States Counterplan

JDI 1 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core
***States Counterplan***
***States Counterplan***.....................................................................................................................................................................................1 States Counterplan 1nc..........................................................................................................................................................................................3 States Counterplan 1nc..........................................................................................................................................................................................4 Theoretical Defense of the States Counterplan........................................................................................................................................................5 NCCUSL Solvency...............................................................................................................................................................................................6 NCCUSL Solvency...............................................................................................................................................................................................7 Solvency Social Services....................................................................................................................................................................................8 Solvency Social Services....................................................................................................................................................................................9 Solvency Social Services..................................................................................................................................................................................10 Solvency Federal Modeling..............................................................................................................................................................................11 Solvency Bioethics / Medical Research.............................................................................................................................................................12 Solvency Disease.............................................................................................................................................................................................13 Solvency Health Care.......................................................................................................................................................................................14 Solvency SCHIP..............................................................................................................................................................................................15 Solvency Native Americans..............................................................................................................................................................................16 Solvency Environmental Justice / Urban Renewal.............................................................................................................................................17 Solvency Education..........................................................................................................................................................................................18 Solvency Education..........................................................................................................................................................................................19 Solvency Domestic Violence............................................................................................................................................................................20 Solvency Immigration Services.........................................................................................................................................................................21 Solvency Immigration Services.........................................................................................................................................................................22 Solvency School Lunches.................................................................................................................................................................................23 Solvency Employment Policies..........................................................................................................................................................................24 Solvency Homelessness....................................................................................................................................................................................25 Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom.....................................................................................................................................................................26 Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom.....................................................................................................................................................................27 Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom.....................................................................................................................................................................28 Solvency AT: Conservative States....................................................................................................................................................................29 AT: Federal Pre-emption.....................................................................................................................................................................................30 AT: Federal Pre-emption.....................................................................................................................................................................................31 AT: Supreme Court Strike Down.........................................................................................................................................................................32 AT: States Link to Politics...................................................................................................................................................................................33 AT: States Dont Solve Soft Power......................................................................................................................................................................34 AT: States Discriminate against Minorities...........................................................................................................................................................35 AT: Permutation Do Both....................................................................................................................................................................................36 ***Lopez Counterplan 1nc****...........................................................................................................................................................................37 Lopez Solvency..................................................................................................................................................................................................38 Lopez Solvency Narrow Ruling........................................................................................................................................................................39 Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit.............................................................................................................................................................................40 Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit.............................................................................................................................................................................41 AT: Permutation Do Both....................................................................................................................................................................................42 AT: Permutation Do Both....................................................................................................................................................................................43 Generic AT: Lopez DAs.....................................................................................................................................................................................44 AT: ESA DA No ESA Overturn.......................................................................................................................................................................45 AT: ESA DA No Impact to ESA.......................................................................................................................................................................46 AT: ESA DA ESA Bad Turn...........................................................................................................................................................................47 AT: Terrorism DA No Link..............................................................................................................................................................................48 AT: Terrorism DA No Impact...........................................................................................................................................................................49 AT: Unpredictability DA.....................................................................................................................................................................................50 AT: Unpredictability DA.....................................................................................................................................................................................51 AT: Courts Link to Politics..................................................................................................................................................................................52 AT: No Test Case................................................................................................................................................................................................53 ***Aff Answers to States***...............................................................................................................................................................................54 States Counterplan Illegitimate............................................................................................................................................................................55 Federal Solvency.................................................................................................................................................................................................56 Federal Solvency.................................................................................................................................................................................................57 Federal Key Strike Down..................................................................................................................................................................................58 Federal Key Soft Power Advantage...................................................................................................................................................................59 Soft Power Extensions.........................................................................................................................................................................................60 Soft Power MPX Extensions................................................................................................................................................................................61 Perm Do Both Cooperative Federalism.............................................................................................................................................................62 Cooperative Federalism Extensions......................................................................................................................................................................63 Links to Politics..................................................................................................................................................................................................64 ***Aff Answers to Lopez***..............................................................................................................................................................................65 AT: Lopez Counterplan Rolled Back.................................................................................................................................................................65 AT: Lopez Counterplan Rolled Back.................................................................................................................................................................66 AT: Lopez Counterplan Doesnt Solve Federalism............................................................................................................................................67 Terrorism DA 2ac...............................................................................................................................................................................................68 ESA DA 2ac.......................................................................................................................................................................................................69
JDI 2 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core ESA DA 2ac.......................................................................................................................................................................................................70 ESA DA Link Extension...................................................................................................................................................................................71 ESA DA MPX Extension..................................................................................................................................................................................72 Unpredictability DA 2ac......................................................................................................................................................................................73 Unpredictability DA 2ac......................................................................................................................................................................................74 Unpredictability DA Link Extension.................................................................................................................................................................75 Unpredictability DA Link Extension.................................................................................................................................................................76
States Counterplan 1nc

The 50 states and territories, through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, should ___(Insert plan mandates). The counterplan is competitive and legitimate tests the necessity of federal government action and avoids the disadvantage and is not multi-actor because it fiats the single enforceable action of the NCCUSL this is real world Razook 2k
Nim Razook, Professor of Legal Studies @ Oklahoma, 2000, Uniformity Private Laws, American Business Law Journal, pg. np The means advanced by our polity to achieve regulatory uniformity are instructive for three reasons. First,
examples of interstate cooperation via interstate compacts, agreements or uniform state laws appear to be the foil for national intervention. That states have somehow managed to overcome the collective action problems associated with efforts to cooperate and to reach some cooperative solution suggests that the costs of interstate cooperation are apparently not insurmountable obstacles. Second, efforts by the states to forge their own solutions can illuminate the underlying reasons for such cooperation in a system in which the forces of maximization discourage such efforts. This section suggests that they do so often to retain their autonomy and to avoid federal preemption. Finally, comparing the efforts of the Conference in promulgating and advocating uniform state laws with the decisions by Congress to preempt historically state-governed areas of law leads to a discussion of whether the Conference's efforts might influence Congressional preemption decisions.
The counterplan solves - A decentralized approach to Social Services solves best a laboratory effect allows for state experimentation, successful approaches, and subsequent federal modeling* Fossett, Professor @ U of Michigan, et al 7
James W. Fossett, Alicia R. Ouellette, Sean Philpott, David Magnus, and Glenn McGee, Federalism and Bioethics: States and Moral Pluralism, Hastings Center Report37, no. 6 (2007): 24-35 A decentralized program structure, by contrast, provides for more experi-mentation in program design
and management, in accordance with Jus- tice Brandeiss oft-quoted comment that states can function as laboratories of democracy. There is frequently no clear consensus on the most appropriate way to manage complex programs and little evidence on the likely consequences of alternative strategies. Allowing for variations in program structure and implementa-tion both permits the tailoring of program management to local conditions and allows other states and the federal government to gain valuable information on the most effective means of improving program perfor-mance. Numerous domestic programs, ranging from TANF and Medicaid to environmental protection, education, and workforce development, permit the administering federal agencies to grant states waivers of existing program requirements or otherwise to alter program structure and management, frequently in major ways.36 States and federal offi-cials pay close attention to the results of these experiments, which are circu-lated via publications and conferences sponsored by associations both of elected officials, such as the National Governors Conference and the National Conference of State Legisla- tures, and of specialized program ad- ministrators, such as the National As- sociation of Medicaid Directors. Pro- gram features that seem to work are frequently adopted by other states and incorporated into subsequent federal policies. Many of the features of the TANF
programwhich re- placed the Aid to Families with De- pendent Children program (AFDC) as the countrys primary welfare program for low income families in 1996grew out of earlier waivers of particular AFDC program requirements. These waivers allowed states to experiment with a variety of ways of discouraging welfare dependence and encouraging self-support among low income families.
States Counterplan 1nc

The counterplan wont be rolled back states have been delegated extreme lenience for providing social services Foer 5
Frank, senior editor at The New Republic and a contributing editor for New York magazine, The Joy of Federalism, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/books/review/006FOERL.html?pagewanted=4 Prodded by a Republican Congress and a conservative Supreme Court, Clinton actually presided over the revitalized
federalism that Sandel imagined, and even spent time in the White House huddling with Sandel and Putnam. Federalism suited his declared ambition to move beyond the era of ''big government.'' In 1995, he signed a law prohibiting the national government from imposing new burdens on the states without first providing funds to cover any costs. The welfare reform package he ushered into law a year later gave states enormous latitude in remaking social policy.
Public and political pressure means enforcement is guaranteed Volden 97

Craig, Profesor of Political Science, The New Federalism, Google Book
Theoretical Defense of the States Counterplan

1. The counterplan is predictable. The 1nc Fossett evidence is indicative of a comparative literature base surrounding social services. The key question is where we should devote attention: the federal government or the states. 2. The counterplan is reciprocal. The affirmative fiats hundreds of politicians to vote for the plan, for the plan to be upheld by the Supreme Court, and to be enforced by the executive. The negative should be allowed to fiat domestic governmental actors. 3. The counterplan is not multi-actor fiat. The counterplan fiats 50 governors act in unison through the NCCUSL. The 1nc Razook evidence describes this process as common, enforceable, and predictable. 4. The counterplan tests the federal key warrant. The affirmative can read any advantage based off of federal action, and that is offense against the counterplan. If the negative cannot test the federal warrant, there will be a topic explosion because any harms area can then be an affirmative 5. The counterplan increases affirmative ground. They can read disadvantages to any state acting, or to the NCCUSL acting as a whole. 6. The counterplan increases education. The counterplan increases education about nonfederal agencies and politics. Since the affirmative does not use the states, only the negative provides this education. 7. The counterplans education has more value than the affirmatives fairness claims. The chief issue of political science is the designation of sovereignty. Columbia Encyclopedia 1
Federal Government, Accessed April 15, 2009, http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/f/federalg.asp FEDERAL GOVERNMENT [federal government] or federation, government of a union of states in which sovereignty is divided between a central authority and component state authorities. A federation differs from a confederation in that the central power acts directly upon individuals as well as upon states, thus creating the problem of dual allegiance. Substantial power over matters affecting the people as a whole, such as external affairs, commerce, coinage, and the maintenance of military forces, are usually granted to the central government. Nevertheless, retention of jurisdiction over local affairs by states is compatible with the federal system and makes allowance for local feelings. The chief political problem of a federal system of government is likely to be the allocation of
sovereignty, because the need for unity among the federating states may conflict with their desire for autonomy.
8. Best policy option justifies negative actor testing. Since the judge is simply an individual in a room seeking solutions to problems, there is no reason his or her ballot should be limited to the federal government. 9. Err negative on theory. The affirmative speaks first and last, chooses the topic, and has nearly infinite prep time to delegate towards defending their plan. 10. Reject the argument not the team If the affirmative wins that the counterplan is illegitimate, that is a reason that the counterplan should not be considered in the judges decision. Voting affirmative on theory is a non-starter because it does not affirm the resolution.
NCCUSL Solvency
NCCUSL compacts are enforced and implemented Zimmerman 2
Joseph Zimmerman, Professor of Political Science at Albany, 2002, Interstate Cooperation: Compacts and Administrative Agreements, pg. np All compacts enacted into law by state legislatures establish a contractual relationship between the party
states which is protected from impairment by the US Constitutions contract clause (Art. I, s. 10). By entering into compacts other than advisory or study ones, states surrender part of their sovereign authority since compacts, in common with international treaties, supercede any conflicting state laws. In effect, a compact establishes the equivalent of a uniform law in all or part of the territory of the compacting states.
NCCUSL compacts are actual law there is no risk of backsliding because of the significant trust in governors appointees Ribstein and Kobayashi 96
Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, Foundation Professor and Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, 1996, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud. 131, pg. np
The commissioners draft, approve, and lobby for enactment of uniform laws. NCCUSL emphasizes that the commissioners have long tenure and receive no compensation beyond reimbursement for expenses. This purportedly ensures that the commissioners will work for the "public good," free from "partisan political considerations." But the commissioners do have private interests that affect the content of uniform laws. First, they contribute their time for which they receive a return in the form of reputational benefits from having participated in drafting uniform laws. Commissioners can sell their expertise through
law practice and as expert witnesses on the background of uniform laws.
There are several examples of all 50 states acting in unison Panko 3

Ron Panko, Staff, 2003, Bestwire, REGULATORS EYE INTERSTATE COMPACTS TO PRESERVE STATE REGULATION, pg. np About 200 interstate compacts are in existence, including 14 in which all 50 states participate, said McCarty. The odds of larger states joining an insurance compact are much lower than for smaller states because larger states realistically won't want to cede power, he said. But Florida is spearheading an effort to collaborate with Texas and California on some insurance matters, he added.
Uniform compacts are common occurrences Zimmerman 92

Joseph Zimmerman, Professor of Political Science @ Albany, 1992, Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power, pg. 50-51 An interstate concordat has the potential to effect cooperative action and settle disputes. In particualr, a
compact preserves the authority of the concerned states and obviates or reduces the need for Congressional preemption to solve a regional problem. Compacts also can eliminate a potential disadvantagelack of uniformityin a federal system since a uniform system of law can be established by compacts in two to fifty states. A great advantage of this interstate cooperative device is its ability to formulate a common policy within a region with distinct interests and problems or a multistate agency to build and operate facilities or provide services. In other words, political power can be centralized at the regional level where desirable.
NCCUSL Solvency
NCCUSL action can act in every area of the law Ribstein and Kobayashi 96
Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, Foundation Professor and Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, 1996, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud. 131, pg. np WHILE a large literature has used economic analysis to examine lawmaking by public legislatures, the economic literature on legislation so far has paid little attention to the potentially influential role that may be played by private or pseudopublic groups, such as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the American Law Institute, and the American Bar Association. This article addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing the adoption of uniform state laws proposed by the NCCUSL. The NCCUSL
operates by promulgating uniform law proposals, which are then considered for adoption by state legislatures. The NCCUSL has proposed uniform laws in virtually every area of state law. Some, notably including the Uniform Commercial Code, have been adopted in nearly every jurisdiction.
Solvency Social Services

State social services are more effective than federal approaches wont get rolled back and avoids political problems of the plan Nathan 5
Richard, is codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Federalism and Health Policy, Health Affairs Vol 24 No 6 Over two centuries, the U.S. federal form has proved to be opportunistic. The role and activities of U.S. governments have changed as U.S. societal values and conditions have changed. The principal question examined in this paper is: Does
U.S. federalism enhance or impede the development of social programs, particularly for health care? The argument here is that U.S. federalism's dominant effect has been to expand the scope and spending of the social sector. The recent history of Medicaid provides evidence for taking this position. In the current period, the national government has tried a number of retrenchment strategies for Medicaid. However, state governments have dug in their heels; Democrats and Republicans alike have staved off Washington's attempted Medicaid rollbacks. Lawrence Brown and Michael Sparer expressed a similar view in 2003. They found that fiscal federalism was a factor in "prompting coverage expansions during good times (the feds paid most of the bill) and deterring cutbacks even in bad times (every state dollar saved meant
two or three federal dollars lost)."^ It is arguable that we are seeing another health-related example of this upward push of state policy initiative in the actions of California, Illinois, Connecticut, and New Jersey to support embryonic stem cell research, which are now, and surprisingly quickly, being expressed in a changed, supportive national policy on this controversial issue. I return now to comments that federalism is dynamic and opportunistic. Where one stands depends on where one has power. Although it might be easier and more efficient for a political faction to advance its goals centrally, when
one's faction is out of power at the center, it is equally logical to advance them from the periphery.
A state-by-state approach to social service policies allows innovation and a race-to-the-top comparatively more effective than unitary federal action Nathan 5
Richard, is codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Federalism and Health Policy, Health Affairs Vol 24 No 6
In the 1980s, when the pendulum of social policy nationally swung toward conservatism, there was a similar spurt in state activism in response to President Ronald Reagan's policies to cut domestic spending. States reshaped programs to reflect state priorities, increased their funding of programs in areas in which the federal government had become less active, and assumed more control over the activities of local governments and nonprofits.^ In these and other ways, states increased their influence vis-a-vis the federal government and their relationships with local governments and nonprofits. More recently. Randy Bovbjerg and other Urban Institute scholars pointed to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 as an example of a state initiative that stimu- lated national policy activism: "HIPAA adapted some state and small group insurance market reforms and applied them nationally."' The key to the argument about the essentially progovernmental activist influence of federalism cycles over time is to convince the reader that in liberal times nationally,
recalcitrance and opposition to change by some states have not been as important for social policy as the state-push factor in conservative periods. The historical record and the Medicaid experience support this position, but I grant that definitive proof is a hard standard to satisfy for theories of this kind.
Medicaid in Tiie Federaiism Context Although it is complex territory, we need to try to unpack the whys and hows of the state-push factor for Medicaid in U.S. federalism. Intrinsic characteristics of federalism have put liberal/innovative states in a
position to lead in conservative periods. Changes that states make in these periods, because they are easier to develop and test in relatively small places (as opposed to having to be adopted nationally), have a demonstration/replication effect on other states. Such changes would not be as likely to occur and be diffused in a unitary political system. When a particular state policy innovation is shown to be substantively and managerially feasible, this gives activist leaders in other states confidence that they can do similar things, providing them with a knowledge base for adopting new or changed policies and reducing apprehensions about doing so.

States solve better federal action is perceived as a social service ceiling, while state action encourages private and federal reciprocation Nathan 5
Richard, is codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Federalism and Health Policy, Health Affairs Vol 24 No 6
This state-push factor in the case of Medicaid in recent years has had a notable protective and expansionist influence, despite the U.S. political culture in which individualism and general skepticism about government's role in social policy is strongly manifest. An underlying reason why this occurs is that many federal grant-in-aid programs, including Medicaid, are structured to give states flexibility in setting benefit levels and determining how benefits are defined. If there had to be one nationwide standard ("one size fits all") for the benefits and services provided under social programs such as Medicaid, the ultimate effect would be less expansive. This floor-setting accommodation to diversity in social policy (sometimes aided by federal waivers for human services for "demonstration-type" initiatives) permits establishing higher standards and benefits in some states. It has also been an instrument for providing federal matching funds for existing health programs (such as mental health and retardation, drug and alcohol treatment, and
school health programs), such that in New York, as the saying goes, "Medicaid is a verb," by enabling the state to use Medicaid funds for programs that are already part of a strong base of publicly supported health care services.
The states are much more effective than the federal government at delivering social services Gilman 7
Michele Gilman, Associate Professor of Law, 2007, IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED, SIGN AN EXECUTIVE ORDER: PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1103, pg. np Presidentialists do not argue that Congress lacks transparency; for better or worse, it does. Rather, they contend that
Congress is prone to factionalism and responds only to state and local pork barrel concerns. Thus, the President is better suited to take broad, national concerns into consideration in shaping national policies. However, where human services are concerned, state and local influence is arguably the goal, and federalism is the defining model. Most social services are delivered at the local level, where officials are deemed better able to identify and respond to the unique needs of their communities. For instance, what it takes to help the jobless in New York City is very different than what it takes in rural North Dakota. In today's human services system, the federal government's role is mainly to disburse funds to state and local governments and establish overarching goals; local governments then decide how best to structure their programs. President Bush's charitable choice initiative thus runs counter to the highly devolved and
decentralized system of social service delivery in this country as well as to his own commitment to federalism and professed preference for localized solutions to social problems.
State governments are more accountable than federal ones Calabresi 95

Steven Calabresi, Assistant Professor at Northwester, 1995, Michigan Law Review, pg. np d. Improved Quality of Governmental Decisionmaking and Administration. Decentralized
governments make better decisions than centralized ones for reasons additional to the whip they feel from competition. Decentralization ensures that "those responsible for choosing a given social policy are made aware of the costs of that policy." 74 This helps ensure a more informed weighing of costs and benefits than often occurs at the national level where taxpayers often may be less cognizant of the social costs of particular legislation.

States solve and avoid politics Fossett, Professor @ U Michigan, et al 7
James W. Fossett, Alicia R. Ouellette, Sean Philpott, David Magnus, and Glenn McGee, Federalism and Bioethics: States and Moral Pluralism, Hastings Center Report37, no. 6 (2007): 24-35
First, a federalist
system is better than a national structure at managing conflicts arising from moral pluralism. Absent a national consensus on how to deal with complex and controversial bioethical issues, a single national structure may be unable to take action at all, given the intense political cross-pressures bearing on it. Both the advocates and the detractors of embryonic stem cell research, for example, have been frustrated by the lack of apparent consensus on how to proceed with such research. As a result, neither group has been able to as- semble a stable majority coalition in Congress.
States are more effective at reaching the needs of the population Fossett, Professor @ U Michigan, et al 7
A second, related advantage is that federalism provides advocates with multiple forums within which to press their claims. The role of national and state governments in check- ing each other and moderating each others policies has been claimed as a major advantage of the federal system since the Federalist Papers. Hamiltons original justification along these lines is instructive: Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are in- vaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
States are comparatively more effective at administering social services Volden 97

Craig, Profesor of Political Science, The New Federalism, Google Book
Solvency Federal Modeling

The counteprlan is a state-push that percolates to federal action that is void of the political problems of the plan Nathan 5
Richard, is codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Federalism and Health Policy, Health Affairs Vol 24 No 6 THE EXPANSION OF MEDICAID In the 1990s and in recent years, however, has not been so much a
function of congressional initiatives as it has the product of state initiatives.^^ Historically, states have performed this role, providing a state-push factor in social policy. In fact, as states have taken measures in recent years to protect and expand their Medicaid programs in the face of Washington's efforts to damp down the growth of the program, a nascent political and programmatic base may be building now for a future expansionist cycle in national policy to improve health care benefits and services^when the stars are aligned centrally for doing so.
States better understand local needs and concerns they are first movers and laboratories Litz 8
Franz T. Litz, Senior Fellow, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, 2008, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/climate_change_101
In addition to the states role as first movers and policy laboratories on important issues, states often bring an understanding of the unique circumstances within their boundaries. As on-the-ground implementers, states have greater knowledge of the regulated entities, easier and more frequent contact with facilities, familiarity with information sources, and experience with forcing compliance.
Social security proves that uniform state action is modeled by the federal government Engel 5
Kristen Engel, Professor of Law at Arizona, 2005, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54, pg. np For these reasons, the ultimate significance of state actions on global climate change lies in the degree to which such actions influence the policies of the larger jurisdictions of which the states are a part - either the federal government or the international community. State climate change policies can have this kind of influence
in a number of ways. One way of influencing these larger jurisdictions is by developing new programs or approaches that are subsequently adopted by the federal government based on the idea of the states as "laboratories of democracy." History is rife with examples of federal legislation that has drawn heavily from ideas being developed at the state level, social security being a prominent example.
State action is modeled federally spills over and has an international impact Golden 99
Dylan, JD Candidate UCLA Law, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Lexis
Individual states vary widely in their fossil fuel consumption and in the amount of carbon dioxide they release into the atmosphere. California emits as much carbon dioxide as all of Scandinavia combined. 46 Texas is the seventh largest carbon dioxide producer. 47 Some states emit a globally negligible amount of carbon dioxide. Some conservative interests may therefore oppose the CCTI on the grounds that it involves a further expansion of federal power into an area which is properly under the jurisdiction of states. Those who believe firmly in strong state governments are similar to the "Greens" (discussed below) in that the "rent", in this case the penalty, at stake in the CCTI is non-economic. [*188] This group does have some justification for their position. Attempted state action involving manipulating markets, generally through the tax system, in the name of the environment tells us a great deal about how various stakeholders - such as business entities, environmental interest groups, and political groups - might respond to federal or international action. 48 State legislatures also
State environmental policy frequently influences Congress. 50 State action increases the feasibility of federal action because: familiarity aids the political process, legislators understand the politics in terms of income, consumption and their regional interests, administrative agencies know how to [*189] administrate and may estimate impacts, interest groups know where they stand, and practical experience can guide legislative drafting. 51 Such grassroots action may also stimulate support among the populous by encouraging people to take personal responsibility for the environment. 52 Action at the state level may also spur more informed federal action, which in turn could spur international action. State-federal agreements are possible on the carbon tax issue and the commerce clause does
provide a forum to raise issues and change perceptions. 49
not prohibit joint or unilateral action. 53 Energy taxes have already been implemented jointly in the case of gasoline taxes. 54
Solvency Bioethics / Medical Research

