1991and again in October1993.In first thesetwobattles in other and morepeaceful political struggles, however, those threatened political economic by and changelost, whilenewgroups that stood to gainfrom changewon.Thesewinners turn in have dominated state policythe making, including foreign policymaking, focusofthenextsection.

Implications Russian for Foreign Policy

The polity emergein Russia over the last decade exhibits of the key to one factors thatMansfield and Snydersuggestfosters belligerent foreign policy behaviorin democratizing states-weak democratic institutions. second The cause of belligerent behavior democratizing in states-resistance from social that standtolosefrom groups democratization-also featured has prominently in theRussiancase. Butin Russia,thiscombination notignited has belligerent international behavior. Whynot? Mostimportant, political economic the and in winners Russia'stransition are the verygroupsthatwould not benefit fromwar. As winners, theyhave avoid international actively pursuedforeign that policies becausethey conflict, arethepolitical economic and actors Russiathat in standto gainthemostfrom thosein Russiawho mayhave stoodto peaceful foreign policies.In contrast, morebelligerent exgain from foreign policies-be theyradicalcommunists, tremenationalists, of or segments the armed forces, partsof the military industrial lost for complex-havepersistently in political struggles statecontrol. At first, winners Russia'sregime the in changepursuedpacific policiesas a of Over time,thesenormative commitments to consequence theirideology. international leadersweresupplemented thetancooperation political by by in gibleinterests peace of the new economic groups.Russianforeign policy boththeWestand theCIS states regarding demonstrates influence these the of ideas and interests.

22:3 | 22 Security International

Democratic Russia, BorisYeltsin, In thequestto destroy Sovietcommunism, of their to ideas toconstruct ideology opposition. and their alliesturned liberal with and the self-determination, integration Ideas about democracy, market, duringthe peak of polarizedconcrystallized the Western capitalist system to mostclearly antithetical theSovietancien in as frontation 1990-91 concepts
regime.

PEACE THROUGH IDEAS

of Rusindependent assumedcontrol thenewly whenYeltsin Consequently, wereguidedby thisset sian statein December 1991,he and his government a policymatters distinctly of liberalideas, ideas thatincludedin foreign Initially, theseideas had everything policy.44 and foreign pro-Western peaceful of twoyearsand to do withthedomestic revolutionary struggle theprevious of interests abroador interests to virtually nothing do withRussiannational or at economicgroups,civic organizations, the electorate home.Regarding weremade at thisjuncture: two decisions relations, critical Russia'sexternal reform thedecision dissolvetheSovietUnionand pursueradicaleconomic to in assistance this in independently Russia,and the decisionto seek Western replaced reform policyquickly reform process.Statebuildingand economic relations. and as armscontrol Europeansecurity themainissuesofEast-West SovietUnion,were antieven within former the foreign actions, Belligerent to policyobjectives. thetical thesenew foreign a On Thisinitial outcome was notinevitable. thecontrary,morebelligerent if at foreign policycould have resulted thisstagein Russia'sdemocratization had whatiftheEmereither oftwo different one conditions obtained.45 First, thatinitiated restoration the putschin August1991 had gencyCommittee illiberal idesucceeded?Thisgroupheld veryanti-Western views,promoted losers of and was comprised severalpeoplecloseto thebigtransition ologies, civil likethemilitary themilitary-industrial and complex. Had they prevailed, war war might have ensuedand interstate would have been morelikely. had and Russia'svictorious revolutionaries Second,what if BorisYeltsin ThatRussia'srevolutionary ideolof ideology opposition? adopteda different proand becamepro-democratic, promarket, by association ogyofopposition
44. On ideasas "roadmaps,"seeJudith Goldstein Robert and Keohane, "Ideasand Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," Judith in Goldstein Robert and Keohane, eds.,IdeasandForeign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, Political and Change (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1993), 3-30. pp. 45. On theimportance counterfactuals understanding orsingle of for rare events, Philip see Tetlock and AaronBelkin, eds.,Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton, PrinceN.J.: tonUniversity Press, 1996).

