Distinguished Lecture in General Anthropology: The Anthropology of Trouble Author(s): Roy A.

Rappaport Reviewed work(s): Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 95, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 295-303 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/679842 . Accessed: 08/11/2011 18:14
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RoY A. RAPPAPORT

University Michigan,Ann Arbor of

Distinguished Lecture in General Anthropology: The Anthropology of Trouble

as at This essaywas presented theDistinguishedLecturein General Anthropology the 91st Annual Meetingof theAmericanAnthropological 4, Association,December 1992, in San Francisco,California.

I ome. Not all of us, of course. Many of us will, and should, remain in our exotic diaspora. But this repatriation, which has been going on for some time (see Messerschmidt 1981), has been gaining momentum and more and more of us are returning to join those of our colleagues who never left. We should not forget that from Lloyd Warner's time anthropology has always maintained what has been, perhaps paradoxically, an outpost in the society from which it sprang, nor should we forget that much of the work mounted from that outpost has been distinguished. But domestic research has never been valued very highly in our discipline, nor has the application of anthropology to the solution of real world problems. I am advocating the relocation of both engaged and domestic research from anthropology's periphery toward its center. I am not proposing that either engaged or domestic anthropology should claim the center, only that they be less marginal. To move engaged domestic research toward the center of the discipline may be, ipso facto, to move anthropology as a whole toward a more central position in our society's attempts to reflect upon and to deal with its own vexations and agonies-to anthropologize, so to speak, public discourse. If this seems unrealistically ambitious, we should remember that we have succeeded in influencing public discourse before, most notably in our public confrontation with eugenics in the second and third decades of the century. I have already suggested that American anthropology has not been very hospitable to the anthropology of American culture. Tacit in our disciplinary ethos is the view that if you haven't been exposed to malaria, or maybe frostbite, you haven't really been in the field. Further, the view that domestic field research is somehow a contradiction in terms has been expressed in some classic places. Benedict, in TheChrysanthemum the and Sword,asserts: AJapanesewhowritesaboutJapanpassesoverreallycrucialthingswhichare asfamiliarto him as the air he breathes.So do Americanswhen theywriteaboutAmerica.[1946:7] There is something to say for this position, but not much. It assumes, among other things, that American anthropologists are really at home in America and that America is culturally homogeneous. The anthropology of the familiar does have its methodological problems, but they seem to me no more disabling than those attending the anthropology of the strange. Domestic anthropology is one thing, the anthropology of trouble another. The societies in which anthropologists have traditionally worked are at least as beset by difficulties as is America and some of their problems are more immediately life
American 95(2):295-303. Copyright ? 1993, American Anthropological Association. Anthropologist

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threatening, but I am emphasizing domestic difficulties for two reasons. First, while it would be an exaggeration to claim that all of the difficulties besetting the societies we have generally studied are to be accounted for by what goes on in the United States and other "core"or "metropole" societies, no place is any longer isolated from an increasingly coherent world system and the United States, Western Europe, and Japan dominate that system. Difficulties in core societies generate difficulties in what are called "satellite,""preindustrial,"or "developing" societies or societies of the periphery. All of this is to say that in an increasingly coherent world the troubles of our own society are more generative of difficulties in others than are troubles originating elsewhere, and their understanding and amelioration are, therefore, more strategic, or at least it can be so argued. The second ground for privileging domestic difficulties has to do with our obviously complex relationship to them. We relate to them not only as anthropologists but as subjects. These are our problems and, whether or not we find them theoretically interesting, we do have a living interest in them and in their amelioration. Inasmuch as our lives are affected by them and inasmuch as we may, by training, be equipped to contribute to their amelioration, it seems reasonable to address them professionally. Caveats are, however, in order. We know, better than anyone else, that although we probably do have some useful things to say about domestic disorders and their correction, no deep salvific truths have been vouchsafed to us alone. Modesty surely becomes us because we have quite a bit to be modest about. Appropriate modesty leads to another point that I don't think anthropologists have thought about very much, namely that the benefits of engagement with society's social problems are reciprocal. Grappling with contemporary difficulties may not only help society to enlarge its understandings of its own difficulties but may also enlarge anthropological theory and method. We have at least as much to gain from engagement as we have to give. In fact we have already gained a great deal. It would be too much to say that our discipline has as yet been transformed by its recently emphasized concerns with matters as problematic to society as gender oppression, ethnic identity, cultural pluralism, class, and inequality, but it has, to say the least, been deeply affected by them. This is to say that the stuff of an engaged anthropology, its subject matter, already has moved toward the center of the discipline, and it is important to recognize where we already are in this regard. I say "the stuff of an engaged anthropology" and not engaged anthropology, per se, has moved toward the center of the discipline. This obviously brings up questions concerning what I mean by "engagement." Am I talking about anything new and different? Applied anthropology has been around since the early 1930s, and a few years ago Marcus and Fischer (1986) made explicit, discussed, and reformulated anthropology's classic but tacit office as critic of our own culture. I think I mean something a bit different from either but closely related to both. as Appliedanthropology, I understand the term, designates analyses of particular human situations, or processes for the purposes of comprehending their causes, problems, dynamics, and consequences and, in some instances, for developing courses of action designed to affect those situations or processes such that they are brought into conformity with someone's goals or values, neither the someone nor the values always being made explicit. Although it isn't always the case, it is usual for that which is taken to be problematic to be stipulated in a document called a "Request for Proposals" (RFP) by a client, usually a government agency, whose frame of reference is often, if not usually, not anthropological. Anthropologists and others respond to RFPsand there are, in the nature of things, what economists call "disincentives" discouraging responders from taking issue with clients' conceptions of the problem: their proposals are in competition with others. Not all applied anthropology is done under contract, of course, but when it is, anthropological understandings, such as they may be, of the problematic nature of what constitutes problems, and thus how to conceptualize any particular problem, are not always or even usually given expression. Whatever values motivate or guide the