Leaving bioethics policy in the hands of the states is the most effective approach Fossett, Professor @ U Michigan, et al 7
Solvency Disease
All 50 states can effectively provide preventive health care and disease management they are efficient and fill-in gaps left by federal action Burke 7
Courtney, Director at Rockefeller Institute Health Policy Research Center, What Do the Presidential Candidates Health Care Proposals Have in Common? One Important Answer: They Rely on the States, New York State Health Policy Research Center, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2007-11-29-federal_health_care_reform_will_rely_on_states.pdf Health care is one of the most talked-about issues in the 2008 presidential campaign. And for all the differences among the leading candidates, there
are also important similarities. Among these, one stands out: the central role the 50 states will play in health care reform, regardless of who wins the White House. A majority
of the candidates, whether Democratic or Republican, say that the health care system needs to increase preventive care, use information technology to decrease costs, and give patients better information about providers and outcomes so they can make informed decisions. These are all good ideas. The primary differences among candidates proposals are the level of financial responsibility for paying for care (i.e., who pays more the individual versus the employer versus government); whether coverage is mandatory or not; and which entity has more responsibility over the provision of care. Republican candidates tend to favor a system that relies more on the individual and private insurers rather than employers or government to purchase and manage care, while most Democratic candidates propose building on the employer-based system and expanding public programs. Regardless of which approach one favors, none of the leading
candidates calls for diminution of the large role that state governments play in financing, regulating, monitoring, and administering the nations health care system. And several proposals call for expanding that role, with varying levels of specificity. For instance, Mitt Romney has said let the states create their own plans, while Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, and Barak Obama all favor providing more coverage through the state administered Medicaid and State Childrens Insurance Health (SCHIP) programs. States already play a notable role in financing and administering publicly funded health insurance to people qualifying for the Medicaid program, which provides care to over 50 million people a year. Government funded
health care also is provided to an additional four million children through the State Childrens Health Insurance Program. The federal government shares in the cost of these programs, but both are largely administered by the states. States also play a large role
in providing incentives to employers and insurers to provide health care coverage, and in regulating insurers and the products they provide. The role that states play in financing care is significant: states spent approximately $155 billion on the Medicaid program alone in fiscal year 2004. The financial role of states in providing health care means that they have been implementing cost controls, restructuring delivery systems, and finding ways to modernize care delivery. States have employed several strategies to provide care, control costs or restructure their delivery systems. Most states already operate disease management programs to improve care and control costs. Other states are experimenting with provider payment systems that pay more for better performance. Such state initiated reforms are not unusual. In fact, states often are carrying out reforms at the very time that there is debate about reform and how to do it at the national level.
Solvency Health Care

States are more effective that the feds at administering health care initiatives Burke 7
Courtney, Director at Rockefeller Institute Health Policy Research Center, What Do the Presidential Candidates Health Care Proposals Have in Common? One Important Answer: They Rely on the States, New York State Health Policy Research Center, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2007-11-29-federal_health_care_reform_will_rely_on_states.pdf
There are benefits to having a state-administered system of health care. Innovation and consensus can be easier to achieve because there are fewer people involved than might be the case in a national program. The system can be more responsive to the inevitable need for change, because it is smaller and closer to the ground than a national system.
State action on health care is modeled by the federal government Burke 7

Courtney, Director at Rockefeller Institute Health Policy Research Center, What Do the Presidential Candidates Health Care Proposals Have in Common? One Important Answer: They Rely on the States, New York State Health Policy Research Center, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2007-11-29-federal_health_care_reform_will_rely_on_states.pdf
Inability to achieve national consensus, current initiatives of states to improve access to health care, and the unlikelihood of comprehensive reform at the national level portend that states will continue to hold an important place when significant reforms in health care take place in the near future, and will continue to control major aspects of Americas health care system. History shows that the federal government often replicates what has already been done by states. Bottom line: if you are interested in health care reform, keep an eye on the states.
Solvency SCHIP
SCHIP ensures that states have the ability to provide medical care to children, pregnant women and immigrants NILC 9
National Immigration Law Center, 2009, FACTS ABOUT New State Option to Provide Health Coverage to Immigrant Children and Pregnant Women, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/cdev/ICHIA/ICHIA-facts-2009-04-01.pdf The recently enacted Childrens Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) provides states
with a new opportunity to provide affordable health coverage to many immigrant children and pregnant women through Medicaid and the Childrens Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This new law was drawn from earlier legislation, the Immigrant Childrens Health Improvement Act (ICHIA), which had longstanding bipartisan support. By allowing states to cover more immigrant children and pregnant women, the new law begins to address some of the health inequities and disparities in our health care system. This fact sheet highlights the key elements of this new law.
Solvency Native Americans

Alaska proves that the states can succeed at providing social services to Native Americans ISER 5
Institute of Social and Economic Research, 2005, Table of Recommendations, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.alaskool.org/resources/anc/anc05.htm The Alaska Area Native Health Service, the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, and
others who provide funds for substance abuse prevention and treatment should conduct an outcome evaluation of the effectiveness
of programs that they fund and, when relatively unsuccessful approaches are found, redirect the funding to fill in the gaps in the treatment system and implement new and different methods to reduce the incidence and prevalence of substance abuse. The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services and the Alaska Area Native Health Service should use existing funds to support the establishment of an Alaska Native Family Development Center modeled after the successful Kakawis Centre in British Columbia, monitoring and evaluating its effectiveness over time for possible expansion.
Both the states and federal government have provided services to Native Americans Balu 95
Rekha Balu, Chicago Based Free-lance writer, 1995, Indian Identity Who's drawing the boundaries?, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/identity.html Because the tribes rely on funding for educational, social, and public works services from the
federal and state governments, they have been dubbed "dependent sovereigns." State and federal money directed to tribes finances such crucial services as the development of sanitation and sewage systems, the providing of adequate health care, and the establishment of schools on the reservation or transportation to schools in neighboring areas.
States have the authority to provide any benefits to Native Americans Cooper 7
Robert Cooper, Tennessee Attorney General, 2007, State of Tennessees Authority to Recognize Indian Tribes, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.state.tn.us/environment/boards/tcia/pdf/ag_opinion.pdf
Congress has acknowledged that state governments have the authority to recognize Indian tribes. Congress created a cause of action for the misrepresentation of goods as Indian produced and defined Indian tribes to include
any Indian group that has been formally recognized as an Indian tribe by a State legislature or by a State commission or similar organization legislatively vested with State tribal recognition authority 25 U.S.C.A. 305e(d) (2000). Tennessees General Assembly provided the Commission with the authority to recognize tribes under Tenn. Code Ann. 4-34- 103(6). A tribe recognized by the State of Tennessee would be able to bring a lawsuit against a person for offering a good in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced pursuant to 25 U.S.C.A. 305e (2000). Federal regulations make benefits available to state-recognized tribes. For example, the
Department of Health and Human Services provides direct funding for Community Services Block Grants for organized groups of Indians that the State in which they reside has determined are Indian tribes. An organized group of Indians is eligible for direct funding based on State recognition if the State has expressly determined that the group is an Indian tribe.
Tennessee proves that states can provide any benefit to Native tribes Cooper 7
Robert Cooper, Tennessee Attorney General, 2007, State of Tennessees Authority to Recognize Indian Tribes, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.state.tn.us/environment/boards/tcia/pdf/ag_opinion.pdf Currently, Tennessee laws do not provide any direct benefits to Indian tribes that are recognized by
the State pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 4-34-103(6). They do provide benefits to Indian individuals by making them eligible to receive scholarships, grants, or any other benefits afforded to minorities from the University of Tennessee system, the board of regents system, or any Tennessee school system. Tenn.
Code Ann. 4-34-201 (1994). The statute defines Native American as an individual recognized as Native American by a federally recognized tribe or a state. Id. As discussed, supra, federal programs do provide benefits to Indian tribes recognized by states. The
federal government does not have the sole right to recognize Indian tribes. Congress has acknowledged that states have the power to recognize Indian tribes by extending benefits and rights to state-recognized tribes. The State of Tennessee has the authority to recognize Indian tribes, so as long as there is no conflict with federal laws.
Solvency Environmental Justice / Urban Renewal

The states empirically solve environmental justice issues Eady 3
Veronica Eady, Professor of Environmental Policy, 2003, Environmental Justice in State Policy Decisions, pg. np In September 1993, EPA chartered its formal federal advisory committee, the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC), a multi-stakeholder advisory body that provides independent advice, consultation and recommendations to the EPA Administrator on matters related to environmental justice.4 The NEJAC model has been fairly successful
at achieving broad stakeholder buy-in and gathering public input on a variety of environmental justice matters. A number of states, including Massachusetts, have imported the model to guide state environmental policy-makers through the process of crafting their own environmental justice policies and programmes. One might argue that state versions of the NEJAC model have been more successful than NEJAC itself because they have been empanelled for the discernable goal of drafting environmental justice policy. While NEJAC has provided an ongoing public forum for community activists and a process for making concrete policy recommendations, one flaw in NEJAC and all federal advisory committees is that EPA is not obligated to take its advice. States, on the other hand, may ostensibly be more inclined to implement the advice of advisory bodies that have come together for a clear and specific purpose to develop an environmental justice policy.
Massachusetts proves the states are effective with local control over environmentally friendly housing Eady 3
Veronica Eady, Professor of Environmental Policy, 2003, Environmental Justice in State Policy Decisions, pg. 168-170 These were anti- sprawl legislation, known as the Community Preservation Act, the Massachusetts Brownfields Act (Chapter 206 of the Acts of 1998) and Executive Orders under both former Governors William F Weld and Argeo Paul Cellucci calling for sustainability (Executive Order No. 385, Planning for Growth) and affordable housing (Executive Order 418, Assisting Communities in Addressing the Housing Shortage), respectively. Not surprisingly, Massachusetts
regulators did not have to look hard to find the tools and legal authority to support an environmental justice programme. Policy-makers also met enthusiastic if sober- public support for the MEJAC process. With Massachusetts placing all of its environmental agencies under the umbrella of a single cabinet office, the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA), the Commonwealth was in a position to make a broad policy statement on environmental rights. Not only was the secretariat positioned to make a statement protecting all individuals from a disproportionate share of the environmental burden with respect to new siting decisions, it was able to ensure an equal share of environmental benefits, including access to open space, parks, state-run ice skating rinks and swimming pools, and funding. Also quite significantly, Massachusetts took the opportunity to promote sustainable technologies and businesses focusing on clean production in the most environmentally distressed communities.
Local control is better for achieving environmental justice Morello-Frosch 2

Rachel Morello-Frosch, Professor of Environmental Science, 2002, Environmental Justice and Regional Inequality in Southern California, Environmental Health Perspectives 110.2, pg. np Third, a regional focus in environmental justice research is crucial because industrial clusters,
transportation planning, and economic development decisions are often regionally rooted. Thus, the equity question is how the social and environmental health effects of such industries are distributed within the regions that host them. Fourth, minority and low-income communities in the region have become increasingly concerned about whether they bear a disproportionate burden of exposures to air pollution and their associated environmental health risks. Thus, our collaborative is connected to community-based strategies for achieving environmental justice and rooted in a region where organizing on various environmental health issues is already happening.
Solvency Education
Education services should stay within the control of the states Manna 6
Paul Manna, Associate Professor of Government, 2006, Conductor, schoolmarm, or struggling substitute teacher?, History Policy Conference, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://pmanna.people.wm.edu/research/Manna2006PolicyHistoryConference.pdf First, historical or developmental studies of federal education policy tend to over- emphasize
machinations inside the Washington beltway. Scholars commonly assume that to understand federal policy, one needs to carefully examine federal decisionmaking. That is certainly a useful starting point, but it is surprising that state and local governments do not loom larger in these narratives given how the United States allocates responsibility for K-12 education. Despite Washington's expanding role, citizens still prefer state and local governments to control the nation's schools. Additionally, the fiscal federalism of education has remained quite stable for over decades. Federal spending has grown, but Washington has never financed more than 10 percent of the nation's overall educational expenditures; for roughly thirty years the federal
contribution has hovered near 7 percent, mere pennies on the dollar when compared to what state and local governments provide. And even though federal grant programs in education, especially Title I of the ESEA, have come with more prescriptive requirements, in general,
grants remain quite fluid and flexible policy too.
States serve as the best avenue to provide services in the school system federal policies encourage fracturing and cant ensure accountability Powell 96
John Powell, Professor of Law at Ohio State, 1996, In Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy, pg. 21 Although education is not a fundamental right under federal law, a number of state courts recently have found that education
is a fundamental right under their state constitutions, and nearly all states ensure adequate schooling under their constitutions. These constitutional mandates create an affirmative duty on the part of individual states to address issues of education and obviate the need for showings of intent or causation. States should be, and have been, held liable for segregative and inadequate conditions in housing and schools, even where these harms
cannot be linked directly to state action. The racial and economic segregation of schools often stems from the policies and actions of multiple actors, including housing and planning authorities and education officials. Likewise, housing segregation often results from the measures implemented by school officials in addition to those enacted by land-use authorities. Because of the way federal
courts fracture the responsibility for segregation among government agencies, litigators often fail or cannot join all the necessary parties.
Education is explicitly a state power McConki 96

Pace Jefferson McConkie, National Litigation Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1996 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 389 Since 1954, the most prominent battles regarding race, civil rights, and federalism have been in
the arena of public education - an arena not "enumerated" in the federal constitution and which traditionally falls under the rubric of state and local governmental responsibilities. In the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision, the Supreme Court ruled: Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural [*398] values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. 46
Solvency Education
The states are the best mechanisms for improving educational quality Radhdert 4
Mark Radhdert, Professor of Law at Temple, 2004, Vision and Revision, Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review, pg. np What about other branches of government? In theory, state legislatures could take steps to restructure public
education in ways that would enable more public school student diversity and stem the deterioration of urban educational quality. States could choose to consolidate school districts, stretch them across city-suburb political divides, or alter attendance zones and policies to enable cross-registration between city and suburban schools. They could revise funding structures to provide new infusions of resources to the cities, creating magnet educational opportunities like the ones imagined by the district court in Jenkins.
Local control of schools is at the foreground of the need for continued federalism Parker 4
Wendy Parker, Professor of Law, 2004, Connecting the Dots, W and M Law Review, pg. np At one level, asking whether federalism is the reason for allowing local control in school desegregation jurisprudence is troublesome. The Court has, at times, emphasized the need for local control on grounds traditionally associated with federalism. On another level, however, the Court could be employing federalist rhetoric to reach a desired result. In addition, guessing why the judiciary reaches a particular result surely cannot be reduced to a single concept. Yet, one cannot disconnect the idea of local control from federalism. Local control, at its core, prefers state and local authority over federal intervention; and this approach is, by definition, federalism at work. In addition, the American history of education rests on a solid foundation of "local control" of schools. Schools are typically governed not
by the national government, but by state and, particularly for primary and secondary schools, local governments. Granted, public schools are not operated entirely independently of the national government, but local and state governance still predominates in theory and practice.
State action is comparatively more effective than action through the Department of Education Prilles 6
Wilfredo B. Prilles, Jr., Ford Foundation International Fellow, July 2006, Towards Greater Local Control of the Public School System, Accessed April 14, 2009, NewsBreak, http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1708&Itemid=88889404 A centrally-managed system for the long run will continue to yield the same inadequate results. Today, the
Department of Education (DepEd), with its 400,000 workforce, is the biggest bureaucracy in the national government, and will only continue to grow bigger as it tries to keep up with the rising school-age population. It will increasingly become difficult to manage such a bureaucracy, and expect it to respond to unique challenges that differ by locality. Moreover, there is very little chance to exact accountability over education outcomes from an organization whose local divisions and districts respond more to their regional and national superiors rather than the local communities they serve.
Solvency Domestic Violence

The states are the effective approach for addressing violence against women Hagan 1
Jennifer Hagan, Juris Doctorate, 2001, Spring Depaul Law Review, pg. np
The states' legislative response to the problem of domestic violence represents the first step in combatting gender-bias in the state legal system and improving the lives of domestic violence victims nationwide. Over the last twenty years, state legislatures have taken steps to address the need for more aggressive domestic violence legislation and the presence of gender bias in the legal system. As a result, the increasing public acknowledgement of the domestic violence epidemic has created a situation where state politicians cannot afford to ignore the need for legislation dealing with gender-motivated violence, unless they risk being voted out of office. This public accountability, along with the financial incentives provided by the VAWA I, has encouraged the enactment of state anti-violence legislation across the country.
All states acknowledge the need to protect victims of violence Hagan 1

States have acknowledged the need for women to feel protected by the system, both when they first leave the abuser, as well as during the period when they are seeking justice. Accordingly, every state has enacted civil protection order statutes and provisions for emergency ex-parte relief for victims attempting to leave an alleged abuser. These protection orders demand that the alleged abuser stay away from the victim, her home, her workplace, and her family, until the outcome of the case or for a specific duration. The protection statutes also provide support for the victim in her attempt to regain control of her life, providing that the state will charge the abuser criminally if he violates the order.
State judges have a lower animus Hagan 1

When enacting legislation, the states did not forget the judiciary and the inherent gender bias that still lingers within courtrooms. Many states, taking advantage of the funding made available through the VAWA I, have created task forces to study the gender bias in the courts and have made recommendations concerning the issue. As a result of these findings, which have shown that gender bias is still rampant, educational programs and training sessions concentrating on remedying judicial bias have been implemented by the states. Many of these programs are specifically targeted to the treatment of domestic violence crimes and its victims. This in turn not only improves the way victims are treated, but also enhances the judge's ability to understand the situation that he or she encounters in the courtroom.
States solve while preserving privacy for women Sullivan 96

Kathleen Sullivan, 1996, Professor of Law at Stanford, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 735, pg. np This counterargument might continue by noting that despite the continuing gender bias that Congress considered in the Violence Against Women Act, the states today are hardly the backwaters with respect to women's rights that the southern
states were with respect to race relations in the 1950s and 1960s. Rape laws have been widely reformed and sexual violence units have been instated in state law enforcement offices. Finally, the privacy preserved by state action doctrine might well be good for women; among other things, it allows reproductive autonomy and all-women colleges.
Solvency Immigration Services

Immigration jurisdiction is shared; the states can act also Huntington 8
Clare Huntington, Professor of Law at Colorado, 2008, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, Vanderbilt Law Review, pg. np
Although the federal government is traditionally understood to enjoy exclusive authority over immigration, states and localities are increasingly asserting a role in this field. This development has sparked vigorous
debate on the propriety of such involvement, but the debate is predicated on a misunderstanding of the nature of federal exclusivity. Challenging the conventional wisdom that the Constitution precludes a meaningful role for
the Constitution allows immigration authority to be shared among levels of government. After establishing the correctness of this view of immigration authority, this Article argues that the constitutionality of state and local involvement should be assessed through the lens of traditional federalism values. A federalism lens does not necessarily validate any particular state and local regulation, but in lieu of the blunt tool of structural preemption, it is a far superior means for determining the proper allocation of immigration authority among levels of government, leading to a more nuanced assessment of the interests at stake.
state and local involvement in immigrationa structural preemption argumentthis Article argues that
The states will be more generous in social service provisions than the feds Schuck 7
Peter Schuck, Professor of Law at Yale, 2007, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, University of Chicago Law Forum, pg. np An interesting feature of these critiques of the plenary power doctrine is that its critics (with the notable exception of Peter Spiro)
seem eager to embrace its corollary - the principle that federal authority over immigration preempts the states from playing any independent role in the development and administration of immigration law and policy. This conjunction of positions, which might otherwise seem illogical or at least awkward, is probably best explained by ideology and politics. As I have explained elsewhere, the immigration law professoriate occupies a position at the extreme left in the national debate over immigration. On the evidence from the post-1996 period, however, it is not at all clear that states unconstrained by the plenary power doctrine and its preemption corollary would treat legal immigrants more harshly than the federal government would - or than reasonable (i.e., non-xenophobic) voters might think wise or fair. Some states (or more likely, localities) might do so, but the the largest immigrant-receiving states are in fact consistently more generous to immigrants, even including undocumented ones, than are federal policymakers.
The states can provide assistance to immigrants they dont rely on the feds Zimmerman and Tumlin 99
Wendy and Karen, The Urban Institute, Occasional Paper Number 24, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ24.pdf Many states have chosen to provide considerable assistance to immigrants, particularly when the costs are
Despite fears of a race to the bottom with states providing as few benefits as possible, nearly every state has opted to maintain TANF and Medicaid eligibility for immigrants who were already in the United States when the federal welfare law passed. But even where the costs are borne by the states and localities, many states have stepped in to provide assistance. Over half the states have opted to provide one of the four key substitute programs to immigrants
shared with the federal government. listed above.
Solvency Immigration Services

States play an increasingly important role in immigration services Zimmerman and Tumlin 99
Wendy and Karen, The Urban Institute, Occasional Paper Number 24, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ24.pdf It has been over two and a half years since the federal welfare law passed, but states are not done setting
policy for
immigrants. States face a host of immigrant- related decisions that have not been addressed here, such as whether and how to enforce the new affidavits of support signed by immigrants sponsors. The federal government may restore benefits to more legal immigrants, leaving states with new decisions about whether to shift their substitute programs to cover populations still ineligible for federal benefits. States may also choose to change the decisions they have made at any time. They may scale back benefits if economic times worsen or they may provide more benefits if the impacts of restrictions on immigrant families is too great.
The only problem with current policy is variance uniformity solves Zimmerman and Tumlin 99
Wendy and Karen, The Urban Institute, Occasional Paper Number 24, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ24.pdf
States with more extensive safety nets for their low-income populations tend to be the states that choose to provide assistance to immigrants, leaving immigrants in those states with greater access to assistance than the
immigrants living in states with weak safety nets. As a result, states often have both a new substitute program for immigrants and an existing one, or they have neither one. In fact, over half the states have neither a new or existing state-funded cash assistance program available to post- enactment immigrant families during their first five years in the United States. The same is true for state-funded health insurance programs. Because states have more authority to restrict immigrants access and immigrants have fewer federal benefits to fall back on, devolution has led to even greater variation across state safety nets for immigrants than citizens.
Feds model the states on immigration policy Zimmerman and Tumlin 99

Wendy and Karen, The Urban Institute, Occasional Paper Number 24, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ24.pdf Finally, in the spirit of devolutionand in line with its approach toward welfare reform generallythe
federal government has left it to the states to decipher the complex set of decisions embedded in the law. In fact, federal action has at times followed state responses. For example, Washington state approached the federal government about the possibility of purchasing federal food stamps to distribute to newly ineligible immigrants before the federal government made it possible for all states to do so. In addition, the federal government has been slow to define key terms in the federal welfare law, such as what is
considered a federal public benefit. The result has been substantial variation in the pace of implementation across states and a lack of guidance that leaves some state policymakers confused about their new roles and responsibilities.
Specifically the states are responsible for impoverished immigrants Zimmerman and Tumlin 99
Wendy and Karen, The Urban Institute, Occasional Paper Number 24, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ24.pdf
The clearest immigration-related mandate that PRWORA creates for the states is, of course, that they pay a greater share of the costs of providing services to their low-income immigrant populations. When immigrants are cut from various federal benefit programs, states face the choice of providing benefits on their own dollar or excluding immigrants from state-funded programs. Even if they choose to limit immigrant eligibility for state assistance, states still bear the consequences of having
a needy population without access to a safety net, potentially increasing homelessness, hunger, or state emergency health care costs. Several states (including Vermont and New York) have statutory or constitutional mandates that prohibit
them from denying assistance to poor state residents, making it difficult to exclude from state assistance immigrants who are no longer eligible for federal help.
Solvency School Lunches