A Precarious Peace| 23

Western notinevitable.46 fact, was In manyalternative ideologies opposition of were articulated and discussedduringthistransitional period.Alreadyby 1988, nationalist organizations as pamyat such (memory) groups and Otchestvo (Fatherland) cultivated anti-Western is, anticapitalism antihad an (that and as communism, communism themwas considered Western, for a cosmopolitan,Jewish ideology), pro-imperial thatwas radically ideology different from theapproach theliberal of and pro-Western Democratic Russia.47 Evenwithin Democratic Russia, several prominent leadersadvocated nationalist ideologies, notliberal ones.48 Likewise, many socialist social-democratic and organizations thatwere bothanticapitalist anti-Soviet and flourished the earlydays of in Gorbachev's liberalization.49severalrespects, alliancebetween In the Russia's liberals Democratic in Russiaand theCommunist-boss-turned-populist, Boris Yeltsin, was an accidentof history forged commonenemies, Soviet by the communist and Mikhail system, later Gorbachev.50 Yeltsin Had risento power or buoyedby a different ideology backedby a different ofallies,Russian set democratization might a have produced morebelligerent foreign policy. Yeltsin's with identification liberal ideas was nottotally nor random, was it determined internal alliancepolitics, thebalanceof ideologies as entirely by within international the system also shapedideational choices and Yeltsin his allies made. Because Western capitalist democracies were prosperous and Yeltsin and Russia'sdemocratic opposed communism, movement looked to Western countries allies in their as commonstruggle againsttheSovietsystem.51 Besidesdemocracy capitalism, and there wereno other attractive models
46. On ideas as focal points that provide unique solutions to multi-equilibria phenomena, see Geoffrey Garrett and BarryWeingast, "Ideas, Interests, Institutions: and Constructing European the Community'sIntemal Market,"in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, pp. 173-206. 47. See the interviewwith pamyat'leader DmitryVasiliev in Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov, The Troubled Birth RussianDemocracy of (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1993) pp. 46-60. 48. McFaul and Markov,The Troubled Birth RussianDemocracy, of chapters4 and 5. The Democratic Party of Russia (head by Nikolai Travkin),the Russian ChristianDemocratic Movement (Viktor Aksiuchits),and the Constitutional DemocraticPartyof Russia (Mikhail Astafiev)leftDemocratic Russia when the organizationdecided to endorse the dissolutionof the Soviet Union. 49. Boris Kagarlitsky, Farewell Perestroika (London: Verso,1990). 50. Author's interviewswith Democratic Russia foundersVladimir Bokser,ViktorDmitriev, Lev Ponomarev,and Gleb Yakunin (summer1995). At the time,DemocraticRussia leaders debated the alhiancewith Boris Yeltsin,as some claimed he was a communistwhile othersthoughthe was a nationalist.In 1992, DemocraticRussia cofounderYuryAfanasiev quit the organization,claiming that it identifiedtoo closely with the antidemocratic Yeltsin.Russian liberals divided again over theirsupport forYeltsinduring the October 1993 events and the Chechen war. 51. This analysis echoes the argumentson transnational with relationsand epistemiccommunities the caveat thatmy argumentincorporates structure the international of the systemas a determining factorfor understandingwhich ideas travel and which ideas do not. For elaboration,see

International Security | 24 22:3

withwhichRussianrevolutionaries or ideologiesin theinternational system could identify.

PEACE THROUGH INTERESTS

Eventually, normative this for impetus pursuing liberal, integrationist foreign policiesfaded,because Russianexpectations Western assistance concerning were not and could notbe met,whileeuphoriaforthemarkets, democracy, and the Western way faded. Even by the end Russia's first year of independence, foreign back to moreanti-Western, policyappearedto be drifting illiberal patterns theSoviet of period.52 Support maintainingliberal for a policy orientation was reinvigorated, when emergent economicinterest however, in groupswith tangibleinterests peacefulrelations with otherstates,and especially peaceful relations withWestern democracies, began to asserttheir in influence foreign with policy matters.53 Groups economic interests-Gazprom, oil companies, mineral and to individuexporters, thebankers-began replace als and groups with ideas forces political as themainsocietal influencing foreign The policyoutcomes. salienceoftheseinterests demonstrated clearly are most in thetwo mostimportant issuesofRussianforeign policytoday:integration withtheWestand relations withstatesin theCIS. INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST. Russia'shandful veryprofitable of corporationsand their allieshave provided sustained for political momentum continued integration withthe West.Russianexporters desireaccess to Western need Western markets, importers wantpartnergoods,and Russianbankers shipswithWestern have used their over capital.Russiancapitalists influence theRussianstateto ensurethattheterms traderemain of favorable local to Thesekindsofactivities, shouldnotbe interpreted ideoactors.54 however, as

