PERSONS AND FAMILY INTRODUCTION A.

Intersection of Modern Constitutional Developments and Traditional F a m i l y L a w Provisions of the 1987 Constitution - Overview of Due Process and Equal ProtectionCasesGRISWOLD v CONNECTICUT (1964) 381 U.S. 479- G r i s w o l d , E x e c u t i v e Director of the planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and itsmedical director as accessories for giving married persons information and medicala d v i c e o n h o w t o p r e v e n t c o n c e p t i o n a n d , f o l l o w i n g e x a m i n a t i o n p r e s c r i b i n g a contraceptive device or material for the wifes use.- G r i s w o l d said the statute violates Amendment (due process clause) the 14th - Sec 12, A r t II- Purpose of the statute was to discourage extraThe State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family itonly prohibits distribution of marital relations and as a basic autonomous social institution. Itshall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. Thenatural and contraceptives and not manufacture or sale primary right and duty of parents inthe rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shallreceive the support of the Government.ISSUES: 1. 2. WON the appellants have the standing toSec 14, Art II assert constitutional rights of people to The State recognizes the role of womenin nation-building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women marital privacy and men. Art XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution Sec 1 The State recognizes theFilipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidaritya n d a c t i v e l y p r o m o t e i t s t o t a l d e v e l o p m e n t . S e c 2 M a r r i a g e , a s a n i n v i o l a b l e s o c i a l institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Sec 3 The Stateshall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religiousc o n v i c t i o n s a n d t h e d e m a n d s o f r e s p o n s i b l e p a r e n t h o o d ; ( 2 ) T h e r i g h t o f c h i l d r e n t o assistance, including proper care and nutrition, a n d s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n f r o m a l l f o r m s o f neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3)T h e r i g h t o f t h e f a m i l y t o a f a m i l y l i v i n g wage and income; (4) The right of families or family associations to participate i n t h e p l a n n i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f p o l i c i e s a n d programs that affect them. Sec 4 The family has the duty to care for its elderly members butthe State may also do so through just WON the contraceptive ban statute violates right of marital privacy (from the right of liberty) HELD: Although not stated in the Bill of Rights, itis included in the penumbra of rights afforded to the citizens. It also sweeps unnecessarily broadly and does not prove to be a sufficient method of family planning. It deprived married

people the due process of law by including people who are not meant to be included. Statutestruck down as unconstitutional. * What if the couples intention for using contraceptive wasfor medical purposes and family planning? * Does it mean that people only use contraceptivew h e n t h e y a r e h a v i n g e x t r a - m a r i t a l affairs? And that if they dont have access t o contraceptives, they will no longer engage in extra-marital affair? EISENSTADT v BAIRD(1971) 405 US 438 Sec 1, Art III - Baird was arrested for violation of Massachusetts law No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law, nor shallanydevicesbe denied the a by exhibiting contraceptive person and giving equal protection of the laws. contraceptive foam to a woman when he ended his lecture at Boston University. - -The statute prohibited the sale, lending or giving away of contraceptives unless prescribed bya physician to married people. Its purpose is to discourage fornication (pre-marital sex) and prevent spread of sexually transmitted disease. However, the medical policy was a merea f t e r t h o u g h t , a m e n d e d a f t e r t h e G r i s w o l d d e c i s i o n i n 1 9 6 6 I S S U E : W O N t h e s t a t u t e i s unconstitutional for denying equal protection to unmarried people PERSONS AND FAMILYRELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 4 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |UP Law B2012 HELD: Yes. It violates due process clause by providing dissimilar treatmentfor married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated. The deterrence of fornicationcannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute since it is riddled with exceptionsmaking contraceptives freely available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope and penalty structure is inconsistent with that purpose. The protection of public health cannot also be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the statute since if this were the case, it would bediscriminatory and overbroad. It would appear that only married people are protected fromt h e e v i l w h i c h i t i n t e n d s t o s u p p r e s s i . e . S T D . - D e p r i v i n g u n m a r r i e d p e o p l e w i t h contraceptive devices is tantamount to punishing them with the risk of having illegitimatechildren for fornication. So all the more that unmarried people should be given access toc o n t r a c e p t i v e s . 2 T E S T S T H A T J U S T I F Y L A W F U L S T A T E I N T R U S I O N I N T O T H E FAMILY 1. 2. Is there a compelling state interest in regulating peoples rights? Is there a fit between the state interest and the measure taken? *In both Griswold and Eisenstadt cases,there was no fit between the state interest and the measure taken. The means employed arenot sufficient deterrent of the evils sought to avoid. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS| Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 5 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012II. CIVIL PERSONALITY STATUS the legal condition or class to which one belongs insociety; the legal or juridical position of the individual in the society; determines the natureand number of his rights and obligation KINDS OF STATUS A. as a member of society -resident or non-resident alien or noncitizen B. as a member of family - single, married or divorced - parent or child;

brother or sister - legitimate, illegitimate or adopted C. as himself -a g e - s e x mental condition - occupation (not a status b e c a u s e n o t i n h e r e n t ) CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS 1. inalienable 2. imprescriptible 3. cant be renounced 4.c a n t b e s u b j e c t t o c o m p r o m i s e 5 . r i g h t s a r i s e f r o m i t c a n n o t b e e x e r c i s e d b y c r e d i t o r s Juridical Capacity <- CIVIL CAPACITY -> Capacity to Act Art 37 Aptitude to holding andAptitude to exercise of enjoyment of rights rights Fitness to be subject of Power to do actswith legal legal relations effects Indivisible and inherent Conditional and voidable Can existw i t h o u t c a p a c i t y R e q u i r e s b o t h ( 1 ) t o a c t i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d (2) will. Capacity is always presumed KINDS OF PERSONS NATURAL h u m a n b e i n g s - p r o d u c t s o f p r o c r e a t i o n Natural Persons JURIDICAL artificial, abstract - product of legal fiction CC, Art 40 Birthd e t e r m i n e s personality; but the conceived shall b it, provided it be born later with the

conditions specified in the followin CHARACTERISTICS OF FETAL PERSONALITY 1.limited because it only has rights for purposes favorable to it 2. provisional/conditional b e c a u s e i t s h o u l d b e b o r n a l i v e l a t e r b e f o r e t h e r i g h t s c a n b e c l a i m e d . B u t w h e n i s i t considered born alive? Refer to Art. 4 1 , C C B i r t h = t o t a l s e p a r a t i o n f r o m t h e m o t h e r o r removal of fetus in from mothers womb by cutting off the umbilical cord A. Concept andClasses of Persons CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL PERSONALITY 1. not a being, but aquality of certain beings 2. not a physical element, but a juridical concept 3. not an object of c o n t r a c t , o r o f p o s s e s s i o n , c a n n o t b e i m p a i r e d b y a g r e e m e n t 4 . m a t t e r o f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t PERSONALITY v CAPACITY (These two concepts are intimately related but not identical)Personality is: is product of capacity in law external manifestation of capacity synonymous to juridical capacity Generally, cannot be limited Specifically, may suffer limitations becauseits merely the result of capacity to act CC, Art 37 Juridical capacity, which is fitness to bethe subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only throughdeath. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may belost. 3. But it can enjoy rights like inherit from will or intestacy and be given donations even before birth CC, Art 41 For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive mothersw o m b . H o w e v e r , i f t h e f e t u s h a d a n i n t r a u t e r i n e l i f e o f l e s s w i t h i n 2 4 h o u r s a f t e r i t s complete delivered from the maternal womb. If intrauterine life < 7 months, then the fetusmust live for 24 hours (even if life is machine sustained only) Otherwise, even if death is byaccident without which fetus could have survived (e.g. the janitor accidentally tripped on theincubator or life supports plug and caused the fetus death), kahit 22 hours pa yan, it will not be considered alive No special sign of life required. Though complete respiration may beindicated by crying or floating of lungs (which you can only do in case of death) Viability(complete and independent functioning of internal organs) not required In case of doubt,there is presumption that the child was born alive - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS| Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 6 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012- GELUZ v CA (1961) 2 SCRA 801 Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. AntonioGeluz which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware of Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art 2206 which CA sustained ISSUE: WON husband can claim damages for thedeath of the unborn fetus? HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not havecivil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetusdoes not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The childshould be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniarydamages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. Therecould be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parentsof an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of theappellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate onthe causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest

int h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d c r i m i n a l c a s e s a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t , b u t w a s m o r e c o n c e r n e d i n obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. *According to Maam: In the Philippines, people who seek pecuniary damages for loss of relatives are seen in a negative light. It givesthe impression that youre just after the money. But it should not be the case. CC, Art 42Civil personality is extinguished by death. - hacked him and his wife and 7 children. His wifeand six of the kids died. Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended, Ciriaco Baldesco and

Bonifacio Tirol. After they were found guilty of the crime of murder of the 7 persons, theyfiled an appeal, during which Baldesco died. ISSUE: WON Baldesco can still be held liablefor his offense HELD: Court dismissed the criminal case since Baldesco is already dead.However, Baldescos personality is continued in his estate (Art 42) hence the civil liabilitieswill be recovered from his estate. CC, Art 43 If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who ar died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, presumed thatthey died at the same time and resorted to there shall be no t Rule 123 of Sec 60 of RevisedRules of Court only if there are no inferential/circumstantial evidences to be inferred from 1.2. 3. 4. Both under 15 older Both over 60 younger Under 15 and over 60 younger Between15 60 male or if same sex, older Under 15/over 60 & bet between the 15 and 60 Applicableo n l y w h e n ( 1 ) c a l a m i t y & ( 2 ) i n v o l v e s succession Weakness of Rule 123 according toM a a m : S i n c e t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n i s b a s e d o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e t w e e n c l o s e a g e s i s not strength, age and sex of individuals accurately represented e.g. who will s u r v i v e between 12 and 15 years old considering they have approximately the same level of strength?5. - Death means natural or physical death, as there no such thing as civil death in thePhilippines Rights and obligations are completely extinguished, while others are transmittedt o h i s successors After the death, personality is deemed to continue to estate PEOPLE v TIROL (1981) 102 SCRA 558 Kosain Manipol and his family were sleeping when he heardthe dog bark. When he went to investigate, two persons have already come up to their house,asking if they can borrow his land. After he gave his consent, Kulas arrived, flashed the lightin his face and punched him. When he fell, the assailants companions (more than 10 armedmen) came in - JOAQUIN v NAVARRO (1953) 93 Phil 7 Summary proceeding to resolvethe order of deaths of Joaquin Navarro, JR and his mother Angela Navarro Setting: WorldWar II. Battle of Manila is considered as a calamity. Also mentioned in the story was theneighbor Francisco Lopez and three other daughters who were shot while trying to escape Itis necessary to establish succession because if JN Jr. died first, his heirs are not entitled toinherit from their grandparents. Refer to the case for explanation of the probable causes ands p e c u l a t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e i r d e a t h ( t o o m a n y t o e n u m e r a t e h e r e , r e f e r t o o r i g i n a l ! ) ISSUE: Who between the mother and the son died first? - - - - PERSONS AND FAMILYRELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 7 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |UP Law B2012 Juridical Persons HELD: Inference can be derived from the evidences so non e e d t o u s e p r e s u m p t i o n . T h a t t h e m o t h e r ( A n g e l a ) d i e d b e f o r e h e r s o n w a s b a s e d o n speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by whichcivil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1)direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art 43 speaks about resolving doubtwhen 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In theCivil Code, in the absence of proof, it

is presumed that they died at the same time, and theres h a l l b e n o t r a n s m i s s i o n o f r i g h t s f r o m o n e t o a n o t h e r . I n t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t , i n c a s e s o f calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship. Kinds of Juridical Persons (CC, Art 44) andlaws governing them (CC, A 1) 2) 3) state and its political subdivisions governed by thelaws creating other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest cr recognizingthem corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or separate and distinctfrom that of each shareholder, partner or provisions of this Code concerning partnership CC,Art 47 Dissolution of No 2 - in pursuance of law or the charter crea B. Capacity to Act andRestrictions Thereon 1. Presumption of Capacity STANDARD OIL CO. v ARENAS (1911)19 Phil 363 1908 Vicente Villanueva signed a bond as surety for Codina Arenas in favor of

plaintiff 1909 The plaintiff sued on the bond; Villanueva did not appear, and was declared ind e f a u l t . Wife appeared when judgment was about to be executed and asked that he b e relieved from the bond and the judgment because he was insane (declared insane by July 24,1909) with his wife as his guardian. Case was reopened and tried and the evidence showedthat Villanueva executed the bond with full understanding of the nature and consequences of the act performed by him although he was suffering from a monomania of great wealth. Hew a s , therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence appealed to the SC. ISSUE: 1. 2. WONmonomania of wealth necessarily warrants that the person does not have c a p a c i t y t o a c t WON Villanueva was actually incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond wasexecuted HELD: SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. It would have been necessary to showthat 1. such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient; 2. that the bond executed was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of anyo t h e r c a u s e , t h a t i s , t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t , o r c o u l d t h e r e h a v e b e e n a n y o t h e r c a u s e f o r t h e contract than the ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania of w e a l t h ; 3 . t h a t t h e m o n o m a n i a e x i s t e d o n t h e d a t e t h e b o n d i n q u e s t i o n w a s e x e c u t e d . Monomania of PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.2008-2009 Page 8 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 4. MERCADO v ESPIRITU(1917) 37 Phil 215 Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado were minors (under the CivilCode), 18 and 19 years 2. Restrictions old respectively, on the date the instrument (sale of land to their uncle) was executed so they CC, Art 6 Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or seek for annulmentof contract. prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. However, in the deedof sale they stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it; andt h e y m a d e t h e s a m e C C , A r t 3 8 M i n o r i t y , i n s a n i t y / i m b e c i l i t y , s t a t e o f b e i n g d e a f - m u t e , prodigality and civil interdiction are mere manifestation before the notary public when therestriction on capacity to act, and do not exempt the document was prepared. incapacitated p e r s o n f r o m c e r t a i n o b l i g a t i o n s , a s w h e n t h e l a t t e r a r i s e f r o m h i s a c t s o f f r o m p r o p e r t y relations. wealth does not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of executing a bondsuch as that in question. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue for so long ast h e c o n t r a r y i s n o t p r o v e d , t h a t i s , a t t h e m o m e n t o f h i s a c t i n g h e w a s i n c a p a b l e , c r a z y , insane, or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of the court, has not been proved in thiscase. Art 1390 (1) if one is incapable of VOIDABLE Art 1403 (3) if both is

 contract, validunless courts says otherwise UNENFORCEABLE unless ratified Art 1397 capacitated partycannot incapable allege the incapacity of other parties Art 1399 restitution not obliged if not b e n e f i t e d ISSUE: WON the dead of sale was invalid because the contractors are m i n o r s HELD: No. The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minorswho have already passed the age of puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age, whenthey pretend to have already reached their majority, while in fact, they have not, is valid, andt h e y c a n n o t b e permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with t h e obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. Their misrepresentation estopped themfrom claiming the invalidity of the contract. Art 1390, CC binding at the discretion of theC o u r t . I t d o e s n o t f a v o r t h e o f f e n d e r , c o m e t o C o u r t w i t h c l e a n h a n d s . B A M B A L A N v MARAMBA (1966) 51 Phil 4 1 7 I s i d r o B a m b a l a n , a m i n o r , e x e c u t e d a d e e d o f s a l e o f a piece of land to the defendant, Genoveva can have still civilly liable although criminallyn o t l i a b l e Muerong. obligation except for contracts SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS

(obligations arise from) 1. law 4. crimes/delicts 2. contracts 5. quasi-delicts 3 . q u a s i - contracts 6. torts REINTEGRATION OF CAPACITY 1. upon reaching age of majority 2.civil interdiction, extinction of principal penalty 3. judicially determined competence withoutg u a r d i a n ( f o r t h e f i r s t t w o , n o n e e d f o r c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g ) A n incapacitated person is notexempt from obligations civilly liable but not This is kind of confusing because he isexcluded from all c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e . e x c e p t c o n t r a c t s , B U T w h a t e x a c t l y i s n o t a contract CC, Art 39 Modify, limit or restrict capacity to act 1. age (minority) 7. alienage 2.insanity 8. absence 3. imbecility 9. family relations 4. state of being deaf-mute 10. trusteeship5. penalty 11. insolvency 6. prodigality - - Bambalan made no representation as to his age,which was well known to the defendant, inasmuch as the latter was the one who purchasedthe plaintiffs cedula to be used in the acknowledgement of the document before a notary p u b l i c . P l a i n t i f f n o w s e e k s t o a n n u l t h e s a l e . A . M i n o r i t y R A 6 8 0 9 - L o w e r s t h e a g e o f majority from 21 to 18 Contracts Art 1327 no more concept of (1) unemancipated minorsc a n n o t g i v e c o n s e n t t o c o n t r a c t u n e m a n - c i p a t e d m i n o r s b e c a u s e a g e o f e m a n c i p a t i o n = majority ISSUE: WON a minors non-representation of his age and knowledge of the other contracting party as to the incapacity of the minor may render the sale void HELD: Yes. Thesale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. Mercado vEspiritu doctrine is not applicable in this case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him to be a minor. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 9 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE (1959) 105 Phil 456 - - Rosario along with her two sons( G u i l l e r m o a n d R o d o l f o ) l o a n e d 7 0 , 0 0 0 M i c k e y M o u s e m o n e y f r o m r e s p o n d e n t s a y i n g theyll pay him equivalent amount after the

war. They did not disclose the age of the sons sothe respondent willingly gave them the amount they were asking for. ISSUES: WON non-disclosure of a minors age may render the deed void and WON the recipients are obliged tor e s t i t u t e w h a t t h e y e a r n e d H E L D : T h e r e w a s n o m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a g e , s o i t c a n n o t constitute fraud. But since they benefited from the amount, they should return it because of Art 1399, CC. Marriage Art 35 (1), FC void ab initio Art 5, FC male or female of the age of 1 8 m a y c o n t r a c t m a r r i a g e C r i m e s A r t 1 2 , R P C P e r i o d s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 9 a n d b e l o w * absolute irresponsibility 9 to 15* conditional responsibility *raised to 15 such that age of discernment is 15-18 -- unless with discernment: (a) manner of committing (b) conduct of theoffender -- for mitigated responsibility, penalty is one degree lower B. Insanity Contracts Art1327 (2) insane/demented cannot give consent to contract Art 1328 (1) contracted in a lucidinterval is valid, but burden to prove lucid interval on prosecution Art 1399 restitution notobliged if not benefited Crime Art 12(1) not exempt from criminal liability if lucid intervalPRESUMPTION OF SANITY a) circumstantial evidence is sufficient b) insanity must proveto precede the act C. State of being deaf-mute Art 1327 Art 807 deaf-mute who are no read,no write cannot give consent to contract deaf-mute may write a will but if no read, no writec a n d e s i g n a t e t w o ( 2 ) p e r s o n s w h o w o u l d c o m m u n i c a t e t o h i m t h e c o n t e n t s b e c a u s e h e wont be able to testify properly deaf-mute cannot witness a will in court if ever the needa r i s e s A r t 8 2 0 P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2008-2009 Page 10 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 D. Prodigality Art 92 (2), RCwanton waste of ones estate; without regard for family exposing them to want and deprivingi n h e r i t a n c e ; m o r b i d s t a t e o f m i n d a n d d i s p o s i t i o n t o s p e n d i n d i s p e n s a b l e , w h o f o r t h i s purpose shall be designated by a competent court, in accordance with the provisions of theRules of Court. Art 11.2, RPC Justifying circ: in defense of family Art 13.5, RPC Mitigating

circ: immediate vindication MARTINEZ v MARTINEZ (1902) 1 Phil 182 Pedro MartinezIlustre appeal after CA rejected his petition for declaring his dad, Francisco, a prodigal Hewas given by dad special powers of attorney but dad revoked it because son is mismanagingtheir estate Son accused dad of splurging and squandering their properties by giving donationt o h i s s e c o n d w i f e a n d h e r f a m i l y I S S U E : W O N F r a n c i s c o should be declared prodigalHELD: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, i t m a y b e i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e a c t s o f prodigality must show a morbid state of bind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen theestate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive thef o r c e d h e i r s o f t h e i r u n d i s p o s a b l e p a r t o f t h e e s t a t e . T h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s insufficient to support his allegations against his father. There was no evidence to show hisfather has been transferring by sale or mortgage any property, which will reflect in the cityrecord of public deeds. The court found the defendant is far from being prodigal, and is stillin the full exercise of his faculties and still possess the industry, thrift and ability in managingthe estate. In fact, the father has increased profit while the son himself possesses propensityto be prodigal. F. Family Relations Art 37, FC incestuous marriage Art 87, FC donation inter vivos not allowed bet spouses Art 215, FC disqualified to testify against each other unlessindispensable to crime against him/another grand/parent Art 1109, CC prescription does notrun between husband and wife, parent and child (minority or insanity), guardian and wardArt 1490, CC spouses cannot sell property to each other unless: (a) separation of property inmarriage settlement (b) judicial separation of property G. Absence Art 390, CC after 7 yearsa person is presumed dead for all purposes except

succession; if 75, 5 yrs only Art 391, CC if there is a danger of death (4 yrs only) (a) vessel lost at sea or missing airplane (b) member of military or armed force in war (c) other circumstances of danger of death Art 124, FC if ones p o u s e i s i n c a p a c i t a t e d , o t h e r s p o u s e m a y a s s u m e p o w e r o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n E . C i v i l Interdiction Art 34, RPC Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as tothe person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his propertyand of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Art 54,CC Any male of the age of sixteen years or upwards, and any female of the age of fourteenyears or upwards, not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 80 to 84, maycontract marriage. (2) Art 123, CC For the validity of marriage settlements executed by any person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced, the presence and participation of the guardian shall be PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 11 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 III. PRE-M A R I T A L C O N T R O V E R S Y I S S U E : W h e t h e r o r n o t b r e a c h o f p r o m i s e t o m a r r y i s actionable HELD: This is not the case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go throughall the preparations publicity, only to Breach of promise to marry walk out of it when thematrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is contrary to good customs for which the justice, give everyone held CC Art 19 Every person must, in exercise of rights and p e r f o r m a n c e o f h i s d u t i e s , a c t w i t h d e f e n d a n t m u s t b e e l s e h i s a n s w e r a b l e i n d a m a g e s i n accordance with Art. 21 due, and observe honesty and good faith. NCC. Defendant is liablef o r a c t u a l d a m a g e s , a s w e l l C C A r t 2 0 E v e r y p e r s o n w h o , c o n t r a r y t o l a w , w i l l f u l l y o r negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify Judgment as to moral and exemplarydamages. the latter for the same. affirmed with modifications (on amount of damages). CCArt 21 Any person who willfully causes loss o injury to another in a manner that is contrary

to morals, good customs or TANJANCO v CA (1966) public policy shall compensate thelatter for damage. 18 SCRA 994 CC Art 2176Whoever by act or omission causes damage toanother,Arceli being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the there Santos and ApolinarioTanjanco are damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractualrelation between the parties, is called a quasisweethearts. Because of the mans promise todelict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. marry the woman, they continuallyhad sexual BASIS FOR HEARTBALM STATUTE (1) property (2) expectation (cultural ands o c i e t a l ) t h e y u s e d t o v a l u e m a r r i a g e a s t h e o n l y g o a l . I m p a i r s h o n o r a n d p u r i t y o f t h e deserted party Why is there no success in claiming damages for breach of promise to marry?relationship with each other for a span of one year with the womans consent. When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant tor e c o g n i z e t h e u n b o r n c h i l d t o g i v e h e r s u p p o r t p l u s m o r a l a n d e x e m p l a r y d a m a g e s o f P100,000. The CFI dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA set aside the CFIdecision. - No source of obligation because marriage is purely voluntary and not compulsory.It should be freely entered into without any threat. People marry because of love, so it cannot be imposed and thus there is no legal basis for action. In the olden days, women are seen asused merchandise when their sweethearts abandon them. Their chances of getting marrieda f t e r b e i n g r e j e c t e d b e c o m e s l i m m e r . M a r r i a g e w a s t h e o n l y g o a l o f w o m e n . T h i n g s a r e different now, especially since women can have careers. No more pressure to marry! Breachof promise to marry is a quasi-delict (refer back to Sources of Obligations in Restrictionson Capacity to Act) ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards setforth in Art 21 HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that

in law is morethan sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman hasy i e l d e d . T h e f a c t s s t a n d o u t t h a t f o r o n e w h o l e y e a r , t h e p l a i n t i f f , a w o m a n o f a d u l t a g e , maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Suchconduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness andmutual passion. If she had been deceived, she would not have again yield to his embraces,much less for one year. Besides, she is old enough to know better. Hence no case is madeunder Art 21. DE JESUS v SYQUIA (1933) 58 Phil 866 Cesar Syquia courted Antonia deJesus who was 20 years old. Amorous relations resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. They lived together for one year until Antonio got pregnant again after which Cesar left to marry another woman. Cesar recognized his paternity of first child inwriting with a letter to the priest and uninterrupted possession of natural child status for oney e a r W A S S M E R v V E L E Z ( 1 9 6 4 ) 1 2 S C R A 6 4 8 - - T w o d a y s b e f o r e t h e w e d d i n g (meaning everything about the wedding was already set, as well as bridal showers and gifts)the groom Francisco Velez suddenly flew to his home in Cagayan de Oro, leaving the bride,Beatriz Wassmer, only this note: will have to postpone wedding my mother opposes it.The next day (day before the wedding) he sent this message through telegram: Nothingchanged rest assured returning soon. But he never returned and was never heard from again.PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page1 2 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 W o m a n f i l e s f o r a c t i o n f o r d a m a g e s f o r breach of promise and recognition of the child. ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damagesfor breach of promise to marry and kids to paternal support HELD: Promise to marry notsatisfactorily proved so the trial court was right in refusing to grant De Jesus prayer. Also,action for breach of promise to marry has no standing for civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Thiscase exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such action. - Antonia de Jesus onlyentitled to the support of the first child because of Cesars prior recognition. No support for t h e second child because no proof of paternity or recognition presented. P I C C I N I N N I v HAJUS (1980) 180 Conn. 369 - - Marie Hajus fraudulently induced Robert Piccininni (yes,the tennis player) to transfer properties to her name for their mutual benefit and enjoyment asfuture husband and wife. Husband does not sue for her not marrying him but for cajoling himi n t o t r a n s f e r r i n g p r o p e r t y i n h e r n a m e I S S U E : W O N t h e p r o p e r t y i s r e c o v e r a b l e u n d e r Heartbalm statute because the wife did not marry him HELD: Yes because marital gifts areconditional until after marriage so recoverable. Ban on Heartbalm statutes only for issues of the heart like anguish, moral damages, failed expectation of financial and social gains. In thiscase, the petition is for recovery of unjust enrichment of deferring wife. PERSONS ANDFAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 13 of 170 KarichiE . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 I V . D E F I N I T I O N & N A T U R E O F M A R R I A G E F C , A r t 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered intoi n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l a w , f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f f a m i l y a n d c o n j u g a l l i f e . I t i s t h e foundation of family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences andi n c i d e n t s a r e g o v e r n e d b y t h e l a w a n d n o t s u b j e c t t o s t i p u l a t i o n , e x c e p t t h a t m a r r i a g e settlements may fix property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by thisCode. illegitimate parent. The parent must first prove that he can sustain his two families andshould undergo counseling. ISSUE: WON statute is unconstitutional for violation of equal protection and due process clauses HELD: Unconstitutional for many

reasons. As for thestate interests: 1) Counseling also is not even an assurance of permission 2) Protect welfareof out custody children to compel collection and incentive to delivery of money to but thereare also other means like wage assignment, civil prior children contempt proceedings or c r i m i n a l p e n a l t y 3 ) P r e v e n t i n c u r r i n g o f n e w o b l i g a t i o n u n d e r i n c l u s i v e b e c a u s e n e w marriage is not the only way people spend their resources, over inclusive because they could be marrying to a better financed couple. Also it only adds more children out of wedlock.*According to Maam only those economically stable may marry and this Beth: implicationo f t h e b a n C O M M I T T O M E M O R Y ! ! ! L O V I N G v V I R G I N I A (1967) violates equal protection clause 388 US 1, 12 - - Mildred Loving (of African and Native American descent)marries Richard Perry Loving (a Caucasian) in violation of Virginias Racial Integrity Actwhich is an anti-miscegenation statute that prohibits Whites from marrying into other racesInteresting phrase: Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, Malay and red andhe placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangementthere would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows thathe did not intend for the races to mix. The statute fuels White Supremacy because onlyW h i t e s a r e f o r b i d d e n t o i n t e r m a r r y , o t h e r r a c e s c a n m a r r y a n y o n e A . M a r r i a g e M o d e l s CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE 1. civil (independent of any religion) 2. institute of public order and policy 3. natural (organic perpetuation of man) PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OFA VALID MARRIAGE 1. emancipation from parental authority 2. personal and economicr e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n s p o u s e s 3 . p e r s o n a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p a r e n t & c h i l d 4 . family relationship 5. legitimacy of sexual union and family 6. modification of criminalliability 7. incapacity to make donations to each other 8. disqualification to testify againste a c h o t h e r M A R R I A G E O n l y b e t w e e n m a n a n d w o m a n S p e c i f i e d d u t i e s a n d r i g h t s o f spouses May not be subject to stipulation or terminated Breech of obligation not actionable ORDINARY CONTRACTS May be same sex - ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutionalf o r violation of both the equal protection and due process clauses of 14th A m e n d m e n t HELD: Yes. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personalrights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the basiccivil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival. Decisions SC and CA of Virginia are reversed. ZABLOCKI v REDHAIL (1978) 434 US 374, 384 - Thomas Zablockiwas denied marriage license because of non-support to prior children. Even if he marriesoutside their state, it will still not be valid. The state interest of this statute was to protect thewelfare of out of custody children and prevent incurrence of new obligation by the - Have theforce of law between them Can be terminated at the agreement of parties Breach of contractgives rise to action for damages *In both marriage and ordinary contracts, partys consent isnecessary TERMS OF A TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1) husband as heado f f a m i l y n a m e and domicile PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.Pangalangan, A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 1 4 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 ( 2 ) husband responsible for support (3) wife responsible for domestic and childcare servicesG R A H A M v GRAHAM (1940) /grahm/) 33 F. Supp. 936 (pronounced as her name w a s purged from the registration list. Hence this action. ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory tochange name upon marriage HELD: No. Woman upon marriage, may elect to retain her ownsurname or she may adopt the surname of her husband and the choice is hers. So long as a p e r s o n s n a m e

remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed in prescribedmanner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, state has nol e g i t i m a t e c o n c e r n a s t o n a m e u s e d . t h e l e g a l n a m e o f a n y p e r s o n i s t h e o n e w r i t t e n on *According to Maam Beth the birth certificate (CC, Art 370) IN RE SANTIAGO(1940) 70 Phil 66 - James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues his former wife, Margrethe,d e f e n d a n t , t o r e c o v e r w h a t h e w a s a l l e g e d l y e n t i t l e d b y a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w h e r e i n defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain some of money. The agreement was that thewife asked husband to quit his job so that he can accompany her to his travels, to which heagreed as long as she will pay him $300 each month. The monthly payment is to be in forceuntil the parties no longer desire the agreement. - ISSUE: WON the agreement compels thewife to continue paying her husband the $300 HELD: No, the contract is not valid. Marriagecontract specifies that its the husbands duty or obligation to support and live with his wife,and the wife must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow him in hisc h o i c e o f domicile. Also, a private agreement between persons married or about to b e married whereby they attempt to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract iscontrary to public policy. BRADWELL v ILLINOIS (1872) 93 US (16 wall) 130 - ErnestoBaniquit and Soledad Colares separated for 9 consecutive years, want to remarry so theysought the aid of Atty. Roque Santiago He instituted a document that waives whatever rightof action one might have against each other but realized mistake after 19 days and cancelledthe document ISSUE: WON the document signed by the spouses legitimately terminated themarital tie between them. HELD: No. Termination of the marriage cannot be stipulated byt h e p a r t i e s . S a n t i a g o g u i l t y o f m a l p r a c t i c e a n d s u s p e n d e d f o r 1 y e a r . SELANOVA vMENDOZA (1975) 64 SCRA 69 Respondent Judge A l e j a n d r o M e n d o z a p r e p a r e d a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of Saturnino Selanova andAvelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw thec o m p l a i n t f o r a d u l t e r y o r c o n c u b i n a g e w h i c h e a c h h a d f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r a n d t h e y waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would

commit against the other. This document was also acknowledged before him as City Judgeand Notary Public Ex Officio. Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of thelaw. ISSUE: WON marriage is valid HELD: Agreement is void because it contravenes the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of CC Art 221. Even before the enactment of the NCC,t h i s c o u r t held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership during them a r r i a g e w i t h o u t j u d i c i a l - M y r a B r a d w e l l w a s d e n i e d l i c e n s e t o p r a c t i c e l a w J U S T BECAUSE SHE IS A FEMALE. That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheresof action and that it belonged to men to make, apply and execute the laws, was regarded asan almost axiomatic truth Amazing they were able to talk to God directly. Prescribe thequalifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment- DUNN v PALERMO (1975) 522 S. W. 2d 679 Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer whomarried Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy her maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes.

Tennessee had a state-w i d e c o m p u l s o r y R e g i s t r a t i o n L a w . S u b s e q u e n t t o h e r m a r r i a g e , s h e l o d g e d w i t h t h e Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo. She was advised that shewas required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her name purgedf r o m t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n l i s t . U p o n h e r r e f u s a l t o s o r e g i s t e r , P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 15 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |UP Law B2012 approval secured beforehand was void. While adultery and concubinageare private crimes, they shall remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission isc o n t r a r y t o l a w a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y n o t judicially recognizable. Respondent is severelyc e n s u r e d . A S S U M P T I O N S O F F A M I L Y L A W ( W e i t z m a n a r t i c l e ) 1 . M a r r i a g e i s a permanent, indissoluble, lifetime commitment 2. First marriages (young & no p r e v i o u s marriages) 3. Main reason is procreation 4. Strict division of labor 5. White middle-classfamily (property and inheritance) 6. Judeo-Christian tradition (monogamy) GOODRIDGE vD E P T O F P U B L I C H E A L T H ( 2 0 0 3 ) 4 4 0 M a s s . 3 0 9 1 4 i n d i v i d u a l s ( 7 c o u p l e s ) w e r e deprived of marriage license because they were the same sex - - They are professionals andactive in socio-civic activities, there was longevity in the relationship and defendants wereinvolved (adopted children and parents) They met all facial qualifications, list of impedimentw a s n o t p r e s e n t e d b y c i v i l r e g i s t r a r ( t o p r o v e t h a t s a m e s e x m a r r i a g e i s o n e o f t h e m ) LEGISLATIVE RATIO: 1. favorable setting for procreation 2. optimal setting for childrearing 3. conserving scarce state and private financial resources B. Requisites of Marriage 1.intrinsic (Art 2) ESSENTIAL REQUISITES ISSUE: 1. WON licensing law treats same sexas impediment presented by the plaintiff 2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimateexercise of the States authority to regulation conduct Court HELD: Marriage is a secular institution. No religious ceremony is required. There are only 3 partners (2 spouses and theState who defines the entry and exit terms) PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT: 1. law does notdistinguish childrens family background so why deprive children the rights when they didn o t c h o o s e t o b e b o r n / g r o w u p i n s u c h a f a m i l y ( c o i t u s v n o n c o i t u s , e . g . a d o p t i o n o r assisted), failed to address the changing realities of American society 2. best interest of thec h i l d p a r e n t s s e x u a l o r i e n t a t i o n 3 . h o m o s e x u a l s a r e w e l l o f f a n d e c o n o m i c a l l y independent, anyway, the same is not condition/requirement for heterosexual couples. A.Legal capacity a. Sex (must be between man and woman) b. c. Age 18 and above (Art 5) No impediment which means: (1) no previous marriage (2) family relations (not incestuous)JONES v HALLAHAN (1973) 501 S. W. 2d 588 Marjorie Jones and her female partner weren o t i s s u e d a l i c e n s e t o m a r r y e a c h o t h e r i n the state of Kentucky. They contend that the

failure of the clerk to issue the marriage license deprived them o f t h r e e ( 3 ) b a s i c constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of association; and the right to freee x e r c i s e o f r e l i g i o n . A p p e l l a n t s a l s o c o n t e n d t h a t t h e r e f u s a l s u b j e c t s t h e m t o c r u e l a n d unusual punishment. ISSUE: WON same sex constitutional rights to marry marriage violates- HELD: No, it does not violate any constitutionally protected right. Two females cannotm a r r y f o r m a r r i a g e h a s a l w a y s b e e n c o n s i d e r e d a s t h e u n i o n o f a m a n a n d a w o m a n . I t appears that appellants are prevented from marrying not by the statute of Kentucky but rather by their own incapacity of entering into marriage as the term is defined. A license to enter i n t o a s t a t u s o r a r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n c a p a b l e o f e n t e r i n g i s a n u l l i t y . Definition of marriage says, union of a man and a woman. Thus, in the courts opinion,there is not constitutional issue involved, since there is no constitutional sanction which p r o t e c t s t h e r i g h t o f m a r r i a g e b e t w e e n p e r s o n s

o f t h e s a m e s e x . I M P L I C A T I O N O F PROHIBITION: deprivation of protection, benefits, same reason why these obligations andr i g h t s e x c l u s i v e t o m a r r i e d p e o p l e c o u p l e s w a n t t h e b e n e f i t o f m a r r i a g e T h e y d o n o t undermine marriage, In fact, they appreciate/ show high esteem for of marriage by asking for i t ! S t a t u t e d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l - S I L V E R I O v R E P U B L I C ( 2 0 0 7 ) 5 3 7 S C R A 2 7 3 Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio wants to change his name to Mely and sex entry in his birthcertificate from male to female because of his sex reassignment (transgender). RTC grantedi n 2 0 0 3 C A r e v e r s e d i n 2 0 0 6 P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 16 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE:WON he is entitled to the change of name action HELD: NO! 1. Names are for purposes of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : A r t 3 7 6 , C C ( n o c h a n g e o f n a m e w i t h o u t j u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n ) , R A 9 0 4 8 (Clerical Error Law), Rule 103 (change of name) and Rule 108 (Cancellation of Correctionof Entries; substantial change) 2. Grounds for Change of Name (Sec 4, RA 9048) a. Difficultand ridiculous, dishonorable name b. Habitual and continual use c. To avoid confusion 3.P e t i t i o n e r h a s n o t s h o w n a n y r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e a n d d o e s n o t s h o w t h a t h i s n a m e m a y prejudice him 4. Case is administrative rather than judiciary 5. Change of sex not allowed because civil status is immutable and inherent 6. No special law yet for sex change, until thensex is determined by the sex at the time of birth as resulted by visual inspection of medicalattendant. 7. Though we get your point and sympathize with you, its not within the provinceof the Court to amend laws. Youre barking at the wrong tree. Go to the Congress and ask them to pass a bill for you. Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she was a virgin.8 9 d a y s a f t e r t h e m a r r i a g e c e l e b r a t i o n , L u i d a g a v e b i r t h . H e r h u s b a n d G o d o f r e d o h e r e i n appellant filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her nonvirginity. ISSUE:WON marriage is valid HELD: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is,when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was pregnant, the marriagec a n n o t b e annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of marriage. Court refuses to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman w a s a t a n advanced stage of pregnancy at the time of the marriage and such condition must have been p a t e n t t o t h e h u s b a n d . E I G E N M A N N v G U E R R A ( 1 9 6 4 ) 5 C . A . R e p . 8 3 6 E d u a r d o Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on 1957. Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action toannul his marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was between ages 16-20 at that timeand his mother did not give her consent to the marriage. ISSUE: WON there was parentalconsent, the absence of which could render the marriage void. HELD: Consent may be givenin any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmanns mother was present at thet i m e o f t h e c e l e b r a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e a n d d i d n o t o b j e c t t h e r e t o , s u c h that consent can be

gleaned from such act. - Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a minor atthe time of the marriage celebration, having represented himself to be over 25 years of age.Art 4 Absence of any essential or formal void, except Art 35(2) Defect in the essentialrequirement voidable (Art 45) Irregularity in the formal requirement no effect in validity, but the parties responsible will be civilly, criminally or administratively liable B. Consentfreely given in the presence of solemnizing officer PEOPLE v SANTIAGO (1927) 51 Phil

68 Felipe Santiago asked his deceased wifes niece Felicita Masilang, 18, to accompany himon an errand Upon crossing a river and reaching municipality of San Leonardo, Satinagoexpressed his sexual desire to which girl declined, but he persisted on with force against her will The two proceeded to accuseds uncle house, Agapito Santiago who called a Protestantminister to conduct a wedding. After the wedding, Santiago sent home the girl with somem o n e y t o buy bread. ISSUE: WON the marriage exempted him from criminal l i a b i l i t y HELD: No! Taking into consideration Santiagos behavior before and after the marriage,there is no serious intention to marry the girl except for to avoid criminal liability for the rapecase. - Girl was under duress and therefore, lack of consent (essential requisite) which makesthe marriage void BUCCAT v MANGONON DE BUCAT (1941) 72 Phil 19 2. FORMALREQUISITES (Art 3) extrinsic A. Authority of solemnizing officer - Who may authorizethe marriage (Art 7) a. incumbent member of judiciary b. priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any religious sect - duly recognized by the religion, - registered in Civil Registry - actingw i t h i n t h e l i m i t o f h i s a u t h o r i t y P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 17 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - at leastone of the spouses is member of the sect c. ship captain and airplane chief only in Art 31 d.military commander to which chaplain is assigned in Art 32 e. consul-general, consul, vice-c o n s u l f o r F i l i p i n o s a b r o a d * M a y o r s a r e a u t h o r i z e d b y L G C t o s o l e m n i z e m a r r i a g e NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY (1996) 259 SCRA 129 Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnizedt h e m a r r i a g e b e t w e e n F l o r i a n o S u m a y l o a n d G e m m a d e l R o s a r i o o u t s i d e h i s c o u r t s jurisdiction. He has j u r i s d i c t i o n i n M C T C o f S t a . M o n i c a B u r g o s , b u t t h e m a r r i a g e w a s solemnized in Dapa which does not fall under his jurisdictional area. Mayor Rodolfo Navarrofiled this administrative complaint. ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable,and whether this will render the marriage void. HELD: Marriage may be solemnized by,a m o n g others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts j u r i s d i c t i o n . Solemnization outside the judges territorial jurisdiction will not invalidate the marriage.What results is an irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid marriage. Respondent judge, by citing Art 8 of the FC as defense for the exercise of his misplaced authority, acted in grossignorance of the law and was therefore held administratively liable suspension of 6 months.Irregularity in formal requisite no effect in marriage validity ARAES v OCCIANO( 2 0 0 2 ) 3 8 0 S C R A 4 0 2 P e t i t i o n e r M e r c e d i t a A r a e s c h a r g e d r e s p o n d e n t j u d g e S a l v a d o r Occiano for gross ignorance of the law. Occiano solemnized the marriage between herein petitioner and the late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and outsideh i s t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . C o u p l e l i v e d t o g e t h e r a s husband and wife until the death of Orobia. But then since the marriage was a n u l l i t y , p e t i t i o n e r s r i g h t t o i n h e r i t t h e v a s t property left by Orobia was not recognized. Respondent explained that he solemnized themarriage out of human compassion and because the parties promised to present their licensethe afternoon after the wedding. ISSUE: WON the respondent judge administratively liable.H E L D : Y e s . H e w a s f a u l t e d f o r s o l e m n i z i n g a m a r r i a g e w i t h o u t t h e r e q u i s i t e m a r r i a g e license and for exceeding his territorial jurisdiction. He was fined P5000 and was given a

stern warning by the SC that repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt moreseverely. The absence of a marriage license made the marriage void. And even if the plaintiff retracted her complaint, thats not how it is done. Withdrawal of complaint exoneration B.V a l i d m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e e x c e p t f o r m a r r i a g e s o f e x c e p t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r A r t 9 A r t A r t M L obtained in habitual residence of one of the parties 10 Requirements of

