CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents. [G.R. No. 137000.

August 9, 2000.] Ponente: Purisima

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by petitioner against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an Australian citizen, not qualified to run for elective office, because: she is a holder of an Australian passport; and she expressly renounced her Filipino citizenship when she declared under oath in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence that she was a citizen or subject of Australia. Issue: Whether or not private respondent is disqualified from running for elective office because of her dual citizenship.

Ruling: In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship. Renunciation must be express, to effectively result in the loss of Filipino citizenship. At most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Dual

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. Her filing of a certificate of candidacy, where she declared that she is a Filipino citizen and that she will support and defend the Philippine Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, sufficed to renounce her foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURHUSSEIN UTUTALUM and ALIM BASHIR EDRIS, respondents. [G.R. No. 93986. December 22, 1992.] Ponente: Padilla FACTS: This case stemmed from elections held in Sulu where LOONG and private respondent Tan ran for the position of Governor while petitioner Tulawie and private respondent Estino ran for Vice-Governor. The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) recommended to the COMELEC a recanvass of the election returns of Parang and Talipao. COMELEC, accordingly, relieved all the regular members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) and ordered such recanvass by senior lawyers from the COMELEC office in Manila. During the re-canvass, private respondents objected to the inclusion in the canvass of the election returns of Parang. The reconstituted MBC, however, merely noted said objections and forwarded the same to respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for resolution. Provincial Board of Canvassers denied the objections of private respondents and still included the election returns of Parang municipality. The canvass of respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers showed petitioners to have overwhelmingly won in the municipality of Parang. The private respondents filed petitions with the COMELEC regarding the inclusion of the questioned certificates of canvass and that there was failure of election in said municipality due to massive fraud Petitioners, likewise filed for failure of elections in 5 other municipalities. COMELEC ruled annulling the results of the elections in Parang as well as holding in abeyance the proclamation of the winning candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor until further orders from the Commission but dismissed other petitions for other municipalities where it was alleged that there were also badges of fraud. Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed within the period prescribed by law. Ruling: COMELEC was incorrect in annulling elections of Parang, Sulu but not ordering for special elections in the same municipality. It was also incorrect in dismissing other petitions for failure of elections in other municipalities where there were also badges of fraud. The Supreme Court held that, before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. We must add, however, that the cause of such failure of election should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. This is an important consideration for, where the propriety of a pre-

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

proclamation controversy ends, there may begin the realm of a special action for declaration of failure of elections. While the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters' signatures and fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean. Needless to say, a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections. The COMELEC was ordered to conduct special elections in the municipality of Parang, Sulu and was directed to supervise the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the results to the end that the winning candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor for the Province of Sulu be proclaimed as soon as possible.

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents. [G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003.] Ponente: Bellosillo

Facts: Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(d) of RA 9189 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. According to the Court, Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under existing election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting. The Court, however, declared certain provisions of the law unconstitutional, namely, portions of Secs. 17.1, 19 and 25, as they trampled on the constitutional mandate of independence of the Commission on Elections. The Court also upheld Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court likewise upheld Sec. 5 (d) of the law. It also declared that pursuant to Sec. 30 of the law the rest of the provision of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR CLIMACO, respondents. [G.R. No. L-25444. January 31, 1966.] Ponente: Bengzon

Facts: This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining to reject the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The COMELEC reached a conclusion that the returns of certain question precincts were obviously manufactured. The COMELEC rejected the returns of about fifty precincts believing that those said returns were fraudulent basing on the statistical probabilities. The Comelec inits opinion stated that the election result in said precincts as reported, was utterly improbable and clearly incredible. For it is not likely, in the ordinary course of things, that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party, without giving a single vote to one of the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party. Such extraordinary coincidence was quite impossible to believe, knowing that the Nacionalista Party had and has a nationwide organization, with branches in every province, and was, in previous years, the party in power in these islands.

Issue: Whether or not it is the duty of the Commission on Elections to reject false or fabricated returns. Ruling: Where the returns were obviously false or fabricated, the Commission on Elections has the power and duty to reject them. Frauds in the holding of election should be settled by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals where testimonial or documentary evidence is necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable from the return itself, there is no reason to give it prima facie value.

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN, MUNICIPAL BOARDS OF CANVASSERS OF TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN, AND EMILIANO MICU, respondents. [G.R. Nos. 111624-25. March 9, 1995.] Ponente: KAPUNAN Facts: Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District. Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district. During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COCs) for these ten (10) municipalities, respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that it contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. On May 21, 1992, the PBC ruled against the objection of private respondent. From the said ruling, private respondent Micu appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as SPC No. 92-208. Issue: Whether or not respondent COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation. Ruling: Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim the winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan. At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when it resolved the "pending incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC on February 9, 1993. Petitioner's contention that his proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless. In Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In so doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive to respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case so as to ascertain the true and lawful winner of the

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

said elections. In effect, petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of regularity and validity of an official act. It was not categorically declared valid. Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both petitioner and private respondent. The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992. The petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still, private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992, respectively, definitely well within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before proclamation of a winner. The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation. Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan. In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more. In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes. Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation.