MichaelMcFaul,"Great PowerIntervention Southern in Africa: Towards Theory Revolution a of in an International Context," Ph.D.dissertation, Oxford University, On theSoviet Russian 1991. and case,see Matthew "The Evangelista, ParadoxofStateStrength: Transnational Relations, Domestic and in Structures, Security Policy Russiaand theSoviet Union," International Organization, 49, Vol. No. 1 (Winter 1995), 1-38;and SarahMendelson, Course: Changing Ideas, and Soviet Politics, the pp. Withdrawal Afghanistan from (Princeton, Princeton N.J.: University Press, forthcoming). 52. Somebelievethistrend continued. for has See, instance, Ra'ananand KateMartin, Uri Russia: A Return Imperialism? York: Martin's to (New St. Press, 1996). 53. Vitaly Portnikov, "'Doktrina Burbulisa' 'Doktrina ili Kozyreva'?" 'Burbulis doctrine' the or [The 'Kozyrev doctrine'?], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 1994, 3; andAndrei 10, p. Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie [Transformation] (Moscow:Mezhdunarodnye 1995). Otnosheniye, 54. As capitalis Russia'spoorest Russian financiers beenmostaggressive seeking have factor, in protection Western from competitors. this On logic, RonaldRogowski, see Commerce Coalitions and (Princeton, Princeton N.J.: University Press, 1989).

A Precarious Peace j 25

of logically motivated normatively or anti-Western, rather reflection the but a foreign policyinterests Russia'scapitalist of class. Russia'snew economic also financial institutions oligarchies wantWestern to remain engagedin Russia'seconomic reform process, thattheydo not so from International the have to pay forit alone. A billiondollarsin transfers Fund to help close the budget deficit a billiondollars that is Monetary WorldBank Gazpromdoes not have to pay in taxes.A multimillion-dollar in costs investment restructuring Russiancoal industry the also represents Even thesmaller in avoidedby domestic capitalists. investments institutional for reforms provided suchinternational by actors theU.S. Agency Internaas tionalDevelopment theEuropeanBankforReconstruction Developand and ment represent projectsthat benefit local capitalists paid for by foreign It to suchfree governments. would be irrational reject money. limited policy This set of economicgroupshas a rather scope of foreign interests. Above all,theyseekto maintain accessto Western capitaland marto threaten kets.Whensecurity issues such as opposition NATO expansion within Russiangovernment theseaccessinterests, coalition liberals the of the to and their alliesinRussia'seconomic havecooperated sustain engagesociety ment. other Regarding foreign policyissuesthatare notseen to have a direct this either has to economic relationship these interests, however, samecoalition or the policy entrepreneglected problem altogether has allowedother foreign neursto assumecenter Russianoil companies bankers and stage.Forinstance, in other interest havedemonstrated interest armscontrol little issues,allowing II to the groups dominate debateon issuessuchas START orCFE negotiations. to this coalition has ceded armstradepromotion the Similarly, engagement of of and Ministry Atomic Energy individual enterprises themilitary-industrial to WhenWestern have attempted linktheseperipheral complex.55 diplomats reactor issueswithengagement, as in thecase ofRussiansales ofnuclear such II their has materials Iranorin thecase ofSTART ratification, strategy failed. to withthe Westhas and this Maintaining policyof engagement integration bothdomestically internationand been challenged countervailing forces by has Russia's rockytransition the market to and democracy ally.Internally, stimulated riseofilliberal the nationalist communist and groupsthat political have deplore this Western integrationist strategy. Especiallyafterelectoral in victories neo-nationalist Vladimir by Zhirinovsky 1993 and the CPRF in
55. Yakov Pappe, "Otraslevyelobbi v pravitel'stve Rossii" [Sectorallobbies in the Russian government],Pro et Contra, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 61-78.

22:3 | 26 International Security

of 1995,many analystsforeshadowedthe possibility change in Russian foreign policy as a consequence of these ascendant ideologies.56 Yeltsindid make some adjustments foreign in policyto appease anti-Western domestic forces. Perhaps most important,Yeltsin replaced his pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev,with Evgeny Primakov,a seasoned Soviet foreignminister, and pro-Easternstances. Primakov's bureaucrat known for his anti-Western appointmentaroused new attentiontoward Russia's relationswith Iraq, Iran, states more generally.In all of these relations,howChina, and non-Western ever,economic interests-be it the sale of nuclear reactors, oil, or airplaneshave been the primaryfocus. Although occasional rhetoricalflaresfromthe Foreign Ministryregardinga Russia-China alliance or a new Russian leadership role in the developing world may have rekindlednostalgicmemoriesof past superpower greatness,these statementshave had littleinfluenceon the principal objectivesof Russian foreignpolicy. Russia's peaceful, westward foreignpolicy orientation, however,has faced challenges not only fromcommunistsand nationalistsat home but also from liberals abroad in the formof NATO expansion. No political actor of importance in Russia today,includingeven unabashed pro-Western liberals such as First Deputy Prime MinisterAnatoly Chubais, has supported NATO expansion. Yet despite the black-and-white natureof thisforeign policy issue within Russia, Russian liberals and economic interest groups thatbenefit fromWestern integration have not allowed NATO expansion to derail Russian relations with the West.57 RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH STATES IN THE CIS. Just as Russia's liberal coalition has maintained momentumforWesternintegration the sake of ecofor nomic interests, theyhave also slowed and amended ideologicallydrivencalls forSoviet reunification. all Regardingeconomic integration, politicaland economic actorsagree thatfurther economic integration between former republics of the Soviet Union is in Russia's interests. Whetherrepresenting Lukhoil in the Caspian Sea oil deliberations,pressuringCIS states to join the Interstate Economic Committee-a supranationalinstitution dominatedby Russia which is created to regulate economic activitybetween the formerrepublics-or pressuringUkraine to pay Gazprom forgas shipments,the Russian state has