Filipino marriagesabroad settled in the consular office which will take over the duties of local civil registry 11Two separate application for one marriage license which shall specify the following: 1. fullname 2. place of birth 3. age and date of birth 4. civil status 5. if previously married, how,w h e n , w h e r e t h e p r e v i o u s m a r r i a g e w a s d i s s o l v e d o r a n n u l l e d 6 . p r e s e n t r e s i d e n c e a n d citizenship 7. degree of relationship of the contracting parties 8. full name, residence andcitizenship of the father 9. full name, residence and citizenship of the mother 10. full name,residence and citizenship of the guardian, person having charge, in case orphaned 12 Proof of age a. original or certified copy of birth certificate b. original or certified copy of baptismalcertif c. residence certificate witnessed by 2 witnesses preferably next of kin Proof of agedispensed with if: a. parents appear personally b. local civil registrar convinced by merelooking (read: mukhang matanda na) c. previously married 13 If previous marriages, not birthcert is required but: a. if no death certificate is available, death certificate of deceaseds p o u s e a f f i d a v i t a b o u t c i r c u m s t a n c e a n d c i v i l s t a t u s b . j u d i c i a l d e c r e e o f a b s o l u t e divorce/judicial decree of annulment/declaration of nullity c. declaration of presumptivedeath 14 if 18-21, then parental consent 15 if 21-25, then parental advice 16 if anyone isrequired with parental consent or advice, both shall undergo marriage counseling. Failure toattach certificate of Art Art Art Art Art PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E.A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 18 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 PD 965A r t 1 7 A r t 1 8 A r t 1 9 A r t 2 0 A r t 2 1 A r t 2 2 A r t 2 3 A r t 24 Art 25 Art 26 accomplishments u s p e n d s i s s u a n c e f o r 9 0 d a y s . ( 1 9 7 6 ) m a n d a t o r y f a m i l y p l a n n i n g a n d r e s p o n s i b l e parenthood 10 consecutive days of posting in bulletin board impediments noted in theapplication for marriage pay for issuance of ML; indigents exempted valid for 120 daysanywhere in the Philippines, automatically cancelled at expiration Either o r b o t h a r e foreigners: certificate of legal capacity to marry from consular officials Stateless persons or refugees: affidavit showing capacity to marry Marriage certificate should state the following:a . f u l l n a m e , s e x a n d a g e o f e a c h c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t y b . c i t i z e n s h i p , r e l i g i o n a n d h a b i t u a l residence c. date and precise time of the celebration of marriage d. marriage license number e. secured parental consent if needed f. complied with parental advice if needed g. if enteredinto marriage settlement, attach copy Duties of solemnizing officer a. furnish couple withoriginal marriage certificate b. furnish local civil registrar with duplicate and triplicate within15 days after the marriage c. keep with him the original marriage license, quadruplicate of the marriage certificate and affidavit of the contracting party to hold marriage elsewhere assaid in Art 8 Duties of local civil registrar a. prepare documents required by this Title b.administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge c. exempt from documentarystamp tax log in registry book every marriage and details marriages validly solemnized ino t h e r c o u n t r i e s a r e v a l i d h e r e e x c e p t f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g : 3 5 ( 1 ) u n d e r 1 8 3 5 ( 4 ) bigamous/polygamous except for Art 41 35 (5) mistake of identity 35 (6) void under Art 5336 psychological incapacity 37 incestuous 38 public policy The following are exempted fromobtaining marriage license Art 27 When either or both of the parties are in articulo mortis,even if the ailing survives (e.g. screenplay Walang Sugat) Art 28 If the residence of either party is in a remote location and transportation is impossible (horse ride and distant walking does not count) Art 31 Marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crews b y s h i p captain or airplane chief, whether in sea, in flight or stopovers Art 32 Military commander of a unit, in articulo mortis, between civilians or members of armed forces within the zone of military operations Art 33 Among Muslims and ethnic communities as long as in accordancewith their custom law Art 34 Man and woman who have lived together as husband and wifefor

five years and no legal impediment REPUBLIC v CA and Angelina Castro (1994) 236S C R A 2 5 7 - - - A n g e l i n a C a s t r o a n d E d w i n C a r d e n a s w e r e m a r r i e d i n a c i v i l ceremony performed by Judge Pablo Malvar. Their marriage was unknown to C a s t r o s p a r e n t s a k a secret marriage. Defendant Cardenas was personally responsible for the processing of thedocuments, including the procurement of marriage license. Couple did not immediately livetogether, but only until Castro became pregnant. They parted ways after 4 months, thereafter she gave birth. Baby was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas, and is now inU S . I n t r y i n g t o p u t i n t o m a r i t a l s t a t u s i n o r d e r b e f o r e l e a v i n g t o t h e U S t o f o l l o w h e r daughter, she sought a judicial declaration of nullity, having discovered that there was nomarriage license issued to Cardenas prior to marriage celebration. As proof Castro offered inevidence a certification (due search and inability to find despite diligence) from Pasig CivilRegister that license number does not appear in the records. Cardenas failed to answer thecomplaint, thus was declared in default. - ISSUE: WON proof of absence of marriage license presented by Castro as evidence is sufficient to render marriage void. HELD: Yes. 1. Thecertification of due search and inability to find issued by civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. It was then sufficiently proved that civil registrars office did not issuemarriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. 2. The failure of Castro to offer anyo t h e r witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the MARRIAGES O F EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 19 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 peculiar circumstances of the case secret marriage. 3. For his failure to answer despite notices,C a r d e n a s w a s d e c l a r e d i n d e f a u l t . P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t C a s t r o c a n n o t b e f a u l t e d f o r h e r husbands lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. MORENO v BERNABE (1995)2 4 6 S C R A 1 2 0 M a r i l o u M o r e n o f i l e d t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e complaint against Judge JoseBernabe for grave misconduct and ignorance of the law. SEGUISABAL v CABRERA(1981) 106 SCRA 67 Judge Cabrera charged w i t h g r o s s i g n o r a n c e o f t h e l a w f o r h a v i n g solemnized the marriage of Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy without a marriage license. - -- She and Marcelo Moreno were married before Judge Bernabe. She averred the Bernabeassured her that the marriage contract will be released 10 days after October 4, 1993. Shefound out that she could not get her marriage contract because the Office of the Local CivilRegistrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claimed that respondent judge connived withrelatives of private respondent Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. - Judge's story: Contracting parties and their families came to him bearing a marriage contract. Their request to have themarriage officiated was of such urgency that the judge conceded after making them promiseto deliver the marriage license that same afternoon. Unfortunately, no marriage license wasdelivered. About a year later, Marlyn Jagonoy went to see the judge, telling him she needed proof of her marriage to Jaime Sayson in order to secure the benefits accorded to Jaime'sfamily after his death as a soldier. The judge gave a copy of the marriage contract to Jagonoya n d t o l d h e r t o p r e s e n t t h e s a m e t o t h e l o c a l c i v i l r e g i s t r a r a n d t o h a v e t h e m i s s u e h e r a marriage license. Local civil registrar naturally refused to issue said license ("for the reasont h a t t h e p a r t i e s h a v e n o t a t t e n d e d t h e F a m i l y Planning seminar") - - ISSUE: WON the

marriage is valid and judge liable HELD: The marriage was void due to the absence of am a r r i a g e l i c e n s e . T h e C o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e O f f i c e o f t h e C o u r t Administrator which investigated on the case that respondent judge was liable for misconductf o r solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license. It also said that the respondent judges claim of good intentions could never justify violation of the law. PEOPLE vBORROMEO (1984) 133 SCRA 106 Elias Borromeo guilty

b e y o n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f parricide, claiming that he should only be charged with homicide since he and his partner w e r e n o t l e g a l l y m a r r i e d , t h e r e b e i n g n o m a r r i a g e c o n t r a c t e x e c u t e d d u r i n g t h e i r c h u r c h wedding. ISSUE: WON the absence of a marriage contract is sufficient to render a marriagev o i d . H E L D : T h e C o u r t r u l e d i n t h e n e g a t i v e , for the fact that no record of the marriageexisted in the registry is not enough t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e m a r r i a g e . F o r a s l o n g a s a l l t h e requisites for the marriage were present in the celebration thereof, the marriage subsists.P r e s u m p t i o n i s a l w a y s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e m a r r i a g e . - A l s o , d u r i n g t h e t r i a l , E l i a s Borromeo admitted that he was married to the victim. The Court took cognizance of this factand articulated that there was no better proof of marriage than the admission of one of the parties of the existence of such marriage. Furthermore, the accused and victim have livedtogether as husband and wife and even had one child. Since the presumption of law is inf a v o r o f t h e m a r r i a g e , a l l evidence points to Elias Borromeo's conviction of parricide. -HELD: Absent t h e f o r m a l r e q u i s i t e o f a m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e , t h e m a r r i a g e w a s v o i d . J u d g e should not have solemnized the marriage without first securing said license. Despite thea s s e r t i o n s o f g o o d f a i t h , t h e j u d g e w a s f i n e d a n e q u i v a l e n t o f h i s t h r e e m o n t h s s a l a r y . ALCANTARA v ALCANTARA (2007) 531 SCRA 446 Restituto and Rosita Alcantara wentto the Manila City Hall in 1982 to look for someone who could "fix" the marriage for them,as they had not then secured a marriage license. A fixer conducted the ceremony right thenand there and also contracted a priest who solemnized the marriage in 1983. - ML was issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite to which neither of them resides. The partieswere given a marriage contract bearing a marriage license number that, obviously because of a typographical error, did not accurately coincide with the original marriage license number.ISSUE: WON the irregularities in the issuance of the marriage license are sufficient to render the marriage void. HELD: Since the marriage was contracted before the effectivity of theF a m i l y C o d e , Article 53 of the Civil Code applies. It states that "no marriage shall b e solemnized the following requisites are complied with: (1) legal capacity of the contracting p a r t i e s ; ( 2 ) t h e i r c o n s e n t , f r e e l y g i v e n ; ( 3 ) a u t h o r i t y o f t h e P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 20 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 p e r s o n p e r f o r m i n g t h e m a r r i a g e ; a n d ( 4 ) a m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e , e x c e p t i n a marriage of exceptional character. In this case, a marriage contract bearing the marriagelicense number and a certification from the civil registrar were presented as evidence. - Theinconsistency between the number (7054033) in the license indicated in the certification of the municipal civil registrar and the number (7054133) typed onto the marriage contract wasconsidered a typographical error and therefore had no bearing. - The fact that neither of thecontracting parties was a resident of Carmona, Cavite was seen as an irregularity that cannotinvalidate the marriage. - Plaintiff should not be made to benefit from his own action and beallowed to extricate himself when situation is no longer palatable to his taste/lifestyle (he hast h r e e c h i l d r e n w i t h m i s t r e s s a n d c h a r g e a b l e o f c o n c u b i n a g e ) T h e y c o n t r a c t e d s e c o n d marriage (religious) after less than a year which used the same ML and marriage contractISSUE: WON the ceremony herewith described fulfilled the formal requisite of a marriage ceremony. HELD: Yes. There was a proper ceremony: signing a statement that declares thatthey take each other as husband and wife is sufficient. In short, the declaration of the partiesneed not be verbal. Article 6 of the Family Code clearly articulates that no particular form of m a r r i a g e c e r e m o n y i s required. For as long as the contracting parties personally appear before a solemnizing officer and make a declaration in the presence of not less than t w o witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife, the formal requisite of ceremony is complied with. MADRIDEJO v DE LEON (1930) 55 Phil

1 Flaviana Perez wasmarried to Pedro Madridejo in articulo mortis. She died the day after the wedding. The priestw h o s o l e m n i z e d t h e m a r r i a g e f a i l e d t o s e n d a c o p y o f t h e m a r r i a g e c e r t i f i c a t e t o t h e municipal secretary. ISSUE: WON the failure to send the copy of marriage certificationwould render the marriage void. HELD: No. The failure of the priest to send a copy of them a r r i a g e c e r t i f i c a t e i s a m e r e i r r e g u l a r i t y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e m a r r i a g e w a s v a l i d . C . Ceremony - No prescribed form of ceremony, what matters is: (Art 6) a. personal appearanceof spouses (No proxy allowed. Marriage via webcam, unlikely to be valid.) b. take each other as husband and wife in presence of solemnizing officer c. sign marriage certificate d. at leasttwo witnesses of legal age - Where can the marriage be solemnized? (Art 8) a. chambers of judge, open court, church, chapel or temple b. office of consul-general, consul, vice consul c.EXCEPT - articulo mortis (Art 27) - remote place, no means of transportation (Art 28) both parties written request, sworn statement (Art 8) MARTINEZ v TAN (1909) 12 Phil 731Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan sent a petition to the justice of the peace stating that theywanted to enter into a contract of marriage. The justice of the peace, the two contracting parties, and two witnesses of legal age, then signed a document ratifying the above petitionand affirming that the signatories were actually present on the day indicated in the justice'soffice. Martinez and Tan were then issued a certificate of marriage. The justice pronouncedthem man and wife. Martinez and Tan did not live together as husband and wife after theceremony because Martinez parents were against the relationship. 3. PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solida or facts leanstoward the validity of marriage, the indissolub children, the community of property duringmarriage, the au validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unla Sec 3 (aa),R u l e 1 3 1 o f R u l e s o f C o u r t T h a t a m a n a n d w o m h a v e e n t e r e d i n t o a l a w f u l c o n t r a c t o f marriage; Marriage contract is only of evidentiary value, there are also other means to provethe existence of marriage: a. birth or baptismal certificate of children bearing the name of thespouses as parents b. couples public cohabitation as spouses c. testimonies from witnesses d.d o c u m e n t a r y p h o t o s a n d v i d e o s o f t h e w e d d i n g T R I N I D A D v C A , F e l i x a n d L o u r d e s Trinidad (1998) 289 SCRA 188 Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix. - When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above namedchildren, he left four parcels of land. Arturo Trinidad, born July 1943, claimed to PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 21 of 170K a r i c h i E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - be the legitimate son of Inocentes making him a compulsory heir. Lourdes and Felix, on the other hand, denied Arturo's claim, contendingt h a t I n o c e n t e s d i e d s i n g l e . A r t u r o n o w h a s t o p r o v e t h a t I n o c e n t e s a n d h i s m o t h e r w e r e validly married and that he was born during the subsistence of said marriage. ISSUE: WONInocentes and Arturos mother were validly married HELD: The Court cited a particular casew h i c h r u l e d t h a t w h e n t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a m a r r i a g e h a s b e e n c o n t r a c t e d a r i s e s i n litigation, said marriage may be proven by (a) the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,(b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, (c) the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and (d) them e n t i o n o f s u c h n u p t i a l i n s u b s e q u e n t d o c u m e n t s . F o r h i s p a r t , A r t u r o w a s o n l y a b l e t o present a certificate from the local civil registrar that all documents of birth, marriage, anddeath (in Aklan) were either burned, lost, or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of them u n i c i p a l i t y . I n p l a c e o f t h e m a r r i a g e c o n t r a c t , p e t i t i o n e r p r e s e n t e d t w o w i t n e s s e s , o n e testified that she was present during the nuptials, and the other that the couple cohabited ashusband and wife. This last witness also stated that she visited the couple's house at the timeof petitioner's birth. Tolentino's annotation to Article 23 of the Family Code

might prover e l e v a n t t o t h i s c a s e : T h e r e i s a p r i m a f a c i e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a m a n a n d a w o m a n l i v i n g maritally under the same roof are legally married. The reason is that such is the commonorder of society, and if the parties were not what they held themselves out as being, theywould be living in constant violation of decency and law. The presumption of marriage isr e b u t t a b l e o n l y b y c o g e n t p r o o f t o t h e c o n t r a r y . S i n c e A r t u r o ' s w i t n e s s e s a t t e s t e d t o h i s parents' public cohabitation as husband and wife, marriage can be presumed. The other partyt h e n b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f i n c o n t e s t i n g t h e m a r r i a g e o f A r t u r o ' s p a r e n t s . V D A . D E JACOB v CA and Pedro Pilapil (1999) 312 SCRA 772 Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claims to bethe surviving spouse of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratrix of hise s t a t e s b y v i r t u e o f a r e c o n s t r u c t e d m a r r i a g e c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n t h e m . P e d r o P i l a p i l , t h e doctor's alleged adopted son, claims that the marriage between Tomasa and Dr. Jacob wasvoid since (1) no marriage license and (2) only a reconstructed marriage contract. HELD:Regarding the first issue, the Court recognized that the contracting parties have been livingt o g e t h e r a s h u s b a n d a n d w i f e f o r m o r e t h a n f i v e y e a r s b e f o r e t h e s o l e m n i z a t i o n o f t h e marriage so that they were exempt from the marriage license requirement. In answer to thesecond issue, the Court explained that though the primary evidence of a marriage must be anauthentic copy of the marriage contract, secondary evidence proving the same is admissible p r o v i d e d t h a t ( 1 ) d u e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e d o c u m e n t a n d ( 2 ) s u b s e q u e n t l o s s o f t h e o r i g i n a l instrument are first proven. Both (1) and (2) were in fact established from the preponderanceof evidence presented during the trial; photographs of the wedding, letter of the solemnizingofficer, statement of the officer that the marriage certificate was lost, etc. Also, the testimonyof one of the parties to the marriage has been held admissible as proof of the fact of marriage.F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i n c a s e s l i k e this is always in favor of marriage. Personsdwelling together in apparent m a t r i m o n y a r e p r e s u m e d , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y c o u n t e r - presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. SEVILLA v CARDENAS(2006) 497 SCRA 428 Sevilla asks for a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Cardenas onthe ground that the marriage was solemnized without the parties' first securing a marriagelicense. Cardenas argued to the contrary, saying that they were married in civil rites withM a r r i a g e L i c e n s e N o . 2 7 7 0 7 9 2 . T h e l o c a l c i v i l r e g i s t r a r w a s a s k e d t o f u r n i s h e v i d e n c e affirming the existence of said marriage license. The representative who appeared in courtc l a i m e d t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t f i n d t h e r e g i s t r y b o o k s u p p o s e d l y c o n t a i n i n g t h e r e l e v a n t information to this case because the person in charge has already retired. - Irrelevant butinteresting facts: Intertuhod sex and knee fetish. Guys mom sent guy to Spain to go to medschool, but while he was there he didnt really study HELD: Loss of the registry book cannot be taken as proof of the nonissuance of a marriage license. No certification like in Alcantaracase saying that due PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 22 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 search was conducted.Instead, the letter said that no full attention given bec of loaded work - The presumption of the law is in favor of the validity of the marriage so that in the absence of sufficient evidencea g a i n s t i t , the marriage subsists. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 23 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 V. VOID& VOIDABLE MARRIAGE A. Void Marriages 1. GROUNDS I. II. 1. 2. 1936 1941 19431949 Arturo Mendoza married Jovita De Asis Mendoza married Olga Lema, with subsistingm a r r i a g e J o v i t a d i e d i n 1 9 4 3 M e n d o z a m a r r i e d C a r m e n c i t a P a n l i l i o , i t w a s f o r t h i s l a s t marriage that he was prosecuted for bigamy. HELD: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for thethird marriage because marriage with Lema was void for bigamy, being contracted when DeA s i s w a s s t i l l a l i v e . W h e n h e w e d P a n l i l i o , h i s m a r r i a g e w i t h D e A s i s w a s n o l o n g e r subsisting by reason of the latter's death. TOLENTINO v PARAS (1983) G.R. No. L-43905A r t 4 A b s e n c e o f f o r m a l o r e s s e n t i a l r e q u i s i t e A r t 3 5

M a r r i a g e s v o i d a b i n i t i o o n e i s under 18 years old solemnized by a person not authorized to perform marriage, except whene i t h e r o r b o t h s p o u s e s b e l i e v e i n g o o d f a i t h t h a t h e h a s t h e p o w e r t o d o s o s o l e m n i z e d without a valid marriage license bigamous or polygamous except under Art 41 mistake of identity subsequent marriage void under Art 53 Age essential requisite Solemnizing Officer formal requisite Marriage License formal requisite Legal impediment essential requisiteC o n s e n t e s s e n t i a l r e q u i s i t e - - S e r a f i a T o l e n t i n o f i l e s f o r r e c t i f i c a t i o n o f d e c e a s e d husbands death certificate to place her as surviving spouse Tolentino contracted a marriagewith Maria Clemente during the subsistence of a prior marriage. He was convicted of andserved sentence for bigamy. After completing the term for his conviction, he went back to hiss e c o n d w i f e . T o l e n t i n o ' s d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e h a d the name of the Maria Clemente as thesurviving spouse instead of Serafia. 3. 4. HELD: Serafia, the first wife, is Tolentino'ssurviving spouse. Tolentino's c o n v i c t i o n f o r b i g a m y i s t h e b e s t p r o o f t h a t h i s s e c o n d marriage was void. WIEGEL v SEMPIO-DY (1986) 143 SCRA 499 Karl Wiegel files for annulment of marriage with Lilia Olivia because she previously married Eduardo Maxion.However Lilia says that the marriage was contracted under duress. Although woman believesthe marriage is void, when the husband learned about Olivia's previous marriage, he filed for a declaration of nullity. HELD: Olivia's first marriage is merely voidable, her consent beingv i t i a t e d b y f o r c e . H e r s e c o n d m a r r i a g e i s v o i d b e c a u s e i t w a s c o n t r a c t e d w h i l e a p r i o r marriage was subsisting. Although the marriage is void, Sempio-Diy says that there should be legal declaration of nullity for void marriages or final judgment of annulment for voidablemarriages SC dismisses case saying marriage is not a matter of private contract and personaladventure. *The decision laid down in this case had NO LEGAL BASIS. The Civil Codedoes not require a final judgment of nullity in marriages void ab initio. To quote MaamBeth: Inimbento lang yan ni Sempio-Diy! 5. 6. FC, Art 40 Absolute nullity of the previousmarriage for the purpose of remarriage may be invoked only through a judicial declaration of nullity - - This provision is retroactive, regardless when the marriage was celebrated. (SeeAtienza v Brillantes.) Judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage protects the spouseand prevents a subsequent marriage contracted by him/her from becoming bigamous. Also,so that everything will be crystal clear between the two ex-spouses. Other uses of judicialdeclaration of nullity of marriage: o Liquidation, partition and distribution o Separation of p r o p e r t y b e t w e e n s p o u s e s o C u s t o d y a n d s u p p o r t o f c h i l d r e n o D e l i v e r y o f c h i l d r e n s presumptive legitime PEOPLE v MENDOZA (1954) 95 Phil 845 PERSONS AND FAMILYRELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 24 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 T E R R E v T E R R E ( 1 9 9 2 ) 2 1 1 S C R A 6 1 9 5 0 ; t h e Family Code becameeffective August 03, 1988). - - Dorothy and Jordan Terre met when the latter was in law school. Jordan was persistent in asking for Dorothy's hand in marriage, even explaining toh e r t h a t h e r m a r r i a g e t o a c e r t a i n M e r c e l i t o e n v e i g l e d t h e Bercinilla was void ab initio because they were first cousins. woman He further reiterated that there was no need for Dorothy to secure a court declaration regarding the nullity of that marriage. Convinced withJ o r d a n ' s w o r d , t h e t w o e n t e r e d i n t o a c o n t r a c t o f m a r r i a g e . Y e a r s l a t e r , J o r d a n s u d d e n l y disappeared. It was found out that he married a certain Vilma Malicdem, giving Dorothy ag r o u n d f o r f i l i n g a g a i n s t h i m a c a s e o f b i g a m y . B t w , D o r o t h y s p e n t f o r h i s l a w s c h o o l expenses and even gave him allowances. - The Court answered this by stating that Article4 0 i s a p p l i c a b l e t o r e m a r r i a g e s e n t e r e d i n t o a f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v i t y o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e , regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,said Article is given

"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Judge Brillantes has nots h o w n a n y vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. - BORJA-MANZANO v SANCHEZ (2001) 354 SCRA 1 Complaint filed by lawful wife of l a t e D a v i d M a n z a n o w h o m r e s p o n d e n t w e d w i t h L u z v i m i n d a P a y a o d e s p i t e s t a t u s o f separated HELD: That the contracting parties have been living apart from their respectives p o u s e s f o r y e a r s d i d n o t d i s s o l v e t h o s e m a r r i a g e b o n d s . E v e n f r e e a n d v o l u n t a r y cohabitation cannot severe the ties of a subsisting previous marriage. Furthermore, maritalcohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated tomarry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It cannot serve asa justification for solemnizing a subsequent marriage. Manzano and Payao's marriage is voidfor being bigamous. Respondent judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when hes o l e m n i z e d a v o i d a n d b i g a m o u s m a r r i a g e . A P I A G v C A N T E R O ( 1 9 9 7 ) 2 6 8 SCRA 47Maria Apiag and Judge Cantero were married in a ceremony supposedly set up by their parents. Two children were born out of their union. T h e j u d g e t h e n l e f t A p i a g w i t h n o financial support whatsoever for her and the children. Maria learned later on that the judgeh a d c o n t r a c t e d a s e c o n d m a r r i a g e . S h e t h e n f i l e d a c a s e o f b i g a m y a n d f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f document against the judge. HELD: The Court reiterated the rule that a marriage though voids t i l l n e e d s a j u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n o f s u c h f a c t b e f o r e a n y p a r t y t h e r e t o c a n m a r r y a g a i n , otherwise the second marriage will also be void (Article 40 of the Family Code). ISSUE:WON Jordan may be charged of bigamy HELD: A judicial declaration that the first marriageis void is essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothy's marriage to Terre is voidfor being bigamous. Even if the court were to assume for the sake of argument that JordanTerre held in good faith the mistaken belief that Dorothy's marriage to Bercenilla was void abinitio, a case of bigamy will still follow. His first marriage to complainant Dorothy must bedeemed valid and his second marriage to Vilma Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous. -E v e n i f v o i d m a r r i a g e , i t s t i l l n e e d s j u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n . * M a a m B e t h : J o r d a n i s v e r y inconsistent. Whatta lousy lawyer. ATIENZA v BRILLANTES (1995) 243 SCRA 32 JudgeBrillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony solemnized by a townmayor and without a marriage license. They went through another marriage ceremony, againwithout securing the necessary marriage license. - Judge Brillantes then married Yolanda DeCastro, saying that he was free to marry because under the Civil Code his first marriage wasv o i d . H E L D : J u d g e ' s m a r r i a g e t o O n g k i k o w a s v o i d , b u t u s i n g A r t i c l e 40 of the FamilyCode, he should have first secured a judicial declaration of the n u l l i t y o f h i s p r e v i o u s marriage. Judge Brillantes argued that the provision does not apply to him since his firstmarriage was contracted in 1965 and was still governed by the Civil Code (which came into effect August 30, - - However, Judge Cantero's second marriage took place b e f o r e t h e promulgation of Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy (1986) and before the effectivity of the Family Code(1988). Hence, the doctrine in Odayat v. Amante, where no judicial decree is necessary toestablish the invalidity of void marriages, is applicable to his case. The judge was free tocontract a second marriage without court declaration of the nullity of the first marriage. Andsince the charge of PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.20082009 Page 25 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - falsification is based on afinding of guilt in the bigamy charge, failure of the bigamy aspect would likewise render thefalsification angle invalid. The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls shortof court standards. However, this mistake should not totally destroy his career and deprivehim or his heirs of the fruits of his labor. For such conduct, the court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death, dismissal of the case was ordered. It turns out Apiag andCantero were only childhood sweethearts and married to save face because the woman got pregnant.

Speculatively, the Apiags were after their share in Canteros retirement benefits.Interesting phrase: Youthful mistake should not forever haunt judge. Man is not perfect.Art 36 Psychological incapacity - (2) compulsive gambling or unbearable jealousy, (3)sociopathic anomalies like sadism or infliction of physical violence, constitutional laziness or i n d o l e n c e , d r u g d e p e n d e n c e , o r s o m e k i n d o f p s y c h o s e x u a l a n o m a l y . E i t h e r p a r t y t o t h e marriage can file for a declaration of nullity. A spouse's psychological incapacity does not b a r h i m o r h e r f r o m i n i t i a t i n g t h e a c t i o n f o r t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f n u l l i t y . I I I . PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY An innovation of the Family Code, derived from Art1 0 9 5 o f t h e C a n o n Law Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. In fact, a psychologically incapacitated party does give a valid consent. The problem lies in his or her inability to fulfill the obligations arising from that consent. An example of vice of consent isinsanity. No examples given of psychological incapacity because doing so would limit thea p p l i c a b i l i t y o f A r t i c l e 3 6 u n d e r t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e j u s d e m g e n e r i s . T h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y incapacitated person is not disqualified from marrying again, especially if he/she can find a partner who would be able to accept his personality. The fact of his or her psychologicalincapacity would be revealed anyway in the application for a marriage license for the secondmarriage and the other party is thus placed on guard to conduct discreet investigation aboutthe matter. The following grounds may be mentioned as manifestations of psychologicalincapacity, according to Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the CatholicArchdiocese of Manila; (1) homosexuality or lesbianism, (2) satyriasis or nymphomania, (3)extremely low intelligence, (4) immaturity, (5) epilepsy, (6) habitual alcoholism, and (7)criminality. Other manifestations, according to other experts on church annulment, would be(1) refusal of the wife to dwell with the husband after the marriage, GUIDELINES LAIDD O W N I N R E P U B L I C v M O L I N A 1 . b u r d e n o f p r o o f i s o n t h e p l a i n t i f f , s u b j e c t t o investigation for collusion 2. root cause must be medically/clinically identified, alleged in thecomplaint and explained in the decision 3. exist at the time of the marriage 4. incurable 5.grave enough to bring about the incapability to fulfill marital obligation 6. cannot performArt 68-71, 220-221 and 225 7. decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic Church should be observed 8. state participation to protect sanctity of marriaget h r o u g h t h e f i s c a l o r p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r ne y M A I N R E Q U I R E M E N TS F O R PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 1. juridical antecedence (prior to the m a r r i a g e ) 2 . incurability 3. gravity SANTOS v BEDIA-SANTOS (1995) 240 SCRA 20 Leouel Santosa n d J u l i a B e d i a c o n t r a c t e d a m a r r i a g e i n 1 9 8 6 . T h e y o f t e n h a d quarrels because of their living arrangement. They lived with the wifes parents who always intervened i n t h e i r conjugal affairs. Julia then left for the United States as a nurse. After seven months, shec a l l e d h e r h u s b a n d t o t e l l h i m s h e w i l l r e t u r n t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r . S h e never went homethough. - - - - Leouel tried to locate her when he was assigned in US for training (he wam e m b e r o f t h e A r m e d F o r c e ) b u t h i s s e a r c h w a s to no avail. Leouel then filed for ad e c l a r a t i o n o f n u l l i t y o f marriage, arguing that Julia's failure to return home a n d communicate with him for more than five years clearly shows her being psychologicallyincapacitated. ISSUE: WON Julia is psychologically incapacitated HELD: NO. The factswere not enough to show psychological incapacity. What was shown was lack of willingnessto comply with marital obligations. Through dicta, the Court also explained that: (1) There ish a r d l y a n y d o u b t t h a t t h e i n t e n d m e n t o f t h e l a w h a s b e e n t o c o n f i n e t h e

m e a n i n g o f - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page26 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 psychological incapacity to the most seriouscases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability togive meaning and significance to the marriage. (2) That the provision is open to abuse. To prevent this, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent the collusion between parties and to take care thatevidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (3) In deciding the case, the judge must be guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and bydecisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. REPUBLIC v CA andR o r i d e l M o l i n a ( 1 9 9 7 ) 2 6 8 S C R A 1 9 8 R o r i d e l M o l i n a f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t i o n o f nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. intercourse even if neither party is impotent. Thewife wanted to annul (instead of declaration of nullity?) the marriage but the husband did not.HELD: The Court first explained that the action to declare a marriage void can be initiated byeither party, even by the one who's incapacitated. This makes it immaterial to determinew h i c h s p o u s e r e f u s e s t o h a v e s e x w i t h t h e o t h e r . I t t h e n w e n t o n t o a r t i c u l a t e t h a t " o n e marital obligation is to procreate based on the universal principle that procreation of childrenthrough sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant nonfulfillment of thisobligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage." Insofar as the case presented a breach of marital obligation, there is psychological incapacity. *According toMaam Beth: Abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage is stronglyindicative of a serious personality disorder. It demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability togive meaning and significance to the marriage. Senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity. *Also: Tsoisl o v e f o r h i s w i f e i s e x c e p t i o n a l . H e d o e s n t m i n d t h e r i s k o f d i v u l g i n g t o t h e p u b l i c h i s package size to be discussed by law students in perpetuity if only to save their MARCOS vMARCOS (2000) 343 SCRA 755 Both spouses are marriage. Poor guy. members of AFPand PSG for Marcos - - She claimed that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo showed signsof immaturity and irresponsibility (i.e. spent all his time with his friends, depended on his parents for support, was dishonest about their finances, was habitually quarrelsome). He alsolost his job and from then on Roridel became the family's breadwinner. The couple had beenliving separately for more than three years as of the commencement of this hearing. HELD:What existed in this case were irreconcilable differences or conflicting personalities, whichin no wise constitute psychological incapacity. Court further said that it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychologicalillness. - - Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotionaloutbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must beshown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less illwill. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, anadverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the personfrom really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. - -Brenda married Wilson Marcos and had five children with him. Marcos was discharged fromhis job and this led to a series of quarrels with his wife, in which he did her physical harm.He was also wont to mistreating his own children. The couple then started living separately.A t one time, the wife went to her husband's house to look for their son. He was g r a v e l y angered by this ran after her with a samurai. For failing to find work and treating his familyviolently, the Regional Trial Court found the husband psychologically

incapacitated. Thisdecision was denied by the Court of Appeals, reasoning that, taking the totality of the piecesof evidence presented, psychological incapacity was not manifest. TSOI v CA (1997) 266SCRA 324 - The case of the two incher Chinese (3 in when erect) Ten months after marriage,Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao still did not engage in sexual HELD: Supreme Court referred tothe guidelines laid out in Republic vs . Molina. It ruled the case in the negative, stating that(1) (based on juridical antecedence) there was absolutely no showing that Marcos' defectswere already present at the inception of the marriage. It was only after he lost his job that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left thef a m i l y h o m e . A l s o , ( 2 ) ( b a s e d o n i n c u r a b i l i t y ) t h e r e P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 27 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |UP Law B2012 was no showing that his defects were incurable, especially now that he's beengainfully employed as a taxi driver. Through dicta, the Court further articulated that Republic vs . Molina included the "medical and clinical identification" of the root cause of t h e psychological incapacity. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequatelyestablish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presentedis enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examinationof the person concerned need not be resorted to. The Court even declared that Article 36should not be equated with a divorce law or legal separation. It is not a divorce law that cutst h e m a r i t a l b o n d a t t h e t i m e t h e c a u s e s t h e r e f o r e m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s . I t i s n o t l e g a l separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted on psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,habitual alcoholism, sexual i n f i d e l i t y , a b a n d o n m e n t a n d t h e l i k e . ( A t b e s t , t h e e v i d e n c e presented by the wife in this case refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaringa m a r r i a g e v o i d . ) C H O A v C H O A ( 2 0 0 2 ) 3 9 2 S C R A 1 9 8 C a s e o f t h e i n c o m p e t e n t psychologist; incompatibility Alfonso Choa filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage b a s e d o n h i s wife's psychological incapacity. The case went to trial with the Alfonso presenting evidence. To this the wife replied with a Motion to Dismiss o r D e m u r r e r t o Evidence (which is an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to theeffect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue). The RTC and CA denied the wife'sM o t i o n t o D i s m i s s . I S S U E : W O N w i f e ' s ( 1 ) i m m a t u r i t y , ( 2 ) l a c k o f attention to their children, and (3) lack of intention of pro-creative sexuality c o n s t i t u t e p s y c h o l o g i c a l incapacity. HELD: The evidence adduced by Alfonso merely shows that he and his wife

could not get along. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedenceor incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. The Court here is of the opinionthat a medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychologicalincapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacityadequately. Here the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficientt o s u s t a i n a f i n d i n g o f psychological incapacity - the lack of medical, psychiatric or psychological examination only worsens the situation. PERSONS A N D F A M I L Y RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 28 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |UP Law B2012 ANTONIO v REYES (2006) 484 SCRA 353 Case of the pathological liar -A n t o n i o f i l e d f o r a d e c l a r a t i o n o f n u l l i t y o f h i s m a r r i a g e t o R e y e s , w h o m h e

a l l e g e d i s psychologically incapacitated, as manifested in her habitual lying (that one brother-in-lawa t t e m p t e d t o r a p e a n d k i l l , t h a t s h e w a s a p s y c h i a t r i s t a n d f r e e l a n c e v o i c e t a l e n t w h o ' s distinguished performer, etc.) There were psychiatrists who testified for both parties. Oneused the Comprehensive PsychPathological Rating Scale (CPRS) and said that Reyes passedthe test and so was not psychologically incapacitated. The doctor from the opposing partycountered the finding, saying that the test was not reliable. TC declared the marriage null andvoid. Before its announcement of its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdioceseof Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of petitioner and respondent on the ground of lack o f d u e discretion of both parties. This decision was upheld by the National AppellateM a t r i m o n i a l T r i b u n a l b u t s t i p u l a t e d t h a t o n l y R e y e s w a s i m p a i r e d b y a l a c k o f d u e discretion. Same decision was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. CA held otherwise,saying there was insufficient evidence. as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shallconstitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would b e i m p r o p e r t o d r a w l i n k a g e s b e t w e e n m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s m a d e b y R e y e s a n d misrepresentation under Articles 45(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates thec o n s e n t o f t h e s p o u s e w h o i s l i e d t o , a n d d o e s n o t a l l u d e t o v i t i a t e d c o n s e n t o f t h e l y i n g spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of Reyes point to her own inadequacy to copew i t h h e r marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 3 6 . REPUBLIC v CUISON-MELGAR (2006) 486 SCRA 177 The wife filed for declaration of nullity of marriage based on her husband's psychological incapacity as manifested in hisimmaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, continual laziness, anda b a n d o n m e n t o f t h e f a m i l y . H E L D : T h e t o t a l i t y o f e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e w i f e w a s completely insufficient to establish psychological incapacity. (1) The wife alone testified insupport of her complaint. (2) She failed to establish the fact that at the time of the celebrationof the marriage her husband was already suffering from a psychological defect. (3) Therewas no evidence showing that the husband was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations.At best, the circumstances relied upon by the wife are ground for legal separation. *MaamBeth points out the inconsistency in the rules: No need for expert psychological opinion but presenting such will strengthen your case, as the court decision said something like couldhave increased her chances of winning PARAS v PARAS (2007) 529 SCRA 81 Rosa Parasfiled for a declaration of nullity of her marriage to Justo Paras on the ground of psychologicalincapacity as manifested in his infidelity, failure to support his children, abandonment of thefamily, and falsification of documents. Death of their two children, the family flew to Statesto recover. When they family return, Justo said that Rosa became cold to him They had agasoline station which the husband usually gives for free for the city government since heu s e d t o b e t h e m a y o r T h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n illegitimate child Cyndee Rose Paras with an alleged concubine named Loida Ching. HELD: While was nothing caused by appeared to thea b o v e allegations were true, there in the records showing that they were p s y c h o l o g i c a l incapacity. Justo's acts have been the result of irreconcilable - HELD: (1) The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged inthe complaint, sufficiently proven by experts (there was no personal examination, but Courtcited Molina ruling saying that the personal examination of the subject by the physician isnot required), and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. (2) That the psychologicali n c a p a c i t y w a s e s t a b l i s h e d t o h a v e c l e a r l y e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e o f a n d e v e n b e f o r e t h e celebration of the marriage. (3) That the gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity issufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The liesattributed to the respondent indicate a failure on her part to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere aswell to any legal or emotional commitments. (4) That the Court of

