[G.R. No. 83524. October 13, 1989.] ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARTA KRAMER, petitioners, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents. Rodolfo D. Mapile for petitioners. Jose M. Perez for private respondent. SYLLABUS 1.TORTS AND DAMAGES; ACTION BASED UPON A QUASI-DELICT PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4) YEARS. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, 16 this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. 2.ID.; QUASI-DELICT; CAUSE OF ACTION; ACCRUAL THEREOF TOLLED UPON OCCURRENCE OF THE LAST ELEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION. In Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, his Court held "The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . . . It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen . . ." It is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. 3.ID.; ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM COLLISION OF TWO VESSELS; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD COUNTED FROM DAY OF COLLISION NOT FROM THE DATE OF DETERMINATION BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. In this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period. DECISION GANCAYCO, J p: The principal issue in this Petition for Review is whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations. LibLex

The record of the case discloses that in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an interisland vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer. 1 On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. 2 The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 2907-P. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, 3 the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. For their part, the petitioners contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. The petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably filed. In an Order dated September 25, 1986, 4 the trial court denied the Motion filed by the private respondent. The trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, and that the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations, which took effect on January 1, 1975 by virtue of Letter of Instruction No. 208 issued on August 12, 1974 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, precisely to answer the need. The trial court went on to say that the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. The pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court are as follows

"Considering that the action concerns an incident involving a collision at sea of two vehicles and to determine negligence for that incident there is an absolute need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collisions. It is obviously to answer such a need that the Marine Board of Inquiry (sic) was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations which became effective January 1, 1975 under Letter of Instruction(s) No. 208 dated August 12, 1974. The relevant section of that law (Art. XVI /b/ provided as follow(s): '1.Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI). Shall have the jurisdiction to investigate marine accidents or casualties relative to the liability of shipowners and officers, exclusive jurisdiction to investigate cases/complaints against the marine officers; and to review all proceedings or investigation conducted by the Special Boards of Marine Inquiry. '2. Special Board of Marine Inquiry. Shall have original jurisdiction to investigate marine casualties and disasters which occur or are committed within the limits of the Coast Guard District concerned or those referred by the Commandant.' The Court finds reason in the argument of the plaintiff that marine incidents have those 'peculiarities which only persons of special skill, training and exposure can rightfully decipher and resolve' on the matter of the negligence and liabilities of parties involved and inasmuch as the report of the Board of Inquiry (sic) admittedly came out only on April 29, 1982, the prescriptive period provided . . . under Art. 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only from that date. The complaint was filed with this Court on May 10, 1985, hence the statute of limitations can not constitute a bar to the filing of this case." 5 The private respondent elevated the case the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging therein that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the Complaint filed by the petitioners. The case was assigned to the Second Division of the appellate court and was docketed as Case No. CA-G.R. SP No. 12032. 6 In a Decision dated November 27, 1987, 7 and clarified in a Resolution dated January 12, 1988, 8 the Court of Appeals granted the Petition filed by the private respondent and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint. The pertinent portions of the Decision of the appellate court are as follows "It is clear that the cause of action of private respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer) accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from which relief from the court is presently sought. Private respondents should have immediately instituted a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict within four years from the said marine incident because its cause of action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision. For this reason, he (sic) could cite the negligence on the part of the personnel of the petitioner to exercise due care and lack of (sic) diligence to prevent the collision that resulted in the total loss of their . . . boat.

"We can only extend scant consideration to respondent judge's reasoning that in view of the nature of the marine collision that allegedly involves highly technical aspects, the running of the prescriptive period should only commence from the finality of the investigation conducted by the Marine Board of Inquiry (sic) and the