56. See JackSnyder,"Russian Backwardness and the Futureof Europe," Daedalus,Vol. 123,No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 181; and Peter Reddaway, "Red Alert,"New Republic, January 1996. 29, 57. SergeyRogov,Russiaand NATO's Enlargement: Search a Compromise the The for at Helsinki Summit (Alexandria,Va.: Center forNaval Analysis,May 1997).

A Precarious Peace | 27

Soviet economic actors theformer in promoted actively interests Russian the of

Union.58

has becauseconsenPolitical integration, however, been moreproblematic, of sus on the re-creation a new union does not exist.The dynamic the of mostvividly thesetensions. Communist Russia-Belarus unionhas illustrated and nationalist forces havecalledforcomplete political economic and political of Lukashenko elected was president unionwithBelarus eversinceAlexander thata majority Russiancitizens of also support Belarusin 1994.Polls indicate theidea. Nonetheless, liberals within Russiangovernment thepowerthe and fuleconomic interest groupsthatstandbehindthemhave delayedfullintein gration. Beginning April1996,Belarusand Russia signedseveralcharters but aboutthenecessity a newSlavicunion, the of containing flowery language or Belarussian terricritical a currency incorporating stepsofissuing common have notbeen taken. (or toryintothe RussianFederation some new entity) in do as reintegration principle longas it is done in Russianliberals notreject have prevailed. an economically rational way.To date,theseforces Regarding relations both withthe Westand with statesin the CIS, the of institutions Yeltsin's and combination weak democratic politicalsuccess of interest coalition economic groupsto have alloweda small,well-organized The role of a policy. combination occupy central in themaking Russianforeign and countervailofsuperpresidentialism, a fragmented party system, impotent interest meansthat theseeconomic lobbies can ingforces representing pluralist in dominate foreign policy.59 That economic policymaking Russia,including in place in policymaking groupswithan interest peace enjoya privileged in insteadofilliberal groupswithan interest war has been made possibleby in been defeated the a secondfactor- Yeltsin's winning ways. Had Yeltsin set withtheCongress People'sDeputiesin 1993, different ofelite of a standoff instituinterest groupswould have takenadvantageof thesame permissive the tionalcontext and dominated statein the cause of a different agenda.
Group and Its Foreign 58. See Igor Khripunovand Mary Matthews,"Russia's Oil and Gas Interest Vol. of Policy Agenda," Problems Post-Communism, 43, No. 3 (May-June 1996), pp. 38-49; Gleb Cherkasov, "Pravitel'stvaSNG sozdali MEK" [Governmentsof the CIS created MEK] Segodnya, September 10, 1994, p. 2; ChristianLowe and Erin Arvedlund, "Lucrative Caspian Oil Pipeline May 12-18, 1997, p. 1; RobertCorzine and ChrystiaFreeland, Times, Deal Sealed," St. Petersburg April 1, 1996,p. 17; and Irina Savateeva, "Gazprom: "A Lubricatorof Exchange," FinancialTimes, September18, 1994, and povertyof empire],Izvestiya, Blesk i NishchetaImperii" [Gazprom:Glitter p. 2. between state and society,see Philippe shape interestintermediation 59. On how institutions Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representationof Social Groups," American 1992), pp. 422-449. Vol. 35, Nos. 4-5 (March/June Behavioral Scientist,