Appeals erred when it didnot consider the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. Through dicta,the Court also draw a distinction between the wife's pathological lying and the implicationso f A r t i c l e 4 5 ( 3 ) o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t a marriage may be annulled if thec o n s e n t o f e i t h e r p a r t y w a s o b t a i n e d b y f r a u d , a n d A r t i c l e 4 6 w h i c h e n u m e r a t e s t h e circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifying that "no other m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r d e c e i t P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 29 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 differences b e t w e e n h i m a n d h i s w i f e c a u s e d b y t h e d e a t h o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n a n d h i s f a i l u r e i n h i s professional endeavors. There was then no evidence that Justo's defects were present at thetime of the marriage and only after he lost the mayoralty election. TONGOL v TONGOL(2007) 537 SCRA 135 Husband filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage based on hiswife's psychological incapacity as manifested in her being given to tantrums, irritability, andwant of dominance. *Stepbrothers and stepsisters are not included in the list. Reasons whyabove mentioned marriages contravene public policy: 1. Recessive genes of families getexpressed 2. Causes confusion in the family tree (what is the relationship of a father to hischild with his daughter?) 3. Legit child and adopted child are presumed to have been raisedas real siblings 4. For Par 9 -> complete moral perversion. Ethics! - A certain Dr. Villegasexamined the wife and concluded that she was suffering from an Inadequate PersonalityD i s o r d e r w i t h h y s t e r i c a l c o l o r i n g w h i c h rendered her psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f m a r r i a g e . V I . A r t 4 1 s u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e UNLESS there is a declaration of presumptive death of spouse in appropriate cases Art 44 i f b o t h s p o u s e s c o n t r a c t e d r e m a r r i a g e f r o m a b s e n c e i n b a d f a i t h ( a s t o a b s e n c e o f o n e spouse) VII. HELD: Dr. Villegas failed to link the wife's personality disorder to a conclusiono f p s y c h o l o g i c a l incapacity since (1) he was not able to satisfactorily explain if h e r personality disorder was grave enough to bring about disability to comply with maritalo b l i g a t i o n s , ( 2 ) t h e r e w a s n o e v i d e n c e t h a t s u c h i n c a p a c i t y w a s i n c u r a b l e . A l s o , t h e psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 is not meant to comprehend all possiblecases of psychoses - here, the spouses' differences and misunderstandings basically revolvearound and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business. Insum, it was not disputed that the wife was suffering from a psychological disorder. However,the totality of the evidence presented did not show that her personality disorder is of the kindcontemplated in Article 36. 2. PERIOD TO FILE ACTION OR RAISE DEFENSE FC, Art3 9 T h e a c t i o n o r d e f e n s e f o r t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f a b s o l u t e n u l l i t y o f a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by RA 8533, approved Feb. 23, 1998) - Under E . O . 2 7 7 , f o r marriages contracted before the Family Code took effect, the action for the declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity prescribed in ten years - that is, ten years after 1988, or 1998. But R.A. 8533 now makes all actions under Article 36 imprescriptible. Itsgonna be here forever, at least, until this law gets repealed. Mere lapse of time cannot giveeffect to marriage or any other contract that is null and void. - IV. 1. 2. Art 37 Incestuousm a r r i a g e b e t w e e n a s c e n d a n t s a n d d e s c e n d a n t s b e t w e e n b r o t h e r s a n d s i s t e r s , w h e t h e r halfblood or full-blood Art 38 Violation of public policy 3. EFFECTS OF NULLITY *For provisions refer to the table in the appendix NIAL v BADAYOG (2000) 328 SCRA 122 V.1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . b e t w e e n c o l l a t e r a l r e l a t i v e s u p t o t h e 4 d e g r e e , i l l e g i t i m a t e o r legitimate between step-parent and step-children between parent-in-law and child-in-law between adopter and adopted surviving spouse of adopter and adopted between survivingspouse of adopted and adopter between legitimate children

of adopter and adopted betweenadopted children of same adopted if one kills own or other wife with the intention to marryanother or the victims spouse th - Nial and Badayog were married in 1974. Nial shot hiswife Bellones in 1985, causing her death (why didnt they convict him of parricide???). After a y e a r a n d a h a l f , N i n a l c o n t r a c t e d a s e c o n d m a r r i a g e w i t h B a d a y o g w i t h o u t a m a r r i a g e license. They executed an affidavit stating they have cohabited for at least five years. Ninaldied in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a declaration of nullity of Ninal's marriagewith Badayog. - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.2008-2009 Page 30 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - It is assumed that the validityor invalidity of the second marriage would affect the children's successional rights. HELD: Nial and Badayog's marriage is void for lack of marriage license. They are not exempt fromacquiring a marriage license because their five-year cohabitation was not the cohabitationcontemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five years thatt h e y h a d c o h a b i t e d , o n l y 2 0 m o n t h s w e r e w i t h o u t a n y l e g a l i m p e d i m e n t . O t h e r t h a n f o r purposes of remarriage (see Article 40 of the Family Code), no judicial action is necessary tod e c l a r e a m a r r i a g e a n a b s o l u t e n u l l i t y . F o r o t h e r purposes, such as but not limited todetermination of heirship, legitimacy or i l l e g i t i m a c y o f a c h i l d , s e t t l e m e n t o f e s t a t e , dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon thevalidity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it isessential to the determination of the case. * This is weird Nial should have been disqualifiedt o m a r r y B a d a y o g b e c a u s e o f A r t 3 8 P a r 9 ( k i l l s o w n o r o t h e r w i f e w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t o marry another or the victims spouse) DOMINGO v CA and Delia Soledad Avera (1993) 226SCRA 572 Soledad Domingo filed for separation of property and declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto Domingo. They were married 1976, but unknown to Soledad, Robertow a s p r e v i o u s l y m a r r i e d t o a c e r t a i n E m e r l i n d a d e l a P a z . S h e c a m e t o k n o w o f t h e f i r s t marriage only after Emerlinda sued them for bigamy. Roberto claimed that Soledad's petitionfor a declaration of nullity was superfluous in that their marriage was void ab initio. On theother hand, Soledad insisted on the necessity of the judicial declaration of nullity, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of t h e p r o p e r t i e s a c q u i r e d d u r i n g c o v e r t u r e . H E L D : J u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n o f n u l l i t y c a n b e invoked for purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the effectsof judicial declaration of nullity. The Court further asserted that a judicial declaration of n u l l i t y o f m a r r i a g e i s n o w explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be i n v o k e d f o r purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projectedmarriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriagevoid. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marriesagain. With the judicial declaration of nullity of his or her first marriage, the person whomarries again cannot be charged of bigamy. *Emphasis on the word ONLY / SOLELYin Art 40, FC *Maam Beth thinks this is a weird case because usually its the first wife thatfiles bigamy against husband. Here, its the second wife. DE CASTRO v ASSIDAODECASTRO (2008) GR No. 160172 - - Reinelle Anthony De Castro impregnated AnnabelleAssidao, a government dentist. Their marriage license expired so they (falsely) executed anaffidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for five years. Byvirtue of this affidavit, they contracted a marriage. The parties, however, lived separatelyafter the marriage's celebration. Assidao filed a complaint for child support, asserting that shewas validly married to De Castro and that her daughter was De Castro's legitimate child.HELD: The execution of the false affidavit stating that the parties had been living together

ashusband and wife cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. They were married without avalid marriage license and so their marriage was void ab initio. - The child born to them wasillegitimate; however, it does not free De Castro from the duty of providing financial supportsince he has been declaring her as a dependent in tax exemption and even signed in her birthc e r t i f i c a t e . B . Voidable Marriages Valid until annulled by a competent court Can beconvalidated (ratified or annulled) either by free cohabitation or prescription Cannot beimpugned upon death of either party 1. Grounds for Annulment FC, A r t 4 5 G r o u n d s f o r voidable marriages 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 18-21 yrs old but no parental consent any party of unsoundmind consent obtained by fraud consent obtained by force, intimidation, undue influenceincurable physical incapacity to consummate the marriage (im incurable and serious STD,e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e m a r r i a g g o n o r r h e a a r e c u r a b l e ) F o r P a r 4 : P E R S O N S A N D FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 20082009 Page 31 of 170 KarichiE. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - Violence use of serious or irresistible force to wrest consent(Art 1335, CC) Undue influence improper advantage of power over the will of the other,depriving the latter of reasonable freedom of choice, threat to enforce a legal claim does notinvalidate consent to a marriage Reverential fear fear of causing distress, disappointment or a n g e r o n p a r t o f t h e v i c t i m F o r P a r 5 : I M P O T E N C Y i s different from STERILITY.Impotency cannot harden up, so no sex is p o s s i b l e . S t e r i l i t y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i s characterized by low spermatozoa count. However, the fact that intercourse is possible, thereremains a possibility, no matter how low or tiny, for the husband to sire a child. - Old age isn o t a g r o u n d b e c a u s e o n e w h o marries an old person should have been prepared for theothers impotence. D O C T R I N E O F T R I E N N I A L C O H A B I T A T I O N : I f w i f e r e m a i n s a virgin after three years of living together, the presumption of impotency commences unless proven otherwise. 533 F. Supp. 623 Maria Moe and Raoul Roe, together with their childR i c h a r d Roe sought the declaration of a New York Domestic Relations Law r e q u i r i n g parental consent as unconstitutional. Relevant portions of the said law provides that all maleapplicants for a marriage license between 16 and 18, and all female applicants between 14and 18 must obtain the written consent of both of their parents. Maria was 15 and Raoul, 18,when this case was initiated. They continue to be prevented from marrying because Marias'mother refuses to give her consent to their union. Plaintiffs contend that the NY Law was unconstitutional since it deprived them of liberty guaranteed to them by the Due ProcessC l a u s e . H E L D : T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s o f c h i l d r e n c a n n o t b e e q u a t e d t o that of adults because of: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) their i n a b i l i t y t o m a k e c r i t i c a l decisions in an informed and mature manner, (3) the importance of parental role in child-r e a r i n g . C o u r t a l s o e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e S t a t e interests espoused in the NY Law are the protection of minors from immature d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a n d t h e p r e v e n t i o n o f u n s t a b l e marriages. The law also assumes that parents naturally act in the best interest of their FC, Art4 6 W h a t d o y o u m e a n b y f r a u d i n A r t 4 5 ( 3 ) ? C o n c e a l m e n t o f : c h i l d r e n , s o t h a t p a r e n t a l consent cannot be 1. final conviction of moral turpitude dispensed with. 2. 3. 4. pregnancy bym a n o t h e r t h a n h u s b a n d S T D D r u g a d d i c t i o n , h a b i t u a l a l c o h o l i s m , h o m o s e x u a l i t y o r lesbianism *for Nos 3 and 4: Incurability of the STD does not factor in because the mainissue is the concealment of the fact of having an STD Can be a ground for Art 36 if proven toe x i s t a t t h e t i m e o f m a r r i a g e A r t 4 7 W h o m a y f i l e t h e a c t i o n a n d w h e n ( s e e T a b l e ) RATIFICATION cures defect existing at the time of marriage and validates the marriagePRESCRIPTION bars the remedy because of the lapse of the period provided by the law for bringing the action to annul KATIPUNAN v TENORIO (1937) 38 OG 71 Marcos Katipunansought annulment of his marriage

to Rita Tenorio on the ground of latter's insanity. - Therewas no proof that Tenorio was insane at the time of the celebration of the marriage. HELD: No ground for annulment. Insanity that occurs after the celebration of the marriage does notconstitute a cause for nullity. SUNTAY v COJUANGCO SUNTAY (1998) 300 SCRA 760Emilio Suntay married Isabel Cojuangco. Prior to the marriage, Emilio was already sufferingfrom schizophrenia. The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of E m i l i o ' s i n s a n i t y . N o w , Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay wants to assert her claim as Emilio'slegitimate heir. H E L D : T h e m a r r i a g e w a s v o i d a b l e , u n s o u n d m i n d b e i n g a g r o u n d f o r annulment and not for declaration of nullity. Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay should FC, Art 49Pendency of the decree thus be accorded the same rights as acknowledged a. support of thespouse (pendent elite) natural children. She was a legitimate heir of Emilio b. custody andsupport of the children c. visitation rights of the other parent and their grandmother. - Therewas a difference in the dispositive (fallo) and the body of the court decision. In case of RPC,Art 344 Prosecution of the crimes adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and actso f v o i d ) , t h e d e c i s i o n d i s c r e p a n c y ( v o i d a b l e a n d n o t l a s c i v i o u s n e s s s h o u l d b e r e a d a s a whole. MOE v DINKINS (1981) FC, Art 48 The need for a prosecuting attorney to preventc o l l u s i o n o r s u p p r e s s i o n / f a b r i c a t i o n o f e v i d e n c e b e t w e e n p a r t i e s . S t i p u l a t i o n o f f a c t o r confession of judgment not to be accepted. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.E . A . P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 3 2 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 BUCCAT v BUCCAT (1941) SUPRA Godofredo Buccat married Luida Mangonon with the belief that she was a virgin. Luida gave birth 89 days after the celebration of the marriage.G o d o f r e d o t h e n f i l e d f o r a n n u l m e n t o n t h e g r o u n d that she concealed her non-virginity.H E L D : I t w a s n o t b e l i e v a b l e f o r t h e h u s b a n d t o n o t h a v e k n o w n h i s w i f e ' s s t a t e , h e r pregnancy being in the advanced stage (sixth month). The Court refused to annul themarriage, saying t h a t t h e r e w a s n o m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r f r a u d o n t h e p a r t o f t h e w i f e . AQUINO v DELIZO (1960) 109 Phil 21 Fernando Aquino married Conchita Delizo, four m o n t h s after the celebration of the marriage, Delizo gave birth. Aquino then filed f o r annulment on the ground of fraud or concealment of pregnancy. HELD: Since Delizo wasnaturally plump, Aquino could not have known that she was four months pregnant at the timeof the marriage. According to medical opinion, even on the fifth month of pregnancy, the enlargement of the woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus and hardly noticeable. It isonly on the sixth month of pregnancy that the roundness of the woman's abdomen becomesa p p a r e n t . R E M A N D E D F O R R E T R I A L A N A Y A v P A L A R O A N ( 1 9 7 0 ) 3 6 S C R A 9 7 Aurora Anaya wanted to annul her marriage to Fernando Palaroan on the basis of his failureto disclose his relationship with another woman prior to their marriage. HELD: There was noground for annulment. Neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration. Also,threat cannot come from lawful actions such as threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar based on immorality. He was also not kidnapped by his wife's relatives, there being manyoccasions for him to escape. - If guilty of seduction, a man cannot avoid marriage by duress( c o m e t o C o u r t with clean hands) MARRIAGE NOT ANNULLABLE. JIMENEZ v CANIZARES (1960) 109 Phil 273 Joel Jimenez filed for annulment on the ground of hiswife's impotency, claiming that her vagina was too small to allow penetration. Remedios Canizares refused to have physical exam despite repeated orders by the court contempt of court for noncompliance and constitutes collusion HELD: Since the only evidence presentedwas Jimenez's testimony, there was no sufficient basis to establish the wife's impotency. For all intents and purposes actually, because only the testimony of the husband, the presumptionof the law is in favor of potency. REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SARAOv GUEVARRA (1940) 40 OG 15

Supp 263 In the afternoon of their wedding, Sarao tried tohave carnal knowledge of Pilar Guevarra, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him towait until evening. When night came, he again approached the wife, but through he found theorifice of her vagina sufficiently large of his organ, she complained of pains in her private parts and he noticed oozing there from some matter offensive to the smell. - Only married her to evade a premarital affair with a close relative and no intention to become husband andwife. - ISSUE: WON disclosure of previous relationship is fraud HELD: NO because fraudas a vice of consent in marriage is limited to those enumerated by law, which in this casew o u l d b e t h o s e m e n t i o n e d i n A r t i c l e 8 6 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e . I f w e w e r e t o r e a d t h e l a t e r provision of the Family Code into this scenario, the clause "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity" of Article 46 would bar Anaya'saction for annulment. RUIZ v ATIENZA (1941) 40 OG 1903 Jose Ruiz impregnated PelagiaAtienza. He was fetched from his residence by Atienza's relatives who allegedly intimidatedh i m i n t o m a r r y i n g h e r . A n u n c l e o f A t i e n z a w a s e v e n s a i d t o h a v e t h r e a t e n e d t o f i l e immorality charges against Ruiz that would prevent his admission to the Bar. - Because of this, coitus had not been successful, and after the first night every attempt the plaintiffs partto have a carnal act with his wife proved a failure, because she complained of pains in her genital organs and he did not want her to suffer. Upon the advice of a physician and with the p l a i n t i f f s c o n s e n t , a n o p e r a t i o n w a s p e r f o r m e d i n w h i c h t h e uterus and ovaries wereremoved. The surgery rendered her incapable of p r o c r e a t i o n , b u t s h e c o u l d c o p u l a t e . Plaintiff, however, since witnessing the operation, lost all desire to have access with his wife. Now, he asks for annulment. - ISSUE: WON their marriage can be annulled based on thed e f e n d a n t s i n c a p a c i t y t o p r o c r e a t e H E L D : T h e i n c a p a c i t y f o r c o p u l a t i o n w a s o n l y temporary. The defect must be lasting to b e a g r o u n d f o r a n n u l m e n t , b e c a u s e t h e t e s t o f PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page33 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 impotence is not the capacity to reproduce, butthe capacity to copulate. ANNULMENT DENIED. PEOPLE v SANTIAGO SUPRA FC, Art4 3 E f f e c t s o f t e r m i n a t i o n b y r e a p p e a r a n c e : ( 1 ) ( 2 ) c h i l d r e n o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e conceived prior to its termi 2. Marriage when one spouse is absent ACP/CPG dissolved and iquidated, but if either spouse cont share of the net profits of the ACP/CPG property shall beforfeite a) common children b) if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a pr c)in default of children, the innocent spouse; Donations by reason of marriage remain valid,except that i faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operat FC, Art 41 Isnull and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouseabsent for consecutive years, the spouse had a well-founded belief that the(4) Thespousewasspouse may revoke the designation of the absent innocent already dead. beneficiary inany insurance policy, even if stipulated as irrevoca Where there is danger of death under thec i r c u m s t a n c e s s e t forth in theThe spouse of Art 391 ofdisqualified toan absence ( 5 ) provisions in bad faith the Civil Code, inherit from innocent s of only two years shall bes p o u s e p r e s e n t m u s t i n s t i t u t e a p r e s u m p t i v e d e a t h o f t h e a b s e n t e e , sufficient without p r e j u d i c e t o t h e e f f e c t o f r e a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e a b s e n t s p o u s e . ( 3 ) * I n C C , s e v e n y e a r s i s required for presumptive death and four years if there is presence of danger of death. Periodo f t i m e d e c r e a s e d i n F C b e c a u s e o f m o d e r n i z e d a n d f a s t e r m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n technology. There is virtually little or no excuse for a spouse not to contact his family for al o n g t i m e . * I n C C , t h e r e has to be a general belief which includes the belief of onescommunity regarding the whereabouts of one spouse. Now in the FC, it is only wellfounded belief because people today no longer care much about their neighbors like in

theyesteryears. FC, Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad donations byreason of marriage and testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n s b y o p e r a t i o n o f l a w . F C , A r t 4 2 T h e subsequent marriage automatically terminated absent spouse, unless there is a judgmenta n n u l l i n g t h e p r e v i o u s m a r r i a g e o r d e c l a r i n g i t A s w o r n s t a t e m e n t o f t h e f a c t a n d circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the p a r t i e s t o the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person s u b s e q u e n t marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined incase such fact is disputed. - - No matter how long it took the spouse absent to appear, thesubsequent marriage will still become void. Because you only presumed him/her to be dead,and that is a rebuttable presumption. If the reappearing spouse did not file the affidavit of reappearance he/she cannot remarry because he is dead until he declares hes alive. (Sot h e t w o s p o u s e s c o u l d n t p o s s i b l y c o m e t o a n a g r e e m e n t t o n o t f i l e a n a f f i d a v i t s o t h e subsequent marriage may subsist.) PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 3 4 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 O L D RULES IN THE CC the marriage. Furthermore, the court also pointed out that ME and evenAJ herself believed Arthur was dead, as evidenced by her treating FH person step CC, Art 83Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of suchas her with father. any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void fromits performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or YU v YU (2006)(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at SCRA 485 the secondmarriage without the spouse 484 the time of present having news of the absentee being alive,o r if the absentee, Custody of child pending for less than case years, though he h a s b e e n absent annulment seven is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent - 390 and 391. TheYu files for contractedshall be valid Eric Jonathan marriage so an annulment case in marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles Pasig in any of the three cases until declared null andv o i d b y a c o m p e t e n t c o u r t . R T C f o r w i f e s p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n c a p a c i t y C a r o l i n e Y u s e e k s custody of their child, Bianca, in litis pendentia (pending case) CC, Art 85 May be annulled for any of Pasay RTC the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: - former husband has jurisdiction be dead was inArt 49 Pasig RTC or wife believed to because of fact(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the living and the marriagew i t h s u c h f o r m e r husband or wife was then in (incidents of a pending decree shall bes p e c i f i e d force; by court wherein the declaration for nullity was filed) J O N E S v HORTIGUELA (1937) - Custody goes to father because mother is unfit 64 Phil 179 Step-daughter versus step-father Marciana Escao died and a proceeding regarding her estate wascommenced. Her second husband Felix Hortiguela), the petitioner and daughter of her firstmarriage, Angelita Jones, the respondent, were appointed as the heirs. The partition of her estate was approved by the court. A year later, AJ filed a motion to declare her the only heir,since she claims that the marriage between ME and FH was null and void. Jan 1918 MEsf i r s t husband, Arthur Jones (Arthur), went abroad and was never heard from again. O c t . 1919ME asked her husband to be judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of the saidmonth, the court issued and order declaring that Arthur is an absentee and the declaration willnot take effect until 6 months after its publication. It was then published in the succeedingmonths. April 1921 Court issued another order, saying that the judicial decree has takene f f e c t . M a y 1 9 2 7 F H a n d M E g o t m a r r i e d . A J n o w c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e

d e c r e e s h o u l d b e understood as not having taken effect from Oct 1919, the date it was first published, but inApril 1921, the date the court held that the decree has taken effect. Therefore, from that dateuntil the time of the second marriage, only 6 yrs and 14 days has elapsed, thus, in accordancewith sec 3 par 2 of GO no. 68, their marriage was void. ISSUE: WON the second marriagewas void. HELD: No. For the celebration of marriage, the law only requires that the former spouse be absent for 7 consecutive yrs at the time of the 2 nd marriage. The date that should b e c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e f o r e , i s J a n 1 9 1 8 , w h e n A r t h u r l e f t a n d w a s n e v e r h e a r d f r o m a g a i n . Therefore, when the 2nd marriage was celebrated, Arthur was already absent for more than 9yrs. Also, the fact that their marriage doesnt appear in the register does not affect the validityo f T A M A N O v O R T I Z ( 1 9 9 8 ) 2 9 1 S C R A 5 8 4 1 9 5 8 S e n a t o r M a m i n t a l A b u d u l J a b a r Tamano married Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano in civil rites. 1993 Tamano married EstrelitaTamano in civil rites too 1994 Tamano died - Zorayda and son filed for the declaration of nullity because of bigamy - Misrepresentations of Tamano as divorced (they never divorced)and Estrelita as single (annulment was not final and executory for noncompliance indicateslack of intention to invoke Muslim practice of polygamy with Art 53) - Estrelita contendst h a t R T C h a s n o j u r i s d i c t i o n b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e M u s l i m s , h e n c e j u r i s d i c t i o n b e l o n g s t o Sharia Courts HELD: Sharia Courts have jurisdiction only over marriages solemnized inMuslim rites. Law is silent as to marriages performed both civilly and Muslim. On the other hand, exclusive jurisdiction of all kinds of marriage (civil and Muslim) belongs to RTC.B e s i d e s , t h e y d i d n o t p e r f o r m w e d d i n g c e r e m o n y i n a c c o r d a n c e t o M u s l i m c u s t o m s . - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page35 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 VI. LEGAL SEPARATION A. Grounds for Legal Separation MUNOZ v DEL BARRIO (1955) 51 OG 5217 Jose del Barrio maltreats thewife - Judge attempts to reconcile but wife declines, she pushes for her petition for legals e p a r a t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t h u s b a n d a t t e m p t e d a t h e r l i f e H E L D : P e t i t i o n o f l e g a l separation not granted because there was intent to kill was not established. The man onlyu s e d h i s b a r e h a n d s / f i s t s . * M a a m B e t h f i n d s t h i s r u l i n g r i d i c u l o u s b e c a u s e F C , A r t 5 7 Arnold Schwarzeneggers bare hands are in itself 1. Repeated physical violence against lethalw e a p o n s . Likewise, what about martial artists? a. petitioner b. petitioners child

husbands sustenance. Abandonment defined in Art 178 & in Gay v State: for desertion of one spouses to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relationsand duties and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake entirely.Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and with intent never again toresume or claim ones rights or interests. Concubinage and mismanagement of business wasnot established either because he actually increased the assets. ONG ENG KIAM v ONG(2006) 505 SCRA 76 Lucita files a petition for legal separation against Chinese husband ont h e g r o u n d s o f r e p e a t e d p h y s i c a l a b u s e . H e w o u l d u s u a l l y b e a t h e r u p o r u t t e r a b u s i v e language to her in front of customers. After 20 years of marriage and 3 kids, she decides toseparate from her husband and went to her family. Husband retorted: - Denied all allegationsof Lucita, they only fight over the discipline of children - Ulterior motives of Lucitas familywas to encumber their conjugal properties It was her who abandoned them when she left theconjugal home - His son, Kingston and other of his employees testified for him To whichwife answered: - Positive identification is always stronger than mere denial - She would notsacrifice/trade her comfortable life and love of her children with the interests of her family if nothings really wrong she left with justifiable cause, because if she didnt, the beating willcontinue - Kingston has been with his father since he was child

while the other witnesseslivelihood depends on the husband. - PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION GRANTED.Connivance (involvement of 3rd party and active participation considered as connivanceRecrimination (both has given grounds for legal separation, co Collusion (agreement betweenspouses) Prescription (Art 57) *Maam Beths Pangalangan) mnemonics: 4C and RP (RaulSTIPULATION OF FACTS v CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT Stipulation of facts is theagreement between spouses of certain details and circumstances. It is not accepted because itcan be tantamount to collusion - Confession of judgment, on the other hand, is when one party admits guilt from which decision issolely based PEOPLE v SANSANO & RAMOS (1933) 58 Phil 73 - 1919: Mariano Venturaand Ursula Sansano got married and had a child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared toC a g a y a n a n d a b a n d o n e d h i s f a m i l y . - W i f e d i d n o t h a v e a n y m e a n s o f s u r v i v a l s o s h e resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos. 1924: Mariano returned and filed for adultery, tow h i c h b o t h S a n s a n o a n d R a m o s w e r e s e n t e n c e d A f t e r c o n v i c t i o n , U r s u l a b e g s f o r forgiveness and for Mariano to take her back. The latter denied and told her to go do whatshe wants to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to Hawaii. Mariano went back tofile for divorce (under Act 2710) ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and therefore barred from action HELD: YES. Because he gave wife freedom to do whatever she wouldlike to do. OCAMPO v FLORENCIANO (1960) 107 Phil 35 1938 - Jose de Ocampo andSerafina got married 1951 - Serafina Jose Arcala s H u s b a n d s e n d s w i f e t o M a n i l a t o study cosmetology for a year where she also had relationship with other men. 1952 - Left thehusband and lived separately 1955 - Husband caught wife in the arms of Nelson Orzame andthen told her he wanted legal separation to which the wife agreed as long as she will not becriminally charged PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.2008-2009 Page 37 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: WON there had beenc o l l u s i o n i n t h e f o r m o f c o n f e s s i o n o f j u d g m e n t b y t h e w i f e H E L D : T h o u g h t h e w i f e admitted her guilt, which constitutes confession of judgment, the husband also presentedother evidences to support the allegation. Refusing to answer is not necessarily collusion.Also, the husband had no duty to search for wife because it was her who left the house and soit was her duty to return or at least inform the husband of her whereabouts. Hence, collusion may not bar the action for legal separation. SARGENT v SARGENT (1920) 114 A . 4 2 8 Husband suspects the wife to be committing adultery with their driver, Charles Simmons. Tosupport his allegations, he hired several detectives and enjoined his servants to keep a closeeye on the actions of his wife. They staged a raid to catch the wife red handed of the crimealleged of her. ISSUE: WON the husband connived employees to set-up his wifes adulterywith his - - Demobilized military man files a petition for legal separation against his wife for her cruelty and abusive behavior He says she tortures him at night, forcing him to have sexw i t h h i m a n d i f h e d e c l i n e s , s h e w o u l d r e s o r t t o e a r p i n c h i n g , h a i r p u l l i n g a n d u s i n g o f obscene language This deprived him of rest and sleep so he had no choice but to give in toher wishes ISSUE: WON having sex constitutes condonation HELD: YES. Because in hiscase, everything was done voluntarily. Sharing the same bed and continual sexual relations isa conclusive evidence of condonation. Decision would have been different if he was the wife b e c a u s e o f p h y s i o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s t r e n g t h o f m a n a n d w o m a n . B U G A Y O N G v GINEZ (1956) 100 Phil. 620 Benjamin was a US serviceman, he left his wife Leonila in thecare of his sisters as she goes to school Valeriana Polangco wrote to him about rumors of wifes adultery; wife then goes away from the sister-in-laws house and stayed at her moms place Leonila wrote to Benjamin as well about a certain Eliong who kissed her in schoolBenjamin went home and searched for her They stayed together for 2 nights and 1 day at

hiscousin, Pedros house Verified the truth which made her pack up and walk away ISSUE:WON Benjamins act of searching for and sleeping with his wife constitutes condonationHELD: Yes. Because even if not yet proven, he had a belief in mind that his wife was alreadyunfaithful yet he still tried to take her back. The ponencia relied mostly on US cases. COURTDENIED PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION. MATUBIS v PRAXEDES (1960) 109Phil. 789 Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes agreed to live separately from each other, theye v e n instituted a document that allows them to get themselves a new mate without t h e intervention of the other. Jan 1955: Man cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado April 1956:Wife the filed for concubinage - TC dismissed because of prescription and consent decisionappealed from in the SC HELD: SC affirmed RTC because there was express consent, henceshe deserved no sympathy from the court. Also, the action was not instituted within a year of cognizance. HELD: YES. Petitioner could have taken steps which would prevent him fromcasting doubts on the fidelity of his wife but instead it appeared that he even facilitated hiswifes wrongdoing. It is to be inferred from his conduct that he did desire his wife to committhe offense in his absence, and that helping as he did to afford the opportunity which broughtabout the desired result, he was consenting thereto. *What could have Mr. Sargent done to prevent occurrence of connivance? He could have just fired Simmons or brought his wifewith him on his business trips. BROWN v YAMBAO (1957) 102 Phil 168 William Brownfiles a petition for legal separation against his wife Juanita Yambao who got pregnant by acertain Carlos Field while he was interred in Intramuros (ground: adultery) - Wife did notreply, so fiscal intervened and found that there was no collusion. However, the fiscal alsofound that the petitioner was barred from filing the action because he had a concubine (LiliaDelito) himself Petitioner says that the fiscals only duty was to ensure no collusion took p l a c e a n d n o t s t a n d i n p l a c e o f t h e w i f e F i s c a l f u r t h e r a d d e d t h a t p e t i t i o n e r w a s a l s o prescribed from action because he learned about the cause in 1945 but only file ten yearslater. COURT DENIED LEGAL SEPARATION. WILLAN v WILLAN (1960) 2 A11 E.R.4 6 3 C a s e o f t h e b a t t e r e d h u s b a n d P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 20082009 Page 38 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 C. When to

file/try actions REQUISITES FOR LEGAL SEPARATION Art 57 The petition must be filedwithin 5 years from the time of occurrence of cause (as compared to the double period of CC) Art 58 6 months cool off (but does not override provisions of Art 49 regarding pendencyof decree i.e. support pendente lite, support of spouse and children and visitation rights) Art59 steps taken towards reconciliation Art 60 stipulation of facts and confession of judgmentshould not be accepted in court or participation of fiscal or prosecuting attorney to preventcollusion CONTRERAS v MACARAIG (1970) 33 SCRA 222 1952 Elena and Cesar weremarried, had three children 1961 Cesar met Lily while working for his fathers business Sept62 Lubos, the driver, told her that husband was living with a woman in Singalong Apr 63More rumors about her husband being seen with a pregnant woman May 63 Husband wasusually away and back for only 23 days; Elena declined to raise the issue lest it drive her husband away more - Asked father-in-law and sister-in-law to talk top and convince her husband to come back to her Employee saw him with a baby on his arms - Elena talked toL i l y w h o s a i d t h a t i t w a s C e s a r w h o r e f u s e s t o l e a v e h e r A p r 6 3 E l e n a , w i t h o f t h e i r t w o children, tried to convince Cesar to go home, the latter refused to return to legitimate familyDec 63 Plaintiff filed petition for legal separation RTC said that wife became cognizant of husbands infidelity on Sept 1962 (Lubos report) SC granted legal separation because wifewas only cognizant

of husbands infidelity when she confronted him and got told that hed o e s n t i n t e n d t o r e t u r n t o t h e m a n y m o r e . H e n c e , t h e r e w a s n o p r e s c r i p t i o n . S O M O S A - RAMOS v VAMENTA (1972) 46 SCRA 11 Lucy Somosa Ramos files petition for legals e p a r a t i o n concubinage and attempt on her life by husband Clemente (1972 so CC wasapplicable) She seeks preliminary mandatory injunction to recover her p a r a p h e r n a l a n d exclusive property ISSUE: WON Art 103 bars judge from such an action HELD: No. It is nota n a b s o l u t e b a r . M a n a g e m e n t o f p r o p e r t y m a y b e d e c i d e d r i g h t a w a y e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page3 9 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 o t h e r s p o u s e m a y e n c u m b e r o r a l i e n a t e petitioner from her rightful share in the assets. the HELD: Wife not asking for support fromhusbands personal funds, rather from the conjugal properties. Also, the allegation of her adulterous relationship was not sufficiently established. It is enough for the court to ascertaint h e k i n d a n d a m o u n t o f e v i d e n c e e v e n b y a f f i d a v i t s o n l y o r o t h e r d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e appearing in the records. It was also shown that he was capable of providing the said amount.D. Effects of Filing of Legal Separation Art 61 a) entitled to live separately b) third personmay be appointed manage their ACP/CPG Art 62 pendency of the case, Art 49 applies a)support of the spouses to b) c) support and custody of children visitation rights for childrenDE LA VINA v VILLAREAL (1920) 41 Phil 13 Narcisa Geopano files divorce complainta g a i n s t h u s b a n d w h o c o m m i t t e d c o n c u b i n a g e w i t h A n a C a l o g a n d b o o t e d h e r o u t o f t h e conjugal home in Negros Occidental She lived with her daughters in Iloilo, and now seeksdivorce (this case is in 1920), partition of property and alimony - Husband rebuts that thecourt has no jurisdiction over invokes husbands right the case since their domicile was in N e g r o s O c c i d e n t a l t o f i x t h e m a r i t a l d o m i c i l e a n d w i f e s d u t y t o f o l l o w . L i k e w i s e , t h e husbands right to administer marital assets (since wife wants separation of property) WON No. Husband abolishes the wifes domicile is still the same with husbands. this right them o m e n t h e f u r n i s h e s cause for the wife to leave him and ground for divorce. She mayacquire separate domicile from her husband. Also, he displaced her from the c o n j u g a l dwelling in the first place. Thus, court had jurisdiction over the case. WON the wife canobtain preliminary injunction Yes. against husbands encumbering and alienating of their conjugal property. The husbands administrative power must be curtailed to protect theinterest of the wife. Even though wife doesnt have the right to administer, she has the rightto share. REYES v INES-LUCIANO (1979) 88 SCRA 03 - Celia Ilustre-Reyes files petitionfor legal separation on husband Manuel Reyes on the ground of attempt to her life. (Attackedtwice, would have been dead if not saved by father and driver.) - Husband does not want togive her pedente lite because he allege that she has adulterous relationship with her physicianand the price she was asking was too high PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.E . A . P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 P a g e 4 0 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 BAEZ v BAEZ (2002) 374 SCRA 340 RTC granted legal separation to Aida and Gabrielfor husbands sexual infidelity, dissolution of CPG and division of conjugal assets Wife kepton asking things and damages from her husband through the court RTC denied the damages b u t g a v e d u e c o u r s e t o t h e e x e c u t i o n pending appeal. CA set aside the RTC ruling for husband to vacate the r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e a n d s u r r e n d e r t h e m o t o r v e h i c l e . H E L D : L e g a l separation is not subject to multiple appeals. Its effects are incidents of the final judgmentand not distinct matters. LA RUE v LA RUE (1983) 304 S. E. 2d 312 - Plain housewifescontribution to the

CPG - 1950 husband and wife got married, wife worked for the first sevenyears but stopped at the request of her husband - Married for 30 years, housewife performedher duties like caring for the children and attending to husbands needs until the relationshipwent sour - Obtained divorce but wife was awarded only with alimony and health insurance -Court denied her claim to one half of the conjugal assets because she made no contributionst h e r e t o I S S U E : W O N w i f e i s e n t i t l e d t o e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n H E L D : Y e s , b e c a u s e s h e contributed her earnings in the early days of the marriage and then her service as a frugalh o m e m a k e r i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t y e a r s . - - U p o n h i s r e t u r n , h e t o o k t h e m t o C e b u R o s a r i o asked permission to bring them to Manila for grandfathers funeral, were given 2 weeksRosario did not return them but instead filed for civil case for custody grant, because he isa l r e a d y l i v i n g w i t h a n o t h e r w o m a n a n d t h e k i d s w a n t t o s t a y w i t h h e r R T C o r d e r s h e r t o return the kids to him within 24 hours HELD: Custody of children is never final and alwayssubject to review for the best interest of the children. However, until decision is modified, thec u s t o d y i s t o t h e f a t h e r s . B e s i d e s , R o s a r i o i s j u s t l i v i n g i n t h e c h a r i t y o f h e r b r o t h e r s . LAPERAL v REPUBLIC (1962) 6 SCRA 357 Elisea obtained legal separation decree fromh u s b a n d Enrique Santamaria, so now she wants to revert to her maiden name. She is a businesswoman and afraid that confusion as to the name will lead her f i n a n c e s t o t h e dissolution of conjugal property. Art 372 mandates that woman retains the name used prior tolegal separation, because it is indicative of status and legal separation affected no change toh e r s t a t u s . H E L D : S C d e n i e d h e r p e t i t i o n b e c a u s e s h e r e l i e d o n t h e f a c t o f h e r l e g a l separation and that there was no conjugal property to fear of because it has been dissolvedwith the decree of legal separation. Likewise, they cannot allow easy circumvention of Art372. CASE DISMISSED. E. Effects of Legal Separation Decree Art 63 1) Live separatelyfrom each other 2) ACP/CPG dissolved; offender no right to any share in the net profits,forfeit in favor of common children, children of guilty, and innocent spouse 3) Custody of minor children goes to innocent spouse (subject to Art 213) 4) Guilty spouse disqualified asintestate heir Art 64 revoke all donations, beneficiary in any insurance policy within 5 yearsMATUTE v MACARAIG (1956) 99 Phil 340 Armando files petition for legal separationagainst wife Rosario because of adultery with brother and brother-in-law Legal separationgranted; custody of four minor children to father Father left them in sisters care in Davaoa n d t h e n w e n t t o U S ; R o s a r i o l i v e d w i t h t h e m there F. Reconciliation There should be voluntary and mutual consent of the spouses to reconcile. CPG not automatically revived. Art67 applies. Art 65 Joint manifestation under oath in the same court as legal separation Art 66Consequences of reconciliation: 1) legal separation proceedings shall be terminated if still pending 2) final decree set aside, but the separation of property and forfeiture remains, unlessthey revive former regime Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify: 1) whatt o c o n t r i b u t e anew to restored property regime 2) what to retain in separate property 3)n a m e s o f a l l t h e c r e d i t o r s P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 41 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 42 of 170K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 V I I . D I V O R C E S I s t h e r e d i v o r c e i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ? There is just relative divorce. BUT BUT! It recognizes two kinds of divorce: foreign divorcea n d M u s l i m d i v o r c e s . A . F o r e i g n D i v o r c e s F C , A r t 1 5 N a t i o n a l i t y t h e o r y a p p l i e s i n t h e Philippines. Philippine laws follow Filipinos anywhere they go. FC, Art 26 Marriages validwhere celebrated are valid everywhere except when 1) one is below 18 2) bigamous, notunder Art 41 3) mistake as to identity of other party 4) void under 53 for non-compliance 5) psychological incapacity 6) incestuous 7) public policy PROOFS FOR FOREIGN LAWSTO APPLY/ BE RECOGNIZED IN OUR JURISDICTION 1) Provision of the foreign law2 ) C e l e b r a t i o n o f m a r r i a g e i n

a c c o r d a n c e t o t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s V A N D O R N v R O M I L L O (1985) 134 SCRA 139 Alicia married Upton, US citizen in Hong Kong. Later on in 1982,they obtained divorce in Nevada. Shortly after that, Alicia contracted another marriage withVan Dorn. 1983 Upton files suit in Pasay RTC for nonapplication of divorce decree to Aliciaand hence his right to administer the conjugal property in Ermita, the decision Galleon Shop- Alicia files for dismissal which the RTC denied assailed in SC HELD: Upton is estoppedf r o m t h e c l a i m b e c a u s e h e d e c l a r e d i n N e v a d a t h a t t h e r e w e r e n o c o n j u g a l a s s e t s . H e i s American and US law applies to him, therefore, Alicia is no longer his wife. The marriaget i e , w h e n t h u s s e v e r e d a s t o o n e p a r t y , c e a s e s t o b i n d e i t h e r . P e t i t i o n o f A l i c i a g r a n t e d . Uptons case dismissed. Prevents the situation wherein you are married to your husband butyour husband is no longer married to you. *Maam Beth likes this decision because it provesthat we dont need new laws. We only have to think out of the box. A change of focus is allwe need. Philippine laws apply to Filipino, ergo, foreigners cannot use our laws against our c i t i z e n s . T h e i r o w n l a w s s h a l l a p p l y t o t h e m . B r a v o ! P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 43 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |UP Law B2012 QUITA v CA & DANDAN (1998) 300 SCRA 592 1941 Fe and Arturo gotmarried, no children 1954 Fe got final judgment of divorce with Arturo; woman remarriedtwice 1972 Husband dies without will - Blandina Dandan and her six children with ArturoPadlan presents themselves as heir of the decedent - Ruperto Padlan intervened - RTC grantssuccession to Quita and Padlan HELD: RTC failed to establish Quitas citizenship which ismaterial to the resolution of case. If proven that she was no long a Filipino citizen, then shew a s n o l o n g e r t h e w i f e o f P a d l a n a n d d i v o r c e d e c r e e b i n d i n g o n h e r ( a p p l i c a t i o n o f V a n Dorn) - Time of divorce is the most material and not the time of the marriage - Remanded thec a s e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e citizenship of Quita at the time of divorce LLORENTE v CA &LLORENTE ( 2 0 0 0 ) 3 4 5 S C R A 5 9 2 1 9 2 7 - 5 7 L o r e n z o e n l i s t e d a s U S N a v y 1 9 3 7 P a u l a married Lorenzo 1943 Lorenzos naturalization in the US 1945 Lorenzo went home to findout that Paula got pregnant by his brother Ceferino 1945 birth of Crisologo Llorente who wasillegitimate and fatherless in his birth certificate - Lorenzo refused to lived with Paula andinstead drew a written agreement witnessed by her dad and stepmom that they will dissolve

the marital union and she will have no claims to the conjugal assets, without charges for criminal act 1952 1958 1981 1985 RTC CA SC Divorce decree became final in the StatesLorenzo married Alicia whos unaware of his previous marriage with Paula; begot 3 childrenLorenzo drafted his last will and testament Lorenzo died Assigned Paula as administratrix,she being the legal surviving wife Alicia declared as co-owner Remand for ruling on theintrinsic validity of the will. There were four significant point in time: 1) divorce 2) marriageto Alice 3) execution of will 4) death Citing Quita, once proven that Lorenzos citizenship isAmerican at the time of divorce, then the divorce will be valid and should be recognized -Validity of the will is governed by laws of the country in which they are remand to the courtfor further clarification SC recognizes the executed divorce decree and upholds the marriageof Alice and Lorenzo - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 4 4 o f 1 7 0 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 GARCIA v RECIO(2001) 366 SCRA 437 Rederick and Editha Samson married in Australia in 1987, thendivorced in 1989 1992 Rederick became US citizen 1994 Rederick married Grace 1995Grace and Rederick lived separately and then Grace files for nullity on ground of