decision of the Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, who has original jurisdiction over the mishap. For one, while it is true that the findings and recommendation of the Board and the decision of the Commandant may be helpful to the court in ascertaining which of the parties are at fault, still the former (court) is not bound by said findings and decision. Indeed, the same findings and decision could be entirely or partially admitted, modified, amended, or disregarded by the court according to its lights and judicial discretion. For another, if the accrual of a cause of action will be made to depend on the action to be taken by certain government agencies, then necessarily, the tolling of the prescriptive period world hinge upon the discretion of such agencies. Said alternative it is easy to foresee would be fraught with hazards. Their investigations might be delayed and lag, and then witnesses in the meantime might not be available or disappear, or certain documents may no longer be available or might be mislaid. . . . 9 The petitioners filed a Motion for the reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 27, 1988. 10 Hence, the instant Petition wherein the arguments raised by the petitioner before the trial court are reiterated. 11 In addition thereto, the petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals runs against the pronouncement of this Court in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals. 12 The private respondent filed its Comment on the Petition seeking therein the dismissal of the same. 13 It is also contended by the private respondent that the ruling of the Court in Vasquez is not applicable to the case at bar because the said case involves a maritime collision attributable to a fortuitous event. In a subsequent pleading, the private respondent argues that the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations cannot have the effect of repealing the provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of actions. 14 On September 19, 1988, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition. 15 After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for decision. The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, 16 this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. In Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 17 this Court held as follows "The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . . . It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen . . ." From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. LibLex Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 85868. October 13, 1989.] ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSELITO Z. YUJUICO, respondents. Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner. Balgos & Perez Law Offices for respondents. SYLLABUS 1.CIVIL PROCEDURE; THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT; CONCEPT. A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint. Such that, were it not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party. 2.ID.; ID.; TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CLAIM IS "IN RESPECT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM." As early as Capayas vs. Court of First Instance of Albay, this Court had already outlined the tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiffs claim." They are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiff's claim. 3.ID.; ID.; CLAIM CONNECTED WITH PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM. Whether or not this Court agrees with the petitioner's assertion that the claim does not "arise out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based," it cannot be denied that the third-party's claim (although arising out of another or different contract or transaction) is connected with plaintiff's claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. 4.ID.; ID.; CLAIM ALLOWED IF IT WILL HELP IN CLARIFYING IN A SINGLE PROCEEDING THE MULTIFARIOUS ISSUES INVOLVED FROM A SINGLE TRANSACTION. It is one thing to say that a third-party defendant may be held liable to indemnify or reimburse the third-party plaintiff "in respect of plaintiff's claim," but it is quite another to state that a third-party defendant may be held liable to a third-party plaintiff. The second instance may not carry with it the necessary connection to the main cause of action and, therefore, is not allowed by the Rules for it introduces a controversy that is entirely foreign to and distinct from the main cause. The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. 5.ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION; "DOCTRINE OF RELATIONS" OR "RELATIONS BACK DOCTRINE;" CONCEPT. That principle of law by which an act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law to have been done at some antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well recognized application

to proceedings at law; a legal fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or to prevent injustice end the occurrence of injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy. The doctrine, when invoked, must have connection with actual fact, must be based on some antecedent lawful rights. It has also been referred to as "the doctrine of relation back." (2 CJS 1310). 6.ID.; ID.; ACTION TOLLED FROM THE DATE OF THE ACT OR OMISSION VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT OF A PARTY. The action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasi-delict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four (4) years from the day the cause of action accrued. In the case of Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court ruled that it is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. DECISION GANCAYCO, J p: What started as a simple collection suit and which developed into an intricate question of procedure is the focus of this petition for review on certiorari. LibLex The present petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14759 dated September 5, 1988 entitled "Joselito Z. Yujuico vs. Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC Judge of Manila Branch LXI and Allied Banking Corp.," 1 and the resolution dated November 9, 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. 2 The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: On April 1, 1976, private respondent Joselito Z. Yujuico obtained a loan from the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00), payable on or before April 1, 1977. As evidence thereof, private respondent issued a corresponding promissory note in favor of GENBANK. At the time private respondent incurred the obligation, he was then a ranking officer of GENBANK and a member of the family owning the controlling interest in the said bank. On March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 675 forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Philippines. This was followed by Resolution No. 677 issued by the Monetary Board on March 29, 1977 ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. It appears that in a Memorandum of Agreement dated May 9, 1977 executed by and between Allied Banking Corporation (ALLIED) and Arnulfo Aurellano as Liquidator of GENBANK, ALLIED acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilities of GENBANK, which includes the receivable due from private respondent under the promissory note. Upon failing to comply with the obligation under the promissory note, petitioner ALLIED, on February 7, 1979, filed, a complaint against private respondent for the collection of a sum of money. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 121474 before the then Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court). Sometime in 1987 and in the course of the proceedings in the court below, private respondent, then defendant in the court below, filed a Motion to admit Amended/Supplemental Answer and Third-Party