22:3 | 28 International Security

lost election, Russianforeign Likewise, BorisYeltsin the1996presidential had course. a policywould have followed verydifferent not a war,and a war waged againsta nondemAlthough explicitly foreign the democracies fight), also thatconsolidated ocratic regime kindofenemy (a the 1994nonetheless demonstrated in Russian invasion Chechnya December of the of state.Understanding interbelligerent capacity Russia'sdemocratizing that and coalitions, economic interests, institutions proplay amongpolitical to mayshed light duced thedecision intervene thedecision withdraw to and as state level. on Russia'sfuture potential a belligerent on theinternational in Russia that Theinstitutional context shapedpolicymaking postcommunist devoid pressures, relatively and insulated from pluralist has been centralized, conditions for of checksand balanceswithin state, the propitious providing Whileliberalgroupshave interest groupsto dominate. small,well-organized for matrix mostof Russia'spost-Soviet takenadvantageof thisinstitutional thissame context soon after the illiberal to groupsorganized exploit history, elections. One group,labeled the"partyof war" by the 1993parliamentary was of the of Russianliberal pressafter invasion Chechnya, comprised several withthesecurity ministries. within closelyaffiliated or keyKremlin officials First Pavel Grachev, DeputyPrimeMinister TheyincludedDefenseMinister Council Nikolai Yegorov, Security Deputy PrimeMinister Oleg Soskovets, Yeltsin's at Chief Korzhakov, personal bodyguard Oleg Lobov,and Aleksandr had the time.60 Whileseveralof theseofficials been in Yeltsin's government grewwhile the from beginning, influence thishawkishcoalition the the of 1994.61 throughout influence liberals of and liberal interest groupsdeclined In the1993parliamentary Russia'sChoice,theleadingliberal elecelection, as smaller liberal fared miserably parties toralbloc at thetime, well as other at the same timethatZhirinovsky's neo-nationalist LiberalDemocratic Party of results apparalmosta quarter the popularvote.These election captured
60. On theformation thiscoalition, Maksim of see Sokolov, "Razberis', prav, vinovat, kto kto da oboikhi nakazhdi"[Figure out,who is right, it who is guilty, bothand everyone], Kommersant' Daily, December 1994;and Aleksandr 8, Minkin, "Advokat shefa KGBKriuchkova zashchishchaet Prezidenta Yeltsina" [Thelawyer KGB chief of Kryuchkov defends President Yeltsin], Moskovskii Komsmolets, January 1995, 1-2. 14, pp. 1994 61. John Dunlopdemarcates their domination decision over making be between to October 1995.See Dunlop,"FiveMonths and February ThatShookRussia," Hoover Digest, 2 (1996), No. pp. 90-94.
CHECHNYA: THE FAILURE AND THEN TRIUMPH OF RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY

A Precarious Peacej 29

ently demonstrated Yeltsin's to Kremlin advisers of that Yeltsin to change had his liberalimage,rhetoric, allies in orderto win the nextpresidential and A of and election.62 secondconsequence theDecember1993elections, a contributing factor Yeltsin's to new political orientation, a deepening was division betweenYeltsin and his immediate circleof adviserson the one hand and reformist political leadersand organizations theother. on Liberals YegorGaidar and Boris FyodorovresignedfromYeltsin's government, leavingtwo members the original1991 reform of team-AnatolyChubais and Andrei Kozyrev-in the government. actual decisionto invade Chechnya The was made without consulting Russia'sliberal forces.63 Russia'sbiggest economic lobbiesalso playedalmostno role in thisdecision.64 Vladimir the of Gusinsky, head ofMostBankand owner NTV television network, opposed theinvasionand supported NTV's honest coverage the of war.For doingso, Gusinsky received threats from comrepeated Korzhakov, the to mostofthat pelling financier livein Londonfor year. Fearing economic losses generated from close staterelations, otherRussianbankers remained but criticized war.65 the loyaltothepresident, privately Instead, political actors close to Russia'ssecurity forces and themilitary-industrial complex-that is, thelosersofRussia'stransition-dominated decision-making this For process. this group of politicians and the interests groupsbehindthem,a military

62. Vladimir Lysenko, "Avtoritarnyi RezhimNeizbezhen," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 22, 1994; and EmilPayinand Arkady Popov, in Azraeland EmilPayin, eds.,U.S. "Chechnya," Jeremy and Russian Policymaking Respect theUse ofForce(Santa Monica,Calif.:RAND, 1996), with to pp. 25-27. 63. Emil'Painand Arkady Popov, "Vlast'i obshchestvo barrikadakh" na [State and society the at with the of Izvestiya, February 1995, 4. In interviews theauthor 10, p. during summer barricades], to 1995, liberal presidential advisers Giorgy Satarov, MarkUrnov, LeonidSmirnyagin and claimed playa marginal in these role deliberations. Similar accounts theliberals' of marginalization be can found Yegor in Dni i Poded Gaidar, Porazhenii [Daysofdefeat victory] and (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996), Resurrection: Struggle Russia(New York: The Random chapter and David Remnick, 13; for House, 9. 1997), chapter 64. The strategic pipeline thatpasses through Chechnya meant thatthewar had realeconomic for new economic consequences Russianbusiness groups, and thepeace settlement created also for in so does opportunities Russian economic elites. However, evidence thepublic the domain far notsuggest direct a economic for motivation initiating war.See Payin the and Popov, "Chechnya," p. 25. 65. Thisimpression comesfrom several conversations thefallof 1994and spring 1995with in of of OlegBoyko, president Russian National Credit, Russia's second largest bankat thetime. During thisperiod, of Boyko also headeda consortium Russia'slargest capitalists calledthe"BigEight." See "Bolshoi Vos'merke Kommersant' vybory nuzhny'[Thebig eight ne does notneedelections], Daily, March14,1995, 3. p.