R e d s bigamy RTC recognized the divorce obtained in Australia and did not question respondentslack of capacity to marry HELD: Respondents legal capacity to marry cannot be determined because he failed to produce the foreign law as well as the decree proving his capacity tom a r r y . N o t sure if he was granted absolute or probationary divorce. VIII. DE F A C T O SEPARATION FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affectthe regime of ACP except that: 1. 2. 3. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refusesto live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported When the consentof one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding In the absence of sufficient community property, theseparate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. Thes p o u s e p r e s e n t s h a l l , u p o n proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicialauthority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the B. MuslimDivorces Governed by Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines ( P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree No. 1083) Divorce or Talaq (Chapter 3) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Repudiation of the wife bythe husband (talaq) Vow of abstinence by the husband (ila) Injurious assimilation of husband(zihar) Acts of imprecation (lian) the wife by the Redemption by the wife (khul) Exercise b y t h e w i f e o f t h e d e l e g a t e d r i g h t t o r e p u d i a t e ( t a f w i d ) j u d i c i a l d e c r e e ( f a s k h ) Y A S I N v JUDGE, SHARIA (1995) 241 SCRA 606 Hatima Yasin seeks to use her maiden name againafter being divorced to Hajin Idris Yasin, who has already remarried. Sharia court dismissedh e r p e t i t i o n b e c a u s e t h e r e h a s t o b e c h a n g e o f n a m e . H E L D : N o n e e d t o h a v e c o u r t proceedings for change of name because her legal name is the one entered in the civilregister. When the marriage ties no longer exists as i n t h e c a s e o f d e a t h o f h u s b a n d o r Muslim divorce, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change inh e r c i v i l s t a t u s i n o r d e r t o r e v e r t t o h e r m a i d e n n a m e a s t h e u s e o f h e r h u s b a n d ' s n a m e i s optional and not obligatory for her. FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband andwife shall not affect the regime of CPG except that: 1. The spouse who leaves the conjugalhome or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported 2.When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judiciala u t h o r i z a t i o n s h a l l b e o b t a i n e d i n a s u m m a r y p r o c e e d i n g 3 . I n t h e a b s e n c e o f s u f f i c i e n t community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for thes u p p o r t o f t h e f a m i l y . T h e s p o u s e present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific s e p a r a t e property of the other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds FC, Art 239 When a husband andwife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicialauthorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouses is required by law buts u c h c o n s e n t i s w i t h h e l d o r c a n n o t b e o b t a i n e d , a v e r i f i e d p e t i t i o n m a y b e f i l e d i n c o u r t alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodyingthe transaction and if none shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reasonwhy the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. FC, Art 242 Upon filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required,of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted,o n o r b e f o r e t h e d a t e s e t i n t h e s a i d n o t i c e f o r t h e i n i t i a l c o n f e r e n c e . T h e n o t i c e s h a l l b e accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of thespouse concerned. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.2008-2009 Page 45 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 246 If the petition isnot resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing onthe basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be

heard and thesubject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. FC, Art247 The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. - being consideredas immoral and gross misconduct The only thing resolved in this case is that they cannot beconsidered immoral in the eyes of their own religious group but it does not deny the fact thatthe relationship is still not legally binding on them. PEREZ v CA and Ray Perez (1996) 255S C R A 6 6 1 1 9 9 6 R a y a n d N e r i s s a g o t m a r r i e d i n C e b u . 1 9 9 2 A f t e r 6 m i s c a r r i a g e s , 2 operations and a high risk pregnancy, she finally gave birth to Ray Jr. 1993 The family wentto Cebu but only Nerissa went back to the US although they all had round trip tickets becauseRay had to stay behind and take care of ill mother. - She came back no longer in good termsw i t h husband RTC followed tender years presumption CA reversed and gave custody tofather Art 213 can be taken to mean separation (legal or de facto) and should t a k e i n t o account all relevant info (material, shall not be separated from mother is mandatory unlessunfit social, moral) financial capacity not determinative as t o e x e r c i s e s o l e p a r e n t a l authority long as both have ample means of support When husband questioned wifes natureof work and its incapability to care for child: - Its nothing that cant be handled. Shifts can b e a d j u s t e d s o s h e c a n a t t e n d t o t h e c h i l d . T h e r e a r e a l s o d a y c a r e c e n t e r s a n d s h e c o u l d always take a leave until the child can manage on its own. Petitioner also invites mother to join them in the States so she could look after the child. Husband will also just leave the careof the child to his mother because of the nature of his work as a doctor Besides, nothing can be more heart rendering that the wifes situation who waited so long to have a child only to be deprived from her before the first year. PETITION GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE ANDR E V E R S E D . R T C R E I N S T A T E D . F o r i m m e d i a t e e x e c u t i o n . E S T R A D A v E S C R I T O R (2006) 492 SCRA 1 Administrative case against an employee of the Supreme Court who isl i v i n g w i t h a m a n n o t h e r h u s b a n d D e c l a r a t i o n o f P l e d g e o f F a i t h f u l n e s s p r a c t i c e o f t h e Jehovahs Witnesses immunized them from PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 46 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 IX.R I G H T S & O B L I G A T I O N S B E T W E E N H U S B A N D & W I F E A . C o h a b i t a t i o n , M u t u a l Love and Respect (e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conductw h i c h t h e w o m a n o r h e r c h i l d h a s t h e r i g h t t o e n g a g e i n , o r a t t e m p t i n g t o r e s t r i c t o r restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directeda g a i n s t t h e w o m a n o r c h i l d . T h i s s h a l l i n c l u d e , b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o , t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t s committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child'smovement or conduct: (f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the p u r p o s e o f c o n t r o l l i n g h e r a c t i o n s o r d e c i s i o n s ; ( g ) C a u s i n g o r a t t e m p t i n g t o c a u s e t h e woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by forceor threat of force, Any harm, or through intimidation RPC, Art 247 Death or physicalinjuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.physicallegally married person who havingdirected against the woman or both of them surprised his spouse in the act of committings e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n , s h a l l k i l l a n y o f t h e m o r h e r c h i l d o r h e r / h i s immediate family; in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or recklessdestierro. conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotionalor If he shall inflict upon them physical

injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not beunder to, the These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents withrespect to their daughterslimited eighteen following acts: years of age, and their seducer,while the daughters are living with their parents. (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or shall otherwise have consented to the Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or humiliation to the woman or her child,i n c l u d i n g , b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o , r e p e a t e d v e r b a l i n f i d e l i t y o f t h e o t h e r s p o u s e s h a l l n o t b e entitled to the benefits of this article. and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children. Sec 26 Battered WomanSyndrome as a Defense. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding theabsence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the RevisedPenal Code. In the determination of the state of mind of the woman FC, Art 68 The husbandand the wife are obliged to live together, who was mutual love, respect andwoman syndromeat the observe suffering from battered fidelity and render mutual time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be help and support. assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.Sec 28 Custody of children. The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custodyand support of CC, Art 34 When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or failsto render aid or protection to any person in case her child/children. Children below seven (7)y e a r s old of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable f o r damages, and the city or municipality shall be older but with mental or physical disabilitiess h a l l s u b s i d i a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e t h e r e f o r . T h e c i v i l a c t i o n h e r e i n r e c o g n i z e d s h a l l b e independent of any criminal proceedings, and a automatically be given to the mother, withright to preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. support, unless thecourt finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law) A victim whois suffering from battered woman syndrome Sec 2 Rape as a Crime Against Persons. Thec r i m e o f r a p e s h a l l h e r e a f t e r b e c l a s s i f i e d a s a C r i m e A g a i n s t P e r s o n s u n d e r s h a l l n o t b e disqualified from having custody of her Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwiseknown as the Revised Penal Code. children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from battered woman syndrome. RA9262 (Anti VAWC Act of 2004) Sec 5 Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- T h e crime of violence against women and NARAG v NARAG (1998) their children i s committed through any of the following 291 SCRA 451 acts: - Dominador was a teacher atSt. Louis College of (a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her Tuguegarao when hemet Gina Espita, a 1st year child; (b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child 17 yostudent. They had a relationship and physical harm; Dominador abandoned his family to livewith (c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child Gina. physical harm; Dominador used power as Sangguniang (d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of Panlalawigan to securee m p l o y m e n t f o r G i n a a t i m m i n e n t p h y s i c a l h a r m ; t h e D T I . P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 47 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. - - Dominadors wife i n s t i t u t e d a disbarment proceeding against him for immorality, but after one year she wanted to withdrawher complaint saying She fabricated allegations in complaint to humiliate and spite husbandLove letters between two guilty were forged She suffered from emotional confusing due toextreme jealousy Denied Gina and Dominador ever had a relationship Dominador never leftthe family But a year later, Julieta filed the same case again due to her husbands continuousthreat. Dominador filed his answer He never threatened, harassed, or intimidated her Henever abandoned family, he loves them. He protected & preserved family. Julieta and twosons drove him out of their house. Julieta is emotionally disturbed incurably jealous

and possessive, violent, vindictive, scandalous. Julietas rich and she abhors poor, he is poor hewas beaten, battered, brutalized, tortured, abused and humiliated by Julieta in public and athome so he filed for annulment because they cannot exist together She has disgraced, shamedand humiliated him by telling everyone everywhere that hes worthless, good-fornothing,evil and immoral Denied relationship with Gina. No kids either. Love letters: inadmissible asevidence He is old thus, unfit to do things alleged by Julieta. Investigating officer: indefinitesuspension from practice of law. He never denied love letters, didnt disprove adulterousr e l a t i o n s h i p . D e n y i n g t w o k i d s ( A u r e l l e D o m i n i c a n d K y l e D o m i n a d o r ) g r o u n d f o r disciplinary action. IBP: affirmed investigating o f f i c e r s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n & g r a n t e d disbarment denials without proof are insufficient. His accusations against Julieta were not p r o v e n . P r o v i d i n g f o r h i s f a m i l y , g i v i n g t h e m a c o m f o r t a b l e l i f e , h i s b e i n g a s u c c e s s f u l lawyer and seasoned politician do not necessarily mean that hes morally fit. He has duties tohis children (support, educate, instruct according to right precepts and good example, givelove, companionship, understanding, moral & spiritual guidance) and to his wife (observemutual love, respect & fidelity & render help and support). He failed to fulfill these duties.He was away most of the time because of his paramour not because of work as he alleges.Sons testimony proved that he abandoned his family which even affected his sons ownfamily. Dominador did not merely contract a marriage, he should have been a partner whol i v e d u p t o h i s p r o m i s e t o l o v e & r e s p e c t h i s w i f e & r e m a i n f a i t h f u l t o h e r u n t i l d e a t h . GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA (1916) 35 Phil 252 Elisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda weremarried on January 7, 1915. They established their residence, where they lived together for amonth after which plaintiff returned to her parents. She alleged that defendant demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals. She refused to perform anyact other than legal and valid cohabitation. Defendant continued demanding such acts fromher. Her continued refusal exasperated him, inducing him to maltreat her by word and deedand inflict injuries upon her lips, face and different body parts. Thus, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and is now asking for support. CFI held that defendant cannot becompelled to support wife, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decreegranting her a divorce or separation from the defendant. ISSUE: WON wife is entitled tosupport outside conjugal abode HELD: Yes. The rule established in Art. 149 of the CivilCode is not absolute. The doctrine that neither spouse cannot be compelled to support theother outside the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting them adivorce or separation is not controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled toleave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abodeand the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. The nature of the duty of affording mutualsupport is compatible and enforceable in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does notcreate any illicit situation. A judgment for separate maintenance is a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. Moreland, concurring:A husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support hiswife imposed by law; and where a ISSUE: WON Dominador should be disbarred HELD:Y e s . A l a w y e r s h o u l d n o t e n g a g e i n u n l a w f u l , d i s h o n e s t , i m m o r a l ( s h a m e l e s s s h o w i n g indifference to opinion of good members of society) or deceitful conduct, should not behavein scandalous manner, in public or in private to the discredit of the legal profession. Theseare continuing requirements/qualification of all members of bar. This includes prohibitionagainst adulterous relationships. Burden of proof of gross immorality for abandoning hisf a m i l y proved when Julieta presented witnesses who attested to adulterous r e l a t i o n s h i p between Gina & Dominador. Even Ginas brother admitted that Gina and Dominador hadtwo children. Even though Julieta has burden of proof, he needs to show that he is

morally fitt o r e m a i n a m e m b e r o f b a r . H i s P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 48 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him,h e c a n n o t t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f h e r d e p a r t u r e t o a b r o g a t e t h e l a w a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e m a r i t a l relation and repudiate his duties thereunder. Cohabitation includes normal sexual intercourseonly. Husband has to support wife because she had just cause for leaving. *Who determinesw h a t i s a c c e p t a b l e f o r m o f s e x ? T h e s p o u s e s ! N o t t h e j u d g e n o r t h e s o c i e t y ! * W h y i s missionary position prescribed by the church? Because it gives the least satisfaction. Sex isnot meant to be for pleasure but for procreation only. WARREN v STATE (1985) 255 Ga.151 Daniel Warren was convicted for rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife while theyw e r e l i v i n g t o g e t h e r a s h u s b a n d a n d w i f e . H e a p p e a l e d t o d i s m i s s t h e i n d i c t m e n t . H i s grounds: 1. Rape statute implies marital exclusion thus husband cannot be guilty of rapingwife. 2. Aggravated sodomy statute provides for marital exclusion, too. 3. Interpreting theabove-mentioned laws otherwise would be tantamount to new interpretations & applicationof such would deny him of his due process rights. ISSUE: WON marital exclusion is impliedi n t h e r a p e a n d a g g r a v a t e d s o d o m y s t a t u t e s H E L D : N o . T h e r e h a s n e v e r b e e n a n e x p r e s s marital exemption in Georgia rape statute. Theories/bases for thinking that marital exclusionexists in rape statute: (a) Lord Hale by giving matrimonial consent, wife gave up herself int h i s k i n d u n t o h u s b a n d a n d s h e c a n t t a k e t h a t b a c k ( b ) S u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e d o c t r i n e o f English law - if marriage between a rapist and his victim extinguishes criminal liabilities thencorollary, rape within marital relationship should be given that immunity (c) Medieval time wife is husbands chattel or property thus rape, thus man is merely using his own property (d)U n i t y o f p e r s o n t h e o r y h u s b a n d a n d w i f e b e c o m e o n e , w i t h w i f e i n c o r p o r a t i n g h e r existence to that of the husband, thus husband cannott be convicted of raping himself. Justifications: (a) prevent fabricated charges (b) prevent wives from using rape charges for revenge (c) prevent state intervention so as not to All of these theories and justificationsare thwart possible reconciliation pass. Equal protection of the laws is being practiced now.Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge with a female forcibly and against her will. Itviolates the moral sense and personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim. Impliedconsent to such in marriage conflicts is absurd and against the constitution. During era of slavery, rape was seen negatively and not acceptable even to chattels. Sodomy is the carnalknowledge and connection against the order of nature by man with man or in same unnaturalmanner with woman. There has been no implied marital exemption under this statute even inearlier times. Consent is not a defense unlike in rape. Anyone who voluntarily participates isguilty. There is due process. Due process merely requires that law give sufficient warning somen may avoid what is forbidden. Statutes concerned are plain and broadly written. This may be the first application to this particular set of facts but it is not an unforeseeable judicialenlargement of criminal statutes that are narrowly drawn. There is no marital exemption inrape. A person commits rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and againsther will. THURMAN v CITY OF TORRINGTON (1984) 595 F. Supp. 1521 Between earlyOctober 1982 and June 10, 1983, Tracey Thurman notified the police officers of the City of repeated threats upon her life and the life of her child, Charles Thurman, Jr., made by her estranged husband, Charles Thurman. This includes breaking her windshield while she wasin the car, where he was convicted of breach of peace, and stabbing her repeatedly. Attemptsto file complaints by wife against husband based on threats of death and maiming her wereignored and rejected by the police because of an alleged administrative classification thataffords lesser protection when the victim is a woman abused by a spouse or boyfriend, or achild abused by a father or stepfather. ISSUES: WON the administrative

violates the equal protection clause classification HELD: Yes. A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman merely because he is her husband. A police officer may not knowinglyrefrain from interference in such violence, and may not automatically decline to make anarrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other. Whatever may b e s a i d a s t o t h e p o s i t i v e v a l u e s o f a v o i d i n g i n t r a - f a m i l y c o n t r o v e r s y , t h e c h o i c e i n t h i s context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. PERSONS AND FAMILYRELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 49 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 S U B - I S S U E S 1 . D i s m i s s a l o f c l a i m s o f s o n C o r r e c t . C o n d i t i o n t o s t a y away from son is not one of the conditions after arrest. There is failure to adequately alleged e n i a l o f e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n 2 . A l l e g a t i o n o f c u s t o m o r p o l i c y - A p a t t e r n e m e r g e s t h a t evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the police department to the complaints of Tracey and its duty to protect her. Such indifference raises an inference of custom or policyo n t h e p a r t o f m u n i c i p a l i t y . 3 . U n i d e n t i f i e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r s - O k a y b e c a u s e c a s e w a s dismissed even before plaintiff had an opportunity to discover identity of u n i d e n t i f i e d defendants. 4. Pendent Jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claim- The court has discretiont o e x e r c i s e t h i s p o w e r . A t t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , c o u r t d e c l i n e s t o e x e r c i s e b e c a u s e n e e d l e s s decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. PEOPLEv L I B E R T A ( 1 9 8 4 ) 6 4 N Y 2 d 1 5 2 M a r i o a n d D e n i s e w e r e m a r r i e d b u t w h e n h e s t a r t e d beating her she sought temporary protection from her husband. The order was granted andMario was directed to move out, stay away from the family home, stay away from Deniseand he may only visit their child once a week. - Mario wanted to visit son but Denise did not

the defendant in his 4. Strike out only the unconstitutional parts since relations with other women coupled with his lack the statute is of major importance. Its not of consideration andeven brutality caused entirely void anyway. Aurelia to leave the conjugal home and for her to5 . D u e process is observed. His act was already establish her own abode. Their finalseparation criminal when he attacked Denise. occurred on A p r i l 1 9 4 7 . T h e r e w a s n o sufficient evidence to establish the cruelty of the husband but there were sufficient B. Fixingthe Family Domicile evidence to establish the infidelity of the husband. ISSUE: WON thew i f e i s t h e c o u r t s h a l l d e c i d e . F C , A r t 6 9 T h e h u s b a n d and the wife shall fix the familyd o m i c i l e . I n c a s e o f d i s a g r e e m e n t , e n t i t l e d f o r s e p a r a t e s u p p o r t f r o m h e r h u s b a n d . TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO (1966) 17 SCRA 674 - Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaowere married in 1948. In 1950, defendant Escao obtained a foreign divorce in Nevada. Shefurther sought papal dispensation of the marriage although no document proving the samewas presented. Escaos marriage to American Rusell Leo Moran in the US in 1954, whichwas later blessed with three children ISSUES: 1. WON divorce is valid 2. WON Court maythen compel Escao to cohabit with Tenchavez HELD: 1. Divorce is invalid for a foreigndivorce decree cannot be recognized in the Philippines especially if it was granted by court of the place which was not the parties bona fide domicile and on a ground not recognized byour law, which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in private international law, foreignd e c r e e s (especially those confirming or dissolving a marriage) cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. HELD: YES - In order to entitle a w i f e t o maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from the husband it is notn e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e h u s b a n d s h o u l d b r i n g a c o n c u b i n e i n t o t h e h o m e . P e r v e r s e a n d i l l i c i t relations with women outside the conjugal home are sufficient grounds. - Ruling

in Arroyo v.Vasquez de Arroyo is not applicable because in the Arroyo case the only grounds that werealleged was cruelty and that charge was not proven. In the present case, the charge of crueltywas also not proven but the Aurelia also accused her husband of infidelity and that chargeh a s b e e n p r o v e n ( r e p e a t e d a c t s o f c o n j u g a l i n f i d e l i t y ) a n d t h e h u s b a n d a p p e a r s t o b e a recurrent, if not incurable offender. This fact gives the wife an undeniable right to relief. -Goitia v. Campos Rueda husband cannot by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself fromthe duty to support his wife. When he drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, hecannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relationsand repudiate his duties. GARCIA v SANTIAGO (1928) 53 Phil. 952 - 1910 Cipriana Garcia Isabelo Santiago married 1925 Cipriana compelled to leave conjugal dwelling: 1.continued family dissensions 2. Alejo, Isabelos son by his first wife seduced Prisca Aurelio,Ciprianas daughter by her first husband. Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of requiring his son to marry Prisca, refused to interfere and he seemed to tolerate their illicitrelationship. 3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo tof o s t e r l a t t e r s w h i m s a n d caprices and thus, damaging and - 2. No. It is not within the province of courts t o a t t e m p t t o c o m p e l o n e o f t h e s p o u s e s t o c o h a b i t w i t h , a n d r e n d e r conjugal rights to the other. However, a spouse who unjustifiable deserts the conjugal abodecan be denied support. DADIVAS v VILLANUEVA (1929) 54 Phil. 92 Aurelia Dadivas deVillanueva married Rafael Villanueva and they had three children. (18, 10, 9) PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 51 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - prejudicing Ciprianas rights. Some of these propertiesi n c l u d e l a n d s acquired during their marriage with money belonging to the conjugal partnership. Land annually produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at P4.00/cavan. Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court: 1. Their separation is necessary to a v o i d personal violence. She could not live in the conjugal dwelling due to the illicit relationship of A l e j o a n d P r i s c a t o l e r a t e d b y I s a b e l o . 2 . S h e i s e n t i t l e d t o P 5 0 0 p e n d e n t e l i t e monthly pension from conjugal partnership. However, Isabelo refused to p r o v i d e f o r h e r s u p p o r t despite her demands. 3. She should be in-charge of the administration of the property of their conjugal partnership because Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral conduct and acts by publicly maintaining an illicit relationship with Geronima Yap. Isabelo answered with ageneral denial. CFI dismissed husband, he claims the right to fix the residence of the family.A f t e r p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r p e n d e n t e l i t e w i t h t h e C F I . C F I g r a n t e d a m o n t h l y allowance of P75. The defendant then filed a petition w h e r e i n h e e l e c t e d t o f u l f i l h i s obligation as fixed by the trial court to receive and maintain plaintiff at his residence in PasayCity. CFI denied the petition. CA presented to SC for Adjudication. ISSUE: WON a wife isentitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live with him on account of s o m e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s h e h a d w i t h t h e h u s b a n d s i m m e d i a t e r e l a t i v e s . H E L D : N o . Defendant-appellant gave the option to support wife at conjugal dwelling apart from his parents home. Should plaintiff refuse, he is under no obligation to give any support. Thewife cannot be compelled to live with her husband but support can be denied to the spousewho left. DEL ROSARIO v DEL ROSARIO (1949) 46 OG 6122 Plaintiff Genoveva delRosario, a widow with 2 kids and defendant Teoderico del Rosario, a mechanic, widower with a son got married. They lived together in the house of defendant's mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left the conjugal home in 1942. ISSUE: WON plaintiff is justified inleaving and is entitled to support RATIO: Yes. As the marriage vow does not include makingsacrifices for the in-laws, there is legal justification for wifes refusal to live

with husband,taking into account the traditional hatred between wife and her mother-in-law (nyahaha). Iti s t r u e t h a t w i f e i s o b l i g e d t o f o l l o w h e r h u s b a n d w h e r e v e r h e w i s h e s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e residence (Art 58, CC), but this right does not include compelling wife to live with mother-in-law, if they cannot get along together. Alimony will be set according to husbands abilityt o p a y . I S S U E S / H E L D : 1 . W O N t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n i s j u s t i f i e d - Y E S . T h e y w e r e h a v i n g a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave thehouse and threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Priscas situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Priscas pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabitcould lead to further quarrels. 2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegalNO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidences evenshow that it was acquired by him before their marriage. 3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500monthly maintenance = NO. Thats too much. P50 is enough. ATILANO v CHUA CHINGBENG (1958) 103 Phil. 255 Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old, married ChuaChing Beng (defendant-appellant) on May 1951. They lived in Manila with the parents of theChing Beng. In October of that year, the couple went back to Zamboanga for a vacation inPilars parents. She stayed behind, telling the defendant that she would go back to him later.On September 1953, however, she filed a complaint of support against her husband, allegingestrangement since October 1952, incessant bickering and his inability to provide a home for them without his parents. Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support; however, heexpressed his desire to fulfil his obligation if she returns to Manila and lives with him in ad o m i c i l e s e p a r a t e f r o m h i s p a r e n t s . A s t h e C . M u t u a l H e l p a n d S u p p o r t F C , A r t 6 8 T h e husband and the wife are obliged to: 1. live together, 2. observe mutual love, 3. 4. respect andfidelity, render mutual help and support FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for for what may constitute necessities of life; personal - attend to their daughter in law who wasa b o u t t o undergo labor. Plaintiff tried his best to help her deliver, but she died due t o childbirth. Plaintiff is now asking for due compensation for his services amounting to P500.Defendants claim that her delivery at their domicile was only incidental, and that it was her husband who should pay for the services rendered by the plaintiff. ISSUE: Who between the parents-in-law and the husband is liable for the payment of Pelayo? HELD: The husband, b e c a u s e r e n d e r i n g o f m e d i c a l a s s i s t a n c e i n c a s e o f i l l n e s s c o m p r i s e s o n e o f t h e m u t u a l obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. It is improper for plaintiff t o h a v e b r o u g h t a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t s s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y were the parties whocalled the plaintiff. The defendants were not, nor are they n o w , u n d e r a n y o b l i g a t i o n b y virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contractentered into between them and the plaintiff. They are strangers with respect to the obligationthat devolves upon the husband to provide support. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS| P r o f . E . A . P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 5 3 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B2012 D. Management of the Household FC, Art 71 The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses shall for such management shall be paidin accordance with the provisions of Art 70. CC, Art 115 The wife manages the affairs of thehousehold. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husbandfails to deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable,unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the p r i c e p a i d i s f r o m h e r p a r a p h e r n a l p r o p e r t y . Y O U N G v H E C T O R ( ) 7 4 0 S o . 2 d 1 1 5 3 E . Exercise of Profession FC, Art 73 Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object onlyon valid, serious and moral grounds In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: 1. the objection is proper 2. benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or t h e r e a f t e r . I f t h e b e n e f i t a c c r u e d p r i o r t o t h e o b j e c t i o n , t h e

resulting obligation shall beenforced against the separate property of the s p o u s e w h o h a s n o t o b t a i n e d c o n s e n t T h e foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. CC,Art 117 The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However,the provided: 1. His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and2. His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. In case of disagreement on thisq u e s t i o n , t h e p a r e n t s a n d g r a n d p a r e n t s a s w e l l a s t h e f a m i l y c o u n c i l , i f a n y , s h a l l b e consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 5 4 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 i s approximately proportionate to either their traditional participation in the targeted activitiesor their proportion of the population, whichever is higher. Otherwise, the following should bestated in the program/project paper, proposal or strategy; (a) The obstacle in achieving thegoal; (b) The steps being taken to overcome those obstacles; and (c) To the extent that stepsa r e n o t b e i n g t a k e n t o o v e r c o m e t h o s e o b s t a c l e s , w h y t h e y a r e n o t b e i n g t a k e n . 6 . A s s i s t women in activities that are of critical significance to their self-reliance and development.Sec 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shallhave the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to thatof men under similar circumstances. In all contractual situations where married men have thecapacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. To this end: RA 7192 Women in Development and Nation-building Act AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OFW O M E N A S F U L L A N D E Q U A L P A R T N E R S O F M E N I N D E V E L O P M E N T A N D NATION BUILDING AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 1. Title. This Act shall be cited as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act." Sec 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure thefundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provided womenrights and opportunities equal to that of men. To attain the foregoing policy: 1. A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments andm u l t i l a t e r a l a g e n c i e s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s s h a l l b e s e t a s i d e a n d u t i l i z e d b y t h e a g e n c i e s concerned to support programs and activities for women; 2. All government departmentsshall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in the development programsand projects of said department, specifically those funded under official foreign developmentassistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the development process; and 3. All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their r e g u l a t i o n s , c i r c u l a r s , i s s u a n c e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s t o r e m o v e g e n d e r b i a s t h e r e i n . S e c 3 . Responsible Agency. The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) shall primarily be responsible for ensuring the participation of women as recipients in foreign aid,g r a n t s a n d l o a n s . I t s h a l l d e t e r m i n e a n d r e c o m m e n d t h e a m o u n t t o b e a l l o c a t e d f o r t h e development activity involving women. Sec 4. Mandate. The NEDA, with the assistanceof the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, shall ensure that the differentgovernment departments,i n c l u d i n g i t s a g e n c i e s a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s w h i c h , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , a f f e c t t h e participation of women in national development and their integration therein: 1. Formulateand prioritize rural or countryside development programs or projects, provide income ande m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o w o m e n i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s a n d t h u s , p r e v e n t t h e i r h e a v y migration from rural to urban or foreign countries; 2. Include an assessment of the extent towhich their programs and/or projects integrate women in the development process and of theimpact of said programs or projects on women, including their implications in enhancing theself-reliance of women in improving their income; 1. 2. Women shall have the capacity to b o r r o w a n d o b t a i n loans and execute security and credit arrangement under the sameconditions as

men; Women shall have equal access to all government and private s e c t o r programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non-material resources and shall enjoy equaltreatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs; 3. Women shall have equalrights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and 4. Married women shallhave rights equal to those of married men in applying for passport, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses. In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act whichshall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances. Sec 6. EqualMembership in Clubs. Women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social, civicand recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same organization. Sec 7. Admission to Military Schools. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of theservices, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for appointment, admission, training,graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of theP h i l i p p i n e s a n d t h e P h i l i p p i n e N a t i o n a l P o l i c e n o t l a t e r t h a n t h e fourth academic year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men exceptfor those minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences betweensexes. Sec 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. Married persons who devotef u l l t i m e t o m a n a g i n g t h e h o u s e h o l d a n d f a m i l y a f f a i r s s h a l l , u p o n t h e w o r k i n g s p o u s e ' s consent, be entitled to voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya atGobyerno), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS)c o v e r a g e t o t h e e x t e n t o f o n e - h a l f ( 1 / 2 ) o f t h e s a l a r y a n d compensation of the workingspouse. The contributions due thereon shall be deducted from the salary of the workingspouse. 3. Ensure the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f w o m e n a n d w o m e n ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e development programs and/or projects including their involvement in the planning, design,implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation thereof; Collect sex-disaggregateddata and include such data in its program/project paper, proposal or strategy; Ensure that p r o g r a m s a n d / o r projects are designed so that the percentage of women who r e c e i v e assistance 4. 5. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.2008-2009 Page 55 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 The GSIS or the SSS, as thec a s e m a y b e , s h a l l i s s u e r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o e f f e c t i v e l y i m p l e m e n t t h e provisions of this section. Sec 9. Implementing Rules. The NEDA, in consultation withthe different government agencies concerned, shall issue rules and regulations as may benecessary for the effective implementation of Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act within six (6)months from its effectivity. Sec 10. Compliance Report. Within six (6) months from thee f f e c t i v i t y o f t h i s A c t a n d e v e r y s i x ( 6 ) m o n t h s thereafter, all government departments,including its agencies and i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , s h a l l s u b m i t a r e p o r t t o C o n g r e s s o n t h e i r compliance with this Act. Sec 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisionshereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Sec 12.Repealing Clause. The provisions of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the CivilCode of the Philippines, as amended, and of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known asthe Family Code of the Philippines, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. executed.The only evidence offered was testimonies of the defendant and her counsel. - AppellantSilva, however, was married to one Priscilla Isabel of Australia during such time. It was onlyafter May 1945, when he was

sent back to US for medical treatments of his battle wounds,d i d h e d i v o r c e P r i s c i l l a . To add, on May 9, 1948, he contracted another marriage withcoplaintiff Elenita L e d e s m a S i l v a . I S S U E S : 1 . 2 . W O N a p p e l l a n t s d e c e p t i o n a n d f r a u d justified award of damages to defendant Yes WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs.Silva - Yes HELD: 1. Yes. If appellant revealed his true situation, appellee would never haveagreed to be with appellant. Esthers loss of employment in the Girl Scouts Davao Councilwas ultimately a result of Silvas deception and she should be indemnified therefor. Hisconcealment of his real status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He Sec 13. EffectivityClause. The rights of women and all should then stand solely liable for any and all the p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s A c t s h a l l t a k e e f f e c t i m m e d i a t e l y u p o n i t s p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e O f f i c i a l Gazette or in two (2) damages arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther newspapers of generalcirculation. acted in good faith since Silva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva, sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority to use his name. F. Use of Surname 2. Yes. Inthe face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that no marriage had really taken place. It is notCC, Art 370 A married woman may use: proper for Esther to continue representing 1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname (e.g.as the wife of Saturninoc o n s i d e r i n g t h a t h e r s e l f M i r i a m D e f e n s o r - S a n t i a g o ) 2 . H e r m a i d e n f i r s t n a m e a n d h e r husband's surname (e.g. Loi Ejercito) the time, he was still married to Priscilla at 3. Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she Isabel. And as as "Mrs." 370CC, a married woman is his wife, such per Art (e.g. Mrs. Francis Pangilinan) is authorized touse husbands surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing CC, Art 373 A widowmay use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance withArticle 370. likewise. 162 SCRA 66 - Private respondent Consuelo David Arturo CC, Art378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action tot h e l a t t e r . T o l e n t i n o ( y e s , t h e o n e w h o a n n o t a t e d t h e l a w ) i n 1 9 3 1 . SILVA v PERALTA(1960) - Marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943 110 P h i l 5 7 p u r s u a n t t o t h e l a w during the Japanese Defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger occupation by a decreeof absolute divorce on sister Florence in the latters arrest and the grounds of desertion andabandonment by investigation. the wife for at least 3 continuous years. There, defendant met plaintiff Saturnino Silva, a - Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but she US citizen andofficer of the US Army. Silva then died soon after the marriage. started courting Esther andshe later accepted his proposal of marriage having been made to - Constancia married ArturoTolentino on April 21, believe that he was single. They started living 1945 and they have 3children. Constancia together as common-law husband and wife and Tolentino is the presentlegal wife of Arturo bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. Tolentino. They were married on Jan 14,1945. However, - Consuelo David continued using the surname no documents of marriagewere prepared nor Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time TOLENTINO v CA (1988)CC, Art 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damagesand other relief. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.2008-2009 Page 56 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - that the complaint was filed.H e r u s a g e o f t h e s u r n a m e T o l e n t i n o w a s a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e f a m i l y o f A r t u r o T o l e n t i n o (brothers and sisters). RTC: Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino CA: reversed RTC ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already prescribed 2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using thesurname of her former husband from whom she was divorced. HELD: 1. Yes - Art 1150 CCThe time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special provision whichordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. Art 1149 CC Periodof prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues. The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21,

1945; Civil Code took effect on August3 0 , 1 9 5 0 ; S h e a c q u i r e d k n o w l e d g e t h a t Consuelo David was still using the surnameTolentino in 1951. She s h o u l d h a v e f i l e d t h e c a s e a f t e r s h e o b t a i n e d k n o w l e d g e t h a t Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23,1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge. 2. No Philippine law is silent whether or nota d i v o r c e d w o m a n m a y c o n t i n u e t o u s e t h e s u r n a m e o f h e r h u s b a n d b e c a u s e t h e r e a r e n o provisions for divorce under Philippine law. Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it, but neither can she restrain others from using it (bias much?). Art371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers toabsolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce more akinto death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as Mrs. of the husband even if he has remarried. If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third p e r s o n s , a c q u i r e d p r o p e r t i e s a n d e n t e r e d i n t o o t h e r l e g a l r e l a t i o n s u s i n g t h e s u r n a m e Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right. There is no usurpation of the petitioners name and surname. Usurpation implies injuryto the - - interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity Element of usurpation o Actual use of anothers name o Use is unauthorized o Use of anothers name is to designate personality or identity of a person None of these elementsw e r e p r e s e n t i n t h e c a s e S i l v a v P e r a l t a w a s c i t e d b y t h e p e t i t i o n e r b u t t h e c a s e i s n o t applicable. In Silva, it was not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendantsrepresentation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva, there was usurpation of the status of the wife. YASIN v SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (1995) 241 SCRA 606 - SUPRA No needto file petition to revert to use of maiden name after divorce since marital ties have beenc o m p l e t e l y s e v e r e d . - - - - P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 57 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 G. Relief from Courts 1. On sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a FC, Art 72 When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugalof jealousy towards which husband in andisposition union or commits acts her tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. was present. aggravateddegree. No sufficient cause Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to providefor the separate maintenance of the PEREZ v PEREZ (1960) wife since this recognizes thed e f a c t o s e p a r a t i o n o f 1 0 9 P h i l 6 5 7 t h e t w o p a r t i e s . C o n t i n u e d c o h a b i t a t i o n o f t h e p a i r - Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, must be seen as impossible, and separationmust be filed a civil case against defendant Angela necessary, stemming from the fault of theh u s b a n d . T u a s o n d e P e r e z a t t h e C F I M a n i l a . S h e i s u n d e r o b l i g a t i o n t o r e t u r n t o t h e domicile. He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place under guardianship based on thefollowing When people understand that they must live allegations: togetherthey learn tosoften by mutual o she was squandering her estate on a young accommodation that yokewhich they know they man named Jose Boloix cannot shake off; they become good husbandsand o she was spending the conjugal partnership wives necessity is a powerful master int e a c h i n g o f g a i n t h e d u t i e s w h i c h i t i m p o s e s o d e f e n d a n t h a s e x p r e s s e d h e r d e s i r e t o marry (Evans v. Evans) and have children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass her husband2 . O n g r a n t i n g t h e r e s t i t u t i o n o f c o n j u g a l r i g h t s . I t i s C F I d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e f o r l a c k o f jurisdiction not within the province of the courts to compel one ISSUE: WON the case fallsunder the jurisdiction of the CFI or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court. HELD: RTC hasn o j u r i s d i c t i o n . I t i s t h e J u v e n i l e a n d D o m e s t i c R e l a t i o n C o u r t w h i c h h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Material injury pertains to personal injury

(personal relations between man and wife) and not patrimonial or financial. ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921) 42 Phil 54 Plaintiff Mariano anddefendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with afew short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their c o m m o n h o m e a n d d e c i d e d t o l i v e s e p a r a t e l y f r o m p l a i n t i f f . S h e c l a i m e d t h a t s h e w a s compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn p r a y e d f o r a d e c r e e o f s e p a r a t i o n , a l i q u i d a t i o n o f t h e i r c o n j u g a l p a r t n e r s h i p , a n d a n allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. - CFI ruled in favor of thedefendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff thenasked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife. ISSUES: of thespouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the o t h e r . I n t h e c a s e o f p r o p e r t y rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purposethan to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotlandhave done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that thedefendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also notentitled to support. 1. 2. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal homeW O N p l a i n t i f f m a y b e g r a n t e d t h e r e s t i t u t i o n o f c o n j u g a l r i g h t s o r a b s o l u t e o r d e r o r permanent mandatory injunction HELD: PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E.A . P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2008-2009 Page 58 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 X.PROPERTY R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N S P O U S E S M A R R I A G E S E T T L E M E N T i s a n agreement entered into before marriage and, in consideration thereof, between an intendedhusband and wife, by which the enjoyment or devolution of property is regulated. A contractentered into by those who are to be united in marriage, in order to establish the conditions of their conjugal partnership with respect to present and future property. FC, Art 77 The form of marriage settlement: 1. in writing 2. signed by the parties 3. before the celebration of them a r r i a g e P r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t t h i r d p e r s o n s : r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e l o c a l c i v i l r e g i s t r y t h e p r o p e r registries of property. FC, Art 78 A minor, who according to law, may contract marriage mayshall be valid only if the persons designated in Art 14 to give c agreement, subject to the provisions of the Title IX of this Code. * Art 14 FC father, mother, surviving parent or g u a r d i a n , o r p e r s o n s h a v i n g l e g a l c h a r g e o f t h e m * T i t l e I X P a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y * B y applying principles of statutory construction, Art 14 which is specific provision for marriages h a l l p r e v a i l F C , A r t 7 9 F o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f a n y m a r r i a g e s e t t l e m e n t s e x e c u t e d b y a b e e n pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall b competent court to be made a party thereto. A. General Provisions FC, Art 74 The property relations between husband andwife shall be governed in the following order: 1. by marriage settlements executed before themarriage 2. by the provisions of this Code 3. by the local customs FC, Art 80 In the absenceof a contrary stipulation in a marriage set governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration This rule shall not apply: 1. Where both spouses are aliens 2. Withrespect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting p the country where the property islocated 3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered int foreign country whoselaws require different formalities for its FC, Art 75 The future spouses may, in the marriagesettlements, agree upon the regime of ACP, CPG, complete separation of property or anyother regime. In the absence of marriage settlement system of absolute community propertyas established in this Code Art 81 Everything stipulated in the settlement or contracts referreF C , s h a l l g o v e r n . f u t u r e m a r r i a g e , i n c l u d i n g d o n a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e p r o s p e c t i v e s p o u s marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depe FC, Art 76 In order thatany modification in the marriage settlement may be valid, it must be valid. of the marriage,subject to the provisions of Art 66, 67 , 128, 135 and 136. Art 66 Reconciliation after legals e p a r a t i o n : S e p a r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y a n d f o r f e i t u r e o f t h e

s h a r e o f t h e g u i l t y s p o u s e s h a l l subsist, unless spouses agree to revive their former property regime Agreement to revivef o r m e r p r o p e r t y r e g i m e s h a l l b e e x e c u t e d u n d e r o a t h a n d s p e c i f y 1 . P r o p e r t i e s t o b e contributed anew to the restored regime 2. Those to be retained as separated properties of e a c h s p o u s e 3 . N a m e s o f a l l their creditors, address and amount owing to each If spousewithout just cause a b a n d o n s t h e o t h e r O R f a i l s t o c o m p l y w i t h h i s / h e r o b l i g a t i o n s t o t h e family: Petition for judicial separation of property or authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership Sufficient causes for separation of property voluntary judicial Art 67COLLECTOR v FISHER (1961) 110 Phil 686 Walter and Beatrice Stevenson, both Britishcitizens were married in Manila where they lived until they established permanent residencein California in 1945. Walter died in 1951 and instituted his wife as sole heiress to real and personal properties in the Philippines, which were assessed for estate and inheritance tax.ISSUE: WON in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, the net estate should bed e d u c t e d a s t h e s h a r e o f t h e s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r l a w o n c o n j u g a l partnership. HELD: Yes. It should be deducted from net estate. It is a well-known doctrine inour civil law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquiredduring their marriage. WHARTONS PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTIONS apply. Propertyrelations of the Stevensons should be determined by the rational laws of the husband. Art 128A r t 1 3 5 A r t 1 3 6 S p o u s e s j o i n t f i l i n g o f p e t i t i o n f o r v o l u n t a r y d i s s o l u t i o n o f ACP/CPG/separation of their common properties PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 59 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012Under Art 1325 OCC, one spouse is a foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial agreement, it isthe national law of the husband that becomes the dominant law in determining the propertyrelations of such spouses. But since both spouses are foreigners, it is British law that shouldapply. However, as there is no proof of what the law of England is in this matter and thecourt is justified to indulge in processual presumption, that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law. FC, Art 85 Donation by reason of marriage of property subject to enthe encumbrance, and the property is sold for less than the total amo liable for the deficiency.If the property is sold for more than the total to the excess. DOMALAGAN v BOLIFER ( 1 9 1 6 ) 3 3 P h i l . 4 7 1 - J o r g e D o m a l a g a n a n d C a r l o s B o l i f e r e n t e r e d i n t o a v e r b a l c o n t r a c t wherein the former was to pay defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of the formerss o n C i p r i a n o D o m a l a g a n w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t s daughter, Bonifacia. B. Donation Propter Nuptias Jorge Domalagan paid the s u m o f P 5 0 0 p l u s P 1 6 a s h a n s e l o r t o k e n o f f u t u r e marriage. However, the Bonifacia married one Laureano Sisi. 1. Requisites for donationsUpon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded return of the said sum of P516 plusFC, Art 82 Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration,inarising from the fact that interest and damages consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. he was obliged to sell his real property in Bohol to come upwith the sum. REQUISITES FOR DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS Defendant deniedc o m p l a i n t a n d a l l e g e d t h a t i t ( D P N ) d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a c a u s e o f a c t i o n . 1 . m a d e b e f o r e celebration of the marriage RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff suffered 2. made inconsideration of the marriage any addtl damages. Ruled in favor of plaintiff for the return of P516 plus 6% interest from Dec 17, 3. made in favor of one or both of the future 1910 plusc o s t s . s p o u s e s DONATIONS EXCLUDED 1. in favor of the spouses after the marriage(ordinary wedding gifts) 2. in favor of future spouses, made before the c e l e b r a t i o n o f marriage, but not in consideration 3. in favor of persons other than the spouses, even thoughthey may be founded on the marriage * governed by provisions on ordinary donations WHOMAY DONATE 1. the spouses to each other 2. the parents to one or both of

the spouses 3. by third persons to one or both of the spouses DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS Does notrequire express acceptance May be made by minors (Art 78) If present property is donateda n d p r o p e r t y r e g i m e i s n o t A C P , l i m i t e d t o 1 / 5 G r o u n d s f o r r e v o c a t i o n i n A r t 8 6 ORDINARY DONATIONS Express acceptance necessary Cannot be made by minors No limit to donation of present property provided legitimes are not impaired G r o u n d s f o r revocation are found in law on donations ISSUE: WON Domalagan can demand his P516since no marriage took place HELD: YES. The amount constitutes DPN since it fulfills allthe requirements, thus it may be revoked. Verbal contracts are valid even if it not clothed int h e n e c e s s a r y f o r m . S E R R A N O v S O L O M O N ( 1 9 5 9 ) 1 0 5 P h i l 9 9 8 M e l c h o r S o l o m o n executed a supposed deed of DPN, stating among others that if there are no children and wifedies first, all of his properties and all properties acquired during the union will be inherited by those who reared the wife. The wife Alejandria Solomon died less than 9 months later without issues, upon which Estanislao Serrano, the uncle who reared her instituted this actionto enforce the deed. - CFI: Donation was not a donation propter nuptias because it was notmade in consideration of marriage and it was not made to one or both parties of the marriageI S S U E : W O N t h e d o n a t i o n m a d e b y M e l c h o r c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a donation propter n u p t i a s . H E L D : N O a n d t h e a l l e g e d d o n a t i o n i s n u l l & v o i d . C F I d e c i s i o n a f f i r m e d . Estanislao wont get anything. Whether you apply Art 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126 FC,Art 83 These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in CC,i n s o f a r a s t h e y a r e n o t o f t h e n e w C C , the result would be the same, modified by thefollowing articles. donations propter nuptias are only those bestowed (1) before t h e celebration of marriage, (2) in consideration of the same and (3) upon one o r b o t h o f t h e spouses. Melchors donation violated PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 60 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 conditions2 and 3. It was not in consideration solely of the marriage, it had additional terms like themarriage had to be childless and one of the spouses had to die before the other. Also, it wasnot in favor of Alejandria. Instead, it was in favor of her parents and those who raised her.Based on Manresas commentary, donations granted to persons other than the spouses eventhough founded on the marriage are excluded. Its not a donation inter vivos (during their l i f e t i m e ) e i t h e r , b e c a u s e d o n e e n e v e r a c c e p t e d i t b y s a m e i n s t r u m e n t o f d o n a t i o n o r i n separate document as required by law. Its not a donation mortis causa (upon death) either. Ithas to be governed by provisions on the disposition execution of wills to be appreciated ass u c h . B e s i d e s , d o n o r i s s t i l l a l i v e . I t w i l l o n l y b e o p e r a t i o n a l u p o n h i s d e a t h . S O L I S v BARROSO (1928) 53 Phil 912 - Spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a DPNof certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wifeFortunata Solis, in consideration of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donationi s t h a t i n c a s e o n e o f t h e d o n e e s d i e s , h a l f o f t h e l a n d s t h u s d o n a t e d w o u l d r e v e r t t o t h e donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo andFortunata got married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of thedonated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After Juans death, Maxima recovered possession of the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunatafiled an action against Maxima (surviving donor) et al and demanded: 1. the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law, 2. transfer of one-half of the donated property toh e r 3 . t o p r o c e e d t o t h e p a r t i t i o n o f t h e d o n a t e d p r o p e r t y a n d i t s fruits - CFI granted the p l a i n t i f f s p r a y e r , b a s i n g i t s j u d g m e n t o n A r t 1 2 7 9 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e . I t o r d e r e d t h e defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to her the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation. ISSUE:W O N t h e p r i v a t e d o c u m e n t i s v a l i d a s D P N H E L D : N O .