The states are comparatively better at providing healthy school lunches Parker 8
Lynn Parker, FRACs Director of Child Nutrition Programs and Nutrition Policy, 2008, Commodity Foods and the Nutritional Quality of the National School Lunch Program, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.frac.org/pdf/commodities08.pdf
In the area of nutrition in the school lunch commodity program, Congress has played little or no intentional role. USDA has made significant changes in offerings and specifications for foods in the school lunch commodity program, but there is still much to be done at the national, state, and local levels to ensure that commodity foods contribute optimally to compliance with the Dietary Guidelines. The greatest potential for change in the nutrition profile of foods made from commodities lies at the state agency level, at the local school district level, and with the
school food processors and distributors.
States play a leadership role in school food policy Parker 8

Lynn Parker, FRACs Director of Child Nutrition Programs and Nutrition Policy, 2008, Commodity Foods and the Nutritional Quality of the National School Lunch Program, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.frac.org/pdf/commodities08.pdf
State agencies should take advantage of their leadership role in child nutrition by assisting school districts in making wise nutrition choices among the products offered by food processors doing business in the state. The states determine which food processors can do business in the state and which products can be sold, another NCCP. Nutrition issues currently play little or no role in the latter decisions, however. States could take advantage of this NCCP in a number of ways, including: (1) developing model specifications for certain common products to assist schools in evaluating the choices they make; (2) working with school districts to make wise choices among available products; (3) evaluating products offered as to whether they make a
contribution to schools ability to meet federal school lunch regulations and the Dietary Guidelines and making those evaluations of the specifications available to the school districts; (4) encouraging processors to change the specifications of some
products and develop new products; and/or (5) requiring that a certain percentage of more healthful products be offered in order for the processor to be able to do business in the state.
Any solvency deficit links to the aff the states distribute all school lunches GAO 96
Governmental Accounting Organization, 1996, SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM Role and Impacts of Private Food Service Companies, Accessed April 14, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc96217.pdf In fiscal year 1995, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) spent about $5.2 billion to provide the nations school-age children with nutritious foods and promote healthy eating choices through its National School Lunch Program.1 State agencies, usually departments of education, are
responsible for the statewide administration of the lunch program through the disbursing of federal funds, monitoring of the program, and record keeping. Many of these responsibilities are carried out in cooperation with local school food authorities. Food authorities are
responsible for managing school food services for one or more schools or for a school district.
The federal school lunch program explicitly leaves food policy in the states hands Story 8
Mary Story, professor in the Division of Epidemiology and Community Health, 2008, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota, Future of Children, pg. np While in many respects inadequate themselves, especially regarding competitive foods, USDA nutrition regulations permit
state agencies and local school food authorities to impose additional restrictions on all food and beverage sales at any time in schools participating in the federal school meal programs. In recent years, many states, local school districts, and individual schools have taken up the challenge. States are also becoming more active in promoting physical activity. Twenty-three states have adopted additional restrictions.
Solvency Employment Policies

Regulating employers falls under the states jurisdiction the federal policy sets a floor not a ceiling HR Tools 9
How Individual States Regulate Safety And Health Programs, http://www.hrtools.com/article.aspx? id=9837&ekfxmen_noscript=1&ekfxmensel=e0fa05764_31_41 According to a 2004 OSHA FACTSheet, the OSH Act of 1970 encourages states to develop
and operate their own job safety and health plans under the authority of state law. These plans may cover both private and public sector employment or may be limited to public sector employment only. OSHA approves and monitors states' plans and provides up to 50 percent of an approved plan's operating costs. States must set job safety and health standards at least as effective as comparable federal standards. They also have the option to promulgate standards covering hazards not addressed by federal standards. States must conduct inspections, without advance notice, to enforce their standards, cover state and local government employees and operate occupational safety and health training and education programs. States provide free consultation,
funded primarily by OSHA, to help employers identify and correct workplace hazards in addition to varying and extensive programs of compliance assistance for employers and employees. To gain OSHA approval for a "developmental plan," the first step in the state plan process, a state must assure OSHA that all the structural elements necessary for an effective occupational safety and health program will be in place within three years.
These elements include: appropriate legislation; standards and procedures for standard setting, enforcement, appeal of citations and penalties; and a sufficient number of competent enforcement personnel. Appropriate state legislation must be enacted and matching Federal funds available prior to OSHA approval. Once a state has completed and documented all its developmental steps, it is eligible
for certification. Certification renders no judgment as to actual state performance, but merely attests to the structural completeness of the plan. At any time after plan approval, when it appears that the state is capable of independently enforcing standards, OSHA may sign an "operational status agreement" with the state. This commits OSHA to voluntarily limit discretionary federal enforcement in all or certain activities covered by the state plan.
Business law is devolved to the states Encyclopedia of Nations 9

United States - Local government, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/United-States-LOCAL-GOVERNMENT.html Since the Civil War, the functions of the state have expanded. Local businessthat is, business not involved in foreign or interstate commerceis
regulated by the state. The states create subordinate governmental bodies such as counties, cities, towns, villages, and boroughs, whose charters they either issue or, where home rule is permitted, approve. States regulate employment of children and women in industry, and enact safety laws to prevent industrial accidents. Unemployment insurance is a state function, as are education, public health, highway construction and safety, operation of a state highway patrol, and various kinds of personal relief. The state and local governments still are primarily responsible for providing public assistance, despite the large part the federal government plays in financing welfare.
Employer compensation is exclusively delegated to the states Bogardus 4

Anne, Human Resource Jumpstart, GoogleBook
Solvency Homelessness
Services for the homeless are best served through a model of decentralized federalism Beirne 87
Kenneth, Washington Based Policy Writer, America's Homeless: A Manageable Problem and Solution, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/religion/bu44.cfm America's homeless problem is manageable. Recent studies of a number of cities reinforce the. 1984 estimate of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urbp Development that, on any given night, approximately 300,000 Americans are homeless. Currently there are shelters and emergency beds available to house about half this number. Already, however, private agencies, states, and
localities have been providing extra resources at a rapid rate to meet specific, local needs. It is pe that
the remaining problem of homelessness can be met with a modest expansion of existing efforts, combined with specialized assistance to the mentally ill, who account for up to half the homeless population. Needless Panic. Congress is being needlessly panicked
into acting without thinking. Lawmakers are ignoring the mounting evidence concerning the actual size and nature of the
homeless problem .al posturing by local politicians and sensational news reports have combined to crwite : regmiclat@ive momentum for new but largely irrelevant federal programs, based on the myth that there is a growing population of over two million homeless Americans who are overwhelming local agencies. Only massive infusions of federal cash, sy advocates, can deal with the problem. The truth is that there is no basis for the two million figure. To make matters worse, such reckless projections discourage those local
actions that are actually making significant progress. Homelessness is a problem whose best solution draws on the strength of decentralized federalism. It is not an issue that demands centralized funding control. Studies indicate that the characteristics of the homeless population differr significantly from city to city. In no American city does the number of homeless appear to exceed the resources of state, local, and private agencies--especially once the unique problems of the mentally ill are addressed. What is required is not more top-down money, but clear local resolve and the energetic use of existing resources in the affected areas. The Reagan Administration and Congress can serve the homeless most effectively in three ways: 1) Modifying existing
law and regulations to make sure that the mentally ill are not deinstitutionalized and put out on to the street without adequate local care already in place. 2) Continuing .to eliminate restrictions on housing and community programs that prevent'cities from serving the homeless under existing programs and make it difficult for state and local agencies to coordinate services. 3) Preventing the use of federal funds to tear down single occupancy hotels and other housing f6r low-income Americans. The legislation recently passed by the House and Senate does none of these things. As such, it should not be signed by Ronald Reagan.
Homeless services are solved by state funding and initiatives Beirne 87

Kenneth, Washington Based Policy Writer, America's Homeless: A Manageable Problem and Solution, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/religion/bu44.cfm
Homelessness is a problem for which the American multilayered federal system is well suited. Homelessness is not rampant and overwhelming. With the possible exception of New York City, it is manageable using the resources of state, local, and i rate agencies, ,pm together with existin$ federally funded programs for which there is local discretion. Ile New York problem is
clearly linked to the city's destruction of its own housing suppl through rent and development controls and exacerbated by City Hall's policy of holYingon to tens of thousands of unrehabilitated vacant apartments. Depending on the makeup of the homeless population, the best response in other cities includes land use policies that encourage single room occupancy hotels, rather than tearing them down, and provides emergency housing vouchers for families. Mentally Ill. Tle gravest dilemma for policyniakers is how to resolve the question of the homeless mentally ill. Here it first is a matter of decidin . h ther the civil rights of the mentally ill and chronic drug abusers include sleeping *in pu spaces, or should these troubled and sometimes desperate Americans be forced into elters and institutions. The reason for the highproportion of mentally ill among the homeless is not so much the result of recent d institutionalization--since that occurred mainly in the 1960s and 1970s--but of a generally accepted policy of noninstitutionalization. Congress and cities need to address these difficult questions concerning individual rights and the need to treat mentally ill Americans in proper medical facilities. With existing federal resources, the great majority of cities can meet the needs of homeless families and capable individuals. Even in 1984, with approximately I 11,000 beds available nationwide, together with emergency vouchers and hofel facilities, the U.S. was within range of meeting the needs of the segment of the homeless population that is not mentally ill. It may prove to be the case, however, that there will eventually be a resistant homeless population of 100,000 to 150,000 Americans who cannot be served without redefining theiF riight@. This will require sensitive and carefully considered policies regardmg special facilities for the mentally ill. Simply allowing these troubled Americans to wander the streets while the federal government showers cities with money does not address the difficult underlying problem. Private Agencies. If federal,
homeless whose needs can be addressed by normal means, they need
state, and local governments are to work with the private sector in serving the to continue their current efforts based on local
initiatives. Private agencies, charitable. organizations, and churches should continue to play the primary role in providi F& services,
supplemented by governments. This is a problem of a size and character precisely suited to be handled within the federal system, using existing resources. A federal takeover of the homelessness problem, with gushing federal dollars and
regulations, replacing creative local efforts, may enable some members of Congress to appear compassionate, and it will assure a direct money pipeline for the media star homeless advocates. But it Will do little to help the creative local groups on the frontline of the issue--or the homeless themselves. I
Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom

The race-to-the-bottom hypothesis is flawed empirically the states innovate and co-ordinate to provide better services to those in need Fossett and Gais 2
John, Associate Professor of Public Health, and Thomas, co-director of the Rockefeller Institute of Government, A New Puzzle for Federalism: Different state responses to Medicaid and Food Stamps, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2002-08a_new_puzzle_for_federalism_different_state_responses_to_medicaid_and_food_stamps.pdf From a federalism perspective, what is interesting about these developments is the opportunity to see how states responded to this growth in flexibility. For the most part, the dominant theoretical traditions would suggest a fairly clear pattern of
response by states to increased discretion in these two program areas. The race to the bottom hypothesis argues that state flexibility in programs serving low-income families generally leads to a reduction in benefits and services. States and localities, unlike the federal government, have open boundaries and, as a consequence, some low-income families may be influenced by benefit levels in deciding where they will live. Assuming that state policymakersfor several possible reasonswant to minimize the number of poor
families who move into their states, they are viewed as likely to compete with other jurisdictions, especially neighboring states, to keep benefits for poor families down. In contrast, fiscal federalism arguments call attention not to the potential recipients of programs and their behavior but instead to the effective costs of providing benefits to families. This is clearly a viewpoint that the Congress has taken seriously as establishes different funding formulae, depending on the federal governments priorities and its estimates of what fiscal inducements are needed to get states to implement and contribute to a program. Under these assumptions, states are
probably more likely to contribute to a program when they do not have to share a large part of the costs. By contrast, if states do have to absorb a large part of the costs, they are less likely to support the program, and they are especially
likely to avoid significant expansion of benefits. Although we are not claiming that we are fully testing these theories of policy choices in this paper, we do present them because we think recent experiences in health care policies and the Food Stamp Program raise important questions about the adequacy of these lines of argument. Devolution has given states greater decision making authority in both of these program areas in recent years, both of which serve similar low-income clienteles. We might therefore expect some reduction in benefits or administrative access to benefits in both programs. However, we would also expect different responses to the new flexibility. Both the
race to the bottom and the fiscal federalism hypotheses would suggest that Medicaid would be particularly likely to undergo a reduction in benefits and availability. Medicaid is a costly program to statestypically the largest single human service program in their budgetsand states have a lot of discretion in setting
policies and structuring the administration of the program. By contrast, the Food Stamp Program offers states less flexibility and a very attractive fiscal formula: indeed, states pay none of the benefits and are only responsible for half of the programs administrative costs.
Given this pattern, we would expectif our two hypotheses are correctthat states would show little interest in expanding Medicaid programs if given a chance, considerable readiness to cut back on such programs if resources become scarce, and much more likely to support program expansions (to the extent possible) in their administration of the Food Stamp Program. But, as President Nixon might have put it, that would be wrong.

Strong state-based constituencies prevent a race-to-the-bottom state policy-makers are intune with domestic political backlashes Fossett and Gais 2
John, Associate Professor of Public Health, and Thomas, co-director of the Rockefeller Institute of Government, A New Puzzle for Federalism: Different state responses to Medicaid and Food Stamps, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2002-08-a_new_puzzle_for_federalism_different_state_responses_to_medicaid_and_food_stamps.pdf
A third factor which may have lessened the appeal of a race to the bottom in Medicaid coverage and spending are the visibility of alternative performance measures of health conditions within states that may serve as a counterweight to the indicators of state tax burdens and overly generous welfare programs to which race to the bottom arguments contend states are most responsive. Such widely reported and easily understood measures of population health as the rates of infant mortality and low weight births and comparable measures of the status of children also provide a means of comparing states to each other. Particularly among states which rank poorly on these indicators, the desire to improve performance relative to ones neighbors may make policy makers more willing to spend money on health programs and less willing to roll back Medicaid coverage and spending if it can be made to appear that such roll backs will worsen their states standing on such measures. Evidence that policy makers are responsive to measures of state standing other than taxes or welfare generosity is anecdotal, but abundant. While a variety of research indicates there is no simple connection between Medicaid coverage and birth outcomes, the political connection has proven persuasive. Particularly in states which rank towards the bottom on such measures, concern over poor state performance on these measures has been the subject of newspaper articles and editorials, creating pressure on politicians to respond in some fashion. It has frequently proven politically possible to cast this low standing as an obstacle to economic improvement and represent efforts to overcome low standing as important to improving a states reputation as a desirable location for families and companies. Southern governors, whose states had among the highest rates of infant mortality and low weight births in the country, were among the strongest supporters of Medicaid eligibility expansions to pregnant women and infants during the late 1980's and early 1990's. In similar fashion, individual Southern governors have made efforts to reduce infant mortality, improve child health, or other nominally liberal policies central elements of campaign platforms or legislative initiatives. Since these states also have high Medicaid match rates compared to wealthier, better performing states, such initiatives are less expensive in poorer states than they might be elsewhere.
States act against conventional wisdom race-to-the-top Fossett and Gais 2

John, Associate Professor of Public Health, and Thomas, co-director of the Rockefeller Institute of Government, A New Puzzle for Federalism: Different state responses to Medicaid and Food Stamps, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2002-08a_new_puzzle_for_federalism_different_state_responses_to_medicaid_and_food_stamps.pdf The two program analyses contained in this paper present evidence of state actions that might be
deemed irrational or counterintuitive under major prevailing theories of state policy behavior. Rather than respond rationally to financial incentives to increase spending on food stamps, which is almost completely financed by the federal government, and limit spending on Medicaid, where states have significant financial responsibilities, most states appear to have made little effort to increase spending on food stamps and spent appreciable amounts of their own money on Medicaid outreach and enrollment simplification efforts whose avowed purpose is to increase Medicaid enrollment and expenditures even further. In similar fashion, states have not availed themselves of the discretion available to them under Medicaid to make themselves less attractive to potential low income residents and lower state taxes, thereby making themselves more attractive to wealthy residents and companies. Rather, they have rather broadly, though not universally, undertaken efforts to expand Medicaid enrollment that can be interpreted as a race to the top rather than in the other direction. In most cases, they have chosen to maintain these efforts under conditions of considerable budgetary stress.

Even during fiscal crises, there is no risk of a race-to-the-bottom Social Services are politically sustainable at the state level Fossett and Gais 2
John, Associate Professor of Public Health, and Thomas, co-director of the Rockefeller Institute of Government, A New Puzzle for Federalism: Different state responses to Medicaid and Food Stamps, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2002-08a_new_puzzle_for_federalism_different_state_responses_to_medicaid_and_food_stamps.pdf Taken together, these findings do not provide evidence that states have made any significant attempts to
limit Medicaid eligibility or restrict access to coverage. To the contrary, most evidence suggests that almost all states have made at least perfunctory efforts to make Medicaid more accessible, and significant numbersperhaps even a majority-- have invested considerable administrative energy and resources both to increase the proportion of their population that is eligible for public insurance programs and to increase enrollment among those who are eligible. While state investment in such efforts obviously varies widely, there is no evidence to support charges of a generalized race to the bottom, or even an inertial slide.
Taken together, these findings do not provide evidence that states have made any significant attempts to limit Medicaid eligibility or restrict access to coverage. To the contrary, most evidence suggests that almost all states have made at least perfunctory efforts to make Medicaid more accessible, and significant numbersperhaps even a majority-- have invested considerable administrative energy and resources both to increase the proportion of their population that is eligible for public insurance programs and to increase enrollment among those who are eligible. While state investment in such efforts obviously varies widely, there is no evidence to support charges of a generalized race to the bottom, or even an inertial slide. Available evidence also suggests that efforts to enhance Medicaid and CHIP enrollment have proven sustainable even in the face of increasing state financial problems. One of the enabling factors for enrollment enhancement efforts in many states through the late 1990's was the strong financial position of most states. Strong local economies and the boom in the stock market which prevailed over most of this period both reduced Medicaid caseloads and produced strong growth in state revenues, particularly income taxes. This combination of strong budgets and reduced caseloads, together with the enhanced match available under the CHIP program and the low cost of covering low income women and children compared to other Medicaid populationsii, made expanding coverage of the demographic groups affected by welfare reform relatively inexpensive. More recently, state economies and budgets have deteriorated significantly. The recession of 2001 and particularly the sharp decline in the stock market which began in mid-2001 have substantially reduced state revenues, particularly income tax collections. While mild by historical standards, the recession of 2001 likely increased the number of adults and children eligible for both Medicaid and CHIP and may have led to increases in caseloads in many states. State tax revenue began to decline in mid-2001, with the rate of decline accelerating through mid-2002ii This sharp decline in resources has made deliberations over state budgets for FY 2002 and FY 2003 extremely difficult, particularly in states which rely heavily on the income tax as a revenue source and have relatively large wealthy populations. These states have been adversely affected by the decline in the stock market, which has dramatically reduced
In spite of this sharp deterioration in state financial situations, there has been little attempt to date to rollback any of the eligibility expansions enacted in the late 1990's or to undo the enrollment simplification efforts intended to make Medicaid and CHIP more accessible. A Rockefeller Institute of Government study of decisions in sixteen states affecting Medicaid and other health programs in 2003 budgets suggests that Medicaid has been unaffected by recent state budget difficultiesiii. Table 3 lists these states and the division of state actions to fill 2003 budget gaps between revenue enhancements and expenditure cuts, and the percentage of enacted expenditure reductions that affect Medicaid. These data suggest that even in states which relied heavily on spending cuts rather than revenue enhancements as budget balancing devices, Medicaid spending was only marginally affected. Only in Tennessee and Utah did Medicaid account for
income from capital gains, as well as income from bonuses, the exercise of stock options, and other market-related compensation. more than a small fraction of enacted expenditure reductions. At least in this set of states, other state functions particularly education and correctionshave absorbed the bulk of expenditure reductions. Rather than a race or even a slide to the bottom, in short, state actions affecting Medicaid in the aftermath of welfare reform have been largely oriented towards expanding public coverage and enrollment. In addition to the expansion of public coverage for children provided by the CHIP program, some states have expanded coverage for adults as well. While efforts to make public programs more accessible have varied widely across states, almost all states have made
at least some effort to simplify their Medicaid enrollment processes and many have undertaken aggressive outreach programs to identify and enroll eligible clients. These initiatives have been largely unaffected by recent state budget difficulties, suggesting at least a modicum of political sustainability.
Solvency AT: Conservative States

States are much more progressive than the feds on a host of Social Service issues Nathan 6
Richard, codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, There will Always Be a New Federalism, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/2006-02-14-there_will_always_be_a_new_federalism.pdf The paradox is that federalism is being rediscovered by liberals. Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) recently was compared to states righter and former U.S. senator Strom Thurmond when Frank argued that the states (with Massachusetts out front) should be the arbiters of gay marriage (Foer 2005).1 Barney Frank is not alone. Other liberals see the states, particularly states with liberal leaders, as
the appropriate governments to deal with many program issues: Protecting MedicaidThe federal government has tried several strategies to slow the growth of the Medicaid program, which aids the elderly, the disabled, and poor families. But since the program has a broad constituency of recipient groups (not just the poor) and multiple provider interests, states have fought hard (and so far pretty much successfully) to shield Medicaid from Washingtons retrenchment efforts. Cleaning Up the EnvironmentThis is a policy area in which many states are ahead of the curve compared with the federal government, as shown by the nine-state Northeastern Accord to freeze power plant emissions and similar regional efforts underway in California, Washington, and Oregon (DePalma 2005). Equalizing School AidHard-charging activists in many states are pulling every leverjudicial, executive, and legislativeto distribute school aid in ways that give more aid to poor core-city and rural communities and provide more aid overall. Providing Public InfrastructureAlthough the Federal Highway Act is a big factor in the transportation field, activists at the state level generally see states as their best avenue for rehabilitating, maintaining, and constructing new roads, schools, parks, and other public facilities. Some of this is old-fashioned pork barreling, but that does not
diminish its importance in providing facilities for services advocated by the supporters of public education, libraries, economic development, the arts, recreation, parks, and so forth. The same point applies for regulatory issues: Minimum
WageThis is a good example of an area where some states are out front nationally. According to a USA Today article
(Cauchan, 2005) seventeen states covering 45 percent of the national population have set minimum wages above the federal rate of $5.15 an hour. Stem Cell ResearchFollowing Californias lead with its $3 billion bond issue to support stem cell research, other states have joined the parade, notably Illinois, Connecticut, and New Jersey. Sex EducationThis, too, is not a good area for liberals to pursue nationally, the expectation being that any action would cater to the rigidity and the intense concerns of religious fundamentalists. End-of-Life DecisionsOne could argue that the 2005 debates on the Terri Schiavo case in Florida was an example of states favoring more liberal positions than those of President George W. Bush and Florida governor Jeb Bush. Teaching
about EvolutionWhile not a likely area for federal policymaking, still it is

liberal point of view is best left to the states
another example of a sensitive subject that from a
AT: Federal Pre-emption

The Homeland Security Act has reinvigorated local control of social services this delegation of power deters rollback Butts 4
Jennifer Butts, JD from Oklahoma University, 2004, VICTIMS IN WAITING: HOW THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT FALLS SHORT OF FULLY PROTECTING TRIBAL LANDS, 28 Am. Indian L. Rev. 373, pg. np
The Homeland Security Act does not place the power of investigation and enforcement in the Department; instead, it vests federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with the responsibility of protecting their jurisdictions and calls for coordination among all jurisdictions. The Act respects and acknowledges the importance of local law enforcement, emergency response providers, and social service agencies. This act embraces the notion of federalism by empowering the local government. Local government is defined in the Homeland Security Act as: (A) a county, municipality, city, town, township, local
public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under State law), regional or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a local government; (B) an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or in Alaska a Native village or Alaska Regional Native Corporation; and (C) a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity.
Delegation to state enforcement of social services is the policy norm Schuck 2k