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

DANIEL GARCIA and TEODORO O'HARA, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO DE JESUS and CECILIA DAVID, and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. [G.R. No. 88158. March 4, 1992.] TOMAS TOBON UY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE C. NEYRA, respondents. [G.R. Nos. 97108-09. March 4, 1992.] Ponente: Melencio-Herrera Facts:

Petitioners GARCIA and O'HARA in G.R. No. 88158, and Petitioner TOBON UY in G.R. Nos. 97108-09, question the arrogation unto itself by the COMELEC of the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. They invoke the previous ruling of this Court in Pimentel v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 53581-83, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 769), which maintained that no such jurisdiction was ever conferred on respondent Commission by the 1973 Constitution or by law. On the other hand, all Respondents in the Antipolo Case (G.R. No. 88158) and in the Isabela Case (G.R. Nos. 97108-09) contend that since the 1987 Constitution now expressly empowers the COMELEC to exercise "appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction" (Section 2[2], Article IX-C), and to "promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it" provided they do "not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" (Section 6, Article IXA and Section 3, Article IX-C), the COMELEC validly promulgated the rule which empowers it to issue the special Writs.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC have jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

Ruling: In the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to issue said Writs. It

10

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

is the COMELEC alone, invoking its Constitutionally invested appellate jurisdiction and rulemaking power, that arrogated unto itself the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in Rule 28, Section 1, of its Rules of Procedure. However, neither the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC nor its rule-making power justifies such selfconferment of authority. Apparently, the COMELEC Rule on its Certiorari jurisdiction is patterned after the previous authorization to the Court of Appeals to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. That authority, however, was not inherent in the Court of Appeals but was specifically conferred by Section 30 of the Judiciary Act (Rep. Act No. 296) and Section 9(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). It does not follow that just because the 1987 Constitution vests the COMELEC with appellate jurisdiction, without more, it can issue such Writs in aid of that appellate jurisdiction. The grant of appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC does not necessarily make it a "superior Court" vis-a-vis Regional Trial Courts. To recapitulate, in the absence of an express Constitutional or legislative authorization, the COMELEC is devoid of competence to issue special Writs simply on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction and its rule-making power. Neither is the COMELEC empowered, through its procedural rules alone, to deprive Regional Trial Courts of authority, in the exercise of their discretion, to order execution pending appeal upon good reasons stated in a special order. The Supreme Court granted these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and prohibition.

11

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G. TIOZON, petitioners, vs. RAUL. A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as Secretary of the House of Representatives, MR. JOSE MARIA TUAO, as Officer-in-Charge, Gen. Services Division of the House of Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives, and the HON. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. [G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992.] Ponente: Romero

Facts: On February 18, 1992, petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the same congressional district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974. Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United Statesas evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and Naturalization Services, he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. Issue: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of House of Representatives for violation of Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of its members. The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days after Dazas proclamation.

12

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ELECTION OFFICER LUDIVICO L. ASUNCION OF SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN; BARANGAY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY. STO. TOMAS, SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN, Board of Election Tellers of Prec. Nos. 30A/30A1, 31A, 31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO PLACIDO, respondents. [G.R. No. 154198. January 20, 2003.] Ponente: Ynares-Santiago Facts: In the barangay elections of July, 2002, Romeo Rulloda and Remegio Placido were
the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Before elections were held, however, Romeo died and petitioner Petronila Rulloda sought to run as candidate in lieu of her late husband. Petronila won the election, but the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the winner. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not substitution of candidate in Barangay Election is allowed.

Ruling:

Private respondent contended that under Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, substitution of candidates is not allowed; that inasmuch as the barangay election is nonpartisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute. The Court ruled that such interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignored the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to the will of the voters. The absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Further, technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Petitioner should be proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.

13

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. [G.R. No. 136351. July 28, 1999.] Ponente: Melo Facts: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En Banc dated December 8, 1998 in SPA Case No. 98-288. The aforementioned resolution of the Comelec reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the First Division of Comelec dated May 16, 1998 dismissing private respondent's petition to declare the substitution of Jose `Pempe' Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiago's mayoralty post void. Issues: 1.) Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 2.) Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling: The Court found neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner. In particular, the Court ruled that the Comelec's action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound because herein petitioner cannot substitute a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been canceled and denied due course. Moreover, Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. The result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998 resolution pertaining to the issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it is not, still, this supposed error did not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed in the present petition for certiorari. However, the Court ruled that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the city board of Canvassers of Santiago to reconvene, prepare a new certificate of canvass and proclamation and proclaim the winning candidate among those voted upon because this was inconsistent with the ruling applied in the case of Labo vs.

14

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos

Comelec, Aquino vs. Comelec, Reyes vs. Comelec and Nolasco vs. Comelec. Accordingly, the petition is partly denied, insofar as the Comelec ruling to annul the election and proclamation of petitioner is affirmed. The petition is, however, granted so as to modify the resolution of the Comelec in SPA No. 98-288 by deleting the portion directing the city board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon during the May 11, 1998 elections.

15

Election Laws Ma-Anne Quitoriano Bagos