D P N i s g o v e r n e d b y l a w s o n donation. Art 633 provides that for a donation of a real property to be valid, it must be madei n a p u b l i c i n s t r u m e n t . T h e o n l y e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e are onerous and remuneratory contracts, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are thengoverned by the rules on contracts. Because the DPN by the spouses were made in a privatei n s t r u m e n t , i t i s n o t v a l i d a n d d o e s n o t c o n f e r a n y r i g h t s . P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 61 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |UP Law B2012 MATEO v LAGUA (1969) 29 SCRA 864 Spouses Lagua donated half of their owned land to their son Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo.This was executed in a public document. Alejandro died so his son would succeed in theownership of the land. The father in law continued tending the farm and giving the wife her share in the fruits. Until the sustenance stopped and the wife discovered that the father-in-lawsold the land. The wife successfully moved for the annulment the sale in a court proceeding.H o w e v e r , t h e L a g u a s s u b s e q u e n t l y f i l e d f o r t h e a n n u l m e n t o f t h e d o n a t i o n b e c a u s e i t neglected their own support as well as the legitime of their other son. Alejandros younger brother, Gervacio, filed a suit for annulment on the ground that it prejudiced his legitime. -Bonifacia (the wife) appealed the decision raising the following errors: o Validity of the DPNh a v e b e e n d e t e r m i n e d i n a p r e v i o u s c a s e o A c t i o n t o a n n u l t h e d o n a t i o n h a s a l r e a d y prescribed since the case was filed 41 years after the donation o DPN is revocable only for any grounds enumerated in Art 132 of the New Civil Code o Determining the legitime of theLagua brothers in the hereditary estate of Cipriano the CA should have applied the provisionso f t h e C i v i l C o d e o f 1 8 8 9 a n d n o t A r t 8 8 8 N C C I S S U E : W O N a n o n e r o u s D P R m a y b e revoked HELD: YES, DPN is without onerous condition and based on liberalities are subjectt o a n n u l m e n t d u e t o i n o f f i c i o u s n e s s . I f p r o v e d t h a t t h e v a l u e o f t h e D P N e x c e e d s t h e disposable free portion of the donor, it may be revoked. However, in this case, no evidencetakes was adduced as to the burdensome nature of the DPN. - future property effect upondeath (by will or mortis causa) 3. Grounds for revocation of DPN 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. FC, Art 86Donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the don if the marriage is not celebratedor judicially declared voi settlements, which shall be governed by Art 81 when the marriagetakes place without the consent of the par when the marriage is annulled and the donee actedin bad fai upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse if it is with a resolutorycondition and the condition is complied when the donee has committed and act of ingratitudeas spec * What does Par 2 mean? The donor is not the parent who did not give consent. *What is a resolutory condition? The DPN is already received which enjoyment is subject tot e r m i n a t i o n u p o n h a p p e n i n g o f t h e f u t u r e a n d u n c e r t a i n e v e n t . I n o t h e r w o r d s d o n e i s forbidden to do something. (E.g. Car is given but it will be revoked if you use it anywhereoutside NCR.) * Grounds of revocation in this article is not by operation of law. Those whichrevokes by operation of law are the ff: 1. if the DPN is stipulated in the marriage settlementa n d n o m a r r i a g e t o o k p l a c e ( A r t 8 1 ) 2 . f o r v o i d a b i n i t i o a n d s u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e s i n a spouses presumptive death, provided the donee acted in bad faith (Art 43 (3) in relation toArt 50) * Art 765, CC Acts of ingratitude (1) If the donee should commit some offenseagainst the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority; (2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any actinvolving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under 2. Donation propter nuptias of his authority; present or future property (3) If he unduly refuses him support whenthe donee is legally or morally bound to give FC, Art 84 If the future spouses agree upon aregime other than thesupport to community of property absolute the donor.

donate to eachother in their marriage settlements more than 1/5 of their present property considered void. 70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600 (balance of 600, promissory note for that sum payable at end of F e b o r M a r c h 1 9 3 5 ) T h e s e t w o b u y e r s i m m e d i a t e l y t o o k p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e l a n d a n d cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since Ariola had not paid by Feb1935, plaintiff wrote him a letter demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo) collected balance of 25 from Birog in March 1935). PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 63 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 308SCRA 75 Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agatas husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in acommon-law marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of unregisteredland in Sitio Sumat, Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lotsincluded within the Sum-at property in favor of the private respondents who purchased thelots on the strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria,to be the owner of the property in question. In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and BeatriceTait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents, alleging that they are the children andcompulsory heirs of George and Agata. They claim that after the death of their mother, their father sold the Otucan property and used the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot inS u m - a t , B o n t o c a n d t h a t f r o m 1 9 8 2 t o 1 9 8 3 , M a r i a s o l d l o t s i n c l u d e d w i t h i n t h e S u m - a t property to private respondents without their knowledge and consent. They further allegedthat although the private respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong toMaria they still purchased the lots from Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at p r o p e r t y s o t h e deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to p r i v a t e respondents. During the trial, petitioners and defense presented several witnesses. ISSUES:1 . W O N t h e t e s t i m o n y o f S h i r l e y E i l l e n g e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f o r g e r y o f t h e d e e d o f donation should be given credence. NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate courtsdecision that Eillengers testimony is vague and incredible and incapable of impugning thevalidity of the public document. Forgery should be proven by clear and convincing evidence,and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same. Not only is Shirley Eillengerstestimony difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she anticipated the questionsof petitioners counsel. Petitioners should have presented handwriting experts to supporttheir claim that Georges signature on the deed of donation was indeed a forgery. by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths. In accordance with the presumption that official dutyh a s been regularly performed, it is to be presumed that the deputy clerk of court w h o notarized the deed of donation in this case was duly authorized by the clerk of court. 3. WONd e e d of donation contravenes Art 133, CC NO. Art 133 provides that every d o n a t i o n between spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply whenthe donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply tom o d e r a t e g i f t s w h i c h t h e s p o u s e s m a y g i v e e a c h o t h e r o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f a n y f a m i l y rejoicing. This prohibition extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v Cervantes). Infact, Art 87, FC provides that every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts whichthe spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibitionshall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.However, this point is being raised for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an issuefor the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present evidencei n s u p p o r t o f s u c h a c l a i m . T h e e v i d e n c e o n r e c o r d does not show whether George was

married to Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria was not m a r r i e d t o George, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the deed of donationwas executed, George and Maria were still maintaining common-law relations. BeatriceTaits (one of the witnesses presented) testimony is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George and Maria continuouslym a i n t a i n e d c o m m o n - l a w r e l a t i o n s u n t i l t h e d a t e w h e n t h e d o n a t i o n was made (April 2,1974). * In short, the donation was valid because there was n o e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e allegation that George was married to Maria. There was also no evidence that the two werestill living as commonlaw spouses at the time the donation was made. CHING v GOYANKOJ R . h a d s e v e n (2006) 506 SCRA 735 - Joseph Goyanko Sr Epifania dela Cruz children who are the respondents in this case - Respondents claim that their property wasnamed after their aunt Sulpicia Goyanko because their father was a foreigner so Sulpicia hadto sell it to Joseph first before Joseph was able to sell it to his common law wife petitioner h e r e i n M a r i a C h i n g 2 . W O N t h e d e e d o f d o n a t i o n i s i n v a l i d u n d e r A r t 749 CC, whichrequires a public instrument as a requisite for the validity of d o n a t i o n s o f i m m o v a b l e property. NO. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authority todo so. However, the acknowledgment clause states that the person who notarized it was thed e p u t y c l e r k o f c o u r t w h o a c t e d f o r a n d i n t h e a b s e n c e of the clerk of court who isauthorized, under Sec. 21 of the Revised A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C o d e o f 1 9 1 7 , a s a m e n d e d PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page64 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - Ching claims to be the owner who purchasedthe property for a certain price RTC and CA dismissed the case because of overwhelmingevidence that she was concubine C. System of Absolute Community 1. General ProvisionsISSUE: WON the sale to the concubine was valid HELD: NO. It falls under the prohibiteddonation between spouses. FC, Art 88 The absolute community of property between spousesshal marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the c other time shall bev o i d . F C , A r t 8 9 N o w a i v e r o f r i g h t s , i n t e r e s t s , s h a r e s a n d e f f e c t s o f c a s e o f j u d i c i a l separation of property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or s a m e s h a l l a p p e a r i n a p u b l i c i n s t r u m e n t a n d s h a l l b e r e c o r d e d a s p r o v s u c h w a i v e r m a y petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent credits. FC, Art 90 The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the ACP b this Chapter. 2. What constitutes community propertyF C , A r t 9 1 U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d i n t h i s C h a p t e r o r i n t h e m a r r i a g a l l t h e p r o p e r t y owned by the spouses at the time of the celebr FC, Art 92 The ff shall be excluded from theACP: 1. 2. 3. acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, by either spo any, unless it isexpressly provided by the donor, testator or property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jew acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legi fruits aswell as the income, if any, of such property FC, Art 93 Property acquired during the marriageis presumed to one of the excluded therefrom. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 65 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B20123. Charges upon the ACP separate property, deductible for his share upon FC, Art 94 TheACP shall be liable for: liquidation (1) The support of the spouses, their common children,and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall begoverned by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contractedduring the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the * Exampleof ante-nuptial debt in Par 9: amortization community, or by both spouses, or by one spousewith the consent of conjugal dwelling or family vehicle (3) Debts and obligations contracted

market value of the community property at the time of the FC, Art 104 W h e n e v e r t h e liquidation of the community properties of celebration of the marriage and the market valueat the time of its dissolution person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultanThe presumptive legitimes of the common children each community shall be determinedu p o n such proof as may be c Article 51. of doubt as to which community the e x i s t i n g properties belong, Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partitioncommunitiesin proportion to the capital and duration of each. of the properties, the on which it is situatedshall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the choose to remain. Children below the ageof seven years * The clause before the effectivity of this Code court has decided otherwise.In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the is there because simultaneously liquidation of two or best interests of said children. * How to applyt h e f o r f e i t u r e s i n A r t 4 3 ( 2 ) a n d A r t 6 3 ( 2 ) N E T A S S E T S w h a t r e m a i n s a f t e r p a y m e n t o f community debts and obligations - NET PROFITS in Par 4 above, shall be the increase invalue between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution more marriages is no longer legally possible under FC which imposes a mandatory requirement for marriages subsequentto an unliquidated marriage to have complete separation of properties. ONAS v JAVILLO(1934) 59 Phil 733 - Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5 children. After R a m o n a s death, he married Rosario Onas and they had 4 children. - During his f i r s t marriage 11 parcels of land were How to compute net acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of profit: land were acquired. - Partition was made on the claim that the Market value properties of the 2nd marriage were products of debt of community the first marriage. netassets or remainder Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that market value at marriagewas made by the administrator of the estate of NET PROFIT her husband. She alleges thefollowing errors: o All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquiredwith the properties FC, Art 103 Upon the termination of the marriage by death proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. of the first marriage. o TC erred in approving the partition dated If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shallliquidate the community property September 9, or extra-judicially within six months from thedeath of the deceased spouse 1931, notwithstanding that the period, no liquidation is made,any disposition or encumbrance involving same did not property of the terminated of the thecommunity include all properties marriage deceased. shall be void. Should the survivings p o u s e contract a subsequent marriage ISSUES and RULING: mandatory r e g i m e o f complete separation of property shall govern the property relations o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t marriage. * Liquidate CP within 1 year from death of spouse. How? 1. judicial settlement intestate or intestate proceedings 2. judicial action, or ordinary action for partition 1) WON thecommunity partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased husband or wife - NO When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that broughtabout the community ceases, for the principles of an ordinary partnership are not PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 68 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - applicable to this community, which is governed byspecial rules. Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any effect for community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to them u t u a l a f f e c t i o n b e t w e e n h u s b a n d a n d w i f e , a n d s e r v e s a s a r e c o m p e n s e f o r t h e c a r e o f preserving and increasing the property; all of which terminates by the death of one of the partners. Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during

the marriage and agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as the spouses are united. - 1/26 to each of the children of the 2nd -19/195 to marriage 2. All other properties acquired during the 2nd marriage each children of the 1st marriage; 2/65 to each children of the 2nd marriage; 28/65 to the surviving spouseH E L D : S i n c e t h e c a p i t a l o f e i t h e r m a r r i a g e o r t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f e a c h s p o u s e c a n n o t b e determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership 2)WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the properties of the first marriage - NO Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or hisor her heirs, can claim no share. 3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower courti s valid - NO Was based on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the secondm a r r i a g e w e r e p r o d u c e d b y t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e f i r s t m a r r i a g e . * * T h e p r o p e r t y corresponding to the first marriage consists of t h e 1 1 p a r c e l s o f l a n d . T h e r e m a i n i n g 2 0 parcels of land were acquired during the second marriage. VDA DE DELIZO v DELIZO( 1 9 7 6 ) 6 9 S C R A 2 1 6 - T h i s i s a b o u t t w o c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e p a r t i t i o n o f t h e c o n j u g a l properties two marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo. He first married Rosa Villasfer whichlasted for 18 yrs (1891-1909) and they had 3 children. He then married Dorotea de Ocampowhich lasted for 46 yrs (1911-1957) and they had 9 children. In 1957 Nicolas died (90 yrsold). - Court originally adjudicated of the land to the 3 children from the 1st marriage, to thesurviving spouse and in equal shares to the children of both marriages. This was modified inconsideration of the fact that, only the Caanawan property (67 hectares) was shown to beacquired during the first marriage and only 20 hectares of which was made productive duringthis time. However, it is from the fruits of this property that enabled the spouses in the 2 ndmarriage to acquire - 8/39 (1/6 + all other future property. 1. Caanawan property and onP.Campa 1/26) to each of the children from the 1st marriage; 1. 2. 3. 1st conjugal partnershipentitled to 18/64 of the whole estate (18 yrs) 2nd conjugal partnership entitled to 46/64 of thewhole estate (46 yrs) The share of Nicolas Delizo is of the net remainder of CPG of bothmarriages or 32/64, divided into equal shares among all his heirs (all 13 of the kids) Thusthe final sharing 1. Rosas share: 9/64 of the whole estate, to be divided among their schemei s 3 k i d s ( 1 4 2 / 1 6 6 4 e a c h ) 2 . D o r o t e a s s h a r e : 2 3 / 6 4 o f t h e w h o l e e s t a t e + h e r s h a r e i n Nicolas estate (662/1664) 3. Nicolas share: 32/64 of the whole estate to be divided into 13e q u a l p a r t s ( 6 4 / 1 6 6 4 e a c h ) P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 69 of 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 D . Conjugal Partnership of Gains 1. General Provisions 2. Exclusive Property FC, Art 109 Thefollowing shall be exclusive property of each spouse: (BY DIRECT ACQUISITION OR ORIGINALLY EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY 1. brought to the marriage as his or her own 2.acquired during marriage by gratuitous title FC, Art 105 In case the future spouses agree inthe marriage settlements shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisionsin this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. (BY SUBSTITUTION) 3. acquired byright of redemption, by barter or by exchange w The provisions of this Chapter shall alsoapply to conjugal partnerships of gains spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights 4. purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or the husbanother laws, as provided in Article 256. E.g. of

OWNED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE FC,Art 106 . Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife 1. property contract except perhaps an indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of d e f e c t i v e c o n s e n t . 4 . W O N s a l e i s i m p r o b a b l e . - N O . I m p r o b a b i l i t y o f s a l e i s p u r e l y speculative. Not relevant considering that all essential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent, object and cause. 5. WON properties in #1 and #2 were conjugal propertiesof Emilio and his wife. - NO. CC, Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumedto belong to CP unless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage(Cobb-Perez v Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties in question wereindeed obtained during the marriage of their parents before he can invoke the presumption.However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP (see RTC decision in bold letters)are insufficient proof. Doesnt say when properties were obtained. Acquisition of title (actualowning of land) is different from registration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties whenhe was still a bachelor and only registered such after marriage. - Married to phrase is amere description of Emilios civil status at the time of registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner, property registered in his name alone and that he ism a r r i e d . C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t r e g i s t r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y i n n a m e of only onespouse doesnt negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy v Paulino). Both requires u f f i c i e n t , c l e a r a n d c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f t o r e b u t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n . M o i s e s s h o u l d h a v e presented sufficient proof to show that properties were acquired during the marriage so thathe may enjoy the presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does note x i s t , t h u s , p r o p e r t i e s a r e c o n s i d e r e d e x c l u s i v e t o E m i l i o . C a s e o f t h e s i c k l y m a n Teresita FRANCISCO v CA (1998) 299 SCRA 188 - - - - - (petitioner) is E u s e b i o s (private respondent) legal second wife. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and AntonioF r a n c i s c o ( p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s ) a r e c h i l d r e n o f E u s e b i o b y h i s f i r s t marriage. Teresitasallegations: 1. Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they h a v e a c q u i r e d p r o p e r t i e s i n Barangay Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal which wereadministered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart diseaseand cancer, which rendered him unfit to administer them. 2. Private respondents succeeded inconvincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita toa d m i n i s t e r t h e h o u s e a n d l o t t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a p a r t m e n t s s i t u a t e d i n R o d r i g u e z , R i z a l . Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, thusenjoining its enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix of properties in dispute.R T C r u l e d i n f a v o r o f p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s h o l d i n g t h a t T e r e s i t a d i d n o t s h o w t h a t s a i d properties were acquired during the second marriage, or that they pertained exclusively toh e r . A s s u c h , t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s b e l o n g e x c l u s i v e l y t o E u s e b i o , a n d h e h a s t h e c a p a c i t y t o administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision. Teresita files this petition, claimingthat: 1. CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title has already been repealed by art. 253, FC 2. It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC However, issuei n Teresitas reply: WON Art. 116, FC applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same C o d e [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code" 4 ISSUE: WON propertiesare not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. HELD: - YES. Petition denied.Arts 158 and 160 CC have been repealed by the FC, specifically by Art 254, FC (not Art253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in relation to Art 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158and 160 does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights

accruedand vested while these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be resolved based on provisions of CC. - Art 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to thehusband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must first show p r o o f o f a c q u i s i t i o n d u r i n g t h e c o v e r t u r e ( m a r r i a g e ) . T h e p r e s u m p t i o n r e f e r s o n l y t o t h e PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page7 4 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 - - - - - - p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d d u r i n g t h e marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to beconjugal was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable withstrong, clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. Inthis case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which sheclaimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. As regards land inBgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebios testimony that he inherited the same from his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit inthe concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebioinherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the propertys h o u l d b e r e g a r d e d a s h i s o w n e x c l u s i v e l y , p u r s u a n t t o A r t 1 4 8 , C C . A c q u i s i t i o n s b y lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it beassumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his secondmarriage, the land would still be his exclusive property because it was acquired by him, d u r i n g t h e marriage, by lucrative title. As regards property in Bgy. Balite, p e t i t i o n e r showed building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant althoughin the name of Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her namealone in support of her claim that it was conjugal property. These, however, do not prove thatt h e improvements were acquired during the second marriage. The fact that one is t h e applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property isconjugal or not. They even counter her claim as her documents all described Eusebio as theowner of the structures (Art 1431, CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence). Further,s h e c a n n o t a r g u e t h a t t h e s a r i - s a r i s t o r e c o n s t r u c t e d o n t h e l a n d o f E u s e b i o h a s t h e r e b y become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at theexpense of their partnership (Art 158(2), CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absenceof evidence on the source of funding (Art. 160, CC) cannot be invoked because there is alsolack in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage. Certificate of title uponwhich petitioner anchors her claim over the property at San Isidro is inadequate. The fact thatthe land was registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, isno proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of - titleand registration thereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title alreadyexisting and the phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio.Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the properties considering thatthe assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannota d m i n i s t e r t h e m i n a s m u c h a s E u s e b i o i s n o t s o i l l a s t o i n c a p a c i t a t e h i m t o a d m i n i s t e r property. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 75 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 b. Properties that compose the CPGOnly net income or fruits of exclusive property of the spouses become conjugal. Expensesfor production, administration and preservation should be taken from the gross fruits and theFC, Art 117 The following are CP properties owner-spouse is entitled to retain the gross 1.acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense income until these expenses are

JAVIER v OSMEA (1916) 34 Phil 336 - Florentino Collantes was married to PetronaJavier who inherited from her parents 2 parcels of land. To perfect her o w n e r s h i p , s h e acquired from her fathers second wife the usufructuary right on properties for P3,000. -Florentino (husband), who succeeded Petronas father as a commission merchant in their family business in Manila, acquired the debt of Petronas father and became indebted toTomas Osmea (one of the chief clients) in sum of P4,000-P5,000. Unable to pay, judgmentwas rendered in favor of debtor Osmena. The sheriff despite the protests of Petrona sold off the two parcels (separate property of Petrona) of land at an auction where Osmea was thesuccessful bidder. - Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to recover her property. Thedefendant Osmea contended that even though land was separate property of Petrona, theu s u f r u c t u a r y r i g h t b e l o n g s t o t h e C P s i n c e i t w a s p u r c h a s e d u s i n g C P f u n d s . D e f e n d a n t prayed that the revenues from both properties, being CP, should be made liable for the debt.ISSUE: WON debts should be paid out of fruits and revenue of the parcels of land which belong to wife exclusively. HELD: Art 141 OCC interest collected or relation, coming fromt h a t w h i c h b e l o n g s c o m m u n i t y p r o p e r t y . s a y s t h e fruits, revenues or accrued during themarriage the conjugal properties or from t o o n e o f t h e s p o u s e s , a r e A s t o w h e t h e r t h e defendants prayer for an appointment of a receiver is to be granted, Art 1984 says that thewife has the right to manage her paraphernal property and (Art 1412) says that the husband isthe administrator of the CCP. Thus, appointment of a receiver shall deprive the spouses of these rights; moreover, there is no need for it. COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN (1968) 23 SCRA6 3 7 D a m a s o P e r e z p u r c h a s e d l e a t h e r m a t e r i a l s f r o m R i c a r d o H e r m o s o f o r h i s s h o e manufacturing business. U n a b l e t o p a y h i s d e b t t o t h e l a t t e r , a c i v i l c a s e w a s f i l e d b y Hermoso. Consequently, the Sheriff of Manila levied upon the shares of common stock inRepublic Bank registered in the name of Mr. Perez. Mercedes Ruth Perez claims that saidshares are conjugal assets and that the debt acquired by her husband was a personal one, not being able to benefit the CPG. ISSUES: 1. WON the debt of Mr. Perez is a personal debt N O . 2. WON the CPG is liable for the said obligation YES. HELD: Fruits of the shoemanufacturing business went to the support of the family/benefit of the C P G . T h e d e b t s incurred by the husband for and in the exercise of industry (shoe manufacturing, in this case)or profession by which he contributed to the welfare of the family cannot be considered ashis personal debt. As the CPG benefited, the said shares are liable. (It was conceded that theshares are conjugal property even if they are registered under the name of Mr. Perez, havingno evidence as to when they were acquired.) DBP v ADIL (1988) 161 SCRA 307 Art 1358OCC states that the fruits of paraphernal properties form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership and are liable for the payment of the expenses of the married couple. PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 82 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - - - Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerteobtained an agricultural loan of P2000 from Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB which isn o w D B P ) , w h i c h i s e v i d e n c e d b y a p r o m i s s o r y n o t e p a y a b l e i n 1 0 e q u a l y e a r l y amortizations. After 10 years, they were still unable to pay the loan. Thus, Confesor, whowas a member of Congress, issued a second promissory note acknowledging the loan and p r o m i s i n g t o p a y o n o r b e f o r e J u n e 1 5 , 1 9 6 1 . H e f u r t h e r a g r e e d t o t h e f o r e c l o s u r e o f t h e mortgage if and when he fails to pay. Another stipulation is that if he secures a certificate of indebtedness from the government for his back pay, he will be allowed to pay amount out of it. The amount remained unpaid on the specified date. Thus DBP filed a complaint againstthe spouses on Sept. 11, 1970. The City Court of Iloilo decided in favor of DBP and ordered

the spouses to pay the debt with interest. CFI of Iloilo reversed this decision and dismissedthe complaint against the spouses. ISSUES: 1. WON the right of prescription may be waivedo r r e n o u n c e d - Y E S 2 . W O N t h e s e c o n d p r o m i s s o r y n o t e i t b i n d i n g o n t h e c o n j u g a l partnership - YES HELD: Yes on both issues. Art 1112, CC right to prescription may bet a c i t l y r e n o u n c e d r e s u l t i n g f r o m a c t s w h i c h i m p l y abandonment of such right. The prescription with regard to the first p r o m i s s o r y n o t e h a d s e t i t . H o w e v e r , t h e s e c o n d promissory note acknowledged the debt and even promised to pay the same thus, the right to prescription was effectively and expressly renounced. - In Villaroel v. Estrada the debt barred by prescription cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing anda s s u m i n g t h e p r e s c r i b e d d e b t w o u l d b e v a l i d a n d e n f o r c e a b l e . P r e s c r i p t i o n o n l y b a r s t h e remedy, which is the payment of the debt, but it does not bar the debt itself. The new promisemade by Confesor constitutes a new cause of action. CFI claims the second promissory noteis not binding pursuant to Art 166 NCC: unless wife is spendthrift, serving civil interdictionor confined in leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber real property of the CPw i t h o u t h e r c o n s e n t . T h u s , t h e C F I h e l d t h a t i n s i g n i n g t h e n e w p r o m i s s o r y n o t e a l o n e , Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife. HOWEVER, Art 165 CC states that the husband isthe administrator of CP. Thus, all debts and obligations which he contracts for the benefit of the CP are chargeable to the CP. He, Confesor, signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable for obligation. LUZON SURETY v DE GARCIA (1969)3 0 S C R A 1 1 1 L a d i s l a o C h a v e z ( a s p r i n c i p a l ) a n d p e t i t i o n e r L u z o n S u r e t y C o . , I n c . ( a s surety) executed a surety bond in favor of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to LadislaoChavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, asg u a r a n t o r s , s i g n e d a n i n d e m n i t y a g r e e m e n t w h e r e i n t h e y b o u n d t h e m s e l v e s , j o i n t l y a n d severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses, costs,stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which it mayi n c u r . P N B f i l e d a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety to recover theamount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorneys fees, and costs of the suit. - A third p a r t y complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted byLuzon Surety. - A writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of p e t i t i o n e r i n t h e s u m o f P 8 , 8 3 9 . 9 7 . T h e n a w r i t o f g a r n i s h m e n t w a s i s s u e d l e v y i n g a n d garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses, from their sugar plantation registered intheir names. - Garciasfiled a suit for injunction and the TC ruled in their favor. ISSUE: WONt h e CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, can be held liable on anindemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3rd party in favor of as u r e t y a g r e e m e n t . - N O H E L D : A C P u n d e r A r t 1 6 1 i s l i a b l e only for such debts andobligations contracted by the husband for the b e n e f i t o f t h e C P . T h e h u s b a n d i s t h e administrator of the conjugal property, however, only obligations incurred by the him that arechargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of hiscareer, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. Thus, there must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearlya c c r u e d t o t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e s p o u s e s . A n d i n t h i s c a s e t h e r e i s n o n e . N o r c a n t h e r e b e , considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party Ladislao Chaves. Actingas guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement is not an act that would benefitthe conjugal partnership. While the husband, by signing the indemnity agreement may bes a i d t o h a v e a d d e d t o h i s r e p u t a t i o n o r e s t e e m a n d t o h a v e e a r n e d t h e c o n f i d e n c e o f t h e business community, such benefit even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful

provisions of paragraph (2) of 3. for authority for sole administration of ACP The obligationst o t h e family mentioned in the preceding paragraph: 6. 1. marital 2. parental 3. p r o p e r t y relations. 3. 5. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses sha Unless theowner had been indemnified from whatever source benefit of the family, belonging to either s p o u s e , e v e n d u e t o f o c o n j u g a l f u n d s , i f a n y . 7 . T h e n e t r e m a i n d e r o f t h e c o n j u g a l partnership properties sh equally between husband and wife, unless of A spouse is deemed toh a v e a b a n d o n e d t h e o t h e r w h e n h e o r s h e h a s l e f t t h e c o n j u g a l d w e l l i n g w i t h o u t a n y intentiona different propo settlements has failed within the same period to returning. Thespouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of 3 months or or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfe give any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no legitimesof returning to the 8. The presumptive intention of t h e c o m m o n c h i l d r e n s h a l l b c o n j u g a l d w e l l i n g . A r t i c l e 5 1 . 9 . I n t h e p a r t i t i o n o f t h e properties, the conjugal dwelling and t agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to thespouse wi choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are d has decidedo t h e r w i s e . I n c a s e t h e r e i s n o s u c h m a j o r i t y , t h e c i n t e r e s t s o f s a i d c h i l d r e n . W h e n i s inventory not necessary? (Tolentino, p. 472) 1. when one of the spouses, or his heirs, shouldr e n o u n c e t h e b e n e f i t s o f p a r t n e r s h i p 2 . w h e n s e p a r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y h a s p r e c e d e d t h e dissolution of the marriage 3. when partnership is dissolved by death of one of the spousesand the deceased leaves no heir except the surviving spouse 4. when dissolution is caused bylegal separation, and the share of the guilty spouse is forfeited to the innocent spouse, there being no children * Par 2 and 3 are called mutual restitution which cannot be found in thedissolution of ACP (Art 102) * Dissolution of CPG has 9 steps, while ACP only has 6, andi t s a l l b e c a u s e o f t h e m u t u a l r e s t i t u t i o n p a r t . F C , A r t 1 3 0 U p o n t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e marriage by death, the c same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse s judicially or extra- j u d i c i a l l y w i t h i n s i x m o n t h s f r o m t h e d e a t h o f t h e p e r i o d n o l i q u i d a t i o n i s m a d e , a n y disposition or encumbrance involvin marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spousecontract a subsequent marriage with mandatory regime of complete separation of propertyshall gove PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 89 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 during the liquidation more estate of FC, Art 131 Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or of themarriages deceased, such right cannot by the same person before the effectivity of thisC o d e i s c a r r i e d o u t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y b e i m p a i r e d b y R u l e 8 3 , S e c . 3 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t which is a of evidence. income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof asmay be considered according to the rulesprocedural In case of doubt as to which partnershipt h e e x i s t i n g p r o p e r t i e s b e l o n g , t h e s a m e s h a l l b e d i v i d e d b e t w e e n t h e d i f f e r e n t r u l e . partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each. Be it noted however that withr e s p e c t t o spouse, the same must be the legitimate spouse (not common-law in t h e appraisal are FC, Art 132 The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed spouses who and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, ando t h e r m a t t e r s w h i c h m o t h e r s o f t h e c h i l d r e n h e r e ) . a r e n o t e x p r e s s l y d e t e r m i n e d i n t h i s Chapter. FC, Art 133 From the common mass of property support shall be given to the duringthe liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining tothem. - SANTERO v CFI OF CAVITE (1987) 153 SCRA 728 Petitioners Princesita Santero-M o r a l e s , F e d e r i c o S a n t e r o a n d W i l l y S a n t e r o a r e t h e c h i l d r e n begotten by the late Pablo

Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina andM i g u e l a l l s u r n a m e d S a n t e r o a r e f o u r o f t h e s e v e n c h i l d r e n b e g o t t e n b y t h e s a m e P a b l o Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late PabloSantero since neither of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. Even before theC o u r t c o u l d a c t o n t h e i n s t a n t p e t i t i o n , p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s f i l e d a n o t h e r M o t i o n f o r Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita andP e d r i t o a l l s u r n a m e d S a n t e r o a s c h i l d r e n o f t h e l a t e P a b l o S a n t e r o w i t h A n s e l m a D i a z praying that an order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo to deliver the sum of P6,000 to each of the seven children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from theestate of Pablo Santero. ISSUE: WON the natural children Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina andM i g u e l s h o u l d b e g r a n t e d a n allowance out of the hands of the property administrator of P a b l o S a n t e r o ? HELD: YES. The fact that private respondents are of age, g a i n f u l l y employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Article 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances tothe widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code givessupport to the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the privaterespondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled toallowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. -Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and tothe children the right to receive support E. Separation of Property and Administration of Common Property by One Spouse 1. Judicial separation of property for sufficient cause FC,Art 134 In the absence of an express declaration in the marria spouses during the marriageshall not take place except by judic either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. COMPLETESEPARATION OF PROPERTY may be had thru: 1. in the marriage settlement 2. judicialdecree a. voluntary (Art conventional by operation of law (Art 103 136) b. sufficient cause(Art 135) 3. compulsory and Art 130) when there is no liquidation of property regime of firstm a r r i a g e F C , A r t 1 3 5 A n y o f t h e f o l l o w i n g s h a l l b e c o n s i d e r e d s u f f i c i e n t c a u s e ( B Y PRESENTATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT) 1. civil interdiction 2. judicially declared anabsentee 3. loss of parental authority by court decree (Art 228 and 229) (PROOF 4. 5. 6. OFCAUSE IS NEEDED) abandonment or failure to comply with family and marital obli abuseof power of administration granted in the marriage sett de facto separation for at least oneyear and reconciliation is h In the cases provided for in Number 1, 2 and 3, the presentationo f t s h a l l b e e n o u g h b a s i s t o g r a n t o f t h e d e c r e e o f judicial separation of pr GARCIA vM A N Z A N O ( 1 9 5 8 ) 1 0 3 P h i l 7 9 8 G o n z a l o G a r c i a f i l e d a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i s w i f e , Consolacion Manzano, for the declaration of the separation of their conjugal partnership property on the ground that they have been living separately since 1948 and that all attemptsat reconciliation between them have failed. As a result of their joint efforts, they accumulatedreal and personal properties. That since their separation, Consolacion assumed completemanagement and administration of the CP. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 90 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - -He alleges mismanagement of the CPG since she was exclusively enjoying the fruits of it,s h e r e f u s e d t o t u r n o v e r t o G o n z a l o h i s r i g h t f u l s h a r e o r a l l o w h i m p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e partnership, she conducted fictitious transfers and alienation of property to third persons andthat she neglected to file income tax returns. TC dismissed complaint for failure to state acause of action upon motion of Consolacion judicial - ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to adeclaration of separation of properties. - NO - HELD: His complaint did not establish a case

that she would live with her parents while she was pregnant, and when she r e t u r n e d , h e refused to accept her. This clearly demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship; moreover, from 1968-1988 when the court finally decided to awardsupport, Jose never gave financial support. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 91 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 3. - -- O n t h e g r o u n d s o f a b a n d o n m e n t a n d a l s o f a i l u r e w i t h o u t j u s t c a u s e t o c o m p l y w i t h h i s obligations as husband and father; apart from refusing to admit Prima his lawful wife, to their c o n j u g a l h o m e , s h e i s e n t i t l e d t o a j u d i c i a l s e p a r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y . C o u r t h e l d t h a t , abandonment is the departure by one spouse with t h e a v o w e d i n t e n t n e v e r t o r e t u r n , followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providingin the least for ones family although able to do so. And the FC states that the aggrievedspouse may petition for judicial separation when there is: Abandonment by a spouse of theother without just cause Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to thefamily without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse. The physicals e p a r a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s c o u p l e d w i t h t h e r e f u s a l b y J o s e t o g i v e s u p p o r t s u f f i c e d t o constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. FCallows judicial separation of property when the spouses have been separated in fact for atleast one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Since the LC found that Jose is thereal owner of the properties, these must be divided between them on the assumption that theywere acquired during their marriage. attorneys fees, with legal interest form date of originalcomplaint until fully paid plus costs. ISSUES: 1. WON separation of husband from his wifeconstitutes abandonment in law that would justify the separation of conjugal partnership property - NO 2. WON the husbands failure and/or refusal to inform his wife of the state of their business is an abuse of his powers of administration of the CP as to warrant a divisionof matrimonial assets NO HELD: 1) There was only mere physical separation and not realabandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the law must be of physical estrangement,moral and FINANCIAL desertion. Based on how abandonment was used in Art 178, in order for desertion of one spouse to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon isto forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and withintent never again to resume or claim ones rights or interests. - Here, Severino did not seemt o h a v e the intention to leave his family permanently since he continued to give s u p p o r t despite his absence which thus negates any intent not to return and resume his marital dutiesand rights. - Since separation in fact between spouses does not affect the CP except if theh u s b a n d a b a n d o n s h i s w i f e w i t h o u t j u s t c a u s e , ( A r t 1 7 8 , C C ) c l a i m s o f t h e Estrella of concubinage on part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at b o l s t e r i n g h e r c l a i m o f abandonment which shall justify, under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets.There is no strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates the existence of illicit relations b e t w e e n N e n i t a a n d S e v e r i n o . N e i t h e r h a s h e b e e n m i s m a n a g i n g f u n d s s i n c e h e a c t u a l l y increased the value of their assets by over a million pesos. 2) For abuse to exist, it is notenough that the husband perform acts prejudicial to his wife or commit acts injurious to the p a r t n e r s h i p . T h e r e m u s t b e a n a c t w i l l f u l l y p e r f o r m e d a n d w i t h u t t e r d i s r e g a r d o f t h e partnership by the husband that would be prejudicial to the wife, evidenced by the repetitionof deliberate acts and/or omissions. It is not condoning the husbands separation from hiswife. Instead, is that there is an insufficiency or absence of cause of action. Remedies of Art167 and 178 are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise restraint since they are

trying to preserve union of spouses; a judgment ordering a separation of assets where theresno real abandonment may eradicate the possibility of reconciliation. Alimony increased fromP2000 to P3000. Attorneys fees must also be borne by defendant since he left DELA CRUZv DELA CRUZ (1968) 22 SCRA 333 - SUPRA - Estrella Severino dela Cruz andblessed with six children. They acquired seven parcels of land at Bacolod Cadastreand three parcels at Silay Cadastre. These are all registered in their names. They are alsoengaged in various business ventures. - She filed a complaint praying for the separation of property, monthly support and payment of attorney fees and costs. - In 1949, she claims thatshe already suspected that Severino was sleeping around which was only confirmed by a noteshe found in his shirt in 1951. She confronted him about it and he promised her to forsake hismistress which he failed to do - Since 1955, he never slept in conjugal dwelling, but only paid short visits. She contends that he abandoned her and their children to live in Manila withhis mistress, Nenita Hernandez. And that after 1955 until the time of the trial, he had never visited the conjugal abode and when he was in Bacolod, she was denied communication withh i m . - R T C o r d e r e d s e p a r a t i o n a n d d i v i s i o n o f t h e c o n j u g a l a s s e t s ( v a l u e d a t P 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) , directing the Severino to pay to Estrella P20,000 as PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS| P r o f . E . A . P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 9 2 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B2012 the conjugal abode and has given cause for plaintiff to seek redress in courts. - 2.V o l u n t a r y s e p a r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y T h e k i d s b y f i r s t m a r r i a g e s h o u l d b e n o t i f i e d o f t h e proceedings and their names and addresses, as well as the names and addresses of the kids bysecond marriage, be furnished by them. LACSON v SAN JOSE (1968) 24 SCRA 837 FC,Art 136 The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court forLacson CarmenSan-Jose Lacson on - Alfonso the CPG and for the separation of their common properties. Feb 14, 1953 with 4 children. - creditors of9, 1963 Carmen left the the petitionand All creditors of the ACP or of the CPG, as well as the listed personal On Jan the spouseshall be listed in conjugal home notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measuresto protect the creditors andManila. She filed a pecuniary and began living in other personswith complaint interests. on March 12, 1963, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courtf o r c u s t o d y o f t h e k i d s a n d t h e i r s u p p o r t . I N R E V O L U N T A R Y D I S S O L U T I O N O F CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES BERNAS (1965) - An amicable settlementwas however reached 14 SCRA 327 between the spouses with regard to custody of the kids(wherein the 2 older kids go to their dad - Jose and Pilar Bernas were married in Dec 1932and the 2 younger ones to their mom), support and they had 2 kids. During the marriage theyand separation of property. This was later acquired 12 parcels of land and two buildings.approved by the CFI, stating that it was - 30 years later, they executed an Agreement for conformable to law. Dissolution of conjugal partnership and Later, Carmen filed a complaint praying for the separation of property believing that this will custody of all the kids. Thisw a s g r a n t e d b y t h e r e d o u n d t o t h e i r m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e , b e n e f i t a n d C A w h o d e c l a r e d t h e agreement null and void gain, and preserve peace and harmony and insofar as the custody of the kids was concerned. prevent friction, dissension and confusion between their heirs sinceJ o s e h a d 2 s e t s o f I S S U E : W O N t h e c o m p r o m i s e a g r e e m e n t a n d t h e c h i l d r e n . A f t e r t h e execution of this contract, judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement they filedwith the court the aforementioned are conformable to law. - YES petition. - LC denied the petition since under Art 192 CC, a HELD: It is valid with respect to the separation of CP canonly be dissolved once legal separation property between the spouses and the dissolution of has been ordered, which can only happen upon the CP since this is allowed by law provided