Peter Schuck, Professor of Law @ Yale, 2000, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 195, pg. np These constitutionally-mandated principles of federalism and separation of powers, however, do
not exhaust the decentralizing thrust of the American system. Decentralization of federal-level domestic programs, at least those not geared to war, has always been a policy norm. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture, for example, from its origins in the 1860s has organized its most important programs around state and local extension services dominated by local political elites. The federal regulatory programs launched during the Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society eras and augmented since the 1970s usually divide policy, fiscal, administrative, and enforcement responsibilities between the federal and state governments. State and local prerogatives are even greater in federal environmental, health, education,
welfare, and other social service programs. Pending legislation in Congress with broad, bipartisan support would make it more difficult for the federal government to legislate and regulate in ways that pre-empt the states on a wide range of issues. The shibboleth of "states' rights," moreover, is increasingly invoked on behalf of liberal or libertarian causes, as well as traditionally conservative ones.
AT: Federal Pre-emption

Congress wont rollback state action Goldsmith 97
Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln The rise in subnational foreign relations activity tells us little, of course, about the activity's normative desirability. But we should also avoid the automatic assumption that this development is normatively undesirable. This is especially true because the federal
political branches have made clear that, in contrast to traditional foreign relations activities which largely have been federalized through statute and treaty, they do not always, or even usually, prefer federal regulation of these new foreign relations issues. The recent increase in state and local involvement in such issues "has occasioned little reaction from Congress or the Executive." 232 And when the political branches do react, they often choose to protect state interests over foreign relations interests when the two appear to clash. A good example is the
United States' recent ratification of a variety of international human rights treaties. 233 These treaties create numerous potential [*1675] conflicts with state law. 234 In the face of international pressure, the President and Senate have consistently
attached reservations, understandings, and declarations to these treaties to ensure that they do not preempt or affect inconsistent state law. 235 Similarly, California's worldwide unitary tax on multinational corporations has
provoked enormous diplomatic controversy with our closest trading partners since the 1980s. 236 The President negotiated a treaty that would have preempted this law, but the Senate withheld its consent. 237 And in the face of substantial pressure from foreign governments, Congress consistently failed to enact legislation preempting the unitary tax. 238
Preemption doesnt take out solvency Goldsmith 97

Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln
Even when the political branches enact preemptive federal foreign relations law, they often do so in a manner that reflects the interests of the states and minimizes intrusion on their prerogatives. When
Congress codified the international law standards for determinations of foreign sovereign immunity, it ensured that otherwise-applicable state law would continue to govern the merits of such suits. 239 Similarly, in federal implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), "political sensitiv- [*1676] ity to state sensibilities were [sic] reflected in several ways." 240 Most significantly, the legislation "precluded the agreements from having any direct effect, and indeed required an action by the United States Government for the purpose of striking down a state law." 241 In addition, the federal government has actively
cooperated with and supported the unilateral state economic activities described above. 242 The overtly political
international activities of states, such as nuclear-free ordinances and state divestment movements, are more controversial. For example, Congress by statute overruled several governors' resistance to allowing the participation of national guard troops in Central American military activities in the mid-1980s. 243 But Congress declined to preempt the most notorious recent state foreign relations activity - state sanctions against South Africa - when it enacted the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 244 and Massachusetts's recent sanctions against Myanmar 245 soon led to similar sanctions by the federal government. 246
AT: Supreme Court Strike Down

All states acting together mean thats the Supreme Court wont intervene Edelman 87
Peter, Professor of Law, Essay: The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor., 39 Hastings L.J. 1 But incremental litigative steps can be pursued, too. These may bring concrete benefits and also
have a secondary benefit by enhancing the later receptivity of the Supreme Court to addressing the problem of survival. The state courts are an important theatre for such activity. Individual state constitutions may provide specific language not present in the Constitution of the United States, one state may be influenced by what another has done, and ultimately the Supreme Court may be influenced by what a number of states have done. The Supreme Court has for some years been encouraging states to utilize state sources of law to go beyond what is required by the federal constitution. The suggestion has come from both left and right on the Court, with liberals encouraging it as a partial antidote to the
Court's conservatism and conservatives espousing it as a kind of judicial "new federalism" 202 (although the conservatives have done it with tongue a bit [*56] in cheek, striking down state forays that were not accompanied by an explicit, plain statement of reliance on state law as the basis for the state court decision). 203 Moreover, the Court is influenced by what states do. Technically speaking, what the states do with their constitutions is irrelevant to the meaning of the federal Constitution. In practice, however, the
Court pays attention. Another logic intervenes. Notwithstanding Attorney General Meese, a broad spectrum of liberals and conservatives agrees that the Constitution is a living document, rooted strongly in history, to be sure, but one that acquires new applications of its text as times change. If the states are properly viewed as laboratories, then what happens to the successful results of the experiments? When the Court sees that a state approach has "worked," it sometimes adopts it regardless of differing textual language or previously conflicting interpretation.
AT: States Link to Politics

The counterplan avoids politics increased devolution is overwhelmingly popular Foer 5
Frank, senior editor at The New Republic and a contributing editor for New York magazine, The Joy of Federalism, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/books/review/006FOERL.html?pagewanted=4
Nobody would ever confuse the Massachusetts liberal Barney Frank with the South Carolina conservative Strom Thurmond. But when the tart-tongued Frank appeared on Fox News Sunday last winter, it sounded as if an aide had accidentally slipped him some of Thurmond's talking points from the 1950's, when he was a states'-rights segregationist. ''Should the federal government say no state can make this decision for itself?'' Frank asked. He had ventured onto Fox to assert each state's right to marry gay
couples. Frank isn't the only supporter of gay marriage to sing the praises of federalism. Last December, Andrew Sullivan argued in The New Republic, ''The whole point of federalism is that different states can have different policies on
matters of burning controversy -- and that this is O.K.'' That same month, Paul Glastris, the editor of The Washington Monthly, posed the question, ''Why shouldn't the Democrats become the party of federalism? '' In some respects, they already have. Liberal energies once devoted to expanding the national government are being redirected toward the states. New York's attorney general Eliot Spitzer, declaring himself a ''fervent federalist,'' is using state regulations to prosecute corporate abuses that George W. Bush's Department of Justice won't touch. While the federal minimum wage hasn't budged since the middle of the Clinton era, 13 (mostly blue) states and the District of Columbia have hiked their local wage floors in the intervening years. After Bush severely restricted federal stem cell research, California's voters passed an initiative pouring $3 billion into laboratories for that very purpose, and initiatives are under way in at least a dozen other states.
State policies are less visible and contentious Rabe 4

Barry Rabe, Professor of National Public Policy, 2004, Statehouse and Greenhouse, pg. 22 But this is not what occurred in the states examined in this study. Instead, a much quieter process of policy formation has emerged, even during more recent years, when the pace of innovation has accelerated and the intent of many policies has been more far-reaching. This is not to suggest that climate-related episodes have been irrelevant or that leading environmental groups have played no role in state policy development. Contrary to the kinds of political brawls so common in debates about climate change policy at
national and international venues, however, state-based policymaking has been far less visible and contentious, often cutting across traditional partisan and interest group fissures. It has, moreover, been far more productive in terms of generating actual policies with the potential to reduce greenhouse gas releases.
States are insulated from political pressure Celli 1

Andrew Celli, Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau of the New York State Attorney Generals Office, 2001, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1091, pg. np I also saw that state enforcement officers, like me and like Peter Lehner, with our small and agile offices
operating below the national political radar, that we can use these federal laws in creative and aggressive ways and perhaps in a way that is insulated from the kinds of political pressure that, say, the
Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department faces.
AT: States Dont Solve Soft Power

Iraq outweighs the aff is minimal in comparison Byman 5
Daniel Byman, Associate professor in the school of Foreign Service @ Georgetown, March 2005, 5 Bad Options for Iraq, Survival, Volume 47, Number 1, pg. np
The cost of all this goes beyond Iraq. World opinion of the United States is at its nadir. The US occupation of Iraq has fostered an image of the United States as an oppressive power bent on killing Muslims. Polls taken in March 2004 indicate opinion of the United States ranges from poor in many Western European countries to abysmal in most countries in the Muslim world.35 Arab world satellite television stations regularly juxtapose footage of Americans fighting insurgents in cities such as Fallujah with Israeli soldiers attacking Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Support for al-Qaeda's message that the United States is at the heart of the Muslim world's problems has grown. Lamenting the effects of this disaster on the war on terror, one senior intelligence officer declared America remains bin Laden's only indispensable ally.
One issue isnt enough Tucker and Hendrickson 4

Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University and Robert J. Fox Distinguished Service Professor at Colorado College, 2004, Foreign Affairs, pg. np
How to restore legitimacy has thus become a central question for U.S. foreign policy, although the difficulty of doing so is manifest. At a minimum, restoring international confidence in the United States will take time. The erosion of the nation's legitimacy is not something that occurred overnight. Washington is unlikely to succeed at renewing it simply by conducting better "public diplomacy" to "make the American case" to the world, for world public opinion already rejects the case that has been made. If the United States is going to be successful in recapturing legitimacy, it will have to abandon the
doctrines and practices that brought it to this pass.
AT: States Discriminate against Minorities

There is strong evidence that states do not act in a racist fashion Zizk 4
Timothy Zizk, Associate Professor of Law at Saint Johns, 2004, Statehood as the new personhood: the discovery of fundamental states' rights, William and Mary Law Review, v46 i1 pg. 231 It seems unlikely, however, that in 1985, when Garcia was decided, the Court rested its decision to
curtail fundamental "states' rights" federalism on these sorts of negative associations. It probably gives
too little credit to the Court, and to scholars, to suggest that modes of judicial enforcement or scholarly support are based primarily upon "changing normative preferences" or mere popularity. Even if one is not willing to give judges and scholars such
credit, it is surely a stretch to paint the "states' rights" of National League of Cities with the same brush as the old "states' rights" of segregationists. The "states' rights" of what might be considered the modern era--freedom from federal wages and hours regulations, for example--are hardly the sort that invoke segregationist ghosts.
Decentralization is the only way to increase awareness against oppression Goldsmith 97

Jack Goldsmith, Associate Professor of Law at Chicago, 1997, Virginia Law Review, November, pg. np This analysis casts doubt on the widely held view that the states have no legitimate interest in the regulation of foreign relations. Many who hold this view are misled by the label "foreign relations," which is invariably associated with traditional foreign relations issues and thus with exclusive federal control. But the issues implicated by the federal common law of foreign relations - state common and criminal law, choice of law, procedural law, nondiscriminatory international economic activities, and state human rights activities - differ significantly from traditional foreign relations matters. Concurrent authority over these nontraditional foreign relations matters are much less likely to undermine the United States' ability to participate in international affairs, and much less likely to harm the national foreign relations interest. And, in contrast to state activities in traditional foreign relations contexts, many affirmative benefits accrue from
the decentralization of these new foreign relations functions. For example, nontraditional state foreign relations activities such as international trade activity and involvement in the international human rights movement assist both the U.S. government and third parties. Subnational foreign relations initiatives increased awareness about the United States' economic policies against oppressive regimes in South Africa
and Myanmar. Similarly, the State and Commerce Departments approve of the manifold state international economic activities presumably because they find that decentralization of these activities serves U.S. interests more effectively than centralized federal control.
AT: Permutation Do Both

The permutation links to our disadvantages to federal action if they sever federal action this is a voting issue because affirmatives can craft permutations to not link to any disadvantage which skews negative ground Independently, the permutation links to federalism Somin 2
Ilya Somin, clerk to Judge J.E. Smith, US Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, 2002, Georgetown Law Journal, pg. np
The danger of federal control over state legislatures and executive bureaucracies is the touchstone of the Supreme Court's anticommandeering decisions, New York v. United States and Printz v. United States. In these cases the Court established the principle that "the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs." Federal commandeering of state governments is condemned because it takes control of state bureaucracies away from their own governments and "reduces [them] to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress." According to the Court, Congress "may not conscript state governments as its agents."
And, cooperative federalism doesnt result in substantial benefits its more likely to be used to justify federal domination of the states Adler 5
Jonathan, Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director. Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law., ARTICLE: Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377 While federal environmental laws grant expansive regulatory authority to federal agencies, most environmental statutes are
implemented following a "cooperative federalism" model. n35 The federal government outlines the contours of a given regulatory program, typically through statutory mandates elaborated upon by regulatory measures. n36 States are then encouraged to implement the program in lieu of the federal government, in accordance
with federal guidelines. Provided these standards are met, states are free to tailor the details of their individual programs to accommodate local conditions and concerns. In most cases the federal standards operate as a floor - albeit a highly prescriptive one - and states remain free to adopt more stringent measures. n37 State programs that meet federal standards are typically eligible for federal financial assistance. n38 States that fail to adopt adequate programs are not only denied the relevant federal funding, they can also be
subject to various sanctions and federal preemption of their programs. n39 That is, if states refuse to regulate in accordance with federal guidelines, the federal government may regulate in their place. [*385] In this system, the states are "indispensable," though not "equal partners." n40 While characterized as a "cooperative" structure, the federal-state relationship in environmental policy is often adversarial and ridden with conflict. n41 State officials "resent what they believe to be an overly prescriptive federal orientation toward state programs, especially in light of stable or decreasing grant awards,"
according to one recent study. n42 The proliferation of additional requirements without corresponding increases in federal financial assistance raises state and local concerns about "unfunded federal mandates." n43 To some observers, the partnership of
cooperative federalism is more akin to a feudal relationship between a federal lord and state "vassals." n44
The perm doesnt provide cover flag burning proves NYT 96

6/13, Lexis
Flag burning has tormented Congress since the Supreme Court handed down its first decision on the matter last year. Much of that torment has to do with the constant tension in this country between the commitment to freedom of expression and the anger at ''the obnoxious and offensive people''
who often exercise it most fully, as Representative Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, puts it. A burning flag is one of the most gripping visual images, communicating in an instant an ugly rejection of the values most Americans embrace. Any politician can imagine its use in a campaign commercial. ''I can see it now,'' said Senator Bob Kerrey, the Nebraska Democrat who is one of the strongest voices against the amendment, '' 'Bob Kerrey votes for gun control, and he won't vote to protect the flag.' It's a great 30-second spot.'' It fits neatly with the new politics of values, used so effectively by George Bush against Michael S. Dukakis in the 1988 Presidential campaign. Mr. Bush continues to appeal to those values and symbols. Today, he received a replica of the Iwo Jima Memorial at a Rose Garden ceremony and urged Congress to pass an amendment on flag
Congress is approaching one of those moments when there is little political cover. The Supreme Court has acted, and the President has spoken. It is now up to the lawmakers in the middle.
burning by the Fourth of July. ''Amending the Constitution to protect the flag is not a matter of partisan politics,'' said Mr. Bush. ''It's an American issue.'' And now
***Lopez Counterplan 1nc****

The United States Supreme Court should narrowly rule that federal authority over _____________________(Insert advantage areas) exceeds the power of the federal government under the 10th Amendment, and should devolve this authority to the states. The Fifty States of America and United States territories should _________________________________________________(Insert plan). The Court can make this ruling and devolve power to the states it wont be rolled back Miller 98
Mark A. Miller, Lawyer @ Baker Botts, 1998, Cleveland State L. Rev., ln The history of the Tenth Amendment is an appropriate starting point in the development of substantive federalism. For a long period of time, the Tenth Amendment operated as nothing more than a plain statement of the obvious that afforded little protection to the states. 249 In the aftermath of Garcia, state sovereignty was left to the political processes. 250 Tenth Amendment power was reborn in New York v. United States when
the Court held that Congress could not commandeer the states' legislative function. 251 This protection is decreed no matter how strong the federal interest in the legislation may be.
252 Protections over state sovereignty were expanded again in the 1996 Term when the Court invalidated certain portions of the Brady Act. 253 According to Printz, Congress cannot force the states' executive branches to enact federal regulatory programs regardless of the federal interest involved. 254 Whenever the structural framework of dual sovereignty is compromised, the Tenth Amendment steps in
to prevent a usurpation of federalism. 255 Printz and New York held that Congress was incapable of commanding the states
to take a course of action that it could not undertake directly. 256 But what happens if Congress breaches the Tenth Amendment through an Article I power like the Spending Clause? Do the Court's enunciated protections extend to Article I? These are the questions that the theory of substantive federalism answers. The restraint on Article I began, to large extent, in Garcia when Justice O'Connor predicted that the Commerce power would be affirmatively limited [*191] by state autonomy. 257 The door was further opened in New York when the plenary nature of the Commerce Clause was labeled as "subversive" to the interests of state sovereignty. 258 United States v. Lopez put
the first nail in the coffin when it struck down an exercise of the Commerce power as going so far as to
approach a "police power of the sort retained by the States." 259 The Commerce Clause, in other words, authorizes control over interstate commerce, but does not authorize regulation of the states. 260 Seminole Tribe, however, lends the greatest support to the substantive federalism theory. The Eleventh Amendment -- a core guardian of state sovereign interests 261 --
withstands any attempt by Congress to pierce the shield of federalism with Article I. 262 Similar to the
Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment once provided little protection to the states when Congress flexed its Article I muscle. 263 Along with the strengthening of the Eleventh Amendment, New York and Printz add to the growth of federalism
and the devolution of unrestricted congressional power. The same 5-4 majority 264 has written the opinions in New
York, Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and Printz, and it is only a matter of time before the rationale in Seminole Tribe is extended to the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the Spending Clause. 265 Substantive federalism presents the argument that the Tenth Amendment will be used in much the same manner as the Eleventh Amendment was used in Seminole Tribe. If a core principle of state sovereignty will be encroached upon by an Article I power, the Tenth Amendment prohibits the intrusion. 266 On the other side of the coin, Congress must look to the Tenth Amendment and ask whether its proposed legislation will impinge upon principles of federalism. If substantive federalism can operate to block congressional action under the Commerce Clause, then it can also curtail the Spending power. 267
Lopez Solvency
Supreme Court can devolve authority to the states Sprick 99
David M. Sprick, Doctoral Candidate & Lecturer in the Department of Political Science @ UMKC, 27 Cap. U.L. Rev. 529, ln Federalism is a constitutional principle involving a distinctive territorial division of powers, usually a special approach to representation within the national government, and mechanisms both legal and political [*530] to settle interlevel disputes. 3 Others have described federalism as that which as a matter of law centers on the division of authority between the federal and the state governments, 4 or as the dispersion of political power, 5 or a system of authority constitutionally apportioned between central and regional governments. 6 The Constitution sets forth the boundaries of federalism with the enumeration of Congress powers in Article I, Section 8; the undefined powers implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause; 7 the General Welfare Clause; 8 the Supremacy Clause; 9 and the Tenth Amendments reservation of powers to the states or to the people. 10 By defining to whom powers not delegated are reserved, the Tenth
Amendment provides an express federalism marker and interrelates the amendment with constitutional and political federalism. 11 The Tenth Amendment states, The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 12 This amendment has been the rallying cry for devolutionists in the political branches concerned with excessive federal power. Moreover, the Tenth Amendments reemergence in constitutional decisions has not gone unnoticed by Supreme Court watchers. The Court seems to be reestablishing itself as the umpire of federalism, 13 a role it all but abdicated in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 14 when it told the states they could find better constitutional protection from the procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system. 15 [*531] In a series of recent cases-U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 16 United States v. Lopez, 17 and Printz v. United States 18 -the Court reversed its thinking in Garcia and is umpiring the federal system once again. More importantly,
the Court appears to be divided over both the meaning of the Tenth Amendment and the first principles of American federalism. The Justices opposing. asymmetrical positions [on federal power] can be discerned by juxtaposing Term Limits with United States v. Lopez. 19 It is possible to add the recent Printz decision to such an analysis because the same factions within the Court, with
respect to federalism, formed to limit federal power once again.
Lopez Solvency Narrow Ruling

The court can issue narrow rulings without linking to precedent disads Smith 2
Stephen F. Smith, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, April 2002, Texas Law Review, Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1057 The end result after decades of case-by-case refinement (and frequently revisionism) was a considerable change in Miranda doctrine, but not a complete evisceration of Miranda. Neither Warren nor Rehnquist got to have his first-best preference. What they did get was a second-best approach in which the suspect must be given basic information as to his rights and has the power, by making (and sticking to) an unequivocal request for counsel, to stop all questioning. Of course, the police have ample latitude to use persuasion or clever, noncoercive means to cause suspects not to exercise that power and, ultimately, to make incriminating statements that can be used against them at trial. n213 After Dickerson, it would appear that Miranda law is finally at an equilibrium that almost all of the Justices - including supporters and critics of Miranda - can accept, as shown by the fact that seven of the nine Justices signed onto without comment an opinion reaffirming both Miranda and all of the limitations and exceptions adopted over the ensuing three decades. n214 This is the advantage of reactivism - it provides an effica-cious means by which a Court that fundamentally disagrees with
earlier precedents, but is unwilling or unable to overrule them explicitly, can move the law (and, with it, actual case outcomes ) back in what it believes to be the right direction. The legal system and the public thereby gain, to varying degrees, the benefits of the overruling. At the same time, reactivism allows riskaverse Justices and the Court as an institution to avoid the unpleasant consequences of overruling that have historically made Justices so reluctant [*1112] to overrule even the most indefensible decisions. n215 Thus, the law gets "fixed" in a way that avoids sharp doctrinal shifts.
The court can issue narrow rulings without overruling past precedent Vandevelde 96
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Thinking Like a Lawyer, April 1, 1996, p.105 Third, the court may create an exception. This is an explicit, but only partial,
repudiation of the prior case. The prior case remains good law, but it no longer controls all of the situations it once did. The last
example could be used to illustrate this technique as well. Assume that, in the first case, there had not been adequate assurances that the stores claim was well founded. In that situation, the second case, rather than overruling the prior case sub silentio, might simply create an exceptionholding that, although prior notice is generally required, subsequent notice is sufficient if the court has adequate assurances that the stores claim to a right of seizure is well founded. Obviously, lawyers may differ at times over whether the second case represents an exception to the first case or an overruling of it sub silentio. To the extent that the two cases are truly different, the second case may well be carving out an exception to the general rule set forth in the first case. To the extent that the two cases seem indistinguishable, however, then the conclusion is almost inescapable that the first case has been overruled sub silentio. As has been seen, lawyers may differ over whether two cases are distinguishable, and thus they may differ over whether the second case created an exception to, or overruled sub silentio, the first case. Any exception changes the law with respect to those situations embraced within the exception. Moreover, by defining the factual predicate of the exception broadly, the court can bring large numbers of cases within the exception. Eventually, the exception may become more widely applicable than the so-called general rule, with the result that the but over
exception is said to swallow the rule. At the time it was created, the exception seemed a minor change in the law. time it proved to be a virtually complete repudiation of the earlier rule.
Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit

Extending Lopez by devolving power to the states sends a powerful federalism signal solves global wars and instability Calabresi 95
Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers, Michigan Law Review December, 1995 The prevailing wisdom is that the Supreme Court should abstain from enforcing constitutional limits on federal power for reasons of judicial competence and because the Court should spend essentially all its political capital enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against the states instead. This view is wrong. First, the rules of constitutional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good
thing, and it is the best and most important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political
branches cannot be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare [*831] decisis does not pose a barrier to
the creation of any new, prospectively applicable Commerce Clause case law. The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. 232 Elite opinion holds that the future of American
constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would
be a very good thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path. Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law reviews or in the newspapers, should
encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world would be a better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in
recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. 233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process,
if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.
Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit

The Lopez precedent is critical to reinvigorate federalism Calabresi 95
Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers, Michigan Law Review December, 1995 The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez 2 marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of
the doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers. After being "asleep at the constitutional switch" for more than fifty years, 3 the Court's decision to invalidate an Act of Congress on the ground that it exceeded the commerce power must be recognized as an extraordinary event. Even if Lopez produces no progeny and is soon overruled, the opinion has shattered forever the notion that, after fifty years of Commerce Clause precedent, we can never go back to the days of limited national power. The Lopez Court has shown us that we can go back, if we want to, so long as: 1) we can figure out a workable theory of the
limits on the federal commerce power; 2) we can agree on the propriety of vigorous judicial review in federalism cases; and 3) we can take proper account of the important reliance interests that have accrued around certain key precedents decided in the past half century.
Extending the Lopez precedent restores federalism Calabresi 95

Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers, Michigan Law Review December, 1995
The very real danger is that the Supreme Court will end up conferring legitimacy on congressional and presidential usurpations of state power that might be resisted more vigorously in the absence of federal judicial review. The advantages of constitutional federalism will not be obtainable if the Court hands down decisions like Lopez only once every ten years. National judicial umpiring of federalism boundaries will be useful only if the courts invalidate usurpations with some frequency, thus justifying the public confidence that the judiciary really is doing its duty in this category of cases.
The counterplan is a victory for federalism Young 4

Ernest Young, Law Professor, University of Texas, TEXAS LAW REVIEW, November 2004, pp. 135-6 The structure of the Court's current Commerce Clause doctrine bears this conclusion out. The Court has conceded that the national economy has become integrated to the extent that there is no meaningful distinction between intra-and inter-state commerce; rather, there is just "commerce." And the Court has also eschewed any effort to compartmentalize the various forms of economic activity, as it once sought to distinguish between "commerce" and "manufacturing" or "agriculture." Now all of these things are "commerce"; that term, the Court has made clear, comprehends all "economic activity." Nonetheless, it is important to maintain some enforceable
limit on the Commerce Clause. Precisely because these cases are so high profile, they play an important symbolic role. As I have already suggested, they may serve an important process function of reminding Congress to consider the limits of its powers when it acts. At the same time, limits on the Commerce Clause are closely linked to the states' autonomy; those limits, after all, preserve a zone of regulatory authority that Congress may not preempt. This is true even though the particular statutes at issue in Lopez
and Morrison were not preemptive - that is, they did not forbid parallel state legislation on the same subjects. If Congress were to attempt to supplant state autonomy to make regulatory decisions over physician-assisted suicide or gay marriage, for example, Lopez and Morrison would likely offer the most promising basis for challenging such legislation.