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study are not necessarily the anthropologist's, usually remain inexplicit, and are sometimes even covert. Marcus and Fischer's conception of cultural critique, as I understand it, contrasts with applied anthropology most radically in the matter of action, which is simply not what they are talking about. There is, however, a less obvious difference. Their cultural critique, perhaps to push it beyond where they may be willing to go, would reject nonanthropological (e.g., economic) formulations of problems and their nature, but would, rather, subject the difficulties our society is facing to anthropologically derived understandings. Whereas prevailing values may constitute objects of cultural critiques, Marcus and Fischer (1986:167) propose that the aim of the enterprise is not the promulgation of any particular value but the "empirical exploration of the historical and cultural conditions for the articulation and implementation of different values." The engaged anthropology that I am advocating resembles Marcus and Fischer's conception of cultural critique in that it would attempt to comprehend contemporary difficulties in anthropologically derived terms but would resemble applied anthropology in attempting to develop programs for correcting them. Two points need to be noted. First, although I may sympathize with Marcus and Fischer's advocacy of valueneutrality, I do not believe it is possible to achieve. It may be easy enough to distinguish analyses of values from their promulgation logically, but it may not be possible to keep them separate in practice. To publish critiques of institutions or values in the society in which they prevail is, almost unavoidably, to support or subvert them. Several points follow. First,we must examine our own values and make them, so far as they are relevant, explicit. Second, we must recognize that anthropology is not equally well guided by any and all values. Those that are appropriate must be of sufficiently high generality to avoid subordination to any particular social or political agenda or party. The aim is to anthropologize social and political discourse, not to politicize anthropology. Third, increasing distance from value-neutrality increases responsibility for precise, accurate, and well-grounded accounts. They need to stand up not only to critical reviewers but also to hostile lawyers. If we are to engage the difficulties our own society faces, we need to develop conceptions of what it is that constitutes "troubles,"to use as neutral a term as possible, and how they are to be recognized. I say "conceptions" because different conceptions provide different but not necessarily conflicting understandings. Contrary to certain postmodern dicta, I am all for explicit, totalizing conceptions here, so long as we understand that no totalizing conception provides us with anything like total or even adequate knowledge. An aspect of any totalizing formulation is that it is in some sense holistic. It seems to me that any adequate understanding of the contemporary situation and any adequate theory for correcting its ills must be holistic or systemic, for we are facing such a multiplicity of quandaries, dilemmas, crises, inequities, iniquities, dangers, and stresses ranging from substance abuse, homelessness, teenage pregnancy, and prevalence of stress disease among minorities to global warming and ozone depletion that they cannot all be named, much less studied. Substantively labeled troubles are literally innumerable, but it may be that they are in large measure generated by a rather limited family of formal disorders, to a discussion of which I will return. It may be an epistemological mistake to give our troubles substantive names, for to do so is to reify them and to set them up for the corrective approach dear to American hearts called "problem-solving,"which is likely to set more problems than it solves by ripping aspects of complex systems out of their contexts. Naming also tends to blur the distinction between symptoms, such as widespread substance abuse, teenage homicide, and, teenage pregnancy, and underlying disorders that generate such symptoms, for instance poverty or, at a yet deeper level, whatever it is that generates and perpetuates that poverty. Such labeling can lead to inappropriate ameliorative action, and it is obvious that ineffective solutions, such as the distribution of free condoms in high