bad * Compared with Art 98 and Art 125, this Article does not provide for donations byreason of charity or occasion of family rejoicing or family d i s t r e s s . Y A P T I N C H A Y v TORRES (1969) 28 SCRA 489 Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay have been livingtogether openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 years Isidros alleged legitimatewife is Josefina Yaptinchay with whom he has a daughter named Virginia Yaptinchay. Isidrodied intestate and upon his death, Teresita sought her appointment as special administratrixa n d t h e n a s r e g u l a r a d m i n i s t r a t r i x o f I s i d r o s e s t a t e A f e w days later, the lower courtappointed Teresita as administratrix. Josefina then r e g i s t e r e d h e r o p p o s i t i o n s a y i n g t h a t Teresita is not a legitimate heir of Isidro and had no right to institute the proceeding for thesettlement of Isidros estate, much less procure the appointment as administratrix. At thes a m e t i m e , J o s e f i n a a n d h e r c h i l d r e n s o u g h t t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f V i r g i n i a a s s p e c i a l administratrix and Josefina a s t h e r e g u l a r a d m i n i s t r a t r i x . L C g r a n t e d J o s e f i n a a n d h e r childrens petition and appointed Virginia as special administratrix. Teresita then filed a p e t i t i o n s e e k i n g action for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during h e r cohabitation with Isidro. LC issued a restraining order to withhold the Virginia and Josefinafrom disposing any of the properties, specifically including a house in Forbes Park Virginiaand Josefina resisted the restraining order and posited that Teresita was not entitled to theinjunction because her right to the properties is still doubtful and is in dispute PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 96 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - LC lifts the restraining order and orders Teresita not todivest Virginia her possession of the Forbes Park property; however it also enjoined Virginiafrom selling, disposing or encumbering said property in any matter pending resolution of thedisputes Teresita alleges that the Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by her andIsidro and she even contributed using her own exclusive funds Josefina and Virginia disputet h i s c l a i m a n d s a y t h e h o u s e w a s b u i l t w i t h I s i d r o s f u n d s a l o n e a n d w i t h o u t T e r e s i t a s intervention. Teresita presents proof that she obtained loans when the Forbes Park house wasunder construction. without the benefit of marriage, are co-owners of the jeepney. Themotion was denied. The court based their decision on Article 144 CC which provides thatwhen a man and a woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of themthrough their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules onc o - o w n e r s h i p I S S U E S : 1 . W O N t h e p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n c o u l d b e g r a n t e d i n f a v o r o f Teresita 2. WON Teresita can claim that she co-owned the house with Isidro by the fact thatthey were commonlaw spouses HELD: 1. Injunction rests upon the sound discretion of thecourt, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. Although Teresita presented loans that she had contracted during the period when saidhouse was under construction as proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which wouldcorrelate such loans to the construction work. Thus, assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property is unsupported and may not be permitted to overridet h e p r i m a f a c i e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t h o u s e , h a v i n g b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d o n I s i d r o s l o t a t h i s instance, and during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under thec o n t r o l o f t h e Virginia 2. Before a common-law spouse can claim coownership of t h e i r spouses properties, there must be a clear showing that the commonlaw spouse had, duringcohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. JUANIZA vJ O S E ( 1 9 7 9 ) 8 9 S C R A 3 0 6 E u g e n i o J o s e w a s l e g a l l y m a r r i e d t o S o c o r r o R a m o s b u t h a d been cohabiting with defendantappelant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 yrs. Jose was the registered

owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freighttrain resulting in the death of 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers. In the resultingc a s e for damages, the CFI rendered decision ordering Jose and Rosalia (the m i s t r e s s ) t o jointly and severally pay. Rosalia filed MFR praying that she should not be liable to pay for damages since the decision was based on the erroneous theory that she was living together with Jose as husband and wife ISSUES: 1. WON Art 144 is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry - NO 2. WON Rosalia,who is not a registered owner of the jeep can be held solidarily liable for damages with ther e g i s t e r e d o w n e r - N O H E L D : 1 . I t h a s b e e n c o n s i s t e n t l y r u l e d t h a t t h e c o o w n e r s h i p contemplated in Art 144, requires that the man and woman living together must not beincapacitated to contract marriage. Since J o s e i s l e g a l l y m a r r i e d t o S o c o r r o , t h e r e i s a n impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cannot be a co-owner of the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose and Socorro. There is therefore no basis for theliability of Rosalia for damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered bythe passengers. 2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can neither be liable for damagesc a u s e d b y i t s o p e r a t i o n , b e c a u s e o n l y t h e r e g i s t e r e d o w n e r i s r e s p o n s i b l e . V D A D E CONSUEGRA v GSIS (1971) 37 SCRA 315 - Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1stmarriage was with Rosario Diaz where they had 2 children. 2nd marriage was with BasiliaBerdin with 7 children. Later he died. Both marriages were contracted in good faith. As amember of GSIS, he was entitled to both a retirement insurance and life insurance. The lifeinsurance was paid to Berdin and her children who were the designated beneficiaries namedin the policy. The retirement policy did not designate a beneficiary. Hence, the petition.GSIS: to Rosario (8/16) and to Basilia (1/16 between Basilia and their seven children).CFI: Same with GSIS. ISSUE: WON Basilia is entitled to the proceeds of the retirement benefits because she was just the second wife. HELD: Yes. The marriage was contracted ingood faith and so it is just and fair for them to receive it. Not just because the retirement doesnot name a beneficiary, means that it should follow what was PERSONS AND FAMILYRELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 97 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 w r i t t e n i n t h e l i f e i n s u r a n c e b e n e f i t s . I t i s j u s t a n d f a i r t o r e c o g n i z e t h e second wife it being that the marriage was done in GOOD FAITH. Provisions on retirementcame when Com Act 186 was amended by RA 660 on 1951 which means that there was nointention for the life insurance beneficiaries to automatically be the retirement beneficiariesa l s o . B e s i d e s , i t i s a l s o r e q u i r e d f o r t h e m e m b e r t o s p e c i f i c a l l y w r i t e t h e n a m e o f t h e beneficiary. *Maam Beth asks: When do you consider good faith in marriages? Only withregard to belief in the authority of the solemnizing officer. MAXEY v CA (1984) 129 SCRA1 8 7 M e l b o u r n e M a x e y and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 in militaryfashion according to their children (which the courts did not recognize). They had 6children: John Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred, and George. Except f o r t h e youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed properties were acquired. Theyhad their church marriage in 1919, and sometime after, Regina Morales died. The disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina MoralesMaxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried in 1953, hissecond wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to therespondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra. This sale according to the petitionerswas unknown to them until in 1961. Petitioners sought to annul the sale arguing that the properties were common properties of their parents. Trial court applied Art. 144 of the Civil purchased with her income as fish dealer during their cohabitation, and that 7 0 , 0 0 0 b e reimbursed to her as her share in the construction of their house. The latters

funding beingfruits of her income as an entertainer. - Jacinto, on the other hand, claims that the petitioner h a d n o s h a r e i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e h o u s e a n d t h a t s h e c o u l d n t h a v e b o u g h t t h e mentioned personal properties as selling fish was just a pastime for her. It was resolved that b o t h p a r t i e s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i r j o i n t a c c o u n t ( f r o m w h i c h t h e f u n d s f o r a c q u i r i n g s a i d properties came from), but there is no sufficient proof of their respective shares. ISSUE:WON the properties in dispute shall be adjudicated in favor of Gina alone - NO HELD: Ginais not legally capacitated to marry, but she nonetheless cohabited with Jacinto. As such, Art148 of the FC shall apply to the properties acquired during their cohabitation. Their share inthe common property shall be determined by the each of the parties actual contribution.T h e r e f o r e , s i n c e t h e r e c e i p t p r e s e n t e d a s e v i d e n c e o n l y s t a t e d P 1 1 , 4 1 3 w a s s p e n t f o r t h e purchase of construction materials, then this is amount which shall be given to Gina. Withregard to the personal properties, since there is an absence of proof, it is presumed that Ginaand Jacintos actual contributions are of equal amount. The amount of P111,375, said amountshall be divided equally. Thus entitling Gina to a reimbursement of P55,687.50 as her share.SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS-SAGALONGOS (2007) PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |P r o f . E . A . P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 1 0 0 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B2012 514 SCRA 294 Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna, contracted threemarriages in his lifetime. - 1st: Virginia Sulit with 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila Edgar, Linda,E m i l i t a a n d M a n u e l , p e t i t i o n e r s ) . - 5 y e a r s a f t e r h i s f i r s t w i f e s d e a t h , h e m a r r i e d a n American citizen named Merry Lee who begot him an only son. However, Lee obtained adivorce decree in Hawaii after five years of marriage. One year after the divorce decree wasgranted, he married the respondent Felicidad Sagalongos San Luis, they had no children.Upon Felicisimos death, Felicidad applied for the dissolution of their conjugal partnershipasset and the settlement of the decedents estate with her as the administrator in Makati RTC.The children from the first marriage opposed this petition. Their contentions are as follows: oCase should have been filed at Sta. Cruz, Laguna o Marriage between them is null and void because it is bigamous, the marriage between their father and Merry Lee was still subsisting -In response, Felicidad adduced the decree of divorce in order to prove Felicisimos capacityto marry. She also invokes the Quita and Van Dorn ruling wherein divorce by alien spousesis likewise valid to the Filipino spouse. Notwithstanding the divorce decree she offers, thee v i d e n t i a r y v a l u e a s l a i d d o w n i n t h e G a r c i a c a s e w a s n o t c o m p l i e d w i t h . I S S U E : W O N pending the determination of validity of the foreign divorce, Felicidad has legal standing toapply for letters of administration. HELD: YES. She may request for letters of administration because she qualifies as an interested person by virtue of their cohabitation. If she provesthe validity of Felicisimos divorce and consequentially, his capacity to marry but fails to prove the validity of their own marriage, she may be considered as a co-owner under Art 144of CC (Art 147 FC). Likewise, if in the case she fails to prove the validity of both the divorcea n d t h e m a r r i a g e , t h e a p p l i c a b l e p r o v i s i o n w o u l d b e A r t 1 4 8 C C ( r e g i m e o f l i m i t e d c o - ownership). PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 101 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 XI. THE FAMILY FAMILY may be defined as a natural and social institution founded on the conjugal union, binding together the individuals composing it, for the common accomplishment of the individual and spiritualends of life, under the authority of the original ascendant heading it. (Tolentino, SempioDiy)BASES OF THE FAMILY 1. matrimonial union 2. relationship within the degree determined by law, whether illegitimate or legitimate 3. adoption IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY 1.the family is an essential factor in the general, social and even political life 2. constant livingtogether of husband and wife, and of parents and children, contributes to the development of a strong sense of duty an aptitude for heroic sacrifice and of the love by future generations of t h e t r a d i t i o n s a n d m o r a l c o n c e p t s o f t h o s e w h o p r e c e d e d t h e m 3 . i t i s a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e element of social cohesion and

equilibrium 4. the vitality and strength of the State dependsupon the solidarity of its nucleus which is the family - E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relationsof the spouses, career or profession that parents should choose for their children, practice or customs in the domestic life, distribution of childrens inheritance (although law provides1 5 0 F a m i l y r e l a t i o n s i n c l u d e : B e t w e e n h u s b a n d a n d w i f e B e t w e e n p a r e n t s a n d c h i l d r e n Among other ascendants and descendants Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood FC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. * Half-blood means having one common parent CLASSES OFFAMILY RELATIONS 1. Natural by consanguinity or affinity 2. Civil created by lawe.g. adoption 3. Religious created by sacraments such as baptism and confirmation (ninong& ninang) Family relations exist even when they are not living together Other relatives livingw i t h t h e f a m i l y a r e members of the household, but not of the family Nephews, nieces,cousins, aunts or uncles are inconsistent with the Filipino culture Illegitimate c h i l d r e n are not relatives included at least in the family of their mother -> Sempio-Diy is wrong! Relatives include both the husbands and the wifes - A. Members of the Family 1. Natureand Scope of Family Relations 2. Support FC, Art 194 Support = everything indispensablefor sustenance, dwe transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. FC,Art 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy be supported referred to in the The education of the person entitled to cherishesa n d p r o t e c t s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s a r e g o v e r n e d b y l a w t r a i n i n g f o r s o m e professional, trade or vocation, even beyond age of the family shall be recognized or giveneffect. going to and from school, or to and from place of work. It is only the external aspecto f f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s t h a t i s g o v e r n e d b y l a w 1 . I n t e r n a l aspect sacred to the family andi n a c c e s s i b l e t o l a w E . g . s p i r i t u a l r e l a t i o n s , s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s o f t h e s p o u s e s , c a r e e r o r profession that parents should choose for their children, practice or customs in the domesticl i f e , d i s t r i b u t i o n o f childrens inheritance (although law provides for equal legitimes of children) BASIS: law must respect the freedom of action of man within his spheres 2 . External aspect BASIS: it is only here that third persons and public interest are concerned *CC didnt include transportation, but FC did because it is possible for one to save up on other expenses like food and clothing but not on transportation expenses, especially if the place isnot reachable by walking. * Full extent means indispensable and financial capacity. This p h r a s e i s a l s o s e e n i n t h e t w o s u c c e e d i n g p r o v i s i o n s f o r s u p p o r t o f f a m i l y m e m b e r s a n d illegitimate brothers and sisters. * Even beyond age of majority PERSONS AND FAMILYRELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 102 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. * Rule on support is different from rule on inheritance195 Obligation to support each other to the whole extent FC, Art 199 Whenever two or more p e r s o n s a r e o b l i g e d t o g i v e s s p o u s e s p e r s o n s i n t h i s o r d e r : l e g i t i m a t e a s c e n d a n t s a n d descendants 1. spouse parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate 2. descendantsi n n e a r e s t o f t h e l a t t e r a n d i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n d e g r e e ( g r a n d c h i l d r e n ) 3 . a s c e n d a n t s i n nearest degree parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate or brothers and sisters4. illegitimate children of the latter (grandchildren) legitimate brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or mo UP Law B2012 * Difference between CC and FC rules on constitution of family home: CCrequires judicial declaration (done by filing a petition and with the approval of the proper court) OR extrajudicial (done recording of a public instrument in the proper registry) for theconstitution of a family home. But no one does that, so the FC makes the constitution of

afamily home automatic. FC, Art 154 The beneficiaries of a family home: 1. husband & wifeor an unmarried head of family FC, Art 160 When a creditor whose claim is not among thoseme and has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actual apply to court for anorder directing the sale of the property under e actual value of the family home exceeds them a x i m u m a m constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum a l l improvements introduced by the person/s constituting the family hom beneficiaries, the samerule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for thefamily hom 1 be applied first to the amount mentioned in Art 157 2 then to liabilities under the judgment and costs (A155) 3 delivered to the judgment debtor 2. parents, ascendants,descendants, brothers and sisters, illegitimate or legitimate, who are: * Judgment debtor isnot a preferred debtor like in a. living in the family home Art 155 b. depend upon the head of t h e f a m i l y f o r legal - All three requirements (family relations, actual residence a n d dependence for legal support) must be present to become a beneficiary So if the wife dies,t h e m o t h e r - i n - l a w b e c o m e s a s t r a n g e r t o t h e h u s b a n d a n d i s n o l o n g e r c o n s i d e r e d a s beneficiary of the family home. FC, 1. 2. 3. 4. * Maam Beth does not think its a wise movefor creditors to go after the family home because he puts his debtor in a more financially p r e c a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e c r e d i t o r i s n o t a p r i o r i t y . F C , A r t 1 6 1 F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f availing of the benefits of a famil constitute, or be the beneficiary of only one family home.Art 155 The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, The provisions of thisC h a p t e r s h a l l a l s o g o v e r n e x i s t i n g F C , A r t 1 6 2 o r a t t a c h m e n t n o n p a y m e n t o f t a x e s applicable. debts incurred prior to the constitution of the f a m i l y h o m e d e b t s s e c u r e d b y mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution debts due to laborers, mechanics,architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished materialfor the construction of the building * According to Tolentino, Par 4 may also apply to repairsand improvements done to the family home to avoid redundancy of Par 2 since constructionof the home would always be before the constitution of the family home. FC, Art 156 Familyh o m e m u s t b e part of the ACP or CPG or of the exclusive properties either spouse w i t h consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of the family on his or her own property. Subject of conditional sale on installments: where ownership is reserved by thevendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price, it may be constituted as a familyhome. FC, Art 157 The actual value of family home shall not exceed municipalities) andP200,000 in rural, as may fixed by law. * Considering this price tag imposed on familyhomes, realistically speaking, there is no family home in the Philippines anymore. The lawmust first seek actuarial computation to update the equivalent value in todays economy. FC,Art 158 It may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner/s with the person constituting the same, the latters spouse and majority of beneficiaries of legal ageFC, Art 159 Family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary a compelling reason. Ruleshall regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 106 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v LUCASAN (1960) 109Phil 294 Parcels of land owned by Filemon Lucasan were sold by the sheriff at a public auction to satisfy a judgment rendered against him. Lucasan opposed with respect to one parcel. He contends that the land is where he and his wife extrajudicially constituted a familyhome hence the land is exempt from execution. ISSUE: WON the property is a family homeand exempt from execution for money judgment? HELD: NO. A family home constitutedafter a debt has been incurred is not exempt from execution. Even if the declaration of familyhome predates the money judgment, the family home may still be liable as long as it is for p a y m e n t o f a d e b t incurred before the constitution. Otherwise, debtors who aim t o circumvent the law may prejudice creditors. MODEQUILLO v BREVA (1990) 185

SCRA766 - Jose Modequillo is to indemnify the relatives of Audie Salinas who died in a vehicular accident (1976 Mar 16) involving the former. In 1988 January 29, CA held that the damagesa r e to be satisfied on his goods and chattels which include a parcel of residential l a n d . Modequillo executed a motion to quash and/or set aside since the same residential land iswhere the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and assuch is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Art 152 and 153 of the FCexcept for the liabilities enumerated in Article 155. Also, the said judgment debt is not one of those listed in Article 155. ISSUE: WON the said residential land has the characteristic of afamily home and thus is exempted from execution HELD: NO. - The plaintiff misinterpretedA r t 1 6 2 o f t h e FC which provides that all existing family residences at the time of t h e effectivity of FC are considered family homes and entitled to benefits of a family home to be retroactive. Art 152 and Art 153 cannot be applied retroactively. Art. 152, which pertainsto the automatic constitution of family home by mere actual occupation, cannot be invoked by the plaintiff. - Also, the debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or wasincurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgmentarising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded theeffectivity of the FC on August 3, 1988. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E.A . P a n g a l a n g a n , A . Y . 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 P a g e 1 0 7 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 TANEO v CA (1999) 304 SCRA 308 Pablito Taneo filed an action against the conveyance of his land to private respondent. The money judgment of RTC was affirmed by CA. Taneoa l l e g e s t h a t t h e lands in question are exempt from execution for being a family h o m e (extrajudicially constituted by his father as early as 1964). ISSUE: WON the family home isexempt from execution HELD: NO. Art 153 does not apply to family homes occupied prior to the effectivity of FC and exempted from obligations incurred prior to that same date (Aug3, 1988). Art 162 is not retroactive considering that the debt preceded the FC (1964). Also, afamily home should be erected on the land owned by the members of the family (owned byP l u t a r c o Vacalares). VERSOLA v MADOLARIA (2006) 497 SCRA 385 - Dr. Ong O h granted P1M loan to Dolores Ledesma - Ledesma sold her house and lot located in TandangS o r a t o spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola for P2.5M. Spouses paid Ledesma P1M a s downpayment with remaining balance in monthly installments Spouses Versola applied for a2 M l o a n with Asiarust Bank in order to raise the full amount that Ledesma demanded -However, the spouses were not able to get the loan because Asiatrust Bank discovered anotice of levy on execution was annotated on the title in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h L e d e s m a s obligation to a certain Miladays Jewels, Inc., in the amount of P214,284. Because of thisannotated encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate Mortgage and refused torelease the P2M loan of petitioners. Dr. Ong Oh filed Complaint after the trial, the RTC andCA ordered spouses Versola to pay Dr. Ong Oh 1.5M with legal interest Dr. Ong Oh filed aMotion for Execution and because of this, the sheriff sold at public auction the property of PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 onlytreated Pablo for P a g e 1 1 1 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 t u b e r c u l o s i s , h e cannot say if he was infertile. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal righto f t h e h u s b a n d o r , i n exceptional cases, his Janets date of birth was not substantially proven

heirs. - NO to Janet Civil registrar did not certify the presented birth certificate of J a n e t which could have proved that Janet was born during the subsistence of R o s a n n a s Rosanna passed the first qualifying factor marriage with Pablo NO to Rosanna Rosannadid not pass the second for claims, that she is the legitimate spouse qualifying factor, thatshe was dependent on Pablo for support since they were separated in fact After the birth of the child, the Whiteheads wished not to go through the surrogacy contract. The Sterns filed acomplaint for possession and ultimate custody of the child. Lower court granted the Sternscustody and ordered termination of Whiteheads maternal rights Whiteheads immediatelyfled to different places to evade the surrendering Baby M for custody and named her SaraElizabeth Whitehead ISSUE: WON the surrogacy contract was enforceable and valid HELD: No. The contract was in direct conflict with existing statutes and public policies regarding 1)involvement of money in connection with adoption (tantamount to baby-selling) 2) lawsrequiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights isordered or adoption is granted and 3) making surrender of custody and consent to adoptionr e v o c a b l e i n p r i v a t e p l a c e m e n t a d o p t i o n s . S e c o n d l y , a l t h o u g h t h e c u s t o d y w a s p r o p e r l y granted to the father since evidence clearly proved it to be in the best interest of the child, thetermination of maternal rights and visitation rights is contrary to law. *M stands for Melissa.W i k i t e l l s u s t h a t M e l i s s a S t e r n formally terminated Whitehead's parental rights andf o r m a l i z e d E l i z a b e t h S t e r n ' s m a t e r n i t y t h r o u g h a d o p t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s . J O H N S O N v CALVERT (1993) 851 P.2d 776 Mark and Crispina was a married couple. Crispina had tou n d e r g o hysterectomy so she couldnt bear children anymore. The couple c o n s i d e r e d surrogacy. By a common friend, they were able to meet such person by the name of AnnaJohnson who was a nurse. They entered into a contract wherein: o Anna would be implantedwith an embryo containing the sperm and egg cells of the couple. o Anna will turn over allrights over the child. o Couple will pay 10,000 in installments. o Couple will pay 200,000 lifeinsurance for Anna. o Relations deteriorated between the couple and Anna. Blood tests showthat Anna IS NOT the genetic mother. TC ruled: Couple was the genetic, biological, andnatural parents. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON Anna can claim custody of the child HELD: NO. Since both parties gave acceptable proof of maternity: Anna as the gestational mother.Crispina is the genetic mother. The case will be decided on the parties intention or fromw h o m t h e b . B I O L O G I C A L A S S I S T E D R E P R O D U C T I V E T E C H N O L O G Y ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION is the impregnation of a female with the semen from malewithout sexual intercourse. Even without the initial consent, the child can still be legitimatedso long as the husband subsequently gives his consent BEFORE the child is born through AICan be homologous (sperm of the husband), heterologous (sperm of a donor) or combined (acombination of the two) That the child was born of AI is not reflected in the birth certificateA child can have as much as five parents: FATHER MOTHER 1. Biological (source of 1.Legal/social sperm) 2. Genetic (egg donor) 2. Legal/Social 3. Gestational (not surrogate)*Maam Beth hates the word surrogate because it is a misnomer. IN RE BABY M. (1988)1 0 9 N . J . 3 9 6 - M a r y B e t h W h i t e h e a d a g r e e d f o r a f e e o f $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 t o b e a r t i f i c i a l l y inseminated with the semen of another womans husband (William Stern), to carry the childs o c o n c e i v e d t o t e r m , a n d a f t e r i t s b i r t h , t o s u r r e n d e r i t t o t h e natural father Surrogacy contract means absolute termination of parental ties to

and his wife the gestational mother upon birth Elizabeth Stern was not infertile, like was was stated in the contract, rather sheh a d m u l t i p l e s c l e r o s i s w h i c h m a y h a v e s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n o n h e r p r e g n a n c y P E R S O N S AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 112 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 mental concept of the child emanated. In this case, thecouple was considered the prime-movers. The agreement was not inconsistent with PublicPolicy. Gestational surrogacy differs from adoption: - Child was not born. - Anna wasnt theg e n e t i c m o t h e r . - T h e p a y m e n t w a s f o r t h e s e r v i c e Judgment of CA affirmed. IN READOPTION OF ANONYMOUS (1973) 345 N . Y . S . 2 d 4 3 0 D u r i n g t h e f i r s t m a r r i a g e , husband A and wife B had a baby born of consensual AID (Artificial Insemination Donor).Husband A and wife B were registered parents in the birth certificate. A and B separated andl a t e r d i v o r c e d b u t t h e i r d e c r e e d e c l a r e d t h e c h i l d t o b e l e g i t i m a t e . W i f e B a n d c h i l d g o t support while husband A had visitation rights. They were not remiss on their parental duties.W i f e B l a t e r r e m a r r i e d h u s b a n d D . H u s b a n d D wanted to adopt wife Bs daughter buthusband a refused to give consent. I S S U E : W O N h u s b a n d A s c o n s e n t i s r e q u i r e d f o r husband Ds petition for adoption considering that the child was conceived through artificialinsemination from an unknown third party donor. HELD: YES. The Domestic Relations Lawr e q u i r e s c o n s e n t o f b o t h p a r e n t s o v e r t h e a d o p t i o n o f a c h i l d b o r n i n w e d l o c k . T h e dispensary circumstances (abandonment, divorce due to adultery, insanity, etc.) were not present in the case. The term father is not limited to the biological or natural father, for w h a t i s c o n s i d e r e d i s the legal relationship of father and child and vice versa. The childc a n n o t b e considered illegitimate since it was born during the marriage and not i n circumstances of infidelity since it was a medically-assisted procedure where the husbanda n d w i f e f r e e l y c o n s e n t e d . L E G A L I S S U E S I N H U M A N E G G D O N A T I O N A N D GESTATIONAL SURROGACY Is it possible to ask a woman to carry a child in her wombfor nine months without giving anything in return? Unless you can find someone whosehobby is to get pregnant and give birth, it is quite an impossibility to have free surrogacy.This is vulnerable to abuse of women in lower social economic classes. - Maam Beth tellsabout the travails of pregnancy and even asked a pregnant student in the class to share her prenatal experiences. What would be the relationship if a woman carries the embryo formed by her daughter and her daughters husband? This was an actual case in an African countrywherein the grandmother bore the child of her daughter. 2. Impugned Legitimacy FC, Art166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the follow 1. physical impossibility for the husband to have sex with w immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: a. physical incapacity (impotence) b. living separately c. serious illness 2. biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not ha provided in Par 2 Art 164 3. conceived throughartificial insemination, the written autho through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influen Whats so important about the first 120 days? It refers to the first trimester w h e n i t c a n n o t b e k n o w n i f a w o m a n i s p r e g n a n t . S h e m a y n o t e v e n b e a w a r e t h a t s h e i s pregnant. During the second trimester, the tummy begins to bulge and so pregnancy becomesevident. *The presumption is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Proof to the contrary would have to be clearlyand convincingly established. *Serious illness of the husband in Par 1C must be of such anature as to exclude the possibility of his having sexual intercourse with his wife. *Biologicalreasons pertain to blood typing and DNA testing BLOOD TYPE O Fathers blood type A BAB Mothers blood type O O O, A O, B A, B A O, A O, A O, A, B, AB A, B, AB B O, B O, The solicitor-general appealed. ISSUES: HELD: No, only clerical mistakes can be made andsignificant changes may only be granted in direct, adversarial action. The change sought willresult not only in the

substantial correction in the childs record of birth but also in the childss t a t u s t h e r e b y a f f e c t i n g h e r r i g h t s w h i c h c a n n o t b e d o n e i n a s u m m a r y a c t i o n . A l t h o u g h Maria Rosario is the real name of the mother, Sarah will become an illegitimate child by virtue of the change. Also, adversarial proceedingsare required in such allegations. Rule 108 may only be used to correct or change clerical or i n n o c u o u s e r r o r s . A l s o , S a r a h a n d h e r p u r p o r t e d parents should have been parties to the p r o c e e d i n g s . T h e r e i s a l s o n o s u f f i c i e n t l e g a l e x p l a n a t i o n w h y t h e G l a d y s , w i t h o u t appointment as guardian, was the petitioner. Effects: Sarahs successional and other rightsm a y c h a n g e Illegitimacy may bring social stigma and embarrass Sarah Rights of h e r parents over her and over each other will be affected A change of name will affect mother and creditors TAN v TROCIO (1990) 191 SCRA 764 School owner and directress, FelicidadBaraan Tan filed an administrative complaint seeking disbarment of Atty. Galileo Trcio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. She alleged that Trocio, who is the legalcounsel of the school overpowered her inside the office and against her will, succeeded inhaving carnal knowledge of her. And as a result, she begot a son whom she named JewelT a n . S h e f u r t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t h e u s e d t o s u p p o r t J e w e l b u t s u b s e q u e n t l y l o s t i n t e r e s t a n d stopped. She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8 years from the incident becauseTrocio threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband and due to the fact that shew a s m a r r i e d a n d h a s e i g h t c h i l d r e n . T r o c i o f i l e s h i s a n s w e r s t a t i n g t h a t h e w a s i n d e e d a counsel of the school as well as of Tan and her family but denies he sexually assaulted her.He adds that the principal was a in a revenge trip when he declined her request to commit a b r e a c h o f t r u s t . I S S U E : W O N T r o c i o h a d s e x u a l l y a s s a u l t e d T a n a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f which the latter begot a child by him PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.Pangalangan, A.Y. 20082009 Page 116 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 (and ist h u s a g r o u n d f o r Trocios disbarment for immoral conduct) HELD: No. D i s b a r m e n t complaint dismissed for insufficiency of basis of the allegations. The alleged threat to deporther husband could not hold because she admitted having lost contact with her husband whenh e learned of the respondents transgression that very same evening. The fear had t h u s become inexistent. She also maintained her transactions with Tan as if nothing had happened.Such actions can be construed as condonation of his alleged immoral act. Physical likenessand unusual closeness between Trocio and Jewel is not conclusive proof of paternity, muchless violation of Tans person and honor. Jewel was born during the wedlock of Tan and her husband as such, the presumption of legitimacy prevails. *Whats the big deal about namingt h e s o n J e w e l ? F o r all we know, the name is pronounced as Joel. *Why is there a n expected reaction from sexuallyabused woman? Different people have different ways of reacting! *If she aborts it, shes wrong. If she learns to love it, she wasnt raped. Theres noo p t i o n ! ! ! P E O P L E v T U M I M P A D ( 1 9 9 4 ) 2 3 5 S C R A 4 8 3 M o r e n o L . T u m i m p a d a n d Constable Ruel C. Prieto are charged with the crime of rape of Sandra Salcedo, a 15 yearso l d , h a d a m i n d o f a f i v e y e a r o l d c h i l d . T h e a c c u s e d a r e t w o o f t h e f o u r s e c u r i t y m e n assigned to the victims father. Sandra first complained of constipation but after medical aidwas sought, her condition did not improve. However, upon seeing Tumimpad coming outfrom the kitchen she told her mother Mama, patayin mo yan, bastos. The mother becamesuspicious so she brought Sandra to the hospital where they found out that she was pregnant. Nine months later, Sandra gave birtb to a baby boy who was named Jacob. Sandra was able to pick the pictures of Tumimpad and Prieto and in the police line-up she p o i n t e d t o t h e accused. The accused moved that a blood test be conducted on the offended party, her childJacob and the two accused. The result of the test showed that Jacob has a type O blood,Sandra type B, Prieto type A and Tumimpad type O.

RTC convicted Tumimpad buta c q u i t t e d P r i e t o . T h e a c q u i t t a l o f P r i e t o w a s o n r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t s t a t i n g t h a t h e h a s a different type of blood with the child Jacob. ISSUE: WON it was impossible for Tumimpadto have committed the crime of rape because most of the time he and his co-accused weretogether with Col. Salcedo. HELD: No. It was proven that they were not always with Col.Salcedo. There were instances that they would even play with Sandra. Based on this it is not physically impossible for the accused to have access to Sandra. Tumimpad argued that hisconviction was erroneously based on the medical finding that he and the victim have thesame blood type O. In Jao vs. Court of Appeals it was held that Paternity Science hasdemonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child and the allegedfather, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child.But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. BENITEZ-BADUA v CA(1994) 229 SCRA 468 Vicente Benitez & Isabel Chipongian owned various properties. OnA p r i l 2 5 , 1 9 8 2 I s a b e l d i e d & h e r e s t a t e w a s s e t t l e d extra-judicially. ON Nov. 13, 1989Vicente died intestate. Private respondents, V i c t o r i a B e n i t e z - L i r i o ( V i c e n t e s s i s t e r ) & Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicentes nephew) filed a case in the RTC, praying for the issuanceof letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of Aguilar. They allege that Vicente iss u r v i v e d b y n o o t h e r h e i r s o r r e l a t i v e s . T h a t t h e s p o u s e s w e r e w / o i s s u e & w i t h o u t descendants whatsoever and that Marissa Benitez Badua who was raised and cared for by thespouses was not related to them by blood nor legally adopted, & therefore not an heir. On Nov. 2, 1990 Marissa opposed the petition stating that she was the sole heir of Vicente. If M a r i s s a w a s r e a l l y a b i o l o g i c a l a n d l e g i t i m a t e d a u g h t e r , t h e r e w o u l d b e n o n e e d f o r T C received evidence regarding the matter: Marissa tried to prove she was the legitimate childof the spouses, presenting documentary evidence: o Her certificate of live birth o Baptismalcertificate o Income tax returns & information sheet for membership w/ GSIS of Vicente,naming her his daughter o School records o She also testified that they raised her as their legit daughter Private respondents presented testimonial evidence that the spouses failed tohave a child & that Isabel was referred to Dr. Manahan (an ob-gyne) for treatment TC ruledin favor of Marissa, relying on Art 166 and Art 170 FC. CA however reversed their decisionstating that Marissa is not the biological child of the spouses and therefore not a legal heir.The CA also held that the TC erred in applying Art 166 and Art 170 FC ISSUES: 1. WONArt 164, 166, 170 & 171 FC is applicable to the case, as the petitioner contends. PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 117 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 2. WON Marissa is the biological child of the spouses andtherefore a legal heir. HELD: No. The following DO NOT contemplate a situation like theinstant case, where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple. Thesearticles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of hiswife. The CA correctly refused to apply these articles to the case. Since this case doesntcontend that Marissa is not the child of Vicente by Isabel; but that she wasnt born to thespouses. Cabatbat-Lim v IAC is appropriate to the case. The totality of contrary evidence presented by the respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioners birthc e r t i f i c a t e . L U M A I N D E A P A R I C H O v P A R A G U Y A ( 1 9 8 7 ) 1 5 0 S C R A 2 7 9 T r i n i d a d Montilde had a love affair with Reverend Father Felipe Lumain, a priest, and in the process identification certificate which describes him as the son of Susana. - RTC: In 1967, FelisaLim was held as the daughter and only heir of Susana Lim to which Uy filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial but the court denied it. - CA: Upon Uys appeal, CA ruled thatn e i t h e r F e l i s a L i m n o r U y i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e i n h e r i t a n c e b e c a u s e : o n e i t h e r o f t h e m b e e n recognized by Susana Lim as her child by any means provided for by law o neither of them been declared in a judicial proceeding to be the child of Susana Lim - They both

assailed thedecision of the CA - Lim says that Susanas consent to her marriage constitutes recognitionas natural daughter and was even executed in a public document in the form of her marriagecontract (Sec 131 of CC of 1889 says that be made in the record of birth, in a will or someother public document - Guadalupe Uy contended that her husband purchased the propertyin question with his own money prior to his mothers death and took conveyance and title.T h e r e w a s a n e x i s t e n c e o f P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 120 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 Faustina Bibiano Pedro Dolores Trinidad, niece of Faustina R a y m u n d o PETITIONERS EVIDENCE C S O A U Y R T S Handwritten note alledgedly written byBibiano to the 18 yo Raymundo with a complimentary ending su padre School records,report cards, school receipts for matriculation all signed and paid by Bibiano Typewrittenl e t t e r s t o A t t y . F a u s t i n o a l l e g i n g h i s p e r s o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e ; a s w e l l a s t y p e w r i t t e n autobiography asserting that his father is a surgeon Bibiano Baas CC 278 provides f o r authentic handwriting which is a private document thus acknowledgement of the child insuch instrument should not be incidental but explicit. The complimentary ending might bedue to the close relations Raymundo enjoyed with his uncle/guardian Bibiano; there is noclear expression of acknowledgement of filiation. Paternal solicitude paternity Bibianosigned these documents as guardian of Raymundo while he is growing up since the latter spent for his education because Pedro (the real father) is unable to support him; thus it isn a t u r a l t h a t B i b i a n o s i g n s a s t h e g u a r d i a n e v e n m o r e s o t h a t R a y m u n d o spent most hislifetime in Bibiano and Fautinas care This typewritten evidence t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t t h e contradicting testimony of Raymundos wife Trinidad casts doubt to the authenticity of these p e r s o n a l a c c o u n t s o f R a y m u n d o M A R I A T E G U I v C A ( 1 9 9 2 ) 2 0 5 S C R A 6 7 5 L u p o Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three marriages with three different women andsired three sets of children. First: with Eusebia Montellano, 4 kids Baldomera: died, survived by kids surnamed Espina Maria del Rosario Urbana Ireneo: died, left a son, Ruperto Second:w i t h F l a v i a n a M o n t e l l a n o , o n e d a u g h t e r , C r e s c i a n a T h i r d : w i t h F e l i p a V e l a s c o , 3 k i d s : Jacinto, Julian, Paulina He died intestate and the children from his 1st and 2nd marriagese x c l u d e d t h e c h i l d r e n f r o m t h e 3 r d m a r r i a g e i n t h e e x t r a judicial partition of Lupos properties. ISSUES: 1. WON prescription barred p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s r i g h t t o d e m a n d partition of Lupos estate. 2. WON the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were What is the nature a b l e t o p r o v e t h e i r s u c c e s s i o n a l r i g h t s o f o v e r t h e estate. of the complaint filed by the private respondents. HELD: The children from the thirdmarriage continuously possessed the status of legitimate children. Filiation of legitimatechildren may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar, a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. 1)WON prescription barred private respondents right to demand partition of Lupos estate.Since they are legit kids and heirs of Lupo, the time limitation prescribed in Art 258 for filingan action for recognition is inapplicable. Prescription doesnt run against private respondentsw / r e s p e c t t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e a c t i o n f o r partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit

prescription is invoked, havent expressly or impliedly repudiated the c o o w n e r s h i p . Prescription of an action for partition doesnt lie except when the coownership is properlyrepudiated by the co-owner. A co-owner cant acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owner absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. Also, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible & cant be barred by laches. Itis at once an action for declaration of co-ownership & for segregation & conveyance of acertain property. No valid repudiation was made by the petitioners. Assuming the petitionersregistration of the subject lot was an act of repudiation of coownership, prescription hasntset in when private RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE A sworn affidavit duly notarized andexecuted by Bibiano Banas declaring that Raymundo Banas is his brother, Pedros son As w o r n J O I N T a f f i d a v i t d u l y n o t a r i z e d a n d e x e c u t e d b y R a y m u n d o a n d P e d r o B a n a s correcting an error made on the marriage certificate of the former changing the father of Raymundo from Bibiano to Pedro C O U R T S A Y S A public instrument explicitlystating Pedro is the father of Raymundo is strong evidence that he does not acknowledge or have the intention thereof that the latter is his son If Raymundo really believed that he isi n d e e d t h e s o n o f B i b i a n o h e c o u l d n o t h a v e c o n s e n t e d t o e x e c u t i n g s u c h d e c l a r a t i o n ; Trinidads contention of the document was contradictory and therefore set aside. *MaamB e t h d o e s not buy the interpretation of Your Father as a reference term for an u n c l e . UYGUANGCO v CA See Illegitimate Filiation PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 121 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP LawB2012 respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition. The r e g i s t r a t i o n d i d n t operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. SC stated that prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation w/c subjectto certain conditions: 1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership 2) such an act of repudiationis clearly made known to the other co-owners 3) the evidence thereon is clear & conclusive4) he has been in possession thru open, continuous, exclusive & notorious possession of the prop for a period required by law Inasmuch as petitioners registered the prop in their namesin fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s d i s c o v e r e d t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a c t o f d e f r a u d a t i o n . And this action wascommenced 2 months after learning petitioners had r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e i r n a m e s t h e l o t s involved to the prejudice of private respondents. 2) WON the private respondents, were ableto prove their successional rights over the estate. YES FC has to apply since it is effectivealready. And under Art 172, filiation of legit kids may be established by the record of birthappearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open & continuous possession of the status of a legit kid. Evidence proves the private respondents legit filiation. Jacintos birthcert was presented. Though Julian and Paulina didnt present evidence required by Art 172,they continuously enjoyed the status as kids of Lupo in the same manner as Jacinto. And for a considerable length of time & despite the death of their mom, they lived with Lupo until hisd e a t h . A C E B E D O v A R Q U E R O ( 2 0 0 3 ) 3 9 9 S C R A 1 0 - E d w i n A c e b e d o c h a r g e d E d d i e Arquero for immorality in an administrative complaint. He alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo and respondent unlawfully cohabited as husband and wife as a result of which agirl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two. Attached was the birth certificate of the girl indicating her parents to be Arquero and Dedjoe. He also presented a copy of their marriage contract. Arquero vehemently denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it isjust a mere harassment and a product of complainants hatred and extreme jealousy to hiswife. He presented a sworn statement wherein Edwin Acebedo (complainant) acknowledged

petitioner claimed that she lifetime. was in the uninterrupted possession of the status of anatural child of the decedent and her Maam Beth asks: How would illegitimate childrenmother. know they are illegitimate if they have always been CA affirmed the lower courtsfindings living with the family? The only time theyd learn ratiocinating that it is not unusualif Pablo looked they do are not entitled to their parents estate is upon Maria as if she werehis own daughter when they die. Only Sempio-Diy knows that rule, because he had no childin his previous mortals dont! marriage. 1. those conceived of parents who have no legali m p e d i m e n t t o m a r r y a t t h e t i m e o f m a y b e l e g i t i m a t e d a l l o t h e r i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n COMPARED t h e c o n c e p t i o n W I T H T H E C C P R O V I S I O N O N P R O V I N G ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION: Art 285 provided for exceptions in t h e p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r recognition of natural children, FC removed this provision in Par 2, Art 175. (Uyguangco vCA) 1. If the father or the mother died during the minority of the child, in which case thel a t t e r m a y f i l e t h e a c t i o n b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f f o u r y e a r s f r o m t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f h i s majority. 2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In thiscase, the action must be commenced within 4 years from the finding of the document. HOWTO BRING ACTION TO CLAIM FILIATION 1. File a separate action 2. Intervene in thesettlement of estate of his/her alleged parent LEUTERIO v CA (1991) 197 SCRA 369 Ma.A l i c i a L e u t e r i o c l a i m s t h a t s h e i s t h e n a t u r a l d a u g h t e r o f P a b l o L e u t e r i o a n d A n a Maglangque, who was the servant of the former. Alicia claims that she was conceived at thetime when her parents were not disqualified to marry each other and that she was legitimated by the ISSUE: WON Alicia is the legitimated daughter of Pablo and Ana HELD: No. CAdecision was affirmed. The relief of petitioner is that of involuntary recognition which may be given if there is incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his p a t e r n i t y . T h e r e c o g n i t i o n m u s t b e p r e c i s e , express and solemn. The photographs she presented likewise did not bear the d e c e d e n t s s i g n a t u r e . S h e w a s a l s o n o t a l e g i t i m a t e d daughter. UYGUANGCO v CA (1989) 178 SCRA 684 Graciano Uyguangco claims that heis the illegitimate son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco who died intestate. Graciano admitshaving no documents to prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous possession of thestatus of an illegitimate child. He moved to Misamis Oriental where Apolinario supported hiseducation and even hired him as a storekeeper in their store without objection of the family.He was allowed to use the surname and shared in the profits of the copra business. ISSUE:WON he should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, whois already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the CC. PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 125 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 HELD: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred.Since Graciano seeks to prove filiation based on Par 2 of Art 172 FC, it should take placeduring the lifetime of the parent. His action is barred because of the death of his father. Art283 CC which gives weight to continuous possession of the status of a child of his allegedf a t h e r b y t h e d i r e c t a c t s o f t h e l a t t e r o r h i s f a m i l y h a s b e e n s u p e r s e d e d b y A r t 1 7 5 F C . RODRIGUEZ v CA (1995) 245 SCRA 150 On Oct. 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos filed a caseagainst Bienvenido Rodriguez. He presented his mother as witness to reveal the identity of h i s f a t h e r . C o u n s e l f o r R o d r i g u e z o b j e c t e d a n d t h e T r i a l C o u r t s u s t a i n e d . C l a r i t o f i l e d a petition in the SC and the SC referred the case to the CA. That decision is assailed in thiscase. Petitioner: Felicitas shouldnt be allowed to reveal the name of the father as stated inArt. 280 of the Civil Code: When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately,