Permutation links to the DA its an immediate federal action that impacts politics and the federal structure The permutation is impossible the counterplan rules that the action of the plan is illegal means doing both is mutually exclusive. Links to federalism exclusive state power is key Gardbaum 97
Stephen, Associate Prof Northwestern U., Texas Law Review, March, Lexis [*796] Despite their diametrically opposed conclusions, however, a fundamental
premise is shared by both sides in this long-standing debate -- a premise that characterizes almost all analyses of American federalism. This shared premise is that the existence of areas of exclusive state power is a necessary condition of constitutional federalism: in order for federalism to operate as a principle of constitutional law, there must in practice (and not merely in rhetoric or national myth) be areas of regulatory authority reserved exclusively to the states -- areas in which Congress cannot regulate. Given this shared premise, the debate has focused on whether or not such areas currently exist constitutionally speaking, and
its content consists largely of arguments for and against various proposed textual bases for them. Leading candidates over the years have included the Commerce Clause, 6 the Tenth Amendment, 7 and the Guarantee Clause. 8
Even small issues spill over and effect federalism Lack 95

James, Senator of New York, Serial No. J-104-31, 7-11, p. 11
Every year Congress considers bills, federal agencies consider rules, and international agencies consider cases that would supplant state statutory or common law. Adverse decisions may result not only in nullifying state laws and court decisions, but also in narrowing the range of issues that legislatures may address. The threat is the steady, incremental, year-by-year erosion of the jurisdiction of state legislatures.
Each issue is key only the counterplan prevents the root cause of federal intrusion on state power Lack 95
James, Senator of New York, Serial No. J-104-31, 7-11, p. 11
Inordinate reliance upon the central government for problem-solving feeds the misconception that uniformity for uniformitys sake alone is a concept that justifies preemption. However, in a federal system strong reasons compel acceptance of diversity among states. Our federalism anticipates diversity; our unity does not anticipated uniformity. By definition, every preemptive law diminishes other expressions of self-government and should be
approved only where compelling need and broad consensus exist. While proponents of preemption may claim expected benefits, these must be balanced against the potential loss of accountability, innovation, and responsiveness.
Dont let the size of the infraction fool you the result is tyrannical governance Lebow 97
Cynthia C., Associate Dir @ RAND, U. Tennessee Law Review, Spring, Lexis
n162 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting Rehnquist, C.J., joining opinion of O'Connor, J.); FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting Rehnquist, C.J., joining in opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice Powell filed his own partial dissent in FERC that also deserves mention. FERC, 456 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Lauding the "appeal" and "wisdom" of Justice O'Connor's dissent, Powell stated that PURPA "intrusively requires [states] to make a place on their administrative agenda for consideration and potential adoption of federally proposed standards.'" Id. at 771, 775 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While finding that precedents of the Court supported the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of PURPA "on this facial attack," Powell also evoked principles of federalism to warn against the encroachment of federal authority into state affairs: But I know of no other attempt by the Federal Government to supplant state-prescribed procedures that in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power to pre-empt state-court rules of civil procedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This would
"Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." Id. at 774-75 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978)). Despite his warning, Justice
be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by Professor Tribe: Powell could probably never have envisioned the degree to which Congress would attempt to preempt state court procedures with respect to tort and product liability actions, areas so traditionally anchored in state common law.

Overlapping power take out solvency promote inefficiency and magnifies the link to the DAs Gorham 95
Brad, State Senator from RI, Serial 104-11, y 4.b 85/3, pg. 81-82
Every federal policy explicitly trades off with state power Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 2k
Spring, Lexis The new term actually gives us a new perspective on the enumerated powers. No
power granted to Congress - think of the Commerce Clause - may be so construed as to preempt entirely the states' power over the people. I
employ the phrase "power over the people" for two reasons. First, this phrase emphasizes that the reserved powers of the states must somehow reflect general sovereign powers, which are powers over people. 60 The "States qua States" cases preserve the states' power over some people - those who are state employees. A state that may resist commandeering so as to retain only the
power to exist in name possesses no meaningful powers. Second, I refer to the states' power over "people" because
the Court has overlooked "the people" in its arguments over the Tenth Amendment, and "the people's" rights are also reserved. The Tenth Amendment expresses a triangular relationship among the federal government, state governments, and the people. Although the context for Tenth Amendment litigation has involved disputes between states and the federal government, residual state authority also inures to the benefit of "the people." In any contest between Congress and the [*566] states, a decision that favors
expanded federal powers necessarily disfavors the states and the people. When Justice Souter wrote in Alden
that "the commerce power is no longer thought to be circumscribed," 61 he meant, implicitly, that the people have reserved no powers over commerce or anything affecting it.
Generic AT: Lopez DAs

The court wont use commerce clause precedent to strike down other measures Stewart 4
Nathan+ Awarded the ninth annual Case Western Reserve Law Review Outstanding Student Note Award, as selected by the Volume 54 Editorial Board., NOTES: Turning The Commerce Clause Challenge "On Its Face": Why Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 Case W. Res. 161 In examining the lower courts' treatment of Commerce Clause statutes in the wake of Lopez and Morrison, Professors Denning
and Reynolds discovered that "in nearly two years following Morrison, only one statute has been held unconstitutional on its face, and that decision did not survive en banc review." n322 Conceding that the judiciary has been "marginally more comfortable sustaining as applied challenges" n323 to commerce-based laws, Denning and Reynolds concluded that "even here the courts have been circumspect," n324 finding "only nine cases in which a defendant's conviction was overturned." n325 Rather than abuse or even widely exercise its post-Morrison discretion to invalidate [*206] Commerce Clause legislation, the judiciary has largely "declined to read Morrison to require that earlier cases be overruled or even seriously reexamined." n326 Moreover, Denning and Reynolds have found courts "quick to invoke circuit rules against overruling circuit precedent and the rules against anticipatory overruling of Supreme Court cases," and have argued that "such a 'desk clearing mentality' makes it difficult to credit the predictions of Lopez and Morrison's, harshest critics: that they will result in courts striking down all manner of federal statutes."
AT: ESA DA No ESA Overturn

No link no reason ESA would be questioned because the conterplan is a narrow ruling The ESA will be upheld on treaty power grounds, even if it violates the commerce clause Fleming 1
Jacalyn R. Fleming, JD Albany, 2001, The scope of federal authority, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 497, p ln Under Article 2, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the power to make treaties is expressly delegated to the United States. 167 Treaties made pursuant to the Constitution are "the supreme laws [*519] of the land." 168 In addition, statutes that are both "necessary
and proper" to execute a treaty are deemed valid. 169 Thus, treaties and their implementing statutes may preempt state
law. 170 For example, in Missouri v. Holland, 171 the Supreme Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty Act against a state's challenge that the Act was interfering with rights reserved to the states. 172 In so holding, the Court discussed the limits of the
Tenth Amendment and stressed the importance of the national interest at stake. 173 In addition, Justice Holmes explained the
special nature of the treaty-making power: We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, "a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government" is not to be found... . [especially] where the States individually are incompetent to act. 174 The Court further explained that the Constitution should not be read as a static document but as an organism that could evolve with a changing nation. 175 A national solution was needed to protect the great value of migratory birds and the Court refused to find "some invisible radiation from the general terms of
the Tenth Amendment" to hamper national action. 176 In addition, the Court began the process of chipping away at the
states' power over wildlife by explaining that wild birds belong to no one, 177 while also [*520] recognizing that "but for the treaty" the state could regulate the subject itself. 178 The authority of ESA is based on federal treaties. Section 2 of the ESA acknowledges Congress's pledge to the international community to protect species from extinction. 179 One express purpose of ESA is to "achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth." 180 Six treaties are specifically listed in the statute, in
addition to a general reference to "other international agreements." 181 One of the named treaties is the
Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (Western Convention). 182
ESA wont be overturned Court will find it constitutional under both the commerce clause and the treaty power Fleming 1
Jacalyn R. Fleming, JD Albany, 2001, The scope of federal authority, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 497, p ln Congress's authority to enact the ESA under the Commerce Clause has been questioned, particularly in the context of wholly intrastate species, because it is unclear how the taking of an endangered species could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, however, has held some activities, such as the growing of homegrown wheat, to be within the realm of interstate commerce due to the aggregate effects of the activity. 292 The question remains whether the Supreme Court will require that the regulated activity itself be commercial, but even if so, the economic and commercial nature of protecting endangered species and maintaining biodiversity should not be difficult to defend. All citizens depend on these species for food, medicine, and every other economic measure independent of minerals. Biodiversity is an untapped economic potential. As a renowned biologist has explained, "the more the living world is explored and utilized, the greater will be the efficiency and reliability of the particular species chosen for economic use." 293 Someday the nation may come to appreciate fully the harm resulting from the loss of biodiversity, and seek to prevent further loss. The ESA may be upheld as constitutional, even without Commerce Clause authority. As an issue of critical national and economic concern, endangered species protections fall well within the treaty power of Congress, and the ESA is a necessary and proper statute adopted domestically to implement provisions of treaties with other nations. Consequently, the ESA is a valid act of Congress under the treaty power and thus may preempt state and local laws to the extent local laws conflict with the ESA pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
AT: ESA DA No Impact to ESA

ESA fails it has never received adequate funding Fischman 4
Robert, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species Act, Questia
There is no getting around the money issue. The ESA has never received adequate funding to fulfill its objectives. As with other environmental laws, the agencies charged with implementing the ESA do not have adequate budgets to perform well. There is a pattern of under-funding programs that self-fulfills the prophesy of federal environmental law failure. The squalid state of ESA funding is a particularly vivid illustration
of this insidious dynamic. For years, agency budgets for listing and designation of critical habitat have fallen short of what is needed to meet the mandates of the stature. (123) This tenuous situation prompts lawsuits asking courts to force the Services to respond to particular petitions. In short order, the agencies expend their entire budgets responding to outside litigation priorities rather than their own. (124) Some critics have used this frustrating situation to argue for limitations on judicial review. (125) But the real solution is to give the Services the resources they need to do their jobs in identifying and listing species on the brink of extinction, designating critical habitat, and preparing adequate recovery plans. There is more than a little hypocrisy in calling for the federal government to act only on the basis of "sound" or "peer reviewed" science, (126) but not supporting the significant budget
Even putting aside the funding required to list species, designate habitat, and conduct consultation, the costs of species recovery alone justify a bleak view of funding. A 1990 Interior Department report estimated the total cost for recovery of listed species to be $4.6 billion. (127) The number of listed species has doubled since that time.
increases necessary to carry out high quality research.
The ESA exempts the biggest polluters Fischman 4

Robert, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species Act, Questia
One important reason why so many ESA disputes revolve around logging, agriculture (including ranching), and residential or commercial land development (the sectors I will call the "Big Three") is that these are the most important non-service areas of the economy that generally escape regulation under the pollution control laws. Activities subject to the pollution control statutes are relatively uncontroversial from an ESA perspective because they are already regulated under those other environmental laws. Where pollution control regulation does the heavy lifting, often what remains necessary for the ESA program is slight. But, for the Big Three, exemptions and exclusions have left the ESA with a tremendous challenge to control habitat degradation.
No regulation is net-better for the environment Dunlop 96

Becky Norton, Individuals, Liberty and the Environment, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Individuals_Liberty_Environment.cfm And finally, environmental policies, which emanate from liberty, are the most successful. Our
chosen political environment in the United States is liberty. And liberty is the central organizing principle. May I remind this
audience that genius of the United States Constitution is not so much that it is a charter to create a government, but rather it is a charter to protect the people and their cherished liberty from government. As I stated previously, there is a direct and positive
relationship between free market societies and the healthiness, cleanliness, and safety of the environment. Free people work to improve their environment, and I might add, the environment of others. And liberty is the energy behind environmental progress. Freedom unleashes forces most needed to deal with problems. It fosters scientific inquiry, technological innovation, entrepreneur ship, rapid information exchange, accuracy and flexibility. Liberty has powerful environmental benefits.
AT: ESA DA ESA Bad Turn

ESA is on-balance worse for species empirics prove it doesnt stop extinction, and the parts that would be struck down provide economic incentives to destroy habitat, resulting in net losses Jonathan H. Adler, Assoc. law Prof @ Case Western, Jan. 2005, Judicial Federalism, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 277, p ln
The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") is the federal regulatory statute most at risk under the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but it
would be a mistake to assume a threat to the Endangered Species Act necessarily poses a threat to the survival of endangered species. Enacted in 1973 to save species from the brink of extinction, the ESA has hardly been a success. In over thirty years, fewer than forty of over 1,000 species have been delisted as endangered or threatened. 553 In this time more species have been delisted because they went extinct or never should have been listed as endangered in the first place than have been legitimately "recovered" due to the Act. 554 Among the various factors that contribute to the ESA's ineffectiveness as a conservation tool are the very regulatory strictures most at risk to Commerce Clause challenge. Section 9 prohibits the "take" of endangered species, including significant modification of listed species' habitat. The presence of a listed species can freeze the use
of private land, barring everything from timber cutting and ditch digging to plowing a field or building a home. In Riverside County, California, the ESA even prevented private landowners from disking to clear firebreaks on their own land lest they disturb the habitat of the Stephens' kangaroo rat. 555 Consequently, private landowners are penalized for owning endangered species habitat. 556 In this fashion, the
ESA creates economic incentives for private landowners to engage in the deliberate destruction of actual or potential wildlife habitat and to forego or prevent future habitat creation on privately
[*460] owned land. 557 Professors Lueck and Michael report that forest owners respond to the likelihood of ESA regulation by harvesting timber and reducing the age at which timber is harvested. 558 Such preemptive habitat destruction could well "cause a
long-run reduction in the habitat and population" of endangered species. 559 In some instances, it is likely that the economic incentives created by the Act result in the net loss of species habitat. That is, in some cases the ESA may be responsible for more habitat loss than habitat protection. 560 Professors Lueck and Michael are
not alone in their findings. A study in Conservation Biology further reports that just as many landowners responded to the listing of Preble's meadow jumping mouse by destroying potential habitat as undertook new conservation efforts. 561 It also found a majority of landowners would not allow biologists on their land to assess mouse populations out of fear that land-use restrictions would follow the discovery of a mouse on their land. 562 The Fish and Wildlife Service also acknowledges that its own regulations can lead to habitat loss on private land. In the Pacific northwest, land-use restrictions imposed to protect the northern spotted owl made private landowners fear the lost use of their land and that "this concern or fear has accelerated harvest rotations in an effort to avoid the regrowth of habitat that is useable by owls." 563 Insofar as ESA regulation discourages private land conservation, it is undermining species conservation efforts.
The majority of endangered and threatened species depend on private land for some portion of their habitat, 564 so by discouraging private land conservation, the ESA could well have a devastating impact on species conservation efforts. While there is no conclusive evidence as to the net effect of the ESA on species conservation on private land,
there is more than enough evidence to challenge the prevailing [*461] assumption that limitations on ESA regulation of private land will result in net harm to endangered species. If courts hold that the Commerce Clause limits federal regulation of
private land, it may even prompt the federal government to adopt alternative approaches to species conservation that do not produce the same unintended consequences and conserve species in a more effective and equitable manner. The imposition of federal priorities on unconsenting states can also have negative
environmental results. In many cases, the assertion of federal regulatory authority to advance environmental goals will safeguard important environmental concerns. But in other cases, federal authority can prevent states from adopting environmentally
preferable alternatives. Federal preemption of more protective state environmental standards can inhibit more effective environmental protection, as well as experimentation with new approaches of
addressing environmental concerns. 565
AT: Terrorism DA No Link

Quick response is irrelevant Osterholm 99
Michael T. Osterholm,- PhD Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies http://www.postgradmed.com/issues/1999/08_99/osterholm.htm To date, most of the federal, state, and local agencies involved in planning and training for terrorism have focused on the classic event involving chemical release or use of an explosive device. In these situations, police, fire, law-enforcement, and other emergency-response personnel descend on a scene where causalities are evident. The news media have depicted preparedness exercises, featuring rescuers wearing hazardous material
reflects our nation's preparedness to deal with terrorism associated with weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, in the case of a biologic-agent release, this scenario could not be further from the truth. Because the onset of illness is often delayed, sometimes up to weeks after the release, and because a biologic agent can be disseminated widely throughout an entire city or region, the timing and location of a bioterrorism event may be extremely difficult to identify. Instead of being heralded by red lights and sirens converging on a known point of assault, a bioterrorist attack will be identified gradually by emergency department physicians, infectious-disease consultants,
(HAZMAT) protective equipment, and this training supposedly clinical laboratorians, and public health epidemiologists. Their role will be critical in recognition of the release of a biologic agent. To date, the public health and medical care delivery systems have been woefully illprepared to meet the challenge of a biologic-agent release (2).
States and localities are more effective than the federal government Hodge 2
James - Executive Director, Center for Law and the Public's Health, http://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/Bioterrorism/4PHealthLaw/PHealth00f.htm
Choosing to assign a primary leadership role to the federal government for responding to bioterrorism threats does have its drawbacks. Federal public health authorities may be slowed by inter-organizational or bureaucratic problems. As well, they are not well-positioned to serve on the frontline of defense to a bioterrorist attack. State and local public health authorities, in conjunction with private sector health-care workers, will in most cases be the first to detect potential bioterrorism activity through effective surveillance. Federal authorities may facilitate detection by sharing resources or intelligence data. However, detection of a potential bioterrorism threat through state and local public health authorities is distinct from the response functions of the federal government.
Federal terror preparedness trades-off with more effective state and local preparedness Carafano and Weitz 6
PhDs, Learning from Disaster: The Role of Federalism and the Importance of Grassroots Response, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1923.cfm In the aftermath of the widespread devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina and the unsteady response to conditions in New Orleans, some argued to give the federal government a much more intrusive role in meeting future catastrophic emergencies. [1] While improvements in the federal response are necessary, turning responsibility for everything over to Washington is
a terrible idea. Homeland security and disaster management are national, not just federal, missions. The right response to domestic emergencies requires effective action from state and local governments, privatesector and voluntary associations, and communities and individuals, as well as support from federal officials. The best way to ensure cooperation and to meet shared responsibilities is not to put big government in charge. Federalism has long been the guiding principle for allocating responsibilities to meet the needs of citizens after disasters. Remaining committed to a federalist approach is not just being a slave to tradition. It is a precedent based on practicality and experience. Both scientific research on disaster response and an analysis of recent emergencies argue that it is still the right approach. Many of the best efforts to save lives and safeguard property highlight the vital role that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private-sector initiatives, and individual civic deeds play during extreme emergencies. In fact, they argue that rather than being supplanted by federal oversight, grassroots responses should be the cornerstone of the national effort. The federal government can best facilitate establishing an effective national response to
catastrophic disaster by meeting its own responsibilities, creating a national response system that promotes collaborative effort, and supporting train the trainer programs that help communities to build strong grassroots response.
AT: Terrorism DA No Impact

All countries co-operating on terrorism now That solves Hachigian and Sutphen October 8
Nina and Mona, senior fellow at the California office of the Center for American Progress and Managing Director @ Stonebridge, Strategic Collaboration: How the United States Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise, CSIS, Autumn, Lexis
All of the pivotal powers are highly motivated to collaborate on counterterrorism efforts, and U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have cooperated with their counterparts in each of these countries. Because the United States cannot have an adequate intelligence presence in every country in which terrorists plot, it is highly reliant on the capabilities of others. British vigilance, for example,
uncovered and foiled the August 2006 plot to blow up 10 airplanes bound for the United States with liquid bombs. 4 With the third-largest Muslim population in the world and Pakistan still a key terrorism hub next door,
India has monitored and countered radical Islamic groups for decades and has emerged to be an important source of information on a number of extremist groups now targeting the United States.
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a hard-line radical Sunni Muslim group based in Lahore, has carried out major attacks in India, including on its parliament. It has now turned its attention from Kashmir to training people "to wage war against nonbelievers, and especially the United States." 5 In June 2003, 11 American Muslims, called the "paintball terrorists" after a favorite pastime of theirs, were charged in Virginia with training with and fighting for LeT. Six of the men eventually pleaded guilty, and three were convicted at trial. In June 2005, India and the United States signed a 10-year defense pact that promises continued counterterrorism operations. Stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists is perhaps the most urgent goal of U.S. foreign policy. Unbeknownst to many, Russia is the cofounder and cochair with the United States of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This group of about 50 countries, some of which would have been reluctant to join if not for Russia's participation, seeks to develop a framework in which they can prevent or respond to potential
China has become a member in good standing of the non-proliferation community. 6 Although its record is far from perfect, since the mid-1990s, China has greatly improved its domestic
radiological attacks. Russia's better protection of its own bomb-ready nuclear material is also an urgent priority for U.S. safety. Over the years, control over the flow of sensitive technologies, signed bilateral agreements with the United States, and joined international conventions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and others, all of which require adherence to specific guidelines on the transfer of nuclear materials. China was instrumental in felling the most
China has signed up to a major Bush administration antiterrorism program, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), designed to prevent terrorists from smuggling a nuclear weapon
notorious nuclear swap meet of our time, run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. Importantly,
into the United States in shipping containers. Because U.S. ports are vulnerable, the CSI is aimed at finding weapons of mass destruction before they are loaded onto ships. Each year, more than 10 million containers leave China's ports bound for
the United States, more than from any other country. U.S. customs officials are now welcomed in the ports of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Shenzhen.
There will be no major attack- several reasons Brookings Institution 8