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schools to reduce the prevalence of both AIDS and teenage pregnancy without changing the social conditions that lead some girls to choose motherhood as a solution to what theyfeel are their problems, are not only ineffective but downright destructive. If girls get pregnant after they have been generously provided free condoms by outsiders worried about a burgeoning underclass, they are likely to be regarded as essentially depraved by the judgmental and as inadequately socialized by the liberal. These attitudes, needless to say, may have political and economic consequences. All of this is to say that, not only do we confuse symptoms with disorders-the social analogues of rashes and fevers with viruses-but attempts at cure frequently cause further problems, something like what doctors mean by "iatrogenic disorders," disorders caused by attempts to cure. Or, perhaps they are social analogues of neurosis, a neurosis being a habit formation that relieves anxiety while protecting the underlying cause of the anxiety. For instance, I was once consultant to a county bureau of substance abuse that dispensed large sums of money to a variety of agencies running programs to keep addicts relatively comfortable on methadone, away from such mischief as armed robbery, and generally out of the public's sight. The effect of all of this was, of course, to keep the county safe for drug dealers and users, and to keep a large substance-abuse bureaucracy employed. It is safe to say that the recognition and definition of social disorders is undertheorized in anthropology. We may note in passing that one of anthropology's core values, cultural relativism, may tend to make us wary about formulating general conceptions of prob lems or disorders. But this is not the case in all of the other social and behavioral sciences. It will be helpful, in formulating ideas of our own, to look briefly at certain practices in economics, a discipline of interest here not only because it has the most fully developed conceptions but also because it supplies the society with its dominant social discourse. Moreover, it is precisely because it is socially empowered that elements of its method and theory may, when inappropriately applied, contribute to serious social, political, and ecological disruption. It is, for example, usual for economists to use cost-benefit analyses and projections of comparative cost-effectiveness in their identification and evaluation of symptoms, disorders, and solutions. Such methods require the application of common metrics, usually monetary, to wide ranges of disparate things. Thus, for purposes of assessing compensation for maritime oil spills, monetary values have been assigned to the various constituents of marine ecosystems (including noncommercial species, on the grounds that commercial species feed on them). This seems a reasonable procedure for fixing the amounts that polluters should pay for the damage they do, but two related issues are raised here. First, it is obvious to anthropologists that not all social and ecological problems can be adequately characterized or described in quantitative, let alone monetary, terms. For example, during a visit to Bristol Bay,Alaska, shortly after the Exxon Valdez catastrophe in 1989, a National Academy of Science panel on which I was serving was continually told by Yupik-speaking Native Americans that an oil spill of similar magnitude in their vicinity would be even more devastating because their coast, in contrast to that of Prince William Sound, was in wetlands harboring hatcheries of the fish upon which they depended. Pollution of their hatcheries by oil, they plausibly claimed, would destroy them. Whereas they could be compensated for the loss of their commercial fishery, they could not for the loss of their subsistence fishery. Yupik culture, they said, is now mainly reproduced through teaching subsistence activities to the young in summer fishing camps. The destruction of the fishery would therefore destroy Yupik culture, for which, they said, no compensation could be reckoned. Cultures are, as we say,priceless. More generally, many of the things humans take to be most important are, in their nature, beyond the reach of quantification. Ask a senator how much his vote is worth. The very question is corrosive and even asking it is, under certain circumstances, criminal. The second issue is less anthropocentric, more general, and even, perhaps, the heart of the matter. The world upon which the monetary metric is imposed is not as simple