he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be identified. Respondent:Fecilitas should be allowed by : 1. Art 283(4) CC: The father is obliged to recognize the childas his natural child when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant ishis father 2. Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: A witness can testify only tothose facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules mother is - In 1983, Luz Fabian fileda complaint for the compelled recognition of her children as compulsory heirs of thedeceased on the grounds of open and continuous possession of the status of i l l e g i t i m a t e children. RTC declared only Antonia as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and entitledto her share in the estate ISSUE: 1. WON Family Code provisions apply in instant case 2.WON application of Family Code in this case prejudice or impair vested right of respondentshould FC be given retroactive effect 3. WON trial court lost jurisdiction when FC took effect. HELD: 1. No. The suit was filed prior to the effectivity of FC, thus CC provisions stillapply. Art 285 CC governs the case and not Art 175 Par 2 FC. 2. YES. If FC prevails over C C i n t h e c h o i c e o f w h i c h s h o u l d g o v e r n , i t w o u l d p r e j u d i c e A n t o n i a s r i g h t w h i c h w a s vested upon her by virtue of Art. 285, through the abovementioned suit for recognition. 3. NO. Since CC still governs the case, trial court never lost its original jurisdiction. What isyour understanding of a vested right? It is not defined in Art 256 FC because it should be ona case to case basis, taking into account all the circumstances and facts. Subsequent changeof law should not affect the available cause of action. JISON v CA (1998) 286 SCRA 495M o n i n a J i s o n a l l e g e d t h a t s h e i s t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e d a u g h t e r o f F r a n c i s c o J i s o n . F r a n c i s c o denied paternity. While married to Lilia Jison, Francisco impregnated the nanny of his eldestdaughter, Esperanza Amolar. The child was born and enjoyed the continuous and impliedrecognition as an illegitimate child. Francisco spent for her education until she became aCPA and eventually worked as Central Bank examiner. It was her father who paid for the burial expenses for her mothers death. And it was through filiation with her father that she previously was able to seek employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. She was able toname the members of the Jison household as well as the staff in her fathers office. She alsoclaimed knowing the 3 children of Francisco and Lilia. The last time she saw her father waswhen she sought his blessings to get married. In sum, Moninas evidence and testimoniesshowed that a. she was close with Franciscos relatives ISSUE: WON the testimony of thea d m i s s i b l e f o r c o m p u l s o r y r e c o g n i t i o n . H E L D : Y e s . P r o h i b i t i o n i n A 2 8 0 , a g a i n s t t h e identification of the father or mother of a child apply only in voluntary & not in compulsoryrecognition. The said laws were repealed by the FC. Art 172 FC states that filiation may be proved by any evidence and proof that the defendant is his father. ARUEGO v CA (1996)254 SCRA 711 Jose Aruego while married had an extra-marital relationship with Luz Fabianin 1959 until his death in March 1982. Allegedly born to this amorous relationship wereA n t o n i a a n d E v e l y n , b o t h s u r n a m e d A r u e g o . P E R S O N S AND FAMILY RELATIONS |Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 126 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP LawB 2 0 1 2 b . - s h e r e c e i v e d P 1 5 a s m o n t h l y a l l o w a n c e f r o m h e r f a t h e r c o u r s e d t h r o u g h accountants of his office c. her filiation was known in the Jison office & household d. her allowance was not recorded in the books but in a separate cash book because it had to beh i d d e n f r o m M r s J i s o n a n d c h i l d r e n e . t h a t s h e e v e n a s k e d f o r a C h r i s t m a s g i f t f r o m h e r godfather, Don Vicente, father of Mrs Jison When Monina wanted to go to Spain, her father negotiated that in exchange for the expenses, she would sign a document that denies her What a poignant novel she can now author as she seeks to establish her parental links withher dad. There must be questions as to why his dad didnt marry her mom when there

wereno legal impediments at the time of her conception. Note that under the different categoriesof illegitimate children under the CC, the natural child occupies the highest position since her parents were not disqualified to marry during her conception. GUY v CA (2006) 502 SCRA151 Sima Wei died intestate in Makati City on October 1992, leaving 10M worth of real and personal properties His known heirs are his surviving spouse and Shirley Guy and childrenPrivate respondents (minors Karen and Kamille Wei), represented by their mother Remediosfiled a petition and prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderlys e t t l e m e n t o f S i m a W e i s e s t a t e . P e t i t i o n e r s p r a y e d f o r t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e p e t i t i o n o f Remedios on the following grounds: 1. That Sima Lei left no debts and there is therefore noneed to secure letters of administration 2. That private respondents should have establishedt h e i r s t a t u s as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei 3. That p r i v a t e respondents claim had been paid, waived and abandoned or otherwise e x t i n g u i s h e d b y reason of Remedios RELEASE AND WAIVER CLAIM stating that in exchange for thefinancial educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor childrendischarge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabitilities ISSUES: PERSONS ANDFAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 128 of 170 KarichiE. Santos | UP Law B2012 1. 2. WON the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes privaterespondents from claiming their successional rights WON private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation IN RE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATESOF DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA (2006) 480 SCRA 334Lucio Campo HELD: 1. No. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms donot explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. The document does not statewith clarity the purpose for its execution. Parents and guardians may not also repudiate theinheritance of their wards without judicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized,t h e R e l e a s e a n d W a i v e r o f C l a i m i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e i s v o i d a n d w i l l n o t b a r p r i v a t e respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. It must also be emphasizedthat waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Private respondents could nothave possible waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status asa c k n o w l e d g e d i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n o f t h e d e c e a s e d . 2 . A r u l i n g i n t h e s a m e w o u l d b e premature considering respondents have yet to present evidences to prove their filiation. It ist h e d u t y o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . A G U S T I N v C A ( 2 0 0 5 ) 4 6 0 SCRA 315 Arnel Agustin had anextramarital affair with Fe Prollamante which p r o d u c e d t h e c h i l d n a m e d M a r t i n . A r n e l suggested to have the pregnancy aborted which Fe refused. Arnel allegedly took care of allt h e m e d i c a l b i l l s i n M a r t i n s b i r t h and even signed his birth certificate as the father.However, in the long run, A r n e l f a i l e d t o g i v e s u s t e n a n c e d e s p i t e h i s a d e q u a t e f i n a n c i a l capacity. Fe, afflicted with leukemia, sues Arnel for support. They also moved for DNAt e s t i n g t o prove their cause of action. ISSUES: 1. WON complaint for support can b e converted to a petition for recognition 2. WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and rightagainst self-incrimination HELD: 1. The action does not amount to conversion. Rather, theDNA was necessity to establish the respondents cause of action. Also, even if the order would effect the establishment of filiation, the integration of the two actions is still lawful because the resolution of one issue necessary in the determination of the other issue. 2. No.R i g h t t o s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n i s c o n s i d e r e d o n l y i n w r i t t e n a n d v e r b a l compulsion. Felisa Ramon Osorio Guillerm o Josefa This case involves the partition of the estate of decedentGuillermo and Josefa Delgado. The two groups contending the right of inheritance are theheirs of Josefa Delgado (her half and full-blood siblings and their descendants) and the heirsof Guillermo Delgado (his siblings and their descendants, his illegitimate child and de factoadopted child).

Josefa died before Guillermo, both intestate. The existence of their marriagei s a l s o u n d e r q u e s t i o n . 1 . H E I R S O F J O S E F A D E L G A D O . F e l i s a h a d s e v e n c h i l d r e n fathered by two men, all the births were out of wedlock. In effect the children belong to theillegitimate line. 2. HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA. He had an illegitimate child namedGuillerma with Amparo Sagarbarria. However, in his petition for adoption of his ampun-ampunan Guillermina, he declared that he had no legitimate, legitimated or acknowledgenatural child. ISSUES: 1. WON Guillermo and Josefa were validly married 2. Who the legalh e i r s o f t h e d e c e d e n t s a r e 1 . T h e i r c o h a b i t a t i o n o f 5 0 y e a r s c a n n o t b e d o u b t e d . B y presumption of law, there existed valid marriage between them. Marriage contract is not theonly proof of marriage. The baptismal certificate wherein Josefa was referred to as seoritahas no legal bearing. Because of the declaration of Luis as the natural child of Felisa, itwas established that no marriage took place between Ramon Osorio and her. Given that,illegitimate siblings, whether half or full blood can reciprocally inherit from each other. Onlythe collateral relatives (and their heirs by their right of representation) of Josefa who are aliveat the time of her death are entitled to a share in her estate. Guilllermas right to compulsoryrecognition prescribed upon the death of her putative father because her open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate Guillermina & Nanie Guillerma (illegitimate childwith Amparo Sagarbarria) Nazario Edilberta Jose Jacoba Gorgonio Luis 2. 3. PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 129 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 child is only a ground for compelling acknowledgement.The obituary written by Guillermo for Josefa which includes her as his child does not pass asgenuine writing. Same goes for the ampun-ampunan Guillermina. As a result, Guillermoscompulsory heirs are his collateral relatives. ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG v DIAZ (2007)540 SCRA 480 - Jinky sued for the determination of her minor child Joannes filiation viaD N A t e s t i n g f o r c l a i m o f s u p p o r t . D e s p i t e h e r m a r r i a g e w i t h H a s e g a w a K a t s u o , s h e maintained illicit affair with Rogelio Ong. She got impregnated, and Rogelio Ong covered allthe medical bills and baptismal expenses until he cut off the support and said that the childwas not his. During the pendency of the case, Rogelio died. ISSUES: 1. WON the court erredin not declaring Joanne as the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky 2. WON DNA analysisis still feasible notwithstanding the death of Rogelio Ong HELD: 1. No. The presumption of legitimacy of the child is not conclusive and may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.Further, the resolution of the second issue will render the issue moot. 2. Yes. Rogelios deathd o e s n o t i p s o facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there e x i s t appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological samples means any organic materialoriginating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects. *This was decideddifferently, deviated from the rule that only the husband can raise or impugn the childslegitimacy. Mam is in favor of this ruling. 2. Rights of illegitimate children FC, Art 176Illegitimate children shall use the surname and sh mother, and shall be entitled to support inconformity with this use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expres record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an ad handwritten instrument is made by thefather. PROVIDED, the before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifeti shall the subsequent marriage of their parents In legitimation, the law makes legal what exists bynature, while in adoption, the law creates by fiction a relation that did not in fact exist byn a t u r e . R E Q U I S I T E S F O R L E G I T I M A T I O N 1 . c h i l d w a s c o n c e i v e d A N D b o r n o u t o f wedlock 2. the parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other at thet i m e o f c o n c e p t i o n C H I L D R E N W H O C A N N O T B E L E G I T I M A T E D 1 . a d u l t e r o u s 2 . but incestuous 3. of marriages against public policy 4. of bigamous marriages can beADOPTED to elevate their status PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |

P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 133 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 Whycant children of adulterous relationships cannot be legitimated? 1. rational of legitimationwould be destroyed 2. unfair to legitimate children in terms of successional rights 3. problemof public scandal 4. will destroy the sanctity of marriage 5. very scandalous, especially if the parents marry years after the birth of the child 6. it is tantamount to tolerating what wouldh a v e b e e n a w r o n g a c t , i t w o u l d s e e m t o b e m o r e b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e e r r i n g s p o u s e T o m a s a married and had a daughter, Maria Luciano. When she was widowed, she took her daughter with her and lived in the house that Leon Escobar built for them. Leon visited them almosteveryday. He sent his sons Antonio and Fortunato to keep them company at night. WhenTomasa died, Leon took Maria into his home until she married and was taken by her husbandto the province. Leon Escobar died, then Fortunato became ill. Antonio wrote to Maria toreturn to Manila to nurse Fortunato, even sending money for passage. When Fortunato died,Antonio took Maria into a FC, Art 178 Legitimation shall take place by subsequent validmarriage between parents. The annulment ofhis home, where she lived until Antonios death.voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. Maria claims that she is entitled to inheritfrom the estate of Antonio by virtue of her being the CC: legitimation takes place throughsubsequent legitimate daughter of Tomasa, who is a marriage (Art 270) provided that the parents have legitimated sister of Antonio acknowledge the child before or after the marriageISSUE: WON Maria Luciano is entitled to inherit from FC: legitimation takes place throughsubsequent Antonio marriage as long as the requisites of Art 177 are met. The length of time b e t w e e n c h i l d s b i r t h a n d H E L D : Y E S . A c h i l d t h a t e n j o y s c o n t i n u o u s p o s s e s s i o n t h e parents marriage does not matter. of the status of a natural child is considered legitimated bythe subsequent marriage of the * The status of legitimated children in void ab initio parents.Maria Lucianos mother Tomasa was marriages are likewise affected because no marriagelegitimated by the Maria of her parents hence a exists at all. legitimate sister of Antonio. Alegitimate daughter of a legitimated sister is entitled to inherit from her mothers legitimatedaughter - Maria may inherit FC, Art 179 Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights aslegitimate children. from Antonio. FC, Art 180 The effects of legitimation shall retroact tothe time RAMIREZ v birth. of the childs GMUR (1919) - * To protect not only the child butalso the childs descendants because it can happen that at the time of the marriage of thechilds parents, the child already had married and died is survived by children who should b e n e f i t f r o m t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n o f t h e i r d e c e a s e d p a r e n t . 4 2 P h i l 8 5 5 D o a A n a R a m i r e z Samuel Bischoff Felisa Castro Wertmuller Leona Castro Frederick Dr. descendants. FC, Art181 The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefittheirErnest von Emil Mory Kauffman FC, Art 182 Legitimation may be impugned only bythose who are prejudiced in theirElena within five years from the time rights, Leontina their cause of action accrues. Elizabeth Federico Carmen Maria Ernesto Esther DE LOS SANTOSv LUCIANO (1934) 60 Phil 328 Tomasa Escobar was born to Leon Escobar and JosefaEsguerra before they were married. After her parents got married, they begot two more children: Antonio and Fortunato Escobar. All the while, Tomasa lived with the spouses andtheir two legitimate children. The children called the spouses Tatay and Nanay. Theo t h e r c h i l d r e n c a l l e d T o m a s a M a n a n g , w h i c h i s a n a p p e l l a t i o n g i v e n t o elder sisters.Tomasa grew up and lived under the care of the spouses until she m a r r i e d . T h e s p o u s e s supported her, treated and presented her as their daughter, and was publicly known as such. -- Samuel, a Swiss, is married to Ana Ramirez without children. He died in 1913 and left awill which declares that he has no forced heir. He bequeaths all his properties to his wife, tothe exclusion of properties in Switzerland which are adjudicated to his brothers and sisters.H i s d e c l a r a t i o n o f a b s e n c e o f f o r c e h e i r s i g n o r e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f h i s d e s c e n d a n t s f r o m Leona. Leona is born to Felisa Castro and an unknown father. However, on the

margin of her original baptismal certificate was an annotation by Fr. Ferrero that Samuel recognized her ashis natural daughter. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 134 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - - Leona grew up inSamuels family and brought up as a family member, which effected a tacit admission of paternity. 1895 Leona Frederick, a Brit born in H K w i t h w h o m s h e h a d t h r e e children. 1899 Leona goes to Switzerland to r e c u p e r a t e i n a s a n a t o r i u m ( d i d n o t s p e c i f y illness). After sometime, she told Fred that she does not want to be his wife anymore. So in1 9 0 4 F r e d w e n t t o F r a n c e a n d obtained a decree of divorce which was granted in 1905.Leona fell for her d o c t o r E m i l . T h e y b e g o t a c h i l d i n 1 9 0 0 a n d m a r r i e d a f t e r L e o n a g o t divorced from Fred. Two more daughters issued in the married. 1910 Leona died The heirs of L e o n a s e e k s participation in the estate of their alleged grandfather Samuel. Otto Gmur (respondent) appeared as guardian of 3 Mory children while Fred a p p e a r e d f o r h i s o w n children. Ana insists that Samuel did not recognized Leona. - Anas contention that onlykids born of persons free to marry may possess status of recognized natural child. There being no evidence to show Felisa Castros status at the time Leona was born, she will be presumed single or widow. Court cannot entertain contrary presumption that Felisas guiltyof adultery. As a recognized natural daughter, had she survived her dad, she would have beenhis forced heir (CC Art 807 (3) & 939) and entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance (CC Art 842). No. French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for dissolution of marriagec o n t r a c t e d i n t h e P h i l b y p e r s o n s d o m i c i l e d h e r e e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e s u c h m a r r i a g e i s indissoluble under Philippine laws. Although the spouses (first marriage) have traveled todifferent places, all those stays were limited & thus we cant say that they have establishedtheir domicile elsewhere. It has been established that court of a country in w/c neither spouseis domiciled & w/c one/both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining divorcehas no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status & a divorce granted by such court isnot entitled to recognition anywhere. Going to one place for the sole purpose of obtainingdivorce w/o intention to remain in that place is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on courtsof that state especially if cause of divorce is not recognized by the laws of the state of that persons own domicile. During the time they obtained divorce decree, the Phil law providedthat a valid marriage can only be dissolved by death of one of the parties. The law invoked inobtaining the divorce allowed divorce where wife has been guilty of adultery/husband guiltyo f concubinage. Evidently, this should not be upheld since it is repugnant to the m o r a l sensibilities of our people & its contrary to law. Leontinas status: The first marriage wasstill subsisting when she was born thus shes an offspring of an adulterous intercourse w/c isnot capable of legitimation (CC Art 119). WON the Mory and the Kaufman children areentitled to inherit. Fredericks children are legitimate & entitled to inherit, thus no need to allowed for certain preference, for instance, they could specify sex. Females are generallymore adoptible because they are easier to take care of. The PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVEPARENTS Inquiry Attend adoption home study report (Sec 14) forum Application DSWDmakes a case study report issuance of pre-adoption placement authority (PAPA) MatchingPlacement 4. 5. 6. 7. PERSONS AND FAMILY

Supervised trial custody for 6 months or less RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 138 of 170 Karichi E.Santos | UP Law B2012 - - notion is adopting a boy is like bringing in a male stranger. The peak season for adoption is during Christmas. Parents prefer younger children because theyh a v e n o v a l u e s y e t . T h e y a r e r e l a t i v e l y m o r e c o n v e n i e n t t o s h a p e a n d r e a r i n a w a y t h e adoptive parents want to. Not much mannerisms or habits yet. Regarding physical attributes,Maam Beth noticed that the adoptive parents want the child to have a resemblance with thehusband. B. Who may adopt/be adopted FC, Art 183 A person of age, and in possession of full civil capacity an support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate in keeping wO n l y m i n o r s m a y b e a d o p t e d , e x c e p t i n t h e c a s e s w h e n t h e a d o p t i o n o I n a d d i t i o n , t h e adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the p nature of the adopted or is the spouseo f t h e l e g i t i m a t e p a r e n t o f t h e p * T h e a g e g a p e n s u r e s t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e adopter and the adoptee will be a parent child relationship (approximate natural filiation) andthat the adopter has sufficient maturity to fulfill the role of a parent to the adopted child.(Think Daddy Long Legs) ADOPTION OF SEVERAL CHILDREN: A person may legallyadopt two or more children. FC, Art 185 Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in thefollow 1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child 2. When one spouses e e k s t o a d o p t t h e l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d o f t h e o t * U n d e r C C a n d P D 6 0 3 , s p o u s e s c a n a d o p t solely. * But what if one spouse seeks to adopt the illegitimate child of the other? FC, Art1 8 6 I n c a s e h u s b a n d a n d w i f e j o i n t l y a d o p t o r o n e s p o u s e a d o s h a l l b e e x e r c i s e d b y t h e spouses in accordance with this Code. * Consent not required in case of legal separation because it terminates the common life between the spouses and the reason for requiring thethis consent of one spouse for the adoption made by the other no longer exists was madeexplicit in RA 8552 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 139 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 the childs sickness, hewas entrusted to the Art 183 (who may adopt), Art 184 (who may not adopt), Art 185 (jointadoption of spouses) and Art petitioners since birth. The natural parents of the 186 (parentala u t h o r i t y ) h a v e b e e n a m e n d e d b y A r t I I I S e c 7 , R A 8 5 5 2 m i n o r v o l u n t a r i l y g a v e t h e i r consent and written conformity to the adoption. The SG opposed the WHO MAY ADOPT petition on the ground that relatives by blood or by affinity are prohibited from adopting oneanother bec I. For Filipino citizens of the incongruous dual relationship that will result. 1. of legal age 2. full capacity and legal rights TC dismissed the petition, hence this appeal. 3. 4. 5.good moral character, no conviction for crime involving moral turpitude emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children WON an elder sister may adopt her younger ISSUE: at least 16 years older than the adoptee UNLESS biological parent of the adoptee or the spouses of the adoptees brother parent II. For aliens HELD: Yes. There is no provisionin the law 1. qualifications for Filipino citizens 2. the country has diplomatic relations withthe Philippinesprohibiting relatives by blood from adopting one 3. 4. 5. 6. another. A. 335 NCC enumerates those persons who has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the filing of application may not adopt, and it has been shown that certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal petitioners arent among those prohibited from capacity to adopt in his/her country adopting. A. 339 NCC names those who cant be his/her government allows the adoptee to enter thec o u n t r y a s h i s / h e r a d o p t e d s o n / d a u g h t e r r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r r e s i d e n c y a n d c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f qualification is waived forthe followingEdwin isnt one of those adopted and the minor a. b.former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relativeexcluded 4 within the by law. A. 338 NCC on the other hand allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural seeks to adoptthe legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse might be, w/c isnt the policy of thelaw. Adoption statutes, being humane and authority and designed If spouses jointly

adoptedor one spouse adopted the illegitimate child of the other, Joint parental salutary, shall beexercised to provide homes, care and education for by parents. unfortunate kids, should beconstrued so as to encourage the adoption of such kids by persons who * Qualifications for e x e m p t i o n i n r e s i d e n c y c a n p r o p e r l y r e a r a n d e d u c a t e t h e m . r e q u i r e m e n t s o f R A 8 5 5 2 (Number 6 in box above) is The fact that adoption in this case will result in a the exemptionto the general rules for adoption by dual relationship between the parties, that the aliens inArt 184 Par 3. One difference is that RA adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting8552 allowed for adoption of relatives by affinity sister, shouldnt prevent the adoption.O n e i s b y n a t u r e , w h i l e t h e o t h e r i s b y f i c t i o n o f l a w . T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p e s t a b l i s h e d b y adoption is limited to the adopting parents and doesnt extend to their other relatives, excepta s e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d b y l a w . P e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n g r a n t e d . A r t I I I S e c 8 , R A 8 6 6 2 REPUBLIC v CA and BOBILES (1992) 205 SCRA 356 WHO MAY BE ADOPTED Any person: Private respondent Zenaida Bobiles filed a 1. below 18 years of age who has beenadministratively or judicially declared available for adoption then 6 yo and petition to adoptJason Condat, 2. legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse who had beenliving with her family since he was 3. illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter toimprove his/her status to that of legitimacy 4 mos old. 4. a person of legal age IF prior to theadoption said person has been consistently considered and treated by the The court a quo,finding the petition to be adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority sufficient in form andsubstance, issued and 5. a child whose adoption has been previously rescinded order setting proceedings for be initiated within 6 6. a child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) hasdied PROVIDED that nothe petition shallhearing. The order was duly published and postedwith copies months from the time of death of said parent IN RE ADOPTION OF EDWINV I L L A ( 1 9 6 7 ) a k a S A N T O S J r . v R E P U B L I C 2 1 S C R A 2 9 9 S p o u s e s L u i s S a n t o s J r a lawyer and Edipola Villa a nurse, having no child of their own, filed a petition praying thatthe minor Edwin Villa, a younger brother of Edipola, be declared their son by adoption. Duet o s e a s o n a b l y s e r v e d t o i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . N o b o d y a p p e a r e d t o o p p o s e t h e p e t i t i o n . Subsequently, the RTC granted the petition w h i c h w a s a f f i r m e d b y t h e C A . D u r i n g t h e pendency of her petition, the FC took effect which makes mandatory the joint adoption of spouses. married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relativewithin the 4 father or mother, and a stepchild by the stepdad or consanguinity OR affinity of the Filipino spouse stepmom. III. Guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial To say that adoption shouldnt be allowedwhen accountabilities the IV. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the followingc a s e s : a d o p t e r a n d t h e a d o p t e d a r e r e l a t e d t o e a c h a . i f o n e s p o u s e s e e k s t o a d o p t t h e legitimate son/daughter of theexcept in those cases enumerated Art 338 CC other, other b. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter PROVIDED that the other spouse has signified is to preclude adoption among relatives no mater his/her consent theretohow removed or in whatever degree that relationship c. if the spouses are legally separated (married to Francisco Veloso) A month after Mariano Lazatins death, Margarita de Asisc o m m e n c e d a n i n t e s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g b e f o r e t h e C F I o f P a s a y . T o t h e s a i d proceeding,M a r i a n o , O s c a r , V i r g i l i o a n d Y v o n n e i n t e r v e n e d s i n c e t h e y claimed to be admittedillegitimate (not natural) children of Mariano w i t h a w o m a n n a m e d H e l e n M u o z . Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another illegitimate (notnatural) child PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.2008-2009 Page 141 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - - 2 months after theintestate proceeding, Margarita de Asis died but left a holographic will (a will

writtenentirely in the testators hand), which provided, among others, for: o a l e g a c y o f c a s h , jewelry and stocks to Arlene De Leon, a granddaughter o a legacy of support to RodolfoGallardo, a son of her late sister o a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara (petitionersson) During Margarita de Asis lifetime, she kept a safety deposit box at the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, which either she or Nora could open. Five days after Margaritas death, Nora opened the said box and removed its contents (shares of stock, adoption papers of hersand her sisters, jewelry belonging to her and to her mother) Her sole reason for opening the box was to get the stock certificates and other small items. A bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to open the box in view of her mothers death. So,she decided to remove everything from it On June 3, 1974, the private respondents filed a p e t i t i o n t o probate the will of Margarita Days after learning that Nora opened the b o x , Ramon Sta. Clara filed a motion in the probate court, claiming: o that Margarita had executeda will subsequent to that submitted for probate o demanded its production o prayed for theo p e n i n g o f t h e b o x O f c o u r s e , w h e n t h e c o u r t o r d e r e d i t s o p e n i n g , t h e b o x w a s a l r e a d y empty. Seven months after Margaritas death, Renato Lazatin intervened for the first time asa n a d m i t t e d i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d . T h e n h e a l s o f i l e d a m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e estate of Margarita de Asis, this time as an adopted child on the basis of an affidavit executed byBenjamin Lazatin, brother of Mariano, stating that Renato w a s a n i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d o f Mariano who has later adopted by him. The affidavit was later modified to state that Renatowas adopted by both Mariano and Margarita Renatos motion to intervene in the settlementof the estate of Margarita was denied by the lower court on the ground that the evidence presented tend to prove that he was a recognized natural child of Mariano, but not a legallyadopted child of Margarita. He never presented a decree of adoption in his favor. Likewise,R e n a t o s m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n w a s d e n i e d b y t h e c o u r t u n l e s s h e p r e s e n t e d s o m e documentary evidence to prove his adoption Renato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention inthe probate proceedings of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child. ISSUE: WONRenato is an adopted child HELD: Renato has not established his status as an adopted child.Secondary evidence is not admissible unless the existence of the records are proven alongwith the contents of the records and its loss. Adoption is a juridical act and the statutoryrequirements must be strictly carried out otherwise it is a nullity. The fact of adoption isnever presumed, but must be affirmatively proven by the person claiming its existence. - - -PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page142 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 SANTOS v ARANZANSO (1966) 16 SCRA344 Paulina, 17 and Aurora, 8 were adopted by spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes.The two minors were in the custody of the couple since infancy and the whereabouts of their biological parents are unknown since the outbreak of the war. Crisanto de Mesa, the guardianad litem gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina who was over 14 years old thenalso put in writing her assent to the proceeding. An adoption decree was eventually granted 8 years later, Juliana died and Simplicio commenced the settlement of her estate declaring thathe and the two adopted daughters, are the surviving heirs Gregoria Aranzanso, an allegedfirst cousin of Juliana opposed the settlement estate saying that the marriage between Julianaand Simplicio is void ab initio for being bigamous. Likewise, the adoption is also null for want of written consent of their parents. Demetria Ventura, who claims to be another cousinof Juliana and mother of Paulina filed her opposition in the same tenor as Gregorias. ISSUE:WON the adoption decree is valid. HELD: Yes. Consent by the parents to the adoption is nota n a b s o l u t e r e q u i s i t e . I f t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s h a v e a b a n d o n e d t h e i r k i d s , c o n s e n t b y t h e guardian ad litem suffices. In adoption proceedings, abandonment imports any conduct onthe part of the parent w/c evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties & relinquishall parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural & legalobligations of care & support which parents owe to their kids. Although the adoption courtdid not use the term abandonment the

reasons propounded bear the essential elements of abandonment. Granting arguendo that the marriage between Juliana and Simplicio is void,the adopted children are deemed to be adopted by Juliana as a single person. The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote welfare of the child, every reasonable intendments h o u l d b e s u s t a i n e d t o p r o m o t e t h a t o b j e c t i v e . D S W D v B E L E N ( 1 9 9 7 ) 2 7 5 S C R A 6 4 5 Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo, naturalized US citizens, filed a petition toadopt their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Antonio Belen grantedt h e p e t i t i o n b a s e d o n t h e f i n d i n g s a n d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h e D S W D t h a t t h e a d o p t i n g parents and the adoptee have developed emotional attachment. When travel clearance was b e i n g s o u g h t f r o m D S W D so that the child may join her adopters in the States, it wasd i s c o v e r e d t h a t DSWD was not informed about the commencement of the a d o p t i o n proceedings nor was it given notice of the petition being granted. HELD: The DSWD has to b e n o t i f i e d o f t h e a d o p t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s . A H o m e a n d C h i l d S t u d y R e p o r t i s m a n d a t o r y before adoption is to be finalized. The DSWD is undoubtedly has the necessary competence,m o r e t h a n t h a t p o s s e s s e d b y t h e c o u r t s o c i a l w e l f a r e o f f i c e r , t o m a k e t h e p r o p e r recommendation. Adoption is a legal advice by which a better future may be accorded anunfortunate child. Judge censured and social worker reprimanded. D. Consent necessary for adoption FC, Art 188 The written consent of the following to the adoptio 1. The person to beadopted, if 10 years or older 2. The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, o 3. Thelegitimate and adopted children, 10 years or older, 4. The illegitimate children, 10 years or older, of the ado latters spouse, if any 5. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to beado Art III Sec 9, RA 8662 WHOSE CONSENT IS NECESSARY 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The adopteeif 10 years of age or over the biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal whichhas legal custody of the child the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, 10 years of age othe illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years of age or over of th spouse the spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted * PD 603 and CC: The consent of the adoptee was requiredo n l y i f 1 4 y e a r s o f a g e o r o v e r . D U N C A N v C F I ( 1 9 7 6 ) 6 9 S C R A 2 9 8 A 3 - d a y o l d b a b y named Colin Berry Christensen Duncan was given by his unwed mother to Atty. CorazonVelasquez. She also instructed him to look for a suitable couple to adopt the child. Atty.Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses (Robin Francis Radley and Maria LucyChristensen) to adopt the child. Husband: British national residing in the country for the last17 years and wife: American citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines No child of their own but previously adopted another child ISSUE: WON Atty. Velasquez is the proper p a r t y r e q u i r e d b y l a w t o g i v e c o n s e n t t h e a d o p t i o n H E L D : Y e s . S h e c a n rightfully give

spouses petition. OSG appealed to CA, CA upheld RTC on 23 January 1992; hence, this petition. ISSUES: WON RTC acquired jurisdiction on petition for adoption WON RTC andCA erred in granting change of given name from Midael to Michael HELD: YES. Petitioner contends that since the name appearing in the requisite notice by publication did not state thetrue name of the child. Court ruled that the case at bar was an obvious clerical error in thegiven name of the child, and does not confuse any identities. NO. The change of given namei s w i t h o u t f o r c e a n d e f f e c t . R u l e 1 0 8 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t d o e s n o t o n l y r e f e r t o e r r o r s concerning civil status, but even to names as well as enumerated in item (o) of 2 of Rule108. The local civil registrar must have been made party to the proceeding. The notice by publication also failed to include the matter on the change of name, depriving the local civilregistrar of notice and opportunity to be heard. REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ (1996) 253SCRA 509 Spouses Van and Regina Munson adopted an infant who bears the name KevinEarl Bartolome Moran in his birth certificate. When they had him baptized, they gave himthe name Aaron Joseph,

the name by which the child is known to the family, relatives andfriends. The spouses then instituted a joinder of the petition for adoption and the petition for a change of name. The petitioner opposed the said action saying that there is no legal basisfor the change of the adoptees given name. RTC ruled in favor changing the name of thechild ratiocinating that as adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may feely select thefirst name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that isfixed by law. - Further, the respondents submit that change of name may be given liberalconstruction since the object of strict implementation is to prevent fraudulent acts, while aninfant has not exercised any of its rights. ISSUES: 1. WON joinder of petition for adoptionand petition for a change of name is allowed by the law 2. WON there is lawful ground for the adoptees change of name HELD: 1. No. In order for two petitions may be joined in one proceeding, the causes of action must: (a) not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and (b) arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character. There is noconceptual unity between petition for adoption and petition for change of name. The twoactions are different and unrelated from each other, and therefore, two special proceedingswhich cannot be joined as having one cause of action. They must be instituted separately. 2. No. The change of surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of theadopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. The birth certificate,as it appears in the civil register, contains the official name. It does not matter if the mother,with all intention to abandon it later, named the child for the sake of naming it. If they reallywant to change the name, they institute another action under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.F. Rescission FC, Art 191 If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the a any p e r s o n authorized by the court or proper government instrume prescribed for l o s s o r suspension of parental authority. If the adopte judicial rescission of the adoption on the samegrounds prescribed for d FC, Art 192 The adopters may petition the court for the judicialr e s c i s 1 . I f t h e a d o p t e d h a s c o m m i t t e d a n y a c t c o n s t i t u t i n g a g r o u n d f o r d 2. When theadopted has abandoned the home of the adopters dur acts has d e f i n i t e l y r e p u d i a t e d t h e adoption ** Under CC, PD 603 and FC, both the adopted child and the adopter can ask for the judicial rescission. However, RA 8552 only allows rescission by the adoptee. PERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 148 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 expenses of judicial adoption o simply register adoptedc h i l d i n h e i r n a m e s a n y p e r s o n w h o c a u s e s f i c t i t i o u s registration GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION OF ADOPTION of birth of child under name/s of person/s not 1. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) his/her biological parent/s punishable by prison mayor medium plus 2. attempt on the life of the adoptee 3. sexual assault or violenceP 5 0 k fine 4. abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations i n c l u d e s physician/nurse/hospital personnel who cooperated in execution of crime, The only remedyavailable to the adopter is Art 919 CC which is disinheritance. similar penalties apply plus permanent disqualification Maam Beth says: The cost of adoption *Art 919 CC causesfor disinheritance decree is just as much as normal delivery! 1. conviction of an attemptagainst the life of Well, at least, thats my rate. the testator, his or her spouses, descendantsor ascendants 2. having accused the testator of a crime punishable by imprisonment for sixy e a r s o r m o r e , i f t h e a c c u s a t i o n h a s b e e n f o u n d g r o u n d l e s s 3 . c o n v i c t i o n o f a d u l t e r y o r concubinage with the spouse of the testator 4. having induced the testator to make a will or toc h a n g e o n e a l r e a d y m a d e , b y f r a u d , v i o l e n c e , i n t i m i d a t i o n o r u n d u e i n f l u e n c e 5 . r e f u s a l without justifiable cause to support the testator 6. maltreatment of the testator by word or deed 7. living a dishonorable or disgraceful life 8. conviction of a crime which carrier the penalty of civil interdiction Art VI Sec 19, RA 8662 EFFECTS OF RESCISSION FC, Art1 9 3 I f t h e a d o p t e d m i n o r h a s n o t r e a c h e d

the age of majority at the time of the judicialrescission of the adoption, the c o u r t i n t h e s a m e p r o c e e d i n g s h a l l r e i n s t a t e t h e p a r e n t a l authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in whichc a s e t h e c o u r t s h a l l a p p o i n t a g u a r d i a n o v e r t h e p e r s o n a n d p r o p e r t y o f t h e m i n o r . I f t h e adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both. Judicial rescission of the adoptionshall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adoptedarising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right touse the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption. Thecourt shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries. Art VIS e c 2 0 , R A 8 6 6 2 1 . Restoration of parental authority to original Reciprocal rights andobligation between adoptee and adopter extinguished Cancellation of amended b i r t h certificate Successional right back to before as of date of rescission Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected 2. 3. 4. 5. G. Rectification of Simulated BirthC R I M E O F S I M U L A T I O N O F B I R T H ( A r t V I I S e c 2 1 , R A 8 5 2 2 ) i n t e n d e d t o c u r b o r prevent such acts done by people who want to avoid trouble and PERSONS AND FAMILYRELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 149 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 R E C T I F I C A T I O N O F S I M U L A T I O N O F B I R T H ( A r t V I I S e c 2 2 , R A 8522) Three-in-one procedure 1. Correction of Entries in Birth certificate 2. Declaration of Abandonment 3. Adoption Decree Application for correction of the birth registration shall befiled within 5 years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter H. Adoptiond e c r e e R E Y E S v S O T E R O ( 2 0 0 6 ) 4 8 2 S C R A 5 2 0 E l e n a L i s i n g d i e d i n t e s t a t e . C o r a z o n Chichioco filed a petition for issuance of letter and administration and settlement and estateas the niece of the decedent with the collateral relatives of the decedent. Chichioco allegedthat the properties of the decedent is with the petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes, her grand niedeand that she be appointed as the administrator of these properties instead. Reyes filed anopposition to the petition, claiming that she is in fact the adopted child of the decedent andher husband Serafin delos Santos and that the appointment of administration is unnecessarysince she is the sole heir of Lising. As evidence, she provided the following: o Certificationfrom the Municipal Registrar of Paniqui, Tralac that on the Record of Court Decrees, Reyes fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex. It creates a presumption of fitness and suitability of one parent without c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e a c t u a l capabilities of both parties. It also imposes unnecessary legal burden on the father. (Note:The burden of proof that the mother is unfit. Thus, the male can only gain custody IF thefemale is unfit even if the father is fit. This violates the equal protection clause.) * Remember Moe v Dinkins, a case about the requirement of parental consent TEST PROXY MOE vDINKINS Maturity Age DEVINE Fitness Sex/Gender Is there a fit between the test and the proxy? No, because even if mothers are closer than fathers during infancy, it is not sufficientground because as the child matures, the difference between the parental skills of the father and the mother decreases. CERVANTES v FAJARDO (1989) 169 SCRA 575 Angelie AnneCervantes is the product of common-law relationship between Conrado Fajardo and GinaCarreon. They offered Angelie for adoption to her sister and brother in law, Zenaida CarreonCervantes and Nelson Cervantes, the petitioners in this case. Gina executed an affidavit of consent and an appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein petitioners. The petitionw a s g r a n t e d . P e t i t i o n e r s r e c e i v e d a l e t t e r f r o m t h e r e s p o n d e n t s d e m a n d i n g t o b e p a i d 150,000, or else, they would get back their child. The petitioners refused. Gina took the childfrom their yaya at the petitioners residence. Petitioners asked for the child but respondentrefused, saying that she had no desire to give up the child in the first place and

the affidavitthat she executed wasnt explained fully to her. The petitioners herein filed a writ of habeascorpus. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 20082009Page 153 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 were given weight by the court since theinterview and the examination were done for foreign travel and school purposes respectively,not for the advancement of the litigation case. Also, she refuses to talk to her in the phoneand when they saw each other in court, daughter ignored her mother and did not show anyl o n g i n g . T h e m o t h e r s i l l i c i t a f f a i r w i t h R e y n a l d o s c o w o r k e r s e e m e d t o h a v e c a u s e d emotional disturbances to Rosalind. There is also nothing in the records which show thatReynaldo was unfit. His assignment in the states is just temporary, and he will be coming b a c k h o m e t o t h e P h i l i p p i n e s p e r m a n e n t l y . C E L I S v C A F U I R ( 1 9 5 0 ) 8 6 P h i l 5 5 4 W h e n Ileana Celis gave birth to a boy, Joel, she entrusted him to Soledad Cafuir because of her fathers displeasure of the disgrace Ileana brought to the family for having illicit relationswith a man whom she is not married with and because of her fathers objection of having her son stay in the paternal home. Ileana made two documents: 1) entrusting Soledad her childand only Soledad can adopt the child. 2) appointment of Soledad as the childs guardian.Ileana only came to visit the boy every Saturday and provided some milk, food and a littlemoney. She eventually married co petitioner Agustin Rivera and then decided to get the boy b a c k , b u t S o l e d a d r e f u s e d . I l e a n a t h e n f i l e d f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus. Soledad, in her defense, claims that the two documents e n a c t e d b y I l e a n a r e n o u n c e d h e r c u s t o d y o f a n d patria potestas over her child. ISSUE: WON Ileana had renounced her custody of the child inf a v o r o f S o l e d a d . H E L D : N o . T h e f i r s t d o c u m e n t m e r e l y e n t r u s t e d h e r s o n t o s o l e d a d . Entrusted cannot convey the idea of permanent renunciation. Also, the clause that says Noo n e h a s t h e r i g h t t o c l a i m f o r a d o p t i o n e x c e p t S o l e d a d m e r e l y p r o v i d e s a n o p t i o n f o r Soledad, which she didnt take. The second document, on the other hand, merely designatedSoledad as the guardian of the child. The designation of one as the guardian does not meant h a t t h e g u a r d i a n w i l l always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position.GAMBOAHIRSCH v CA (2007) 527 SCRA 380 - Agnes Gamboa-Hirsh FranklinHarvey Hirsch and a daughter was born to them named Simon Noelle - They were married in Bacolod but the couple cannot agree on where they would establish their c o n j u g a l h o m e , w h e t h e r i n B o r a c a y o r i n M a k a t i . - T h e y s e t t l e d i n B o r a c a y b u t A g n e s insisted on going to Makati. She did, and took with her Noelle with no intention of coming back. Husband petitions for writ of habeas corpus which CA granted and they were given joint custody ISSUE: WON the CA erred in giving custody to both the parents HELD: Yes.A r t 2 1 3 a p p l i e s b e c a u s e t h e c h i l d i s u n d e r 7 y e a r s o l d a n d t h e m o t h e r d i d n o t h a v e t h e disqualification for possessing custody. SY v CA (2007) GR No. 124518 Mercedes filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for her two minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah. Her h u s b a n d W i l s o n a l l e g e s t h a t s h e i s u n f i t f o r c u s t o d y b e c a u s e s h e h a s 1 ) a b a n d o n e d t h e i r family, 2) mentally unstable and 3) cannot provide for their children ISSUE: WON Mercedescan have custody of her children HELD: Yes. Because all of Wilsons arguments, aside from being unsubstantiated, had been refuted by Mercedes. She left the conjugal home to work inT a i w a n a n d e a r n m o n e y t o r e c l a i m h e r c h i l d r e n . H e r a c t o f p r a y i n g i n t h e r a i n is a mereexpression of her faith, which is the same reason for the couples s e p a r a t i o n ( r e l i g i o u s differences). ii. PARENTAL UNFITNESS FELDMAN v FELDMAN (1974) 358 NYS 2d5 0 7 M a d y F e l d m a n f i l e d f o r d i v o r c e a g a i n s t h e r h u s b a n d , P h i l i p , b a s e d u p o n c r u e l a n d inhuman treatment. Pursuant to their separation agreement, she was awarded the custody of their 2 children. After the divorce, the former wife began dating a married man. In one visitof the former husband at her former wifes