International 22:3 | 30 Security

in victory Chechnya might have reaffirmed importance theRussian their to On Chechnya, however, was a disasterforthiswar coalition. the eve of attack, DefenseMinister Grachev predicted themilitary that actionwould be lost hours. After years, two which100,000 Russiancitizens overwithin during their wenthomein defeat.67 lives,Russiansoldiers role the WhileRussia'sweak democratic institutions playedlittle in shaping role the decision intervene, to elections playeda critical in prompting decision camto withdraw. Severalmonths before 1996presidential the vote,Yeltsin Aleksandr that paign'schief pollster, Olson,had determined peace in Chechnyawas a necessary (although no meanssufficient) by condition electoral for success.68 Duringthefirst three months 1996,however, of Yeltsin's campaign in was runbySoskovets the"party war,"which and of had no interest ending in thewar (and little interest havingthe election).69 thebeginning the At of their control thecampaign of as year, and theKremlin was complete Yeltsin his in had fired three pivotalliberals from government January-First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Presiand dential Chief Staff of Sergei Filatov. Thisliberal purgecoupledwith miserable a teameventually Rusearly campaign performance theSoskovets by prompted to sia's businessleadersto intervene.70 urgedYeltsin appointChubais They head of thecampaign and removethe"party war" from government. of the heeded thisfirst Yeltsin piece of advicein March1996,whenhe reorganized alliesin charge. Weeks hisreelection effort placedChubaisand his liberal and in withChubais'snew liberalelectoral later, compliance strategy, Yeltsin anin nounceda cease-fire Chechnya, signeda peace accordwithChechen resistance leaders, and then personallyvisited Chechnyato underscorethe
66. Gaidar, Porazhenii Dni i Poded, 329.Thesemotivations precisely ofthecausesofwar one p. are outlined Mansfield Snyder, in and "Democratization theDangerofWar." and 67. The figure comesfrom "Where RussiaHeaded? An Uncertain Is 100,000 Grigory Yavlinsky, Journal Democracy, 8, No. 1 (January of Vol. 1997), 4. p. Prognosis," 68. Author's interview Aleksandr with chief for Olson, pollster theYeltsin campaign, president and oftheFoundation Public for Opinion (December 1996). 13, Thedatashowing positive the electoral the in results ending warareprinted Fond,"Obshchestvennoe of "Klyuchevye problemy mnenie," predvybomoi kampanii zerkaleobshchestvennogo v mneniya," Rezultaty sotsiologicheskikh issleNo. dovannii, 29 (May 10,1996), 4-5. pp. 69. McFaul, Russia's 1996Presidential 3. Election, chapter 70. Freeland, Thornhill, Gowers, and "Moscow'sGroupofSeven";and Aleksei Zudin,"Biznesi v politika prezidentskoi 1996goda"[Business politics the1996presidential and in kampanii camPro No. Center, 1996), 46-60. Fall pp. paign], et Contra, 1 (Moscow:MoscowCarnegie state.66

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importance thepeace treaty.71 of Yeltsin actedon thesecondpieceofadvicein June between rounds thepresidential of election whenhe removed from office seniormember the"party war."72 of every of After electoral his victory, YeltsinappointedGeneralAlexandrLebed to negotiate formal a peace settlement Chechnya, with becauseLebed placed a third thefirst in strong roundofthepresidential election an antiwar as candidate.73 Although Lebedeventually clashedwith Yeltsin was removed and from he office, successfully completed negotiations theChechens August his with on 31, 1996, buoyedby his electoral mandate 11 million of to voters end thewar. Russia'swar withChechnya mostlikely would nothave occurred Russia if had been a consolidated Fromtheverybeginning, democracy. roughly twothirds all Russiansopposed the war,a figure of thatgrewsteadily overthe nexttwo years.Had their interests been represented thestatethrough in the usual pluralist institutions found stable, in the to liberal democracies, decision nothavebeenmade.Atthesametime, attack Russia'swarwith may Chechnya wouldnothaveendedin 1996without presidential the election. WhileRussia's of politymay have lackedthecomponents a liberaldemocracy to necessary the prevent war,theone robust ruleofRussia'selectoral did democracy create theincentives end thewar. to