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as the metric itself. Plants, animals, and societies are complex beyond full human comprehension. To remain healthy, each requires a great variety of distinctmaterials, generally derived from a variety of sources. As the experiences of mariners voyaging before the mid-19th century attested, humans can stuff themselves with protein-rich foods, but if they don't get vitamin C their teeth will fall out. Monetization, however, forces the great range of unique and distinct materials and processes that together sustain or even constitute life into an arbitrary and specious equivalence. Phenomena that relate to each other essentiallyin terms of their qualitative distinctiveness are represented and understood in terms of a logic that reducesall qualitativedistinctionsto a merequantitativedifferences, logic that, as it were, attempts to "bottom line" the world. This logic is especially destructive of ecological systems. It is in accordance with it to rip the top off a complex system like West Virginia to get at one simple substance, coal, particularly when environmental damage can be ignored as an "externality." This discussion is not meant to be a critique of capitalism or of human greed or even a summacontraeconomics. That certain forms of analysis popular in that discipline are not properly applicable to biological systems, and that they are devoid of cultural sensitivity, does not invalidate them in any absolute way. No mode of analysis can properly claim universal applicability. The criticism here is not of all uses of monetary metrics or all forms of economic analysis but of their privileged status. Economics' undoubted analytic capacities would be less "useful"but more helpful if the discipline were not so influential that it leaves little room for other discourses. Its excessive empowerment makes it part of the problem rather than part of the cure. We have been considering incompatibilities between discourses, in this instance one economic and the other broadly biological, and we may, therefore, be tempted to take such incompatibilities to constitute an underlying disorder in the deeper sense mentioned earlier, namely one that generates such symptoms as various forms of ecological disruption. But this would be a mistake. Such inconsistencies by themselves cannot be considered disorders, for the world is full of distinct kinds of things and processes, each conforming to laws and logics in some degree distinctive, none valid in more than a limited domain. But even so, how, in the example at hand, is the relationship between economic discourse and biological discourse to be conceived? Are these discourses simply and straightforwardly competitive? Are we supposed to do something eclectic with them? Or are there principles in terms of which we can "put them in order," that is, decide that one takes precedence, or is superordinate to, the other. I believe that, in the case at hand, a simple principle, at once logical and substantive, pertains. It is that of contingency. The existence of any and all cultural systems is contingent upon biological-ecological systems, but the converse is obviously not the case. Organisms appeared billions of years before economic systems, which emerged only recently in one primate species, plausibly-at least initially-as part of that line's species-specific means for fulfilling its biological functions. That is, the relationship of the economic to the biological-ecological is a relationship of the instrumental to the fundamental. It is, at the same time, a relationship of the conventional, the rules of which are relatively easy to modify, to the natural, the laws of which are virtually inflexible. Implicit in this account is, of course, a guide to environmental and social policy: Life comes first. More important, we have identified a common form of deep disorder, the subordinationof thefundamental to the contingentand instrumental. This deformation of what may be called "The order of viability"underlies such processes as ozone depletion: the use of aerosols seemingly takes precedence over the need to screen organisms from overexposure to ultraviolet radiation. It is a ubiquitous form, producing political and social as well as biotic and ecosystemic symptoms. Two observations are in order. First, when we speak of the subordination of the fundamental to the contingent, of giving higher valuation to aerosols than to ozone, we are speaking of values and their disordering. Such an assertion may violate anthropol-