house, he found a copy of Screw Magazine andsome letters with explicit photographs on the dining room and kitchen tables. The letterswere in response to the ads placed by the former wife and her male companion regarding funand games with other couples or groups. The former husband then filed a petition for thecustody of the two children. The trial court found that the wife was living sexually liberatedlifestyle. Based on this, the trial court granted the custody of the two children to the former h u s b a n d . I S S U E : W O N t h e m o t h e r s u n u s u a l s e x u a l activities makes her unsuitable for custody because of immorality PERSONS A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 154 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 HELD: No. Her peculiar sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. It wasfound that she had supported her children well and has given them a great atmosphere athome. The unusual practices by the mother did not, in any way, affect the children. There isno evidence also, that the publications or pictures were ever seen by the children. (Note: theright of a divorced woman to engage in private sexual activities, which no way affect her minor children, is within the penumbra of privacy mandated by the Bill of Rights) Also, thechildren were well-provided for both emotionally and physically (doing good at school, evenelected as class officers) and that the mothers home had a cheerful and happy atmosphere(which to Maam Beths mind was maaliwalas. SANTOS v CA (1995) 242 SCRA 407Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of the latters parents ever since the childwas born. The grandparents were the ones who provided support for the child, since Leouelcannot afford to do so. Julia then left for the States to work. The grandparents claim that Juliahas been sending financial support to her son. On September 1990, Leouel abducted the childfrom his grandparents. The grandparents then filed for custody of the boy, which the trialcourt granted. Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents have failed to show the he isu n f i t to be the father and that the substitute parental authority granted to t h e b o y s grandparents was inappropriate. The respondents claim that they are financially well-off totake care of the son, while Leouel is not. They can provide the child with an airconditionedroom since he is asthmatic. Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them. Leouels use of trickery than rights 5. fruits of all the properties of the child whether acquired by lucrative or oneroustitle insurance proceeds accruing to the child PURPOSES WHICH THE PARENTS MAYUSE THE FRUITS AND INCOME OF THE CHILD 1. be civilly liable for the injuries andFC, Art 221 Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall childs support andeducation damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living intheir company and daily needs of the family as subject to 2. collective under their parentalauthority a the appropriate defenses provided by law. social unit FC, Art 222 The courts mayappoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the1 . e m a n c i p a t i o n o f child child so requires EXTINGUISHMENT OF P A R E N T S USUFRUCT 2. 3. death of the child loss of parental authority through judicial decree FC, Art2 2 3 T h e p a r e n t s o r , i n t h e i r a b s e n c e o r i n c a p a c i t y , t h e i n d i v i d u a l , e n t i t y or institutionexercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the p l a c e w h e r e t h e c h i l d resides, for an order providingparent to the childs living 4. consent of the for disciplinarymeasures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of hischoice or appointed by the court, and a summary independently hearing shall be conductedw h e r e i n t h e p e t i t i o n e r a n d t h e c h i l d s h a l l b e h e a r d . 5 . d i s i n h e r i t a n c e a n d i n c a p a c i t y t o succeed by reason of unworthiness However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the Administration andusufruct such other circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adoptare two measures as it may deem just and proper.distinct things. There may be FC, Art 224 The measures referred

to in the preceding articlemay include the commitment of the child for not more than 30 days in entities or institutionse n g a g e d i n c h i l d c a r e o r i n c h i l d r e n ' s h o m e s d u l y a c c r e d i t e d b y t h e p r o p e r g o v e r n m e n t agency. FC, Art 227 If the parents entrust the management or administration The parentexercising parental authority shall not interfere with thethe net proceeds whenever committed but shall provide for The child care of the child of such property shall belong to the owner.h i s s u p p o r t . U p o n p r o p e r p e t i t i o n o r a t i t s o w n i n s t a n c e , t h e c o u r t m a y t e r m i n a t e t h e commitment of the childwould havejust if the adm amount not less than that which the owner whenever paid and proper. the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thusg i v e i n l e g i t i m e . F C , A r t 2 2 5 T h e f a t h e r a n d t h e m o t h e r s h a l l j o i n t l y e x e r c i s e l e g a l guardianship over the property of the unemancipated Who has authority father's decisionshall prevail, unless common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, theover the childs property? 1. parents unless minor or disinherited by there isa judicial order to the contrary. administration without usufruct or vice versa. ascendantWhere the market value of the property or the annual income of 2. child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be the parental authority required to furnish a bond in such amount asthe court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the propertyor annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligationsv ABANILLA generalguardians. SALIENTES prescribed for (2006) A verified petition for approval of the bondshall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child - MarieAntonette thereof is situated. resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the placeLorenzo Emmanuel The petition shall be where the property or any partLoran docketed as asummary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of However, Loran cannot the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Articleshall be heard and resolved. get along with his in-laws 500 SCRA 128 - The family lives withthe wifes parents. so he urges his wife to leave and transfer to their The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory exceptown place. Marieunder substitute parentala u t h o r i t y , o r w h e n t h e c h i l d i s r e f u s e s s o L o r a n l e a v e s a l o n e . L o r a n w a s p r e v e n t e d f r o m seeing his the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinaryrules on guardianship shall apply.childn. So he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for h i s 2 y o c h i l d . F C , A r t 2 2 6 T h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e u n e m a n c i p a t e d c h i l d e a r n e d o r acquireddismissed his case becauseonerousis resorted CA with his work or industry or byW H C o r g r a t u i t o u s title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be d e v o t e d exclusivelycases latter's support and education, withheld to in to the where rightful custody isunless the title or transfer provides otherwise. from a person entitled thereto. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to thechild's support and ISSUE: WON a father may be deprived to see his son secondarily to thecollective daily needs of the family. PROPERTY OF THE CHILD 1. childs earning throughhis labor, work or industry 2. property acquired by the child by gratuitous title donated or inherited 3. property acquired by the child through onerous title HELD: No. Since they havede facto separation, the custody is yet to be settled so father retains his parental authorityover the child. CABANAS v PILAPIL (1974) 58 SCRA 94 - Florentino Pilapil had a child( M i l l i a n Pilipil) with the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas, married to another man. T h e deceased insured himself assigning the child as the beneficiary and his brother, respondentPERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-

2009 Page159 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 herein, Francisco Pilapil as the trustee duringher minority. Upon his deaths, the proceeds were given to the brother. - Mother prays for appointment as the administrator in her capacity as the natural parent. Uncle resists invokingthe terms of the insurance policy. ISSUE: Who between the mother and the uncle has theright to administer the childs property? HELD: The mother. Art 320 and 321 of CC says thatthe father, in his absence, the mother is the legal administrator of the property of the child.There is no ambiguity in the law, so apply it if the facts are not disputed. LIBI v IAC (1992)214 SCRA 816 - Julie Ann Gotiong (18 yo, 1st year Commerce student at University of SanC a r l o s , C e b u ) a n d W e n d e l l L i b i ( 1 8 - 1 9 ) w e r e s w e e t h e a r t s . J u l i e b r o k e u p w i t h W e n d e l l because he was sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell attempts to reconcile with her but to noavail. So he resorts to threatening Julie who in turn, sought the help of her best friend MalouAlfonso in whose house she stayed to avoid her ex-bf. Julie and Wendell died from a singlegunshot inflicted by a revolver licensed in the name of Wendells father, Cresencio Libi (the p e t i t i o n e r ) . N o eyewitness account so the parents of the two parties presented their owntheories. GOTIONG VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell killed their daughter, thecommitted suicide. LIBI VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell was an informer of theConstabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), so an unknown a n d a n t a g o n i z e d t h i r d p a r t y killed him and included Julie to eliminate any witnesses. The Gotiongs filed a civil caseagainst the Libis to recover damages for their daughters death ISSUE: WON the parents of the Wendell are liable for the damages HELD: Yes. Parents are primary liable for damagesc a u s e d b y m i n o r c h i l d r e n f r o m q u a s i - d e l i c t s a n d c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e s e x c e p t w h e n t h e y exercised due diligence. In this case, parents did not exercise due diligence since the songained access to the key of the safety deposit box where gun was (mother just kept it in her bag, to the knowledge of the son) and their ignorance to the nature of his job as evidence bythe picture of him with a gun given to Julie Ann. Also, the Libis theory is untenable becausethey did not file a case against the alleged malefactor of their son, there were only two bulletsu s e d a n d n o p a r a f f i n t e s t w a s c o n d u c t e d b e c a u s e o f t h e hasty interment. * Maam Beth requirement for guardianship. FC, Art 231 The court in an action filed for the purpose in arelated ca the person exercising the same: 1. 2. 3. 4. Treats the child with excessive harshnessor cruelty; Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example; Compels the child to beg;or Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasc The grounds enumeratedabove are deemed to include cases which h the person exercising parental authority. ISSUE:W O N t h e g r a n d m o t h e r m a y b e g r a n t e d g u a r d i a n s h i p o f t h e t w o c h i l d r e n i n s t e a d o f t h e mother. HELD: OF COURSE NOT. As the Court held in Santos, Sr. v CA, parents have the preferential right to the custody of their children especially if there is continuous parentalauthority. Grandparents are only resorted to in case the parent is absent, dead or proved to beunsuitable. Bonifacia did not present convincing evidence showing that Helen is unfit to beVincents guardian (Valerie already turned 18 by 1998, ergo guardianship for her is moot).Also her expatriate status disqualifies as a substitute guardian because 1) she resides in theUS (plus the fact that her libel case here in the Philippines would give her second thoughts oncoming back) and 2) her old age, she will merely delegate guardianship duties to someonee l s e w h o m a y n o t q u a l i f y a s a g u a r d i a n . B e s i d e s , V i n c e n t o n l y h a s 2 y e a r s b e f o r e emancipation. CA DECISION AFFIRMED. If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or thewelfare of the child s parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper undThe suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental auth same proceeding if thecourt finds that the cause therefor has ceased a FC, Art 232 If the person exercising parentalauthority has subjected t abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such FC, Art 233 The person exercising substitute

parental authority shall h the parents. In nocase shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engag inflict corporal punishmentupon the child. TERMINATION permanent SUSPENSION temporary a. ipso facto if with civil interdiction (reclusion temporal, perpetua or death) terminated by: i. service of penalty ii. amnesty or pardon b. judicial decree C. Suspension or Termination of ParentalAuthority FC, Art 1. 2. 3. FC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. FC, Art carries with it the penalty of civilinterdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or uponI S S U E : W O N P a c i t a m a y r e g a i n h e r c h i l d p a r d o n o r a m n e s t y o f t h e o f f e n d e r . C H U A v CABANGBANG (1969) 27 SCRA 791 CFI dismisses Pacitas claim for her daughter. Shewas a prostitute who had three children by 228 Parental authority terminates permanently:three men whom she lived with successively Upon the death of the parents; (Chua Ben, SySia Lay and Victor Tan Villareal). Upon the death of the child; or Betty Chua, 11 yo at thetime of the trial, was Upon emancipation of the child one of her children and is in the custodyo f F l o r a C a b a n g b a n g . C a b a n g b a n g a n d C h u a h a d d i f f e r e n t s t o r i e s a s t o 2 2 9 U n l e s s subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: how Bettysc u s t o d y w a s a c q u i r e d . a d o p t i o n g u a r d i a n s h i p F L O R A : s h e f o u n d t h e c h i l d w r a p p e d i n a bundle abandonment in their front door final judgment divesting parental authority PACITA:V i l l a r e a l g a v e B e t t y t o F l o r a a s a a b s e n c e o r i n c a p a c i t y p a y m e n t f o r h i s d e b t s . S h e n o w claims custody of her child after five years allegedly because she did not know exercising thes a m e o f c r i m e 2 3 0 P a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y i s s u s p e n d e d u p o n c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e p a r e n t o r t h e person where to look for theachild. which HELD: No. There was constructive abandonmentand hence she may be deprived of parental authority. She only wants the child back so her biological fathers support would resume (take not that this is still uncertain) and she waseven willing to withdraw her suit if the Cabangbangs would pay her 150 K. She attests nogenuine motherly longing. In the best PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 163 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 interest of the child, Flora Cabangbang should retain custody. COMPARED WITH CELIS v CAFUIR,Celis did not lose communication with her child during the time that Cafuir had custody of her child. ABIERA v ORIN (1907) 8 Phil 193 Alejandro filed annulment of their weddingand brought his children to his mother. During the pendency of the annulment proceeding,A l e j a n d r o d i e d a s a p o l i c e m a n . I S S U E : W O N M a r i a C o r t e s m a y h a v e c u s t o d y o f h e r children? HELD: No. she had insufficient means to support the children and the fact that shehad been found guilty of adultery, she has corrupt moral values harmful to the welfare of theminors. Grandmother retains custody. *Cortes is a very old case and would not be the same if decided today. In the olden days, females are judged by her womb, all these laws reflect thatshes just a wife and mother, not a person. Parents Miguel Vicenta Mario Petra Juan Sebastian Vicenta, Mario and Petra were brothers and sisters. Vicenta was married to Miguel; Petrato Juan. When Vicenta died, Miguel, Mario and Juan entered into an agreement covering thedisposition of the properties left by Vicenta; Mario and Juan were representing their children,who are the heirs of Vicenta. Sebastian, son of Petra and Juan filed a complaint as specialadministrator of his deceased father, alleging that Miguel has not complied with the saidcontract/agreement. ISSUE: WON Sebastian, being the son of the deceased Juan Abiera hasthe right to ask for the compliance with the said obligation HELD: No. The true interested parties in the obligation contracted by Miguel Orin are the children of Juan Abiera, and notthe latter, for the simple reason that the obligation was executed in their favor and not inf a v o r o f s a i d Abiera. This being the fact, it is evident that the plaintiff in his office a s administrator of the deceased Juan Abiera has no right to ask for the compliance with the saidobligation. As such administrator, he has only the right to institute such actions as correspondand

pertain to the estate which he is administering, and no other action dealing with contractsand obligations contracted in favor of 3rd persons or others from whom he does not derivesuch right, can be brought as such administrator. The right of Juan Abiera to represent hisc h i l d r e n a s f a t h e r o r g u a r d i a n o f t h e s a m e , a n d t h a t h e h a s n o t t r a n s f e r r e d nor could hetransfer to the administrator of his estate such right from the mere f a c t t h a t h e w a s s u c h administrator. The said right attached to parental authority or guardianship was extinguishedwhen Juan Abiera died. CORTES v CASTILLO (1921) 41 Phil 466 - Maria Acardio andBernardo Maria committed adultery and Cortes Alejandro Herrera was convicted butAlejandro pardoned her and they reconciled. However, Maria again committed adultery soPERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page1 6 4 o f 1 7 0 K a r i c h i E . S a n t o s | U P L a w B 2 0 1 2 C C , A r t 3 6 1 J u v e n i l e c o u r t s w i l l b e established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality. D. Rights andDuties of Children Rights of the child Duties of the child CC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. Rights of the parents Duties of the parents CC, Art 362 Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court,the father, mother or guardian may in a proper case be judicially admonished. * Rights of thec h i l d * C o m p a r e w i t h A r t 3 o f P D 6 0 3 3 5 6 E v e r y c h i l d : i s e n t i t l e d t o p a r e n t a l c a r e s h a l l receive at least elementary education shall be given moral and civil training by the guardiansh a s a r i g h t t o l i v e i n a n a t m o s p h e r e c o n d u c i v e t o p h y s i c a l , m o r a l a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l development CC, Art 363 In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her childunder seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. CC,Art 375 In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, theword Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shalleither: 1. Add a middle name or the mothers surname 2. Add the Roman numerals II, III and mortality. They shall encourage international co-operation in this regard and strive to see thatno child is deprived access to effective health services. Periodic review of placement Achild who is placed Art 11 Art 12 Art 13 Art 14 Art 15 Art 16 Art 17 Art 18 Art 19 Art 20A r t 2 1 A r t 22 Art 23 Art 24 Art PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 167 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 25 Art 26A r t 2 7 by the State by reasons of care, protection or treatment is entitled to have t h a t placement evaluated regularly. Social security The child has the right to benefit from socials e c u r i t y i n c l u d i n g s o c i a l i n s u r a n c e . S t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g E v e r y c h i l d h a s the right to as t a n d a r d l i v i n g a d e q u a t e f o r h i s o r h e r p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , m o r a l , s p i r i t u a l , a n d s o c i a l development. Parents have the primary responsibility to ensure that the child has an adequatestandard of living. The States duty is to ensure that this responsibility can be fulfilled and is.State responsibility can include material assistance to parents and their children. Education The child has a right to education and the States duty is to ensure that primary education isfree and compulsory to encourage different forms of secondary education accessible to everychild and to make higher education available to all on the bases of capacity. School disciplineshall be consisted with the childs rights and dignity. The State shall engage in internationalco-operation to implement this right. Aims of education Education shall aim at developingt h e c h i l d s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to the fullest e x t e n t . Education shall prepare the child for an active adult life in a free society and foster respectfor the childs parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values,

and for thecultural background and values of others. Children of minorities or indigenous populations Children of minority communities and indigenous populations have the right to enjoy their own culture and to practice their own religion and language. Leisure, recreation and culturalactivities. The child has the right to leisure, play and participation in cultural and artisticactivities. Child labor The child has the right to be protected from work that threatens his or her health, education or development. The State shall set minimum ages for employment andregulate working conditions. Drug abuse Children have the right to protection from the useof narcotic and psychotropic drugs and from being involved in the production or distribution.Sexual exploitation The State shall protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse,including prostitution and involvement in pornography. Sale, trafficking and abduction It isthe States obligation to make every effort to prevent the sale, trafficking and abduction of children. Other forms of exploitation the child has the right to protection from all forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the childs welfare covered in Articles 32, 33, 34a n d 3 5 . T o r t u r e a n d d e p r i v a t i o n o f l i b e r t y N o c h i l d s h a l l b e s u b j e c t e d t o t o r t u r e , c r u e l treatment or punishment, unlawful arrest or deprivation of liberty. Both capital punishmentand life imprisonment without the possibility of release are prohibited for offenses committed b y p e r s o n s b e l o w 1 8 y e a r s . A n y c h i l d d e p r i v e d o f l i b e r t y s h a l l b e s e p a r a t e d f r o m a d u l t s unless it is considered in the childs best interests not to do so. A child who is detained shallhave legal and other assistance as well as contact with the family. Armed conflicts State parties shall take all 38 feasible measures to ensure that children under 15 years of age haveno direct part in hostilities. No child below 15 shall be recruited into the armed forces. Statesshall also ensure the protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflict asdescribed in relevant international law. Rehabilitative care The State has an obligation toensure that child victims of armed conflicts, torture, neglect, maltreatment or exploitationreceive appropriate treatment for their recovery and social reintegration. Administration of juvenile justice A child in conflict with the law has the right to treatment which promotes the childs sense of dignity and worth, takes the childs age into account and aims at his or her reintegration into society. The child is entitled to basic guarantees as well as legal or other assistance for his or her defense. Judicial proceedings and institutional placements shall b e avoided wherever possible. Respect for higher standards Wherever standards s e t i n applicable national and international law relevant to the rights of the child that are higher than those in this Convention, the higher standard shall always apply. The States obligationto make the rights contained in this Convention widely known to both adults and children.Art 39 Art 40 Art 28 Art 41 Art 29 Art 42 Art 30 The Child is Not a Person: Family Law andother Legal Cultures (Caroline Sawyer)3 Paradigms of the Child 1. Family Law 2. PropertyL a w 3 . Childrens Obligation Tort and Contract Confusion between the capacity of a person to be the subject of rights and obligations (legal personality) and the capacity of that person to take action which produces legal effects (legal capacity) Art 31 Art 32 Art 33 Art3 4 A r t 3 5 A r t 3 6 A r t 3 7 E . P a r e n t s v e r s u s C h i l d r e n W h e n r i g h t s c l a s h S T R U N K v STRUNK (1969) 445 S. W. 2d 145 | CA of Kentucky Tommy (28) and Jerry (27) Strunk are brothers. Tom is suffering from chronic glomerulus nephritis, a fatal kidney disease, andrequires a kidney transplant. Jerry, an incompetent with the mind of a 6 year old and a speechd e f e c t ( s e v e r e l y r e t a r d e d w i t h I Q o f 3 5 ) , i s t h e o n l y v i a b l e d o n o r f o r t h e operation. Themother as a committee secures court consent for the operation. B o t h t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Mental Health and psychiatrist find Jerry is emotionally dependent on Tom such that hisdeath would be more detrimental and traumatic for him than the loss of one kidney. Guardianad litem questions authority of the State to approve the procedure. Art 3 Summary by KrissyConti PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009Page 168 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: WON a court of equity maya p p r o v e t h e o p e r a t i o n f o r t h e i n c o m p e t e n t . H E L D : Y E S ! T h e

d o c t r i n e o f s u b s t i t u t e d judgment applies which means that where the legal disability of the individual is shown, the jurisdiction of the court is plenary and potent to afford whatever relief may be necessary to protect his interests and preserve his estates. Such rule has not only been extended to cover matters of property but also of personal affairs of the incompetent. It is also important to notehere the questioned ruling of the circuit court. Therein the operation was approved because itwas held to be for the best interest of the incompetent. The testimony of the psychiatristheld that Tommy was indispensable for the welfare of Jerry because he is the only livingsibling Jerry has. For Jerry only those who are able to communicate intimately with him canh e l p i n h i s m e n t a l t r e a t m e n t , a n d i n m o s t c a s e s t h e s e a r e m e m b e r s o f h i s f a m i l y . T o m i s important to him in that he can identify himself with him. Tom is his model, his tie with hisfamily thus his life is vital to his improvement at the asylum. Considering that their parentsa r e i n t h e i r f i f t i e s , i t w o u l d b e i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f J e r r y s w e l f a r e i f T o m m y w e r e t o survive. CONSERVATORSHIP OF VALERIE N. aka Mildred G. v Valerie N. (1985) 707 P.2d 760 | SC of California Valerie N (29), is inflicted with Down Syndrome and has an IQ of 30. She lives with her mother and her stepfather. The mother instituted a court proceeding for appointment as conservators and requested for additional powers to sterilize Valerie throughtubal ligation (salpingectomy). According to the mother, sterilization was necessary becauseValerie is sexually aggressive at the sight of men (kiss, hug, climb and sit on their laps).Though she is not sexually active for being under close watch, she masturbates excessively.Her mother fears the day when she will no longer be able to look after her daughter. She alsow e n t t h r o u g h unsuccessful behavior modification, tried to ingest contraceptive pills b u t rejected it eventually and would not cooperate in pelvic examination for intrauterine device. Lower court granted conservatorship authority to sterilize the i n c o m p e t e n t . b u t n o t exhausted. The mother also did not provide clear and convincing evidence as to the necessityof irreversible sterilization. That Valerie is capable of pregnancy, that other brands of pillswere administered and that other means of administering contraceptive pill were attempted.JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993) 851 P. 2d 776 - SUPRA GILLICK v WEST NORFOLK &WISBECH AREA HEALTH AUTHORITY (1985) 3 All E. R. 402 Victoria Gillick wrote toarea health authority asking for assurance that her daughters aged 13, 12, 10 and 5 will not begiven contraceptive advice and treatment without her consent. The reply to the letter statedt h a t t h e y c a n n o t g i v e s u c h a s s u r a n c e b e c a u s e t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n m u s t b e f o r t h e d o c t o r s clinical judgment. Gillick again asked for a declaration from the office that it will not provideminors under 16 years old with contraceptive advice and treatment without informing the p a r e n t s b u t t h e h e a l t h a u t h o r i t y w a s s t e a d f a s t . T h e y a r g u e d f o r t h e p a t i e n t - d o c t o r confidentiality and that if this principle is abandoned, minors might not seek professionaladvice at all. This will lead to consequences such as unwanted pregnancies, STD and highr i s k a b o r t i o n s . S h e c o n t e n d s t h a t p e r m i t t i n g m i n o r s t o d i s r e g a r d t h e i r p a r e n t s c o n s e n t undermines parental responsibility and family stability. ISSUE: WON doctors can lawfullygive contraceptive advice and treatment to minors without parental consent (the extent of a parents right and duties with respect to the medical treatment of a girl under 16 years old)H E L D : N O . G i r l s u n d e r 1 6 c a n g i v e n o v a l i d c o n s e n t t o a n y t h i n g i n t h e a r e a s u n d e r consideration which a p a r t f r o m c o n s e n t w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a n a s s a u l t , w h e t h e r c i v i l o r criminal, and can impose no valid prohibition on a doctor against seeking parental consent.CURTIS v SCHOOL COMMITTEE (1995) 652 N. E. 2d 580 | SC of Massachussetts Parentscontend the condom availability program in a public school where senior and junior highschool students may obtain condoms for free in the nurses office and for 75 cents in thev e n d i n g m a c h i n e i n t h e i r C R . C o n d o m s a r e g i v e n a w a y w i t h c o u n s e l i n g f r o m n u r s e a n d pamphlet about HIV/AIDS and STD, with authorities stressing the importance of abstinenceas the best method to

avoid STD. The program did not provide for an opt out nor parentaln o t i f i c a t i o n wherein parents would be notified of their childrens request for c o n d o m s . ISSUE: WON conservators can give consent to sterilization on behalf of their incompetentwards HELD: No. Although the repeal of the statutes regarding asexualization of mentallychallenged individuals have been declared unconstitutional for violating their due processand equal protection rights, conservators still may not be authorize to conduct the procedureu n l e s s a l l m e a n s h a v e b e e n P E R S O N S A N D F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | P r o f . E . A . Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 169 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: 1.WON the program violates the parents constitutionally protected right to familial privacyand parental liability 2. WON the program infringes into the free exercise clause HELD: 1. No. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate how condom availability constitutes unconstitutionalinterference by the state. There was no coercive burden upon the students: a. Students arefree to decline b. Parents are free to instruct their children not to participate 2. No. They wereunable to demonstrate sufficient facts to support any substantial burden to religious exercise.They merely alleged that the program contravenes parental teaching on premarital sex: thenot only is it permissible but can be made safe. 3. Parents have no right to tailor public school policy to meet their individual religious and moral preferences. ROE v DOE (1971) 29 NY2d 188 | CA of New York Daughter was cut off from support by her father by not obeying hisinstructions that she live in a college dormitory while studying in college and instead took upresidence with a female classmate in an offcampus apartment. Her father requested she come home but instead, the daughter sold her car [a gift from her father] and finished the schoolyear using the proceeds thereof. Upon returning to New York for the summer, she further disobeyed her father by choosing to stay with the parents of her female classmate in LongI s l a n d . D a u g h t e r i n g e n e r a l f a r e s p o o r l y i n s c h o o l a n d h a s e x p e r i m e n t e d w i t h d r u g s . Furthermore she has had a spotty childhood, her mother died when she was three and her father has repeatedly married and remarried since then his most recent remarriage in 1970.With the help of a guardian ad litem, she initiated this action for support. ISSUE: WONdaughter is entitled for support in light of her transgressions against her father. HELD: Whiled e l i n q u e n t b e h a v i o r o f a c h i l d e v e n i f u n e x p l a i n e d o r p e r s i s t e n t d o e s n o t m e r i t t h e termination of the duty of the parent to support, voluntary abandonment by the child of the p a r e n t s h o m e i s t a n t a m o u n t t o f o r f e i t u r e of the claim to support. A father in return for maintenance and support may establish and impose reasonable regulations on his child.C o u r t s a s m u c h a s possible do not interfere with the parents prerogative in c a r i n g , controlling and protecting the child except only when there is a clear and obvious display of abuse or neglect on the part of the parent. The parent was concerned about the temptationsthat abound outside of campus hence his insistence that she live in the campus dorm. Whilet h e d a u g h t e r m a y b e f r e e d i s a g r e e a n d c h o o s e t o n o t c o m p l y , s h e p u t s h e r s e l f a t r i s k o f incurring her fathers wrath and consequently, by abandoning her home she forfeits her rightto support. IN RE EDWARD C. (1981) 178 Cal. Rptr. 694 | CA of California The appealinstituted by spouses Edmond and Deborah to regain custody of their two sons Edward andEric who were previously declared dependent children. Edward and Eric were removedfrom their parents home because they were maltreated and subjected to cruel and inhumancorporal punishment by their father. The father, supported by the mother, argues that he isvested with divine and Biblical authority to inflict discipline on his children. Their daughter,Marlee, was given to her maternal grandmother for adoption after suffering physical abuse inthe hands of her father. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,A . Y . 2008-2009 Page 170 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: WON t h e dependency of children is a violation of constitutional right of privacy of the family HELD: NO. The parental doctrine and childs best interest are usually compatible but when theyclash, the

latter is protected by the legal system. The finding on Marlees case is admissibleto Eric and Edward. The fact that the sons witnessed the vicious beatings as command of theL o r d m a y inhibit their healthy emotional development. Until the parents cooperate t o counseling program, reunification of the family will be detrimental to the welfare of theminors. PRINCE v MASSACHUSSETTS (1944) 321 US 158 | SC of Massachusetts SarahPrince, a member of the Jehovahs Witness is a mother to two sons and the guardian of minor Betty Simmons One night she went one to distribute Watchtower and Consolation, fulfillingo n e o f h e r religious obligations She used to bring along her kids but upon reprimand b y Peskins because it violates the statute law against child labor and employment, she ceased totake her children with her. However, Betty Simmons insisted to come that particular night.ISSUE: 1. WON the religious act of selling their magazines violate the statute 2. WON the presence of parent will exempt them from punishment HELD: 1. Yes. It does not infringe onthe free exercise clause because the burden on the religious activity was merely incidental.T h e prohibition applies to all children. 2. No. There was clear and present danger e v e n though in the company of adults. The States authority over children is broader than adultsespecially in public activities and employment which has crippling effects on the child. Theyreserve the Parents can make martyrs out of themselves but not of their children. 3. Check out the dissent. Parents reserve the right to train their children religiously. - However, the presiding judge went on leave effect June 1. But the new presiding judge issued decision infavor of the mother on May 31. ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over habeas corpus p e t i t i o n s . H E L D : Y e s . R A 8 3 6 9 d i d n o t d i v e s t R T C jurisdiction o v e r s u c h c a s e s . MADRINAN v MADRINAN (2007) 527 SCRA 487 - Felipe Francisca three sons and adaughter Romnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo and Krizia Ann The couple had a quarrel so hetook the sons with him to Ligao, Albay and then to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Wife sought the helpof the parents and the parents in law, and even the Lupong Tagapagpamayapa to make peacewith the husband, but to no avail. She alleges that the travel disrupted the education of thechildren and deprived them of maternal care. They accused each other that their respective parents always meddle with their family affairs. Mother is unfit because she is always drunk and would come home late at night from the beerhouse. She neglected her duties as a mother.Father, a tricycle driver, drove mother out, and a gambler, drug addict and alcoholic himself.ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction regarding writ of habeas corpus under Sec 5 (b) of RA8369 HELD: Yes. Concurrent jurisdictions of Family Court, SC and CA so that the decisionwill be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Note that he had moved to two different provinces. F. Summary Procedure REYES-TABUJARA v CA (2006) 495 SCRA 844 - IvyCarlos Iigo The separated and custody battle ensued. Dad Joan Ernesto initially won.Mother files a consolidated petition for writ of habeas corpus and Anti-VAWC.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009Page 14 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 (2) husband responsible for support(3) wife responsible for domestic and childcareservices GRAHAM v GRAHAM (1940) (pronounced as /grahm/) 33 F. Supp. 936 James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues hisformer wife, Margrethe, defendant, to recoverwhat he was allegedly entitled by a writtenagreement wherein defendant agreed to pay theplaintiff a certain some of money. The agreement was that the wife asked husband to quit his job so that he can accompany her to his travels, to which heagreed as long as she will pay him $300 each month. The monthly payment is to be in force until the parties no longer desirethe agreement. ISSUE: WON the agreement compels the wife tocontinue paying her husband the $300 HELD: No, the contract is not valid. Marriage contract specifies that its the husbands duty or obligation to support and livewith his wife, and the wife must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow him in his choice of domicile.Also, a private agreement between persons married or about to be married whereby they attempt to change the essentialobligations of the marriage contract is contrary to public policy. BRADWELL v ILLINOIS (1872) 93 US (16 wall) 130 Myra Bradwell was denied license to practice law JUST BECAUSE SHE IS A FEMALE. That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action and that it belonged to men to make, apply and executethe laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth Amazing they were able to talk to God directly. Prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment DUNN v PALERMO (1975) 522 S. W. 2d 679 Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who married Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoyher maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes. Tennessee had a state-wide compulsory

RegistrationLaw. Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo. She was advised that she was required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her name purged fromthe registration list. Upon her refusal to so register, her name was purged from the registration list.Hence this action.ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory to change nameupon marriage HELD: No. Woman upon marriage, may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband andthe choice is hers. So long as a persons name remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed in prescribedmanner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern as to name used.*According to Maam Beth the legal name of any person is the one written on the birth certificate (CC, Art 370) IN RE SANTIAGO (1940) 70 Phil 66 Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares separated for 9 consecutive years, want to remarry so they sought the aid of Atty.Roque Santiago He instituted a document that waives whatever right of action one might have against each other but realized mistake after19 days and cancelled the documentISSUE: WON the document signed by the spouses legitimately terminated the marital tie between them.HELD: No. Termination of the marriage cannot be stipulated by the parties. Santiago guilty of malpractice and suspended for1 year. SELANOVA v MENDOZA (1975) 64 SCRA 69 Respondent Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of SaturninoSelanova and Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each hadfiled against the other and they waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would commitagainsttheother. This document was also acknowledged beforehim as City Judge and Notary Public Ex Officio. Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with grossignorance of the law.ISSUE: WON marriage is valid HELD: Agreement is void because it contravenes the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of CC Art 221. Even before theenactment of the NCC, this court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriagewithout judicial PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009Page 15 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 approval secured beforehand was void. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they shall remain crimes, anda contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law and consequently not judicially recognizable. Respondent isseverely censured. ASSUMPTIONS OF FAMILY LAW (Weitzman article)1. Marriage is a permanent, indissoluble,lifetime commitment 2. First marriages (young & no previous

marriages)3. Main reason is procreation4. Strict division of labor 5. White middle-class family (property andinheritance)6. Judeo-Christian tradition (monogamy) B. Requisites of Marriage 1. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES intrinsic (Art 2) A. Legal capacity a. Sex (must be between man and woman) b. Age 18 and above (Art 5) c. No impediment which means: (1) no previous marriage(2) family relations (not incestuous) JONES v HALLAHAN (1973) 501 S. W. 2d 588Marjorie Jones and her female partner were not issued a license to marry each other in the state of Kentucky. They contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the marriage license deprived them of three (3) basic constitutional rights,namely, the right to marry; the right of association; and the right to free exercise of religion. -Appellants also contend that the refusal subjectsthem to cruel and unusual punishment.ISSUE:WONsamesexmarriageviolatesconstitutional rights to marry HELD: No, it does not violate any constitutionally protected right. Two females cannot marry for marriage has always beenconsidered as the union of a man and a woman. It appears that appellants are prevented from marrying not by the statute ofKentucky but rather by their own incapacity of entering into marriage as the term is defined. A license to enter into a statusor a relationship which the parties are incapable of entering is a nullity. Definition of marriage says, union of a man and awoman. Thus, in the courts opinion, there is not constitutional issue involved, since there is no constitutional sanction whichprotects the right of marriage between persons of the same sex. GOODRIDGE v DEPT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2003) 440 Mass. 309 14 individuals (7 couples) were deprived of marriage license because they were the same sex They are professionals and active in socio-civic activities, there was longevity in the relationship and defendants wereinvolved (adopted children and parents) They met all facial qualifications, list of impediment was not presented by civil registrar (to prove that same sex marriage isone of them) LEGISLATIVE RATIO:1. favorable setting for procreation2. optimal setting for child rearing3. conserving scarce state and private financialresourcesISSUE:1. WON licensing law treats same sex asimpediment presented by the plaintiff 2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimate exercise of the States authority to regulation conduct Court HELD:

Marriage is a secular institution. No religious ceremony is required. There are only 3 partners (2 spouses and the State whodefines the entry and exit terms) PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT: 1. law does not distinguish childrens family background so why deprive children the rights when they did not choose to be born/grow up in such a family (coitus v noncoitus, e.g. adoption or assisted), failed to address the changing realities of American society 2. best interest of the child parents sexualorientation 3. homosexuals are well off and economicallyindependent, anyway, the same is notcondition/requirement for heterosexualcouples. IMPLICATION OF PROHIBITION: deprivation of protection, benefits, obligations and rights exclusive to married people same reason why these couples want the benefit of marriage They do not undermine marriage, In fact, they appreciate/ show high esteem for of marriage by asking for it! Statutedeclared unconstitutional SILVERIO v REPUBLIC (2007) 537 SCRA 273 Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio wants to change his name to Mely and sex entry in his birth certificate from male to femalebecause of his sex reassignment (transgender). RTCgranted in 2003CAreversed in 2006 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009Page 16 of 170Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: WON he is entitled to the change of nameactionHELD: NO! 1. Names are for purposes of identification: Art 376, CC (no change of name without judicial declaration), RA 9048 (Clerical ErrorLaw), Rule 103 (change of name) and Rule 108 (Cancellation of Correction of Entries; substantial change)2. Grounds for Change of Name (Sec 4, RA 9048)a. Difficult and ridiculous, dishonorable nameb. Habitual and continual usec. To avoid confusion3. Petitioner has not shown any reasonable cause and does not show that his name may prejudice him 4. Case is administrative rather than judiciary5. Change of sex not allowed because civil status isimmutable and inherent 6. No special law yet for sex change, until then sex is determined by the sex at the time of birth as resulted by visual inspection ofmedical attendant. 7. Though we get your point and sympathize with you, its not within the province of the Court to amend laws. Youre barking at the wrong tree. Go to the Congress and askthem to pass a bill for you. B. Consent freely given in thepresence of solemnizing officer PEOPLE v SANTIAGO (1927) 51 Phil 68

Felipe Santiago asked his deceased wifes niece Felicita Masilang, 18, to accompany him on an errand Upon crossing a river and reaching municipality of San Leonardo, Satinago expressed his sexual desire to which girldeclined, but he persisted on with force against her will The two proceeded to accuseds uncle house, Agapito Santiago who called a Protestant minister to conduct a wedding.After the wedding, Santiago sent home the girl with some money to buy bread. ISSUE: WON the marriage exempted him fromcriminal liabilityHELD: No! Taking into consideration Santiagosbehavior before and after the marriage, there is no serious intention to marry the girl except forto avoid criminal liability for the rape case . - Girl was under duress and therefore, lack of consent (essential requisite) which makes the marriage void BUCCAT v MANGONON DE BUCAT (1941) 72 Phil 19 GodofredomarriedLuidawiththebeliefthatshewasavirgin.89daysafterthemarriagecelebration,Luidagavebirth.HerhusbandGodofredoherein appellantfiledforannulmentonthegroundthatsheconcealedhernon-virginity. ISSUE: WON marriage is valid HELD: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew thatthe wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration ofmarriage. Court refuses to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman was at an advanced stage of pregnancy at thetime of the marriage and such condition must have been patent to the husband. EIGENMANN v GUERRA (1964) 5 C.A. Rep. 836 Eduardo Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on1957. Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action to annul his marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was between ages 16-20 at that time and his mother did not give her consent to the marriage. ISSUE: WON there was parental consent, theabsence of which could render the marriage void. HELD: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmanns mother was present at thetime of the celebration of marriage and did not object thereto, such that consent can be gleaned from such act.- Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a minor at the time of the marriage celebration, having representedhimself to be over 25 years of age. Art 4 Absence of any essential or formal void, exceptArt 35(2) Defect in the essential requirement voidable(Art 45) Irregularity in the formal requirement no effect in validity, but the parties r e s p o n s i b l e w i l l b e c i v i l l y , c r i m i n a l l y o r administratively liable 2. FORMAL REQUISITES extrinsic (Art 3)

A. Authority of solemnizing officer - Who may authorize the marriage (Art 7)a. incumbent member of judiciaryb. priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any religious sect- duly recognized by the religion,- registered in Civil Registry- acting within the limit of his authority - at least one of the spouses is member of the sectc. ship captain and airplane chief only in Art 31d. military commander to which chaplain isassigned in Art 32e. consul-general, consul, vice-consul forFilipinos abroad*Mayors are authorized by LGC to solemnizemarriage NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY (1996) 259 SCRA 129 Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction. He has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica- Burgos, but the marriage was solemnized in Dapa which does not fall under his jurisdictional area. Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this administrativecomplaint.ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable,and whether this will render the marriage void. HELD: Marriage may be solemnized by, amongothers, any incumbent member of the judiciarywithin the courts jurisdiction. Solemnization outsidethe judges territorial jurisdiction will notinvalidate the marriage . What results is an irregularity in the formal requisites of a validmarriage. Respondent judge, by citing Art 8 of the FCas defense for the exercise of his misplacedauthority, acted in gross ignorance of the law andwas therefore held administratively liable suspension of 6 months. Irregularity in formal requisite no effect in marriage validityARAES v OCCIANO (2002) 380 SCRA 402 Petitioner Mercedita Araes charged respondent judge Salvador Occiano for gross ignorance of the law. Occianosolemnized the marriage between herein petitioner and the late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage licenseand outside his territorial jurisdiction. Couple lived together as husband and wife until the death of Orobia. But then since the marriage was a nullity, petitionersright to inherit the vast property left by Orobia was not recognized. Respondent explained that he solemnized the marriageout of human compassion and because the parties promised to present their license the afternoon after the wedding. ISSUE: WON the respondent judge administrativelyliable. HELD: Yes. He was faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license and for exceeding his territorial jurisdiction. He was fined P5000 and was given a stern warning by the SC thatrepetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt more severely. The absence of a marriage license made themarriage void. And even if the plaintiff retracted her complaint, thats not how it is done. Withdrawal of complaint exoneration B. Valid marriage license exceptfor marriages of exceptionalcharacter

Art 9 ML obtained in habitual residence of one of the parties Art 10 Requirements of Filipino marriages abroad settled in the consular office which will take over the duties of local civil registry Art 11 Two separate application for one marriagelicense which shall specify the following:1. full name2. place of birth3. age and date of birth4. civil status 5. if previously married, how, when, where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled 6. present residence and citizenship7. degree of relationship of the contractingparties8. full name, residence and citizenship of thefather9. full name, residence and citizenship of themother 10. full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian, person having charge, in case orphaned Art 12 Proof of agea. original or certified copy of birthcertificate b. original or certified copy of baptismal certif c. residence certificate witnessed by 2 witnesses preferably next of kinProof of age dispensed with if:a. parents appear personally b. local civil registrar convinced by mere looking (read: mukhang matanda na)c. previously marriedArt 13 If previous marriages, not birthcert isrequired but: a. death certificate of deceased spouse if no death certificate is available, affidavit about circumstance and civilstatusb. judicialdecreeof absolutedivorce/judicialdecreeof annulment/declaration of nullity c. declaration of presumptive deathArt 14 if 18-21, then parental consentArt 15 if 21-25, then parental adviceArt 16 if anyone is required with parental consent or advice, both shall undergo marriage counseling. Failure to attach certificate of