Independent research and policy institute Have we exaggerated the threat of terrorism? Brookings Institute, July 18, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0221_terrorism.aspx One participant argued that terrorism presents minimal cause for concern. Discounting war zones, studies
show that there have been very few people killed by Muslim extremists each yearin fact, more people drown in bathtubs each year in the United States. The FBI reported in 2005 that it had not found an al-Qaeda presence in the United States. Additionally, terrorism, by its very nature, can be self-defeating: many attacks by al-Qaeda have caused the group to lose popularity. This participant questioned both the intentions and capability of al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden has threatened many attacks that he has not been able to execute. In specific, this participant
thought it unlikely that that al-Qaeda would obtain nuclear weapons, despite fears to the contrary. Another participant agreed that the
fears about terrorism are exaggerated and differentiated between the actual campaign against al-Qaeda and its supporters and the idea of a general war on terrorism.
However, participants also detailed the larger problems that terrorism can create, regardless of the numbers it kills directly: terrorism often leads to insurgencies or civil wars; it could destabilize U.S. allies in the Middle East and the whole Middle Eastern architecture; terrorism keeps oil prices high; and it has psychological effects beyond the actual death tolls. Additionally, many planned attacks have been stopped before they were carried out; one participant noted that there have been several near-misses recently. One participant argued that the war on terrorism is actually about an ideological battle between the United States and its allies and radical forces. Another participant agreed with this assessment of the general struggle between the United States and radical Islamic extremism. This participant noted that the larger struggle is much more complicated to understand than terrorism in specific and that this leads to a disproportionate focus on terrorism and the accompanying misallocation of resources. Participants highlighted the difference between the risks presented by terrorism in the United States and around the world. The impact of terrorism in Iraq and Lebanon, for instance, is completely different than the impact in the United States, which one participant categorized as being essentially psychological. The relevance of the capability of governments at preventing terrorism was also addressed. Terrorism is particularly dangerous in places where there is weak government capacity and rule of law. Participants
there not been another terrorist attack in the United States since September 11, 2001. One participant presented several reasons: the United States has a supportive domestic Muslim population; the would-be terrorists in the United States are not skilled; and U.S. counterterrorism policy has made it more difficult for the al-Qaeda core to plan complex attacks. This participant argued, however, that there
discussed why has are risks that this situation may change going forward. As the al-Qaeda core reconstitutes itself in Pakistan, it may be able to plan more complex attacks again. Additionally, the U.S. Muslim population may become less supportive overtime as a result of U.S. homeland security policy. However, another participant did not think the attitudes of the U.S. Muslim community were particularly relevant to this debate.
AT: Unpredictability DA
Unpredictability is inevitable multiple factors Caminker 94
Evan H., Professor of Law @ UCLA, April, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817 Even if courts uniformly applied federal rules, absolute predictability would still elude us. First,
legal rules are unstable over
time. While stare decisis creates a strong presumption that existing legal rules will govern present behavior, courts can still abruptly change the law by overturning precedent. 142 Second, even stable precedents cannot answer all legal questions, and the answers they do provide are often quite fuzzy and uncertain. As a result, potential litigants are typically faced with some uncertainty as to how the law will ultimately apply to their conduct. Third, federal law is superimposed on a diverse landscape of state laws, introducing an additional element of uncertainty (except where federal law preempts state law). This is especially so since state laws are often potentially unclear and unstable, and liberal venue rules and indeterminate choice of law rules often make it difficult for persons to predict which state law(s) (in addition to federal law) might govern their conduct. 143 Fourth, litigants face uncertainty concerning actual or provable facts. Finally, the potentially nonuniform behavior of other actors (including juries, prosecutors exercising their discretionary powers, and the President exercising her pardon power) necessarily introduces additional elements of unpredictability. In short, litigants face substantial uncertainty, the uniformity of judicial law-decla [*852] ration notwithstanding.
Respect for precedent does not affect legal predictability judges can cite hundreds of contradicting decisions depending upon personal beliefs Calabresi 5
Steven, Professor of Law, CAN ORIGINALISM BE RECONCILED WITH PRECEDENT?: A SYMPOSIUM ON STARE DECISIS: TEXT, PRECEDENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOME ORIGINALIST AND NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR OVERRULING PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA v. CASEY, 22 Const. Commentary 311 There is one final sense in which the doctrine could be said to be thicker than the document and that is in the sense that there is literally more of it: it is bulkier, wordier, and takes longer to read. Thus, Professors Merrill and Strauss are fond of pointing out that the number of paragraphs in Supreme Court opinions and briefs discussing caselaw is greater than the number of paragraphs discussing text or original history. The first thing to be said in
the fact that the doctrine is bulkier than the document does not mean that the doctrine is more constraining of judicial discretion. In fact, I suspect the exact opposite is true. The greater bulk of the doctrine means that it is easier for result-oriented judges to manipulate doctrinal arguments by "picking their friends out from among the crowd" as judges have been accused of doing with legislative history or with foreign sources of constitutional law. 49 The doctrine [*329] is certainly bulkier than the document since there are more than 500 volumes of the U.S. Reports, while the Constitution is a few thousand words long, but that does not prove that the doctrine is more constraining. In fact, one can find caselaw support on both sides of almost any constitutional issue. Doctrine lends an air of lawyerly authenticity (and, for laypersons, of impenetrability) to judicial decisions, but this does not mean doctrine restrains judicial discretion. To the contrary, I suspect doctrine gives judges more wiggle room to make policy both because it can be cited for any side of any proposition and because it can be used to pull the wool over the eyes of non-lawyers. I am thus
response to this argument is that
unpersuaded by Professor Merrill's intuition that the doctrine is thicker than the document and original history.
A change in precedent is not perceived as activist Lino 3

THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW III. THE LIBERAL ACTIVISM OF THE REHNQUIST COURT IV. CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISM BY THE REHNQUIST COURT, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-2877865_ITM
Nor should it be considered activist--it is anti-activist--for a court to overrule a prior activist decision, returning the issue to the political process. Rulings of unconstitutionality give the prevailing party a positive
victory, the adoption of a policy preference it failed to obtain in the ordinary political process, while the losing party has its political victory taken away. Rulings upholding constitutionality simply leave things as they were. For practical purposes, the
extent and nature of a court's constitutional judicial activism is best determined by considering only its rulings denying, not its rulings upholding, constitutionality and comparing liberal and conservative victories.
AT: Unpredictability DA
Non-Unique Commerce Clause jurisprudence unpredictable now Kreit 6
Associate, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, Spring, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. 705, Rights, Rules, and Raich, Alex, LN)
Raich leaves Commerce Clause jurisprudence in an increasingly confused state and that should be a cause for concern for everyone interested in the Commerce Clause, regardless of whether one favors a limitless or heavily circumscribed commerce power, or something in between. The Commerce
Clause now encompasses three overlapping rules: the aggregation doctrine, the four-part Lopez test, and the broader regulatory scheme rule. If Raich is applied faithfully, the Lopez test will apply in only a very limited number of cases
in the future. But, in the absence of a clear framework for choosing between each constitutional rule, it is difficult to know exactly how each test will function and what, if any, activity Congress can not regulate. The confusion that surrounds the tests, also leaves room for future majorities to follow any of the three rules or rationales based solely, or primarily, on a Justice's policy preferences or the ability to cobble together a majority in a particular case. In addition to its internal conflicts, the Commerce Clause now appears to be at odds with the well-settled principles of constitutional adjudication that favor as-applied to facial challenges. Given these problems, the Court should either adopt a clearer, universal standard for limiting Congress' commerce power or consider abandoning its revived limits altogether. Whatever one believes is the ideal interpretation of the Commerce Clause, n260 a clear framework for analyzing cases that is consistent [*749] with the basic principles of constitutional adjudication (whether it be a return to Wickard in which no challenge can succeed or a revival of Lopez) is preferable to a jurisprudence in which it seems as if the most "parsimonious account is that there are some statutes
five or more justices . . . think are more or less good ideas, and others that five or more justices think are more or less bad ideas; and that those justices will go to any (purportedly doctrinal) port in a storm to reach the results they think sensible."
AT: Courts Link to Politics

Courts are insulated politicians can deflect criticism and pressure Intoccia 1
Gregory Intoccia, practicing attorney specializing in telecommunications, 2001, Reassessing Judicial Capacity to Resolve Complex Questions of Social Policy, 11 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 127, pg. np Elected politicians appear to "pass the buck" to the judiciary when an issue divides the electorate in a
manner that is not in keeping with conventional party divisions. As the judiciary is a non-partisan institution that has traditionally resolved specific controversies, the courts offer politicians the opportunity to deflect issues potentially disruptive to partisan debate. For example, judicial policy on abortion suggests that this principle is valid. For at least a decade prior to the Supreme Court's abortion decision in Roe v.
Wade, many mainstream politicians generally sought to avoid the abortion issue. In the mid-1960s, the two major parties remained divided over New Deal economic issues, but voters were increasingly interested in other issues such as law and order, race, gender equity and social lifestyles. At that time, the majority Democratic Party was divided between liberals who were attracted to new views of social lifestyles and traditionalists who condemned them. The Republican Party was also divided internally over these issues, but to a lesser degree. While the two parties primarily debated economic issues, many mainstream politicians sought to avoid debate on a number of noneconomic social issues. As the debate over such issues as abortion intensified, elected officials
increasingly deferred to the judiciary for resolution. In the months prior to the Roe v. Wade decision, many politicians sought to remove themselves from the potential fall-out of a legislative solution to the abortion question, preferring instead that the judiciary decide whether to eliminate abortion restrictions.
The plan links 4 times more than the counterplan CSM 97

Christian Science Monitor, Why America Puts Its Supreme Court On Lofty Pedestal, June 25, Lexis Today this holds true even more. In one sense, the reason is obvious: With divided government and partisan sniping in Washington,
when politicians must create a TV image and constantly raise funds, the scholarly-looking justices seem a refreshing alternative. They come out in black robes from behind red silk curtains, and everyone stands. They ask incisive questions. They disappear. It looks like competence personified. And there's some truth to it. The members of the court don't need to campaign for office every few years. They were selected for life. They don't need speech writers or have to check the polls. The current justices, unlike earlier courts, generally write their own opinions. They are free to dissent, and their rulings are not tied to interest-group pressure. Moreover, as an institution, the court is uniquely constituted. It is not one targetable political persona, as is a single chief executive. Yet it is smaller than a Congress of 535 people. Congress is covered by TV four times as much as the court is. The White House is covered eight times as much, says Lee Epstein of Washington University in St. Louis. The court stands out now because it is not part of Washington's political swamp. The carefully cultivated aloofness of the Supreme Court is, in the Washington scene, almost countercultural in nature. The court's warts don't show. "People don't see the court infighting; it seems more harmonious and less political," says one court-watcher. "With Congress and the White House, we see the blood-letting on the street." Importantly, say scholars, current
justices benefit from courageous stands the court took in cases like Brown school desegregation, and the Roe abortion-rights case - when the majority was fragile and the justices felt under great pressure. Those decisions are a main reason the court image is so buffed today.
Justices Don't Have to Wade in Washington Swamp
AT: No Test Case

The Court has so many cases it can find one Quirk and Bridwell 95
WILLIAM J. Quirk, Professor of Legal Research at University of South Carolina Law School and R. RANDALL Bridwell, Professor of Law at University of South Carolina Law School, JUDICIAL DICTATORSHIP, 1995 We would answer that the Court is the least dangerous branch as Alexander Hamilton said; it has no executive or legislative authority; it doesnt make rules; it just decides cases that come before it. The trouble with our answer is that the Court is able to select the
cases that come before it from a large number of them. The Court, at its 1992-93 term, refused to hear 7,233 cases while it decided to hear ninety- seven, or 1.3 percent. In 1950, on the other hand, the Court heard 10 percent of the cases brought to it which indicates it was then acting as a court of appeal over the lower federal courts. The Courts power to pick from among such a large number of cases gives it the practical ability to rule on issues it thinks important, to act, in effect, as a Court of National Policy.
The court can always find a case Adamany 90

David Adamany, Professor @ Wayne State, The American Courts: A Critical Assessment, 1990, p.9 Since Congress adopted the Judges Bill of 1925, most cases on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets have been by writ of certiorari a request for the justices to hear cases that they may, but are not required, to hear. Under Supreme Court Rule 17, which gives broad categories of cases that the Court may hear, at least four justices must agree to hear a case before it is considered by the Court. Some cases on the appellate docket have been appeals by right, certain cases involving the constitutionality of state or federal laws or state constitutional provisions. By law, the Court was required to hear these cases; but the justices developed broad discretion by rejecting cases that failed to pose a substantial federal question as defined by the justices. In 1988, Congress revised the law virtually to
eliminate appeals by right, thus giving the justices almost complete choice about what cases to decide. With more than 5.000 cases pending annually, the Supreme Court can almost always find a case to raise any policy issue that the justices wish to decide. Chief Justice Earl Warren apparently asked his law clerks to fmd a case on the Courts docket that would allow the justices to overrule a previous decision holding that there was no right for the poor to have an attorney in every criminal trial. The clerks found such a case, and the Court used it to announce a new constitutional rule guaranteeing the right to counsel (Danelski and Danelski 1989, 508). The Court has sometimes gone to great lengths to find the issue it wants to decide. In
the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 617 [1961]), the Court held that illegally seized evidence could not be used in state criminal trials. But the dissenting justices accused the majority of reaching out to find that issue in the brief of amicus curiae, because the jurisdictional statements, briefs, and oral arguments of the parties had all been devoted to First Amendment free speech issues. Where
the Court cannot find an issue on its docket, it may order parties to argue an issue that the justices want to consider. Over the strong objection of four justices that the majority was raising a question not presented by the parties,
five justices ordered the parties in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (485 U.S. 617 [1988]) to rearue the case to determine whether the Courts 1976 interpretation of a federal civil rights statute should be reconsidered and changed. The majority pointed out four previous cases within the past twenty years when the Court had also ordered reargument to determine whether an earlier decision should be reconsidered and changed.
***Aff Answers to States***
States Counterplan Illegitimate

The uniform states counterplan is illegitimate: 1. The counterplan is plan-inclusive. Since the counterplan includes the majority of the plan, it doesnt prove that the plan is a bad idea. Plan-inclusive counterplans discourage substantive education about the implications of increasing social services. 2. The counterplan fiats multiple different governmental agencies. Reject multi-actor fiat because no single judge has the power to make the decisions of multiple state governmental officials. This doesnt link to the affirmative because we fiat the single government in the District of Colombia the federal government. 3. The counterplan is unpredictable. There is no author that writes that all 50 states should implement a uniform change in social services through the NCCUSL. Since there is no solvency advocate, it is impossible for the affirmative to prepare because no one writes counter-arguments. This is especially true since judges rely heavily on evidence to determine argumentative quality. 4. The counterplan is not a rational test of opportunity cost. Since the federal government acting does not prevent in any way the states from acting, the counterplan itself does not test whether the affirmative is a good idea. The net-benefits could be stand-alone and test the desirability of the plan. 5. Err affirmative on theory. The negative gets the block, tons of other generic arguments like Kritiks and topicality, and the 1ar is the hardest speech in debate because of the comparative time differential with the negative block. 6. This is a reason to reject the team, not just the argument. The only way to deter against illegitimate counterplans is to create a community consensus that running them will have penalties outside of mere rejection of that counterplan. Voting against the team sets a clear standard against states counterplans. Also, the damage is already done. We have had to invest time in this theory argument, which has a tradeoff with other arguments.
Federal Solvency
Federal services are better; state policies will be fragmented and fail Morgan 5
Denise Morgan, Professor of Law at New York University, and Rebecca Zieglow, Professor of Law at Toledo Law School, 2005, University of Cincinnati Law Review, pg. np
The limitations that the Supreme Court has placed on Congress's powers in the name of states' rights have severely weakened the one institution that has a constitutional mandate to create a nationally uniform baseline of rights of belonging and the ability to do so. Although state legislatures have
played--and should continue to play--an important role in more fully developing our national understanding of what rights are necessary to belong to America, state legislation is simply not an adequate substitute for federal legislation because
it must necessarily be piecemeal and varied. In contrast, Congress has greater institutional competence to determine when there is a need for rights of belonging than individual state legislatures have, only Congress can create a nationally uniform baseline of rights, and a shared understanding of rights of belonging reinforces those rights and strengthens our political community. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not attempt to delegate Congress's role in protecting rights of belonging to state governments based on the assumption that there is parity between the institutions.
The uniformity of the counterplan ensures there is no comparative advantage Kansas Law Review 99
University of Kansas Law Review, 1999, November Law Review Publication, p. 1322 If all of the states pursued identical regulatory strategies, or were prevented from instituting meaningful agendas altogether, these values, as a logical matter, could
not be promoted. Obviously there would be no regulatory diversity, because all of the states would structure the lives of their citizens in the same way. Moreover, this uniformity would prevent state competition and experimentation: people would have no incentive to "vote with their feet" if each state provided the same package of public goods, and experimentation by definition requires that different states attempt different solutions to the same social problems.
Federal Solvency
Even if the feds dont strike down the counterplan, the chance that they could means the counterplan isnt enforced Rossi 6
Jim Rossi, Professor and Associate Dean for Research, 2006, Florida State University College of Law, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, pg. 311
State constitutions present a challenge for courts within the system of American federalism. The federal constitution defines the scope of federal power, along with many protections for individual liberty. To the extent that federal authorities may be able to override subnational constitutions, as they do in many instances, state constitutions seem subsidiary. State constitutions rarely speak to who is to interpret them, or to how state actors are to solve conflicts between state and federal power. Where state courts interpret state constitutions, the practice has been questioned as pallidly mimicking other jurisdictions, mindlessly following in "lockstep" the federal constitution, or, when a state does go at it alone, frequently unprincipled and incoherent - a "failed discourse." Just as some have questioned whether affording states any independent legal status is really necessary to afford adequate representation in national politics, n6 at some level one might even question whether subnational constitutions really matter at all in a federal system of government. This presents a bit of a puzzle for both federal and state courts in interpreting state constitutions. Why should federal or state courts afford state constitutions any special legal status - beyond other positive legal texts as, say, statutes - in a system where the national government possesses sufficient power to do most of the things it wishes anyway?
Only federal policy avoids variance Bryner 2

Gary, Dept Political Science @ Brigham Young U., Environs 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, Fall Federal agencies are believed to be insulated enough from resource-depleting communities to ensure preservationist values are pursued. When agencies fail to protect resources or reduce pollution, the solution is to replace them with more ambitious regulators and to strengthen the regulatory authority of federal officials. 2 A number of studies have compared states according to
their commitment to environmental protection and found significant variation in expenditures, legal authority, methodologies to determine environmental quality, reporting [*3] requirements, enforcement actions, and in the environmental standards they are authorized to set under federal law. 3
Federal Key Strike Down

Congress will supersede state action Brown 2k
Judityh Brown, Professor Emeritus, Northeastern University School of Law, 2000, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1, pg. np The changes wrought in both the Commerce Clause and the sovereign immunity doctrines have one clear
corollary: to place at center stage the scope of congressional authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. By a process of doctrinal elimination, Section Five seems to have become the residual source for congressional authority to address vital national concerns which are not primarily economic, and the primary path by which Congress can supercede the states' sovereign immunity.
Congress wont hesitate to step in and strike down the counterplan Wilkinson 1
Harvie Wilkinson, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2001, THE 2000 JUSTICE LESTER W. ROTH LECTURE: FEDERALISM FOR THE FUTURE, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 523, pg. np
Congress has trespassed upon all manner of traditional state powers, including education, family law, and the ability of states to define the most basic criminal offenses. Congress has intruded upon local and noneconomic activity whose only relationship to interstate commerce is a highly attenuated one. And Congress has imposed one-size-fits-all regulatory regimes in disregard of different community conditions. The Supreme Court, meanwhile, was so wary from its confrontations with the Executive and Legislative Branches during the Progressive Era and the New Deal that it abdicated any meaningful Commerce Clause review for almost sixty years, to the general detriment of the Constitutional structure and to the particular misfortune of the states.
Federal Key Soft Power Advantage

Increased federal services help promote a positive image of the United States Nye 5
Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, is also the Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at Harvard, 2005, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics, pg. 57
How America behaves at home can enhance its image and perceived legitimacy, and that in turn can help advance its foreign policy objections. It does not mean that others need or want to become American clones. American performance on implementing our political values at home is mixed.
As noted earlier, the United States ranks at or near the top in health expenditure, higher education, books published, computer and Internet usage, acceptance of immigrants and employment. But America is not at the top in life expectancy, primary
education, job security, access to health care, or income equality. And high rankings in areas like the incidence of homicide and the percentage of the population in jail reduce attractiveness. On the other
hand, there is little evidence for the cultural decline that some pessimists proclaim, and many American domestic problems are shared by other postmodern societies.
Federal action is key they are the biggest promoters of soft power FAT 9
Foundation for Asymmetric Threats, 2009, Soft Power, Accessed April 23, 2009, http://asymmetricthreat.net/soft_power/soft_power.shtml Government leaders in the U.S. have, for some time, reached a general consensus that there are limits
on the efficacy of military force alone in meeting current and future asymmetrical threats. The collective and coordinated strengths of a broad range of government institutions, the private sector and the influence of American culture are needed to effectively meet increasingly asymmetrical challenges and threats. The current foreign policy dialogue is focusing on soft power. The concept has an important role to play in an integrated national security strategy. While Congress has initiated steps to strengthen the soft power capabilities of federal government departments and agencies, more is needed if the U.S. is to move forward in creating a meaningful and practical security framework in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.
Soft power solves 30 wars Nye 96

Joseph, Washington Quarterly, Winter, Lexis While generally less threatening to U.S. interests than global or regional balance of power conflicts, communal
conflicts are the most likely kind of post-cold war conflict and have thus far proved the most frequent. Less than 10 percent of the
170 states in today's world are ethnically homogenous. Only half have one ethnic group that accounts for as much as 75 percent of their population. Africa, in particular, is a continent of a thousand ethnic and linguistic groups squeezed into some 50-odd states, many of them with borders determined by colonial powers in the last century with little regard to traditional ethnic boundaries. The former Yugoslavia was a country with five
, there have been some 30 communal conflicts since the end of the Cold War, many of them still ongoing. Communal conflicts, particularly those involving wars of secession,
nationalities, four languages, three religions, and two alphabets. As a result of such disjunctions between borders and peoples are very difficult to manage through the UN and other institutions built to address interstate conflicts. The UN, regional organizations, alliances, and individual states cannot provide a universal answer to the dilemma of selfdetermination versus the inviolability of established borders, particularly when so many states face potential communal conflicts of their own. In a world of identity crises on many levels of analysis, it is not clear which selves deserve sovereignty: nationalities, ethnic groups, linguistic groups, or religious groups. Similarly, uses of force for deterrence, compellence, and reassurance are much harder to carry out when both those using force and those on the receiving end are disparate coalitions of international organizations, states, and subnational groups. Moreover, although few communal conflicts by themselves threaten security beyond their regions, some impose risks of "horizontal" escalation, or the spread to other states within their respective regions. This can happen through the involvement of affiliated ethnic groups that spread across borders, the sudden flood of refugees into neighboring states, or the use of neighboring territories to ship weapons to combatants. The use of ethnic propaganda also raises the risk of "vertical" escalation to more intense violence, more sophisticated and destructive weapons, and harsher attacks on civilian populations as well as military personnel. There is also the danger that communal conflicts could become more numerous if the UN and regional security organizations
The Pivotal U.S. Role Leadership by the United States, as a key factor in limiting the frequency and destructiveness of great power, regional, and communal conflicts. The paradox of the postcold war role of the United States is that it is the most powerful state in terms of both "hard" power resources (its economy and military forces) and "soft" ones (the appeal of its political system and culture), yet it is not so powerful that it can achieve all its international goals by acting alone. The United States lacks both the international and domestic
lose the credibility, willingness, and capabilities necessary to deal with such conflicts. Preventing and Addressing Conflicts:
the world's leading economy, its most powerful military force, and a leading democracy, is
prerequisites to resolve every conflict, and in each case its role must be proportionate to its interests at stake and the costs of pursuing them. Yet the United States can continue to enable and mobilize international coalitions
the United States can frequently serve as the sheriff of the posse, leading shifting coalitions of friends and allies to address shared security concerns within the legitimizing framework of international organizations. This requires sustained attention to the infrastructure and institutional mechanisms
to pursue shared security interests, whether or not the United States itself supplies large military forces. The U.S. role will thus not be that of a lone global policeman; rather, that make U.S. leadership effective and joint action possible: forward stationing and preventive deployments of U.S. and allied forces, prepositioning of U.S. and allied equipment, advance planning and joint training to ensure interoperability with allied forces, and steady improvement in the conflict
Soft Power Extensions