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ogy's own value of cultural relativism. If so, cultural relativism requires some reevaluation. Second, these values are obviously not free-floating in society but are held and promulgated by particular institutions, interest groups, sectors, classes, and individuals, all of which are differentially powerful--even more so as a concomitant of technical and sociocultural evolution. It therefore becomes increasingly possible for ever-more narrowly defined interests to become regnant in larger socioeconomic systems, for, this is to say,the contingent and instrumental to claim the status of the fundamental. President Coolidge couldn't have said it better when he proclaimed, "The business of America is business." Business, in such a formulation, usurps the place of, or claims to realize, the "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" for which this society represents itself to itself to have been established. The instrumental, in claiming the place of the fundamental, degrades fundamental value to the status of mystifying ideology at the same time that it generates social injustice, urban turbulence, savings and loan disasters, and environmental degradation and, further, reduces the capacity of social systems to deal with such troubles as they emerge. Witness the ability of the Council on Competitiveness to impede adaptive responses to ozone depletion and global warming at the United Nations conference in Rio deJaneiro. This general discussion might suggest that the disordering of contingency relations and the usurpation of the status of the fundamental by the instrumental-or what amounts to the same thing, the elevation to and representation of the narrow and special interests of particular subsystems of society to the status of society's basic values-are intrinsic to unbridled capitalism. I believe this to be the case, but it would be a mistake to think that it is exclusive to capitalism. A formally similar sort of error concerning birth control has cost the Catholic Church both membership and authority in recent decades by attributing a degree of sanctity comparable to that of the Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to specific rules concerning nonimmaculate nonconception (see Kung 1971). More important, it also must be recognized that few if any socialist countries seem to have done any better in avoiding this form of maladaptation than have we. I have used the term maladaptation. take it to refer not to such symptoms as substance I abuse or ozone depletion or even to the political, economic, or cultural processes that seem to be such symptoms' proximate causes. "Maladaptation"in the usage denotes those disorderings of structure that in their nature both generate troubles and impede the capacities of social systems to respond adaptively to them (for more detailed discussions, see Rappaport 1977 or 1979). Adaptive responses are those that correct or ameliorate the troubles afflicting a system such that it can persist sufficiently unburdened to continue to respond adequately to the unforeseeable stresses by which all systems are continually faced. Violation of contingency relations is only one form of maladaptation. There are others. They include overspecialization subsystems, which, when geographically exof can turn whole countries into mono-crop plantations, a trend that reduces local pressed, political autonomy and economic self-sufficiency and is environmentally degrading. This form is likely to be accompanied by overcentralization, condition in which the a regulatory functions of local systems are replaced by increasingly remote centralized regulators, responding directly to changes in increasingly aggregated and simplified variables, such as monetary values, which are decreasingly sensitive to the particulars of the systems being regulated. Aspects of the loss of information entailed in overcentralization are likely to include decreased ability to detect signs of environmental degradation in its early stages, and the use of inappropriate valuesin governance, for instance, reference using economic reference values in the governance of political, social, and ecological processes. Institutional deafness,the unwillingness or inability of authorities to understand messages encoded in terms other than those of the dominant economic discourse, is related. The responses, or lack thereof, of the Bush administration to international concern about ozone depletion, global warming, and biodiversity provide instances.

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in Another form, hypercoherence,which the increasingly tight integration of ever-more inclusive systems makes it increasingly likely that disruptions originating anywhere will quickly spread everywhere, is also related, as is a structural distortion I have labeled The complexity and power of global processes maldistribution organization. hierarchical of increase at the expense of local and regional systems, which then lose autonomy and self-sufficiency, reducing thereby the stability and resilience of the world system as a whole. I would suggest that these and a very few other such structural anomalies can account for a multiplicity of the innumerable symptoms from which our society suffers. This brief account of maladaptation is schematic, tentative, and, in some respects, no doubt erroneous, but it is probably not totally off the mark. It is surely the case that no social system is, or ever has been, totally free of what I am designating "maladaptive forms," but the formulation is meant to be normative rather than descriptive. As such, it represents an attempt to provide a standard model of relations against which actual states of affairs can be judged. It is thus meant to serve, first, as a means for recognizing dis-eases, that is, structural disorders underlying symptoms; second, as a ground for critiques of policies and programs; and, third, as a rationale for corrective programs. It tacitly asserts that the goals of corrective programs should, in broadest terms, be to preserve adaptive relations in human socioecological systems and to restore adaptiveness to systems deformed by maladaptations. Flannery many years ago (1972) suggested that such correction may include the sorts of structural transformations that we think of as revolutionary or evolutionary. This general conception of adaptation and maladaptation may seem alien to cultural anthropologists come of age in traditions in which the interpretation of cultural particularities has been elevated to the status of ultimate value. The "macroanthropological" formulation represented here seems to bear closer resemblance to political economy, to some forms of ecological anthropology, and to a good deal of theorizing in archeology (e.g., Flannery 1972), biological anthropology, and biology (Bateson 1972[ 1963]; Slobodkin and Rapoport 1974). It is not, however, in any way antagonistic to interpretive anthropology; indeed, interpretation is central to it, given the central place it proposes for meaning, information, and value. The concepts of adaptation and maladaptation are not exclusive to anthropology, of course, but the emphasis placed upon information, value, and meaning distinguishes the approach outlined here from other systemic models and identifies it as essentially anthropological. It not only has room for the "microanthropology" of interpretive ethnology, but privileges it. Ethnography is crucial in a world in which the domination of privileged discourse, amplified by increasingly concentrated mass media, threatens to make other discourses inaudible or unintelligible. It follows that an important first step in rectifying disorders in relations between and among discourses is to make all of them intelligible and audible. Anthropology has had as one of its central goals since its inception making the understandings of others comprehensible, and anthropology, because of its emphasis on participation as well as observation, remains the social science best equipped to be useful in this respect. An important point must be made here. It is one thing to make a discourse intelligible and quite another to make it audible.To publish a monograph on the plight of some "Other"is seldom if ever sufficiently audible to call attention to the conditions afflicting the subjects. Anthropologists need to give thought to a deep theoretical as well as practical problem: how is information concerning the troubles of a system to be introduced into that system in ways that will help to avoid, ameliorate, or correct those troubles rather than to exacerbate them? In sum, an anthropological approach to correction would have several features. First, it would be built upon one or more general conceptions of disorder or dis-ease. The formulation offered here features the related notions of adaptive structure and maladaptive deformity, but I make no claim for the preeminence of these conceptions.