Conclusions
Russia's peacefulforeign policyhas not resultedfromthe institutional or normative constraints essential the"democratic to On peace" thesis. theconRussia'svolatile, and transition democracy protracted, incomplete to has trary, created contextual the factors political and groupsthathave produced belligerent countries foreign policiesin other In undergoing regime change. Russia, these factors contributed the war in Chechnya.Aside fromChechnya, to this context also allowed pacific has interests to however, same institutional dominateRussian foreign policy for most of Russia's first years of indeUnliketheir in statesin theearlypart pendence. counterparts democratizing ofthis liberal and in interested peacehave politicians economic groups century,
71. "Luchshaya operatsiyachechenskoivoiny" [The best operation of the Chechen war], Moskovokskii Komsomolets, May 29, 1996,p. 1. 72. This drama is detailed in Remnick,Resurrection, chapter 11. 73. Lebed campaign slogans included "I know war, and I know that war must be stopped," as well as "The weak carryout wars. The strongdo not allow wars to happen."

International Security 22:3 | 32

won or other powerin Russia.Had others won and thenmaintained political a policymight have followed verydifideologiesprevailed, Russianforeign ferent trajectory. UntiltheRussianpolitical system developsthearrayof liberalinstitutions from wars with fighting and normsthatconstrain leadersmorecompletely inotherdemocracies, severalchangesin the statusquo could precipitate and conflict a moreaggressive or foreign policyin theshort creaseddomestic mediumterm. from thathas benefited the of groupsbehindYeltsin First, coalition interest thiscoalition endured numerhas already peace couldbreakdown.Since1991 of interest Even the consortium economic ous splitsand challenges. groups and liberalpoliticians converged that campaign duringthe 1996presidential In announceda major began to unravelsoon thereafter. March1997Yeltsin of whichdividedtheold liberalalliance. Yelreorganization his government, but tsinkeptChernomyrdin prime as Chubaisand liberal minister, appointed Soon after taking office, Nemprime ministers. BorisNemtsov first as deputy controland regulationover tsov pledged to seek greatergovernment labeledanti-Rusa Gazprom, policymovethatGazpromhead RemVakhirev communist leadersin theDuma ralliedto Gazprom's cause. sian.74 Ironically, In addition, dividesbetween bankers havewidenedover Russian also political An to the battles obtain lastgemsofRussianprivatization. open splitbetween on a Chernomyrdin the one hand and Chubais and Nemtsovon the other, or divide pitting and gas againstthe bankers, open politicalstruggle oil for alliancethat has between bankers couldhave graveimplications theliberal For sustained pro-Western, a nonbelligerent Russianforeign policy. instance, could seekrevenge governlosersin theselatest againstthecurrent struggles in election thenext or ment backing illiberal presidential by politicians thenext crisis. political in who have lostpersistently thepostcommuactors Second,thosepolitical transformation nistperiodmight win.Although Russia'seconomic eventually it has produceda handfulof big economicwinners, has also produceda of fromthe market-a majority losers who have not yet realizedbenefits for candidates. comA situation provides that fertile electoral ground protest munist context enjoyed President by president placedin thesameinstitutional in Yeltsin alterRussianforeign Morelikely Ruspolicy. todaycould radically
74. JohnThornhill, "Russia: State Moves to ReassertControlof Gazprom, FinancialTimes, May 14, 1997.

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sia's current electoral context to might theascension powerof an illiberal be nationalist.75 Russian politicallandscape now boasts several potential The presidential candidates withunproven liberal credentials.76 in analyzing conditions Third, the specified thedemocratic by peace argument, thisarticle has focusedon the likelihood war betweenRussia and of democratic states. must remembered, It be that however, democratizing Russia is locatedin a neighborhood dominated authoritarian quasi-authoritarby and ian regimes wellas very as weakand unstable states. With neighbors including China, Iraq,Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, probabilities the that Russia may be drawnintoan interstate conflict witha nondemocratic state remain high. in The potential breakdown theliberal for coalition thathas dominated the Russianstate,the possibility election a new president of of postcommunist withilliberal of stateson views,or the probability war withnondemocratic all Russia'sborders represent causesoffuture wars.A decade sinceGorbachev launchedliberalization theSovietUnionand sixyearssinceRussiabecame in it an independent how interstate has resulted war state, remains striking little from Russia'srevolution. of Although lacking manyoftheinstitutions a liberal in that and havelostenormously the democracy threatened interest by groups democratization marketization and Russiahas displayed little the of processes, that to states radicalpolitibelligerent activity we expect see from undergoing cal and economic transformations. Russiais a critical Although case does notdisprove theory a case,one deviant or obviatea correlation betweendomestic regime changeand war.Thatthe tremendous volatiletransformation boththe polityand economy and of in Russiahas notproducedinternational does raisequestions conflict, however, abouttheassumedcausalmechanisms internal linking changeto international conflict.
75. Despite disappointments with democraticand marketreforms, majorityof Russian citizens a stillvalue normsassociated with democraticregimesand stillrejectideas associated authoritarian regimes.See T.I. Kutkovetsand I. M. Klyamkin,RusskieIdei [Russian ideas] (Moscow: JanuaryFebruary, 1997); Igor Klyamkinand Boris Kapustin, "Liberal'nyeTsennostiv Soznanii Rossiyan" [Liberal values in the mentality Russians] (Moscow: Fond "ObshchestvennoeMnenie," 1995); of and United States Information Agency,"Political ContinuitiesOvershadow YeltsinComeback in Russian Election," OpinionAnalysis, No. M-169(ENDASH)96, July19, 1996, p. 1. These attitudes, however,do not guaranteethatnationalistleaders will not come to power,as protestelectionscan propel to office opposition candidates thatmay not necessarilyreflect interests theirvoters. the of 76. For elaboration,see McFaul, Russia's 1996 Presidential Election, chapter7. IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN THEORY AND PRACTICE