Lack of federal services causes the US to be viewed as morally retrograde makes criticisms of hypocrisy and arrogance resonate Ikenberry 2
John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics, 2002, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, pg. 173 First, America is morally retrograde. It executes its own people, and it likes to bomb others. It is the land of
intolerant, fundamentalist religion.
The United States will not submit to the dictates of global goodness it will not respect climate conventions, nor ratify the International Criminal Court or the Land Mine ban. Internationally, its like Dirty Harry and Globocop rolled into one an irresponsible and arrogant citizen of the global community. Second, America is socially
retrograde. It is the land of predatory capitalism (thus former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt) that denies critical social services, like health insurance, to those who need it most. Instead of bettering the lot of the poor and unskilled, mainly dark-skinned minorities, it shunts them off into prison. America accepts, nay admires gross income inequalities whereas the rest of the civilized world cherishes the social justice that comes with redistribution. The United States lets its state school system rot, not to speak of the public infrastructure.
Federal attempts to combat poverty in the US is viewed internationally as an attempt to rid the world of the negative effects of globalization has a powerful effect on soft power Bradford 7
Colin Bradford, Professor at American University, 2007, From Dominance to Trust, Accessed April 23, 2009, http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/colin_bradford/2007/07/from_dominance_to_trust.html The biggest challenge is global poverty. Fifty years from now there will be 3 billion more people in the world than today. All the additions to global population will come from the non-industrial, non-western, non-white world. The West will have less than 1 billion people in a world of 9 billion. Forty percent of the world's population now lives on less than $2 a day. The great challenge
is how to absorb the additional 3 billion in population into the global economy in a socially and politically sustainable way. The problem in meeting this challenge for the United States is that the global economy is seen as based on an American model, and thus globalisation is often viewed as Americanisation. Giving globalisation a human face and forging an economic model with social inclusion, greater equality and massive reductions in extreme poverty are now security issues for the United States, since it is identified in the rest of the world with exclusion, inequality and polarisation. With 40 million Americans without health insurance and income inequality on the rise, the struggle for new social integration into the market economy is a domestic issue for America, not just a global issue.
Expansion of US soft power solves terrorism Chertoff 8

Michael Chertoff, 2nd United States Secretary of Homeland Security, under George W. Bush, and co-author of the USA PATRIOT Act, July 2008, Preventing Terrorism: A Case for Soft Power, Harvard International Review, Accessed April 23, 2009, http://www.allbusiness.com/crimelaw/criminal-offenses-crimes-against/11664266-1.html One final point needs to be made about the use of soft power: In the battle of ideas, words matter. Good deeds, while crucial, are not enough. Actions can speak more loudly than words, but it would be sheer folly to neglect the power of words to explain our actions and defend our message. A large part of the world has been subjected for years, if not decades, to a steady
drumbeat of extremist propaganda. Policymakers must do a better job in countering its distorted narrative by telling the story of a nation whose founding document declares that freedom and hope are not for a privileged few, but for the whole of humanity. Moreover, mainstream Muslims, including their leaders, must be encouraged to work among their own communities to rebut the false picture of Islam being propagated by violent extremists who seek to hijack it for their own ideological and political ends. By telling this story and living it before the world, and by combining it with a steely resolve to defend the free world and its values, we can and will see the ideology of terrorism defeated and our world made safer and freer.
Soft Power MPX Extensions

Soft power is necessary to prevent AIDs and Terrorism Reiffel 6
Lex Reiffel, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, 2006, International Volunteering: Smart Power, Accessed April 23, 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2006/06volunteering_rieffel.aspx
The United States is seeking a leadership role that protects its vital national interests while effectively engaging other nations as willing partners. Global challenges such as terrorism, poverty, and HIV/AIDS call for new policies to promote mutual understanding and cooperation with the citizens of other countries. The disadvantages of acting alone or in small coalitions have become clearer in recent years. Furthermore, the experience in Iraq has made the American public more aware of the limitations of "hard power." Hard power can topple unfriendly regimes, but it cannot build stable and prosperous nations. The appointment of Karen Hughes as under secretary of state for public diplomacy and
public affairs in March 2005 showed that the Bush Administration is committed to relying more on the kind of "soft power" that Harvard professor Joseph Nye has been advocating for more than a decade.
AIDS leads to extinction Mathiu 2k

Mutuma, Africa News, July 15, Lexis Nexis
Every age has its killer. But Aids is without precedent. It is comparable only to the Black Death of the Middle Ages in the terror it evokes and the graves it fills. But unlike the plague, Aids does not come at a time of scientific innocence: It flies in the face of space exploration, the manipulation of genes and the mapping of the human genome. The Black Death - the plague, today easily cured by antibiotics and prevented by vaccines killed a full 40 million Europeans, a quarter of the population of Europe, between 1347 and 1352. But it was a death that could be avoided by the simple expedient of changing addresses and whose vector could be seen and
With Aids, the vector is humanity itself, the nice person in the next seat in the bus. There is nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. Every human being who expresses the innate desire to preserve the human genetic pool through the natural mechanism of reproduction is
exterminated. potentially at risk. And whereas death by plague was a merciful five days of agony, HIV is not satisfied until years of stigma and excruciating torture have been wrought on its victim. The plague toll of tens of millions in two decades was a veritable holocaust, but it will be nothing compared to the viral holocaust: So far, 18.8 million people are already dead; 43.3 million infected worldwide (24.5 million of them Africans) carry the seeds of their inevitable demise - unwilling participants in a March of the Damned. Last year alone, 2.8 million lives went down the drain, 85 per cent of them African; as a matter of fact, 6,000 Africans will die today. The daily toll in Kenya is 500. There has never been fought a war on these shores that was so wanton in its thirst for human blood. During the First World War, more than a million lives were lost at the Battle of the Somme alone, setting a trend that was to become fairly common, in which generals would use soldiers as cannon fodder; the lives of 10 million young men were sacrificed for a cause that was judged to be more worthwhile than the dreams - even
. Aids, on the other a holocaust without even a lame or bigoted justification. It is simply a waste. It is death contracted not in the battlefield but in bedrooms and other venues of furtive intimacy. It is difficult to remember any time in history when the survival of the human race was so hopelessly in jeopardy. From the 35,000 Aids orphans of Homa Bay to the
the mere living out of a lifetime - of a generation. But there was proffered an explanation: It was the honour of bathing a battlefield with young blood, patriotism or simply racial pride
hand, is
abandoned infants of Nyumbani Children's Home, the Aids calamity is a cloud whose silver lining, if it exists, is well concealed.
Terrorism leads to extinction retaliation Speice 6

Speice, Patrick F., Jr. "Negligence and nuclear nonproliferation: eliminating the current liability barrier to bilateral U.S.-Russian nonproliferation assistance programs." William and Mary Law Review 47.4 (Feb 2006): 1427(59). Expanded Academic ASAP. The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. (49) Moreover, there
would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. (50) In addition to the threat posed by
terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. (51) This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, (52) as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. (53)
Leads to nuclear strikes Easterbrook 1

Greg, Senior Editor of the New Republic, America's New War: Nuclear Threats, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html
Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries.
Perm Do Both Cooperative Federalism

Permutation: Have the federal government fund the plan, but leave enforcement and use of funding up to the states. Doesnt sever because enforcement isnt in the plan we only specify the provision of social services. The permutation encourages cooperative federalism solves the race to the bottom Dibadj 5
Reza Dibadj, Associate Professor of Law, 2005, DELAYERING CORPORATE LAW, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 469, pg. np
Under the cooperative federalism model, certain choices are removed from the state level to ensure that the state does not compromise - for whatever reason - on issues of national importance. Thus cooperative federalism schemes define the terms of competition between the states so that they do not deviate from basic federal policy goals, underinvest in goods and services that would benefit neighboring states, or engage in a "race to the bottom." Cooperative federalism has been used in a variety of regulatory contexts: environmental law, telecommunications, and social services , to name a few. In their usual incarnation, cooperative federalism programs "set forth some uniform federal standards - as embodied in the statute, federal agency regulations, or both - but leave state agencies with discretion to implement the federal law, supplement it with more stringent standards, and, in some cases, receive an exemption from federal requirements.
Cooperative federalism in the United States prevents Russian wildfires solves warming Wilkinson 5
J Wilkson, Research Professor at Notre Dame, 2005, COMMENT: UP IN SMOKE: USING COOPERATIVE U.S. FOREST FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICIES AS A MODEL FOR IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE FOREST FIRE PREVENTION PROGRAM IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST, 14 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y 575, Pacific Rim, pg. np
Massive widespread wildfires threaten the unique boreal environment of the RFE, contribute to global warming, and have the potential to turn the region from a carbon sink into a carbon source. The vast majority of these fires are preventable, human-caused events. Although the Russian Constitution provides for joint federal/regional government jurisdiction over natural resource management and environmental protection, Russia's fire management policies fail to lay out a comprehensive, coordinated prevention strategy that could mitigate this crisis. The United States, similarly afflicted by severe fire seasons in recent years, has implemented a cooperative program that could serve as a model for Russian fire management policies. U.S. laws, which authorize cooperative intergovernmental and interagency forest fire management, provide solid hope for reducing fire danger in the future. Given Russia's federal system of government and the UNFF cooperative forestry guidelines which Russia has pledged to implement, a similar cooperative fire prevention approach should be adopted in Russia.
Warming leads to extinction Henderson 5

Hill. 3/16/5. http://www.countercurrents.org/cc-henderson160305.htm. But these
immediate effects of global warming pale before the possibility of runaway global warming where warming due to our greenhouse gas emissions causes greatly increased greenhouse gas production from normal terrestrial sources the release of CO2 stored in tundra, for example - creating positive feedback loops which overwhelm regular biosphere regulation and lead to temperatures possibly hundreds of degrees warmer then present. Runaway global warming that could lead to an atmosphere like Venus. In September 2000, world-renowned physicist Stephen Hawking was widely quoted in the press as being very worried about runaway global warming: "I am afraid the atmosphere might get hotter and hotter until it will be like Venus with boiling sulfuric acid," said Hawking. "I am worried about the greenhouse effect." If we go over this cliff no more humanity; the extinction of almost every existing species except some bacteria; the end of life on Earth as we know it.
Cooperative Federalism Extensions

Russian forest fires and illegal logging cause economic instability Wilkinson 5
J Wilkson, Research Professor at Notre Dame, 2005, COMMENT: UP IN SMOKE: USING COOPERATIVE U.S. FOREST FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICIES AS A MODEL FOR IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE FOREST FIRE PREVENTION PROGRAM IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST, 14 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y 575, Pacific Rim, pg. np
The RFE encompasses a vast geographic area between Siberia and the shores of the North Pacific. This region comprises thirty-six percent of Russia's landmass, totaling more than 6215.9 million square kilometers, containing twenty percent of the world's forested areas, and fifty percent of its coniferous forest stock. The RFE's rich reserves of timber are extremely important both to Russia and the world's economic, ecological, and environmental well being. For instance, the forests of the RFE act as a massive global carbon sink potentially mitigating global warming - and provide habitat to a large variety of animals, including the critically endangered Siberian tiger and Far Eastern leopard. The RFE has long been considered critical to the Soviet and Russian economies, providing timber and natural resources to the industries located in the West.
This trend is expected to continue, as evidenced by the high priority placed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on paving the trans Siberian highway in order to increase the accessibility of these resources. Russia is also making serious efforts to solicit new bids to exploit the RFE's economic potential as a source of raw timber.
Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war David 99

Steven R., professor of political science @ the john Hopkins U, Foreign Affairs, January/February, LN. AT NO TIME since the civil war of 1918 -- 20 has Russia been closer to
bloody conflict than it is today. The fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. For 70 years, the Soviet Union operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the KGB and the
Communist Party. Now its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Unable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. But the Yeltsin administration has abjectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups -- the Russian Mafia -- increasingly hold sway. Expectations raised by the
If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely
collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and Moscow's inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the
Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the
country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.
environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another
horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a
clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken,
making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.
Links to Politics
The public cant differentiate who gets blame and credit the solvency for the counterplan would implicate the president
***Aff Answers to Lopez*** AT: Lopez Counterplan Rolled Back

Congress can override the Courts devolution Goldsmith 97
Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln Nonetheless, these concerns need not affect the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations. Although federal courts might be generally unsuited to make federal foreign relations law on both legitimacy and competence grounds, the adverse consequences of stateby-state regulation in the face of federal political branch silence might be worse. States suffer from many of the same disabilities as federal courts in this context. Moreover, federal courts, in contrast to the states, have independence from local political processes and, as a branch of the national government, are likely to be more sensitive to national foreign relations interests. Even in the absence of strategic behavior by the states, one might think that, all things being equal, suboptimal but uniform federal judge-made regulation of foreign relations is preferable to the nonuniformity inherent in state-by-state regulation of a foreign relations issue. 213 Finally, the federal common
law of foreign relations is designed to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign relations that the political branches themselves are structurally unsuited to protect. Any remaining concerns about the legitimacy or competence of the federal common law of foreign relations are thus mitigated by the political branches' ability to override judicial errors in the development of such law.
Congress will roll back contravening judicial decisions Calabresi 95

Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers, Michigan Law Review December, 1995 Moreover, even when the Court is determined to resist the policy objectives of a lawmaking majority, Dahl demonstrates that "Congress
and the president do generally succeed in overcoming a hostile Court on major policy issues." 193 Dahl shows that when the Court strikes down a major national policy initiative, Congress and the President typically repass the law in defiance of the Court. These arguments, confirmed in recent scholarship, 194 constitute an important rebuttal to those who profess fear that national judicial activism someday might lead to a dangerous weakening of the constitutional powers of the national government.
Most Lopez rulings are overturned Journal of Criminal Law 3

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Fall 2003, p. 770 Unfortunately for the judiciary, despite Lopez and
its progeny, the drive to federalize crimes continues. And though Lopez has been used to challenge many of these federal criminal laws, "to date, [Lopez] has been of assistance to few defendants." In fact, as of the summer of 1998, of the 400 Lopez challenges made to federal statutes, only three had been upheld.
The President can quickly roll back the counterplan Goldsmith 97

Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln Much more significant than the President's constitutionally derived powers are the broad and numerous foreign relations lawmaking powers delegated to the executive by Congress. 275 Congress has delegated these powers
the President has access to superior expertise and because structural advantages allow the President to take quick and decisive action. The broadest such delegation is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"). 276
to the executive precisely because Presidential lawmaking power under IEEPA is triggered by "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
IEEPA enables the President to respond quickly to suspend or invalidate state law whose application would interfere with or impede the federal government's conduct of foreign relations. The best known example is President Carter's invocation of IEEPA to lift state-law judicial attachments on Iranian assets and suspend private (largely state-law governed) claims against Iran as part of
economy of the United States." 277 the deal to secure the release of the hostages in Iran. 278
AT: Lopez Counterplan Rolled Back

Executive can rollback Lopez decisions Goldsmith 97
Jack Goldsmith, Prof @ Chicago, November 1997, Virg. L. Rev., ln The executive branch has special monitoring capabilities and preemptive
lawmaking powers when foreign relations is at issue. As for monitoring, it is inconceivable that the executive branch will be unaware of a state's action that adversely affects U.S. foreign relations or unduly burdens the federal government's ability to conduct
foreign relations. The President is the primary agent of U.S. foreign relations and the primary organ of communication with foreign governments. 266 And the executive branch receives all foreign government complaints about state activity. When the executive branch identifies harmful state foreign relations activity, it is much better positioned than Congress to address it. Foreign relations is (and is perceived to be) the President's responsibility. He is thus more accountable for foreign relations problems than Congress, and has a greater interest in redressing state-created foreign relations difficulties. The President also has a massive executive branch
bureaucracy at his disposal to monitor and redress such difficulties. Importantly, the executive branch's ability to
respond to these difficulties is not burdened by collective action problems to nearly the same degree as Congress. 267 In addition, the President's unique role in foreign relations enables him to redress unacceptable state foreign relations activity in a variety of ways. First, he exercises special influence on the congressional foreign relations agenda and the content of foreign relations legislation. 268 Second, he or one of his subordi- [*1685] nates can communicate directly with states on behalf of the federal government in order to influence or alter the offensive state activity. 269 Sometimes this communication is nothing more than an informal telephone call to the proper state or local official. Other times the State Department will send a formal letter to the state urging it to cease its offensive behavior. And sometimes the executive branch will file an amicus brief in state court. 270 These means of "informal" presidential control are often employed and often, though not always, successful in changing the offending state behavior. 271 Third, the President has limited but important federal
lawmaking powers that enable him, on his own, to preempt state law that adversely affects the nation's foreign relations or the political branches' ability to conduct such relations. Some of these powers derive directly from the
Constitution itself. For example, incident to his power to recognize foreign governments, 272 the President can enter into international agreements that preempt state law. The most famous instance is the Litvinov Agreement, which officially recognized the Soviet Union and assigned all Soviet property in the United States to the federal government. This "executive agreement" preempted inconsis- [*1686] tent state property and creditor law. 273 It also ended state court uncertainty about the domestic effect of the Soviet Union's extraterritorial confiscations. 274
Congress will overrule contentious Supreme Court decisions- trends are on our side Schor 7
Elana, June 27, 2007, Legislators consider fixes to Supreme Court rulings, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/legislators-consider-fixes-to-supreme-court-rulings-2007-06-27.html
lawmakers are mulling the future of a thriving breed of bill: the high court fix. Members of both parties are pressing or planning at least six bills to clarify recent Supreme Court rulings, signaling what may become a new era of congressional sensitivity to court decisions that can be remedied with legislation. What the courts saying to us is, you have to write down every single little thing you want done, Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) said. Congress should not have to step in often to address the courts interpretation of statutes, he added, but Im afraid we may be moving in that direction. Harkin is spearheading measures to counter two of this terms most contentious rulings,
As the Supreme Courts term winds to a close this week,
one that limited workers window to sue for pay discrimination and another that exempted home healthcare aides from minimum-wage rules. The House bill to mend the former decision, Ledbetter v. Goodyear, will be marked up today by Education and Labor Committee Chairman George Miller (D-Calif.). Lawmakers have written bills responding to the Supreme Court for
the rare confluence of a high court drifting to the right and a Congress under Democratic control gives extra urgency to the current crop of legislation. I think we have to be
decades, and the high number of recent offerings is hardly a new phenomenon. But
responsive to Supreme Court rulings, as precise as possible in our language, and from the Democratic perspective, expect the worst, Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), a senior Judiciary Committee member, said. Much of the heightened concern among Democrats centers on Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, two Bush appointees who sparked partisan wrangling during tense confirmation hearings last session. Now that a series of narrowly divided rulings has alarmed Democrats by curtailing free speech and workers rights, the new majority is striking a Cassandra-like note of warning. Its clear where the majority of the court is going, and its going far right, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), also on Judiciary, said. That was our greatest fear. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee Chairman Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) echoed that sentiment in a statement: When they were nominated, John Roberts and Samuel Alito insisted they would be neutral umpires. Now that they are on the Supreme Court, every big call seems to go in favor of corporate and government power, and against ordinary citizens. Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) noted several spheres in which the court has taken a conservative approach, remarking, Were going to have to come back to legislate and look in each of these areas. It certainly sends a profound message about the long-term impact of judicial appointments. In addition to the bills remedying the Ledbetter case and the home healthcare aides case, Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, Miller aims to move a bill that would clarify the government definition of supervisor after a 2001 Supreme Court ruling allowed the Bush administration to exempt several classes of workers from overtime-pay rules. Any time the court issues a ruling that serves an ideological agenda instead of interpreting the law in a way that reflects workplace realities and congressional intent, we will work to rectify those misguided rulings, said Aaron Albright, a spokesman for Millers panel. Responding to this years decision upholding the ban on certain late-term abortions, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) is leading the push
The number of bills answering the Supreme Court will increase, no doubt, because as the Alito-Roberts court issues more and more decisions there are a variety of areas where they may take a stand thats far over on the ideological spectrum, said Caroline Fredrickson, Washington director for the American Civil
to carve out a permanent abortion right for mothers whose life or health is jeopardized. And Kennedy is working on a bill that would address several recent civil-rights rulings.
Liberties Union.
AT: Lopez Counterplan Doesnt Solve Federalism