Complaint. Private respondent sought to implead the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano as third-party defendants. It was alleged in the third-party complaint that by reason of the tortious interference by the Central Bank with the affairs of GENBANK, private respondent was prevented from performing his obligation under the loan such that he should not now be held liable thereon. Acting on the motion and on the opposition filed thereto, the Regional Trial Court through the Hon. Judge Felix B. Mintu issued an order dated August 13, 1987 denying the admission of the third-party complaint but admitting private respondent's amended supplemental answer. When the case was re-raffled to Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presiding Judge Domingo D. Panis, on February 29, 1988, reiterated the order denying the admission of private respondent's third-party complaint and admitting the amended supplemental answer. When both parties filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration, the Hon. Judge Panis issued an order dated April 18, 1988 denying both motions. Thereupon, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari 3 on June 1, 1988 questioning the orders of Hon. Judge Panis dated February 29, 1988 denying private respondent's motion to admit third-party complaint, and April 18, 1988 denying private respondent's motion for partial reconsideration of the February 29, 1988 order. On September 5, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge, the Order of February 29, 1988 as well as that of April 18, 1988 insofar as it denies petitioner's motion to admit his third party complaint, is hereby declared null and void. Respondent judge is hereby ordered to admit the proposed thirdparty complaint. Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED." 4 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated November 9, 1988. Petitioner assigns the following errors: I RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HON. JUDGE PANIS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING ADMISSION TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, CONSIDERING THAT: A.PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PETITIONER'S CLAIM. B.THE ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION SET FORTH IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. C.THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT WILL ONLY CAUSE FURTHER UNNECESSARY DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE OF PETITIONER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, THE RULE PRESCRIBING THAT DEFENSES NOT RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL IS NOT APPLICABLE TO SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS OF CERTIORARI. 5 From the foregoing assignment of errors, petitioner would like Us to resolve the following issues: (a) Is there a proper ground to admit the third-party complaint?; and (b) assuming that there is, has the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed? A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. 6 The third party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint. Such that, were it not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party. 7

After going through the records of this case, this Court finds that the third-party plaintiffs claim is premised not only on what was alleged as the tortious interference by the third-party defendants with the affairs of GENBANK. More importantly, attention should have been focused on the fact that this allegation is wedded to a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 107812. 8 We quote the pertinent portion of the affirmed decision, to wit: "Based on the foregoing facts, the Court finds the liquidation of GBTC as embodied in Annex "A" and Annex "B" of the petition, which merely adopted the bid of the Lucio Tan group as the liquidation plan of GBTC, as plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and therefore the same must be annulled and set aside. . . ." 9 (Emphasis supplied). This decision, which declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK, prompted private respondent herein to file a third-party complaint against the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano on the theory that he has a right to proceed against them in respect of ALLIED's claim. In the words of private respondent, he "[s]eeks to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. 10 Thus, if at the outset the issue appeared to be a simple maker's liability on a promissory note, it became complex by the rendition of the aforestated decision. As early as Capayas vs. Court of First Instance of Albay, 11 this Court had already outlined the tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiffs claim." They are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or whether the thirdparty's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for

all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiff's claim. 12 While the claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent herein, does not fall under test (c), there is no doubt that such claim can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) above mentioned. Whether or not this Court agrees with the petitioner's assertion that the claim does not "arise out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based," it cannot be denied that the third-party's claim (although arising out of another or different contract or transaction) is connected with plaintiff's claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party complaint. Put differently, there is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory note, they are seeking, by means of the third-party complaint, to transfer unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which, in the first place, was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s alleged in the thirdparty complaint, it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint. 13 While these allegations in the proposed thirdparty complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit, it cannot, however, be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose. It is one thing to say that a third-party defendant may be held liable to indemnify or reimburse the third-party plaintiff "in respect of plaintiff's claim," but it is quite another to state that a third-party defendant may be held liable to a third-party plaintiff. The second instance may not carry with it the necessary connection to the main cause of action and, therefore, is not allowed by the Rules for it introduces a controversy that is entirely foreign to and distinct from the main cause. The first instance is allowable and should be allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a single transaction. It is this Court's pronouncement that the first instance is applicable in the present situation. As to the issue of prescription, it is the position of petitioner that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already prescribed. 14 Being founded on what was termed as "tortious interference," petitioner asserts that under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delict 15 the action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25, 1981. 16 On the other hand, private respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" 17 to support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12, 1986 when the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 became final and executory. Thus, it is contended that while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on February 7, 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed. cdphil There can be no question in this case that the action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasi-delict or alleged "tortious interference" should be filed within four (4) years from the day the cause of action accrued. 18

In the case of Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 19 this Court ruled that it is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. Thus, while technically the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed, however, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the General Bank to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated September 5, 1988 and its resolution dated November 9, 1988 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void, and another judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the trial court of February 29, 1988 and April 18, 1988, denying the admission of the third party complaint. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.