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Second, this "macroanthropological" conception relies upon "microanthropological" research, which is as much interpretive as it is material in orientation. It aims, among other things, to grasp people's understandings of the difficulties they are facing and to help those people make those understandings explicit to themselves and intelligible and audible to others. Third, our discussion of maladaptive forms suggests that other things being equal corrective action at less inclusive levels is preferable to intrusive programs imposed by remote central regulators. Corrective programs planned and undertaken by local people guided by local knowledge are likely to be more effective not only because more nuanced, culturally sensitive, and less disruptive than centralized programs operating in terms of highly aggregated and simplified information, but also because they strengthen rather than undermine local institutions and are thus empowering. To use a medical analogy, the approach has more in common with homeopathic than with modem medicine. That is, instead of attempting to correct disorders as understood by outsiders through programs imposed on local systems, the intention is to strengthen whatever capacities local systems have to correct themselves of disorders they themselves experience. This implies that one of the aims of ethnographic research on disorders is to identify indigenous institutions or processes the strengthening or support of which can lead to culturally appropriate as well as substantively effective corrective programs. Fourth, please note the italicized phrase, "other things being equal," under point three. Our discussion of maladaptive forms suggests that some subsystems, particularly industrial corporations and transnational conglomerates, enjoy greater autonomy than their special nature and special interest warrant. If "whatis good for General Motors" is to be kept from usurping the status of "whatis good for America," the autonomy of General Motors may have to be limited. Viable relations among autonomy, self-sufficiency, and instrumentality is an area requiring research. Fifth, it follows from all the above that the role of an engaged anthropology is not confined to research but also necessarily includes planning, advocacy, and information dissemination as well as continuing development of more refined theories of disorder and correction. Responsible anthropologists may, understandably, be reluctant to move from more traditional stances with respect to public affairs to the engagement I have been advocating, which may seem to them arrogant and even dangerous. We must be modest, and modesty must breed both caution and rigor. But we should not forget that we are citizens as well as anthropologists. We should not, any more than anyone else, stay out of public arenas or check our professional modes of understanding when we enter them, nor should we forget that public approaches to public problems are now informed by views of the world, its ills, and ways to cure its ills provided by other, narrower disciplines no better founded than our own, and considerably less humane. Notes I acknowledge with thankshelpfulsuggestionsmade on a draftof this paper Acknowledgments. A versionof the paperwill appearas by RobertLevyand AndreaSankar. much more elaborated of MichiganPress.
a conclusion to DiagnosingAmerica,edited by Shepard Forman, to be published by the University

RoyA. RAPPAPORT the Professorfor Studyof Human Understanding, of Department Anthropology, University is Walgreen MI of Michigan,Ann Arbor, 48109.

References Cited Bateson,Gregory 1972[1963] The Role of SomaticChange in Evolution.In Steps to an Ecologyof Mind. Pp. Ballantine. 346-363. NewYork:

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Benedict, Ruth 1946 The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns ofJapanese Culture. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Flannery, Kent 1972 The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 3:399-426. Kung, Hans 1971 Infallible? An Inquiry. Edward Quinn, trans. Garden City, NY:Doubleday. Marcus, George E., and Michael M.J. Fischer 1986 Anthropology as Cultural Critique. An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Messerschmidt, Donald A. 1981 Anthropologists at Home in North America: Methods and Issues in the Study of One's Own Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rappaport, Roy A. 1977 Maladaptation in Social Systems. In Evolution in Social Systems. J. Friedman and M. Rowlands, eds. Pp. 49-71. London: Duckworth. 1979 Adaptive Structure and Its Disorders. In Ecology, Meaning and Religion. Pp. 145-172. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books. Slobodkin, L., and A. Rapoport 1974 An Optimal Strategy of Evolution. Quarterly Review of Biology 49:181-200.