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TheRussiancase demonstrates weakand partial that democratic institutions along withinterest groupsthatlose from transition be necessary condimay tionsforproducing belligerent foreign policiesin democratizing states, but conditions. addition, In theyare not sufficient leadersand groupswithan in interest international conflict mustcome to power.Futurestudiesof the relationship betweendemocratization war mustbringindividuals, and their ideas,and their interests wellas thecontingencies domestic as of politics more into centrally their analyses. The Russiancase also suggeststhatthe international systemof the late twentieth a century may offer different of constraints incentives set and for politicians or engaged in promoting obstructing regimechangethan were in to present earliereras. In contrast manyrevolutionary ideologiesof the eighteenth, and the nineteenth, earlytwentieth centuries, ideologythathas guided Russia's contemporary revolutionaries does not threaten seek to or as are changetheother great powersin theinternational system, they already liberal democracies.77 Whilerevolutionary ideas in eighteenth-century France and Bolshevism Nazism in thiscentury and were antisystemic to challenges the international is Russianliberalism a pro-systemic system, ideologythat advocatesintegration theexisting into international of not community states, its demise.At the same time,losers fromRussia's regimechangehad no international alliesto call to their aid.78 Liberalism, has not triumphed even in all of however, everywhere-not to Europe.It has thepotential failin Russiaas well. Onlysix yearssincethe Sovietcollapse,Russia'srevolution by no meansended.79 has WhileRussian
77. Liberalism,however,does threatennondemocraticleaders and interest groups in otherparts of the world and therefore could serve as a precipitant domesticconflict for and international war in these regions.Or thishegemonicpull of the core liberalstatesmay play a similarpacifying role regardingotherregimechanges. Distinguishing between the conditionsin which liberalismfacilitates peaceful transitions and the conditionsin which liberalismexacerbatesconflict during transitionsis a richand unexplored researchagenda. 78. For instance,democratizers eighteenth-century in France challenged the existinginternational systemof states,and thereby provoked foreign powers to back theiropponents.Likewise, democratizationin Italy and Greece in the nineteenth century Hungary,Czechoslovakia, or Angola in or the twentieth century promptedinternational conflict because local authoritarian leaders could call upon international allies to help them quell challengers.In contrast,antidemocraticgroups in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and then Russia had no international alfies. 79. In comparativeperspective,six years marks only a midpointformajor revolutions.In Russia in 1923 (six years afterthe BolshevikRevolution),Marxism-Leninism appeared to be in remission; Stalin did not come to power until several years later.In France in 1795, the Jacobindictatorship had crumbled,Thermidorlooked to be thefuture, and Napoleon was stilla fieldcommander.Both Russia in 1923 and France in 1795 were considered weak statesincapable of threatening great the powers. See Crane Brinton, The Anatomy Revolution of (New York: VintageBooks, 1938).

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leadersare stillcommitted developing market to a economy a democratic and and to joiningrather polity, thanthreatening community democratic the of it states, is in thevitalnational interests theUnitedStatesand theWestin of general ensurethat to thispolicytrajectory continues. Continued engagement ofRussia'sliberals, sustained of market demoand promotion Russianliberal cratic and of institutions, gradualintegration Russiaintoboththeworldcapitalistsystem and the international community democratic of statesare the policiesthatwill prevent from Russia'sdemocratization turning belligerent. of Containment, isolation, neglect liberal and institutional within development Russia are the kindsof policiesthatwill help transform Russia'srevolution in intoa security threat democratic to states theWest and especially democto ratizing states closerto Russia.