Extending Lopez has no external benefit for federalism Mouton 99
H. Geoffrey Mouton, Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, 1999, Minnesota Law Review, Spring March/April, pg. np
Despite the Court's apparent nostalgia for a dramatically smaller national government, no judicially enforced federalism doctrine is going to undo the last quarter of the nation's history. And while cases like New York, Lopez, and Printz may on occasion stimulate important debate, such as the examination of federal criminal law that has followed Lopez, they will never have more than the most marginal relevance to the allocation decisions that matter most. Those who truly believe in the instrumental values of federalism should therefore focus not on persuading courts to undo congressional "mistakes," but rather on promoting wise institutional choice in the political process.
Terrorism DA 2ac
Extending Lopez prevent the government from effectively fighting the War on Terrorism Ledewitz 5
Bruce Ledewitz, Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law, 2005, Duquesne Summer University Law Review, pg. np
In terms of foreign-based terrorism, it is generally conceded that national governments must control national borders, so in that context the issue of federalism does not arise. But in terms of terrorism occurring internally from whatever source, whether domestic or foreign, the situation is quite otherwise. It has been argued vigorously in the United States, for example, that, aside from taxing and spending powers, the central government lacks a regulatory police power. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently held, in cases acknowledged as reinvigorating federalism, that Congress may not regulate weapons in schools or violence against women and has also intimated that Congress may not regulate the crime of ordinary arson. If these holdings were taken seriously, and their consistent application is in doubt, they might cripple central government efforts to combat terrorism occurring within the United States. For example, terrorists in other countries have already used violence against women to
accomplish their political and religious goals. Were this to occur in the United States, the Morrison case would simply have to be overruled, either expressly or impliedly, in order for Congress to respond effectively. But, to acknowledge the incapacity
of the states to fight terrorism without central government leadership and control is to acknowledge that there really is, and must be, a central government police power. Yet, the acceptance of such a national police power would be taken among many in the United States to be a direct contradiction of federalism.
ESA DA 2ac
A. Striking down congressional power to legislate over issues with substantial economic effect would require overturning all of Congresss powers under the Commerce Clause Moyers 98
Peter Moyers, Princeton, Spring 1998, Drug Legalization, Princeton U.L.J., v. 11, iss. 2, www.princeton.edu/~lawjourn/Spring 98/ Wickard v Filburn (1942) affirmed the decision in NLRB and granted additional power. The respondent in the case was found guilty of violating a law prohibiting the production of more than 11.1 acres of wheat. Even though he did not sell his extra wheat, the Court found that the respondent along with others could possibly substantially affect the wheat market were they all to violate the quota. Although Filburns acts did not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce, many "Filburns" could do so. The risk of substantial effect was enough for congressional regulation. Therefore, Congress interest in stabilizing prices on the wheat market required farmers not to exceed the quota, even if the surplus was not used for commercial purposes. This decision granted Congress the power to
regulate non-commercial, local activity if it presents the risk of "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." These
cases bring us to the most recent decision of U.S. v Lopez (1995). In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist notes that three categories of activity may be regulated by Congress under the power of the Commerce Clause. First, the channels of interstate commerce are open to congressional regulation. Second, Congress may regulate the persons or things, the instrumentalities, of interstate commerce. Third, an activity may be regulated if it has a substantial relation to interstate commerce, or more specifically, substantially affect interstate commerce. In Lopez, the government argued under the third category, attempting to show that the presence of firearms on school grounds has substantial relation to interstate commerce. The Court found the argument to lack force, asserting that the definition of substantial relation or effect the government was putting forth would transform Commerce Clause power into "a general police power of the sort retained by the States." This decision does not categorically reject the federalization of police powers but rather affirms the doctrine of substantial relation or effect. The Court was unwilling to build "inference upon inference" to see a substantial economic effect; the presence of firearms on school grounds was found to be too far removed from interstate commerce to come under the third category. The Court would be faced with a similar case in the congressional policy of outlawing the use, sale and possession of drugs. In order for the congressional policy to prevail, it must show that the possession and use of drugs, sanctioned by the state policy, substantially affect interstate commerce. However, in order to be consistent with Lopez and Wickard, whose doctrine of
substantial risk of effect has never been overturned, and in the absence of empirical evidence, the Court must recognize that even the risk of an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce is sufficient for legitimate congressional regulation. I find the activities sanctioned by the state policy to be of sufficient risk of
substantially affecting interstate commerce to find the congressional policy a constitutional regulation denying the practice of the activities sanctioned by the initiative. ***Continues*** The state policy demonstrates the risks involved in allowing states, in the case of drug policy, to pursue different policies. As I argue above, the legalization of drugs within one state almost certainly will substantially burden the effective pursuit of drug use and possession prevention in other states. A neighboring state would have to create nearly impervious borders in order to remain faithful to its anti-drug policy; one wonders if the free flow of people to and from the state, let alone commerce, would remain a possibility. By upholding the constitutionality of the congressional policy, the Court would recognize and condemn the substantial burden a state pursuing an independent drug policy places on neighboring states. Admittedly, to the casual observer, the Courts decision would appear to be a significant usurpation of states police powers and a step toward a unitary system. I agree that the Court ought to be wary of assaults on federalism. The decision should not be looked upon by future Courts as a precedent for allowing the nationalization of police powers, but rather as an affirmation of Congress power to regulate any activities, including crimes, that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In this case, the state policy creates a risk of substantially affecting interstate commerce. To deny Congress power in this case would
be to overturn nearly all Commerce Clause precedents as well as Marigold. And to overturn Marigold would be to all but eliminate any non-enumerated means Congress requires to pursue its powers and duties. Although to find for the federal government might blur the line of federalism, to find for the state would strip Congress of its power, granted in Marigold, to act beyond its enumerated means to pursue its enumerated duties. The latter I do not think our system can tolerate.
ESA DA 2ac
B. That would require striking down the ESA its based on the commerce clause Lee 6
Mollie Lee, 11-1-2006, Yale L. J., Environmental economics, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6199333/Environmental-economics-amarket-failure.html When Congress enacted the ESA, it did so with very little debate and with overwhelming public support. (11) The environmental movement was at its peak, (12) and a nation of newfound environmentalists was eager to respond to well-publicized stories about threats to the bald eagle, blue whale, polar bear, and other "charismatic fauna." (13) Endangered species already received some protection from statutes enacted in the prior decade, (14) but these statutes were limited in scope, and it soon became apparent that they were inadequate to prevent further extinctions. (15) Thus, in 1973 Congress adopted the ESA as a comprehensive approach to protecting threatened and endangered species throughout the nation. Congress relied chiefly on its Commerce Clause powers
in passing the statute, (16) but the legislative history contains no explicit discussion of this constitutional authority. However, congressional findings and testimony suggest that Congress understood species extinctions as a problem with both commercial causes (17) and commercial consequences. (18) The causal link between commercial activity and species extinction is particularly prominent in the legislative findings for the statute. There, Congress noted that "various species offish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered
extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation." (19) While this finding suggests that Congress understood economic activity to be a primary cause of species extinction, Congress did not choose to protect endangered species by directly regulating economic activity. Instead, the ESA prohibited any activity that would jeopardize the continued survival of threatened and endangered species.
C. The ESA is critical to prevent species extinctions UCS 6

Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/restoring/science-in-the-endangered.html Biological diversity provides food, fiber, medicines, clean water, and many other products and services we depend upon every day. Yet nearly one-third of native species in the United States are at risk of disappearing. "As children, small creatures endlessly fascinate us; as adults, we can protect them so as to inspire future children." - Les E. Watling, Marine Ecologist It is clear that the ESA has given new hope for sustained survival to numerous species that were
on the brink of extinctionless than one percent of species listed under the ESA have gone extinct since 1973, while 10 percent of candidate species still waiting to be listed have suffered that fate. In addition to the hundreds of species that the Act has protected from extinction, listing has contributed to population increases or the stabilization of population declines for more than 30 percent of listed species, as well as the recovery of such signature species as the peregrine falcon.
D. That causes extinction Warner 94

Paul Warner, American University, Dept of International Politics and Foreign Policy, August, Politics and Life Sciences, 1994, p 177 Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which species are expendable to the system as a whole. As Philip Hoose remarks, "Plants and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure which
species holds up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary ecosystem. And, because removing species is an irreversible act, it may be too late to save the system after the extinction of key plants or
animals. According to the U.S. National Research Council, "The ramifications of an ecological change of this magnitude [vast extinction of species] are so far reaching that no one on earth will escape them." Trifling with the "lives" of species is like playing
Russian roulette, with our collective future as the stakes.
ESA DA Link Extension

The ESA is based on the Commerce Clause the CP would open the door to striking it down Lee 6
Mollie Lee, 11-1-2006, Yale L. J., Environmental economics, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6199333/Environmental-economics-amarket-failure.html When Congress passed the United States' major environmental statutes in the 1970s and early 1980s, (1) it
acted under its constitutional authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." (2) At the time, courts and Congress shared an expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause. (3) The idea that there were limits on Congress's Commerce Clause authority was an "intellectual joke," (4) and
the standard law school treatment of Commerce Clause powers boiled down to the explanation that "Congress can do whatever it wants." (5) However, congressional authority to enact environmental legislation has been called into question
by recent Supreme Court cases suggesting that Commerce Clause regulation is valid only if Congress is regulating "economic activity." (6) While lower courts applying this new doctrine have held that environmental regulation is
valid Commerce Clause regulation, they have had difficulty explaining why. In particular, they have struggled to identify the economic activity regulated by certain environmental statutes. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is especially vulnerable under the
Court's new Commerce Clause analysis. Many environmental statutes may be upheld because they directly regulate
industrial activity, which courts regard as sufficiently "economic" for Commerce Clause purposes. (7) This logic is more difficult to apply to the ESA, however, because the statute seeks to protect threatened and endangered species by prohibiting any actions that harm designated species, rather than by regulating specific types of commercial activity. For decades, the wide reach and strict prohibitions of the ESA have generated resistance, (8) and the Court's new Commerce Clause doctrine has created an opening
for a wave of legal challenges to the statute. In response to the Court's renewed attention to the economic nature of
Commerce Clause legislation, opponents of the ESA have challenged applications of the statute that have only a questionable link to economic activity.
ESA DA MPX Extension

ESA is key to check global species extinction and the economy, and doesnt stop development Perciasepe 3
Robert Perciasepe, chief operating office of Audubon, SF Chronicale, 12-23-2003, The ESA at 30, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi? file=/chronicle/archive/2003/12/23/EDGJ33S6TO1.DTL Americans recognized the danger to their natural heritage and collaborated across party lines to find a solution. The Endangered Species
Act slowed and halted a seemingly inexorable slide toward extinction for too many of America's wild birds and animals. Signed on Dec. 28, 1973, by President Richard Nixon, the act is a model worldwide for protecting wildlife and habitats. The ESA's effectiveness is obvious today. California species such as the brown pelican, peregrine falcon and gray
whale are again abundant enough to have been removed from the endangered list. The state's sea otters and condors would simply not be here without this landmark bill. The bald eagle is among the act's most dramatic success stories. Down to only a few hundred breeding pairs by 1973, this bird has bounced back thanks to ESA-mandated programs, bringing the number of nesting pairs into the thousands. Now, American schoolchildren once again have a chance to see this most majestic of our birds flying over their communities. No myth, no symbol on a flag or seal, but a living, breathing embodiment of our national spirit. It is something to be proud of for many reasons, not the least of which is a lesson in the potential of American lawmaking. Though effective, the ESA is not without detractors. Critics want it gutted, claiming it protects "unimportant" species and halts development. In fact, the
act allows almost any development to go forward, as long as provision is made to protect imperiled species it affects. The law sets the bar high when a developer or polluter wants to remove the last of a species from the planet forever, and it should. Despite critics' arguments, the act actually pushes both the national and California economies forward. U.S. consumers spent nearly $39 billion on wildlife watching in 2001. That year, $2.6 billion was added to
California's economy by wildlife watchers, many of whom took trips to see gray whales, condors, sea otters and other animals that can be viewed nowhere else in the country. That they can be seen at all is to the act's credit. When naysayers make claims for weakening the law, they also reveal indifference to what we nearly lost forever -- and what is still at risk. Since
the inception of the act, human impacts on wilderness have snowballed. Bird populations such as the cerulean warbler (a species we believe should be listed as endangered) have declined by as
much as 75 percent since 1973. Sprawl increases daily, wetlands disappear and special interests seek to undermine environmental protection to increase their short-term profits. The ESA needs to be in place to act as a balance. Perhaps the best example
of why is found in two species that haven't recovered. The act was needed, but came too late, for the dusky seaside sparrow, a small bird found in the Cape Canaveral area. Its habitat was destroyed by unchecked coastal development in the 1960s; the last bird died in captivity in 1987. But the California condor may yet be saved. Captive breeding, field studies and identification and removal of toxic threats, along with the reintroduction of individual condors to Central and Southern California -- all mandated by the ESA -- are taking place to resurrect this bird. It's a victory in progress: Nearly 50 of these imposing and stately creatures are back where they belong, when only a decade ago, this bird was officially extinct in the wild. This is owing completely to the ESA. Why we would weaken a demonstrable success that has only positive benefits to wildlife and to the economy -- and to the health of us all - is something the act's enemies have a hard time defending convincingly. Earlier this month, a celebration played out on Capitol Hill in Washington. Lawmakers, conservationists and even wildlife came together to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Endangered Species Act. They celebrated because it is a
the act is needed now more than ever. They celebrated because, when supported, the act does what it was designed to do: save species from extinction. Significantly, the wildlife representing proof of the
success. They celebrated because
act's effectiveness was a bald eagle -- there thanks to the ESA.
ESA is key to economy empirical studies prove Scopp 5

David, Editor-in-Chief, U.S.F. Law Review, Volume 40, University of San Francisco of Law Review, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 789, Spring As Congress comprehended, preserving biodiversity positively impacts interstate commerce by providing
valuable resources, as well as by contributing to the availability of ecosystem services. A rich variety of genes, species, and biological communities provide our economy with food, wood, fibers, energy, raw material, industrial chemicals, and medicines. 201 For example, a species' genetic information not only allows it to adapt to changing environmental conditions but is also used in genetic engineering to produce new types of crops, foods, and pharmaceuticals. 202 These contributions funnel billions of dollars into the world economy each year. 203 Furthermore, eco-tourism generates at least $ 500 billion per year worldwide. 204 Empirical evidence supports these contentions and shows that the ESA actually affects the national economy. In fact, an empirical study performed by a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology indicates that the listing of a species under the ESA may have a positive impact on the agricultural sector's performance. 205 Furthermore, another empirical study
indicates that the critical habitat designation under the ESA may enhance recreational activities and economic development in other areas through the reallocation of water resources. 206
Unpredictability DA 2ac
The CP would be send a massive signal of unpredictability and confusion from the court Ford 5
Matthew Ford, Law Student at St John's University School of Law in New York. 9/15/05. John Roberts, Stare Decisis, and the Return of Lochner: An Impetus to Jump-Start the Labor Movement. Mr. Zine Magazine, A Project of the Monthly Review. http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/ford180905.html Our common law system is based largely on the idea of "stare decisis," the idea that the rulings of judges are generally binding. Such a system
is designed to create continuity so as to send a signal to society about what sort of behavior society will or will not tolerate, to avoid confusion certain to arise if laws are constantly changing, and to diminish the likelihood of agitating society as a whole or creating a backlash by overturning laws that are widely valued. However, as Judge Roberts put
it, "[S]tare decisis is not an inexorable command" ("Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings," 13 September 2004). The Supreme Court can overturn precedent when it sees fit, or, in the words of Roberts, "You have to consider whether [precedent has] created settled expectations that should not be disrupted in the interest of regularity in the legal system" ("Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings," 13 September 2004). If Roberts sticks to his word, large, well-organized, militant groups such as the Women's Rights Movement should find comfort in the fact that Roberts Wade would likely lead
has implicitly acknowledged that the overturning of such a key precedent as Roe v. to large-scale upheaval by the well-organized feminist movement that would shake society so forcefully that to even fathom overturning the ruling is to start trouble.
Legal certainty is key to the economy Roller 5

Lars-Hendrik Rller, European policy perspectives, 2005, Economic Analysis and Competition Policy Enforcement in Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2005_011_en.pdf The second challenge to economics and economists in competition policy is legal certainty. Predictability and legal certainty are important aspects of competition policy law. There is real economic value to transparency and predictable procedures.
Running a successful businesses is all about the ability to be forward looking. Management decisions about technology, markets, competitors are complex and determine the success or failure of companies. Increased regulatory uncertainty raises costs, threatens survival and potentially reduces economic growth. More generally,
clarity and credibility are likely to increase the effectiveness of a policy. The effectiveness of an antitrust agency is not solely determined by the decisions that it takes. To a large extent, the impact of an antitrust agency can be attributed to the decisions that it does not have to take. Indeed, if competition rules were well understood, and the consequences of breaking these rules are reasonably unattractive, less antitrust action would indeed be needed. In this sense, the credibility of the antitrust agency is a significant determinant of its effectiveness.
The challenge to economics is to ensure that economic analysis does not come at the expense of legal certainty and predictability. As John Vickers recently pointed out,24 legal certainty and economic principles are not
substitutes but complements. In other words, given the current state of affairs, we can get more of both, in particular in the context of guidelines. By enhancing predictability and legal certainty guidelines contribute towards the effectiveness
of competition policy.
Unpredictability DA 2ac
Nuclear war Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8
Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Gabriel, Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, The Dangers of a Diminished America, WSJ, 10/21, Proquest
Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable
swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous
consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by
foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks
buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has
China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on
demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external
Unpredictability DA Link Extension

Roberts has been clear that he wont do anything crazy plan makes him look inconsistent and unable to maintain legal stability and predictability Gerhardt 6
Michael J. Gerhardt, Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. Minnesota Law Review, May, 2006. 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1204. THE FUTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT: INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND BEYOND: Essay: Super Precedent. Chief Justice Roberts was a model for avoiding pitfalls in the confirmation process. It is possible he may have been too good a model. He constantly espoused respect for precedent throughout his hearings. He may or may not have been a firebrand when he worked in the Office of the Attorney General, the White House, or in Office of the Solicitor General, but he was not a firebrand when he appeared in front of the Senate [*1228] Judiciary Committee. He no doubt understands that President Bush would love to see him not only vote as Chief Justice Rehnquist did but also move the Court further to the right. Yet, John Roberts the nominee accepted some judicial decisions inconsistent with that political agenda, including those recognizing a marital right of privacy, 98 the framework for analyzing separation of powers conflicts, 99 the constitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 100 and heightened scrutiny for gender classifications. 101 Roberts even acknowledged Roe as "settled law," and recognized that overruling a precedent
would be "a jolt to the legal system." 102 One has to assume that some overrulings would produce more of a "jolt" to the system than others, and some might fatally electrocute the system. While Chief Justice Roberts suggested it was not unthinkable for the Supreme Court to overrule settled law, he made abundantly clear that his philosophy of judicial modesty is grounded, at least in part, on respect for what came before. Roberts acknowledged that predictability, stability, consistency, and reliance are values to be taken into account in constitutional adjudication, and it
would seem to follow that these values ought to count in most cases. 103 It further follows that there may be at least some instances in which the values promoted by fidelity to precedent become compelling. A Court that overrules too many precedents not only sets
a bad example for the Courts that follow (because it provides no incentive to respect the work of its predecessors), but also signals permission for other branches to view its decisions with the same lack of respect with which it views them. A healthy respect for precedent means learning to live with decisions with which you
disagree. When Roberts went further to describe himself as a "bottom-up" kind of judge, 104 he signaled that his inclination is to decide cases incrementally and to infer principles from the records of the cases below. A bottom-up judge is willing to learn from experience, which necessarily means that a good deal of our experience has to be left in tact.
Even if there has been unpredictability in the past, the counterplan has a higher magnitude its too soon after a new justice to have a drastic shift in federalims policy Padden 94
Amy, JD, NOTE: Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee., 82 Geo. L.J. 1689
Even though recent cases are not immune to being overruled, the change of one Justice's vote in a short period of time is not in itself sufficient reason to abandon a precedent. 199 Although the public may realize that overrulings rarely occur without changes in the Court's personnel, 200 the public is also familiar with the doctrine of stare decisis and views it as one of the mechanisms for preventing the Court from becoming a political branch of the government. 201 Therefore, a reversal fueled by a mere change in the Court's personnel is particularly damaging to the Court's image as a neutral decisionmaker. Overruling recent cases merely because they are recent is supported by no reasoned rationale. If it is merely due to the fact that the Court's personnel has changed, then the image of legal decisions as the product of reasoned elaboration fails. Because it is a Constitution that the Court is expounding, 202 a mere change in the expounders should not lead to rapid fluctuations in interpretations.
Unpredictability DA Link Extension

Legal uncertainty kills business confidence Healy 1
Thomas Healy, Associate, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Washington D.C. Former Law Clerk to Judge Michael Hawkins on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. West Virgina Law Review, Fall, 2001. 104 W. Va L. Rev. 43. STARE DECISIS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT. The most frequent claim made on behalf of stare decisis is that it fosters certainty in the law. 498 By agreeing to follow established rules, the courts enable individuals to predict the legal consequences of their actions. 499 A person who writes a will according to accepted procedures can be confident that the courts will enforce that will after his or her death. Likewise, a corporation developing a new product can anticipate its liability for potential defects. This certainty is desirable in its own right: it satisfies a basic human need for security and stability. 500 Certainty also has instrumental worth. When
individuals and businesses are able to predict the are more likely to engage in the kinds of activities that lead to a prosperous and productive society. By contrast, if courts routinely change legal rules, people will hesitate to risk their time and money in pursuit of goals that might ultimately be thwarted.
circumstances under which courts will enforce contracts, impose tort liability, or extend the protection of bankruptcy laws, they
Businesses are watching Roberts closely predictability is key FT 6

Financial Times (London, England), June 29, 2006. The Supreme Court has been bad for business. It is not that business wants every decision to go its way: many did this term, including an important ruling limiting securities class action lawsuits. The most important thing for corporate America is to know what the rules are: certainty -
even the certainty of a loss - reduces litigation. Chief Justice Roberts has spoken of the need for judicial modesty: he thinks courts should not decide more than is necessary, and he is right. But what they do decide,
they should do so clearly, if at all possible - or they risk deciding nothing at all. The court has plenty of time to rectify this situation in the term that begins in October: the justices have already agreed to hear critically important cases in the area of punitive damages, antitrust, patents and environmental regulation. As Miguel Estrada, a former Clinton administration lawyer, says, this Supreme Court seems
willing to give the business community a hearing, but it is not clear yet whether they will also give business a break - or even more importantly, some answers to its questions.
Even single decisions send an important signal to a close-watching public Calabresi 1

Steven, Professor of Law at Northwestern, Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science, March
the little that the Court does in cases like Lopez is better than no federalism enforcement at all. When the Supreme Court decides a big federalism case like Lopez, it does a lot more than simply resolve the immediate case and issue at hand. In some fundamental sense, it sets up a symbol for the American people of the importance that is attached to a constitutional value or norm. Symbolism is terribly important in constitutions and in constitutional case law. Symbols help citizens organize their beliefs, reinforce core values, and provide a rallying point for those who believe in them, thus reducing the costs of organization. When powerful symbols issue from the Supreme Court of the United States, those symbols help to set the national agenda, and they affect the flow of our politics. Lopez, for example, caused devolution and federalism concerns to become more prominent in Congress than they otherwise might have been.
I think it is reasonable to fear that the Court will do too little in enforcing federalism boundary lines because the Court is a nationalist umpire for national-state disputes. Nevertheless, I still think that
This may well have played into the last Congress's decision to devolve part of the federal welfare entitlement to the states. The public has always understood that symbolism is terribly important in law, a point that elites often have trouble remembering. It is for this reason that the public has never shared the hostility of intellectuals from John Stuart Mill down to most present-day social scientists to laws creating so-called victimless crimes. Underenforced, but symbolic, laws against drug use, like underenforced, but symbolic, federalism cases, serve
important social purposes. They teach the public about the proper hierarchy of norms and values, and in legislative bodies they help to set the agenda for policymaking debates.

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JDI 1 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

JDI 3 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

States Counterplan 1nc

JDI 4 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

States Counterplan 1nc

Public and political pressure means enforcement is guaranteed Volden 97

JDI 5 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Theoretical Defense of the States Counterplan

JDI 6 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

There are several examples of all 50 states acting in unison Panko 3

Uniform compacts are common occurrences Zimmerman 92

JDI 7 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

JDI 8 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Social Services

JDI 9 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Social Services

State governments are more accountable than federal ones Calabresi 95

JDI 10 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Social Services

States are comparatively more effective at administering social services Volden 97

JDI 11 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Federal Modeling

JDI 12 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Bioethics / Medical Research

JDI 13 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

JDI 14 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Health Care

State action on health care is modeled by the federal government Burke 7

JDI 15 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

JDI 16 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Native Americans

JDI 17 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Environmental Justice / Urban Renewal

Local control is better for achieving environmental justice Morello-Frosch 2

JDI 18 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

grants remain quite fluid and flexible policy too.

Education is explicitly a state power McConki 96

JDI 19 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

JDI 20 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Domestic Violence

All states acknowledge the need to protect victims of violence Hagan 1

State judges have a lower animus Hagan 1

States solve while preserving privacy for women Sullivan 96

JDI 21 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Immigration Services

JDI 22 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Immigration Services

Feds model the states on immigration policy Zimmerman and Tumlin 99

JDI 23 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency School Lunches

States play a leadership role in school food policy Parker 8

JDI 24 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency Employment Policies

Business law is devolved to the states Encyclopedia of Nations 9

Employer compensation is exclusively delegated to the states Bogardus 4

JDI 25 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Homeless services are solved by state funding and initiatives Beirne 87

homeless whose needs can be addressed by normal means, they need

JDI 26 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom

JDI 27 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom

States act against conventional wisdom race-to-the-top Fossett and Gais 2

JDI 28 BMM 2009 States Counterplan Core

*Lopez Counterplan 1nc**